AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NAMIBIAN DEFENCE
FORCE SUCCESSION PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF THE DEFENCE
HEADQUARTERS, WINDHOEK

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ABSTRACT

This study investigated into the effectiveness of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) succession planning using the case study of the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek. It is worth mentioning that the NDF was established by unifying and integrating two opposing forces of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF) in 1990.

Although the NDF started with the process of rejuvenating the force since 1996, only less than 10% of young officers have made it into management positions in the entire NDF making it to be confronted with the challenge of the aging force, especially at the level of officers’ corps in management. It was against this background that this study investigated the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning.

The study used mixed methods, which are the qualitative and quantitative methods. The study found out that the NDF does not have a clear succession planning policy in place and it appeared to have made it difficult for management to implement effective succession planning because there was no clear guide. The system of succession which is an inbuilt mechanism within the NDF structure was ineffective because it was not applied consistently at all levels of defence structure.

The study also revealed that some of the NDF young officers who were recruited from 1996 onward appeared not to be ready to take over from the retiring generation because they did not complete all the required military courses. The study recommended the NDF to develop, approve and operationalise its succession planning policy that would serve as a guide for workforce planning and staffing. It was also recommended for the NDF succession planning policy to be integrated with recruitment, retention, training and development, posting and promotion.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all the members of the Namibian Defence Force, men and women in uniform who are charged with the responsibility of defending Namibia, its people and their valued properties. They are the fortress of the territorial land, air space and ocean of the country.
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This research wouldn’t have reached this stage without your assistance and I’m proud of you all. God bless.
DECLARATION

I, Gideon Shuuya, hereby declare that this study is a true reflection of my own research, and that this work, or part thereof, has not been submitted for a degree in any other institution of higher education.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SPSS : Statistical Package for Social Science

MOD : Ministry of Defence

NDF : Namibian Defence Force

PLAN : People’s Liberation Army of Namibia

SWATF : South West Africa Territorial Force

CDF : Chief of the Defence Force

COS : Chief of Staff

CEO : Chief Executive Officer

DAC : Direction, Alignment and Commitment

NDC : National Defence College

HR : Human Resources
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction and background of the study

After independence, the establishment of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was among the priority agenda for the Government of the Republic of Namibia. Chapter 15, Article 115 of the Namibian Constitution makes provision for the establishment of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), making this formation an instrument of power to fulfil the political will of the government (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990).

Furthermore, the National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia passed the Defence Act (Act 20 of 1990 as amended), which provides for the establishment of the NDF with its prescribed composition, powers, duties, and procedures with the mandate of defending the territorial integrity and national interests of Namibia. This Statutory Act, therefore, makes provision for the NDF to be under the political control of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The President is the Commander–in–Chief of the NDF, and he/she is vested with necessary powers to exercise his/her constitutional functions in relations to the management and strategic operations of the NDF. It is worth mentioning that the NDF was established by unifying and integrating two opposing forces of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF) (Ministry of Defence, 2002).

However, according to Ndjoba (2010) the integration process resulted in the Defence Force saturated with members of different age groups with various levels of competences and military attributes due to their diverse military background and orientations. In addition, the integration of the two opposing forces resulted in the NDF attracting more former combatants both from PLAN
and SWATF to take up commanding and leadership positions at that time. However, most of these officers were close to their retirement ages.

The Public Service Act No 13, of 1995 and regulations are also applicable to the members of the NDF and it provides for the retirement at the age of 60 years across all civil service (Office of the Prime Minister, 1995). This Act had implications on the NDF composition because although some members were young in 1990s, the NDF needed to be reinforced with young members constantly through succession planning to sustain the force and to prepare young officers to take over once the old officers have retired.

It was on this basis that the NDF management embarked on the force rejuvenation process by recruiting and inducting young Namibians into the force as an initial phase for succession planning. The process commenced in 1996 where the first crop of young Namibians were recruited and inducted into the NDF to join the former combatants who were drawn from both PLAN and SWATF. It appeared that, although the process commenced in 1996, only less than 10% of young members have made it into management positions in the entire NDF (Ministry of Defence, 2016). It was against this background that this study investigated the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning.
1.2. Statement of the problem

The NDF was confronted with a challenge of the aging force, especially at the level of officers’ corps in management. Although the challenge was anticipated well in advance, and resulted in an ongoing process of recruitment and induction of young members since 1996, it appeared that little progress (less than 10%) has been made for young officers to take up management positions in the NDF. This was despite much resources and efforts that have been spent on human resource development, career progression training and the education of these young officers (Ministry of Defence, 2016). It was against this background that the effectiveness of the NDF succession plan was worth investigating.

1.3. Research questions

The study focused on the following research questions:

a) What was the strategies of training and posting young officers in the NDF?

b) How effective were these strategies?

c) What were the weaknesses of the NDF succession plan?

d) Were the young officers correctly deployed to maintain national security after retirement of the current management?

1.4. Significance of the study

The study will contribute to the academic body of knowledge of security and strategic studies by providing the well-researched and verified information about the succession planning of the NDF. In addition, the findings of the study will be resourceful to the MOD and the NDF management, as it would provide appropriate recommendations on how they can effectively address the challenges surrounding their succession planning. Furthermore, Human Resource Practitioners
may benefit by using the findings to plan, develop, and implement the appropriate evaluation system for their respective succession planning. Moreover, the outcome of the study could be valuable to other institutions, especially in the security sector, that are confronted with the same challenge. The research findings could also provide professional values and inform the formulation of appropriate policies that are meant to solve the challenges of succession planning.

1.5. Limitations of the study

The study was confronted by a number of limitations that might have compromised the appropriate representation and accuracy of the findings. Firstly, the study relied on the perceptions of the key selected respondents from the Defence Headquarters who had their own personal bias. The study was also constrained by the military bureaucratic process, as a result, the interviews with the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Chief of Staff (COS) Joint Operations could not be fixed although their Secretaries and Military Assistants were approached two months in advance. In addition, the study was constrained in a sense that some respondents were not free to reveal some official information due to its security nature.

1.6. Conclusion

Chapter one discussed the rationale behind the investigation into the effectiveness of succession planning in the NDF, using the case study of the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek. The chapter reviewed the background of the establishment of the NDF through the provision of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia and the Defence Act. The chapter further discussed the statement of the problem, research questions, significance of the study as well as the limitation of the study, and conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Succession planning is a human resource function that has been neglected, especially in the public sector; however, with the increasing demand of service delivery, succession planning is becoming commonly discussed in the public sector because most of the institutions are realising the danger of not having adequate succession plans and mechanisms in place when experienced executives retire. Helton and Jackson (2007) defined succession planning in its most basic form as a process of identifying future leaders. Helton and Jackson further stated that succession planning is squarely rooted in human capital strategy as an intentional process of ensuring leadership continuity in key positions, retain and develop intellectual capital and knowledge capital for the future, and encourage individual advancement.

Johansen (2012) stated that it may be challenging for some leaders to think about the future, more particularly when they are overwhelmed by the present. Surprisingly, when the present becomes unbearable, foresight becomes most useful. Johansen further explained that the most important reason for appropriate succession planning is that institutions rely on staff members to carry out the missions, provide services, and to meet the goals of the organisation; however, they pay little attention on what would happen to the constant provision of services and the ability to fulfil the mission if a key staff member leaves the institution.

Charan et al. (2001) stated that succession planning is critical as it provides an opportunity for the institution to identify and fill the pipeline with high performing people to ensure that every leadership level has an abundance of these performers to draw from now and in the future. The
focus should be on high performance, which will be the admission price for future growth and development. Charan et al. further suggested that institutions should invest more on human resource development for the organisational stability and sustainability, in order to ensure that there is an established process to meet staffing requirements.

Strategic succession planning may ensure that when vacancies in senior or key positions occur, there may always be a pool of well mentored members readily available to fill the positions. It may further help the young managers interested in moving up the corporate ladder to have adequate skills and experience required because they have been adequately mentored (Reeves, 2010). Careful succession planning helps the organisation to manage the changes that result from a generational transfer of leadership, as well as the ongoing changes that occur regularly when key employees leave an organisation (Rothwell et al. 2005).

This chapter, therefore, encapsulated various literature around succession planning, replacement planning, succession management, and succession planning in the public sector as part of the theoretical framework of this study. The chapter further explored the models of succession planning, implications of notifying internal successors, measuring the value and success of succession planning, as well as the realism theory in relations to succession planning in the military.

2.2. Definition of succession planning

Succession planning has been among the top priority agenda of most of the Accounting Officers in both public and private institutions, due to the fact that when experienced members leave the institution through retirement, resignation, or sometimes death, they do not only take with them the capacity to do the work, but all the wealth of accumulated experience as well (Rothwell, 2010).
This situation is likely to happen at all level and functional areas of operations in an institution, so some institutions such as the Namibian Defence Force amongst others have already felt the effects of talent loss resulting from massive retirement of experienced members.

Rothwell further defined succession planning as a deliberate and systematic effort by an institution to ensure leadership continuity in key positions, to retain and develop intellectuals and knowledge capital for the future, and to encourage individual advancement. It is a proactive engagement that is mostly confused with replacement planning, which is a form of risk management and it is more limited in scope and reactive. Succession planning is about preparing people for promotion and to climb the corporate ladder of the organisational chart in order to assume higher level management responsibilities. Dodd and Simons (2005) stated that succession planning is not just for what-if scenarios; but it is rather a thorough process designed to ensure the continued and effective performance of an institution by planning for the development and replacement of key people when the need arises.

Johansen (2012) referred to succession planning using the analogy of the slogan “I have seen the future” to emphasise that leaders in the world are entrusted to create the future for all human kind. Johansen clarified that making the future begins with listening, however, the biggest danger lies when an institution is caught off guard, losing experienced members who have leadership skills and possess special knowledge about the way past decisions have been made and why. The loss of such institutional memory may only be avoided if the institution is prepared for change. Thus, the best way to prepare the appropriate succession planning is to listen 10 years ahead. Johansen further stated that leaders of the current generation should migrate from the slogan “I have seen the future” to “I am making the future”, because the future must not only be thought about; it ought to be created today.
Jarrell and Pewitt (2007) stated that succession planning is framed around visionary thinking and forecast that allow the succession planner to make better decisions in the present. Leaders who can make better decision at present for the benefit of the future in relations to succession planning will need to have vision, understanding, clarity, and agility. The strategy is to listen ahead with a clear foresight, but one has to listen through an awful noise of present events. Ringo & Lesser (2007) stated that leaders who craft succession planning strategy need to see through messes and contradictions, to foresee the future that others may not see, and to find direction in the midst of confusion of current circumstances. Ringo & Lesser further asserted that it requires a clear direction, alignment, and commitment from leaders across the board.

Similarly, Gay and Sims (2006) stated that succession planning is one of the strategies that can be employed to manage talents and align people with organisational goals. The most important change for an institution is to shift from the ‘one-to-one’ replacement mapping, and move into an approach of creating a pool of future leaders who are capable of meeting the succession needs of the organisation. Gay and Sims explained that there are two ways to acquire talent, namely: to develop the talent internally, which is a traditional focus of succession, and to recruit talent from outside the institution; however, some work is too specialised, making it difficult to hire from outside the organisation, like in the case of the Namibian Defence Force.

The succession planning approach was further reinforced by Rothwell et al. (2005) who asserted that succession planning may help the organisation in a sense that if positions become vacant, either planned or unplanned, the organisation will look into its talent pool for successors who are properly groomed and mentored, and can immediately step into the positions. Rothwell et al. further stated that succession planning forms the basis of communicating career paths, establishing
development and training plans, establishing career paths and individual job moves, and creating a more comprehensive human resource planning system.

2.3. Distinction between succession planning, replacement planning and succession management

The term succession planning has been traditionally referred to as planning for top-level leadership continuity, but it has recently evolved to mean planning for leadership continuity at all levels even those that are far below senior leadership (Cooke, 1995).

While succession planning is mostly associated with the robust exercise that includes activities such as defining development plan for each successor, to identify competency gaps the successor needs to develop in order to be prepared to move into the role they have been identified for, and identifying successors for future leadership roles that will be needed; replacement planning is considered to be a simplest form of succession planning (Gay and Sims 2006).

Gay and Sims defined replacement planning as a process of identifying potential replacement of candidates for current incumbent leaders; it is referred to as a basic level of succession planning that does not take into account the identification of future leadership position, future leadership pools, successor competency gaps, and capacity development needs amongst others. Replacement planning is attributed to the replacement of incumbent who are expected to retire or move on to other roles, and successor are brought in as a quick fix to take their places at that time.

On the other hand, Rothwell (2010) referred to replacement planning as a reactive engagement, which is a form of risk management, more limited in scope that is mostly exercised by institutions that are caught off-guard by a high tides of members, leaving an institution through retirement and resignation amongst others. It should, however, be noted that replacement planning may be a solid
first step as an organisation implements a talent management strategy for the first time. Over time, replacement planning may evolve into a more robust succession management strategy.

Succession management focuses on the management and a constant development of strong leadership teams for strategic tasks, rather than focusing on the right person for the right position at the right time (Leibman et al. 1996). This focus means that succession management helps succession planning to survive, to be effective, and to be consistent. Kim (2006) stated that in order for succession planning to function effectively and appropriately in today’s dynamic environment, a much more active strategy characterised by succession management is needed and its emphasis should be ongoing, focusing on integrated processes. It must focus on the process that helps institutions to manage the workforce to ensure that they have sufficient, capable, and experienced members to fill senior management and executive positions (Byham et al. 2002).

Succession management and planning are most often used interchangeably, but they are different. The former focuses on institutional efforts to ensure the continued effective performance of an organisation by making provisions for the development and replacement of key people who leave the institution as a result of retirement, resignation and or death amongst others. However, the latter goes a step further to be more comprehensive as opposed to succession planning, because it is a thoughtful and systematic action plan by an institution to manage and encourage individual advancement, and to ensure continuity in key positions, including management, technical, and professional specialist roles (Kim, 2006).

2.4. Succession planning in the Public Sector

The public sector in the contemporary world is challenged by numbers of social, and economic issues such as limited resources and aging workforce amongst others (Jarrell and Pewitt, 2007). In the study about state employees conducted by Carroll and Moss (2002) predicted that by 2006
state governments could lose over 30% of their total workforces, leading to a significant erosion in institutional knowledge and expertise.

