

**A SECURITY COMPLEX IN TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE
OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
(SADC) AS A NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY**

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Abstract

The key argument of this thesis is that the southern African region is historically a security complex that is undergoing meaningful transformation however, towards a security community. The study harnesses a social constructivist perspective to draw on the works of the Copenhagen School of International Relations on regional security complexes. Applying the regional security complex theory with post-structuralist categories, the study shows that the region has historically been characterised by conflict-generating relations between its key political actors (the Frontline States and the South African-led white minority regimes), which it largely attributes to the bankruptcy of the orthodox power-dilemma approaches to International Relations.

The study further argues that in the post-Cold War, post-Apartheid era, the regional security dynamics have changed from interstate to intrastate, and that this, together with the historical development of Southern African Development Community as a hegemonic intervention, suggest the region is undergoing fundamental and positive transformation. The study applies Adler and Barnett's security community framework to argue that this transformation places the region on track towards a security community, where there may be dependable expectations for peaceful change. However, still short of being a mature security community, SADC needs to guide its Member States through the outstanding issues in their democratic transitions towards its consolidation. The nature of this regionalisation, however, is a negotiated process which cannot be fast-tracked without penalties on regional integrity.

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Table of Contents</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>vi</i>
<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>viii</i>
<i>Dedication</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Declaration</i>	<i>x</i>

Chapter One: Introduction and Background

Introduction	1
Statement of the Problem	4
Research Questions.....	5
Objectives of the Study.....	5
Significance	5
Limitations.....	6
Background.....	6
Chapter Organization.....	10

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

Introduction.....	12
Brief History of International Security Studies.....	13
Regionalism	15
Contending Theories of Security Studies	19
Realism/Neo-Realism.....	20
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism.....	22
Constructivism.....	24
Post-Structuralist Premises and Discourse Theory.....	32
Limitations of and Criticisms Against Discourse Theory.....	43
Regional Security Complex Theory.....	45
Security, Securitization and Desecuritization.....	47

Criticisms Against the Copenhagen School.....	50
Security and Development.....	52
Weak States and Problems of Security.....	55
Security Complex Continuum.....	58
Regional Security Complex and Security Community.....	59
Conclusion.....	69

Chapter Three: Methodology

Introduction	72
Research Design	73
Documentary Research	75
In-depth Interviews	77

Chapter Four: SADC as a Regional Security Complex

Introduction.....	80
The Making of a Regional Security Complex	82
From Politico-Security Strategy to Economic Strategy.....	86
Discourse Theory and the FLS Identity	92
From Coordination to Development Community	102
Conclusion	109

Chapter Five: SADC's Institutional and Policy Frameworks: Indicative

Elements of a Nascent Security Community

Introduction	115
The Treaty	117
Social and Economic Development: The Raison D'êtres for SADC.....	119
Crafting the Security Architecture	121
The Structure and Functions of the Organ	125
The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ.....	129
Instruments for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.....	131
Conclusion	141

Chapter Six: The Role of SADC in Regional Political Crises: The Cases of Zimbabwe and Lesotho

Introduction	143
SADC Framework for Democratic Elections	144
SADC Mediation in the Zimbabwe Crisis.....	147
Background	147
The Crisis and SADC Mediation	150
The Global Political Agreement	158
SADC and the GPA	160
SADC Mediation in Lesotho.....	164
Background	164
The 2007 Post-Election Conflict	169
SADC Mediation in the Conflict.....	171
Conclusion	176

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

Introduction	181
A Regional Security Complex	182
A Security Community	184
Conclusion	195

References **198**

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Lusaka Manifesto

Appendix 2: The Windhoek Declaration

Appendix 3: Letter of Introduction

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Regime Typology, Transition Trajectory and Governance Condition	57
Table 4.1: Sectoral Coordination by SADCC Member States	90
Table 6.1: SADC's Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections	145

List of Figures

Figure 2. 1: The Development of Security Communities	66
Figure 5.1: The Structure of the OPDSC	126

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Lastly, however, I am solely responsible for any error of fact, omission and interpretation in this thesis.

Dedication

To the trinity of Bonny, Lefika and myself

Declarations

1. I, Lucky Ramokgadi Bogatsu, declare hereby that this study is a true reflection of my own research, and that this work, or part thereof has not been submitted for a degree in any other institution of higher education

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Lucky R. Bogatsu

Date.....

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

The challenges emanating from the post-Cold War international system are transnational, multidimensional and multilateral in extent and therefore require the intervention of multilateral actors (Baylis, 2008: 239). This has led to the growth of 'new regionalism' as both a coping mechanism in the face of globalization and as a direct consequence of the politics of "adjacency", where conflicts are between neighbours rather than between non-neighbours (Best and Christiansen, 2008:437).

The region of southern Africa has known conflict from as far back as pre-colonial Defaqane wars of the 19th Century to the colonising wars aimed at subjugating the indigenous populations of the region to the wishes of the Europeans. These were later followed in the 1960s to 1980s by the liberation struggles to break free from colonialism, the civil wars feeding off the colonial legacy of 'weak' and 'artificial' states – the ramifications of which are still being felt today – and overlaying superpower rivalry that fed into and prolonged the civil conflicts of the region (Schoeman, 2006: 240-263). Throughout these periods, the peoples of the region have laboured to find solutions and manage their differences to levels where life could continue. This has become even more pronounced in the wake of the end of the Cold War, when superpower interference subsided in regional politics leaving truly intra-regional security dynamics to come to the fore.

Formed in 1992, from the erstwhile Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the latest

attempt at regionalisation in pursuit of the illusive peace. In this endeavour, SADC envisions, for its citizens, "a shared future, a future within a regional community" (SADC, 1992: 5) "that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom in an environment of peace, security and stability, regional cooperation and integration, equity, mutual benefit and solidarity, social justice, peace and security for the peoples of southern Africa ..." (SADC, 2003: 4). To enable the realisation of its vision, SADC has a development strategy codified in its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003, and an evolving security architecture centred around its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The OPDSC, through its protocol of 2001, is mandated to promote peace and security in the sub-region as an enabler for development. SADC has also gone further to operationalize the Protocol through the formulation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) (revised in 2011), leading to the establishment of the SADC Standby Force (SSF), and Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) among its regional mechanisms for achieving peace, stability and security (SIPO 2004: 14) and as part of the African Union's (AU) peace and security architecture.

Peter Meyns observes that in 2001 SADC underwent a profound introspection that resulted in the restructuring of the organisation, especially with regard to the OPDSC, in Blantyre, Malawi. This introspection was instigated by the political challenges from Lesotho and the Congo, and followed fundamental differences between former President Mandela of South Africa and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe on the question of the regional security structure (2002:142). Currently, and within the context of this regional security architecture, the sub-regional body is

fully engaged by the political crises in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Zimbabwe and not so long ago Lesotho.

It is this history of conflict management that some writers believe sets the region apart, rather than the conflicts themselves which were more common throughout Africa at these times anyway (see Du Pisani 2010: 23). According to Buzan (1991), it is such regional interaction that defines a security complex, and the success of its conflict management would determine its transformational trajectory from a conflict-prone area to a security community. However, the idea of a security community involves a general internalisation of democratic values within the states making up such a community (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The argument being that the SADC vision in its ambitious form wishes for its citizens the trappings of a mature security community, while on the other hand democracy may not be fully entrenched within the region. While the present and future security challenges may continue to determine the transformational trajectory of SADC as a security complex, the danger, however, lay in the possibility that some trajectories may be perilous to this budding security community.

The definition and conceptualisation of the theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) is based largely on the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde spanning more than two decades, with other colleagues who together form, what is generally regarded as the "Copenhagen School". The basic premise underpinning Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is that "since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes" (Buzan and Waever,

2003:4).

1.1 Statement of the Problem

A Regional Security Complex by definition accommodates both amity and enmity relations, however, to transform to a security community Member States need to institutionalise democratic principles and norms (Buzan, 1991 :218). This is because a security community requires that the probability of coercive violence is low both in the external and internal relations of its Member States, hence "disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fears, or prepares for, either political assault or military attack by any of the others" (Buzan, 1991: 218).

SADC through its summits and conferences as joint decision-making fora, its protocols and common policies and mechanisms covering the different security sectors, and its on-going mediation efforts in regional conflicts has demonstrated some institutional growth with regard to respect for each other, trust and establishment of common norms (Ngoma 2005: 55-57). Therefore, while real and practical conflicts and security threats still exist in southern Africa, it can be argued that the possibility of an inter-state war is very low, on the other hand it will be presumptuous and premature: to argue that SADC is a mature security community. In this context, the extent of its transformation into a security community becomes of interest.

This study intends to use Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to define the Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region as a Regional Security Complex espousing a security community. The study will then, using the

history of the region and the political crisis in Zimbabwe and the 2007 post-election crisis in Lesotho in the context of the sub-region's historical security cooperation and its security architecture, examine the extent of its transformation and the challenges threatening SADC's consolidation into a robust security community.

1.2 Research Questions

The thesis intends to address itself to the following questions in order to unravel the above problem statement

1.2.1 Can SADC be defined as a regional security complex?

1.2.2 Is SADC in the process of transforming into a security community?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study intends to achieve the following objectives:

1.3.1 To conceptually explore the conditions that characterise SADC as a regional security complex;

1.3.2 To establish the de facto locus of SADC within the phases of development into a security community; and

1.3.3 To describe the challenges impeding further consolidation into a robust security community.

1.4 Significance

The study will be significant in the following respects;

1.4.1 The thesis will contribute to the empirical study of regional security complexes.

1.4.2 By commenting and monitoring the integration process of SADC, the

study contributes to promotion of regional cooperation and integration.

- 1.4.3 The thesis will also contribute to the theoretical application of post-structuralism to security studies.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

- 1.5.1 The thesis will rely on elite interviews and therefore gaining access to the targeted respondents may be difficult due to their hectic schedule or for bureaucratic reasons.
- 1.5.2 The respondents may also, due to their expertise and vested interests, manipulate the interview.
- 1.5.3 Due to resource limitations the interview respondents will be limited to the SADC staff only. It is hoped that their general involvement in regional matters will provide the required factual information on the structures and operations of SADC.
- 1.5.4 The study will be limited to the events of the case studies upto and including September 2012.
- 1.5.5 The study has to limit case studies to SADC member states that use English as an official language to enable the use of local discourse materials as research data for analysis.

1.6 Background

The starting point to the ultimate existence of southern Africa as a distinct political region from the rest of Africa can be located in the 1800s, composed of the decline of the British Empire and the global economic stagnation that led to the notorious

'scramble for Africa' by various European powers. The peculiarities of the sub-region relative to the rest of Africa, explain the comparatively huge settler population in the region. The huge mineral wealth combined with a temperate climate, the near absence of malaria, and a permissive land ownership with plentiful supply of cheap semi-skilled and unskilled African labour resulted in settler colonialists rather than administrators (Farley, 2008: 1).

The struggle for land between the African kingdoms and the settlers led to disadvantageous treaties that resulted in Africans losing their land, and being incorporated into political units established by the colonial powers. Therefore, by the time of de-colonisation, like the indigenous populations, this settler population regarded those countries as their own. And, as Farley puts it, "their lives, emotions and aspirations were all bound up in these lands: psychologically and financially, detachment was impossible" (2008: 1).

While colonisation resulted in the occupation of Angola and Mozambique by Portugal, and Britain in the rest of the region, it is the aftermath of the Second World War that laid the foundation for its regional polarisation during the liberation period. South Africa emerged from the war in a powerful position regionally and through its industrialisation attracted significant number of migrant labourers to its mines. Then in 1948, the apartheid system was introduced with the ascendancy to power of the National Party. The existence of a minority-ruled racist system in South Africa, and colonial governments in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Rhodesia brought the region into a period of conflict fuelled by demands for decolonisation (Farley 2008).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 as

a Regional Economic Community (REC), signalling the change of focus from its forerunners, the Frontline States (FLS) and Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The FLS was formed in 1974 by a group of southern African independent states comprising Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. This was an informal alliance aimed towards the political liberation of the sub-region from colonialism and white minority rule. Their activities included regular meetings to coordinate their efforts, resources and strategies in their assistance of National Liberation Movements that were fighting against colonialism, racism and white minority-rule in southern Africa. Its vision, attributable to its two founding figures – former Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania – was “a trans-continental belt of independent and economically powerful nations from Dar es Salaam and Maputo on the Indian Ocean to Luanda on the Atlantic (Khadiagala, 1994: 225).

The advent of the FLS in the regional security dynamics of southern Africa is credited to the two former heads of states, who had honed their skills in its precursor organizations; namely the Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) established in 1958, which later gave rise to the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in 1962. These two were dissolved upon the formation of the Organization for African Unit (OAU) in 1963. Feeling that the OAU was too formal and broad to effectively articulate the emancipatory interests of southern Africa, Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia initiated informal conferences on East and Central

African Countries (CECAC) for this purpose. In 1969, CECAC penned its first southern African declaration -the Lusaka Manifesto -which would be the basis for future political dialogue on and about the sub-region. The Manifesto was subsequently inherited by the FLS as a guiding document on the southern African liberation struggle against colonialism and the Apartheid system in South Africa (Cilliers 1999: 3).

The end of the Cold War, with the accompanying removal of the superpower penetration and overlay, exposed regional and intra-state challenges that were hitherto hidden. The conflict in the DRC in 1997 with the involvement of the countries from East and Central Africa had distinct regional geopolitical dimensions to it, threatening to polarise the SADC members between what is commonly referred to as the 'peace block' (led by South Africa) and the 'defence block' (led by Zimbabwe); the territorial dispute between Botswana and Namibia was another moment of political tension within the region. SADC's inability to resolve the dispute meant that the concerned parties had to invite the intervention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, which ruled in favour of Botswana. The Zimbabwean instability following farm invasions by some former freedom fighters, political intolerance demonstrated by the incumbent government of President Mugabe and the accompanying economic meltdown resulted in an influx of illegal immigrants into Botswana and South Africa, and human security challenges within the country, all with regional ramifications that bordered on a regional security threat; and a number of "unrests and coup-like dimensions" in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007, and Zambia in 1997 (Ngoma, 2005: 5) are all characteristic of the new

challenges that were facing SADC and needed normatively grounded institutional reforms.

SADC has, therefore, since its inception been preoccupied with a search for a regional structure that can mitigate both the politico-security and socio-economic challenges facing the sub-region for the common good of its peoples. This study is an attempt to examine, understand and comment on the effort to derive this structure within the context of its vision for a security community.

1.7 Chapter Organisation

The study is divided into three sections. The first section, composed of two chapters, focuses on the theoretical framework and the methodological approach of the study. Chapter Two provides an overview of the dominant theoretical approaches to security studies attempting to justify the choice of social constructivism as the preferred approach for the study. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology employed for the design, collection, analysis and interpretation of data pertinent to the study. The analysis aligns with post-structuralism, arguing that constructivism's weakness is its underdevelopment of the concept of identity, and post-structuralist categories in discourse theory avail better tools to understand identification within the context of southern Africa, especially with regard to the security complex hypothesis and the present day SADC.

The second section is made up of three chapters. It deals with the empirical dimensions of the two hypotheses implied in the research questions within the context of identity and difference and their implications to SADC regionalisation. Chapter 4 addresses itself to the formation of southern Africa as a security complex

based on discourse coalitions and antagonisms. It argues that SADC is a product of identity crisis and hegemonic struggles in the context of the dynamics between the discourse coalitions of FLS and the demise of the apartheid system. It then suggests that the discourses of the liberation solidarity (which was marginalised in the hegemonic formation of SADC) represent its 'constitutive outside' and therefore a real threat to its stability. Chapter 5 examines the security architecture of SADC and how the effects of its operationalisation move the sub-regional body forward (and backwards) within the paradigmatic framework of a security community. Chapter 6 is the examination of the two case studies of Zimbabwe and Lesotho as exemplifying the major challenges and pre-occupation of SADC to date, in its effort to attain regional peace and security. In this context, it assesses the ability of SADC to cascade its norms within its Member States and instil regional coherence and stability. It argues that probably the biggest threat to SADC's integrity is the structural weaknesses of its members.

Finally, the last section comprising Chapter 7 is the study's conclusion. It attempts to link theory to the case, and consolidates the major conclusions with regard to the research questions.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

The previous chapter has introduced the study against the historical development of southern Africa as a specific exemplar of regionalism. This historicity provides the context upon which the core arguments presented in the thesis are based. This chapter conceptualises the major contending theoretical approaches to security, for possible analytical application to the sub-region in terms of its security dynamics. This chapter explores Neo-realism, Neo-liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism, particularly highlighting deficiencies of the first two theories while illuminating the significance of the last for the study of SADC's politico-security dynamics as a social construct. Further, highlighting the shortcomings of the constructivist approach with regard to the concept of identity and difference, the chapter suggests the use of post-structuralist categories of the discourse theory to enhance its applicability and overcome the criticisms against the approach.

The second section explores concepts of security, securitisation and desecuritisation as tenets of the politico-security processes within security complexes, and how concerned agents deploy them to declare certain issues as security issues and the discourse of desecuritizing such issues in regional politics. This conceptualization also establishes the development-security nexus as the wellspring of human security, as well as the significance of securitization and desecuritisation practices to the concerns of human security.

The third section briefly outlines the theoretical conception of 'weak state' focusing mainly on aspects of statehood that are most likely to become referents of security in the periphery states. SADC, falling in this tier of the international system, is likely to face challenges emanating from the inherent characteristics of its Member States as 'weak states', and therefore an impediment to desecuritisation efforts within the region. The application of the weak state concept also adapts the securitization theory to the developing world and away from its euro-centric approach. To motivate for a solution, the concept is counterbalanced with Khabele Matlosa's conception of democratic deficit as a more useful description of the African state system. The final section explores the concept of security community as a point in a RSC continuum and a locality for desecuritisation and, therefore, as an ideal for a security complex transformation.

2.1 Brief History of International Security Studies

International Security Studies is a sub-field of International Relations (IR), although historically the two were separate disciplines and, like most fields, both are largely Western subjects (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 1). The foundation of Security Studies can be apportioned to among others, Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz and Thucydides (Kolodziej, 2005: 48-75). Also included in the pre-Second World War period are thinkers like Mahan, Richardson and Haushofer.

According to Buzan and Hansen, the field in this period focused on "war studies, military and grand strategy, and Geopolitics" (2009: 1). This was the result of the domination of IR by the Realist Theory. The realists not only dominated the debates but also tended to focus mainly at the systemic and state levels of analysis, creating a

theoretical and empirical analysis void at the regional level. The conceptual shift in focus from 'defence' or 'war' to 'security' after 1945 marked a watershed moment in the evolution of the two fields. This opened opportunities for analysis of far more political issues than hitherto.

Additionally, the literature that emerged during this period concerned itself with issues of the Cold War and nuclear weapons – areas that were not purely military and therefore highly civilianised. Security as a concept, at the time, was mainly about nuclear standoff between the two superpowers and their military strategies (national security), and only "matured" very late in the Cold War (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 2). As the superpower rivalry waned or "matured" in the late 1970s pressure started building for opening up or 'widening' the concept so that other, non-traditional threats (that are more relevant post-Cold War) like economic and environmental concerns could be addressed with the same vigour as military security during the Cold War.

It was in these realist lacunae that the Copenhagen School of International Relations found a niche for an alternative conception of security. Therefore the security complex theory, as a conception of the Copenhagen School, is based on the conceptual existence of an intermediate level where security is considered in terms of the regional interaction between states, amidst a space created by superpower retreat at the end of the Cold War (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 10). The conception emphasizes studying security as a "speech act", based on the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 26).

So the end of the Cold War, among other things, has laid claim to the birth of major conceptual developments in the field of International Relations in general, and

Security Studies in particular (Buzan, 1991: 2).

2.2 Regionalism

This study is located within the "new regionalism" scholarship, with a particular bias towards security regionalism. The reference to 'new' relates to the distinction between what are regarded as the two waves of regional integration. The first wave (old regionalism) is generally located in the period 1940s up to the early 1970s, while the second wave (new regionalism) is recognised as the period of mid 1980s onwards (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000: 33). The 'old' regionalism was based on an "explicit competition with globalism and the promotion of import substitution on a regional scale, protectionism, collective self-reliance and the reduction of dependency and exclusiveness" (Soderbaum, 2009: 78).

New regionalism, according to Hettne, refers to "a transformation of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions", to include culture, security, economic development and political regimes (1996). Regionalisation, on the other hand, refers to "the (empirical) process that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space" (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000 34). Hettne asserts that the "process of regionalisation can only be understood within the context of globalisation" (1999: xxxi). This assertion can be seen as foreclosing the mainstream debates about globalisation and regionalism, where on the one hand regionalisation poses serious challenge and threat to globalisation and, on the other, regionalism builds on to globalisation, providing the benefits of globalisation while protecting against the insecurity that comes with it (Hurrell, 2007).

The contrasts between the two regionalisms include but are not limited to the following:

- The new regionalism is a more spontaneous process, where states within the post-Cold War context (multipolar) experience the need to cooperate with each other based on geographic proximity in order to tackle new regional and global challenges, while the old was located within and dictated by a bi-polar world order.
- In contrast to the closed and objective-specific old regionalism, the new is a more comprehensive and multidimensional process with a broad focus on trade, economic development, environment and societal security, while it recognises and provides policy space for the non-state actors (Hettne, 1996).

The concept of regionalism speaks of regions inhabited by people who through their interactions give these regions a social character. According to Hettne, these relations constitute a security complex, "in which the constituent units, as far as their own security is concerned, are dependent on each other as well as the overall stability of the regional system" (1996). On this basis, he conceives of a "formal" region based on an organizational membership, and a "real" region based on its potentialities for a region, like the extent of the social interactions. This allows for a regional organisation to be considered in terms of its relevance to the security relations in the real region and its future potential. In terms of this study the distinction between 'formal' and "real" regions suggests that it is important to maintain a clear distinction between a security complex and a security community. While a security complex suggests the geographic extent and intensity of security dynamics between the constituent units, a security community talks to the ability of the formal region to cover over the boundaries of the complex.

The two prominent architects of the new regionalist approach (Hettne and Soderbaum), as cited by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, conceive of development

regionalism and security regionalism thus:

Development regionalism means concerted efforts by a group of countries in a given region to enhance the economic complementarity of constituent political units in order to strengthen the total capacity of the regional economy. Security regionalism, on the other hand, refers to attempts by states and other actors in a particular area – a region in the making – to transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations into a security community characterised by co-operative external (interregional) relations and internal (intraregional) peace (2012: 6).

A region can therefore have a security outlook through its desire to manage conflict by putting in place conceptual and normative structures to maintain regional order, manage conflicts in its vicinity and/or involvement in maintaining world order. The region can thus be the cause (the regional security complex), the means (regional security management), and the solution (regional development) (Soderbaum and Hettne, 2010: 17). The hypothesis of SADC as a security complex undergoing transformation to a security community is significant for its security management and regional development prospects.

2.2.1 Security Regionalism in Africa

Previous to the creation of the African Union (AU) conflicts were mainly addressed by way of interventions by superpowers, former colonial powers, or powerful neighbours, and only a few resolved conflicts could be credited to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Abegunrin, 2009: 146-150). This approach had its problems like violations of international norms, for instance South African intervention in Lesotho in 1998, and late responses to conflicts resulting in unimaginable human security repercussions, like the Rwanda genocide in 1994.

To overcome some of these problems, the OAU was transformed into the AU on 9th

July 2002, heralding a departure from the era of negative sovereignty regimes and non-intervention doctrines that the OAU was notorious for, into a new peace building agenda with new norms and institutions. The new norms and policies in the area of peace and security are embodied in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and concretised by the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of July 2002, and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) of 2004.

The APSA has largely been informed by the concepts of "African solutions to African problems", "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), and "politics of non-indifference" as a new set of norms (Besada, 2010) characterising the transition from the OAU and reflecting the trends of the 'new regionalism' as discussed earlier.

The African Charter under Article 3(1) recognises five regional blocks -Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – and vests the primary responsibility for promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa on them. This arrangement interfaces the efforts of the sub-regions with those of the continental body, as well as incorporates these RECs into the APSA.

To date the following institutions and normative structures have been established as components of the APSA:

- The Peace and Security Council. The PSC was established with a mandate of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building, humanitarian assistance and post-war rebuilding (Art. 6).
- The Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the Wise was officially launched in 2007 to support and advice the PSC through the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and research (PSC Protocol, Article 6 and 11). The structure reflects commitment to "African solutions to African problems" in its use of long African tradition of conflict resolution based on the wisdom and

goodwill of elders (Murithi and Mwaura, 2010: 79-80).

- The AU Commission includes the Peace and Security Commissary and the Peace and Security Directorate. PSC decisions are implemented through several divisions: the Conflict Management Division (CMD), the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), the Defence and Security Commission, and the Darfur Integrated Task Force (Art. 10).
- The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The CEWS is responsible for monitoring possible crisis situations to enable preventative action by the other structures like the Panel of the Wise (AU, 2002: 17).
- The African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is a rapid intervention force based in the RECs responsible for preventative deployment, rapid intervention and peacekeeping and possibly peace enforcement (AU, 2002 18-19).

The development of a regional-centred approach to security, especially within Africa is premised on the tendency for domestic conflicts to assume a regional dimension, therefore requiring regional solutions. Accordingly, by virtue of their proximity and vested interest, regions are considered more suited to manage their problems than the distant and often politically polarised UN. Regional actors with their local knowledge are better placed to address the conflicts than multilateral organizations (Soderbaum and Hettne, 2010: 29).

The efforts of SADC therefore, are in complement to and fulfilment of the continental peace and security agenda. The SADC Organ is therefore expected to embody all the norms from the continental and global peace and security policies.

2.3 Contending Theories of Security Studies

The debate between 'Realists' and 'Liberals' about possibilities for cooperative action in international relations is largely divided between materialist constructs of power, human nature and absolute versus relative gains on the one hand, and knowledge,

institutions and transaction costs, on the other (Little, 2008: 298.9). The Critical International Relations scholarship, in contrast, sees the problem with the above debates as their essentialisation of the identity of the units and neglect of the inter-subjective logic, instead taking a more sociological perspective to security studies (see Linklater, 2008). The idea of cooperation is significant to international security as far as it relates to prospects for peace and development of an international community. This section examines three leading theories of security studies and their utility to the current project.

2.3.1 Realism/Neo-realism

Realism/Neo-realism is the most significant approach to security studies among the dominant traditional International Relations theories. Realists include classical authors such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The more contemporary writers include E. H. Carr, Hans I. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and others.

The realist view of security has been in terms of state survival which securitised sovereignty, hence the traditional view that security encompasses only national and military sectors. To the Realists, power, national interests and state survival are crucial to understanding both international and state security (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 93). These scholars considered a state to be secure when it was successful in the international struggle for power (Buzan 1991:4). Realist definition of political structures in terms of anarchy, self help and distribution of capabilities (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 98) is faulted by constructivists like Wendt for failing to predict whether two states will be friends or enemies, or will recognise each others'

sovereignty and so on. These are inter-subjective factors that "affect states' security interests and thus the character of their interaction under anarchy" (1992: 396).