The study on linking employees’ assessments to succession planning by Kim (2003) estimated that some public institutions will lose between 40% - 50% of their workforces, resulting in the retention of staff members with fewer than 15 years of experience, as well as large numbers of employees slated to retire within 15 years. Succession planning was hardly conducted in public institution for numbers of reasons. Politicians for example, were reluctant to engage themselves into succession planning issues because they felt it is beyond their scope of work. They lacked information on how to manage succession planning while human resources practitioners were reluctant to challenge their own system (Green, 2000).

However, the value of succession planning in the public institutions is increasingly reaping fruits as it is currently treated as a top priority agenda in order to meet the most critical goal of the institution and to deliver the required public service (Kiyonaga, 2004). Leaders of the public institution are becoming aware that their respective institutions must be proactive in anticipating, influencing and managing the forces that impact their ability to remain effective and relevant. This means they have to effectively manage their human resource capabilities by matching their human resource requirements with the demand of the external environment and the need of their institutions (Pynes, 2004).

Public institutions are required not to focus on individual employees, but rather on integrating human resources into their institutional strategy in terms of succession planning. Succession planning in the public sector is linked to the strategic plan that guide the institution through future challenges, meet the demand of the public, and address the strength and weakness of the institution (Cohn et al. 2005). It is an ongoing undertaking, purposeful and systematic identification of
qualified and appropriate successors to leadership positions. It requires commitment of assessing, developing and investing in institutional leadership to enhance performance, talent development and preparedness (Kim, 2003 and McDonald, 2006). Succession planning in the public sector is now regarded as the business that requires putting the right people on the bus, getting the wrong people off the bus and positioning the right people in the right seats (Michelson, 2006).

Some academics have, however, maintained that the public institutions are ignoring the anticipated leadership crisis which is likely to hit majority of the public institutions (Green, 2000 and Michelson, 2006). This was observed through some public institutions’ leaders who lack exit strategy and offer little support to issue of succession planning and knowledge transfer. It is stated that they treat succession planning as nothing else than lining up employees for any upcoming vacant positions (Michelson, 2006). As a results, four themes of formalising succession planning in the public sector were recommended namely; planning and development of succession planning, selection and training of staff members, sustainability of succession planning, and evaluation of the process of succession planning.

2.4.1. Planning and development of succession planning in public institution

Succession planning begins when the institution engages into the workforce forecast to determine the overall future workforce needs. It requires human resources to predict the number of employees to staff specific positions. Workforce turnover including retirements must be anticipated and planned for. It also requires human resources to track the skills of incumbent employees and keep the skill inventories (Pynes, 2004).
Karaevli & Hall (2003) stated that there is no one agreed best practice of developing and implementing succession planning, therefore, public institution should not be restricted to rely on a one size fit all approach. Succession planning does not need to be too complex, but each public institution can be flexible to personalise their own plan to meet the need of their respective institutions based on their culture, history, politics, resources and budget (Michelson, 2006).

Succession planning should not be conducted in isolation or exclusively by the human resources department, but it should rather be a collective effort from all levels of an institution. It requires Accounting Officers of public institutions and other leaders to be on the forefront of planning and leading the whole process. Such planning must be aligned with the strategic priorities of the institution (Cohn et al. 2005). Planning and development of succession planning further requires external stakeholders to be part of the participants in the planning process because it serves as a key strategic planning tool for improving government performance, accountability and quality service delivery (Kim, 2003).

2.4.2. Selection and training of staff members

The first step towards the selection and training of staff members is to conduct employees’ assessment and individual training needs. Employees’ assessment is critical as it highlights the leadership shortage within the institution and the needed leadership competencies based on the strategic goal of the institution. It also helps the institution to assess the employee strengths, skills gaps, development needs, and to effectively monitor the implementation of succession programs with the support of the top management (Kim, 2003).
Public institutions such as the Namibian Defence Force in the case of Namibia for instance are becoming more innovative in recruiting, training and developing, and retaining talents. This is realised through the increased usage of job rotation, creation of specialised formal training based on the institutional needs, and the establishment of co-managers in critical functions to ease older leaders into retirement. Such innovation is also observed when new leaders are being prepared for new roles, and diverting existing high performing staff members to more strategic roles for the success of the institution (Green, 2000).

Coaching, mentoring, and career development are the main focus for the effective training and development of the staff members (Gaffney, 2005 and Green, 2000). Therefore, the selection of staff members for training in the Namibian Defence Force should be done on merit and be encouraged across all departments within an institution to include the alignment of roles with the organization’s strategy. The process should identify high-performing individuals, comprising the talent pool of at least 50 members, who are capable and flexible (Walker, 1998).

2.4.3. Sustainability of the succession planning

Effective succession planning focuses on developing a talent pool that matches the preferred skills for future performance of the institution (Walker, 1998). For succession planning to be sustainable, it should focus on the future, encourage proactive career development, provide growth to high performing staff members and reduce dependency on the past silos that dictate past practices (Kim, 2003).

Karaevli & Hall (2003) stated that succession planning can only be sustainable if it has the adequate support and commitment from top management, who should direct the institution on how best they should handle staff members who resist the required changes. Top management of the MOD and NDF for example would further help the process to be sustainable by developing a
constituent commitment through extensive strategic planning sessions. Karaevli & Hall further stated that the succession planning will also be sustainable if new staff members who are recruited are molded with the culture of learning to be adaptable, desire to learn, and foster continuity for the future success of the institution.

2.4.4. Evaluation of succession planning

Cohn et al. (2005) stated that succession planning should be assessed and measured over the long term to establish the core competencies that are matching the strategic focus of the organization, as well as to identify any gaps that may exist within the system. The evaluation of succession planning focuses on examining the ability of the institution to fill existing vacancies and respond to the needs of the public (Conger & Fulmer, 2003).

Institutions are required to develop a comprehensive, competency-focused, employee-centric career development program relying upon multiple dimensions of feedback which is meant to inform the performance of the succession planning (Kim, 2003, and Metz, 1998). Evaluation can further promote the ongoing, and continuous program planning review. The constant feedback should be sought from employees, as well as the supervisors involved in the succession planning program (Metz, 1998).

2.5. Succession planning during economic downturn

The main obstacle to effective succession planning in the public institutions is the increasingly limited financial resources that has been an issue in the world since the Great Depression. Economic downturn has forced the public institutions to cut their operational cost and with the majority of the capital projects being placed on hold due to budgetary constraints (Reeves, 2010). It is on that basis that the training and development budget in support of succession planning is
always cut during the economic downturn, forcing it to be less prioritised. Reeves further stated that it becomes difficult to plan for effective succession planning when employees are openly encouraged to take early retirements due to budgetary constraints.

Ahlstrom (2006) stated that the economic downturn can cause the new leaders not to be properly developed through adequate training and development to assume the vacant positions that are vacated by the retiring leaders. Ahlstrom further stated that it also puts more pressure on the institution like in the case of the Namibian Defence Force as it would not be able to recruit fresh talents, or promote staff members, but it will merely rely on promotion that is based on replacement of critical vacated positions, and the replacing staffs may not necessarily be sent for formal training, but rather be mentored internally due to budget cut. The economic downturn can compromise effective succession planning and lead to a talent shortages and the only viable option that can be adopted by human resources specialist is to explore informal mentoring and coaching which are short term strategies (Covey, 2004).

It is, therefore, worth mentioning that effective succession planning is driven by human resource planning, which is a critical component of strategic planning within an institution, and it requires good funding. Succession planning may not succeed without human resource planning which is used to assess past trends, evaluate the present situation and project future events within the institution. Forecasting in human resource planning and succession planning complement each other in a sense that forecasts identify expectations while plans establish concrete goals and objectives (Pynes, 2004).

Pynes further stated that forecasting has become increasingly important as a large segment of the public workforce is inching toward retirement. Succession planning during the economic downturn is therefore difficult and can puts institution under pressure to mitigate strategies of coping with
the high tide of retirement, shifting of undeveloped employees to different departments as successors, as well as to struggle with little resources for recruitment, training and development of future leaders.

2.6. The benefits of succession planning in an institution

Succession planning is a human resources tool meant to meet future staffing needs of the institution. It takes the large number of available high performers into consideration and also focuses on the quality of the candidates by addressing competencies and skills gaps. Succession planning further provides leaders with a strategy to tap into institutional knowledge that would otherwise be lost due to retirement, promotion and general attrition (Helton and Jackson, 2007).

Dodd and Simons (2005) stated that succession planning allows the institution to take stock of its resources and employees, map out its strengths and weaknesses, and close the gaps so that it may not be caught off guard and left without adequate leadership in the future. Dodd and Simons further stated that, other than providing leadership continuity and a plan in the event of crisis or change, succession planning offers the additional benefits such as strategic thinking and evaluation of an institutional performance amongst others.

Helton and Jackson (2007, p.336-337) suggested six fundamental benefits that may be extracted from effective succession planning, namely;

1. Enables the institution to assess its talent needs by establishing competency models.
2. Allows leaders to identify key people who are available to fill critical work functions.
3. Provides avenues for present and future succession planning and discussions about how to develop talent.
4. Defines career pathways for employees to increase the breadth and depth of their institutional knowledge.
5. Provides for a higher return on investment from employees.

6. Leads to the appropriate promotion of people to meet institutional goals.

2.7. Models of succession planning.

Succession planning is a concept that emerged in the 1960s, and its historical context is divided into a three time periods that are interpreted through various models (Mahler & Graines, 1983). The initial period covers the 1960-1980, and it is mostly described by empirical evidence as a rise of succession research. The main focus of this period was on Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and senior management succession, whereas the second period covers 1980-1990, and it is described as an emerging trend and development of succession planning. During this period, the focus shifted to planning for the entire organisation’s succession need as opposed to focusing on the senior management team only. The third period covers 1990–present, and it is described as a systematic succession planning and beyond, which is characterised by succession management (Rothwell, 2010). During these periods, various studies on succession planning were conducted to identify key variables in succession equation, establish research models, and to test hypotheses (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).

It is, therefore, worth mentioning that since succession planning is evolving into succession management, there is no one size fit all model to succession planning. Each institution including the Namibian Defence Force will require their own unique models of succession planning that may suit them. This study will, therefore, explore three models of succession planning, namely: The Seven-Pointed Star Model by Rothwell (2001, 2005 and 2010), Accelerated Pool Model by Byham et al. (2002), and Leadership Pipeline Model by Charan et al. (2001).
2.7.1. The Seven Pointed Star Model

In his studies, Rothwell (2001, 2005, and 2010) stated that succession planning is a systematic approach that requires full commitment, and that each institution goes through an evolution in a form of a life cycle of development in their respective succession planning accomplishments. Rothwell described the life cycle of succession planning and management into five generations highlighting that in each generation, institutions evolve into a more sophisticated approach on how they handle their various businesses and workforce in relations to succession planning.

The table below summarised the features that comprised each generation of the succession planning and management cycle invented by Rothwell (2001). The first generation started with the simplest replacement planning targeting the CEO level, and the approach in generation two and three gradually developed into a systematic approach of succession planning and management which focused into the development and management of the talent pool. The talents in the fourth and fifth generation are mostly developed from within the organisation, and the scarce talents are head-hunted from the external talent pools.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life Cycle of Succession Planning</th>
<th>Typical Implementation Plan</th>
<th>Major Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation 1</td>
<td>A simple replacement plan for CEO</td>
<td>• A simple replacement plan for CEO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Generation 2                     | A replacement plan for CEO and his or her immediate reports | • Simple replacement plan for CEO and his or her immediate report (senior leaders, the senior executive team)  
• Involvement of senior managers |
| Generation 3                     | Succession planning and management program for middle managers and perhaps their key reports | • Succession planning and management program for middle managers  
• Drafts of policies and procedures for succession planning and management  
• Use of competency models  
• Value statement |
| Generation 4                     | A talent pool approach focused inside the organisation | • Focusing on development of internal pools  
• Everyone in the institution is considered as a possible successor for key position  
• Provide tool for career development for future  
• No-more organisation chart  
• Use of competency model, performance appraisal, individual development plan, full cycle multi-rater assessment, and other sophisticated methods for development |
| Generation 5                     | A proactive talent pool approach focused inside and outside | • Include external talent pool |

Table 2.1. *Five Generations of the Succession Planning and Management Cycle* by (Rothwell 2001.p. 26)

Rothwell (2001 and 2005) further introduced the Seven Pointed Star Model for systematic succession planning and management meant to help institution that are struggling to operationalise the implementation of succession planning in their institutions.
Figure 2.1. *The Seven Pointed Star Model for systematic succession planning and management* (Rothwell, 2001, p. 74).

The first step of the Seven Pointed Star Model of a systematic succession model is for an institution to establish succession planning programs and be committed to such programs. Commitment requires efforts and time from management as well as financial resources to sustain the succession planning programs. The approach of this stage is further reinforced by Johansen (2012) through his Direction, Alignment and Commitment (DAC) Model, where he stated that commitment happens both before and after action. Building commitment happens before you act, but maintaining commitment happens afterwards. Johansen, therefore, emphasised that commitment
should be nurtured constantly by management for it to be sustainable and to achieve the desired outcome.

The second step requires senior management to access the current requirement expected from the incumbent occupying key positions within the organisation. At this stage, management identifies where key leadership positions exist within the structure of the institution and help to establish further requirement for such key leadership positions. Once the requirements are set, it helps management to prepare the team of successors for advancement based on the requirement of various leadership positions.

The third step requires management to access the level of performance from individuals occupying critical positions within the organisation. Effective performance is a prerequisite for individuals to be elevated or promoted to the next position within the organisation. This stage helps management who are spearheading the succession planning program to identify the available talent that require further mentorship and be ready to occupy key positions in future.

Step four requires management to identify key competency requirement that key leadership positions would require in the future. Rothwell (2001 and 2005) stated that this stage requires management that has foresight to anticipate the influence of technology, globalisation, and economical standing of the state during such times. Step four is critical and relevant, as it may help management to anticipate the organisation’s future and implications that might come with the work requirements.
Step five expects management to focus on assessing individuals’ future potential against the future work requirements. This step helps management to appraise the current competency of the team earmarked for future leadership positions, to establish the gaps, and to develop measures to address and close the existing gaps.

Step six requires management to establish consistent leadership development programs that would help them to develop internal successors. At this stage, succession planning would be evolving into succession management, where it is consistently managed, and other measures of tapping talents from the external pools are also explored to meet the future succession needs of the institution.