This limited view of security, Buzan argues, led to the underdevelopment of the concept prior to the end of the Cold War (1991: 7-11). This narrow view of security and its predominant focus on the struggle for power in an anarchic world by the superpowers and the great powers, thus left the developing world ('Periphery' or 'Third World') largely unexplained. During the Cold War a 'Third World' state was only commented on as an arena for ideological contestation between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union, for example, Angolan civil war and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In terms of the cooperation projects, Neo-Realists assert that the international system being too anarchic, the intentions of others are too uncertain for states to enter into long term cooperative arrangements that constrain unilateralism and may even be benefitting others more than themselves (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 102). In this sense, Neo-Realists see the balance of power logic (not cooperation) still indispensable in both explaining and guaranteeing regional security. But in the case of southern Africa, it can be argued that the mechanism of balance of power adopted by the FLS and SADCC during the Cold War had endangered security in the region through increased militarisation against South Africa instead of making the region a safer place. The durability of the southern African alliance project from the FLS to the present SADC defies the notion of self-help as "the principle of action" (Waltz, 1979: III). This issue is revisited in the analysis in Chapter Four.

As such, realism was irrelevant and continues to be inadequate in its more recent

variants, to the conceptualisation of the problems of the developing world in general, and Africa, in particular. However, Realism finds consonance with security complex theory in as far as it articulates territorialisation as opposed to de-territorialisation, as will be shown later (Buzan and Waever, 2003:11).

2.3.2. Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal Institutionalism or Neo-liberal Institutionalism developed as a challenge to realism or neo-realism and is rooted in the functional integration scholarship of the 1940s and regional integration studies of the 1960s (Lamy, 2008: 131). Some of the notable proponents of this theory include Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner. It is one of the four varieties of liberalism. Others are commercial, republican and sociological liberalisms.

Commercial liberalism advocates free trade and a market economy in the effort to promote peace and prosperity. Republican liberalism or democratic peace theory sees democratic states more inclined to respect the right of their citizens and less likely to go to war with their democratic neighbours. These two variants have had a profound influence on the "foreign policy goals of many of the world's major powers" (Lamy, 2008: 131). Sociological Liberalism concerns the notion of community and the process of interdependence. It holds the view that human interaction at the sub-state level leads to governments becoming interdependent, thus increasing the costs of going to war with each other or taking unilateral decisions in matters of international relations. This cooperative relationship leads to the development of a peaceful international community with legal rules or institutions to govern and facilitate the cooperative (Lamy 2008: 131). Common among these studies is the notion that for

states to achieve peace and prosperity they have to pool their sovereignty towards integrated communities to promote economic growth or respond to regional problems. To them, the effectiveness of SADC lies in its construction as a supranational organization with powers that are independent of the member states. However, SADC's creation and continued evolution can be seen as more pragmatic.

Liberal Institutionalism sees cooperation as essential in a world of economic interdependence and believes that shared economic interests create a demand for international institutions and regimes to constrain self-interested state behaviour (Stein, 2008: 204-5). This is in direct contrast to the neo-realists' downplaying of the significance of institutions in shaping international politics and their insistence that the anarchical world system does not have room for meaningful cooperation. However, like neo-realists, they view hegemony as necessary to maintain and facilitate institutionalized cooperative regimes. In addition, like neo-realism, the theory views states as self-interested and rational egoistic actors, but rejects the idea that states will remain so because it is in their nature to be as such. Institutionalism is thus optimistic about the future of states under a cooperative environment (Lamy, 2008: 131-4). Contrary to the assertion by Neo-Liberal Institutionalists that cooperation will limit sovereignty, however, in the case of SADC it can be argued that their cooperation was more for state and nation building as evidenced by their prioritisation of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's states in their cooperative mechanism as stipulated in the preamble to the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC, 2001). Any pragmatic approach to

southern African regionalisation will, therefore, require more than Liberal Institutionalism to explain.

Institutions and regimes in this respect will be understood according to Burchill's conceptualisation. According to him, institutions mean "sets of rules which govern state behaviour in specific policy areas". A reference to an organisation like SADC as an institution should be understood to be in relation to the organisation as a seat or custodian of the rules and norms represented by such an organisation. He defines Regimes as "sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which constrain state behaviour by formalizing the expectations of each party to an agreement" (2009: 66). So although Neo-liberal institutionalists may focus on the same variables as do constructivists, their notion of "self-interested actors" and insistence on rules "prevents them from considering fully how a community might be forged through shared identities" or "how transnational interactions can alter state identities and interests" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 11).

2.3.3. Constructivism: Towards the Social Basis of Politics

The two theories discussed above belong to positivism (which regards truth as pre-existing reality that awaits discovery through scientific methods of research). As a counterpart to positivism, there are other theories regarded as post-positivist or reflectivist, which, in contrast, emphasize interpretations rather than empirical data. The antagonism between these two approaches to knowledge is what is otherwise known as the "Third Debate" (Wendt, 1999: 39). Ontologically, the latter challenges the rationalist conception of human nature, arguing that interests and actions are not always rational and emphasize the social construction of actors' identities in shaping

interests and actions (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Waever 1996). Epistemologically they challenge the validity of positivist methods in social research, arguing that there is no objective truth and as such inter-subjective meanings can only be researched by non-positivist methods (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 261).

Included in the repertoire of post-positivism are 'Constructivism' and 'Post-structuralism', which nonetheless play opposing roles in the third debate. Whereas the latter poses more radical challenges to rationalist research agenda, the former modifies rationalism – hence regarded as occupying the middle ground between Realism and Post-structuralism (Wendt, 1999: 40). Post-structuralism, on the one hand, employs post-positivist epistemology and ontology by examining the role of inter-subjective meaning using the tools of discourse analysis. On the other hand, constructivism (1980s) emerging later than post-structuralism (1970s), reconstructs the neo-neo synthesis by incorporating a post-positivist ontology (like the role of ideas and identities), while maintaining the positivist epistemology and methodology (use of scientific methods and empirical observations) (Baylis and Smith 1997, Waever 1996).

Constructivism's grounding emanates from sociology and Critical International Theory (Finnemore 1996; Reus-Smit 2009: 219). As already mentioned it developed as a reaction to the failure of the mainstream positivist theories to explain the unfolding transformation of the global order following the end of the Cold War (Kolodziej 2005: 270). Specifically, they were seen failing to explain actor interests and identities, questions of how do territorial states form particular identities and interests, and how are state identities and interests co-constituted. The theories were

also found wanting with regard to normative issues like humanitarian intervention in International Relations (Ruggie, 1998). Constructivists posit that interests and identities are not primarily determined but socially constructed, insisting that identity comes from difference and exploring the role of the 'Other' (Ruggie 1995: 873). Alexander Wendt, on the other hand, points out that "IR constructivism draws selectively from social theory and is characterized more specifically by its idealism". According to Wendt, this idealism means that "structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature" (1999: 1).

Other than John Ruggie and Alexander Wendt, the theory is also credited to the pioneering works of Nicholas Onuf, Richard Ashley, and Friedrich Kratochwil among others.

One of the contributions of John Ruggie to the development of constructivism is in the concept of anarchy. While Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz assert that anarchy is some undeniable truth in international politics, John Ruggie challenges this notion by showing differences between the medieval and modern international systems. According to Ruggie, the absence of the concept of sovereignty in the former system and its existence in the latter, points to a social construction of sovereignty in line with the development of private property rights and legislation in the modern society (1986: 143).

Alexander Wendt for his part advances from Ruggie's notions on anarchy by suggesting that anarchy is socially constructed and illustrating this with the use of

Hobbesian (pre-Westphalia), Lockean (since Westphalia), and Kantian (since WW II) cultures. According to him these societies or cultures had different conceptions of anarchy and of their relations with each other, maintaining that "anarchy is what states make of it" (1999: 310, 368). In this illustration, the Hobbesian culture is characterized by enmity which lies at "one end of a spectrum of role relationships governing the use of violence between Self and Other ..." – the notion of "war of all against all" (1999: 260). Following Westphalia, states moved from enmity to rivalry in their relations under the Lockean culture. In his conception, rival constituted with reference to the 'Self' and the 'Other' is less threatening. Rivals recognize each other's right to exist (sovereignty), while enmity implies violent conquest (1999: 279). Wendt argues that:

Rights are social capacities that are conferred on actors by others' 'permission' to do certain things. A powerful state may have the material capability to defend its sovereignty against all comers, but even without that ability a weak state can enjoy its sovereignty if other states recognise it as a right (1999: 280).

Therefore states utilize 'Other help' rather than 'Self help', suggesting an expansion of the sense of Self in which they are willing to help one another. The Kantian anarchy, according to Wendt, is based on friendship with two principles: the rule of non-violence and the rule of mutual aid (1999: 298-9). This has made collective security possible because "The cognitive boundaries of the Self are extended to include the Other: Self and Other form a single 'cognitive region' ..." (1999: 305).

Following from the above, the theory is based on three ontological propositions. First, that normative or ideational structures are just as important as material

structures (a view held by realists and Marxists) in shaping the behaviour of social and political actors. Constructivists see systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values as having structural characteristics and argue that these exert a powerful influence on social and political actors. According to this tradition, “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt, 1995: 73).

The constructivist focus on social character of global politics, importance of state identities and interests and how they may have changed the way power is utilized legitimately, and their regard for human rights, multilateralism and the value of international institutions has led to the resurrection of the idea of security community. For this reason the theory becomes central to the analysis of SADC as both a regional security complex and an aspiring security community. On this basis, the constructivist scholarship carries a more nuanced promise for the study of SADC as a social entity and how its structures and processes may lead to the growth of a regional community.

The second proposition is that understanding how non-material structures construct actors' identities is important, because identities inform interests and in turn, actions. Neo-realists and neo-liberals, in contrast, do not concern themselves with the origins of actor preferences or interests but on the actors' strategies for pursuing these interests, viewing culture as constraining action rather than a source of identities and in turn, actions. Constructivists on the other hand argue that "culture informs the meanings that people give to their actions" (Barnett, 2008: 164). Buzan rounds off this argument thus: “The very fact that these meanings are fixed through politics and

that once these meanings are fixed they have consequence for the ability of people to determine their fates suggests an alternative way of thinking about power” (2008: 165).

The theory of constructivism therefore links cultural structures to identity. It focuses on environmental structures, which shape state norms, identities and actor policies. According to its proponents, its main ingredients are norms, identities, environmental relations and cultural institutions. Holding these, therefore, it is possible to construct southern Africa as a social entity with roots in the particular historical relations between the regional actors.

The third, and last proposition, is that agents and structures are mutually constituted (Reus-Smit, 2009: 221). Citing the idea of legitimacy – the belief by states that they are acting according to and pursuing the values of the broader international community – as an example, Barnett argues that even a superpower like the USA will seek legitimacy from the United Nations to attack a small country like Iraq, to the point of launching a propaganda campaign to win some support among the UN Member States. The same power of legitimacy is utilised by the human rights activists through the "naming and shaming" tactic. Because states care about their reputations they are sensitive to the perceptions of other actors in whether their actions are in consistence with the prevailing international standards (2008: 165). On this basis, it can be argued that the creation of SADC and its antecedents was a result of the shared history of the states in the region. This necessitates reference to the history of the region in the examination of southern Africa as a security complex.

But how do norms/institutions develop and what markers can suggest the

development of norms? Finnemore and Sikkink suggest three stages in the life cycle of norms: 'norm emergence', 'norm cascade' and 'norm internalization'. The first stage is attributable to or led by 'norm entrepreneurs' who spearhead the recruitment of the other states into embracing the new norms. In doing so, they use language that names, interprets and dramatizes new issues to the attention of other actors. In other words they create and drive discourses. The second stage is where the norm entrepreneurs socialize others to follow them. The motivation could be a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance legitimacy in the international arena and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self esteem. In the last stage the norm is taken for granted and is no longer a matter of debate (1998: 894 -905). This model is useful when trying to discern the development of norms within SADC, and the life cycle stage of the significant norms in the region may be indicative of its stage in the development of the RSC towards a security community.

2.3.3.1 Criticisms Against Constructivism

In view of the above discussion, the Constructivist approach can, therefore, provide distinct insights and analytic frameworks into the evolutionary development of SADC, and its mechanisms for the pursuit of stability, peace and security; which, as has been suggested, mostly defies both the Realist and Institutional logics. However, its treatment of identity weakens its full utility.

Wendt's reliance on foundationalism, by arguing that human description and social relations have nothing to do with any discourse (1999: 49-50) exposes his version of constructivism to weakness with regard to the concept of identity. First with regard to identity formation he bases interests on ideas and identity (1999: 133-4) but fails to

show how identity is constructed and changed from the Lockean to the Kantian culture of anarchy. While using the Foucauldian logic to argue that anarchy is initiated by exclusion, but through change in ideas the 'Other' can become absorbed into the self, he does not provide reasons why states change their perspectives of others (1999: 305).

Privileging post-structuralism and defining identity as difference precludes any notions of pre-existing foundations of identity. Following David Campbell, identities are constructed through the differences between inside and outside. For him the "the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 'foreign' (1998: 9). This allows for more nuanced treatment of identity and, when couched in Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, it provides a better perspective on norms. This is because the study analyses how conflict and identity were constructed in southern Africa, and how the articulatory processes of inclusion and exclusion continue to form and sustain, while also threatening, the identity of SADC.

Discourse Theory specifically addresses itself to the "driving forces behind the formation and cohesion of political alliances, governance networks and political communities" (Torfing, 2005: 23). This is important to the staying power (resilience) of security communities, which is one of the subjects of this thesis. Discourse Theorists present their argument in a three step format to facilitate the above claim. First, the formation of communities is considered a response to dislocations in the form of experiences of negation, frustration and hope for a future which is expressed as empty signifiers and functions to catalyze community formation. Second,

communities thus formed are held together by common identities, vocabularies and narratives which determine inclusion within and exclusions from the communities. Third, the "discursive meanings and identities that bind together individuals or collective actors into communities often have a totalizing, imaginary, or even fantasmatic dimension" as they brandish the promise of a fully achieved identity in the future. This makes ideological myths key features of political communities (Torfing, 2005: 23 -24).

In southern Africa it has been argued by researchers that it was identity and difference that has historically determined the security of the region (see Vale, 2003: 24). Employing a well developed conceptualisation of identity can be expected to shed better light on the dynamics of the region and how to overcome their challenges for a better, human-friendly security transformation. This in a nutshell is what discourse theory brings to the table. The next section, therefore, explores Discourse Theory as the key tool in the analytic chapters.

2.4 Post-structuralist Premises and Discourse Theory

There are different approaches to social constructionism: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's Discourse Theory, Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, Discursive Psychology and Foucauldian approach among others. Social constructionism is a general term for a group of new theories about culture and society, and is rooted in French post-structuralist theory which rejects totalising and universalising theories such as Marxism and Psychoanalysis (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 6). Poststructuralist approach, as implied above, is ontologically anti-essentialist and epistemologically anti-foundationalist in its understanding of the

relation between the world, knowledge and language. To them, the social world does not possess any pre-given or essential meaning, but rather it gains meaning through language. Reality or the world, as we know it, is the result of historical and collective constructions such as categories, discourses and perspectives; all realised in and through language (Torfing, 2005: 15). The Post-structuralists view discourse as "practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak" (Foucault, 1972: 49), and consists of historically specific rules of formation that "determine the difference between grammatically well-formed statements, and what is actually said at particular times and places" (Foucault, 1991: 63). On the other hand, Realist and Marxist conceptions consider the "nature of the objective (**material**) world" as determining the "character and veracity of discourses" (Howarth, 2000: 7) [emphasis added].

The Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe is one of the purest post-structuralist theories available (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 6). In their conception of discourse theory, Laclau and Mouffe extend its scope to include all social practices and relations, in contrast to the earlier generations of discourse theorists (Howarth 2000; Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). The first generation regarded discourse in the "narrow linguistic sense of textual unit that is larger than a sentence, and focused on the semantic aspects of spoken or written text" (Howarth, 2005: 6). Still following Howarth, the second generation broadened discourse more than the first. They extended it to a wider set of social practices (2005: 7). These include Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). In contrast, the third generation extends the notion of discourse to cover all social phenomena. These "are discursive

because their meaning depends upon a decentred system of contingently constructed rules and differences" (2005: 8). For instance, whereas Fairclough regards economy and institutions as falling outside discourse, Laclau and Mouffe see them all as parts of discourse such that discourses and discursive practices are synonymous with systems of social relations (Howarth, 2000: 8). Fairclough's discourse analytic approach will preclude these domains for other analytic tools other than discourse analysis. In terms of this study, this expansion allows for application of discourse analysis to all areas of security concerns and the institutions promoting such securities.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe are generally regarded as post-Marxists – a label they did not invent and are not necessarily opposed to (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: ix). The label itself was motivated by their "reactivation" of the "Marxist categories" in light of "contemporary problems" (crises in the left wing project) and the theoretical impoverishment of Marxism as a result of its association with Leninism (2001: viii). The result was to transcend the traditional Marxist ideology, hence the label. In their conceptualisation, the two theorists bring together Gramsci's theory of 'hegemony', Derrida's and Foucault's post-modern discourse theories, and Althusser's concept of 'over-determination' which are external to Marxism (2001: ix), to develop a post-structuralist theory of discourse.

While Laclau and Mouffe contend that our knowledge and understanding of the world is socially constructed through discourse, at the same time, according to Howarth, "discourse becomes a method for understanding and interpreting the world, and forms the limit of a full understanding of that world" (2000:164) Accordingly,

Howarth makes a useful distinction between discourse theory and discourse analysis; the former provides the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions while the latter consists of a range of techniques for analysing discursive structures (2005:336).

2.4.1 Discourse Theory

In the language of Howarth,

Discourse theory begins with the assumption that all objects and actions are meaningful and their meaning is a product of historically specific systems of rules. It thus enquires into the way in which social practices construct the discourses that constitute social reality. These practices are possible because systems of meaning are contingent and can never completely exhaust a social field of meaning (2000: 8).

This quotation sits at the centre of understanding of discourse and its structures through discourse theory. By discursive, Howarth explains that he "means that all objects are objects of discourse", because every object's meaning is depended on "a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences" (2000: 9). It is in this sense that a diamond can be a 'timeless symbol of beauty', 'a curse and source of social suffering', or 'a source of government revenue for equitable economic development' depending on the particular discourse that confers meaning to it at the particular moment. By being a subject of such intense debate, it has moved from being just a brute matter to being significant, conferring different meanings to different people i.e. gaining meaningful existence.

Laclau and Mouffe outline the structure of a discourse as follows:

... we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated (2001: 105).

A discourse is thus a totality of signs which derive their meaning from the relation they have with each other. According to Laclau and Mouffe, these signs are called 'moments'. When a sign is articulated, it is positioned relative to the others and given meaning which is contingent and temporary. Laclau and Mouffe refer to articulation as "any practice that establishes a relation among elements so that their identity is modified..." (1985:105). The totality of related signs given meaning is called a discourse.

The signs, though, are not exhaustible, and those that have been left outside (surplus) the particular discourse are called 'elements'. In addition to being left outside, they also hold all other possible meanings the articulated signs could have had. Any of these elements can become a moment but only when its meaning is fixed through articulation as part of a discourse. Being a common feature of every discursive situation, "this 'surplus' is the necessary terrain for the constitution of every social practice. We will call it the *field of discursivity*" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 111).

Laclau and Mouffe theorise identity as constructed in a relational condition of "inside" and "outside", which cannot be absorbed into any higher unity. In this conceptualisation, they appropriate Derrida's notion of "constitutive outside" to argue that an object will always have a "special" outside that will be the limit of its own

identity and will constitute it as a particular kind of object (1985: 127 -134; also Mouffe, 1993: 2). Because this "outside" is necessary for a given kind of entity to emerge, it is now called constitutive.

However, when the constitutive outside start to be considered as negating the entity's identity and questioning its very existence, the relationship becomes a site of a struggle. This is necessary for the study to explain the source of amity and enmity within any security complex. This struggle is the basis for the concept of antagonism, and demands an acknowledgement of an ever present possibility for conflict in the context of the social. Antagonisms need to be understood as opposing the mainstream theories on social conflict which regards the antagonizing social agents as fully constituted with identities and therefore interests (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 39). Discourse theory argues that social antagonisms are a result of social agents not being able to attain their identities and interests. In order to account for this 'failure' they construct an 'enemy' (opposing discourse) who is deemed responsible for this 'failure' (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 59).

In their formulation, Laclau and Mouffe, reflecting this realization argue that conflict must always be welcome in a democratic setup. From this conceptualisation, Laclau makes three points: that constitutive outside affirms difference as the very condition for the formation of the social, in contrast to the objectivist notion of a positive entity which is impervious to otherness; that antagonism as a necessary element of the political, should always be encouraged in a democratic political space, and; the existence of the "constitutive outside" to any entity asserts the contingency and historical character of the social and the historical, which are always inhabited by

antagonism (1990: 19-23).

Laclau and Mouffe assert further that it is through "articulation" that the social and the political momentarily stabilize around certain "nodal points" that define one of its possible descriptions. This makes discourse an incomplete totality, which nevertheless presents itself as a complete totality through the exclusion of alternative meanings (1985: 113). This formulation becomes important for understanding the identities of the FLS, South Africa, Resistance Movements, SADCC and SADC in terms of their moments and antagonisms. In other words, SADC becomes conceivable as an entity because of what it claims it stands for. Therefore it is through its principles, objectives and strategies that it can claim some constituency or population. The articulatory practices of these stabilise the identity of SADC and make it appear sedimented or essential.

Elements that are particularly open to different meanings or interpretations are called 'floating signifiers'. Through discourse contestation, social agents try to give meaning to floating signifiers by associating them with particular nodal points (Howarth 2000: 110). Nodal points are privileged reference points that bind together a particular system of meaning. For instance, borrowing from his illustration, the meaning of signifiers such as "democracy", "freedom" and "state" will differ depending on whether they are structured by the nodal point of "communism" or "liberalism". Where the term nodal point refers to a structuring core within a specific discourse, floating signifiers refer to the battles over important signs that take place between different discourses (Jorgensen and Philips 2002: 28).

2.4.1.1 Logic of Equivalence and Logic of Difference

Antagonisms have been shown to exist due to negation of alternative meanings and options and exclusion of those social agents who identify themselves with these alternative meanings. This is achieved by emphasising the sameness of the opposed social agents so as to put them into the same category of 'enemy'. How this plays out discursively is elaborated through the concepts of 'logic of equivalence' and 'logic of difference'.

The 'logic of equivalence' attempts to reduce the social space to only two oppositional poles, by emphasising the sameness of those opposed to it, so that they are seen as one. The emphasis of sameness makes the identities of the opposing discourses equivalent to one another around that pole. By creating only two identities, the logic of equivalence precludes alternative interpretations of the social (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 44-5). According to Howarth, this is the case when populist movements, like the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, position themselves against the system (2000: 107). The implications of a social order dominated by the logic of equivalence, according to Torfing, are political actions aiming at disposing of the antagonistic force in the belief that a full identity will be achieved (1999: 129). The two concepts will allow for investigation of how the opposing political formations in southern Africa have constituted each other as enemy and the implications thereof.

The logic of difference, in contrast, functions in counter to the ends of the logic of equivalence. It dissolves the chains of equivalence into a system of differences, so that coalitions breakup resulting in a society of plural identities, and therefore

"displaces and weakens antagonisms" (Howarth. 2000: 107). So these two equivalences operate simultaneously, with the outcome determined by the dominating or hegemonic equivalence.

2.4.1.2 Hegemony

Hegemony occurs when one discourse temporarily dominates and has managed to stabilize the social as well as the discursive field by articulating as many elements from the field of discursivity as possible around the various nodal points (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000:15). Hegemonic practices will attempt to bring together different discourses (identities and political forces) into a common project in order to dominate a field of meaning. In this way the dominant discourse may become a "collective will that represents universal values and interests" (Howarth 2000: 109). Hegemony thus occurs when one discourse temporarily dominates others and has managed to stabilize the social as well as the discursive field by articulation of as many elements as possible around nodal points, "which underpin and organise societal order" (2000: 110). If antagonism is taken as open conflict between discourses, then hegemony is to be taken as the dissolution of the conflict through a displacement of boundaries between the discourses. For instance, if insistence on sovereignty of states creates antagonism and perpetuates conflicts between them and hence insecurity, then creation of an inclusive and hegemonic identity like SADC should lower the significance of state sovereignty creating a new 'we' that is inclusive of all states in the region – a community of states.

The concept of hegemony dispels the essentialist idea that identity is an inner core or an essence we are born with. This delusion may result from a hegemonic discourse

becoming so fixed or "sedimented" that it is taken for granted that it is essential (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 36). Being conscious of the fact that identities derive from discourses, render social agents open to possible alternative ways of seeing and organising the world and this is important for solving social and political problems.

To account for positioning of objects within a discursive structure, the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe conceives of subject positions and political subjectivity. The former refers to a position an individual holds within society or a discourse and the latter refers to how social agents act (Howarth, 2000:108). A person can be a 'national president', a 'war veteran' and a 'father' all at the same time (i.e. be over-determined). So a subject within a discourse simply means a subject position occupied by that individual within the particular discourse or a discursive structure. In accordance with these positions there are certain expectations on how such a subject must act, what to say and what not to say (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 41). Howarth goes on to argue that these actions emerge because of the contingency of the discourses that confer identity on them. Due to the process of "dislocation", which will be discussed shortly, the agent is forced to take decisions where he/she identifies with certain political projects when social identities are in crisis and structures need to be created, thereby creating a political subjectivity. This subjectivity once it stabilises it transforms into a subject position (2000: 109).

2.4.1.3 Dislocation

According to Torfing, dislocation "denotes a situation in which a discursive construction of meaning" or identity "collapses", opening the discursive space/terrain for political battle about the nature and scope of the identity (2005: 96). This happens

when a hegemonic discourse encounters or is confronted by new events that it cannot explain, represent or domesticate (Torfing, 2005: 16). Dislocation should be understood in the context of the general condition that all identity is constructed in relation to a constitutive outside, which always threatens to subvert such identity. Dislocation then represents the disruption of the discourse or identity by its constitutive outside. Social antagonism on the other hand could be a response to a dislocation (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 59). According to Torfing, a dislocation will be evidenced by a structural or organic crisis in which there is a proliferation of floating signifiers. A dislocation can entail small disturbances that are handled through minor political re-articulations (also called day-to-day politics), a major change that requires a far-reaching political reconstruction of the discursive identity (also called radical politics), or something in between (Torfing 2005: 97).

Basing discourses on a field of discursivity means that the greater the depth of dislocation the wider and denser the elements that will be available for re-articulation. In this conceptualisation, dislocations are the instigating events or sources of discourses, in that discourses get changed when elements are rearticulated differently and into new structures, leading to changes in the social world. However major changes are rare. The historical and cultural context of discourse means that new meanings are always based on discourses that are existent; therefore, all new discourses are always rooted in the past discourses (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, 38).