The seventh and final stage of the Seven Pointed Star model is evaluation, conducted by using balanced scorecard model and comparison of the program to its objectives model amongst others. This stage requires management to consistently conduct the continued evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the succession planning. The outcome of the evaluation should be used to perfect the succession planning and management (Rothwell, 2001 and 2005).

2.7.2. The Acceleration Pools Model

Byham et al. (2002) invented an Accelerated Pools Model to target a wide range of possible successors within the organisation. The Accelerated Pool Model allows an institution to establish talent development programs targeting a large number of possible successors earmarked for critical leadership positions as opposed to targeting one or two individuals. This model compels management to initiate programs meant to develop the pool of talent through on-the-job training, mentorship, coaching, special training programs, as well as academic training through colleges
and universities. This model can help management especially in the Namibian Defence Force to have a pool of talents where they can draw from in case of any planned and unplanned vacancies.

This model was further explained by Charan et al. (2001) that the Accelerated Pool Model advocates for a broader perspective by avoiding to develop the potential successor with specific skills needed for the incumbent position, but rather to develop a large group of high performing individuals in a broader way to increase their leadership skills and interpersonal competencies in order to hasten their preparation for future leadership assignments. The Accelerated Pools Model by Byham et al. (2002) was explained in five phases and sub themes of analysis as follow:
Figure 2.2. *Acceleration Pools Model* (Byham et al. 2002, p.20-21).
2.7.3. The Leadership Pipeline Model

The Leadership Pipeline is a model that focuses on leadership development because the demand for leadership has greatly exceeded the supply (Charan et al. 2001). The sign of this imbalance between the demand and supply of leadership may be observed in many institutions when they bring in top executives from outside their institutions. The attempt to recruit from outside could be an indication that the internal leadership pipeline is not adequate and one may safely conclude that the internal training, mentorship, and other succession development programs are not keeping the leadership pipeline full and competitive, making it necessary to recruit from outside.

The Leadership Pipeline Model by Charan et al. therefore, would allow institutions to keep their leadership pipeline full and flowing because finding the appropriate leaders with the right required skills is becoming difficult and expensive. The model allows management to understand and acknowledge that different levels of leadership exist, and employees need to acquire skills and value transitions at each level. This model can further help management especially in the Namibian Defence Force to understand that an institution should not only promote people with the expectation that they have the adequate knowledge and skills to handle their respective jobs, but they should also consider individual skills to handle a particular level of leadership. The Leadership Pipeline Model compels management to explore methods and measures that ensure that more leaders at various levels are prepared, developed, and deployed strategically (Dodd and Simons, 2005).

The Leadership Pipeline Model, according to Charan et al. (2001), is not a straight cylinder but rather one that is bents into six career passages. Each of the passages represent a change in organisational position, and a significant turn in terms of leadership that has to be made by the potential successors. These changes could involve major changes in job requirements, demanding
new skills, time applications, and work values. The figure below shows the Leadership Pipeline Model.

Figure 2.3. *The Leadership Pipeline Model* (Charan et al. 2001, p.7). Note: This model is based on work done by Mahler (1983) called *Critical Career Crossroads*.
2.7.3.1. Passage One: Managing self to managing or leading others

Passage one is mostly associated with new and young employees who have recently joined, and they usually spend their first years with an organisation as individual contributors. These employees contribute by doing the assigned work within a given time frames and in ways that meet the organisations’ objectives. When they demonstrate an ability to handle responsibilities and adhere to the organisational values, they are often considered for promotion to the first line manager.

The first time manager needs to know how to plan their work schedules, and how to re-allocate their time, so that they may not only accomplish their own tasks but to supervise and help others to perform effectively. This passage helps the staff members to shift from doing all the assignment to the final point, but to understand the importance of teamwork where the assignments are completed through others (Charan et al. 2001).

2.7.3.2. Passage Two: Managing or leading others to managing or leading managers

This passage introduces the staff members to managerial skills, which are attributes in management. Individual contribution at this level is no more critical, but to rather assign managerial and leadership work to others, coaching them and measuring their progress as managers. It is also at this level where managers should begin to think beyond their direct functions, but rather to align their approaches with strategic issues that are in line with the overall objectives of the institution. This passage introduces them as management to differentiate between members who can do technical work from those who can truly lead the team (Charan et al. 2001).
2.7.3.3. Passage three: Managing or leading managers to functional managers

Passage three is important, as it requires functional managers to manage and supervise managers who are performing unfamiliar work areas and those that are outside their own experience. This level requires them to not only understand work outside their areas of specialisation, but to also value them and consider them when required. It is at this level where functional managers should become proficient strategists, not only in their areas of specialisation, but to blend in the overall grand strategy of the institution. This level requires managerial maturity, where a functional manager should think and act as a leader rather than as a functional member who does not have any authority (Charan et al. 2001).

2.7.3.4. Passage four: Managing or leading functional managers to business managers

Passage four introduces functional managers to being a real business manager where they become responsible for extra unfamiliar functions and outcomes. This level also requires them to manage different functions, work with great numbers of people of various skills, as well as to balance between present needs and future goals of an institution. A staff member at this level is expected to have gone through the various positions within the organisation, and should be well vested in areas of human resources, business finance, and the legal aspects. This level requires more time to be devoted to reflection and analysis of possible trends, opportunities, and threats in the best interest of the institution. Passage four requires someone to learn how to trust his or her team, accept advice, receive feedback from all functional managers, and to act appropriately for the success of the institution (Charan et al. 2001).
2.7.3.5. Passage five: Managing or leading business managers to group managers

Passage five may be critical, and it requires transformation of business managers who only think and value the success of their own business to start thinking as group managers, and to value the success of other people’s business.

Charan et al. (2001) explained that passage five requires a critical shift in four skill sets. The first skill is for the group managers to be effective at strategy evaluation for finance allocation and deployment, considering which strategy is most viable and has a probability of success and is worth funding. The second skill is required in spotting talents; group managers should know who, among functional managers, is ready and possesses experience to become business managers. Coaching new business managers is equally a critical role of the group manager at passage five. Furthermore, the third skill is associated with strategic thinking. Group managers are expected to be forward-thinking leaders who ask questions like: Are we doing the right business? What else do we need to do? What talent do we need to ensure the current and future success of the institution?

Finally, the fourth skill requires group managers to access the capability of the current workforce, in order to avoid wishful thinking. This is a level where managers prepare themselves for challenging decisions, greater risks, and uncertainties where they view the issues in broader terms. Notably, some institutions do not have group managers, and usually, their CEOs take up the responsibilities of group managers (Charan et al. 2001).
2.7.3.6. Passage six: Managing or leading group managers to enterprise managers

Passage six is associated with CEOs and Accounting Officers in institutions who by virtue need to lead institutions for longer terms through visionary thinking, and to be proactive rather than being reactive to some obvious issues affecting their institutions. This passage demands a leader who is prepared to shift from strategic to visionary thinking, as well as from operations to global perspectives. CEOs and Accounting Officers need to assemble a team of high performing and ambitious direct reports, with a knowledge that some of them are highly qualified and might want his or her job, but team performance and institutional success shall be the key focus.

The passage six level might be the only leadership position in an institution that can easily inspire the entire workforce through various platforms and communication channels. However, some challenges to the leadership pipeline might occur when the CEO or Accounting Officer is unaware that passage six require changes in values. It is always a challenge when CEOs and Accounting Officers sustain the same skills, time applications, and work values that served them well when they were group managers and never adjust their self-concepts to fit their new leadership roles. If the CEO or Accounting Officer is behaving as if he or she is running a portfolio business rather than an entity, or when they skip one or more leadership passages, it diminishes the performance of managers who report directly to them, as well as all other employees down the structure, compromising effective governance and service delivery (Charan et al. 2001).

The Leadership Pipeline Model is therefore critical in relations to succession planning, as it advocates for the pipeline to be filled with high performers at all levels of the six passages. It allows for successful career development and talent management across the board, which is essential for succession planning and management. The Pipeline Model makes skipping the passage unlikely, and it helps employees to move through the passage at the calculated speed.
Institutions such as NDF amongst others that have adopted the Leadership Pipeline Model might experience fewer challenges and setbacks with their succession planning because their leadership pipelines would have abundant leaders of various levels who are properly groomed, who have passed the test of time, and are ready to move to their substantive leadership positions.

2.8. Implications of notifying and developing internal successors “To tell or not to tell”

The concept of talent inventory is key to succession planning and management in every institution, with the underlying assumption that if an institution assembles a team of talents, it will probably have a strong backup to replace departing leaders (Charan et al. 2001). For employees to be considered as possible successors, they are identified on the basis of high performance, which is an admission price for future growth and development, and the full performance across all leadership levels should be the objective of succession planning. However, controversy comes with the question of whether “To tell or not to tell” individuals that they have been identified as possible successors within an institution (Gay and Sims, 2006).

Gay and Sims further stated that there are no definite and accurate practices regarding whether to tell or not to the potential successors, but it all depends on the institutional policy on succession planning, based on what can suit them best. Some institutions have policies, directing that internal successors should not be told about their selection, and they are left to their supervisors to facilitate their leadership development programs, while some other institutions do the opposite by informing the potential successors, so that they would be prioritised to participate on special development programs to enhance their leadership skills for future leadership roles.

Rothwell (2010) stated that the issue is not necessarily to tell or not to tell everyone whether they are part of the succession planning list, but rather to think of when to tell, who to tell, and how to
tell them. Gay and Sims (2006) addressed the question of when to tell the potential successor, stating that it may be successful when the incumbent has made it known that he or she will be leaving an institution within a specified period of time. In this situation, particularly at senior management level, the best practice may be to inform the potential leaders that they are the potential successors for the positions. This may compel management to start with the highly focused development actions for the identified successors. The notification process, in this case, may involve formal briefing or written statements clearing that an individual succession plan status is not a guarantee for promotion, but it would be sanctioned through leadership capability and high performance.

Guy and Sims further stated that the potential successor may also be notified officially when the appointing authority is convinced and satisfied that the potential successors have demonstrated the solid leadership and professional maturity, and by making it formal to the potential successors; it would serve in the best interest of the institution because development of individuals for the incumbent’s positions would be enhanced and accelerated.

Rothwell (2010) stated that there are advantages and disadvantages to both telling and not telling the potential successors within the institution. Rothwell argued that if potential successors are notified, they relax, causing their performance to go down, assuming that their promotion is guaranteed. They may also stop their personal development to acquire key skills that they would need in their substantive positions. The situation may also worsen if their colleagues hear that they are not parts of the potential succession list. This situation may lead to some employees, who are equally high performers, to start looking for jobs elsewhere, where they would stand a chance to be considered for promotion. The following table explained the risks of notifying the potential successors.
Risks and concerns for notifying the potential successors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Creating an Elitist Group:</strong></th>
<th>We will create an elitist group in our organisation, or a group who is considered to be the “favourites”, if we notify high potentials.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk of Lowering Morale and Retention:</strong></td>
<td>We risk lowering the morale and engagement level of important, high performing employees; they may even leave the company if they are not selected for the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Concern Over Advancement Opportunity:</strong></td>
<td>Employees might think if they are not selected for the program, they will not have opportunities for development and advancement, which could also lower productivity and retention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The “Big Head” Concern:</strong></td>
<td>If we start telling people that they are high potentials, they will get big head over it and become conceited, rather than being team players.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Things Change:</strong></td>
<td>Employees performance and potential are subjective and can also change over time, and if we have to tell someone they are no longer in the high potential program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Program of “Favoured Ones”:</strong></td>
<td>This concern relates to both the perception and reality of the validity of your high potential selection process. Leaders and employees may perceive the selection process provides a way for leaders to identify their “favourites” for development and advancement opportunities, rather than having a selection process based on merit and potential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Couching Avoidance:</strong></td>
<td>It will be difficult to explain to employees who are not selected for the program why they are not selected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-Functional Employee Loss:</strong></td>
<td>If others in the organisation know who my high potential employees are, they will recruit them into their department, and I will lose my top talents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Concerns:</strong></td>
<td>Employees who are not selected could instigate litigation, citing an unfair selection process, loss of advancement opportunity, etc. Employees who are selected may perceive the program as a guarantee of positions, employment, or advancement, which could result in legal problem at some point.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3. *Risks and Concerns for notifying High Potential Successors*, (Gay and Sims, 2006. p.57).
There are, however, some advantages that come along with the notification of individuals that they have been selected to participate in a high potential program. Notifying individuals may help the institution to directly develop high potentials, deploy them in key and strategic positions, and measure the program’s results. It may also have retention benefits to the institution in a sense that potential successors are assumed to be the top talents and future leaders, and management would be interested to make them aware that they are valued in order to increase their retention with the institution (Gay and Sims, 2006).

Gay and Sims further maintained that high potentials are more likely to be ambitious and always on demand to be head-hunted by other institutions; therefore, management would want to be proactive in their internal career advancement to avoid the risk of losing their high talents to their competitors. The same views were shared by Rothwell (2010), who stated that the advantage of telling or notifying the potential successor is that it is likely to motivate successors to learn more or be willing to build their talent in anticipation for promotion. It may further increase the potential successors’ chance to not think of leaving the institution for greener pasture.

It is, therefore, worth mentioning that despite the advantages that the institutions could acquire from notifying their potential successors, majority of the institutions would choose to not tell their potential successors because the disadvantages are more harmful, and they may cause insecurity and fragmentation among the staff members.

2.9. Measuring the effectiveness of succession planning

Measuring the effectiveness and success of the succession planning program is one of the key functions of the CEOs or Accounting Officers and the Human Resources team. Measuring the effectiveness and success of the succession planning can help the institution to know how much
their succession planning program has contributed to the quality service delivery and growth of the entire institution. Kim (2006) argued that succession planning is not easy to measure, but it can be measured; what is mostly needed is information on how to measure the value of succession planning. The value of succession planning cannot, however, be adequately measured if the institution does not have the mission statement of its succession planning. When the institution does not know where it wants to go and what it wants to achieve with its succession planning, it would be difficult to measure whether it will arrive at the right place at the right time with the right results. Correct measurement can only be established when the mission, objectives, stakeholders and clients of the succession program are well formulated and understood (Kim, 2006).

Bernthal & Wellins (2003), as cited in Kim, (2006) stated that the recent survey on measuring the success of succession planning has proven that there is a decrease in succession planning programs, and about 46% of the institutions do not have the succession plan in place. According to their study, such a figure is high, compared to that of the similar study conducted in 2001, which revealed that 37% of the institutions did not have succession plans. The failure to not have the succession plan in place might have been caused by the Human Resources that have failed to show the value of succession planning to their respective institutions.

Rothwell and Kim (2005) suggested the models and/or the methods that could be used to measure the value and success of succession planning, namely: Comparison of the program to its objectives, and application of balanced scorecards model amongst others.
2.9.1. Comparison of the program to its objectives model

The comparison of the succession planning program to its key strategic objective is one of the simplest form of measuring the value of the succession planning. Kim (2006) provided an example of objectives of the succession planning within the institution as follows:

a) To fill key positions with high performing individuals and,
b) To broaden and diversify the talent pools of the institution,
c) To enhance service delivery.

The first objective can be measured against the numbers of individuals from the talent pools who are adequately prepared and ready to fill leadership positions, as well as the timeframe it takes for them to be prepared and developed. The second objective can be measured against the total numbers of males and females “gender representation” in the pool, the numbers of individuals from the previous disadvantaged communities “ethnicity” as well as disable individual who are prepared for future leadership functions. Their numbers could be compared to the initial target or objectives to measure the required results. Lastly, objective three could be measured against the customer satisfaction, and profit that results directly from the impact of succession planning.

2.9.2. Balanced Scorecards model

The balanced scorecard is an old model, which has been traditionally used to assess executive performance, and it focuses on serving multiple stakeholders such as employees, clients and investors (Ulrich, 1997). The balanced scorecard model focuses on the future, rather than the past profitability. It helps to clearly communicate the vision of the institution that could help employees to align their performance to the vision and goals of the institution (Kaplan & Norton, 1996).
The balanced scorecard has four perspectives, namely: financial perspective, customer perspective, internal business process perspective, and organisation and learning perspective. Rothwell and Kim (2005) suggested that the balanced scorecard could be used to measure the value of succession planning and management in a theoretical and conceptual sense. They argued that succession planning is a strategic issue of the institution, and decisions on the successors of the managers who are retiring or resigning are key to the survival and success of the institution in future; thus, it deserves to be valued and measured. Rothwell and Kim (2005) repeated the four perspectives of the balanced scorecard, accompanied by questions to be answered in order to measure the value and success of the succession planning, namely;

a) Financial perspectives: How much does the succession planning and management program contribute to the reduced costs or enhanced revenue of the institution?

b) Customer perspectives: Who are the customers of succession planning and management, and how do they assess the value of succession planning and management program?

c) Internal process perspective: What is the process associated with an effective succession planning and management program, and how can their relative value be measured?

d) Learning and innovation perspective: How much does the succession planning and management program contribute to enhance learning and innovation in the institution? (Rothwell and Kim 2005) as cited by (Kim, 2006, p. 50). The figure below shows the example of strategic map for succession planning and management using balanced scorecard.
Figure 2.4.1. Example of Strategic Map for Succession Planning and Management using balanced scorecard (Kim, 2006, p.190).
2.10. Realism theory in relations to succession planning in the military.

Since the study was investigating the effectiveness of succession planning within the military setup, it was guided by realism theoretical approach, which is the theory of international relations and security studies. Realism is divided into three broad categories namely; classical, modern and neo-realism, however, they all share the common core principles of power politics (Heywood, 2011). Realism school of thought emphasises that the state must be the primary actor in international system and non-state actors are less important. Realism further places a greater emphasis on the anarchic nature of the international system in which human nature fosters fear, egoism, selfishness, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity (Donnelly, 2000).

Donnelly further stated that realism believes that morals and ethics sometimes have no place in politics and each state has to seek for its own survival and self-help by acting rationally and the intensification of power can be safely argued to be the goal for each state under a system of anarchy. In international anarchy, states may have interests that could clash with the interests of others particularly over the scarce resources.

The absence of the overarching authority to control the world causes some states to use force to attain their goals especially when they assess their possibility for success. Some powerful states value such survival goals as opposed to valuing the pleasures of peaceful coexistence in the world (Brown and Ainley, 2009). These realism views on the character of states and their motivations in an anarchic international system could easily cause war among nations. War is explained by Karl von Clausewitz, in his book ‘On War’ as a controlled and rational act and a continuation of politics by other means (Morgenthau, 1948).
The realism theory is of the notion that the international system is chaotic since there is no central government over other states and states are forced to rely on self-help in order to achieve survival and security which can only be ensured through the acquisition of military power. The theory further stated that power has to be fought with power and states have to wage war for survival and would only avoid war if they calculate that their chances of victory are slim, therefore, the decision about war and peace are made through a kind of cost-benefit analysis by the military strategist. However, the national self-interest would always dictate whether to go to war or to avoid it (Heywood, 2011).

It is on that basis that states train and develop their military officers to build their strong military forces for protection because of fear and for survival in the world of anarchic (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). The Defence Force and Ministry of Defence (MOD) in general and by virtue of their functional focus are supposed to be special institutions in the class of key security institutions, where only officers with the right academic backgrounds and exposure are deployed to their Service Departments (Magbadelo, 2012). Magbadelo stated that the same principles should guide the appointment and deployment of Permanent Secretary and Honourable Minister to the MOD. The Minister of Defence should be either a retired military officer or a person with sufficient knowledge in defence and military strategy, while the Permanent Secretary of defence should equally be a retired senior officer, or a good graduate of relevant social science or humanities and with requisite security experience. Magbadelo insisted that unless and until the haphazard and indiscriminate deployment of personnel to the MOD is addressed, the implementation of the defence transformation programme and indeed other programmes such as succession planning might be jeopardised.
Therefore, the succession planning in the military is treated with care, take time and require the successors to go through all military career passages before they are declared that they are ready for deployment in senior leadership positions. Defence Forces are key security institutions and military leaders carry the lives and security of the state, and military profession is a technical career that require the highest level military and security training and development, sacrifice, selflessness and combat experience at all levels of leadership, and the capability to project power is the key.

2.11. Conclusion.

This chapter provided a review of previous studies and literatures related to succession planning, security and strategic studies. It attempted to provide the definitions of succession planning, replacement planning and succession management. It also explored the prospects of succession planning the public sectors, its benefits as well as its implications during the economic downturn. It further explored the models of succession planning that may be used by institutions that are planning to implement the succession planning, and scholars who have interests in the same area. The chapter further explored the methods of measuring the value and success of succession planning in an institution, and concludes with the realism theory in relations to succession planning in the military which is believed to be the guiding principle that informs the training and operation strategies of the military.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this study was to investigate into the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning and to recommend some solutions to the research questions and challenges of succession planning, using best practices that are informed by studies on the same areas. This chapter, therefore, highlighted the procedures and methods that were used to carry out the study. It focused on the research design, population, samples and sampling techniques, research instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis and research ethics.

3.2. Research design

The study used mixed methods, which are the qualitative and quantitative methods. For the quantitative research design, the study used structured questionnaires to test the perception of various respondents about the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning. It also added value to the study through the employment of statistical interpretations of the succession planning of the NDF. The qualitative research design used unstructured questions through an in-depth interview with the selected MOD and NDF management. All the unstructured interview questions were meant to capture the expert opinions and inside information on the status of succession planning in the NDF.
3.3. Population

The Defence Headquarters has a population of over 1000 staff members including both civilians and military personnel. However, due to unavailable timeframe and financial constraints, the research population of this study only targeted 100 officials and officers at the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek. These officials and officers included the MOD and NDF management and those that are below management.

3.4. Sample

The total population sampled was 25 officers and officials working at the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek. The qualitative research design used the purposive sampling method, and it sampled five (5) (out of 25 respondents) key interviewees, namely: Minister of Defence, Permanent Secretary, CDF, COS Human Resources, and COS Joint Operations to provide their expert opinions on the NDF succession planning. Purposive sampling was relevant for this study because it enabled the researcher to select a sample based on the purpose of the study and knowledge of a population about the NDF succession planning. The chosen subjects had the required characteristics that informed the study. This was done using the researcher’s expert knowledge of the population and selected such a sample in a non-random manner. Therefore, the senior management team was sampled purposively because they formed part of the strategic team that advises the CDF on issues of training, promotions, posting, recruitment and the NDF operations.
The quantitative research design used the simple random sampling method for the population of 20 officers (out of the total population of 25 respondents). Their perceptions about the NDF succession planning were tested through structured questionnaires. The simple random sampling was appropriate for this study because it gave each member of the population an equal chance of being chosen for the study. It also guaranteed that the sample chosen is a representative of the population, and that the sample is selected in an unbiased way.

3.5. Research instrument

An unstructured interview (qualitative) was used to collect expert opinions from the interviewees, namely: Minister of Defence, COS Human Resource, as well as from the Director of Defence Central Staff who represented the Permanent Secretary. Although the researcher had a plan to interview the CDF and the COS Joint Operations, the interview with the two (two out of the initial five management members) could not be fixed because they were out of the country on official assignments. As a result, only three senior managements were interviewed. In addition, a structured questionnaires (quantitative) was used to test perceptions of the 20 officers (20 out of the total population of 25 respondents) about the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning.

3.6. Procedures

The researcher administered the interviews and questionnaires. He conducted the entire process to make sure that all stages and procedures of this research were followed properly, especially to ensure that permission to conduct research was granted, appointments with respondents and interviewees were secured, questionnaires administered, interviews were carried out, and ethical considerations were adhered to.
3.7. Data analysis

The qualitative data were analysed and presented manually by giving the full textual report, based on the expert opinions and information shared by the interviewees through the unstructured interviews. The quantitative data were entered into the computer system (Statistical Package for Social Science “SPSS”), and analysed using tables and pie charts. The statistics presented through these tables, and pie charts were justified and elaborated through the comprehensive textual reports, discussing and contextualising the outcomes, based on the theories and research questions as themes of analysis.

3.8. Research ethics

The guidelines in the prospectus of postgraduate students of the University of Namibia on ethical observation was strictly adhered to throughout this study. As a result, the researcher firstly obtained permission letters both from the University of Namibia and Ministry of Defence to conduct the research. Permissions from all respondents were obtained before the interviews and questionnaires were administered. Respondents were informed that their participation on this study were voluntary. Integrity was the priority for the correct reflection of what was studied, and it was also explained clearly to all the respondents.

Information obtained through questionnaire was treated with strict confidentiality and no names were attached to it. However, information obtained from the interviews were on record, highlighting names, positions and dates of the interview because they had to speak with authority from the expert opinion perspective. Finally, academic theft “plagiarism” was avoided at all cost and other researchers’ opinions and works were acknowledged throughout the study.
3.9. Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the methodology used to carry out this study using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative research method was used to capture in-depth and detailed views on the status of succession planning in the NDF from management within their own natural settings. In addition, the quantitative research method was used to test perceptions of the respondents and captured the required statistical interpretation of the NDF succession planning.
CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Introduction

The chapter presented, analysed and discussed the data from the two main sources namely; 20 officers from the Defence Headquarters and three senior management of the MOD and the NDF. The survey conducted among the 20 officers from the Defence Headquarters was testing perceptions on the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning, while the unstructured interview with the three senior management of the MOD and NDF was aimed at capturing the expert opinions, the approach they use towards their succession planning and the challenges that hampers the effective implementation of their succession planning. The unstructured interview further aimed at capturing the possible solutions that might be used to effectively address the challenges of the NDF succession planning.

The study incorporated both quantitative and qualitative research methods. As a result, quantitative data collected through questionnaires from the 20 officers from the Defence Headquarters, were analysed using tables and pie charts to give the statistical representation of the demographic information and their views, based on their own perceptions. Furthermore, the qualitative data collected from the three senior management of the MOD and NDF were analysed and presented manually, by giving a full textual report based on their expert opinions. At each stage of data analysis, the outcomes of each question is addressed and discussed separately in order to justify and qualify the outcomes.
4.2. Outcomes of the quantitative research testing perceptions and opinions of the officers about the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning, conducted from 01 – 30 September 2017 at the Defence Headquarters.

4.2.1. Demographic information

The demographic information aimed at capturing the profile of each respondent participated in this survey and their information were captured from question one to seven as presented below;

1. Age

Table 4.1 shows the age of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>18 - 35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>46 - 50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>51 - 60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table 4.1, 20 respondents participated in this survey with the age group of 36 – 45 being the majority 45% of the respondents, followed by the age group of 51 – 60 with 25%. The age group of 18 – 35 and 46 – 50 were least represented with 15% each. Although the survey was only conducted among 20 officers at the Defence Headquarters, one may assume that the NDF has a diversified staff compliment in terms of the age group on its officers’ corp.
2. Gender

Table 4.2 shows the gender of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this study, male respondents were the majority with 65%, while the female respondents were the least with 35%. Based on this gender statistics, one may safely conclude that there are few female officers in the NDF as opposed to their male counterparts, making the scale of talent pool to be unbalanced in terms of gender representation.

3. Education level

Table 4.3 shows the education level of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Number of respondent</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table 4.3, the respondents with tertiary qualifications were the majority with 90%, while the respondents with secondary level of education were 10%. There was no respondent with
primary level of education. It can, therefore, be safely stated that majority of the NDF officers have acquired academic qualifications in various field of studies, making it easier for them to be selected into the talent pools for future leadership positions.

4. Rank

Table 4.4 shows the rank of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4 shows that Lieutenants who are junior officers in the NDF were the majority with 35% of the respondents, however, the next position which is the Captain was least represented with only 5% of all the respondents. The Majors were fairly represented with 25% followed by Colonels with 20%, while the Lieutenant Colonel had 15% and the Generals were not represented. One can assume that the Generals were not represented because they are very few and out of over 1000 staff complement at the Defence Headquarters, there are only 13 Generals.
5. Recruited or integrated

Table 4.5 indicates whether the officers were recruited or integrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Recruited or integrated</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Recruited</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5 indicates that officers who were recruited were the majority with 65% as opposed to their counterparts who formed up 35% of the respondents. The officers who were integrated were former combatants who were unified from the two opposing forces (PLAN and SWATF) that fought against each other’s during the liberation struggle of Namibia. These officers were integrated into the NDF after independence, and became the pioneers of the NDF. The least representation of the integrated members 35% is in agreement with the views shared by Ndjoba (2010) that the integration of the two opposing forces resulted in the NDF attracting more former combatants both from PLAN and SWATF to take up commanding and leadership positions at that time, however, most of these officers were close to their retirement.
6. **Highest military courses**

Table 4.6 shows the highest military courses which the respondents have accomplished.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Military course</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Commission course</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Platoon Commander course</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Company Commander course</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Junior Command and Staff course</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Senior Command and Staff course</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>National Defence College (NDC)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table 4.6, majority of the respondents 50% have only accomplished the Commissioning course which is the first course that translates the military personnel from the non-commissioned officer corps to the commissioned officers corps. The respondents who have successfully accomplished the Platoon Commander and Company Commander courses constitutes only 10% each. The two courses are critical in the military and are supposed to be done by all Junior officers (Lieutenants – Captains) to prepare them to command troops in the battle field, therefore, 10% each can be arguably stated to be a bit low and insufficient.