In terms of this study, this means SADC's formation cannot be considered outside its antecedents. Since dislocations signal possible beginnings for new discourses,

analysts generally tend to use them as the starting point for analysis of identity constructions. This is exemplified in the next chapter where the identity of the FLS was started by the dislocation in the "white bloc" with the coup in Portugal, while the SADC formation is placed within the dislocation of the Apartheid and colonialism identities in the early 1990s. To Laclau, dislocation is not only disruptive, traumatic or negative but it is also a condition of possibility for social and political creation and re-articulation. Dislocations serve as the "foundations upon which new identities are constituted" (1992: 39), and it therefore talks to the creation of both FLS and SADC as based on the opportunities presented by the dislocations that immediately preceded them.

2.4.2 Limitations of and Criticisms Against Discourse Theory

Discourse analysis has been the subject of criticism as a "subjectivist gibberish", that it neglects the material conditions, institutions and natural constraints on the production of meaning, falling prey to conceptual and moral relativism, and that it lacks normative application and therefore it fails to deliver viable accounts of social life (Howarth 2000: 13). Torfing in agreement with Howarth feels that some of "these criticisms are helpful in pointing out significant differences between discourse theory and other theoretical approaches. Others are completely ill-founded and based on clear misunderstandings or a failure to engage with the literature on discourse theory" (2005: 17).

The first set of criticisms generally accuses discourse theory of being idealistic. The critics think that by asserting that all social meanings and identities are discursive, it denies the independent existence of reality. However, following Torfing, discourse

theory does not dispute the independent existence of matter outside human "consciousness, thoughts and language". It merely contends that matter gains meaning through discourse, and is therefore subjective. Further borrowing from Torfing, a particular piece of land can be seen as habitat for an endangered species by a group of biologists, a recreational facility by urban population, fertile farmland by local farmers, or a business opportunity by urban developers (2005: 18). All the discourses identifiable in the above example are relatively antagonistic to each other and therefore potentially disruptive, meaning their individual meanings are not final, but contested. In a nutshell, matter is real but it is discourse or discursive practices that give it meaning and therefore significance as more than a brute matter. With regard to ruling out analysis of political institutions, discourse analysis, according to Howarth, is not opposed to institutional analysis. Institutions and organisations are understood as "sedimented" or stabilized discourses which have become manifest as relatively permanent and durable (2000: 120).

The next accusation concerns discourse analysis being "adrift in relativist gloom". According to Torfing the criticism argues that since according to discourse theory everything is discursive, it is "impossible then to defend any particular set of claims about what is true, right or good" (2005: 18). Although the premise of the argument is correct, the conclusions however, cannot be any further from the truth. Discourse theory posits that "there is no extra-discursive truth, morality or ethics", but in any particular issue, one belongs to one discourse or another. There can never be a situation when one accepts that all claims are equally valid. The particular discourse that we subscribe to at any given time provides us with the required set of values,

standards and criteria on which to base our judgement of true or false, good or bad. These positions however, are contingent as there is a constant de-articulation and re-articulation through processes of "mutual learning, political struggles or violent conflicts" (Torfing, 2005: 19).

The last criticism is with regard the status of discourse theory as an explanatory theory. The contention here is that discourse theory can understand and therefore describe the "articulatory practices within and between various discourses, but it fails to explain social, political and culture life". The counter-argument to this is that for one to explain, one must understand first; the two are not opposed to each other. According to Torfing, discourse theory "opposes causal explanations of social phenomena, which harness empirical events to the yoke of universal laws". It rather aims to describe, understand and explain how and why particular discursive formations were constructed, stabilized, and transformed by utilising a set of contextualized concepts like dislocation, hegemony and social antagonism (2005: 19).

Having considered the theoretical approaches that can be harnessed for explaining the SADC case, the next sections explore the frameworks that such impending analysis could follow.

2.5 Regional Security Complex Theory: A Framework for Analysis of Regionalisation

The Copenhagen School conceives of a descriptive framework for analysing Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) as a matrix of four levels of analysis which

together constitute the security constellation within any RSC. These are the domestic level; state-to-state relations within the complex; inter-regional interaction, and; global level interactions (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 51).

The transformational aspect of RSCs is based on their durable structures and as such any attempt to monitor the transformational tendencies within an RSC will of necessity privilege this structure (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53). The structure composes of both internal components and an external boundary. According to Buzan and Waever, the "essential structure" comprises:

- A boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours;
- An anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units;
- Polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units, and;
- Social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units.

On the basis of this structure, Buzan and Weaver further posit that discursive practices, within and outside, can have any of the following transformational trajectories on a particular RSC: maintenance of the status quo, which means that there are no significant changes in its essential structure; internal transformation, where the essential structure is undergoing change within the existing boundary, or; external transformation, where the external boundary expands or contracts resulting in changes in membership (2003: 53).

The RSCT framework further divides RSCs into types based on power polarity, variations in patterns of amity and enmity, and global power penetration. On this basis the resultant typologies are 'Standard RSCs'; 'Centred RSCs', 'Great power'; and 'Super-complexes'. A 'standard RSC' involves at least two powers with a primarily

politico-military security agenda. A 'centred RSC' involves a major or great power with a number of significantly less powerful states. While in the former anarchy dominates, in the latter power dominates security interactions. In both, however, states may have various shared and convergent interests (2003: 54 -8).

With regard to the other two types, Buzan and Waever posit that a 'great power complex' involves more than one global level power within the complex, while a 'super-complex' involves inclusion of a superpower resulting in strong interregional security dynamics as spill over from the complex into neighbouring or even distant complexes (2003: 59-62).

2.5.1 Security, Securitization and Desecuritisation

The end of the Cold War having rendered less credible the pre-eminent focus on the military and national security sectors, the Copenhagen School conceptualised a new framework for security analysis. Its conceptualisation of security is built around the ideas of securitization, security sectors and regional security complexes. It has conceptualised sectors in terms of political, societal, economic, environmental and military concerns (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998:7). The different sectors can be seen as "views of the international system that highlight one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all other constituent units" (Buzan, Jones and Little as cited by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 27), while the security complexes refer to the regional-level focus of approach. Each sector has different and distinct threats and referents. In this conceptualisation, security is about the protection of an individual or 'human security' from an array of security threats classified in terms of the security sectors above. To achieve this, the Copenhagen

School utilised the notion of 'speech act', a term borrowed from J. L. Austin (1962), or securitisation, where, according to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde "an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object" (1998: 21). It is then "securitised" when a legitimate authority acknowledges the issue as an existential threat and receives support from its society to take all necessary means to meet the threat. This, according to Buzan and Waever, is because "survival ... involves a point of no return" that can change the basis for all other questions, which then justifies the "use of extraordinary means" to protect the referent object (2003:71).

Implicit and explicit in the process of securitisation is the assumption of urgency towards the issue posing a security threat. Therefore, a securitisation speech act is deemed successful when an actor makes a claim of existential threat to the unit on whose behalf he/she is authorised to speak and gets it accepted by an appropriate audience (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 71). The necessity for extra-ordinary measures, including violation of international norms, has been found problematic as it tends to carry with it unintended consequences. In the developing world, within the context of "weak states" (Buzan, 1991) or "democratic transitions" (Matlosa 2008) securitisation can be misused for internal political gains against legitimate opposition.

As indicated earlier, the Copenhagen School has contributed immensely to the broadening of the concept of security, not only by including new referent objects of security other than the state, but also by providing an accompanying framework for defining security and how to determine when an issue becomes securitised. The

concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation as a model have ensured that security is able to be broadened without losing the central coherence of the concept.

The model depicts a public-political-security continuum where any issue can be non-politicized, politicized or securitized. According to the model, an issue is non-politicized when the state does not address it, and when it is not included in the public debate. It becomes politicized when it "is part of public policy requiring government decision and resource allocations" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998: 23). On the other hand, an issue can be securitized when it is framed as a security problem. Securitization then is "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" – therefore an extreme version of politicization (1998: 23). Desecuritization is the direct opposite of securitization. It involves the "shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (1998: 4). The object of this study is therefore to examine the role of SADC in securitisation and desecuritisation of regional security issues and its effects on inter- and intra-state security dynamics.

In this thesis the primary securitizations and de-securitizations are in the politico-military, economic and societal sectors. This is borne out of the observation that SADC's genesis from the former Frontline States (FLS) was more of a defensive strategy using military, political and economic means (Buzan and Waever 2003: 234). Consequently, the history of conflict and conflict management in southern Africa is that of resistance against colonialism and Apartheid South Africa. To account for the widening of the concept of security, where the individual is the

referent object, the study includes aspects of societal security in the analysis. For instance, it is arguable that the Zimbabwean political crisis has been securitized regionally and continentally due to its human dimensions, notably cholera outbreaks, and atrocities against political opponents, among others (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010: 2-4), rather than national or military security concerns.

2.5.2 Criticisms Against the Copenhagen School

Notwithstanding the utility of the securitization-desecuritization model in security analysis, there are a number of criticisms against it. First, is its supposed inability to identify “the silent security dilemma”. The main contention being that the reliance on the 'speech act' or explicit articulation as an epistemological and methodological criterion for securitization will exclude the plight of the voiceless. According to this criticism, the Copenhagen School's theory presupposes the existence of political structures that allow free speech and "guarantee individuals protection against random and systematic violence" (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 216). But as will be shown later, such presumption becomes problematic in the context of African states with engrained democratic deficits.

Secondly, the normative privileging of desecuritization is seen as potentially problematic if desecuritization will serve to suppress an issue instead of allowing for its politicization where compromise, resolutions and debate are made possible. Securitization is seen as problematic in as far as it may precludes the above possibilities, so while desecuritization may be desirable due to the risks associated with the process of securitization, it should not have the same effects as securitization (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 216).

Anthony, Emmers and Acharya, on the other hand, identify the following shortcomings in the theory. First, they see fault with the theory in its failure to address the motives of social actors. While it allows analysis of who securitises and how securitization occurs it fails to address the question of why securitization is undertaken (2006: 5). To them, the risk of curtailing civic liberties or undermining civilian authority in the 'quasi' African states is ever present in the process of securitization. The second shortcoming they see as the underdeveloped empirical application of the theory resulting in the poor empirical understanding of the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization. They cite the use of 'speech act' as the only indicator of securitization when others can be developed (2006: 5). A third shortcoming they identify as the theory's euro-centric bias. This limitation permeates the other criticisms against the Copenhagen School as it presupposes a mature state development and as such misses the reality in the developing world. Lastly they fault the theory in overlooking the policy effectiveness of securitization and desecuritization, and the unintended consequences of these processes (2006:6).

It is hoped that the application of the securitization theory in the southern African context will serve to investigate some of these criticisms and add to the empirical utility of the theory. The application of the concept of 'weak state' specifically as peculiar to the developing world is intended to negate the tendency to view security dynamics only in euro-centric lenses. It is worth admitting, however, that just as the Copenhagen School's formulation is seen wanting in addressing actor motives, discourse theory is also not the best at investigating motives (Waeber, 2005:35).

2.6 Security and Development

The concept of 'development' is traceable to the dawn of decolonisation, in particular, the Bandung Conference of 1955. At the time it was expected that development will flow out of decolonisation. But following the experiences of the 1960s and 70s (like Cuban Revolution, resumption of the Viet Nam war and the outbreak of the Biafran war), it was realised that some level of security is necessary as a precondition for sustainable development (Rufin, 1977: 59). The concept was furthered by the pioneering work of Mahbub ul Huq of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by shifting its focus from the "inanimate objects of convenience" like commodities production to the "quality and richness of human lives – human development (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 8).

Human development, according to the UNDP, is "the process of widening the range of people's choices", while human security provides a safe environment for pursuing those choices (2005: 18-9). The nexus between the two concepts can be viewed from their points of reference – the people. Human security is an enabling condition for human development, while human development becomes the principal strategy for advancing human security. According to the UN Commission on Human Security, human development is "concerned with removing the various hindrances that restrain and restrict human live and prevent its blossoming". However, it further argues that this concept is "far too upbeat to focus on rearguard actions needed to secure what has to be safeguarded" (2003: 8). Human security, therefore, serves to provide the safeguard; hence the two ideas are both complementary and mutually reinforcing. But how is the concept of human security related to the concept of national or state security?

Human security, also referred to as people-centred security, takes the individual and vulnerable communities as its key referents (Acharya, 2008: 492). It places the human beings, rather than the states at the focal point of security considerations. The notion however does not trivialize the traditional concept of security, but rather broadens the view of the challenges facing the state and its people, and by sectoring security, enhances the prospects that these challenges can be effectively managed by both the state and other equally important actors.

Human security and national security are complementary to each other. In the first place the provider of national security is the state and the providers of human security are the government ministries. There may be many other providers of human security but they also need the state for coordination of their efforts and protection. Secondly, both forms proceed from the protection requirement. Human security proceeds from the need for protection of the individual to his/her ultimate empowerment, but itself requires the protection of the state in order to be possible. In emphasizing this reality Zacarias argues that human security or "the idea of a good life" is not possible in the absence of the four pillars comprising peace, justice, order and economics". These pillars, he further argues "must co-exist in a condition of dynamic equilibrium" for security to be realizable (2003, 42-44). The state is the principal provider of these pillars and therefore an important agency in the provision of human security. It is therefore evident from the above arguments that human security cannot replace national security; it is not more important than national security; and it cannot be divorced from national security.

When analysing securitization and desecuritization, the task in terms of discourse

theory, is not to assess whether objective threats really endanger a human collective, but to "understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat" (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 26). The task in this study therefore concerns finding out how SADC 'speaks' security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions and with what effect. Since SADC speaks through its Treaty, Protocols, strategic plans and other mechanisms, these become of primary importance in this endeavour.

The concept of human security evolved mainly for two reasons: firstly, the state as a principal provider of security is arguably and ultimately providing security for the good of the individuals or communities living within its borders. Appropriating from theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hume, it can be concluded that the state and by extension the other sectors of security, ultimately exist for the good of humankind. But all of them combined still fall short of comprehensively safeguarding the security of the individual, hence the securitisation of those challenges that threaten the security of the individual and small communities. Secondly, the state is not the only purveyor of security in the contemporary international system anymore. The end of the Cold War and globalization brought to the fore new kinds of threats that are largely transnational in nature and therefore beyond the capacity of the state alone. Besides, it has been demonstrated that in some instances the state is either failing to safeguard the security of its people or it is the very source of human insecurity (see Buzan 1983: 21-30). This point is contextualised in the next section.

2.7 Weak States and Problems of Security

One of the key problems with the traditional security conception of the realists is their assumption that the state has monopolized the legitimate use of force within its territory, from where the threat to other states emanates (Jung, 2009: 11). Therefore, any framework for governance of security based on this assumption becomes problematic for the developing world in general and Africa in particular, where there may be multiple and competing centres of authority. The typical Westphalian idea of a state is control over the state's physical base and adequately functioning institutions to give the population a sense of common identity (Buzan 1991: 65). Buzan conceives of the idea of "weak states" based not on power relations, but on the "society's belief in the existence of that state and its legitimate authority (1991: 66). A 'weak state' therefore, implies characteristic deficiencies in legitimacy and unity. This should be contrasted with Michael Handel's conception of weak state which is based on relative power (1990: 30-46).

Following Buzan's conceptualisation, in weak states common in Africa, one or both of these characteristics are deficient; hence the state is not only unable to adequately portray a sense of state identity but also lacks the capacity to impose unity among its population. This weakness, according to Buzan is the source of its vulnerabilities and its tendency to produce insecurities for its people (1991: 99). Amitav Acharya, on the other hand, alludes to artificiality of nation-states in the developing world as complicit in human insecurity in the South. He argues that the boundaries were drawn arbitrarily without regard to the ethnic linkages of people, and any attempt at rejection of these "colonial-imposed boundaries have been accompanied by the most

egregious violations of human security by governments" (2008: 503). Dietrich Jung for his part sees the state in the developing world as characterised by contestation between sources of power and legitimacy, the tension between states and societies (2009: 16). These have resulted in a different structure of the security sector in the developing world, than in the western world (Moller, 2009: 35). These attempts to define the state of African states are a reflection of ongoing debate between the classical and the critical approaches to security studies.

On the basis of the vulnerabilities of weak states and their tendency to define the conditions of insecurity of their own citizens, Buzan feels the idea of "national security" for them "borders on nonsense". He further argues that a predominance of weak states within an RSC can imbalance the formation of a security community, because of the tendency to export their domestic problems to each other (1991: 106). This argument although having implications for the prospects of SADC as a security community, as a good number of its members can pass for weak states, does not offer opportunities for a solution.

A more nuanced and helpful offering is by Khabele Matlosa who developed the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa's (EISA) framework of democratic assessment. The framework considers the liberal notions of political control, political equality and socio-economic equality in its assessment of democratic transitions. He underscores this combination with the challenge facing SADC of "achieving democracy and development simultaneously, while at the same time ensuring security and political stability" (2008: 2). His entry point is that African states have gone through democratic transitions from various types of authoritarian regimes of

the 1960-80s and are now stuck at different points of transition and faced with varying challenges of institutionalising democratic governance.

The framework combines regime type, state of democratic transition and the governance conditions of each Member State to classify them into categories as depicted in table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: Regime Typology, Transition trajectory and Governance

Regime Type	Transition Trajectory	Governance Condition
Liberal Democracy	Transition has successfully taken place	Democracy consolidating
Electoral Democracy	Transition has successfully taken place	Democracy stabilising
Electoral Authoritarianism	Transition has taken place, but not successfully	Lack of political stability
Closed Authoritarianism	Transition has been blocked/stalled	Political instability is rife

Source: Khabele Matlosa (2008).

The states under liberal democracies have successfully gone through political transition and are in the process of consolidating their democracy. In electoral democracies, although transition has successfully taken place, democracy is progressively stabilizing, but the consolidation process has not yet started. These countries still need to institutionalise democratic governance. States under electoral authoritarianism may have gone through political transition but it has not been successfully concluded. These are characterised by regular elections that are always contested, even violently. There is visible lack of democracy and therefore no stability. In closed authoritarianism either transition has not taken place at all or it has

been stalled or blocked midway. Political instability is endemic with open violence or non-violent conflict (2008: 47-8). With this framework the challenge to SADC and other stakeholders then centres on how to assist the individual countries to successfully complete their democratic transitions, including its consolidation. Noting the paradox of democracy, as conflict-ridden and as an approach to peace (Large and Sisk, 2006), Matlosa insist on the move towards developmental democracy (2008: 60), where its instrumental value could be felt by the people in the promotion of sustainable human development (2008: 61).

2.8 Security Complex Continuum: Locating and Explaining Security

Communities

The idea of a concept of community explaining international politics is one that would not sit well with scholars of IR especially in the rationalist approaches. For self-interested actors cannot be expected to "share values, norms, and symbols that provide social identity" and engage in a whole range of interactions that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3). But developments in constructivism have enabled for conceptualisation and empirical studies of these possibilities and their suspected instances in the post-Cold War era. Viewing states/nations in anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist perspectives allows for consideration of the notion of self-interest in a much wider configuration than possible within the essentialist views of Neorealists and Neo-liberal institutionalists. Under constructivism, therefore, a political community as a social construct cannot be limited to a territorial state, but can be possible with other ideational and cultural factors like political regionalisation practices.

This section aims to stake out the theoretical and conceptual perspectives on the concept of security communities, prior to an overview of the framework for the study of security communities as advanced by Adler and Barnett (1998).

2.8,1 Regional Security Complexes and Security Communities

A RSC is defined by Buzan and Waever as "a set of units whose major process of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (2003:44). These security relations, Buzan adds, are defined "by patterns of amity and enmity" which occupy a spectrum or continuum (1991: 190).

Chaos and security community are the two extremes of this continuum. In chaos each actor is the enemy of the others. From chaos is a 'regional conflict formation' where although inimical relations dominate, amity is possible. Next is a 'security regime' in which "a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behaviour of others" he asserts. In a security community "disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fears, or prepares for, either political assault or military attack by any of the others" (Buzan, 1991:218). This initial consideration of 'security' is realist and, therefore, narrow in its view of security in terms of threats posed to and by other states.

2.8.1.1 Security Community: The Concept

The concept of security communities, although proposed earlier, only received full scholarly investigation in 1957 by Karl Deutsch and his associates. Their

constructivist conceptualisation at that time was in a very hostile environment of materialistic theoretical approaches and was only to receive a revisit later in the advent of 'new regionalism' by among others, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998). The Deutschian conceptualisation, as cited by Naison Ngoma defined a security community as

... a group of people which has become "integrated", By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of security" and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief ... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change" (2005:43).

Deutsch as the pioneer of the concept of security communities conceived of two distinct types: amalgamated security community, where states formally unify, and a pluralistic security community, where states retain their individual sovereignty but derive 'community-ness' through "a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and mutual responsiveness ... and are integrated to the point that they entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 7). This study is biased towards the latter because of its theoretical and empirical proximity to regionalisation developments, especially within the SADC sub-region.

In developing the Deutschian model of a security community, Adler and Barnett defined a pluralistic security community as

a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it. These categories provide the basis for distinguishing between two ideal types, loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities (1998: 30).

Accordingly, loosely coupled security communities have to observe the minimum properties of a security community: have to be a "transnational region ... of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change" (1998: 30). In contrast, tightly coupled security communities, according to Adler and Barnett, exert further demands upon themselves. Firstly, they have a "mutual aid" society in which they construct collective system arrangements. And secondly, they approximate a supranational organisation where some sovereignty has been pooled together, and they are "endowed with common supranational, transnational and national institutions and a collective security system" (1998: 30).

The idea of collective security within SADC, in as far as it presupposes an extra-state threat, is found problematic as a strategy to pursue peace and security in the region by some analysts (see Hammerstad, 2005: 69). However, as will be indicated in Chapter Five, SADC can be viewed as pursuing a combination of collective security regime through its Mutual Defence Pact, and a common security regime through the mechanisms of Panel of the Elders, SADC Standby Force and its electoral framework. The contention is that while the prospects for intra-regional state conflict may be unthinkable, the situation in the DRC smacks of extra-regional state conflict (see Reyntjens, 2009). The unattractiveness of collective security should be seen in its focus on state security, as opposed to common security which is

more attuned to the concerns of human security (Hammerstad, 2005: 70).

The concept of community in this formulation connotes a "social basis" to international relations "and that this social basis might have characteristics that resemble a community" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31). Associating themselves with sociological conceptualisations of a security community (Charles Tilly 1979 and Michael Taylor 1982), Adler and Barnett identify three characteristics of a community. First, members have shared identities, values and common meanings. Taylor (1979) as cited by Adler and Barnett elaborates his construction thus:

Common meanings are the basis of community. Intersubjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings. These are objects in the world everybody shares. This is what makes community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31).

Second, the relations between those in the community are direct and happen in many different settings. Thirdly, a community exhibits "a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interests and perhaps even altruism" (1998: 31). Accordingly long-term interest derives from mutual knowledge between interacting members and altruism implies a sense of obligation and responsibility. This however does not preclude self-interest on the part of the members. However, Adler and Barnett indicate that analytic emphasis should be on the "degree of diffuse reciprocity" (1998: 32). It is worth noting, however, that self-interest suggests the precariousness of the community as it may lead to conflict, therefore, is important in the interrogation of the sustainability of these communities. They suggest that in a

community, the members do not "fear the use of violence as a means of statecraft and to settle disputes" (1998: 32).

On the other hand, Raimo Vayrynen, in recognition of peculiar conditions in some parts of the developing world where states may have regionally eliminated possibilities for war between themselves but still remain weak internally with real prospects for and experienced instances of internal violence, differentiates between what he calls "interstate" and "comprehensive" security communities. He defines comprehensive security communities as regions where not only is interstate war eliminated, but also collective domestic violence has become unthinkable. On the other hand, the former will demonstrate the expectations of pacific settlement of political problems only at interstate level, while the domestic conditions remain gripped by coercive state-building tendencies that may expose their domestic populations to large scale violence (2000: 163-4). In examining the sequence of establishing a national state in the developing world, Mohammed Ayoob, emphasize the priority given "by state elites in the Third World to the primitive accumulation of power in the hands of the state over the creation of popular consensus about the content and parameters of nationalism in fragmented societies" (1995: 26). This lack of consensus gets exemplified in the tension between the state and the society within, and has implications for internal security.

Governance as a property of a community is viewed by Adler and Barnett (and of course reflective of Deutsch) as "activities backed by shared goals and inter-subjective meanings that may or may not derive from legally and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome

defiance and attain compliance" (1998: 35). This connotes a political practice where responsibilities are clear and separated. On this basis, governance here will be understood within the context of democratic governance.

Democracy as a political practice is viewed by Andre du Pisani as the "specific institutional habits and practices for organising and exercising public power in accordance with universal norms and principles" (2007: 5). Christian Peters on the other hand sees regional integration working where there is "political democratic convergence", that is, where there is a general tendency towards high degrees of democratic practices at national level. This suggests that for democratic governance to be exhibited at the regional level, it has to be seen to be practiced at the national level. In fact, Peters sees political democratic convergence ensuring predictability through common political and economic conditions among the members (2011: 156). Therefore, any search for a security community must not be limited to the community level but will do better to include the constitutive components of the community.

This is also one of the areas where Post-structuralism is advantageous over constructivism; constructivism considers international identity from the state level without allowing for consideration of its internal dynamics (Wendt, 1992: 392), which, as highlighted above, can affect the exogenous identity of a state and how such a state is regarded by the other members of the community. According to discourse theory, for congruence and cohesion the same nodal points (norms and values) articulated at regional collective level must of necessity be articulated within the intra-state discourses. Besides, as suggested by Adler and Barnett, a member's

validity and dues in terms of "rights, obligations and duties, depends on the member's ability to abide by the region's normative structure" (1998: 36).

To the extent that communities interact face-to-face due to their geographic proximity, the conceptualisation by Adler and Barnett coincides with the concept of regional security complexes, however, with the advent of globalisation and its characteristic technological advancement and communication, it can be conceivable for communities to exist among non-contiguous entities. The distinguishing property of a security community, according to Adler and Barnett, remains that its members entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change (1998: 34).

2.8.1.2 Security Community: The Framework

The framework of conceptualising the existence of security communities as developed by Adler and Barnett is reproduced in figure 2.1 below. It is organized around three tiers, as a segmented process, comprising "the precipitating conditions" as Tier One; "factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity" as Tier Two; and "necessary conditions of dependable expectation of peaceful change" as Tier Three (1998: 38).

In tier one, states are motivated by either internal or external factors like technological developments, external threat causing alliance formation, desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, demographic and migration patterns" among others "to look in each other's direction and attempt to coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage" (1998: 38).

Under tier two, there is increased interaction between both states and their peoples that may start to transform their social environment, leading to "new roles and possible new worlds". The "dynamic, positive and reciprocal relationship" between

the underlying variables within the tier is expected to create "conditions under which a collective identity and mutual trust can form" (1998: 39).

In tier three, the mutual trust and collective identity created above are regarded as approximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Trust and collective identity are considered reciprocal and mutually reinforcing in that incremental dose of one is expected to lead to increased realisation of the other and vice versa (1998: 45-7).