The respondents who have successfully accomplished the Junior Command and Staff course constitutes 25% which can be safely stated that it is a reasonable statistic. The Junior Command and Staff course is done by Captains in the military to prepare them for command and staff functions and it is always a prerequisite for a Captain to be promoted to the rank of a Major.
The respondents who have successfully accomplished the Senior Command and Staff course constitutes 5% which can be arguably stated to be very low in the NDF especially at this stage when there is a high tide of Senior officers going on retirement. This predicament creates a situation where some officers at this level are ill prepared in terms of military capability and experience to take over positions that will be left by the retiring Senior military officers.

The challenge of a few officers who have successfully accomplished the Senior Command and Staff course can be attributed to the fact that NDF does not have its own training institutions that can offer such a course and as a young defence force, it relied on assistance from other countries, in terms of specialised training of that level. The NDF officers are, therefore, expected to have the necessary training to enable them to operate effectively because they would be expected to operate jointly with the soldiers of other nations in assistance of a neighbour or in Peace Support Operations.

The Senior Command and Staff course is supposed to be attended by all Majors and Lieutenant Colonel and it is a prerequisite for one to be promoted to the rank of the Colonel in the military. This course prepares the Senior officers to take up senior leadership positions of both command and staff nature. The views about the importance of military training were shared by Booth & Wheeler (2008) stating that country train and develop their military officers to build their strong military forces for protection because of fear, and for survival in the world of anarchic. The same views were shared by Magbadelo (2012) stating that Defence Forces and Ministries of Defence (MOD) in general and by virtue of their functional focus are supposed to be special institutions in the class of key security institutions, where only officers with the right military training and experience and officials with the best academic backgrounds and exposure are deployed to their Service Departments.
7. Highest academic qualification

Table 4.7 shows the highest academic qualification for each respondent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Highest academic qualification</th>
<th>Numbers of respondents</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Honours Degree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Master Degree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 shows that the respondents hold the academic qualifications with majority 45% at the level of a Diploma and 20% at the Honours Degree level. The certificates and Degrees constitute 10% each, while the Master Degrees constitute 15%. There was no respondent with a PhD.

It appeared that majority of the respondents as indicated in table 4.7 have acquired the appropriate qualifications in various field of studies for them to effectively perform various command and staff functions at their respective duty stations. These ideals of good academic training are in agreement with the views shared by Gaffney (2005) and Green (2000) that career development, effective training and development of the staff members shall be the main focus for the effective implementation of succession planning.
It can, therefore, be safely stated that the statistic of the academic credentials of the NDF officers listed above proves that soldiers need to be qualified both militarily and academically because they are expected to plan, lead and operate sophisticated weapons systems that are on par with the constantly changing technologies. They are, therefore, not only operators of weapon systems but must also intelligently apply their minds to everything they do in relations to the environment they would find themselves both at home and abroad.

4.2.2. Respondents’ perceptions on the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning

a) Perceptions on the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning

Figure 4.1 shows the respondents’ perceptions on the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning.

Figure 4.1 shows that no one of the respondents felt that the NDF succession planning was very effective, making it to score 0%. The 20% of the respondents felt the NDF succession planning was effective, while the other 20% of the other respondents felt it was poor. However, majority 60% of the respondents felt the NDF succession planning was ineffective proving the fact that the MOD and NDF management were faced with the challenge of succession planning that required
urgent attention because majority of the Senior officers and General are going on retirement in big numbers, leaving the successors unprepared to take over. The findings on figure 4.1 can be attributed to the views shared by Green (2000) and Michelson (2006) who stated that some public institutions are ignoring the anticipated leadership crisis which is likely to hit majority of the public institutions due to some leaders who lack exit strategy and offer little support to issue of succession planning and knowledge transfer.

b) Perceptions on whether the NDF gives equal chances to all officers to attend academic and military training

Figure 4.2 shows the perceptions of the respondents on whether the NDF gives equal chances to all officers to attend academic and military courses or not.

Figure 4.2 indicated that majority 65% of the respondents felt that NDF does not give equal chances to all officers to upgrade their skills in terms of academic and military training. However, 35% of the respondents felt that NDF gives equal chances to its officers to attend both military and academic courses. The perceptions under figure 4.2, that the NDF does not give equal chances to its officers to attend military courses is in agreement with the perceptions in table 4.6 about the
officer highest military qualifications where it shows that majority of the officers did not accomplish the required military courses.

The perceptions on equal chances for academic courses however, does not correspond well with the perceptions in table 4.7 about the highest academic qualification of the respondents. Although it is indicated under figure 4.2 that NDF does not give equal chances to its officers to attend academic courses, majority of the respondents according to table 4.7 have acquired their academic qualifications. One can safely argue that perhaps they acquire the qualifications on their own efforts through distance or part-time modes of studies without sponsorhip from the MOD.

One can recommend the MOD and NDF to embrace the views shared by Kim (2003) in terms of training and development that the first step towards the selection and training of staff members is to conduct employees’ assessment and individual training needs. Employees’ assessment was found to be critical as it highlights the leadership shortage within the institution and the needed leadership competencies based on the strategic goal of the institution.
c) **Perceptions on whether the NDF gives fair chances to female officers to attend military courses**

Figure 4.3 shows the perceptions of the respondents on whether the NDF gives equal chances to female officers to attend military courses or not.

![Pie chart showing perceptions on female officers' chances to attend training](image)

Figure 4.3 indicated that majority 45% of the respondents felt that NDF does not give equal chances to female officers to attend the required military courses, while 40% of the respondents felt the NDF accords equal chances to the female officers to attend military courses. 15% of the respondents on the other hand felt that the process of selecting female officers to attend military courses is being bias towards females in the military.

It can, therefore, be argued that perhaps NDF is discriminating its officers based on the gender perceptions that females are weak and they are unfit to take up leadership positions in the military. Such perceptions are not new to the military environment. Traditionally according to De Pauw (1998), military was a career reserved for men, and women were supposed to be at home, take care of children and perform other duties which are light and within the career path of being a female such as nursing, teaching, administrations and communication amongst others.
De Pauw further highlighted that physical concern was one of the issues that political and military leader were concerned about when they decided to reserve females from combats. De Pauw stated that on average, female soldiers do not possess as much physical strength as their male counterparts and this may put them on a disadvantage position when fighting males.

In contrast, other feminist scholars such as Goldman (1992) and Mboti (2014) countered the view of females’ exclusion from military emphasising that females must be given equal right and equal opportunities with men. They stated that their representation in the positions of command and power is not sufficient and they must be given a fair chance to prove themselves. Furthermore, they argued that women who joined the military in combat roles would almost certainly be aware of the risks that they would be involved as soldier and they would be ready to accept them. Goldman and Mboti further stated that it is inappropriate to portray women as weak creatures because some women do possess the physical attributes suitable to become combatants.

The idea of female empowerment in the military is also supported by the United Nations. According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of (2000), an open discussion on women, peace and security was held in which 40 member states made statements supporting the mainstreaming of gender perspectives into peace support operations and the participation of women in all aspects of peace process. It further highlighted the importance of bringing gender perspectives to the center of all United Nations conflict prevention and resolution, peace building, peacemaking, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts. This equally motivated the United Nation member states to ensure that female components are represented within the structures of their military forces. It is on that basis that one may argue that Namibia as an active member of the United Nations is not an exception to this collective security call and, therefore, needs to consider female empowerment and inclusion on its succession planning.
d) The best approach to handle succession planning in the NDF

Figure 4.4 shows the perceptions of how the respondents prefer the succession planning to be handled.

![The best approach to handle succession planning](image)

Figure 4.4 indicated that majority 85% of the respondents prefer the NDF succession planning to be handled by the succession planning committee, while the rest prefer the human resources, senior management committee and Chief of the Defence Force with 5% each.

The views of the majority 85% of the respondents as indicated in figure 4.4, who prefer the succession planning to be handled through a succession planning committee are in line with the views shared by Cohn et al. (2005) who stated that succession planning is not an isolated individual event conducted exclusively by the Human Resources Department, but rather a collective undertaking through a well constituted committee. The succession planning committee roll out the planning and leadership development which are aligned to the strategic priorities of the institution. This type of planning should be inclusive, allowing mid-level, front-line supervisors and other external constituents to become participants in the planning process that serves as a key strategic
planning tool for improving government performance and accountability (Kim, 2003). Succession planning which is handled by a committee often requires a long period, and costly investment in the selection and training process to create a sustainable values-based culture that regards integrity and competency as significant in leadership development (Karaevli & Hall, 2003).

e) The preferred times for the NDF succession planning to be evaluated

Figure 4.5 shows the preferred time for the NDF succession planning to be evaluated and reviewed.

![Pie chart showing the preferred times for the NDF succession planning to be evaluated and reviewed.](image)

- 75% prefer annually
- 20% prefer after three years
- 5% prefer after five years

Figure 4.5 indicated that majority 75% of the respondents prefer the NDF succession planning to be evaluated and reviewed annually, while 25% of the respondents felt that it should be after three years. However, 5% of the respondents believe that the appropriate time to have the NDF succession planning evaluated and reviewed is after five years. The views of constant evaluation of succession planning is also shared by Jarrell and Pewitt (2007) who stated that institutions should create formal and systematic evaluation mechanisms that provide decision makers with empirical evidence of the return the institution is receiving for its investment in succession planning.
f) Perceptions on the NDF approach of first come first move in relations to succession planning

Figure 4.6 shows the respondent perceptions on the NDF approach of first come first move.

Figure 4.6 indicated that the respondents have mixed feelings and views about the NDF approach of first come first move. The perceptions of the respondents who strongly agree, combined with those who agree with the approach accounts for 45% (15% + 30%). However, the combination of the respondents who disagree and strongly disagree accounts for 55% (30% + 25%), which proved that majority of the respondents do not agree with the NDF approach of first come first move in relations to its succession planning.

The concept of first come first move in relations to succession planning was also explored by Reeves (2010) who asserted that senior leaders and those who came first should be viewed as key people because they have experience and are capable of passing the leadership baton to designated employees who have been identified as capable to become the next institutional leaders. Reeves further stated that the approach of first come first move can be a good strategy for effective
succession planning, however, it may become unproductive if those who came first are not performing, greedy and lack the exit strategy. Reeves, therefore, highlighted that some private institutions force such people to resign or go for early retirement if they are not performing, but it is very rare in public sector and as result, it frustrates the upcoming high performers whose passion is to move the institution forward.

**g) Perceptions on the diversification of the NDF talent pools in terms of age group, gender and ethnicity**

Figure 4.7 shows the perceptions of the respondents on the diversification of the NDF talent pools.

![Diversification of the NDF talent pools](image)

Majority 80% of the respondents as indicated in Figure 4.7 showed that the NDF talent pools are not diversified, while 20% felt it is diversified. The 80% of the respondents who felt that the NDF talent pools are not diversified, justified their arguments stating that although the NDF management attempts to diversify the workforce by recruiting the new members from all 14 regions of the country, management pays little attention at linking diversification with promotion, posting, training and development of the staff members.
The 80% of the respondents whose views were captured through structured questionnaires as indicated in figure 4.7 further stated that age, gender and ethnicity is hardly considered in the NDF when it comes to recommendations and selection to attend military courses as well as for promotion. These respondents state that the selection for courses in the NDF can also be inconsistent in a sense that sometimes strict measures are taken to follow the set entry requirements, for example entry test for Junior Staff Course, however, such requirement sometimes get relaxed. With regards to promotion, the same respondents stated that criteria are strictly followed in some instances, however, incidences of officers who are being promoted without accomplishing the required courses are still common. Such inconsistency is argued to have compromised the set standards of the force.

The 80% of the respondents who felt that the NDF talent pools are not diversified as indicated in figure 4.7 also stated that one may find commanders with their deputies who are of the same age group, deployed at key positions, forgetting that such people will retire at the same time, leaving the potential successors ill prepared or groomed to take over. The respondents further stated that age factor is hardly considered in the NDF in relations to its succession planning, resulting in a situation where some senior leaders who are left with one or two years before they retire, were still selected to attend Command and Staff courses.

One may recommend the MOD and NDF to emulate the views shared by Pynes (2004) that workforce turnover including retirements must be anticipated and planned for and it require institution have the capacity to track the skills of the employees, and updated skill inventories. In addition, the same views were shared by Walker (1998) who reaffirmed that effective succession planning should focus on developing a pool of talent that matches the current and future preferred skill in the institution.
h) Perceptions on whether the young officers who were recruited from 1996 onward are properly groomed and ready to take over from the retiring NDF Commanders

Figure 4.8 shows the perceptions of the respondents on the readiness of the young officers to take over from the retiring NDF Commanders.

Figure 4.8 showed that majority 90% of the respondents felt that the NDF young officers who were recruited from 1996 onward are not ready to take over from the retiring Commanders. Although 10% of the respondents indicated that young officers are ready, they still went on to indicate that there is an urgent need for training and development of these young officers because majority of them did not complete the required military courses.

The 90% of the respondents who stated that the NDF young officers are not properly prepared as indicated by figure 4.8 justified their arguments stating that the NDF does not have a clear guide for grooming or mentoring its young officers for future appointment and in most cases, promotion policy is not properly adhered to. The same respondents further stated that the programs for grooming young officers in the NDF were neglected from the beginning especially at the Army and Air Force.
The perceptions of the respondents appeared to be in line with the statistics given by the Ministry of Defence (2016) that, the Army had only managed to have two young officers who are Colonels, while the Air Force has one Air Commodore and a Group Captain as opposed to the Namibian Navy that had managed to have seven Captain Navies. Such statistics proved that the Namibian Navy had gone an extra mile with its succession planning, training and development compared to the Army and Air Force considering that it was only established in 1998 as a Maritime Wing and commissioned in 2004 as a fully-fledged Navy.

i) Perceptions on whether the NDF correctly deploy its young officers for coaching and mentoring

Figure 4.9 shows the respondents perception about the deployment of the young officers.

![Deployment of the NDF young officers](image)

Figure 4.9 showed that majority 70% of the respondents felt that the NDF young officers were wrongly deployed, however, 30% of the respondents believed that the young officers were correctly deployed and are receiving the required mentorship and coaching from their Commanders. The evidence provided by 30% of the respondents as indicated in figure 4.9 was that most of the young officers were progressing well with majority taking up leadership positions
with ranks of Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonel and very few Colonels, Group Captain and Captain Navies. The same respondents further made reference to the Deputy Air Force Commander (an Air Commodore) who was a young officer from the 1999 training intake.

The 70% of the respondents as indicated in figure 4.9, however, stated that majority of the NDF young officers were wrongly deployed and correct deployment was needed at all levels of command structures starting from a Sections to the Arms of Service. The respondents recommended that the best practice for deployment was for the young officers to be deployed at the Units and Formation immediately after they are commissioned to gain command and control experience before they are deployed at the Headquarters which are mostly predominated by staff and administrative duties.

The same 70% of the respondents as indicated in figure 4.9 further stated that succession planning appeared not to be well-known within the NDF and it was argued to be the root cause of wrong deployment. This was evident by Commanders and staff officers at all levels of the NDF command structure who were occupying strategic positions but they were retiring at the same time without mentoring anyone as their possible successors.

Similarly, the NDF structure was also a challenge because there are too many officers out of structure especially at the Headquarters which equally complicated their deployment. The views of the strategic posting of the staff members were shared by Green (2000) who stated that couching and mentoring of the upcoming high performing and potential staff members are the best ingredient for succession management. Furthermore, Karaevli & Hall (2003) reinforced the same views that succession planning can only be realised when there is adequate support and commitment from senior management, who should direct the institution on how best they should
handle staff members who resist the required changes such as staff deployment, redeployment and rotation.

j) **Perceptions on the challenges to the effective implementation of the NDF succession planning**

The respondents whose perceptions were captured through questionnaires during this study highlighted that training and development of young officers was a challenge because the local military institutions were not well capacitated and only offered courses for Junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Command and Staff courses are mostly the prerequisite for officers’ promotion, however, there were limited training slots at Namibia Command and Staff College as it only offered one training intake per year for less than 30 junior officers.

The same respondents further highlighted that there was a large numbers of senior officers who were promoted without completing the Command and Staff courses as well as without the required academic qualifications, causing them to be under performing in their respective duties because they have skipped some levels of the required leadership passages. In addition, the military approach of first come first move appeared to become a barrier for the young high performers who may not be allowed to bypass the underperforming officers who were inducted before them. This approach appeared to have some loopholes that protect the underperforming officers, and management might be hesitant to force such officers to resign or retire because there was no clear policy that made such provision.

The respondents of the study also highlighted that the absence of the succession planning policy in the NDF appeared to have made it difficult for management to implement effective succession planning because there was no guide. It also appeared that there were few officers who were
qualified both militarily and academically at the Defence Headquarters to assist with the development of policies and strategies that will serve in the best interests of the NDF.

Moreover, the respondents of the study asserted that gender in the NDF appeared to be a challenge in relations to succession planning because women appeared not to be the possible successors as majority were militarily unqualified, and it has resulted into the NDF to have only one female General in the entire NDF. However, some respondents countered such views stating that promotion and posting in the military is done on the basis of capability and qualifications and not on the basis of gender representation.

4.3. Outcome of the qualitative research testing views and expert opinions

The researcher facilitated the unstructured interview with the five senior management of the MOD and NDF namely; Minister of Defence, Permanent Secretary of Defence, CDF, COS Human Resource, and COS Joint Operations to capture the expert opinions on the NDF succession planning and the challenges thereof. Each of the NDF and MOD senior management were interviewed individually at their respective offices to share their expert opinions and experiences on the subject matter. However, the CDF and COS Joint Operations were unable to give audience to the researcher because they were out of the country at the time of interview on official assignments. Furthermore, the Permanent Secretary assigned the Director of Defence Central Staff to represent him as he was also engaged with other official assignments.

As a result, only the Minister, COS Human Resources and Director of Defence Central Staff were interviewed. Honourable Penda Ya Ndakolo, Minister of Defence, was interviewed at his office on 05 October 2017, 14h30 – 15h00, while Rear Admiral (Junior Grade) Setson Hangula, COS Human Resources in the MOD, was interviewed at his office on 04 October 2017, 15h00 – 15h40.
Brigadier General Petrus Nathinge, Director of Defence Central Staff in the MOD was interviewed at his office on 07 October 2017, 15h00 -15h40.

The interviewees were informed that their participation was voluntary and information which they will share will be on record for academic purpose, but not only limited to academic domain because the MOD and NDF management might be interested to have some copies of the thesis after the completion of the study. As a result, interviewees were, therefore, informed to speak with authority to express their expert opinions and experiences on the NDF succession planning.

4.3.1. Outcomes of the unstructured interview with Honourable Penda Ya Ndakolo, Rear Admiral (Junior Grade) Setson Hangula and Brigadier General Petrus Nathinge

a) Views on the status of the NDF succession planning

Ya Ndakolo highlighted that the Human Resources (HR) Policy and other Ministerial guidelines guide succession planning in the NDF. In addition, Commanders at all levels of the Defence Force were expected to plan for succession, especially at the time when the NDF was going through a process of generational change whereby the old guards were exiting at a high rate and the younger officers were taking over command and control of the Force.

Ya Ndakolo further confirmed that he was aware that there was much room for improvement with regard to succession planning and on the implementation of the HR Policy. However, he stated that a good leader, Commander or Senior officer would usually groom junior officers for possible taking over when they retire; thereby making sure that there was no leadership vacuum or crisis after their departure.

Hangula on the other hand stated that the succession planning in any defence force was an inbuilt mechanism which was structured within the defence systems and structure. He highlighted that
military institutions were unique in a sense that they follow their own traditions and norms that were hardly found in other public institutions. As a result, military traditions of succession planning was structured differently and one can hardly find the documented records of military succession plans of any military in the world due to the security nature and mandate of the military.

Hangula provided the practical example of a command structure from the Section of 12 infantry soldiers to a Brigade of 3 Battalions or Regiments in relations to succession planning. He stated that if a Section Commander was incapacitated in the battle field, it was automatic as per the military tradition that the Deputy Section Commander would take charge, and if it was the Company Commander, the Platoon Commander of Platoon one would take charge. The same approach was used at the level of the Brigade that the Deputy Brigade Commander took charge in case the Brigade Commander died, incapacitated or retire. In the situation where the Deputy Brigade Commander was not around or also incapacitated, the Battalion Commander of the first Battalion or Regiment in the Brigade took charge.

Moreover, Hangula maintained that militaries were highly specialised institutions with sensitive and demanding mandate of defending the territorial integrity, people and their properties, therefore, they do not recruit Commanders of all levels from outside. One had to go through various military trainings to qualify for any military appointment. Military institutions were ought to be consistently rejuvenated with the young officers for the system to revolve where the incoming soldiers took up the entry positions and those who came first move on to the substantive positions, and such arrangement created the situation of succession within the military.

On the contrary, Nathinge confirmed that there was no clear succession policy or framework that guided succession planning in the NDF. He highlighted that the current approach that was used by NDF was that, when a vacancy developed, the immediate Commander responsible for that
particular structure was required to propose a suitable officer to fill the existing vacant position. The Commander at the next level would also get involved to propose the suitable candidate for the position. Once the process of selection and recommendation was finalised, the name of the suitable candidate had to be communicated to the overall Commander where the decision to endorse the proposed candidate would be taken. He stated that succession planning in the NDF was not properly arranged because the current selection process might overlook some qualified candidates because there was no proper monitoring mechanism in the entire selection process.

Nathinge, therefore, recommended that the best approach for succession planning in the military was to have a selection board that look at various potential candidates and recommend the most qualified candidate for promotion or succession. He further stated that the normal circumstances of succession planning in other defence forces monitored the candidates from their initial officer cadet training. He gave an example in relation to high performance that the top three or four officers who performed exceptionally well in their cadet training can be guaranteed to become Generals in their military career if they continue to excel. Furthermore, the other officers who did not make it to the top should conduct themselves exceptionally and effectively perform in their appointments in order to join the high performing pools of talent. Nathinge confirmed that such practice was not happening in the NDF and officers who were the top performers during their cadet trainings and continued to perform effectively in their appointments were bypassed by the officers who were not necessarily the high performers.

The status of the NDF succession planning was in agreement with the study conducted by Bernthal & Wellins (2003), as cited in Kim, (2006) that the recent survey on measuring the success of succession planning proved that there was a decrease in succession planning programs, and about 46% of the institutions did not have the succession plan in place. According to their study, such a
figure was high, compared to that of the similar study conducted in 2001, which revealed that 37% of the institutions did not have the succession plans.

The failure to not have the succession plan in place might have been caused by the Human Resources that have failed to show the value of succession planning to their respective institutions. However, one may argue that military traditions of succession planning was structured differently and it was not necessarily the same like in the civilian institutions.

b) Views on how the NDF measures the success of its succession planning

Ya Ndakolo stated that the succession planning measurements provisions were part of the Human Resources Policy and other related regulations in the NDF. In general, the NDF has been quite good at succession as there have been no instances of leadership vacuum or crisis experienced within the Force.

Furthermore, Ya Ndakolo stated that military structures and organization traditionally facilitate smooth succession because each military Unit, from the Section to the highest Units of Defence Force have Commanders and in most instances, such Commanders have one or more Deputies. He confirmed that he did not foresee major problems related to succession in the NDF even if the Human Resources Policy still needed to be implemented effectively. He further stated that if one looked at instances where Commanders conducted the change of Command all over the NDF, it has been properly planned, and smooth handing over and taking over has been witnessed.

Addressing the same issue, Hangula highlighted that the inbuilt mechanism of the NDF succession planning made it easy to see its success which was natural and smooth. The military institution committed to the consistent rejuvenation, training and development of its members will never go wrong with their succession planning because it creates an environment that avoid the key
members to retire at the same time because there would be a pool of high performers of different age groups capable and well trained as potential successors.

Hangula provided an example of the school setup where he stated that if it happened that there would be no enrolment for grade one for one or two years in a country, it would create a problem of a generational gap, that there would be no intake for some classes or even university in some years. However, if there could be a consistent enrolment of grade one every year, the process will be natural and smooth at all levels of education system throughout. Hangula confirmed that such system works exactly the same as the military succession.

Nathinge on the other hand stated that the succession planning can be measured in various ways depending on what one would be looking at. He, however confirmed that the NDF did not have a set guideline which was known and communicated to all Commanders at all levels on how they should measure the success or impact of its succession planning. He, therefore, suggested that the best approach was to look at the performance of the potential candidates’ previous appointment and current appointment to determine the possibility of their next appointment to the senior positions. Nathinge recommended that there must be check and balances within the succession planning process of the NDF and performance must be the admission requirement to the next senior appointment.

Since the NDF appeared not to have the clear guideline to measure the success or impact of its succession planning, one would recommend them to consider models and/or the methods that could be used to measure the value and success of succession planning, namely: Comparison of the program to its objectives, and application of balanced scorecards model amongst others as suggested by Rothwell and Kim (2005).
c) Views on the challenges of the NDF succession planning

Ya Ndakolo stated that the main challenge remained the proper implementation of the HR Policy which if fully implemented would make the succession planning much smoother. He confirmed that succession go together with requisite training and promotion which involved costs, and finance was always a challenges especially at the time when Namibia’s economy was not performing well. He further asserted that there might be cases of skills and knowledge deficit on the part of those who had to take over from others which was equally posing a challenge to smooth succession in the NDF.

Hangula on the other hand stated that the NDF was challenged by a situation of a generational gap which was created at the establishment of the NDF in 1990. He stated that the NDF was not rejuvenated with the young soldiers from 1990 – 1995. Hangula confirmed that such a generational gap of six years created a challenge to the NDF because the officers who were young in 1990 were the one occupying key positions 2017 and were retiring in big numbers without possible successors. The impact of such a generational gap created 27 years ago was real and the MOD and NDF management had to work hard to ensure that the gap was closed through vigorous trainings and development, mentoring and as well as couching of the young officers. He also stated that the other possible alternative to close the generational gap was to extend the service of the incumbents occupying key positions but due for retirement, in order to provide sufficient time for the possible successors to be groomed.

Hangula further emphasised that the key positions such as Brigade Commander and Service Commanders amongst others positions in the military cannot be advertised and be filled by incumbents from outside the military, therefore, consistent military skill audits and trainings was
the key at preparing the internal successors. However, financial resources were a challenge because training and development costs were high and not all the required training was conducted at home.

Nathinge concurred with Hangula that the NDF did not have the capacity to conduct most of its specialised training for its officers, therefore, most of the officers were not qualified in terms of the required training. In addition, Nathinge highlighted that the NDF had some officers in senior positions who have not done the required courses, making it difficult for them to value the importance of such courses and the positive impacts it could have on officers. Furthermore, the NDF did not have a system that allow the positions to be contested by the qualified officers through the selection board, making the process to overlook some potential and highly qualified officers.

Nathinge also highlighted that apart from the financial constraints in the Government, the NDF did not have the targeted approach towards the training of its officers right from the beginning. Some officers who were sent for various courses abroad were not properly selected with a clear plan of ploughing back in the system by developing own programs and training institutions at home. As a result, such officers could not become instructors or directing staffs at the local military institutions. He further stated that some officers came back with unqualified reports that they could not be posted as Commanders or Staff officers and such situation affected the NDF’s capacity to effectively run the established military institutions.

d) Views on the diversification of the current NDF talent pools

Ya Ndakolo acknowledged that although the NDF still needed to improve its talent pool, there was a good body of talented and experienced officers where the NDF can draw for its succession planning. He stated that the diversification of the NDF pool was a challenge. He, therefore, stated that the NDF needed to improve in terms of gender and ethnicity diversity. Ya Ndakolo, however,
emphasised that the situation was not a deliberate arrangement, but sometimes it was due to the requirement of the positions to be filled as some candidates may not qualify to succeed the retiring officers on account of their military experience and qualifications.