Fig 2.1: The development of security communities (Courtesy: Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Adler and Barnett in their security community model conceive of three phases in the formation of security communities: nascent, ascendant and mature security communities (1998:49). Each phase is briefly examined below according to Adler

and Barnett's conceptualization.

2.8.1.3 Nascent Phase

Adler and Barnett's model puts this phase as an initial consideration of their (participating parties) desire to coordinate relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower their transaction costs, and/or encourage further interactions (1998: 50). Trigger mechanisms for these explorative interactions are to include the existence of a mutual security threat, which when coupled with historical affinities in culture, political, social and ideological orientations become a *casu belli* for a security community (1998: 51). This may lead to development of new institutions and organizations to maintain order and security. The existence of institutions is said to encourage or facilitate the development of trust amongst the parties. Adler and Barnett further posit that the existence of core states can bind the alliance together by "projecting a sense of purpose, offer idea of progress and/or provide leadership around core issues" (1998: 52). The resulting interdependence is expected to intensify as the alliance moves forward with its collaborative culture.

2.8.1.4 Ascendant Phase

This phase is supposedly characterised by "increasingly dense networks" and "new institutions and organizations" that reflect growth in mutual trust and reduction of fear of each other. The new institutions and organizations reflect "diffuse reciprocity" and shared interest resulting in a perception of a shared identity (1998: 53). Through various and intensified interactions mutual trust and responsiveness are reinforced. Within the security sector, evidence of trust can be exemplified by combined military procurement decisions and transnational intelligence exchanges. There is supposed to

be increased common understanding between the peoples and their states about society, politics, economics and culture, which would further cement the idea of a common identity within the region.

2.8.1.5 Mature Phase

Adler and Barnett define the 'mature' phase in terms of shared identity and "dependable expectations of peaceful change" that give rise to a robust security community. In this phase they typify the security communities between loosely coupled and tightly coupled communities. In the former, states identify positively with one another; there are multiple and diverse mechanisms for interactions; there is an informal governance system based on shared meanings and collective identity. The typology is further indicated by a growth of multilateralism, unfortified borders, change in military planning, common definition of threat, and a distinct discourse and language of the community (1998: 56).

A tightly coupled security community, on the other hand, is distinguished by change in national identity to reflect the regional character; institutional context for the use of power changes; and the use of force only becomes legitimate when used against external threats and those members who violate the core values of the security community. They further stipulate the indicators as cooperative and collective security; a high level of military integration; policy coordination against "internal" threats; free movement of populations; and internationalization of authority (1998: 57; see also Adler, 2008: 195-230).

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has explored new regionalism as the theoretical framework of this study, and located it within the security regionalism typology. The analysis also showed that SADC security architecture is part and parcel of the AU.

The chapter has also examined the leading theoretical approaches to security studies (Neo-realism, Neo-liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism) in which the rationalist theories have essentialized identity of international agents and therefore failed to view their relations as social phenomena. The study has privileged sociological approach to international relations in general and security studies in particular. In this context, the study puts identity at the centre of the relations between the state actors in the study of southern Africa, both as a security complex and its deliberate regionalisation as a security community. It has been argued that constructivism offers some innovative frameworks when compared to the mainstream rationalist theories for the study of southern Africa, especially the concepts of regional security complexes and security communities, in which a region can be seen as a cause of security concerns, a means to manage the security situation and a solution where it addresses the underlying conditions of insecurity by development-based regionalisation. However, Constructivism, especially the Wendt version, is found deficient in its development of the concept of identity in as far as it fails to account for identity construction, hegemony and demise. To make up for the deficit, the chapter has introduced the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe as an analytical instrument towards treatment of identity in a more nuanced manner.

Within the Copenhagen School, security becomes a discursive practice that can be

empirically studied using the securitisation and desecuritisation model. An issue becomes a security issue when it is elevated beyond the normal political debates, and therefore requires emergency measures that go beyond the normal rules of the game. It is therefore important, in the examination of southern Africa as a security complex, to consider the role of securitization in the perceptions of friends and foes, and consider SADC as 'the solution' within the context of desecuritisation.

The chapter has also explored the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe and established that addressing SADC identity through the lens of discourse theory means discarding offhand the idea of identity as an inner core or a pre-existing essence, but to uphold that all forms of social practice are discursive, and are based on relational systems of signification.

From articulation or fixation of meaning, we strive for an impossible totality in which discourses become so established or "sedimented", that we take them for granted or think of them as natural and forget their contingency and precariousness. It is in regarding social entities as natural that the existence of alternatives, within the field of discursivity, is forgotten.

It has also been made clear that identity constructed through relations of difference or exclusion can be challenged by that which has been excluded or other competing identities. It is also noteworthy that dislocation is the site for the birth of discourses, when new articulations are organized around some empty signifiers as their nodal points to try and bring order to a confused situation. In the process of constituting a new discourse or identity, simultaneously another discourse or identity is being constructed as a "constitutive outside" of the new discourse through social

antagonism. The role of the "constitutive outside" or the "Other" is to create unity within an otherwise decentred discourse. In this analysis therefore, the construction of antagonistic relations between different discourses featuring in the evolution of SADC as a social entity becomes important to the analysis of the identity of SADC of today.

Furthermore, the chapter has examined the frameworks of regional security complexes based on the Copenhagen School's research agenda, and security communities based on the conceptualisation by Adler and Barnett.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The aim of this research is to define the SADC sub-region as a security complex espousing a security community, and through securitisation and desecuritisation discourses, attempt to conceptually locate it within the phased development of a security community. It is for this reason that the study will be a qualitative interpretive research, located within the liberal constructivist paradigm (Waiter, 2006:17). This approach will allow for investigation of historical discursive experiences of the region and how the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation were and continue to be deployed to shape the region into what it is today.

The conceptual focus on identity and interests, with the inherent weakness of constructivism in conceptualisation of identity, as discussed earlier, necessitated the combination of constructivist conceptualisations with the methodological categories of discourse theory. Discourse analysis is a method of choice in line with the requirements for the study of empirical research questions and prescriptions of the Copenhagen School (Buzan and Waever 2003:52).

The traditional and conventional conceptualisation of research methods aims to assure that research is firmly grounded in the scientific method and the findings are reproducible by the scientific community (Hansen and Sorensen 2005: 98). However, Discourse theory does not lay claim to the virtue of objective investigation. In fact it is a basic assumption of discourse theory that the researcher is "always situated in a particular discursive formation and within a specific tradition, in which he or she has

been constituted" (Jorgensen and Phillips: 2002: 22-3). Thus this researcher attributes meaning to the textual phenomena, and his standing as a university student. In addition his historical and cultural attributes as a SADC and Botswana citizen renders him incapable of conducting a purely objective analysis. His immersion into the writings of others on discourse theory and analysis, among these Laclau, Mouffe, Howarth, Torfing, Stavrakakis, Jorgensen and Phillips, Hansen, Sorensen and Waever is, therefore, aimed at equipping him with necessary concepts, strategies and methodological techniques to produce work that can pass as a valid research.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology used in this research. The chapter covers the research design, methods and data analysis, especially discourse analysis of the research material.

3.1 Research Design

The research design is a case study of SADC based on the Copenhagen School's Regional Security Complex framework which has been explored in the previous chapter. The framework provides the variables to study as well as delineate the boundaries of the case. The argument is that this design will allow for an in-depth and holistic understanding of the complex politico-security relationships and processes that occur within SADC and approximate them to both a security complex and security community frameworks (Denscombe, 2010: 52). Although case studies have been criticised by some social scientists for, among other things, being limited tool for producing knowledge or at worst misleading and therefore dispensable, in discourse analysis they are indispensable (Howarth 2005: 330). Because discourse theory focuses on the "interpretation of problematized phenomena and the analysis of

sedimented and exclusionary practices”, the case study approach is an ideal method for achieving the above ends (Howarth, 2005: 30).

Furthermore, the study leverages the ability of case studies to allow the use of a variety of sources, different types of data and a variety of research methods in this investigation. In order to meet the requirements of the research problem, the research design employs documentary research, case study and in-depth interviews to collect the necessary data. The resultant data is analysed using content analysis and discourse analysis. This has allowed the methods to supplement each other given their individual shortcomings, and for the study to benefit from the triangulation effect of the different methods and data (Denscombe, 2010: 154).

One of the methodological problems for a discourse analyst is how to select texts, events and interview respondents (Hansen and Sorensen, 2005: 100). In this study the problem was approached by employing an open method of selection in the initial phase of the research. An extensive period of literature reading preceded the selection of the texts, the cases to be studied and the selection of potential interview respondents.

The design encompasses the study of SADC’s security dynamics in terms of its discursive identity through the lens of discourse theory, and case studies of two of its Member States (Zimbabwe and Lesotho) to examine how the regional body articulates its identity within its constituent units in terms of its norms and principles. The two case studies were chosen on the basis of the currency of their crises and SADC’s involvement, as well as the convenience of the English language within the states. For instance, while Madagascar was initially preferred, Lesotho was

ultimately chosen to avoid the limitation of French in the study.

The use of the two cases in this study privileged the comparative approach (Tredoux and Smith, 2006: 172). This was borne out of the anticipation that the historical and cultural differences between the two cases (Zimbabwe and Lesotho) may have influences on how the relevant discourses were formed, maintained and transformed. It was also hoped that the comparative aspect will identify "decisive factors" in the understanding and explaining of identity formation within SADC's integration project (Howarth, 2005: 334).

The individual research methods and data analytic approaches employed in the study are explained below.

3.2 Documentary Research

Documents have played a significant role in this research as tangible material to be investigated. In the social constructionist world documents are important as they represent the key means through which ideas and discourses are circulated in society (Kelly, 2006: 316). This was the experience in this research. They were also taken "as a source of data in their own right – in effect an alternative to questionnaires, interviews or observations" (Denscombe, 2010: 216).

In this study documentary data was used in conjunction with interviews for triangulation purposes, recognising that in documentary research nothing can be taken for granted (Punch, 2005: 185). In fact, Denscombe advises that the validity of documentary sources is something that needs to be established rather than being taken for granted. He goes further to proffer criteria for such validity based on

authenticity, representativeness, meaning and credibility (2010: 222). Reliance on official documents and triangulation with published professional works has been aimed at keeping this research within these criteria. However, the extent that this is maintained should be understood within the social constructionist context that "observations and all data are theory – laden and in other ways depend on the view of the researcher – and his or her personal and social characteristics associated with preunderstandings and value commitments ... – and/or language used to construct" them (Alvesson, 2002: 163).

The official documents comprising treaties and declarations establishing the organisations, communiqués, protocols and strategy papers have been used extensively in this research as authoritative and credible sources of information about SADC and its fore-runners. The importance of such documents rests on a series of decisions taken by key agents of the regional body at various events and moments in its history. It is within this realisation that the Lusaka Manifesto and the Windhoek Declaration were selected as appropriate official documents for discourse analytic examination of SADC's identity and difference. The discourse theory as examined in the previous chapter locates the beginnings of identity projects in the aftermath of crises or dislocations. The search and selection of the above documents was based on this pointer and the initial literature reading mentioned earlier. Published research and professional commentaries on SADC served to contextualize and validate the changing discourses from the FLS to the present day SADC within the official documents.

Newspapers and internet sources have also played an important part in this research, especially with regard to the case studies. Local and international newspapers provided rich information on the context of the crises and SADC's involvement. They also highlighted the role of these countries' officials and SADC's agents at various phases of the history of the regional body. Their information has been even more valuable when they corroborated each other. Other independent sources were accessed from the internet, like Wikileaks and Solidarity Peace Trust (SPT) for instance, and proved very valuable in cataloguing the events and official briefings by the SADC mediators in Lesotho and Zimbabwe respectively, and the actions and reactions of the various stakeholders in the crises.

Most of the documents were subjected to a method of document analysis called qualitative content analysis (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 116), while the Lusaka Manifesto and the Windhoek Declaration were specifically analysed through discourse analysis, as the key material on SADC's historical discourses of inclusion and exclusion. Content analysis involved the extraction of excerpts, quotations and examples from the different documents for interpretation to support observations and relationships and to provide evidence for arguments in the study (Johnson and Reynolds, 2008: 282).

In discourse analysis, the aim was to identify and analyse the categorisations through which meaning is produced, fixed, contested and subverted within the discourse materials concerned, with the use of concepts of logics of equivalence and difference, the production of floating and empty signifiers, organizing metaphors, the logics of dislocation and hegemony, and the formation and disruptions of discourse coalitions

within the identities of southern Africa in the period from the early 1970s up to the present day SADC (Howarth, 2005: 341). This historicizing was important for the establishment of SADC's genealogy beyond the August 17, 1992 Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the southern African States. The textual analysis was then contextualised within the micro-and macro-practices within the region to produce rich accounts of the identities and how the different identities constructed each other as friend and foe, and trace the different symbolic resources deployed to oppose each other.

3.3 In-depth Interviews

Qualitative research privileges subjectivity in explaining social reality, with thick descriptions of events and processes in contrast to positivist approaches (Durrheim 2006: 47). In this study, this requirement was met with the use of qualitative in-depth interviewing of nodal actors supported by content analysis of state- and organisation-generated documents. In-depth interviews were used to generate factual information about the politico-security structures and processes of SADC and representations of events. In total four interviews were undertaken with relevant officers from the SADC Secretariat. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their role, especially with regard to the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). Snowballing also played a part in identification of some interviewees where an interviewee will suggest another officer with more exposure and insight into the matter raised in the interview.

Every interview was based on informed consent and confidentiality of sources as I always disclosed my identity and the purpose of the research project beforehand.

Interviewees were also asked if their names could be cited in the research report. However, all interviewees opted for confidentiality.

To conduct the interview, a small electronic voice recorder with a microphone that can be clipped onto the respondent's clothing was used throughout. This allowed for more flowing, conversational exchange between the interviewer and the interviewee as there was no interruption to manually record what was said. It also reduced possibilities for error as the recording could be replayed as many times as is necessary to transcribe it. Although the recorder may not always be clear or audible, when downloaded into the laptop computer and used with external speakers, it proved very effective and handy in this research.

Lastly and as already stated earlier, interview data was also cross-checked and supplemented with detailed document analysis of other sources of data to provide context and thickness of accounts (Griggs, 2008: 123).

After accounting for methodology, the next chapter employs the concepts and methods so far discussed, on the basis of the frameworks for both a regional security complex and a security community, in an attempt to answer the key research questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

4.0 Introduction

While regional security projects have provided rich grounds for comparative analysis, they have not enjoyed as much individualistic treatment to emphasise their peculiarities. This analysis will limit itself to SADC and its antecedents in terms of their discursive processes of securitisation and desecuritisation to deal with regional security challenges. It traces the historical evolution of southern Africa as a regional security complex that have institutionalised into SADC, thereby arguing that SADC is a wellspring for a nascent security community.

A regional security complex has been defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns are so closely intertwined that their national securities cannot meaningfully be understood in isolation from one another (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Waever, 2003). The concept is predicated upon what Buzan calls patterns of amity and enmity among states. Demarcating a regional security complex will therefore involve the conceptual identification of the historical patterns of amity and enmity existing within the southern African region.

The present and future regionalisation of southern Africa as a viable security community cannot be understood and contextualised outside its past. For accepting the constructivist ideal that international relations are socially constructed necessitates knowledge of the entities constituting the specific social construction under consideration, and how their past shapes and influences their interpretation of

their contemporary circumstances. But as already argued, constructivism's core is also its very weakness. So, while developing southern African regionalisation along constructivist perspectives, references will be made to post-structuralist categories to better conceptualize SADC as a social construction by a group of states seeking to define themselves in terms of their common relationship to their antagonistic 'Other'.

This chapter examines the evolutionary development of southern Africa from a conflict-prone region into an institutionalised and self conscious SADC of today. This study proceeds from an understanding that to analyse southern African Regional Security Complex formation is to explain identity formation practices and ideas between states of southern Africa. In other words, to discern and trace the discourses of the "we" concepts among the states that form SADC and how they are underpinned by their concern for security. To achieve this, the first part will concern itself with securitization and desecuritisation processes of the key actors, and their conflict generation effects, in the period 1974 to 1990, that are central to regional security complex hypothesis. The second part takes the analysis of the Lusaka Manifesto as its focus and serves to interrogate the above processes and practices within a discursive formation. The analysis of the Lusaka Manifesto reveals among other things that in the securitization of the southern African situation, FLS was just as concerned about societal security (universal human rights, human equality and dignity) as it was about the states' security. The third part focuses on the period after 1990, particularly SADC formation from a discursive point of view, using the Windhoek Declaration of 1992. The Windhoek Declaration places the formation of the new SADC identity within a context of dislocated regional environment in which

the constitutive Other of the FLS and SADCC (colonialism and apartheid) is no more, necessitating a new hegemonic and more inclusive identity project. In this construction the immediate past regional history is deployed as narratives and metaphors that may bind the region into a communitarian identity.

4.1 The Making of a Regional Security Complex: The Frontline States and the Apartheid South Africa

The Frontline States (FLS) became a significant southern African politico-security actor from 1974 upon the collapse of the Portuguese empire that left South Africa and Rhodesia highly vulnerable to African nationalism and international pressure, resulting in the South African instigated regional *detente* (Khadiagala, 1994: 22 -3). Prior to the collapse, the "white bloc" resistance comprised an informal tripartite alliance of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa arrayed against the independent and majority-ruled Africa. The use of "white bloc" and "black bloc" is borrowed from Cantori and Spiegel (1970), in reference to the two political power blocs that existed in southern Africa during anti-colonialism struggles.

The collapse of the Portuguese empire following the coup of April 1974 carried with it a major portion of the defensive structures of Apartheid both from the pressures of African nationalism from the North and from external western interference. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) could now operate from Tete province with assistance from the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) that was now in power in Mozambique (Khadiagala, 1994: 20). That Portugal was a member of NATO no doubt had an influence on the reluctance of the West to view national liberation as a matter of urgency, a condition that put paid to the continued strangle

hold on Angola and Mozambique by Portugal prior to the coup. The collapse of Mozambique as a fortress of the white bloc left Rhodesia especially vulnerable to multi-front insurgency actions, and also cut its access to Mozambique transport network and port facilities. According to Colin Legum as cited by Khadiagala, by early 1974, 80% of Rhodesia's exports passed through Mozambique ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) (1994: 20).

Mozambique's independence also affected South Africa both in terms of its own security and its ability to sustain Rhodesia (militarily and economically) against the onslaught of insurgency. While it opted to accept the independent Mozambique as a neighbour to address security concerns with, it also choose to disengage from Rhodesia at the same time pressuring it to negotiate for majority rule. Khadiagala cites the *Johannesburg Star* newspaper of October 16, 1974 remarking thus:

Can we still afford to bail out Rhodesia?" The question needs to be faced, with growing urgency, as political patterns shift in Southern Africa and the World's diplomatic war on South Africa reaches new levels of hostility. Black rule in Mozambique makes Rhodesian "white buffer" less important to us strategically. Economically, she is largely a burden... (1994: 22).

The recognition by South Africa of its vulnerability led to its quest for a multilateral solution to regional conflicts. In October 23, 1974, South Africa made a foreign policy pronouncement with regard to its relations with the rest of Africa based on non-aggression treaty arrangement – regional *detente* – with willing countries (Khadiagala, 1994: 22). Zambia, itself in an economic conundrum, hedged on this overture, approached Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania for a diplomatic effort on the question of the independence of Zimbabwe. This was the transformation of the

FLS from a two-man alliance (as in Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere) to a four – country alliance. Angola only joined in April 1976 after the recognition of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) as the legitimate government of Angola.

The FLS alliance staged a diplomatic front to South African overtures in an attempt to achieve a negotiated independence of Zimbabwe. Its commitment to this window of opportunity, while it lasted, meant even standing against the general opinion at the OAU, who were against any attempt to go soft on South Africa. In this standoff with the OAU, a Zambian Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga, is cited by Khadiagala saying that “The Zambian people have rejected and will continue to reject microphone revolution because it does not solve the problems of the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa. When the chips are down we know that few around this table will come to our aid, when we face the consequences of armed struggle” (1994: 30).

President Nyerere parrying the OAU onslaught and calling for a realistic approach to the liberation of southern Africa is cited by Khadiagala saying:

We should be clear in our minds about how to proceed now after the success of the freedom fighters in Angola and Mozambique ... this has not only changed the political and military situation for Rhodesia and South Africa, but must cause them to rethink their policies. Africa must do likewise ... If they are ready to talk about decolonization, we talk. If they are not ready to talk, we fight until they are ready (1994 31).

Within the atmosphere of temporarily halted hostilities, negotiations with South Africa on Rhodesia began leading to the release, from prison, of Joshua Nkomo of

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU, and paving way for the first conference between the FLS, Rhodesia and South Africa (Khadiagala, 1994: 28).

The independence of Mozambique therefore brought the perception of southern Africa as a distinct sub-region with distinct regional actors, as well as strengthened the collaborative interactions between the independent majority-ruled states within the framework of the Lusaka Manifesto.

However, the intervention of South Africa in the Angolan civil war killed the detente framework, necessitating a change of strategy for the Zimbabwean independence. The FLS in this respect took a number of decisions to include: return to the armed struggle; the creation of a military high command to unite the otherwise divided ZANU and ZAPU movements, as a lesson from the Angolan situation; the exclusion of any foreign fighters in the Zimbabwean struggle; and the closure of Mozambican border with Rhodesia in compliance with the UN sanctions (Khadiagala, 1994: 53-4). Therefore the FLS pursued joint military and economic strategies against Rhodesia. As an extension of the economic strategy, the FLS enlisted external support to force Rhodesia to the table. This brought in the British and Americans both putting pressure on Rhodesia to negotiate with the black majority, and ultimately leading to the signing of the Lancaster agreement on the 21st December 1979 and holding of elections in February 1980 (Khadiagala, 1994: 55,79-88). These achievements were made at the time when the political and economic costs of the war were weighing heavily, especially on Rhodesia, Mozambique and Zambia.

The FLS fundamental participation in the liberation of Zimbabwe fostered a strong

sense of collective identity, and a solidarity that created a foundation for broadening cooperation into other areas. And, going along with Khadiagala, "that they consistently maintained this strategy despite countervailing pressures was testimony to the ability of small-state alliances to make a profound contribution to the change in their immediate external environment" (1994: 90).

The FLS role in the Angola-Namibia front was largely limited to wooing multilateral actors to the Namibian question, and diplomatic manoeuvring against South Africa and its allies. This allowed the FLS to focus their limited resources and time on the Zimbabwean liberation, against the South African and Rhodesian military machinery. A decision that paid by its success. It is doubtful if the same could be the case had they multi-tasked on the Angola-Namibia front. However, Angola's lack of support from its regional allies forced it to look to its external allies in the form of Russia and Cuba for assistance in its civil war (Khadiagala, 1994: 37).

4.2 From Politico-Security Strategy to Economic Strategy: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The liberation of Zimbabwe, like that of Mozambique changed the security dynamics within the sub-region. The strength of the FLS had increased to six for starters. The economic burden on the economies of the FLS was relieved, and the transport network North of Limpopo was now available to the FLS creating new possibilities and options on its relations with South Africa (Khadiagala, 1994: 85). Energised by their solidarity and success in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, the FLS saw opportunities for expansion and institutionalisation of their cooperation to counter South Africa's strategy of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), in

the formation of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The constellation framework was conceptualised as a formal regional security grouping based on South Africa's regional economic status and its transport infrastructure, and aimed at securing sub-continental military, political and economic objectives. The constellation was also tied to the supposed infiltration of the region by communism, and seen as an anti-Marxist belt of southern African States South of the Cunene-Zambezi line which would form a regional security and economic bloc of between seven and ten states. These were South Africa, the Homeland 'states' of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Malawi, Zimbabwe and possibly Mozambique (Evans 1984: 1). The proposal for CONSAS and the countervailing establishment of SADCC marked the new locus of the ongoing struggle between the Frontline States and South Africa for diplomatic supremacy in southern Africa in the ensuing period (1980 to 1990).

The road to the establishment of SADCC started formally in Gaborone in May 1979 at the meeting of the FLS foreign ministers convened on Botswana's motivation to consider the possibility of an economic collaboration. President Sir Seretse Khama motivated the idea as follows:

The strength and effectiveness of coordinated action in the political liberation encourages us to believe that a similar dynamic of coordination is attainable on the economic front... There must be a perception of common regional interests but the pursuit of these common interests must provide for the real and immediate needs of each cooperating state (Nsekela, 1981: x).

A subsequent meeting by the economic ministers in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979

proposed the following objectives for SADCC: the reduction of economic dependence, particularly on South Africa; the forging of links to create genuine and equitable regional integration; the mobilization of resources to promote national, interstate and regional policies; and concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a regionally determined strategy for economic liberation. These were subsequently adopted in the Lusaka Declaration (SADCC, 1980).

In the build up to the FLS Summit that established SADCC, invitations were extended to three other independent states: Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Considering the enormity of the project and the need to wean these states from economic relations with South Africa, it was only proper that such a decision is made. But nonetheless, the decision was based on faith for these were the least motivated to liberate themselves from South Africa. In fact, Malawi's President Banda failed to attend the inaugural summit in Lusaka. Zaire was excluded on the basis of Mobutu's claim to a Zambian territory and his support of Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in opposition to the FLS's foreign policy position on these issues, although not officially stated. It is possible that Zaire's membership has been put forward for consideration in all the five SADCC summits from November 1980 in Maputo to 1983 in Maseru (Anglin, 1983: 686).

The Lusaka Declaration that formally established SADCC was adopted on 1st April 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia (SADCC, 1980), cementing a consensus to create a regional economic organization that would bind members together, harmonise their policies and minimise the impact of South Africa's hegemony (Khadiagala, 1994: 228). From

the beginning SADCC preferred a flexible arrangement to circumvent the problems associated with bureaucratic heavy organisations. The membership to SADCC did not preclude other bilateral and multilateral relationships by Member States, including with South Africa, emphasised sectoral coordination based on Member States and the primacy of the national decision-making on individual members' sectors.

The concept of sectoral coordination ensured that political will was harnessed and sustained, and avoided ideological clashes from members with varying ideologies. According to Simba Makoni, the SADCC Executive Secretary, as cited by Khadiagala, it guaranteed a "direct involvement of governments and their functionaries... It placed primary responsibility and accountability for the organization's policies, progress and projects on the member government rather than on a distant, faceless and impersonal bureaucracy" (1994: 230).

This innovation is acknowledged by a number of political analysts, and is exemplified in four ways: the respect paid to the sensitivities of members to infringements on their national sovereignty; the degree to which responsibility for operational programs has been devolved to national governments; the balance of power between the political and bureaucratic organs; and the institutionalization of external dependency (Anglin, 1983: 692). Table 4.1 below the allocation of economic sectors to the respective members of SADCC.

Table 4.1. Sectoral Coordination by SADCC Member States

Country		Sector of Responsibility
1	Angola	Energy
2	Botswana	The Secretariat, Crop research and Anima disease control
3	Lesotho	Soil conservation and land utilization
4	Malawi	Fisheries, wildlife and forests
5	Mozambique	Transport and communications
6	Swaziland	Manpower
7	Tanzania	Industrial development
8	Zambia	Mining
9	Zimbabwe	Food security

The limited selection of areas for disengagement from South Africa reflects the realities of the SADCC states' dependence on South Africa, and their national resource endowments to finance the specific sectors.