Hangula on the other hand confirmed that good governance required each institution to be representative and diversified. He stated that it was difficult to enforce diversification in terms of age, gender and ethnicity in the military which has a service that require selflessness and sacrifice. Hangula emphasised that one should to be highly qualified in terms of physical fitness, military experience, as well as academic attributes to enter the pools of potential successors in the military. Such attributes can be enforced because the military mandate of defending the state cannot be compromised in the name of diversification. As a result, one may find officers from the same ethnic group, same age or same sex who are top performer and management could be forced to compromise with the needed quality by relaxing the requirement to accommodate diversification, which can be a security risk in the military.

Hangula admitted that the NDF talent pools have a balanced ratio in terms of age representation, however, gender and ethnicity was not yet at the required level for numbers of reasons. He stated that some ethnic groups have bigger population as opposed to others, therefore, balancing their numbers could be a challenge. In addition, some ethnic groups (white community) have less representation due to lack of interests, therefore, it affected their equal representation in the talent pools. In terms of gender, Hangula confirmed that male representation was dominating due to the demanding mandate and some females found it too tough to handle.

Hangula, however, confirmed that the NDF female officers were consistently accorded the required support through various training and development that could qualify them to enter the talent pools. He further stated that the idea of female empowerment in the military was a call of
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of (2000). As a result, the NDF management, through quality training, had consistently ensured that the female components were represented within the military structures and value the roles of female officers during conflict situations. Hangula reaffirmed that the NDF was committed at capacitating its training institutions to develop diversified talents that were capable of defending the country and peculiar skill was the main focus.

Nathinge on the other hand confirmed that the NDF does not discriminate its officers on the basis of gender, ethnicity, age or any sorts of discrimination. He stated that all the nominated officers would always be allowed to attend the required training. However, Nathinge warned that the military ought to be a highly specialised institution with a demanding mandate that deals with people’s lives. He therefore stated that one would not confine themselves by appointing officers to meet the need for diversification, but rather appoint officers based on quality and merit for combat readiness and effectiveness. He established that military environment dictates that each officer to be selected for course, succession or recommended for promotion must meet the requirement, and not to compromise the set standards and requirements in the name of diversity.

e) Views on the procedure of nominating members for military courses

Ya Ndakolo confirmed that the NDF members were nominated for military and leadership courses based on course requirements and the talent needs of the Force. He further stated that the Human Resource Policy made the provision for Human Resources Planning.

Hangula on the other hand confirmed that the nomination of the NDF officers to attend the military courses was done on merits based on capability, recommendation from the prerequisite course, and the entry requirements amongst others. He further asserted that the NDF was strengthening its capacity to be able to have the skill audit mechanism that evaluate and identify where they were
under-training and over-training, and where there was a skill shortage as well as to identify which skills were being lost through brain drainage. He confirmed that such capability was at its infant stage in the NDF and ought to be computerised for efficiency and effectiveness.

On the contrary, Nathinge highlighted that the NDF process of nominating officers for courses was not thoroughly scrutinised to determine whether the candidates were within the required age limit (not over aged) and whether they have done the prerequisite courses. He stated that as long as the officers were in the required ranking parameters, they were always allowed to go for courses, despite the fact that one might be close to their retirements. Nathinge argued that the incidences of sending officers who were close to their retirement were done at the expense of the young officers who had more years to serve and contribute to the development of the force.

Nathinge further stated that the incidences of sending the candidate who have not completed the prerequisite courses, caused some officers to fail the courses and came back with the unqualified reports of attendance. He provided an example that for an officer to qualify for the Senior Command and Staff course, they supposed to have successfully completed the Company Commander course and Junior Command and Staff course.

f) Views on the deployment procedures of the NDF young officers

Ya Ndakolo highlighted that the challenge with a deployment and posting of officers in the NDF was an issue of the existence of vacant positions where such officers could be deployed or posted fittingly. He stated that in some instances, the number of officers to be deployed did not correspond to the structure and existing positions. He also stated that despite the challenges, efforts were being made to make sure that officers with qualifications are deployed to positions where they can serve effectively for the benefit of the force. Ya Ndakolo further confirmed that the Directorate of
Human Resources has the responsibility to ensure that officers are deployed and posted according to their qualifications, and mentorship was the responsibility of Commanders at all levels in the NDF.

Hangula concurred with Ya Ndakolo that deployment in the NDF is guided by the structure or institutional organogram which inform management about the existing vacant positions that should be filled by the competent and qualified officers. Hangula stated that the mission of the NDF is aligned to the geography of Namibia as an element of national power which determine the structure of the entire NDF. As a result, the geo-strategic location of Namibia makes provision for the NDF to have a Navy on its structure because Namibia is bordered with the Atlantic Ocean as opposed to other landlocked countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe. He confirmed that the right structure would attract the right skills which determine their deployment.

Hangula acknowledged that the NDF was sometimes inconsistent at ensuring that the young officers were deployed according to the capability and performance alongside with their former combatants for mentorship and grooming. He stated that such arrangement was critical to the NDF because it could allow knowledge transfer between the young officers and the former combatants who are battle tested and have combat experience.

Nathinge on the other hand underscored that the absence of the clear succession plan in the NDF made deployment to be ineffective in a sense that if officers go for military course, they come back to their previous positions. He reasoned that the best practice in the military profession is that, if officers go for courses, they would be removed from their respective positions and placed into their Commanders’ reserve for further deployment. He further stated that once such officers come back with qualifications, they must be redeployed to new positions. Nathinge confirmed that such military tradition was not consistently followed in the NDF and there was no clear system of
verifying whether the officers who were sent to courses have passed or failed their respective courses.

Nathinge, therefore, maintained that all sorts of wrong deployment were happening because there was no clear guide towards the succession planning. The NDF did not have a clear system that monitored the career progression of officers whether on training, regimental duties or operations. He further stated that the Career Planning Division at the Defence Headquarters was not properly empowered to be involved in the selection process of officers going for military courses. Nathinge emphasised that such Division supposed to be involved in the selection process of officers going for courses, conduct skill audit and monitor the career progression of all members in the NDF.

g) Reasons for the slow pace of young officers to climb the military ladders in the NDF

Ya Ndakolo stated that the military ladder is like a pyramid, the high one climb, the thinner it becomes. He asserted that such a situation might be the reason why the pace for young members to climb the military ladder would appear to be too slow. However, it was expected that as the older generations leave the force, the young members will have the opportunity to take up more senior positions in the force. Ya Ndakolo, therefore, advised the young officers to prepare themselves properly and be ready to take over the leadership and management of the NDF when the old guards retire.

Hangula appeared to concur with Ya Ndakolo that there has been a slow pace of young officers to climb the military ladder especially the Army and Air Force as opposed to the Navy. He however, stated that such slow pace was created by the generational gap of 1990 – 1995 where there was no force rejuvenation. As a result, young officers who were recruited from 1996 onward had to go
through all the stages of the military leadership passages and only some of the few were almost making it to the senior and top leadership of the NDF.

Hangula stated that the career progression in the military is naturally slow because one has to do all the required courses before they move to the next level of leadership. He confirmed that military requirements are strict and are ought to be met by all the potential successor without any compromise. He further confirmed that most of the key positions were occupied by the former combatants who were equally high performing officers. He also stated that administratively and as per Public Service Act No 13, of 1995 and regulations, all public servants should retire at the age of 60, therefore, one may not strip off the senior positions from the NDF pioneers and be relinquished to the young officers because their military services were still active. He, therefore, stated that the older officers were battle tested and their service was needed to mentor the young officers as potential successors.

Hangula acknowledged that the case of the Namibian Navy was, however, different because although it was established late in 1998 as Maritime Wing, it attracted young officers who took up senior positions as opposed to the Army and Air Force. He stated that the Navy’s young officers were able to move fast to take up senior positions because there were vacant positions and there were deliberate interventions that were taken to accelerate their training and development with the assistance of the Brazilian Navy.

Nathinge on the other hand acknowledged that the NDF was confronted with the challenge of the aging workforce at the level of officers’ corps in management who were retiring in big number, however, accentuated that one should understand that Namibia’s independence was fought for by the majority of the Generals and Senior officers who were occupying key positions in the NDF at the time under report. He stated that such Generals as well as Senior officers were promoted to
such positions on merit and they deserved such positions because they have military experience, battle tested and their service was critical to transfer skills to the new generation in the military.

Nathinge, however, refuted the argument that young officers’ pace to climb the military ladder was slow, emphasising that military has its own policy for promotion, and one has to effectively perform and qualify before they move on to the next position. He stated that the NDF prides itself for having produced a young officer at the level of a Brigadier General, and a numbers officers at the level of Colonel from the crop of young members who were recruited from 1996 onwards.

He highlighted that it is very rare, and it takes longer in some defence forces where officers have to serve for over 20 years before they become Colonels, Group Captains or Captain Navies. He, therefore, highlighted that the NDF’s young officers’ pace to climb the military ladders was not overlooked, but they were rather on the move and what was lacking was the element of accelerating their training and development.

h) The strategies which the NDF might use to close the gap that will be left by the retiring Generals and Senior officers

Ya Ndakolo stated that there was no escape from the generational change and it should not be a question of what will happen when the old guards go. He maintained that it was a fact that the crop of experienced members of the NDF will one day retire from the force as a generation and at that moment, the young members of the force will inevitably take over and they have to be ready and well prepared.

Ya Ndakolo, therefore, confirmed that the strategy to close the gap that will be left by the retiring NDF Generals and Senior officers was to train, prepare and groom younger officers to take over. He also confirmed that there was already a big pool of very good young officers and Commanders
within the NDF who were ready to take over from retiring Senior officers and Generals, however, constant training and development had to continue because military career is too demanding.

He advised that the process needed to be managed smoothly so that there would be no leadership vacuum and crisis in the NDF, emphasising that he hoped and believed that the Generals and Senior officers were aware of such fact, and were preparing the young officers to take over from them so that when they retire, they would be confident that the Defence Force is in the trusted good hands.

Hangula on the other hand admitted that the situation of the NDF Generals and Senior officers retiring in big numbers was real and required the MOD and NDF management to work at the lightning speed, and to take targeted interventions to remedy the situation on the ground. He stated that the situation would require the MOD and NDF to capacitate its military training institutions to be able to train and develop the young officers, preparing them to take over from the pioneers of the NDF. He, however, asserted that financial constraints and budget cut were the major concern that might derail the process of closing such a generational gap because training and development does not come at cheap price.

On the same note, Nathinge confirmed that in response to the high tide of retirement of Generals and Senior officers, the NDF developed a training strategy meant to enable the officers to attend the required military courses, to qualify and be posted correctly. He highlighted that such training programme was done through cooperation with the Zimbabwean Command and Staff College whose instructors and directing staffs were deployed in Namibia to develop and establish proper curriculum for courses such as Platoon and Company Commander courses as well as the Junior Command Staff courses amongst others.
Nathinge further concurred with Ya Ndakolo and Hangula that the training strategy was meant to establish military institutions that would be able to effectively train the members and prepare them to be posted at challenging positions within the NDF establishment. Such training programme would allow the young officers to prove themselves that they have what it takes to lead the NDF. Moreover, Nathinge concurred with Hangula that the training programme were hampered by the financial constraints in the country.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter presented the analysis and discussion of data drawn from the respondents engaged through questionnaires and unstructured interviews. The questionnaires were administered to 20 officers at the Defence Headquarters to test their perception about the NDF succession planning. The unstructured interviews were conducted with the Minister of Defence, COS Human Resources and Director of Defence Central Staff to get the expert opinions on the NDF succession planning. Data from both research instruments were analysed and it was quite imperative to note that there was no succession policy or framework that guided succession planning in the NDF. It is also worth mentioning that the respondents of both quantitative and qualitative research used in this study had mixed views about succession planning in the NDF due to the absence of the succession policy which supposed to be the guide.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this study was to investigate into the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning, and understand the challenges and issues impeding the effective implementation of their succession policy. This chapter, therefore, provided findings and conclusion of the study. The academic, policy and strategic recommendations that can be used and explored by the NDF on its quest to effectively implement its succession planning were issued.

5.2. Findings

The main purpose of this study was primarily an attempt to investigate into the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning and address the main research question which explored the strategies of training and posting of young officers in the NDF. Other subsidiary questions were also explored to establish the effectiveness of the aforementioned strategies, the weakness of the NDF succession plan, as well as to determine whether the young officers were correctly developed and deployed to maintain the national security after the retirement of the current generation. After the survey that tested the perceptions of officers and the unstructured interviews that captured the expert opinions about the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning, the following findings were discovered.
5.2.1. Strategies of training and posting young officers in the NDF

a) It was revealed in the study that the NDF has a training strategy meant to establish military institutions that would be able to effectively train the members and prepare them to be posted at challenging positions within the NDF establishment.

b) The NDF developed such a training strategy to enable the officers to attend the required military courses, to qualify and be posted correctly. It was also revealed that such training programme were done through cooperation with the Zimbabwean Command and Staff College whose instructors and Directing Staffs were deployed in Namibia to develop and establish proper curriculum for courses such as the Platoon and Company Commander courses and well as the Junior Command Staff courses amongst others.

c) The deployment and posting of officers in the NDF was guided by the structure or institutional organogram which informed management about the existing vacant positions that should be filled by the competent and qualified officers, however, it was found to be inconsistently followed.

d) It was discovered that there were incidences of wrong deployment in the NDF because there was no clear guide toward the succession planning.

5.2.2. Effectiveness of training and posting strategies

a) It was discovered that the NDF training institutions were inadequately capacitated and as a result, it derailed the training strategy. In addition, there was a lack of qualified local instructors that equally disadvantaged the capability of such institutions to conduct some of the specialised training on their own.
b) The NDF still relied on training slots that were offered by other sister Defence Forces on courses such as Senior Command and Staff courses, and NDC amongst others, which was equally described to be insufficient to the NDF senior officers.

c) Financial constraints and budget cut were discovered to be the major concern because training and development does not come at cheap price.

d) Posting of the young officers was discovered to be inconsistent, making it to be ineffective.