The following information is meant to illustrate the hegemonic status of the South African economy relative to SADCC. According to the World Bank, as cited by Khadiagala, in 1987 the SADCC states had a total gross domestic product (GDP) of about US\$23bn with a large population of about 75 million, compared to US\$74bn of South Africa with a population of 38 million. South Africa also accounted for three-fourths (US\$20bn out of US\$27bn) of the region's exports and with a huge per capita consumption of energy (2 465 kg) compared to SADCC's weighted average of 140kg. In addition South Africa's GNP per capita of US\$1 890 was incomparable to SADCC's weighted average of US\$240. On the other hand the balance of trade was hugely skewed in South Africa's favour, while there was hardly any intra-SADCC trade of significance (1994: 232). One other area of SADCC's dependence on South

Africa was transport and communications. Of note in this situation is the fact that six of the nine member states of SADCC are landlocked.

This dependence on South African transport system became the rallying point for SADCC's disengagement and the reasons for increased external support to SADCC. This effort was coordinated through the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC) in Maputo from 1980. SADCC estimates that by 1988 it had collected about US\$1.9bn of the estimated cost of the projects of US\$4.6bn. Among the projects undertaken were the Zambian link to Tazara railway, and the rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor which had strategic significance to Malawi and Zambia (Khadiagala 1994: 235-8).

The success of SADCC did not go unnoticed by South Africa, which reacted with its 'total strategy'. The total strategy involved a combination of military, political, economic and diplomatic attrition on SADCC members. It unleashed a series of attacks into Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho, and escalated the war against MPLA and South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) (Johnson and Martin, 1986: xviii). Its aim was to smash the stability of the FLS and blunt the development of SADCC while simultaneously striking the African National Congress (ANC) and its host nations (Evans, 1984: 4). Its modus operandi involved economic sabotage and the use of proxy forces throughout the region to destabilise and destroy the transport infrastructure being built by SADCC. Some of the proxy forces included the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, the Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho and Zambian Mushala group (Johnson and Martin, 1986).

Although SADCC's disengagement efforts were negated by the South African total strategy, its major achievement was the demonstrated FLS collective effort, which became a motivation for even more ambitious objectives in the post-Cold War period. In 1990 Namibia joined SADCC as the tenth member after attaining independence, while South Africa was on its way to attaining majority rule. Motivated by the above and changes taking place in the external environment, SADCC set itself towards economic integration through the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration and Treaty that transformed SADCC into Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992.

4.3 Discourse Theory and the FLS Identity

This analysis takes the Lusaka Manifesto and contextualises it within the above examination and historicity, employing the categories of the discourse theory in order to examine the identity aspects of the study.

There are two major blocs in the history of conflict in Africa in general, and southern Africa in particular, that crystallized themselves as the major antagonistic discourses of the liberation period: colonialism and imperialism in the rest of Africa and their alliance with the apartheid system in southern Africa arrayed against anti-colonialist and nationalist discourses of African liberation. As systems of racial subjugation and continental plunder, colonialism and apartheid were based on a myth of racial superiority as its justification, where Africans were regarded as part of the natural environment together with the wild animals (Bull-Christiansen, 2004:45). According to Homi Bhabba, the "objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify

conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction" (1994:70). Therefore colonialism was an instrument of power: "a discourse which works through certain subjectification and surveillance" (Bull-Christiansen, 2004: 36). The overall intent of the colonial and racist discourses was that of subjugation, entitlement to African resources including land, and total inferioritisation of the African peoples.

This discursive construction of colonialist hegemony has simultaneously and differentially constructed the discourses of resistance and liberation, embedded in anti-colonialism and anti-racism movements among the black Africans. In southern Africa, this is exemplified by the formation of the Frontline States, whose nodal points and signifiers are codified in the Lusaka Manifesto. Subsequently, the FLS formed a discourse coalition with the "resistance movements" (CECAC, 1969) arrayed against a loose alliance of apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.

The FLS identity was constructed around the myth of universal human rights and self determination. It is the position of this thesis that the FLS was indeed a coalition of identities and not a homogenous entity as it may appear. It is also worth noting the existence of a foreign appendage within the FLS – The London Steering Committee – established in May 1979 as a think tank and a secretariat comprising of the diplomatic representatives of SADCC states and "invited individuals in a position to provide specialized advice and assistance" (SADCC, 1980: Annex vii, p.2). In establishing this alliance, the different identities were each acknowledging that they share with each other a situation of a 'necessarily incomplete determination" (Butler, 2000:31). The identification of the "resistance movement" as a separate discourse

within the FLS is important to understand the current security dynamics of SADC as a security complex.

The following is the analysis of FLS's identity formation based on the Lusaka Manifesto, how it created the security complex and its impact on the present. This analysis recognises that the constructivist conceptualisation of southern Africa as a security complex tends to treat its identity as pre-existing, thus treating the interactions as occurring between fully formed entities, whereas discourse theory considers the interactions as part of the identification process through the category of articulation, and that attainment of full identity is impossible.

The Summit of CECAC, in drawing up the Lusaka Manifesto sought to achieve a number of aims. They discursively constructed their identity around their distaste for colonialism and racism, predicated upon the recognition and full embrace of universal human rights and the right to self-determination. They also engaged in the construction of equivalences with the rest of the international community by articulating certain nodal points as central to that which defined them. Through this construction they declared their antagonism to racism and colonialism, which they implicitly constructed as their "constitutive outside" or "Other". In doing this, they projected this 'Other' as the reason for southern Africa specifically not being able to attain its full identity of non-racist majority ruled and prosperous African states, and the world in general not able to realise the universal principles of human equality and self determination. By articulating chains of equivalences between themselves and the rest of the world they strategically sought to displace apartheid as the hegemonic discourse in the region, therefore transforming the regional political and security

landscape.

To establish the purpose for authoring the Manifesto they declared that there exists an unnecessary "disharmony" between themselves and the world and that this hinders a "united action" in southern Africa. By implication, the main purpose of the Manifesto was to explain themselves to the world: "It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to southern Africa, we the leaders of East and Central African States meeting at Lusaka, 16th April 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto" (CECAC, 1969).

This explanation achieves the ends of discourse coalition formation by dissolving the differences and highlighting the similarities of interests between themselves and the rest of the international community. The southern African identity, as espoused by the Frontline States, is predicated on a popular antagonism to oppressive regimes in the sub-region. It is worth noting that without these oppressive racist regimes the collective struggle for a southern African identity would have lacked a unifying centre. In other words, the oppressive regimes in as far as they occasioned the formation of the FLS, represent the 'Other' of the southern African identity, without which this identification process would have been difficult to construct. The extent of oppressive manifestation of the 'Other' and the extent of the countervailing action of the FLS in southern Africa function to determine the geographic and political boundaries of the regional security complex.

The chains of equivalence were established between themselves and 'the world' by articulating their interests in association with the interests of the international community:

By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organization (Appendix 1: line 9-13).

At the same time they disarticulated colonialism and racism by dissociating South African interests from the interests of the international community and therefore argued that apartheid South Africa did not qualify for the membership of this community:

South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations' Agencies and even from the United Nations itself. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient, if it can. South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent (Appendix 1, line 87-91).

The constructive ends of identity formation were therefore achieved by emphasising images of sameness and unity of purpose between the FLS and the rest of the world. On the other hand, they nominated their antagonism by implication rather than direct reference in most of the Manifesto. For instance they went through the first half of the Manifesto without the explicit identification of the 'enemy', and this was characteristic of a negative portrayal of the antagonistic 'Other', while the 'We' identity was nominated explicitly and throughout the document using the

categorizations of "Southern Africa"; "the world"; the human race; Organization of African Unity; and United Nations.

In the process CECAC proposed a new identity for Southern Africa:

Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. **We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans**, regardless of the colour of their skins; **and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin.** We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society (Appendix 1, line 42-48)[emphasis added].

By articulating their identity in the language of "opportunity for all the people of these States working together as equal individual citizens ... to build harmonious society" they constructed the identity around a mythical idea of a 'good life' based on pluralistic principles. According to Ernesto Laclau, a myth functions like a blank surface ready for inscription with all societal discontents and ambitions, precisely because it is devoid of a particular determinism – an empty signifier (2002: 83). Therefore the creation of the FLS was based on an idea that transcended the political liberation of Southern Africa. In this instance the pronouncement meets Laclau's (2002) conception of an ethical decision as a radical investment.

Laclau differentiates between the ethical and the normative as conditions and results of a decision. He proffers that the moment of the ethical is a moment of radical

investment (as nothing predetermines its condition of a recipient). On this basis he asserts that "only that aspect of the decision which is not predetermined by an existing normative framework is ethical", and that any normative order that may result is nothing but a sedimented manifestation of the initial ethical event (2002: 82). So the construction of FLS as such became an investment in as far as it was a illusory promise, whose realisation was in the indeterminate future, and the norms that got established through the process of its articulation were the results of this investment. Laclau further asserts that "if the radical ethical investment looks, on one side, like a *pure* decision, on the other it has to be collectively accepted" (which is why it is a master signifier) (2002: 82). That is it has to be accommodative of all particular discourses via the principle of articulation. By virtue of the myth inherent in the articulation of the identity of the FLS, this condition was satisfied. When demands based on particular targets get achieved, like attainment of political independence for instance, their achievement can mean the end of the movement.

The master signifier's appeal functions to transcend such intermediate objectives like ending colonialism. This is important for understanding the resilience of the idea of southern Africa through the transformations from CECAC to FLS to SADCC and ultimately to SADC. The vision of SADC still reflects this idea of a blank surface where the discourses of the region can tag on in pursuit of their own particularities. This is the defining element of hegemony. This is further expounded in the next two chapters when the focus turns to norms and the different interests and challenges that SADC has to address.

Idealisation of the future in the Manifesto reflects not only the determination for a

solution to the southern African question in the best interest of the indigenous and the settler populations, but also the alliance's flexibility in this quest. Discursively however it suggests a complex social order in the future self-determined states of southern Africa.

Discourse coalitions are a necessary condition in the hegemonic struggles. As Mouffe puts it, "the progressive character of a struggle" depends on "its link to other struggles. The longer the chains of equivalences set up between the defence of the rights of one group and those of other groups the more difficult it will be to neutralize certain struggles" (1998: 100). By articulating their interests in the language of universal principles, the FLS did not only seek to establish chains of equivalences with the rest of world, but also with the non-state actors in the international system, for instance human rights groups and international organisations like the European Union. And if such a project succeeds, it will be very difficult for the oppressive regimes in southern Africa to neutralize, thus enabling the anti-racism discourses to ascend to the hegemonic status.

The CECAC proposal for a new dispensation of non-racist democratic southern Africa brings to the fore the ambiguities and tensions implied in the logic of difference and logic of equivalence on identity. The proposed identity will possibly have no clear cut antagonist in that the groups will be obstructing both their own and 'Others' fulfilment of identity. By accepting all races living in Africa as Africans this obstructs the black majority from recapturing Africa to themselves (true and original identity), while it also denies the oppressive (white) regimes the ideals of white domination as espoused by the colonial discourses. However, for Anthony Appiah, in

his book *"In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture"*, basing African unity on race or ethnicity is counter-productive, arguing that Africans have too many problems and projects to be distracted by a bogus basis for solidarity. He points out that "Whatever Africans share, we do not have a common traditional culture, common languages, a common religious or conceptual vocabulary ... we do not even belong to a common race; and since this is so, unanimism is not entitled to what is, in my view, its fundamental presupposition" (1992: 26).

To him the African identity has not been realized yet. But, agreeing with CECAC, trying to forget colonialism is to "suppress the conflicts that have shaped our identities; since it is too late for us to escape each other, we might instead seek to turn to our advantage the mutual interdependencies history has thrust upon us" (1992: 72).

However this study argues that the liberation solidarity of the "resistance movements" in the context of the post-1992 southern Africa has been disarticulated into a "constitutive outside" of SADC, through the denial of "Africa to Africans". This argument is taken up in the next section and in the case study of Zimbabwe in chapter Six.

The abomination of the racial domination as embodied in the Manifesto, including "reverse racialism", is constructed as the basis for any future dispensation. So since the construction of the FLS identity is based on the antagonism to racial discrimination, and it is in fact discrimination that differentially constructed the discourse of the FLS, it can be argued that the major threat to the integrity of southern Africa as embodied in SADC is disintegration into racial or ethnic

formations. Any discourse that attempts to construct such an identity will be a threat to SADC. It is therefore the argument here that ZANU-PF, with its nationalist policies of exclusion (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004; Bull_Christiansen 2004), manifests and exemplifies the existence of this threat to SADC. The preoccupation with norms as will be shown in the next chapter should be seen as the concerted effort of the hegemonic discourse or identity of SADC to stem this manifestation.

The other important point coming out of this analysis is the precariousness of hegemonic discourses and the impossibility of a full identity. Southern African blacks in negotiating an inclusive future cannot achieve their previous self nor can the racist minority regimes in the sub-region. The new solution may then lie in the construction of a new and negotiated identity, what Homi Bhabha has called 'hybridization' (1991, 1994) – an identity where none can achieve the original idea of self. For Bhabha, hybridity operates as a "reversion" of the "effect of the colonialist disavowal so that the other 'denied' knowledge enters upon the dominant discourse and estranges the basis of its authority" (1994: 114). From this, like Laclau and Mouffe's notion of impossibility of full identity, Bhabha conceives of hybridity as the space of negotiation, resistance and incorporation of elements of one discourse with the elements of its antagonistic Other, resulting in a new heterogeneous identity.

The next section revisits the above arguments through a gaze into the Windhoek Declaration as a discursive transformation of FLS/SADCC into SADC.

4.4 From Coordination Conference to Development Community: The Windhoek Declaration

It has been argued that identity helps to shape and drive actors interests as well as their view of and response to events. It is also supposed to determine how other actors respond to them and their actions (Fierke, 2010). On the other hand, Derrida, as cited by Calarco, on logic of identity, maintains that any subject that takes up an identity position does so in relation to a certain difference with that identity. "This ensures that any identity will always be marked by its own outside, its own difference to itself" (2000: 53).

The regionalist identity of SADC is accessed through the analysis of the SADC's Windhoek Declaration of August 17, 1992, signed in Windhoek by ten former members of SADCC to signal their determination for regional integration in the post apartheid era. This declaration was signed together with the Treaty establishing SADC. The analysis examines how the regionalist narratives, as the basis for the hegemonic regional discourse, create a notion of a regional identity or an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1983), and how the same discourse functions as a means of inclusion and exclusion.

The point of entry in the construction of SADC as a discursive regional identity is the dislocations of colonialism marked by the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the demise of the South African apartheid system marked by the transition period towards majority rule. These dislocations meant that the collective self-consciousness of those who identified with the dislocated identities is shattered and new forms of identification are required. At the same time the identities of the FLS and SADCC

were also dislocated, albeit slightly, to the extent that they defined themselves in relation to the dislocated identities.

The previous relations of conflict that defined the region as a security complex and the old narratives of the liberation struggle would no longer be valid in an environment promising relative peace and tranquillity. But most importantly, the FLS/SADCC identity as the hegemonic identity had to rearticulate itself in the face of new elements floating in the field of discursivity from the dislocated discourses of colonialism and apartheid. On this basis the members of SADCC met in Windhoek in August 1992 to address these new circumstances and it was at this Summit that they took a decision to advance with their regionalisation agenda established during the liberation period as detailed in the previous section.

This new identity, as will be shown throughout the analysis, was constructed around an organizing metaphor or myth of a "shared future, a future within a regional community" (Windhoek Declaration, 1992: 4).

The agents of this declaration identified themselves as "the Heads of State and Government of the Southern African States" not as FLS or SADCC (SADC, 1992a: 1). This signifies the dislocation within the previous regional discourses that forces the discursive agents to associate with new subject positions - Laclau's ethical decision. They then start to construct the basis for their common identity through the narratives of "our common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspiration" (1992a: 1). Besides constructing images of common identity, the narratives also resonate with the past discourses of the FLS and SADCC through inter-discursive meanings identifiable between this

declaration, the Lusaka Declaration of 1980 and the Manifesto, thereby creating a temporal link to the existence of SADC. The references to "common problems and aspirations", "freedom and social justice" for the peoples of southern Africa are all common in the three founding documents. The narratives are deployed to establish chains of equivalences between the "Southern African States" as the basis for their membership to SADC.

In terms of discourse theory, the inter-subjective meanings demonstrate the incremental nature of change within discourses overtime in the establishment and maintenance of hegemony. By linking with the past discourse of the anti-colonial struggles, SADC identity shows consistency with numerous small changes along its history instead of major and fundamental changes, which also give it a sedimented feel as if it has existed prior to the moment of the decision. This incremental change also talks to the nature of transformation that can be expected within SADC as a nascent security community.

The declaration then moves to define the identity of SADC within the regional, continental and global narratives and dimensions, thereby placing it as part of this sedimented existence that carries the promise of a 'good life'. The statements that "the quest for democracy and popular participation in the management of public affairs is entrenched and spreading fast and wide" in southern Africa (1992a: 1); the promotion of "closer economic relations" on the African continent under the auspices of the OAU (1992a: 2), and; fundamental and far-reaching political and economic changes in the global scene where "world affairs are increasingly managed on the basis of consultation and consensus, rather than confrontation and competition" (1992a: 3) all

carry images of a good life in the future, while at the same time constructing an idea of a 'community' within the international community which are all dedicated to improving human life. They also serve to give SADC a temporal and spatial existence, and are common features of 'imagined communities' conceived by Anderson (1983: 24-27).

The notion of "community" functions as an empty signifier in that it promotes a particular and ideologically loaded notion as a universal panacea to the fundamental lack that prevents society from achieving its full realization (Reyes, 2005: 244). It further doubles as an organizing metaphor of the new identity of" SADC that not only differentiates it from its erstwhile antagonisms but also its predecessors. In so doing, the myth functions to open discursive space for new elements rearticulated from the past identities. By the same token, by disarticulating other elements, it also functions to exclude certain identities that may associate with or harbour these elements, for instance ethnic nationalism or reverse racism.

The fantasy that is implicit in the organizing metaphor of a "shared future, a future within a community" also runs through the floating signifiers of "common cultural and social affinities, common problems and aspirations, regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and integration" (1992a: 1), and serves to grip its audience or subjects. The expectation being that once so gripped the identity becomes sedimented through its practices, institutions and images. At this point the discourse becomes a relation of domination with its agents in that they are now complicit in their acceptance of the structure and practices of the new identity (Howarth, 2009: 324). So the narratives and their 'fantasmatic' signifiers function to bind the units together

and install legitimacy of the organisation. On this basis Zizek, as cited by Howarth, calls this the stabilizing dimension of fantasy, in that it brings and maintains order within a discourse (2009: 322).

In contrast to the stabilizing dimension, the declaration also constructs aspects of the destabilizing dimension of fantasy through the assertion that:

...colonialism, racism, especially apartheid, and destabilization have left Southern Africa a legacy of wide disparities, deep economic dependence and social dislocation. This situation is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term, because it is both unjust and wasteful. It is also a potential source of tension that could lead to future instability in the region. There is, therefore, an urgent imperative to restructure regional economies and relations towards balanced, equitable and mutually beneficial growth and development (SADC, 1992a: 3).

This construction of the threat functions to scare the subjects from ever entertaining any nostalgic considerations of the past, and most importantly it constructs the instability of the past as the main culprit in the current "social dislocation", and as a constant threat to the integrity of SADC. So the fear of a polarised southern Africa becomes the driving force behind this regionalisation. In contrast to the Lusaka Manifesto which accommodated violence as a strategy in the liberation struggle, the Windhoek Declaration not only disarticulates such a strategy, but also deploys it as the reason for the lack within the region. It is important here to note that political liberation was the fundamental aim of the liberation movements while violence was their central strategy. This as has been shown in the Lusaka Manifesto was only intermittently softened through interventions by the FLS, as was the case during the short-lived *detente*.

In offering the promises of a "shared future" the agents declare thus

In the light of its peculiar circumstances, and international changes in the organisation of production and trade, Southern Africa needs to arrange and manage its affairs in a manner that will provide opportunities to all its peoples, on the basis of equity and mutual benefit; to invest and to become effective actors in the regional and international market places (1992a: 4).

The reference to the past and future, following Bhabha, asks of the peoples to remember and forget (1994: 160-1), which according to Anderson, rewrites the internal antagonisms of the recent past into narratives of the triumph of the regional spirit (1991: 199-200). In the notion of forgetting, the new identity of SADC is constructed within the myths of better and 'shared future', as if it is the prize for the past sufferings.

In this articulation, the notions of democracy, justice, improved human life become floating signifiers upon which any particularity can inscribe itself. Most importantly they serve as modifiers of such particularities by creating analogical relations between the disparate demands into a universal unity (Howarth, 2009: 120), On this basis any particular discourse that will not recognise the right of other discourses to inscribe upon this identity shall be excluded. Through these metaphors of a common future, the peoples of southern Africa (both black and white) are being called upon to forget the antagonisms of the past, so that they can all become part of the new southern African identity, SADC.

After constructing the basis for a common identity, the Windhoek Declaration enunciates general strategies of achieving this "vision of a shared future, a future

within a regional community" (1992a: 5). These strategies, organized around "human resources and environment", "infrastructure and services", "finance, investment and trade", and "international cooperation" clusters, should be understood within the SADC's "shared future" based on democracy, justice and improvement of human life. In this context the Zimbabwean land policy can be understood within the strategy of food security, but its failure to observe the above norms creates tension between itself and the SADC discourse. In other words, it articulated certain elements that have been excluded from the SADC identity.

The strategy of international cooperation, on the other hand, recognised southern Africa as still "a developing region which will continue to need the support of the international community to realise its plans and aspirations". For this reason, it calls for every effort "to consolidate the **goodwill** which the Southern Africa States have established with their international cooperating partners, and to justify and stimulate enhanced practical international cooperation, for mutual benefit" (1992a: 10) [emphasis added]. On this basis, for ZANU-PF to construct the strategies for its political survival around the discourses of radicalized anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism (Bull-Christiansen, 2004: 69) it jeopardised this strategy and resulted in targeted sanctions being imposed on prominent individuals within the political party. These sanctions became complicit in the Zimbabwe crisis and the suffering of the many. On this basis, the radicalism of ZANU-PF was regionally counterproductive. Anne Hammerstad in her article "*Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions? Challenges of Security Integration in Southern Africa*" reflects this observation by asserting that "indeed, Zimbabwe constitutes a good example of a country that has changed from a

regional motor for integration to an impediment to the building of a security community" (2005: 76).

In summary, the Windhoek Declaration placed democracy, within an empty signifier of a "community", as the cornerstone of its identity in order to modify all the particularities that may need to associate with the SADC project. This was out of the realization that on the basis of their differences, some particularities could be antagonistic to each other. On this basis, democracy became an important norm that must define the discursive practices and processes within the regional body and its Member States, such as the interventions by SADC in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar. The efficacy of SADC therefore may depend on its ability to cascade and internalise democracy within the region, or even beyond the region.

This understanding talks to Khabele Matlosa's democratic transition framework presented in Chapter Two, which recognises that SADC states are at different stages in their democratic transitions and therefore facing differing challenges. The role of SADC then becomes that of assisting its members manage this transition and its challenges, case by case, to increasingly consolidate their democracies.

4.5 Conclusion

A regional security complex according to Buzan and Waever, evolves naturally due to regional proximity and historical contact of its units. Furthermore, the development of a security complex may or may not lead to regionalisation (2003: 43 4). In the case of southern Africa, it has been argued that the historical, cultural, political and economic dynamics of the region are responsible for the formation of a

distinct and sufficiently independent politico-security regionalism to be considered a security complex.

Historical and cultural affinities between the peoples of southern Africa have influenced the extent and breath of the complex. For instance, Lesotho and Swaziland were part of the complex not because of their deliberate decision to join SADCC, but by their mere geographical location, their history, and their social and economic relations to South Africa. It was therefore natural that they would make a decision between the FLS and South Africa when the time came.

Historically it has also been shown that a number of countries shared colonial history that has led to both linguistic and political affinities between them. This has also become part of their culture. These cultures expanded and intermingled with each other regionally during the labour migrations to the South Africa mines, basing of liberation movements in neighbouring countries and the displacement of peoples as refugees within the region. These countries were also highly, but to varying degrees, dependant on the South African economy for both employment and trade. This has created a whole complex dynamic of how the individual countries viewed their individual and collective security.

The use of friendly nations' territories by the liberation movements meant that South Africa's security was also determined by the actions of the independent states, especially Tanzania which was geographically more removed from South Africa. This resulted in the South African reliance on the strategy of forward defences. As more and more countries of the complex became independent and aligned to the FLS, the security of the apartheid South Africa became more precarious, if not untenable.

But at the same time the security of the peoples of these states and of the states themselves was simultaneously compromised by this alliance decision, which tended to invite the brutality of the apartheid South Africa into their backyards. This is exemplified by the Angolan situation where the total strategy served to prolong the civil war resulting in huge human and material losses to the country and the region.

The southern African security complex fits the typology of a standard RSC, as described by Buzan, in which power relations are polarised between the FLS alliance on the one hand and South Africa and its allies on the other. This polarity was gradually modified following the successes of the FLS up to and including the demise of apartheid in South Africa.

The Soviet penetration in the Angolan civil war also modified the pattern at least at the extra-regional level. Whereas the USA was in support of the FLS in the Zimbabwean question, the presence and side of the Soviets in Angola naturally meant the USA enters the conflict on the opposing side, supporting South Africa and UNITA. So the prolonged existence of colonised states and apartheid system in southern Africa has acted as both a conduit for conflict and as its externalisation, especially in the case of Angola and Namibia. The extent of such externalisation in the Zimbabwean liberation was deliberately checked by the FLS decision to bar any foreign fighters from involvement. This demonstrates the extent to which the FLS, contrary to their 'weak' label (Khadiagala, 1994:1; Vale 1996), was able to control and determine the direction of conflict in the region, mostly at the expense of the hegemonic South Africa. For as long as colonialism existed within the region and apartheid existed in South Africa, enmity dominated the relations within the RSC.

But due to the entrenched dependence, by the FLS states, on the South African economy, the intensity of enmity was checked by regard for national survival. So while the FLS alliance may have wanted a total disengagement from South Africa, the move could have been suicidal for states like Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and less so for Zambia but still serious.

The southern African security complex is therefore largely demarcated by the regional interests of South Africa during the apartheid era, as exemplified by the scope and extent of its destabilisation in the region. However, the countervailing mechanisms of the FLS have also played a role in delineating the boundaries of the complex. While Tanzania could be argued to be more significant for the East African region (Hammerstad, 2005: 74), its leading role in instigating for and sustaining the FLS makes it an important part of the complex.