5.2.3. The weakness of the NDF succession planning

a) It was discovered that traditionally, succession planning in any Defence Force was an inbuilt mechanism which was structured within the defence systems and structure. Military traditions in relations to succession planning was structured in such a way that one can hardly find the documented records of military succession plans due to the security nature and mandate of the military, however, some Commanders found it difficult to encapsulate, hence, inconsistent deployments and posting were happening.

b) The absence of a clear succession policy appeared to be a weakness on its own because there was no adequate guiding principle which could be consistently followed by all the Commanders in the NDF.

c) The NDF did not have an adequate system that allowed the vacant positions to be contested by the qualified officers through the selection board, making the succession process to overlook some potential and highly qualified officers.
5.2.4. Strategic deployment of young officers to maintain the national security after the retirement of the current generation

a) It was discovered that although the NDF management was working around the clock to ensure that young officers were properly trained, developed, mentored and correctly deployed as per structure, incidences of inconsistent deployments were still happening because there was no clear framework of succession policy.

b) It was discovered that military profession was a specialised, sensitive and security conscious, resulting in military institutions not to recruit Commanders from the external pools or outside the military, but rather train and develop their own Commanders. Hence, young NDF officers were being constantly trained, mentored and groomed both at home and abroad for future leadership positions and possible taking over from the current generation.

5.3. Conclusion

With reference to the findings of this study, it can be safely concluded that the NDF used the unique succession system which was an inbuilt mechanism structured within the defence systems and structure. It was also worth noting that the military institutions were so unique in a sense that they follow their own traditions and norms that was hardly found in other public institutions. As a result, military traditions of succession planning was structured differently and one can hardly find the documented records of military succession plans of any military in the world due to the security nature and mandate of the military. Therefore, there was no clear succession policy within the NDF.
The study also concluded that the NDF’s existing training institutions were not properly capacitated, and as result, the NDF did not have the capacity to effectively offer some of the specialised training to its own officers, hence, some of them were underqualified due to unavailability of training slots. Training and development is invariably interlinked with succession planning, therefore, effective succession planning may not take place in the environment where training of the potential successor is at its basic.

The study further concluded that military was a highly specialised institution with a demanding mandate involved with people’s lives. Therefore, appointing authority in the NDF would not confine itself by appointing officers to meet the need for diversification, but rather appoint officers based on physical fitness, military experience, as well as academic attributes for combat readiness and effectiveness. Therefore, the issue of the un-diversification of the NDF talent pools of potential successors in terms of age, gender and ethnicity was justifiable.

Moreover, the study concluded that the NDF was inconsistent with the deployment of its young officers causing the system to have Commanders and their Deputies who were of the same age group, retiring at almost the same time without any prepared successors who were readily groomed and mentored as the potential successors. The study further concluded that the NDF officers and Generals had mixed views about the pace of young officers’ climbing the military ladder. Some felt the pace was slow while other felt it was at the right speed. The study, however, concluded that the pace was a bit slow, and such a slow pace was created by the generational gap of 1990 – 1995 where there was no force rejuvenation. As a result, young officers who were recruited from 1996 onward had to go through all the stages of the military leadership, attend all the required courses to qualify themselves, and only some of the few were almost making it to the senior and top leadership of the NDF.
Finally, the study concluded that although the MOD and NDF established numbers of training institutions, management would be required to work at the lightning speed with the targeted interventions to capacitate the military training institutions to be able to train and develop the young officers, preparing them to take over from the pioneers of the NDF who were retiring in big numbers.

The same views on the importance of training and military preparedness were shared by the former Chief of the Namibian Defence Force, Lieutenant General Ndaitwah (2017) who stated that Defence Forces are unique institutions in terms of their missions, structures and traditions. Their uniqueness can be observed in the way states go some extra miles in building their credible and formidable forces to project power and send clear signals to the would-be aggressors not to try to disturb their peace and stability. Such projection of power is done in relations to their assumptions and perceived threats. For clarity, General Ndaitwah explained these assumptions and perceived threats with reference of the establishment of the fire brigade as an example. He stated that the Fire brigades cannot be created when there are houses on fire; however, they are created on assumptions that there might be a house on fire one day that would need to be extinguished.

General Ndaitwah further stated that it takes time before one is qualified to be called a professional soldier, who is ready to take up future commanding and leadership positions in the military. He argued that preparing a pool of military talents that are haphazardly prepared shall mean, lack of experience that will culminate into weak elements called soldiers whose soldering effect will be at zero level. He, therefore, concluded that the nations that relent and become complacent, putting less efforts in capacitating their military hoping that there shall be no emerging security threats shall do that at their own peril. Such views of training and military preparedness, therefore, justified the realism theory that has been used to guide this study.


5.4. Recommendations

In the views of the findings and conclusion, the following policy, strategic and academic recommendations were made.

5.4.1. Policy and strategic recommendations

a) It was recommended for the NDF to develop, approve and operationalise its succession planning policy that would serve as a guide for workforce planning and staffing.

b) It was recommended for the NDF succession planning policy to be integrated with recruitment, retention, training and development, posting and promotion.

c) It was recommended for the MOD and NDF to capacitate its local military training institutions to be able to train and offer military courses that were not offered in Namibia.

d) It was recommended for the NDF to consider sending at least a sizeable number of young and capable officers to be trained abroad so that they could become lecturers, instructors and Directing Staffs at the local military training institutions that lack the qualified staff members.

e) It was recommended for the MOD and NDF to capacitate the Career Planning Division at the Defence Headquarters with qualified Human Resource Analysts and Strategists who would be able to conduct skill audits and advised management on where the NDF was overtraining and undertraining.

f) It was recommended for the Career Planning Division to be involved in the selection process of officers who were to be recommended for courses, posting and promotion because they would know the career progression records of each officer. Such arrangement would avoid wrong posting, undeserving promotion, idleness of officers without training opportunities, as well as short cuts within the military leadership passage.
g) It was recommended for the MOD and NDF to consider buying training slots especially for Senior Command and Staff course amongst others because slots that were voluntarily offered by other sister forces were insufficient for a large number of the NDF senior officers who were still in the queue for such courses.

h) It was recommended for the NDF to establish the succession planning committee that would be chaired by the COS Human Resources and constituted of officers from Career Planning Division, Joint Operations, as well officers from Arms of Service Headquarters. Such committee could be able to meet annually to monitor and evaluate the performance of the succession planning and report to the CDF.

5.4.2. Academic recommendations

In the views of the findings, the following recommendations for further study were made.

a) It was recommended that a study be carried out to investigate into the prospects and constraints of the NDF transformation.

b) It was also recommended that a study be carried out to investigate into the implications of unqualified military officers on the national security.

c) It was finally recommended that a study be conducted to investigate into the implications of defence budget cuts on military preparedness and national security.
6. References


7. Appendixes

7.1. Appendix one: Questionnaires

Dear participant

I am Gideon Shuuya, a Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies student at the University of Namibia. I am conducting a study on the effectiveness of succession planning in the NDF as part of my thesis. The aim of the study is to test perceptions, in-depth information, and to recommend solutions based on research and best practices that would enhance the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning. Your participation in this survey is voluntary. In addition, information provided will be treated as confidential, and will only be used for the purposes of the study.

I, therefore, kindly ask you to complete the following questionnaire to your best honest ability.

Yours

Gideon Shuuya

Kindly indicate your choice by ticking the appropriate box and explain where required.

1. Age

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<td>a</td>
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<td>36 – 45</td>
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2. Gender

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<td>a</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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3. **Education Level**

   a. Primary
   b. Secondary
   c. Tertiary

4. **Rank**

   a. Lieutenant
   b. Captain
   c. Major
   d. Lieutenant colonel
   e. Colonel
   f. General

5. **Were you integrated or recruited after 1996**

   a. Integrated
   b. Recruited
   c. Others (specify)

6. **What is the highest military course that you have successfully completed?**

   a. Commissioning course
   b. Platoon Commander course
   c. Company Commander course
   d. Junior Staff Course
   e. Senior Staff Course
   f. NDC
   g. Others (specify)
7. What is the highest academic qualification that you have successfully completed?

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<td>Degree</td>
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<td>Postgraduate Diploma or Honours Degree</td>
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<td>e</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>Doctorate of Philosophy (PhD)</td>
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<td>g</td>
<td>Others (specify)</td>
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8. In your own view, how effective is the NDF succession planning?

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<td>a</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>Effective</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>ineffective</td>
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<td>d</td>
<td>Poor</td>
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9. Does the NDF give equal chances to all officers to attend academic and military courses?

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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
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10. Does the NDF give fair chances to female officers to attend military courses?

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<td>a</td>
<td>Gives fair chances</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>Limited chances</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>Bias/sideline women</td>
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<td>d</td>
<td>Others (specify)</td>
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11. What would be the best approach to handle succession planning in the NDF?

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<td>a</td>
<td>Set up a succession planning Committee</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>To be handled by HR</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>To be handled by CDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>To be handled by the MOD and NDF Senior Management Committee</td>
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<td>e</td>
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12. How often would you like the NDF succession planning to be evaluated and reviewed?

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<td>a</td>
<td>Annually</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>After three years</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>After five years</td>
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<td>d</td>
<td>Others (specify)</td>
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13. Do you agree with the NDF’s approach of “first come, first move” in terms of succession planning and promotion?

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Strong agree</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
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14. Does the NDF have a diversified talent pool in terms of age group, gender and ethnicity who are ready for senior leadership positions?

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Diversified talent pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Undiversified talent pool</td>
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If your answer is B, justify what is lacking:

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15. In your own views, are the officers who were recruited from 1996 onwards properly prepared and developed to take over from the current leaders that are retiring in big numbers? Please justify.

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16. In your own views, does the NDF correctly deploy its young officers for the on-job coaching and mentoring in preparation for succession in the future? Please justify.

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17. What are some of the challenges that are affecting the effective implementation of the NDF succession planning?

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Thank you for your participation!
7.2. Appendix two: Interview questions with the MOD and NDF Senior Management members

1. What is the status of succession planning in the NDF?

2. How does the NDF measure the success of its succession planning?

3. What are some of the challenges of the NDF succession planning?

4. How diversified are the current NDF talent pools?

5. What approach does the NDF use to nominate its members for military and leadership courses?

6. What strategy does the NDF use to ensure that these officers are correctly deployed and posted?

7. Since 1996 when the NDF started with the rejuvenation of the force, only very few young members have made it into management positions. Why is the pace too slow for these young members to climb the military ladder?

8. The NDF is faced with the large number of experienced and battle tested members who are going on retirement in big numbers. What strategy will the MOD and NDF use to close the gap that will be left by the retiring Senior Officers and Generals?
7.3. Appendix three: Permission letter to the Permanent Secretary

MEMORANDUM

Extension : 2107/081 3861 353
Enquiries : Mr. Gideon Shuuya

TO : Permanent Secretary
FROM : Gideon Shuuya

DATE : 15 August 2017

SUBJECT: REQUISITION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON THE NDF SUCCESSION PLANNING

1. I, 17295888, Gideon Shuuya, a Chief Media Officer at Public Relations Division, and a final year student at the University of Namibia, School of Military Science, doing Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies, hereby kindly and humbly seeks permission from the PS to conduct academic research on the effectiveness of the NDF succession planning.

2. This research is necessitated by the challenge of the aging force at the level of the officers’ corps in management, with majorities of the well experienced and battle tested Senior Officers and Generals retiring in big numbers in the next five years. The study is an academic requirement for the partial fulfilment of my Master of Arts Degree and it is purely for academic purpose and a final copy will be shared with the MOD and NDF Management. It is worth noting that I will be supervised by Dr. Vincent Mwange to ensure that the security of the MOD and NDF is protected at all times.

3. As a product of the MOD and NDF, I chose the topic of succession planning in the NDF in order to explore international best practices and the succession planning models that are used to effectively develop and implement the succession planning. The outcome of the study could be resourceful to the MOD and the NDF as it would provide appropriate policy and strategic recommendations on how to effectively address the challenges of the succession planning. It will also provide scholarly recommendations for further research.
4. Kindly find the attached letter from the University of Namibia, School of Military Science that has approved my topic for research. Furthermore, kindly find the attached interview questions and questionnaire for this study for your approval.

I am counting on your usual support.

GIDEON SHUUYA
CHIEF MEDIA OFFICER; PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

22 May 2017

This letter serves to confirm that Gideon Shuya (Student No: 200215523) is a final year candidate for the Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies (MASSS), Faculty of Science, School of Military Science. In this regard the student is required to conduct a research project as part of the requirement to complete the Master’s program successfully. The topic of the thesis is An Investigation into the Effectiveness of the Succession Plan of the Namibian Defence Headquarter Windhoek.

Therefore, the University of Namibia is requesting your good offices to grant the student all the necessary assistance for him to obtain information required to write his thesis. The research findings will be used for the masters study purpose only and the participant opinions/views will be kept confidential.

Thank you for the support.

22 May 2017

[Signature]

DR. V. M. MWANGE
ASSOCIATE DEAN: SCHOOL OF MILITARY SCIENCE
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH IRO 17295888 MR GIDEON SHUUYA

1. This correspondence serves to inform that, 17295888 Mr Gideon Shuuya is a member of Ministry of Defence (MOD) / Namibian Defence Force (NDF), Chief of Media Office at Public Relations Division and a final year student at the University Of Namibia, School of Military Science doing Masters of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies (MASSS).

2. The member is conducting a research “on an investigation of the succession plan of the Namibian Defence Force: A case study of the Defence Headquarters Windhoek.” The research will be conducted within Defence Headquarters, Windhoek from 1st August 2017 till 31st October 2017 as one of the requirements to graduate from the Masters of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies. The research will be for academic purpose only and the exercise will be carried out during the said period.

3. The targeted populations for this research will cover twenty (20) officers and non-commissioned officers and five (5) high ranking officers including Minister of Defence, Permanent Secretary, Chief of Defence Force, Chief of Staff Human Resources and Chief of Staff Joint Operations and Training, based at the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek.

4. The researcher will use quantitative and qualitative method and collect data through questionnaire and verbal interviews.

5. In view of the above-stated requirements, 17295888 Mr Gideon Shuuya is hereby granted permission to conduct his academic research in the MOD/NDF Defence Headquarters, Windhoek.

6. Render the member all the necessary support and assistance he may require.
7. Enclosed hereto, find the supporting documents for your action.

Enclosures: 1. Letter to the PS (from the member)
2. Research Proposal
3. Research Questionnaires
4. Research Programmer

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For Action

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For Info

PS
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