The success of the FLS can be credited with the internal transformation of the security complex, while the demise of the apartheid system may have resulted in its external transformation. The attainment of freedom by colonised states meant that the membership of SADCC increased, while the attainment of majority rule in South Africa may have attracted the states of Mauritius in 1995, Seychelles and the DRC in 1997, and Madagascar in 2005 (SADC, 2003a: 3). But most importantly it brought stability and relative security to the region that had known conflict throughout its existence as a distinct region in Africa. This experience was enough motivation for the units of the complex to wish for regional integration through institutionalised mechanisms for ensuring stability, peace and security between them. So the existence of a security complex within southern Africa has had an influence on the present

security regionalism of SADC. This history, therefore, becomes the bedrock for future security direction of the region.

The security dynamics of the region rested on both the economic and societal security concerns of the people and their states. The shared culture and history provided the narratives upon which the security discourses of the region were articulated.

On the question of identity, it has been shown that whereas constructivism treats identity with some essentialism, discourse theory allows the tracing of the development and failure of an identity through the categories of articulation, hegemony and dislocation. For southern Africa, discourse theory allowed the realisation that by articulating a mythical idea of southern Africa based on human equality and dignity, and the principle of self determination, the FLS and its antecedents have provided a blank discourse, master signifier, that transcends the attainment of political independence and, therefore, a cohesive platform on which a lot of sub-regional discourses can articulate their own particularities, without breaking it apart. However, in this construction, the discourse of reverse discrimination or "Africa for the Africans" (Kwame Nkrumah, as cited by Appiah, 1992: 19) was firmly excluded on the creation of SADC, therefore making it the nemesis of its integrity. On this grounding it is possible to understand why political and security concerns may have been prioritised in the integrative endeavours of SADC, rather than the socio-economic issues.

On the other hand, SADC's identity it has been argued, is constructed around a metaphor of "a shared future" that together with the historical narratives function to

grip its subjects together, albeit precariously, as it is also being disarticulated by other discourses. The continued hegemony of the regional project will depend on its continued relevance to the interests of the people of the region.

CHAPTER FIVE

SADC'S INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS: THE INDICATIVE ELEMENTS OF A NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY

5.0 Introduction

Having established that the SADCC formation was a politically motivated response and defensive mechanism by the Frontline States to the apartheid regime in South Africa, the demise of the regime upon South Africa gaining majority rule necessitated a transformational introspection within the grouping in the 1989 Harare Summit, that resulted with the signing of the Declaration and Treaty establishing Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia.

The events in the sub-regional, continental and global environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s pushed the region towards a formalised regionalisation. Namibia attained its independence in 1990 and South Africa was on its way to majority rule; both formally ending the struggles against colonialism and racial discrimination respectively. These took the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, towards that of peace, security and stability. This conceptually marked a transformation from a regional security complex defined by interstate conflicts towards a potential security community defined by regional cooperation and development.

On the regional level, the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Heads of States and Government signed a treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), which defined Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as the building

blocks of the continental community (OAU, 1991: 8). This was followed by the normative transformation of the continental body to the AU. To this end, SADC Heads of State and Government could define their regional integration project within the context of the continental effort.

At the global level fundamental political and economic changes included the end of the Cold War and increased culture of consultation and consensus, rather than confrontation and competition (SADC, 1992a: 3). The new regionalism was in vogue among researchers, and countries were deliberately and actively organising themselves into closed economic and political entities on the back of promises of economic windfalls (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000: 134), southern African states could not, therefore, help but be encouraged along by these events to unanimously sign the SADC Treaty of 1992.

The Treaty formalised or legalised the body giving it an equal legal status to other such international organizations like the EU, ECOWAS, and AU etc. As the only legal vehicle for SADC to pursue any security or social and economic development endeavours, the Treaty has been at the centre of all efforts to date to promote both a common security regime and a regional economic development policy infrastructure.

This chapter attempts to review the important characteristics and features of the Treaty. In doing so, it also examines and evaluates the security project of SADC, asking whether the resultant architecture provides the conditions and mechanisms necessary to transform the sub-region into a security community as envisioned in the SADC Treaty. Specifically, it examines the OPDSC in terms of its structure and functions, and how these may impact on the Organs ability to develop and cascade

the requisite norms and values for peace and security. The specific questions to answer are what norms/values are being articulated by the institution and mechanisms of the Organ? And what are the discernible institutional and conceptual challenges that may impede the achievement of its general objective?

5.1 The Treaty

The preamble to the Treaty recognises as SADC's duty, in pursuit of economic liberation, to "promote the interdependence and integration" of the "national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the Region" (SADC, 2009: 1-2).

The objectives of SADC as spelled out in Article 5 of the Treaty are to:

- a) Promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- b) Promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective;
- c) Consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability;
- d) Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self reliance, and the interdependence of Member States;
- e) Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- f) Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the Region;
- g) Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment;
- h) Strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the Region;
- i) Combat HIV/AIDS or other deadly and communicable diseases;
- j) Ensure that poverty eradication is addressed in all SADC activities and programmes; and

- k) Mainstream gender in the process of community building (SADC, 1992b).

These are very ambitious objectives compared to those of SADC's predecessors, highlighting new concerns and challenges after achieving regional political freedom. The prolonged regional conflicts and economic stagnation have occasioned wide spread poverty, disease, environmental degradation, democratic deficit and weak state institutions that must be tackled by this new regional dispensation (Le Pere and Tjonneland, 2008:111).

The Treaty, under Article 9, establishes the following institutions, which have increased through amendments from 6 in 1992 to the current 8:

- a) the Summit of Heads of State and Government;
- b) the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation;
- c) the Council of Ministers;
- d) the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees;
- e) the Standing Committee of Officials;
- f) the Secretariat;
- g) the Tribunal; and
- h) SADC National Committees (SADC, 2009: 8).

The main function of institutions is to promote and internalize sub-regional norms and values within the Member States, and thereby putting the sub-region in the road towards a common future and the feel of a collective identity. It is through the internalisation of institutional norms that the regional body can get entrenched or sedimented.

In the background to the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the SADC Secretariat notes that notwithstanding the achievements since 1980, it has also encountered "difficulties and constraints" These are listed as lack of institutional reforms for effective transformation from SADCC into SADC; lack of synergy

between the objectives of the Treaty, on the one hand, and the existing SADC Programme of Action (SPA) and institutional framework on the other, and finally lack of appropriate mechanisms capable of translating the high degree of political commitment into concrete programmes of community building and integration (SADC, 2003a: 3).

In order to address these and other institutional problems, the Heads of State and Government approved the restructuring of SADC institutions at their Extraordinary Summit held in March 2001, in Windhoek. Under the restructuring, the twenty-one sectors have been grouped into clusters under four Directorates at the SADC Secretariat. At the national level, SADC National Committees will coordinate their respective individual Member State interests relating to SADC. At the regional level, an Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) has been created to coordinate the work of different clusters. The new structure also includes the Troika system and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. To this end, SADC has now centralised the structure under the Secretariat resulting in a unified policy coordination and programme implementation. The result of the restructuring also included a 15-year strategic roadmap – The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan heralded as the blueprint for regional integration and approved in 2003.

5.2 Social and Economic Development: The Raison D'être for SADC

The transformation from SADCC to SADC had taken place at a tumultuous period in the international political and economic system, partly attributable to globalisation. Coupled with internal challenges within Member States, this meant that its regional

integration agenda faced serious challenges from the start. Garth le Pere and Elling Tjonneland, in their evaluation of the 2001 restructuring of SADC, summarised the environment thus:

SADC has experienced and been subject to the convulsive changes that have accompanied globalisation and trade liberalisation. Its regional integration agenda has been further complicated and shaped by the integration and expansion of the EU; the evolving but highly contested trade diplomacy in the WTO; the free-trade agreement between South Africa and the EU; institutional and programmatic developments in the AU and NEPAD; and the implications of the new trade and development framework with the EU under the Cotonou Agreement.

... uncertain political processes in its member countries continue to exert a profound impact on SADC's future, albeit with varying effects. These range from successful democratic transitions to continuing civil strife and communal violence. While parliamentary elections and open pluralism are becoming vectors of change, the region cannot escape poverty, underdevelopment, political turmoil, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is against this background that SADC has had to redefine its *raison d'être* (2008: 101).

SADC, like its predecessors, initially had underdeveloped development regionalism content. Trade institutions were limited to Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) of the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and various bilateral agreements (Schillinger, 2008: 13). However, this changed in 1996 with the adoption of SADC Trade Protocol heralding a new dimension to the SADC regionalisation project. According to Schillinger, the Protocol and RISDP were largely fashioned along the European Union framework, with targets for SADC Free Trade Area (PTA) by 2008; SADC Customs Union by 2010; SADC Common Market by 2015; SADC Monetary Union by 2016 and; a launch of SADC currency by 2018, all pointing to a strong developmental orientation

by the regional body (2008: 13).

According to the agreement amending the SADC Treaty, the RISDP, based on the strategic priorities of SADC and its Common Agenda, is designed to provide strategic direction with respect to SADC programmes, projects and activities. It provides SADC Member States with a coherent and comprehensive development agenda on social and economic policies over the next fifteen years. It also provides the Secretariat and other SADC institutions with clear guidelines on SADC's approved social and economic priorities and policies, and, therefore, enhances their effectiveness in discharging their facilitating and coordinating role (SADC, 2010: 1.6).

To this end, the strategic plan has been organised into the following priority areas which were refocused in 2007: Trade, economic liberalisation and development; Infrastructure in support of regional integration; Politics, defence and security cooperation; Food security, environment and management of trans-boundary natural resources; Social and human development; Gender and development; Statistics and Science and technology (SADC, 2011: 12).

5.3 Crafting the Security Architecture

While SADC defines itself in terms of social and economic development, it is also mindful of the nexus between development and security. To this end, while pursuing the economic integration agenda, it is also making efforts to create an environment of peace, stability and increasing democratic practices. The recognition within SADC that investment and development need a stable political environment may also herald a recognition that state sovereignty is not a licence to impunity, and that internal

affairs should be open to legitimate scrutiny. With a number of Member States still involved in internal conflicts and contested election results, the sub-region remains volatile and unstable, creating a need for capacity within SADC to deal with all possibilities within and between the Member States. A focus on mediation, diplomacy and peacekeeping within SADC can create an enabling environment for social and economic development while also creating depth to similar functions within the African Union.

The provision within the Treaty for an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), hereafter called the Organ, bears testimony to this paradigm shift. The arduous process of establishing the Organ ran from 1994 to its substantive adoption on 14th August 2001, and its Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO) was adopted in 2004 hopefully to run concurrently with and in an enabling relationship to RISDP. Indeed SIPO is seen as an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda embodied in the RISDP (SADC, 2004: 5). The signing of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation constitutes the formalisation of a more inclusive approach to security and provides the institutional framework that will guide security cooperation within the sub-region. SADC can therefore be seen as pursuing both developmental and security regionalisms.

The preamble to the Protocol establishing the Organ reaffirms the United Nations as the ultimate authority in the maintenance of peace and security, and recognises the role of the African Union in the same (SADC, 2001: Preamble). This sets the basis for upholding the principles, norms and values of the two international institutions by SADC and its mechanisms. But in the same preamble, SADC reaffirms itself to the

principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of others. Although in themselves, they may not be harmful to the overall aim of the Organ, there is a well documented tendency by the elites to use these same principles to securitize issues for their (elites) own benefit and at the expense of human security (Matlosa, 2006: 18). To guard against such tendencies, these principles should have been accompanied by a declaration to transparency and democratic principles, especially with regard to matters of peace and security.

The genesis of the OPDSC can be traced to the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security held in Windhoek from 11 to 16 July 1994. It is this workshop that made recommendations that would lead to the ultimate signing of the Protocol establishing the Organ in 2001. The length of time it took to negotiate the structure and content of the Organ is reflective of the intensity of the debates behind the negotiations and the differences in values between the parties involved. For instance, the South African government had a problem with the level of precedence between the chair of the SADC Summit and the chair of the Organ. As a political and security organ its chair was bound to command the most influential position in the region, and overshadowing the Summit chair. The South African position was that SADC must of necessity be "a single, integrated regional cooperation mechanism" (Cilliers, 1999: 25). Jackie Cilliers drawing from the controversy concludes that the differences displayed "draw more than a little on the changed power relationships evident in the region following the presidency of Nelson Mandela in South Africa – they also

reflected fundamental differences in political values and practices between SADC member countries" (1999: 25).

Be that as it may, the contention here is that the controversy and the ensuing debates around the nature of the Organ is a necessary event in the identity formation of SADC, where disparate discourses have to forge a coalition articulating expanded and inclusive moments into the new discourse. This is a hegemonic struggle playing out as a spirited negotiation among those who seek to see themselves as one. To be a norm, as in a defining feature of the new identification project, it is necessary that such engagements between members are welcomed and cherished on the basis of articulating a new value system that must cascade within the community. It is unfortunate that, apparently, this is one of the very few instances of a real debate about what is being created in the name of SADC.

The process was intermittently interrupted by the outbreak of the Angolan civil war in 1997, and also the outbreak of hostilities in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 without the Organ in place to guide the response of SADC to these crises.

The next Summit of Heads of State and Governments after the onset of the three crises was in Maputo in August 1999 and the one lesson that came from the crises was, apparently, the urgency of a solution to the impasse. At the end of the Summit the Communiqué, as cited by Cilliers, read thus:

The Summit decided that the Council of Ministers should review the operations of all SADC institutions, including the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security [sic], and report to the Summit within six months. The summit further agreed that the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security [sic] should continue

to operate and be chaired by President Mugabe of Zimbabwe (1999: 33).

The Summit had also laid the foundation for a Troika system for the Organ through a decision that the operations of the Organ had to occur in consultation with the outgoing, present and incoming chair of SADC.

These events were followed by the change of government figures in South Africa following elections, in the energised persons of President Mbeki and a new Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota. By the end of 1999 a solution had been reached that largely reflected the current structure of the Organ, including the decisions for a protocol of the Organ and the drafting of a Mutual Defence Pact (Cilliers, 1999).

5.3.1 The Structure and Functions of the Organ

The provision to establish the Organ is provided for under Article 9 of the Treaty, and its establishing Protocol outlines the institutional structures and their functions. The Treaty also mandated the Summit to elect the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the Organ under Article 10A.

The Protocol of the Organ, over and above the general objective, outlines its specific objectives as follows

- a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intrastate conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;
- b) promote political co-operation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
- c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora;
- d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;

- e) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;
- f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
- g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charter and conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and United Nations respectively.
- h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;
- i) develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to:
 - (i) address cross-border crime; and
 - (ii) promote a community based approach to domestic security;
- j) observe, and encourage State Parties to implement, United Nations, African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;
- k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operation; and
- l) Enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance.

Figure 5.1: The structure of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

Cooperation




Figure 5.1 show the structure of the Organ, and its major components, which are discussed subsequently below. The Organ is headed by a Troika, of the substantive Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson. The SADC Summit and Organ Troikas are mutually exclusive; but can hold combined extraordinary summits. The chairperson and deputy chairperson are elected on the basis of rotation among the members of the Summit, provided they are not also the chairperson of the Summit. Their term of office is one year respectively. The chairperson with his/her troika is responsible for the overall policy direction and achievement of the objectives of the Organ. Organ matters may be tabled at the Summit through a request by the Organ chairperson to the Chairperson of the Summit (2001: Article 4).

A Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) comprising of the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each of the State Parties reports to the Chairperson. Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each Member State perform the functions of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy within the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Ministers for Defence, Public Security and State Security work through the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (2001: Articles 5, 6 & 7).

The Article on conflict prevention, management and resolution stipulates that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, State Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self defence against an armed attack (Article 11). Even though SADC is generally faulted for the

unauthorised and unprocedural interventions in the DRC and Lesotho, it may be argued that at the time the protocol was not in operation, and nobody could claim prior knowledge of its ultimate wording. Besides, a norm should not necessarily be based on a legal stipulation but on the general acceptance of its value among the members of the community.

The jurisdiction of the Organ under Article 11.2 is outlined as follows:

- a) The Organ may seek to resolve any significant inter-state conflict between State Parties or between a State Party and non-State Party and a 'significant inter-state conflict' shall include:
 - (i) a conflict over territorial boundaries or natural resources;
 - (ii) a conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened; and
 - (iii) a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory of a State Party which is not a party to the conflict.
- b) The Organ may seek to resolve any significant intra-state conflict within the territory of a State Party and a 'significant intra-state conflict' shall include:
 - (i) large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights;
 - (ii) a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a State;
 - (iii) a condition of civil war or insurgency; and
 - (iv) a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory of another State Party,
- c) In consultation with the United Nations Security Council and the Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the Organ may offer to mediate in a significant inter- or intra-state conflict that occurs outside the Region (SADC 2001).

The integration of the Organ with the SADC Secretariat following the restructuring exercise of 2001, as also observed by Hendricks and Musavengana, may have improved governance and integrity of decisions of the Organ (2010: 16), through the

involvement of SADC technocrats in the decision-making process, especially in light of Article 12 of the Protocol pertaining to confidentiality of information.

5.3.2 Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) is parallel but mutually reinforcing to the RISDP. Its objective is to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region can realise its socio-economic objectives as encapsulated in the RISDP.

The foreword to SIPO by the then Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho and Chairperson of the Organ in 2004, underscores peace, security and political stability as the "linchpins for socio-economic development". This pronouncement sets the context within which SIPO must be understood. It further states that the Protocol of the Organ was adopted in the pursuit of the shared future for the sub-region. To this end, it declares that SIPO is not an end in itself. Instead, it is an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC development agenda embodied in the RISDP (SADC, 2004: 5).

SIPO was divided into the following sectors that fall under the ambit of the Organ: The political, defence, state security and Public security sectors. The objectives set out in the Protocol for the Organ are then allotted to the different sectors as appropriate and specify activities and strategies for the realisation of the respective objectives for each sector.

The initial SIPO was to run from 2004 to 2009, meaning that there should have been a review prior to 2009 so that its second instalment could proceed seamlessly from

2009. But what is informally known as SIPO II (otherwise officially called the Harmonised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ) was only approved, with outstanding issues, by the SADC Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia in 2010, and officially launched in November 2012. SIPO II has been divided into five sectors: political, defence, state security, public security, and police sectors in contrast to the initial SIPO with four sectors (SADC 2012).

- The Politics and Diplomacy sector focuses on promoting good governance among Member States on the basis of shared political values and practices, improved conflict management, improved civilian participation in peacekeeping, and the effective management of regional disasters.
- Defence sector seeks to enhance participation in peacekeeping, roll out the SSF, and provide support to civilian authorities.
- State Security sector is aimed at preventing the subversion of the constitutional order, and deal with economic threats to Member States, by regulating intelligence exchanges among state security agencies and services in the region.
- Public Security sector seeks to address the threats associated with organized crime syndicates by coordinating the activities of law enforcement, public safety, correctional services and prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, and customs and refugee agencies.
- Police sector focuses on the prevention of cross border crime, and enhancing law and order by coordinating the activities of the region's police services and forces.

In terms of the security community paradigm, SIPO through the advancement of strategies and mechanisms for common and collective approach to security, developing trust and confidence within the defence sector, improving public security and promoting the capacity for pacific settlement of conflicts contributes to the deepening of the security community feeling in line with the indicators across the nascent, ascendant and mature phases of a security community. Seeking

collaboration and cooperation can unify the states in the sub-region, a key ingredient for a community feeling.

5.3.3 Instruments for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Pursuant to the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation the following mechanisms have been established:

- a) Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC)
- b) SADC Standby Force (SSF)
- c) Mutual Defence Pact
- d) Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit
- e) Southern African Regional Police Chiefs' Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO)
- f) Panel of the Elders.

The next section examines them individually.

5.3.3.1 The Regional Early Warning Centre

The REWC has been established within the SADC HQ in pursuance of Article 11.3b of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Its aim is to facilitate the preventative function of the Organ on conflict outbreaks and escalation. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) also calls for the establishment of an early warning unit in each Member State as part of the state security sector. The REWC is supposed to be interfaced with the national early warning centres and the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The functions of an REWC, as stipulated by the AU framework are as follows

- a) To implement an early warning mechanism to promote peace, security and stability in the region
- b) To articulate a holistic approach to anticipating potential conflicts in the region
- c) To support regional mechanisms for conflict prevention

- d) To strengthen existing national mechanisms to feed into SADC mechanism
- e) To establish a database system for early warning in SADC
- f) To compile strategic assessment and analyses of data collected at the regional level
- g) To conduct research on conflict issues
- h) To share information among member states on major issues that threaten the SADC security and stability
- i) To arrange technical review meetings among relevant institutions to reconsider methodologies and operational issues with the view to making early warning mechanisms more effective (African Union, 2002: 2(2)).

It is supposed to focus on a wide range of issues that encompass both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Although it was planned for launching in 2006, it has only been launched in July 2010 due to delays in the physical establishment of the centre (interview, 2012: April, 23).

5.3.3.2 SADC Standby Force

The establishment of the SSF is traceable to the 1997 meeting of OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff in Harare and SADC's own meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff also in Harare in July 1998. The former meeting suggested that the OAU could raise a brigade-size, contributed force to be on standby from each of the five sub-regions of the continental body, while the latter went on to recommend to the ISDSC for the establishment of a SADC peacekeeping brigade and a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (Cilliers, 1999: 46-7). The establishment of the SSF is therefore out of both sub-regional and continental instigation.

Following the transformation of the OAU to the AU, Article 13(1) of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council, 20 December 2003, calls for setting up

of the African Standby Force (ASF). The purpose of the ASF is to provide the AU with capabilities to respond to conflicts through the development of peacekeeping forces and to undertake interventions pursuant to Article 4(h) and j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (African Union 2002: 13(1)). The ASF is intended for rapid deployment of multidisciplinary contingents with civilian, police and military components ready, in their respective countries of origin, for, inter alia, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace building, post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and humanitarian assistance (African Union 2002: 13(1)).

The SSF, in pursuit of the ASF aims was launched in 2007 in Zambia and operates under the principles of the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Member States. The functions of the SSF, as outlined in the MOU, are as follows:

- a) Observation and monitoring missions;
- b) Other types of peace-support operations;
- c) Intervention in a State Party in grave circumstances or at the request of that State Party, or to restore peace and security;
- d) Preventative deployment in order to prevent
 - i. A dispute from escalating;
 - ii. An on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states;
 - iii. The resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
- e) Peace building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation;
- f) Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas; and
- g) Any other functions as may be authorised by the SADC Summit (SADC, 2007c: 4).

According to the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ, the establishment of the SSF

will enable the achievement of the following in the operationalization of the OPDSC objectives:

- a) To enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance;
- b) To develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in International and Regional Peacekeeping Operations;
- c) To consider the developments of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats;
- d) To consider enforcement action in accordance with international law, as a matter of last resort, where peaceful means have failed;
- e) Promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end.

To date the SSF has completed most of the operationalization requirements as set out by the PSC, including participation in collective exercises such as Blue Hungwc, Blue Crane (interview, 2012: April, 23).

The SSF Planning Element (PLANELM) comprising the military, police and civilian representatives is functional and co-located with the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. It has completed its doctrine, operational guidelines, standard operating procedures, logistic concept, verified the various country pledges, logistic support and land for the Main Logistic Depot in Botswana has been allocated. A command post and field training exercise have been conducted with participation from all the State Parties except Madagascar due to its suspension from SADC. The structure of the civilian component and its personnel are among the few outstanding issues (Interview, 2012: April, 23).

In terms of norm development, cascading and internalisation, the principles enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights are the same ones guiding the PSC and by extension the establishment, mandate and modus operandi of the ASF. Besides its potential for increased effectiveness in dealing with peace and security, the SSF as a mechanism may also increase the traction of these same norms and practices within the national security forces in general. Also, by combined deployment under a single command structure, trust is built between forces of the Member States there by reducing the possibility of war between them.

The contribution of the SSF towards a security community lies in its potential to preempt conflict through the observatory role and the potential to restore peace and security in a conflict environment through the whole array of possible operations it can be called upon to perform, and the building of trust and dependable expectations between the Member States through the adoption of common standards in operations and creation of capability for mutual assistance. By insisting on a common doctrine, common command and control, common logistics, SADC is projecting a sub-region whose members are intent on acting as one. All these are key characteristics in the development of a mature security community in the Adler and Barnett model.

5.3.3.3 The Mutual Defence Pact

Article 11.3(e) of the Protocol of the Organ stipulates that external military threats to the region shall be addressed through collective security arrangements to be agreed upon in a mutual defence pact among the State Parties. In furtherance to this, objective 4 of SIPO under the Defence sector is to consider development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats (SADC, 2001: 27). In compliance with the Organ and

furthering the strategic objectives of SIPO, the Mutual Defence Pact was signed by Heads of State and Government Summit in Tanzania in 2003.

The objective of the Mutual Defence Pact (hereafter the Pact) is to operationalize the mechanism of the Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters (2003b: Article 2). The Pact, viewed within the context of the impasse that immobilised SADC with regard to the DRC conflict of 1997 and synthesising from its wording, is both a non-aggression treaty arrangement as well as a collective defence strategy. Articles 3, 7 and 8 read with Article 1(2) of the Pact commits the State Parties to mutual non-aggression, while Articles 4 and 6 of the Pact commits the State Parties to the defence of one another and make it their individual and collective responsibility to raise and maintain the capability to come to each other's defence. Within the commitment to non-aggression and collective defence, however, the State Parties are restrained by the emphasis on peaceful rather than confrontational approach to resolving disputes, through Article 3(1) and (2) of the Pact. This is a necessary restraint for the overall stability of the region.

The Pact further calls upon State Parties to cooperate in defence matters and facilitate interaction among their armed forces and defence related industries through training, exchange of intelligence and joint research, development and production of military equipment. This is expected to create a conducive environment for trust development and growth among the SADC militaries. This student researcher, a Botswana military officer studying at the University of Namibia on the invitation and sponsorship of the Namibian Ministry of Defence, is as such, a testimony to the letter and spirit of the Pact. The signing of the Pact by State Parties has therefore codified their

commitment to regional stability, peace and security. Naison Ngoma echoing the same sentiment interprets their signing as their visualisation of "a sub-region so intertwined that targeting one another militarily would be inconceivable" (2005: 204).

In terms of the security community paradigm, the SADC Member States, by agreeing to a non-aggression treaty, have made one big step in the effort to eliminate distrust and fear among themselves, while ensuring that they regard the insecurity of one as the insecurity of all. This is one key indicator of a mature security community. While not suggesting SADC to have reached a mature phase, the achievement indicates the extent to which SADC has gone in the various areas.

The emphasis on and commitment to mutual defence can only bring the states into a closer and stronger relationship in which there is common threat perception and a common undertaking on the response to such threats. The situation in the DRC in 1997 has demonstrated the potentiality of an external threat to the sub-region which the Pact aims to address. When states respond collectively, it also increases the prospects for the pacific approach to such conflicts. All this augurs well for the development of a robust security community as defined by Adler and Barnett.

5.3.3.4 Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation

The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) was officially established in August 2, 1995, in the Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. The police chiefs, meeting under the framework of the ISDSC decided to form an organisation that can enhance regional cooperation on public security matters (Cilliers, 1999: 55). In 1997 SARPCCO became the de facto sub-regional arm of the

International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and to date they are co-located in Harare, Zimbabwe, where INTERPOL serves as the secretariat to SARPCCO. The organisation was formally integrated into the OPDSC in 2009 (Hendriks and Musavengana, 2010: 24).

SARPCCO is governed by a constitution, which outlines its objectives as follows:

- a) To promote, strengthen and perpetuate cooperation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications;
- b) To prepare and disseminate information on criminal activities as may be necessary to benefit members in their attempts to contain crime in the region;
- c) To carry out regular reviews of joint crime management strategies in light of changing national and regional needs and priorities;
- d) To ensure the efficient operation and management of criminal records and the efficient joint monitoring of cross-border crime, taking full advantage of the facilities available through INTERPOL;
- e) To make recommendations to governments of member countries in relation to matters affecting effective policing in the Southern Africa region;
- f) To formulate systematic regional police training policies and strategies, taking into account the needs and performance requirements of the regional police services or forces;
- g) To carry out any relevant and appropriate acts and strategies for purposes of promoting regional police co-operation and collaboration as dictated by regional circumstances (Cilliers, 1999: 56).

In 1999, the police organisation ratified a multilateral cooperation agreement on combating crime in the region. This agreement in combination with the constitutions of INTERPOL and SARPCCO provide the institutional framework for police cooperation in southern Africa.

The organization has also created its own code of conduct, which largely reflects the

principles of the international conventions on police cooperation. The principles are: respect for national sovereignty; equality of police services/forces; non-political professionalism; mutual benefit to all member countries; observance of human rights; non-discrimination and flexibility of working methods; and mutual respect and goodwill (Cilliers, 1999: 56). By complying with the international standards, the organisation is making a promise to the citizens of SADC for an appropriate and democratically accountable policing culture, which creates and fosters trust among the SADC police forces and between the police forces and the people they serve.

Since its inception, it has developed into the primary regional mechanism for the prevention and fighting of cross border crime. Its activities have covered the following areas of crime concern: Smuggling and illegal importation of goods and counterfeit commodities; Drug trafficking; Smuggling stolen motor vehicles; Armed robberies; Smuggling endangered species and rare resources; Financial crime; Money laundering; Illegal migration, people smuggling and human trafficking; Terrorism; Stock theft; and Corruption (SARPCCO, n.d.: 3).

The framework established by SARPCCO and its relationship with INTERPOL is an indication of a collaborative approach to public security issues within the sub-region. In this respect, the chances for a more comprehensive protection of the SADC public are improved, while building trust and professionalism amongst the police forces of the sub-region. The cooperative approach, like in the exchange of crime intelligence, also approximates the optimized use of the limited resources within the Member States by avoiding duplication of efforts, while encouraging complementarity.

SARPCCO as a mechanism of SADC must be understood within the context of SIPO

as an operationalization of the objectives of the Organ. In this respect, protocols that have been developed in the areas of firearms and ammunition; extradition; against corruption; and mutual legal assistance in matters of crime provide further institutional grounding of the collaborative culture, and facilitates the work of the police forces.

The contribution of SARPCCO and INTERPOL to the development of a security community can therefore be seen in the improvement of public security across the region tied to the regional effort complementing the respective national efforts. This regional perception can elicit a sense of a community among the peoples of the region. The 'we-feeling' has been indicated as an important component, more than the protocols, in the development of a security community, especially in the ascendant and mature phases of a security community.

5.3.3.5 The Panel of the Elders

The addition of the Panel of the Elders in the SADC's OPDSC mechanisms should bolster the preventive diplomacy mechanism. Through the REWC, it will be expected to anticipate tensions and follow potential crisis situations to effect timely interventions when necessary and prevent escalations. According to the interview of SADC officials (2012, April 23), the mechanism was adopted in 2010, but has been hampered by resource constraints to come into full operation.

Its structure consisting of the Panel of Elders supported by the Mediation Reference Group and a Mediation Support Unit follows the design and modalities of the AU's Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the Wise of the AU is mandated to "advise the Peace

and Security Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa" (African Union, 2002: 11(3)). Its modalities adopted on the 12th November 2007, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia stipulate among other things that members shall be elected from among "highly respected African personalities of high integrity and independence, who have made outstanding contributions to Africa in the areas of peace, security and development" (African Union, 2002: 1); and that members should not be politically active at the time of their appointment and throughout their tenure. These are some of the standards that can be expected to be upheld in the SADC's Panel of the Elders.

5.4 Conclusion

It has been argued in the previous chapters that the historical, cultural, political and economic dynamics of the region are responsible for the formation of a distinct and sufficiently independent political region to be considered a security complex. The resulting security situation characterized by weak states, poverty and democratic deficit calls for capacity within SADC to address them. The concept of a security community has been suggested as one of the approaches to peace and security. Conceptually therefore, the extent that a regional identity approximates the security community paradigm in its various articulations may be indicative of the extent of its achievement of peace, political stability and security.

On the basis of this background, this chapter has examined the politico-security architecture of SADC including its mechanisms, and argues that despite enduring challenges, there is profound evidence within the architecture of meeting the

characteristics of a security community.

On the SADC's policy implementation framework and its contribution to the development of a security community the verdict is still pending. However, a number of areas deserve comment in this regard. The OPDSC through its inherent mechanisms have contributed immensely to the development of SADC as a security community. Firstly, the collaborative and cooperative culture being nurtured has increased the diversity of interactions and transactions within the sub-region, as well as between the sub-region and the external world, especially the AU and UN in the context of international community. The increased diversity is a component of tier two in the development of a security community. Secondly, the repeated reference to the "shared future" and "common agenda" are reflective of the conscious effort by SADC to move towards a security community. Thirdly, through the establishment of institutions like the MCO, ISPDC and ISDSC, the adoption of the Mutual Defence Pact, the promotion of interoperability doctrine between the security forces and services of the sub-region, and joint exercises, coordination and cooperation are enhanced in a way that results in the reduction of fear and increased trust among Member States, characteristic of the ascendant phase of a security community.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF SADC IN REGIONAL POLITICAL CRISES: THE CASES OF ZIMBABWE AND LESOTHO

6.0 Introduction

As alluded to previously in this study, SADC's past experiences with conflict resolution dates back to Lesotho in 1994 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997, other than when it was still the former FLS. One aspect that limited SADC at the time was its lack of institutional mechanisms and capacity pending a solution on the then ongoing debate on the structure of the Organ. Zimbabwe and its "coalition of the willing" unilaterally took the decision to intervene and fight in support of the Government of the DRC (Likoti, 2006: 164). South Africa and Botswana also took a decision in 1998 to intervene militarily in Lesotho in spite of the SADC structures. The two cases were to be later endorsed after the fact, as SADC-mandated. Specifically, SADC was still experimenting with its OPDSC at the time and there was no SIPO. The interventions did not even seek AU or UN approval as should be the case under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

SADC continues to be called upon to intervene in its member states with the aim to promote regional stability. At the time of writing this thesis it was fully engaged in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar and the DRC (SADC, 2012: 3-4). Swaziland is also a potential hot spot that may require its engagement in the near future. This chapter looks at the cases of Zimbabwe and Lesotho within the context of promotion of stability and good governance within the region, utilizing its existing institutional mechanisms.

The two case studies in this chapter are located within a changed environment from that of the 1990s mentioned above, and aim to examine conformity with existing institutional and policy frameworks. SADC has developed substantial institutional structures and mechanisms, especially for addressing security related issues within the sub-region. The extent to which SADC is able to propagate its norms, with these structures and mechanisms, within the Member States and promote common value system should greatly enhance its advance towards a robust security community.

6.1 SADC Framework for Democratic Elections

The lessons that came out of SADC's experiences in its previous interventions have led to the drafting and adoption of the 2004 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in Mauritius, and the inauguration of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) in April 2011, both of which have their basis in the Protocol of the Organ and SIPO. The SIPO provides a framework for institutionalising democracy and good governance and promoting peace and security for, among other things, the attainment of integration and socio-economic development. One of the objectives of SIPO is to "promote the development of democratic institutions and practices by State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights" (SADC, 2001: 20).

In order to achieve this objective, SIPO's strategies include:

- establishment of common electoral standards in the region, including a code of electoral conduct;
- Promoting the principles of democracy and good governance;

- Establishing a SADC Electoral Commission for the promotion of and respect for human rights; and
- Strengthening member states' judicial system (SADC, 2001: 20).

The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (see Table 6.1 below) aim at advancing democratic governance and political stability in the SADC region through the promotion of peaceful, credible and democratic elections that deliver legitimate and accountable governments. Since their adoption in 2004, they have been used by SADC in observing elections in all the member states that have held elections thus far.

Table 6.1: Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in the SADC Region.

Principles	Guidelines
Full participation of the citizens in the political process;	Constitutional and legal guarantees of freedom and rights of the citizens
Freedom of association	Conducive environment for free, fair and peaceful elections
Political tolerance	Non-discrimination in the voters' registration
Regular intervals for elections as provided for by the respective National Constitutions	Existence of updated and accessible voters roll;
Equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media	Timeous announcement of the election date
Equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for	Where applicable, funding of political parties must be transparent and based on agreed threshold in accordance with the laws of the land
Independence of the Judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions	Polling Stations should be in neutral places
Voter education.	Counting of the votes at polling stations
Acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been free and fair by the competent National Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law of the land.	Establishment of the mechanism for assisting the planning and deployment of electoral observation missions
Challenge of the election results as provided for in the law of the land	SADC Election Observation Missions should be deployed at least two weeks before the voting day.

Courtesy of SADC

In order to further improve on its election-related work as defined in SIPO, SADC established the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) whose primary mandate is to advise SADC on issues pertaining to elections and the enhancement of democracy and good governance.

Its specific objectives are to:

- To urge and encourage SADC Member States to adhere to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.
- To encourage SADC Member States to adhere to international best practices whenever they are holding elections.
- To advise SADC Member States on strategies and issues to enhance and consolidate capacity of Electoral Management Bodies in the SADC region.
- To encourage SADC Member States to uphold and respect the independence and autonomy of Electoral Management Bodies (SADC, 2011b).

The study is very cognisant that elections and democracy are not synonymous concepts, but holds that the existence of competitive free and fair elections are critical features in defining states as democratic. In addition, post-election crisis and conflict have been shown to be the major pre-occupation of SADC in light of the incomplete democratization in most Member States (Matlosa 2008).

The case studies in this research do not only allow the examination of SADC in terms of observance of its norms, but avail opportunity to examine its promotion of democracy and good governance within its Member States. On a positive note Lesotho has shown commitment to these principles through electoral reforms following the 2007 election disputes and in preparation for the May 2012 elections. However, Zimbabwe is yet to hold elections that would be declared free and fair

under the SADC framework. It is expected that the current mediation in the country will be tested by the outcome of its next election.

Nonetheless, the following limitations have been observed by Khabele Matlosa in his numerous researches on SADC elections and post-election violence. The first relates to the legitimacy of the Principles and Guidelines on the basis of lacking regional civil society involvement (Matlosa, 2005). Secondly, he observes that "the principles are not binding on SADC Member States while there are also no mechanisms in place to hold member states breaching them accountable". These concerns are further bolstered by the sidelining of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, after its critical assessment of the Zimbabwe elections in 2002. As a remedy he recommends transforming the principles and guidelines into a protocol (Matlosa and Lotshwao, 2010: 35).

6.2 SADC Mediation in the Zimbabwe Crisis

6.2.1 Background

In March 2007 at its Dar-es-Salaam Extraordinary Summit, SADC appointed a sitting and now former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, as the principal mediator in the Zimbabwean crisis. The current crisis itself had been on-going, arguably, since 2000, (Raftopoulos, 2006: 203) when President Robert Mugabe lost a referendum on a new constitution against a re-organised labour and civil society led by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Zimbabwean post-independence history has come to be a history of a series of political conflicts and crises in which "political instability, lawlessness, misgovernment and relentless economic meltdown" have overtime brought the country to its political knees

(Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010: 1).

The chronology of conflict in the post independence Zimbabwe starts with a failed security sector reform (SSR) and a resultant contestation between Zimbabwe African National Union -Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAPU-PF) as two competing liberation movements based on ethnic and territorial differences. The former Rhodesian forces had, however, been partly integrated into the Zimbabwe Armed Forces. This meant that the two liberation movements went into post-independence with their military wings still intact, and continued to see each other as enemies rather than political contestants, and consequently one had to annihilate the other.

According to an account by Gavin Cawthra, President Robert Mugabe turned to North Korea for military support and unleashed ZANU-PF-dominated military units (notably the 5th Brigade) onto the ZAPU forces in Matabeleland. Conflict reached high levels during the mid-1980s and according to most estimates thousands of people were killed as a consequence of the political violence. The conflict ended with a unity accord between the two parties in December 1987, which however eventually took the form of the de facto absorption of most elements of PF-ZAPU into ZANU-PF. With the expiry of the white Rhodesian vote in 1988 (and seats in parliament guaranteed under the Lancaster House constitution) Zimbabwe became de facto almost a one-party state (2010: 24). The incomplete SSR process also means that ZANU-PF continues to exist with the umbilical cord to its military wing intact. The political issues of land reform and incomplete SSR remained outstanding from the Lancaster Agreement which was the road map to independence, and would come to

haunt Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF in the intervening period (Khadiagala, 1994: 86).

The economic decline of the late 1980s (characterized by the billion dollar budget deficits) and 1990s saw Zimbabwe going into a World Bank/International Monetary Fund-inspired Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 1990s, which as has been experienced elsewhere in the continent, "led to rapid de-industrialisation, growing unemployment and the severe erosion of living standards of the majority" of Zimbabweans (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010: 2). Add to this, a decision by President Robert Mugabe in October 1997 to pay War Veterans pensions and gratuities as recognition for their sacrifices in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. This off-budget expenditure, plus a further unexpected expenditure in 1998 as a result of Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC conflict in support of Laurent Kabila's regime compounded the already dire economic situation within the country.

The resultant human hardships heightened dissatisfaction among the working population organized under the Zimbabwe Workers Union (ZWU) which has hitherto been associated with ZANU-PF. The disgruntled workers union broke away from the ruling party and in coalition with the civil society formed the first political party not associated with the liberation struggle, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999, and headed by a former trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010: 3) The formation of the MDC in 1999, in a country that has never accommodated political opposition except that by the whites imposed by the Lancaster Agreement, and its formidable challenge to the "political ZANU-PF dominance created a sense of panic within the ruling party which resulted in ruthless

efforts to destroy the opposition, including widespread use of violence". Mlambo and Raftopoulos further note that:

Convinced that the MDC was a front for white, particularly white farmer interests, ZANU-PF hit back with the fast-track land reform exercise under the banner of the Third Chimurenga economic war. What made the land reform programme a feasible strategy for hitting back at political opponents and mobilising the populace behind ZANU-PF was the fact that, for a variety of reasons, the land question had never been fully and satisfactorily resolved since independence in 1980 (2010: 2).

MDC on the other hand, has since its formation identified itself with the liberal democratic principles by articulating concepts of democracy, development and human rights (Raftopoulos, 2010; MDC, 2009). So from the 2000 elections up to 2005, the MDC has been giving ZANU-PF sleepless nights and threatening to interrupt its 25 year reign. The violence that has been accompanying the built up to the respective elections has not been taken seriously by both the regional body, SADC, and its continental counterpart, the AU. However the results of the 29th March 2008 Harmonised Elections scared ZANU-PF out of its wits. For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe the opposition polled more votes than ZANU-PF, and it lost the presidential vote. A brief chronology of events in the crisis pre-and post March 2008 is outlined below including SADC's role in the crisis.

6.2.2 The Crisis and SADC Mediation

In 2007, Zimbabwean Civil Society Organisations wrote a report shadowing the Zimbabwean government reports to the AU. Its summary deserves direct reproduction here:

Over the period between 1996 to April 2006 the Government has passed a series of legislative measures that have drastically curtailed many....rights and freedoms. This violates its obligations under the African Charter. The Government has criminalised dissent and protest by persons opposed to or critical of its policies. It has severely restricted freedom of speech and freedom of the media. It has made concerted efforts to compromise the independence of the judiciary. It has sought to transform the law enforcement agencies from professional, apolitical forces into forces that enforce the laws in a partisan fashion against the political opposition and brutally suppress anti-government protest (2007: 4).

In January 2007, the AU Summit in Ethiopia adopted the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, that the Zimbabwean Government were in violation of Article 1 and 7 of the African Charter and thus the Government of Zimbabwe had violated the right to protection of the law and that it failed to put in place measures to ensure the enjoyment of these rights by Zimbabweans (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2007).

On 11 March 2007, the police prevented a prayer meeting organized by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign and the MDC from taking place in Harare. Leaders of the MDC and the civic movement and a number of those who wanted to attend the meeting were arrested and brutally assaulted by the police (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2007: 6). This should be understood in the context of the general onslaught of state violence against what the state has labelled an 'unpatriotic', and 'foreign controlled' opposition (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2007: 7).

Following the March 11 incident and the preponderance of international condemnation of the Zimbabwe government, SADC convened an Extra-Ordinary

Summit of the Heads of State and Government on the 29th March 2007 in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, to discuss the "political, economic and security situation in the region, with special focus on the situations in Lesotho, DRC and Zimbabwe". President Mbeki was selected to facilitate dialogue in the Zimbabwean political crisis. The mediation's intention was to get political parties in Zimbabwe to agree on processes that would lead to a generally acceptable election (SADC, 2007a).

The motives and expectations of the different stakeholders in the facilitation process have been assessed by the Solidarity Peace Trust (SPT) as follows: The South African Government saw this as a new opportunity to extend its policy of "quiet diplomacy", and to push for a process that would initiate the stabilization of the Zimbabwean situation, preferably through a government of national unity, a long cherished goal of the Mbeki administration; The Tsvangirai MDC was more circumspect about the role of the South African government, because of the shaky relationship between Tsvangirai and Mbeki which emerged as a result of several factors: The Mbeki administration's perception of a "western" backed MDC; the initial relations between the MDC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) of South Africa; and the Tsvangirai formation's perception that Mbeki had favoured the Welshman Ncube formation in the united MDC and thus played a role in the final split of the MDC (2008: 6).

However, MDC-T could also recognise that an electoral solution facilitated by the regional body remained the most feasible route to power given the existing balance of forces in the country; The Mugabe regime was compelled by "its formal accountability to SADC, and as a way of using the process to reconstitute the

electoral process and political conditions to prolong its stay in power” (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008: 6). The mediation process under President Mbeki has excluded the participation of the civil society (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2007: 12).

The 2008 Harmonised Election in Zimbabwe was described by some as the "most historic of the post-independence elections". The elections took place on the back of a mediation effort "which provided limited electoral reforms and engendered a more free and fair electoral environment" (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008a: 6). After over a month of delay, the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) finally announced that the combined MDC won a majority of 109 seats in Parliament against ZANU-PF's 97 seats, thus defeating the ruling party's majority in the House of Assembly for the first time in the post-independence period. The more controversial Presidential count gave 47.9% of the vote to Morgan Tsvangirai, 43.2% to Mugabe, 8.3% to Makoni and 0.6% to Langton Towungana. However the less than 50% plus one victory for Morgan Tsvangirai meant that there will have to be a re-run of the Presidential election (2008a: 6).

In the intervening period to the run-off elections there was an "unprecedented" level of political violence. The Solidarity Peace Trust report of 29 July 2008 attributes the activities to the Youth Militia, while the Joint Operations Command is indicated for orchestrating the violence. According to the report "the combined ZANU-PF paramilitary forces of militia, war veterans and supporters accounted for 82% of the violence, while the MDC/other category accounted for 1 % of the violence". The report further observed that most of the violence (77%) was in the three Mashonaland provinces and Harare, targeting "wards and villages that had shown a high MDC

vote, in what can be described as both a policy of punishment for 'betraying' ZANU-PF, and a pre-emptive strike ahead of the run-off, to turn the tide against Morgan Tsvangirai" (2008b: 5).

Campaign discourses were also not helping. In one of his campaigns, President Mugabe is reported to have declared that "The MDC will never be allowed to rule this country – never ever. Only God, who appointed me, will remove me – not the MDC, not the British. Only God will remove me" (Philip and Mahlangu, 2008, June 22). He reportedly, further warned that "we are prepared to fight for our country and to go to war for it" (Philip and Boyle, 2008, June 15). Similar themes were reported from the security chiefs, like the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General Constantine Chiwenga stating that " ... Defence Forces chief, our leader President Mugabe ... will romp to victory. We say so because we have no apology to make to any house nigger and puppets" (Rukuni, 2008, June 6-12).

Other incidents include the arrest of the President of the MDC Morgan Tsvangirai on several occasions in the month of the run-off, the arrest of the MDC Secretary General, Tendai Biti, on the charge of treason and the arrest and harassment of at least 10 MDC MP's and 2 Senators (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008b: 7).

President Mbeki made a last ditch attempt on the 18th June to persuade Mugabe to cancel the run-off and begin talks on a negotiated settlement without success. On the background of this violence and political rhetoric against the MDC structures and its supporters, Tsvangirai announced on the 22nd June 2008 that he would "no longer participate in this violent, illegitimate sham of an election process."(MDC, 2008, June 22). This state of affairs was further observed by the UN Security Council on

the 24th June that "the campaign of violence and the restrictions on the political opposition have made it impossible for a free and fair election to take place" (UNSC, 2008, June 24).

The June election subsequently went ahead as a one man race with Mugabe 'winning' a 'landslide victory' with 2,150,269 to Tsvangirai's 233,000 votes (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008b: 8). Following these elections, SADC's position on the election was that it "did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe," and recommended a continuation of the SADC mediation (SADC, 2008, June 27). The Observer Mission of the African Union on its part concluded that the "Election process fell short of accepted AU standards"(African Union, 2008, June 29), while the Pan African Parliamentary Mission concluded that "the current atmosphere prevailing in the country did not give rise to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections" and called on the regional organisation to engage the broader political leadership in Zimbabwe into a transitional negotiated settlement" (Pan African Parliament, 2008, 29).

On the basis of the need for continued mediation Tsvangirai, Mugabe and Mutambara met on the 21st July 2008 to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) brokered by President Mbeki; the culmination of over a year of protracted mediation. The agreement set out, amongst other guidelines, that:

- The parties commit themselves to a dialogue with each other "with a view to creating a genuine, viable, permanent and sustainable solution to the Zimbabwean situation".
- During the course of the dialogue the parties shall not "take any decisions that have a bearing on the agenda of the Dialogue," such as the convening of Parliament or the formation of a new government.
- The parties will take all necessary measures to eliminate all forms of political

violence, including by non-state actors. and to ensure the security of persons and property.

- The parties shall refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or undermine each other.
- The implementation of the agreement shall be underwritten and guaranteed by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU. (MOU, 2008, July 21).

On the 15th September 2008 the three major political parties in Zimbabwe, MDC (Tsvangirai), ZANU PF and MDC (Mutambara), signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Harare, Zimbabwe. The agreement was designed to bring an end to the political impasse in the country, particularly after the universal non-recognition of Mugabe's violent and fraudulent June 2008 presidential election. The Declaration of Commitment by all parties to the agreement read:

The parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation, and in particular to implement the... agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country (GPA,2008:4).

The parties entered this arrangement under immense pressure to deliver, occasioned by a number of factors: the weakening of both ZANU-PF and the opposition, together with the social forces and civic groups that supported the MDC; the disastrous economic and humanitarian descent in the country; pressure from SADC; and growing international isolation of the Mugabe regime. After some delay by the parties to the GPA and an intervention by SADC through the Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government in Sandton, South Africa in November 2008, the new government was finally inaugurated on the 13th February 2009 (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2009: 9).

Since the SADC meeting in Zambia called to discuss the aftermath of the March 29 election in Zimbabwe, there have been growing differences within the region over the Zimbabwe question. Countries like Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania have taken an increasingly critical stance on President Mugabe. On June 25 2008, a SADC Troika meeting called to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe further revealed the differences in SADC. The late and former President of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, is reported to have told journalists that "It's scandalous for SADC to remain silent on Zimbabwe," after Zimbabwe opposition chief, Morgan Tsvangirai, withdrew from the country's presidential run-off (AFP, 2008, June 22). The Botswana Foreign Affairs minister, Phandu Sekelemani, as cited by Solidarity Peace Trust, has indicated that "Everyone agreed that things are not normal, except Mbeki. Maybe Mbeki is so deeply involved that he firmly believes things are going right. But now he understands that the rest of SADC feels this is a matter of urgency and we are risking lives and limbs being lost. He got that message clearly" (2008:17).

Fully aware of these differences emerging in SADC, President Mugabe saw a threat to the future of the organization while expressing his confidence in the mediation role of President Mbeki. He commented that "We are surprised by what some SADC leaders are saying. Some are even calling for President Mbeki to stop current mediation efforts while others want him to be replaced. These reckless statements being made by some SADC leaders could lead to the break-up of SADC" (Kawadza, 2008: June 27).

At an international level increasing pressure from the United States of America and the United Kingdom pushed the issue on to the UN agenda supported by the

agreement at a G8 meeting in Japan to tighten sanctions against Zimbabwe's ruling elite and to press for the appointment of a special United Nations envoy to Zimbabwe (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008b: 10). The US Ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, expressed his government's displeasure with the South African position noting that it was particularly disturbing, given the role that international sanctions played in the democratization process in South Africa, "for its representative to be protecting the horrible regime in Zimbabwe." He went on to note that thus far Mbeki's mediation had "been a failure" and that he was "out of touch with the trends in his own country" (Lauria, 2008: July 13). The mediation by Mbeki was transferred temporarily to the then Acting President Motlanthe and later to President Zuma, upon his assuming power.

The implementation of the GPA has been facing challenges especially the drafting of the constitution which is supposed to be the basis for the next elections.

6.2.3 The Global Political Agreement

The GPA is clear on the parties to the agreement, with the civil society prominent by its absence. Article 1 of the GPA stipulates that the agreement is between the "ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively for restoration of economic stability and growth, while Article IV dealt with the issue of sanctions and political isolation of Zimbabwe. It closes with the endorsement of the SADC position that "all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe" and committed all parties to the re-engagement of the international community on this matter (2008: 7). Article V

addresses the land question as fundamental to the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis and called for a "comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit ... for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships" (2008: 8).

The GPA also called on the parties to engage a Select Committee of Parliament to initiate and manage the process of drafting the constitution, and specified time frames for specific milestones in the process under Article VI. The establishment of the framework for the 'new government' is covered by article XX, and vests the executive authority of the new government under a shared responsibility of the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet.

For a full and proper implementation of the agreement, a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) was to be established with the responsibility to "ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of the agreement", to assess implementation and among others, to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between parties" (2008: 27). In between the key issues outlined above, the GPA also called for restoration of societal values such as promotion of equality, cohesion and unity (Article VII); respect for national institutions and events (Article VIII); free political activity (Article X); rule of law and respect for the constitution (Article XI); and freedom of assembly and association (Article XII). The breath and significance of the reforms called upon by the GPA meant that the work of the Inclusive Government was cut out for them. Therefore the effectiveness of the mediation process can partly be assessed by the achievement made in its implementation.

6.2.4 SADC and the GPA

The ascendancy to power by President Zuma and his subsequent endorsement as the SADC mediator in Zimbabwe has brought some changes to the mediation process and the attitudes of the parties to the agreement. In contrast to Mbeki, the current mediator has a team of ministers that assist him in the mediation process. At the time of writing this thesis the team was made up of Foreign Relations minister, Lindiwe Zulu, Mac Maharaj and Charles Nqakula (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 2012: May 28). Zuma is not as rigid, and does not seem to display the same level of reverence to Mugabe as his predecessor. In fact since March 2011, Zuma and SADC have changed their tone and language with regard to Zimbabwe especially ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe. The language of the March 2011 SADC Troika Summit in Livingstone, Zambia, of "grave concern", "resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation" has become common. Although failing to name Mugabe, the language and nature of resolutions of the above summit were, as observed by Solidarity Peace Trust, "the most forthright diplomatic criticism that SADC has ever issued to the parties, especially President Mugabe (2011; 18). In another incident a member of the mediation team, Lindiwe Zulu is reported to have publicly criticised Mugabe and warning that "there will be civil war if next election was not held in a free and fair atmosphere" (The Zimbabwean, 2011: Oct 28).

The current situation with regard to the GPA does not give hope for a speedy resolve of the impasse. According to the initial plan, the reforms would have been completed by February 2011, and followed by elections shortly after. It is more than a year from the initial deadline and there is general lack of progress in all areas. The land audit is

reportedly still pending; and media reforms have not gone far enough with various boards still to be reconstituted. The constitution making process, considered the basis for the next election is reportedly at negotiations stage and dogged by disagreements between the principals of the parties to the GPA. It is expected to be ultimately put to a referendum (International Crisis Group, 2011, November 16).

Besides these and other challenges, the parties continue to declare their commitment to the GPA. The MDC-T has continued to put pressure on SADC and the mediation team to assist reining over Mugabe as the main culprit for the current state of affairs (International Crisis Group, 2011, November 16). After insisting on elections being held this year (2012), the indicators from ZANU-PF is that they are climbing down. After meeting the President and the Prime Minister, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, indicated in a media briefing that elections are likely in 2013. This was further confirmed to journalists by the ZANU-PF Inter-party negotiator, Patrick Chinamasa, who is quoted saying that they "will consider elections after the constitution making process is complete" (Majoni, 2012: May 25). SADC on the other hand may also be showing signs of mediation fatigue. One of the resolutions of the Extra-Ordinary Summit in Sandton was to send a team to assist the JOMIC to move forward. But according to reports the team had not arrived by April 2012, a year after the resolution (Raftopoulos, 2012: Update No.4). In a related issue, it is reported in the media that Lindiwe Zulu when asked when will the President come to Zimbabwe, she replied "when he is free and able to" (Karimakwenda, 2012: Apr 17).

Mediation by a sitting president has its challenges. Raftopoulos echoes the same

sentiments when he observes a loss of momentum due to national engagements by the facilitator: "President Zuma and his team were caught up in the internal problems of the ANC, the centenary celebrations of the South African ruling party, and the machinations of the election over the new head of the African Union" (2012: Update No.4).

It is no secret that ZANU-PF enjoys advantage in the struggle between the parties because it controls the security apparatus of the state. This is exemplified by the arrests of MDC-T ministers and the continued strangle hold over civil society, especially the media (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2011, 7). However it is important to note that any meaningful re-construction of Zimbabwe, post-2008, is dependent on the extent to which the security sector is reformed.

Notwithstanding the problems of the GPA, it is worth noting its limited achievements. Following Solidarity Peace Trust's observation, the GPA has "provided certain parameters of accountability for ZANU-PF", previously unknown. In all governments structures (Cabinet, JOMIC, Parliament and others) ZANU-PF now has to contend with serious challenges to its intended interventions, "that have then provided markers for the ways in which Mugabe regime has distracted the full implementation of the GPA". Similar effects can be expected in the economic sphere, like the demand for missing diamond revenues of US\$300 million, and an audit of the public sector employees (2011: 8).

The effect of SADC mediation therefore, can be seen in the effect of the GPA on Zimbabwean political and economic spheres since 2009: reduced violence, accountability, microeconomic stabilization; and also in the breaking of the strategy

of 'silence diplomacy' that SADC was notorious for. But in the face of the snail pace of progress in the implementation of the GPA, SADC will need to re-strategise on its handling of the Zimbabwean crisis, which has proved to be the longest and possibly the most potentially dangerous political crisis for the sub-region.

In the final analysis, key points that deserve isolated mention from the crisis, are detailed below. These include

- SADC's mediation capacity has been found wanting, with institutional effectiveness hampered by the lack of monitoring mechanisms and a specialised structure within the regional body to handle the complexity of the crisis. The reliance on self-monitoring by the parties through the JOMIC denied SADC the opportunity to determine the pace of implementation as well as timely interventions when obstacles were encountered.
- The exclusion of some key stakeholders in the mediation, such as the civil society and labour, may have resulted in the specific needs of victims of the crisis not getting immediate attention. This is suggestive of the tendency towards sovereignty, or regime security, at the expense of human security, and could explain the slow pace of implementation of the GPA, as priorities have been misplaced.
- The use of principles and guidelines instead of protocol has hamstrung the regional body. Whereas protocols are binding, the framework that was employed relies on the laws of the individual states to enforce compliance.
- The mediation has also exposed South Africa's regional dilemma as an unwilling hegemon that has so far been suggested by political commentators and analysts. As Dzinesa G. and Zambara W. of the *Zimbabwe Independent* put it "on one hand, the country does not want to be seen as assuming a hegemonic role in the region, yet on the other, Zimbabwe would not be where it is today without the ability of South Africa's leaders, Mbeki and Zuma, to influence events" (2011, Aug 25).
- Finally, the exemplified historical and personal linkages between the former liberation movements and their continued influence on the character of SADC mediation and their resolution efforts in the region (Gatsheni 2011) attest to its continuity as a regional security complex. Through these linkages most SADC countries, especially those governed

by former liberation movements, could not muster courage to openly criticise President Mugabe and ZANU-PF on their repressive tendencies and the violations of everything that SADC stands for. The countries of Angola, DRC, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa were conspicuously silent in this regard, and therefore dancing to both Mugabe's discourse of 'liberation solidarity' and Mbeki's "silent diplomacy" strategy. But in adopting this strategy, SADC was denied an opportunity to fully internalize its norms within the 'new Zimbabwe' being forged through the GPA. Preference for temporary stability within Zimbabwe came at the expense of a "greater acceptance of the value of democracy, good governance, pluralism, human rights, social peace and human security as fundamental for the future stability of the region" (Gatsheni, 2011: 17).

6.3 SADC Mediation in Lesotho

6.3.1 Background

Lesotho has a turbulent political history. In 1986 there was a military coup which brought Major General Lekhanya into power. In 1993 Lesotho returned to constitutional governance after 23 years of military rule. The 1993 general elections brought Prime Minister Ntsu Mkhehle into power under the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP). These elections were followed by political unrest with allegations of fraud by the opposition parties. The Prime Minister suspended parliament in 1994 in the mist of political unrest, and installed a ruling council. The Prime Minister sought the assistance of SADC and the OAU, whereupon Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe were brought in to find a negotiated settlement to the impasse (Kabemba, 2003: 5).

In March 1997, the Prime Minister announced his intention to retire from politics on grounds of poor health and old age. This led to internal struggle by party factions for the control of the party. However, contrary to expectations, Prime Minister Mkhehle with Support of his majority National Assembly formed a new

party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), and without calling for elections, transferred power to the new party. Opposition leaders denounced the move as a political coup, declaring that Mkhlehle should have resigned as Prime Minister, sought dissolution of the National Assembly, and held new elections. The LCD denied any contravention of the Constitution, as the Prime Minister was supported by the majority of the National Assembly. This resulted in more demonstrations around the country (Kabemba, 2003: 6).

In January 1998, Mkhlehle resigned as Prime Minister and was succeeded by Bethuel Phakalitha Mosisili, the Deputy Prime Minister. Banking on the popularity of the new party, the new Prime Minister called a snap elections for May 1998, which the new party won by a landslide (78 seats out of the available 80). The opposition, contrary to otherwise positive pronouncements of elections as free and fair by the international observers, challenged the validity of the results.

Following the non-acceptance of election results by the opposition and the ensuing public unrest, the parties agreed to seek mediation from South Africa. In response to the request, the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, assembled a commission comprising officials from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and headed by a South African High Court judge, Justice Pius Langa. The commission, otherwise known as the Langa Commission, started its work on the 14th August 1998 (Kabemba, 2003: 6). The completion of the report was followed by confusion and apprehension. Firstly the findings of the report were withheld from those that sought it most, until it was presented to a SADC Summit of 13-14 September in Mauritius (Thai, 1998, October 4). Then there were allegations of the report being doctored

prior to release resulting in two versions (Boot 1998, September 25).

The delay coupled with inconclusive and ambiguous findings of the report could only serve to fuel further tension and unrest within the country. Around September 10 -17, a mutiny was reported at the main army barracks in Maseru, with armed soldiers reportedly looking on as demonstrators surrounded government offices, including the burning of part of the Lesotho High Court (Thai, 1998, October 4).

On the 16th September 1998, the Prime Minister made another plea to South Africa and SADC for military intervention citing an imminent military coup and basing the request within the mandate of the 1994 mediation by Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which has also been the basis of the Langa Commission (Mooketsi, 2005: 9). On 22nd September South African National Defence Force (SADNF) contingent entered Lesotho territory, followed later by Botswana Defence Force (BDF) contingent as a military intervention codenamed *Operation Boleas*. Zimbabwe as a member of the Organ Troika declined to participate in the operation (Thai, 1998, October 4). This should be understood within the context of the misunderstanding between former President Mandela and President Mugabe on the structure of the OPDS (sic) and the refusal by the former to join Zimbabwe alliance in the DRC intervention. President Mugabe was also the interim Chairperson of the Organ since 1996, as indicated in the previous chapter.

The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho has been put under the microscope by a number of political commentators and analysts. It has since emerged that the King was not consulted prior to the request for military assistance as required by the constitution of Lesotho. From the international perspective, it has been seen as

inconsistent with the UN Charter and failing the humanitarian test. Fako Lekoti in his study entitled *"African Military Intervention in African Conflicts: An Analysis of Military interventions in Rwanda, the DRC and Lesotho"* concluded that the intervention was influenced by national interests especially with regard to South Africa (2006: 165). Analysts observe that both Botswana and South Africa failed to obtain prior authorization from the UN Security Council as required by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Furthermore, it was also inconsistent with Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty, which underwrites the principle of sovereign equality of all Member States (see Matlosa 1999). It has already been made clear in the previous chapter that by the time of the intervention, the Member States were still in disagreement on how the OPDS (sic) should relate to SADC and who should control it. Therefore at that time the provisions of the OPDS (sic) were inconsequential. However, the consistent intervention in Lesotho by South Africa as the leading nation may have set precedence where stakeholders know that South Africa will not allow instability in its backyard, therefore leading to their preference for peaceful solutions.

One of the contentious issues surrounding the post-election dispute was the electoral system that produced one dominant party which was experienced in the 1993 and 1998 elections. Lesotho used the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system inherited from Britain at independence. So in the quest to move forward, Lesotho undertook to reform its electoral system. The 2002 general election was not characterized by tension and violent conflict. It is widely assumed that this was because of the electoral reform which resulted in the adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system (Kabemba, 2003, 2).

The MMP system in Lesotho as at 2002, was modelled such that

- 80 members were elected from single member constituencies by a plurality
- 40 seats were allocated so as to compensate parties for the discrepancy between percentage votes obtained and percentage constituency seats

To cast their votes, each voter is given two ballots. The first is to vote for the constituency candidate of choice, and the second for the party of choice. The allocation of compensatory seats is then undertaken on the basis of party ballot results (EISA, 2007).

According to Claude Kabemba, Lesotho's history of political violence can be attributed to a number of causes that are related to its weak and dependent economy and weak governance institutions that restrict government capacity to address public concerns:

- Lack of employment opportunities, making the government the largest employer in the bureaucracy, security forces and other departments. Therefore control of government improves prospects for employment, reducing elections to competition for jobs which raises the stakes for political competition. The competition has created factions, including in the military.
- The legacy of Apartheid which used to finance and pit political parties and insurgents against each other under the 'Total Strategy' has led to the Lesotho's political intolerance culture.
- Failure of civil governance over the state and especially the security forces. Lesotho is the only country in the SADC region to have experienced a military coup. Factions within the security forces are divided in their loyalties and interests. However, the government with the help of the Commonwealth has addressed these problems with the restructuring of the security forces and training to instil professionalism.

- Lastly, was the 'First-Pass-The-Post' electoral system in a homogenous country with no district variations. This resulted in the total dominance of Parliament by a single party. Excluding opposition from Parliament as already alluded to can only be a recipe for disaster (2003: 16-21).

6.3.2 The 2007 Post-Election Conflict

The 2007 Lesotho Parliamentary elections were held on the 17th February, marking the fourth instalment of the democratic dispensation since 1993. Like the 1998 elections, these were described as "snap election". The pre-election environment in Lesotho ahead of the 2007 poll was characterised by disputes arising from dissatisfaction from various stakeholders (particularly given that this was a snap election) including hasty voter registration processes that left some out of the voters' roll, submission of party lists, access to public media, and campaign funding (EISA, 2007: 1).

The major event in the pre-election period was the formation of alliances by political parties. The two larger parties, the ruling party (LCD) and the main opposition, All Basotho Convention (ABC), made arrangements with smaller parties whereby the larger parties contested only the constituencies and the smaller parties submitted party lists for the compensatory seats, which included members of the larger party. The understanding was that the smaller partner's supporters would vote for the larger partner's candidates on the constituency ballots; in exchange the larger partner's supporters would vote for the smaller partner on the party ballots (SADC 2007a, 3).

On the basis of this arrangement:

- The ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) fielded constituency candidates while the small National Independent Party (NIP) included LCD members on its party list. The result was that the LCD won 61 constituency seats and the NIP was allocated 21 compensatory seats giving the alliance 82 seats in the National Assembly, or 68.3% of the seats.
- The ABC made a similar arrangement with the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP). The outcome was that the ABC won 17 constituency seats and the LWP was allocated 10 compensatory seats, giving the alliance 27 seats in the National Assembly, or 22.5% of the seats (EISA, 2007: 1).

Although generally declared credible, lawful and peaceful by the observers, the allocation of seats on the basis of the MMP system benefitted the LCD more than others. This generated a conflict between the ruling party and a group of opposition parties under the leadership of the main opposition. The electoral disputes rotated around two main issues~ the allocation of seats in parliament, and the regulation of pre-election party alliances. Linked to this point, was also a feeling that lack of legal framework governing and regulating formation of party alliances and coalitions during elections and how this also plays out in the development of party lists has a great potential to undermine the spirit of the MMP, especially its compensatory mechanism. Opposition parties then staged a sit-in in parliament and subsequently organized a stay-away as part of their protest. This was followed by a number of incidents like a week-long curfew in the main cities of the country, all indicating a deterioration of the security situation in the country (EISA, 2007: 7).

6.3.3 SADC Mediation in the 2007 Post-Election Conflict

The developments mentioned above coincided with a Ministerial Troika meeting of SADC in Maseru, whereupon the opposition decided to present their grievances to the meeting. According to EISA, citing Selinyane of the *Publiceye* newspaper, the general strike was suspended after the SADC Executive Secretary promised that regional mediation would be initiated (2007: October). The matter was then tabled in the Dar-es-Salaam Extra-Ordinary Summit of March 2007, and a team comprising Tanzania, Angola and Namibia was sent to Lesotho to investigate and report to the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation Chairperson, President Kikwete of Tanzania (SADC 2007b: 1).

In its report, the SADC Ministerial Committee attributed the post-election tension and grievances to manipulation of the MMP electoral system by political parties, controversial political party alliances and the unfair allocation of parliamentary seats and lack of dialogue among political leaders. The committee summarized the matter thus “...some stakeholders raised concerns about the PR system. They argued that the allocation of the proportional representation seats was not conducted in a fair manner and as a result small political parties were denied the opportunity to participate in Parliament” (SADC 2007a, 3-4).

As a result of the recommendations of the report, the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, was appointed on the 13 June 2007 to facilitate the dialogue between the stakeholders in the dispute, a decision which was accepted by the main opposition ABC party's leader Thomas Thabane (EISA, 2007, October).

According to EISA (2007), the Terms of Reference of the mediation were as follows:

- Hold consultative meetings with all relevant stakeholders;
- Develop a structured plan for the dialogue;
- Initiate dialogue between the ruling party, opposition parties and other relevant stakeholders;
- Facilitate the dialogue process; and
- Compile a report of the dialogue process for submission to the Chairperson of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and for presentation to the Government of Lesotho and other stakeholders.

The mediation process began on the 14th June 2007 amid mounting political tension which invariably involved political violence. The stakeholders identified and met by the mediator included all political parties, the Government of Lesotho, the Media Monitoring Panel, the Lesotho Council of NGOs and the Diplomatic Corps, among others (Wikileaks, 2011, September 1).

According to a Wikileaks report (2011), the mediation team comprised of officers from Botswana, Tanzania and SADC Secretariat. The report reveals that on the 28th June 2007, Sir Ketumile addressed the Diplomatic Corps in Lesotho to update them on his mission after days of mediation. Reportedly, his task was to address two "packages" of issues relating to the Lesotho's political impasse: The general political tensions and the application of the Mixed Member Proportional system. In this address, the mediator reportedly recognised the deteriorating security situation as a concern. His assessment of the impasse was that (1) it appears unreasonable for the Government of Lesotho to place parliamentarians who lost their elected seats into cabinet positions; (2) It is "clear" that there is either misunderstanding or intentional manipulation by all parties of the MMP system, and; (3) it is not reasonable for the Government of Lesotho to refuse to recognise the All Basotho Convention, which gained the most seats after the LCD, as the official opposition.

On June 28, the stakeholders, reportedly, agreed to engage and chose experts to determine whether the allocation of proportional parliamentary seats was conducted in compliance with the MMP system. The terms of reference for the experts were as follows: (1) to establish the nature, objective, provisions and spirit of the Lesotho's MMP system in order to explore whether any of the political parties or the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) undermined it in the 2007 elections; (2) to examine the legality of the candidate lists which were used for the distribution of proportional representation seats; (3) examine whether the allocation of proportional seats complied with the MMP model; and (4) to make such recommendations as they may deem necessary, including on remedial measures, if any, concerning the allocation of proportional seats in Parliament following the 2007 elections. There was, reportedly, divergence on expectations, between the ruling party on the one hand and the opposition parties on the other, on the possible effect of the outcome of the recommendations. The ruling party reportedly saw the "seat distribution as a purely legal issue that must be settled through the courts with effect only on future elections", while the opposition parties hoped for adjustment of seats in accordance with the recommendations. The mediator's stand was that the recommendations of the experts were not binding, and only "the law of the land" could change electoral procedures. The stakeholders were, reportedly, not very keen to address the tension and violence in the country (Wikileaks, 2011, September 1).

According to Bame Piet of the *Mmegi Online*, some of the highlights of the Lesotho's politics in the post-election period included: A State of Emergency in July 2007 declared following the most severe drought in 30 years; Five people charged with

high treason for their alleged role in attacks on the homes of the opposition leader and cabinet ministers in October 2007; and assassination attempt on the PM Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili in April 2009 (2009, July 23), This demonstrates the extent of violence since the elections of 2007.

In his media briefing in Gaborone on the 17th July 2009, according to Piet, Sir Ketumile Masire held the Government of Lesotho responsible for the failed mediation efforts in Lesotho. He reportedly, blamed the government of abusing the loopholes in the system and not being willing to compromise, while the opposition was much more compromising and open-minded on the possible solutions to the impasse. According to Piet:

Sir Ketumile said the opposition had filed their complaint with the High Court to challenge the allocation of the seats. He revealed that he was surprised when the court ruled that the opposition had no right to challenge the outcome of elections in court and that it also had no jurisdiction over such matters "How can the highest court in the land say it does not have jurisdiction over any matter of national concern?" he wondered (Piet, 2009: July 23).

According to this briefing the government made it clear that it would not accept any form of advice from the experts and that it wanted to maintain the status quo. Reportedly, the government later told the mediator that it was no longer interested in his mediation and that he could go home. The former president, on the basis of this, wrote a report to SADC's OPDSC and ended his role as a mediator in Lesotho (2009: Jul 23).

On the heels of the failed SADC mediation, the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) proposed to take over the mediation role, and was accepted by the stakeholders and

SADC. SADC in its Double Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 14 January 2010, resolved to support the initiatives of the CCL and mandated the Organ Troika to work with it towards a solution (SADC, 2010). On the 28 April 2011, the CCL and SADC announced the formal and successful completion of the mediation process. The main result of the process was an overhaul of the Lesotho electoral legislation (both the electoral Act and the Constitution) by the Lesotho Parliament. The expectation by the mediators was that this will ensure a more proportional representation of members of parliament and strengthen the role and credibility of the IEC (Southern African News Features, 2011, May 6). This cleared the road for the 2012 elections.

At the time of writing this thesis, the attention was on the May 26, Lesotho General elections. The King had dissolved Parliament and announced the election date on the 15 March 2012. This was followed by the launch of the SADC Electoral Observer Mission (SEOM) to Lesotho on 12th May 2012. According to the press release of the SEOM, its presence in Lesotho is "to ensure that the provisions of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections are adhered to in the conduct of democratic elections" (SADC, 2012: May 12). But the environment was reminiscent of the previous elections, characterised by the defection of the Prime Minister Mosilili with 44 other MPs to form a new party, the Democratic Congress (DC), on the 25 February 2012 (Southern African News Features, 2012, April 10).

However, the joint press release by the foreign election observers (AU, SADC, the Commonwealth and EISA) stated that "the voting and counting took place in an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity", and further called on the stakeholders of the

"electoral process to await the conclusion of the process with the same spirit of national unity" (Joint Press Release, 2012: May 29). The final results by the IEC indicated that after allocation of the proportional representation (PR) seats, the DC had won 48 seats, ABC had 30 seats, and LCD won 26 seats. The balance out of the 120-seat Parliament was held by a number of small parties (IEC: 2012). On the basis of these results, the opposition resolved to form an alliance government.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to examine SADC implementation of its peace and security mechanisms within the context of mediation in political crises of Member States, in this case Zimbabwe and Lesotho. It has been contextualised by the examination of SADC's policy and institutional framework in the previous chapter. The focus is on how well SADC conforms to its frameworks for promotion of democracy and good governance and its effectiveness in getting the Member States to implement the necessary changes to make solutions sustainable.

The case of Zimbabwe examined the origin of the current crisis in what is generally regarded as various crises spanning the entire post-independence history of the state. As a de facto one-party state, Zimbabwe's ruling party from independence, ZANU-PF has never shared political space with an opposition, until 2000. Its crisis is, however, attributed to plethora of factors. The effects of bad economic policies, corruption, complicity of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, and incomplete SSR programme all contributed to a complicated economic and political situation. The economic pressures led to a creation of the MDC as a non-liberation party based on the labour movement and civil society. The MDC would bring

ZANU-PF to the first taste of defeat and embarrassment, resulting in retaliatory reprisals on the opposition, civil society and everybody opposed to ZANU-PF.

It was only in 2008 that SADC resolved to intervene in the situation amidst a very thick atmosphere of regional and international outcry for some action to stop the pervasive human suffering in the country. The first elections under the mediation of SADC were inconclusive, and again Robert Mugabe trailed the MDC leader, and necessitated a rerun of the presidential vote. In reaction and anticipating the rerun, the Zimbabwe government unleashed the most gruesome and widespread torture and abuse under the watch of SADC and its mediator, former President Thabo Mbeki. The run-off elections failed due to the extent of violence leading to a negotiated government of national unity formed to implement the Global Political Agreement and prepare the country for a freer election.

The mediation was influenced by the discourses of liberation solidarity and national interest on the part of both the mediator and the general membership of SADC, to which the norms and values of the sub-regional body played second fiddle. However, the case study observed that following the initial challenges and complications, SADC has modified its stand and attitude towards the crisis and the stakeholders, especially President Robert Mugabe, who has been the stumbling block in the implementation the GPA. The effectiveness of the mediation will be judged in the extent to which democracy and good governance will be instilled in the resulting dispensation and the conduct of free and fair elections.

The Lesotho's 2007 post-election conflict was examined as part of a history of election related conflicts from 1993, when the country came out of military rule. This

was attributed to the weak economy and weak state systems. However, the Lesotho case is peculiar in a number of respects that make it easily amenable to a negotiated solution. There are no underlying ethnic factors that can inflate the election disputes, mainly because it is an ethnically homogenous state.

First, Lesotho's history of post-election conflicts demonstrated a high propensity for external intervention among both the government and the opposition parties, which in the Zimbabwean case was highly resisted. Basutho have also, upon realising the causes of the problem collectively sought to address them through the constitutional amendments that ushered in the MMP electoral system and the restructuring of the security sector (Kabemha, 2003: 2). So the 2007 election disputes were largely as a result of manipulation of the system by both sides.

Secondly, the mediation in Lesotho was assigned to a former president, which eliminated the complexities of national interests and cluttered work schedules as factors in the prospects for a solution as has been suggested in the Zimbabwe case. This ensured that the mediator dedicated himself to the mediation and dictated its progress. For this reason, even when the mediation failed, it was easy to pinpoint the cause of the collapse and this improved the chances for the next option. The acceptance of a local mediator in the second round and its successful conclusion is reflective of the general disposition towards a lasting solution by all stakeholders, which can only help the mediation effort.

Thirdly, the Lesotho mediation involved the civil society, which influenced the use of a local mediator in the second round. Such an option hedges on the knowledge of culture and history of the disputes, and increases the chances for the solution gaining

general acceptance within the population. This is not the case in the Zimbabwe mediation. The case concludes that the general disposition of the stakeholders towards a democratic solution and the use of non-encumbered mediator contributed immensely towards the successful conclusion of the Lesotho mediation. The latter point is also more in line with the best practices at the continental level.

The governance structures of a security community, according to Adler and Barnett depends on "the state's external identity and associated behaviour" on the one hand and "its domestic characteristics and practices" on the other (1998: 36). It has been argued amply by analysts that the major security concerns within SADC are intra-state. Matlosa attributes this state of affairs to stalled democratic transitions (2008: xvi) which manifest as politico-security challenges to the regional body. This means the domestic characteristics and practices of governance are important in the evaluation of SADC as a security community.

These case studies have served to cover the above as well as to examine the effect of SADC's mediation on the domestic characteristics and practices. The expectation is that while states may elevate issues to emergency status in the times of crises, SADC's implementation of its institutional and policy frameworks to promote democracy and good governance should minimise the need to resort to securitization by states. In this way SADC's successful interventions must lead to desecuritization within the concerned states. Desecuritized environment, in as far as it entails handling issues within the political sphere must be conducive to the development of dependable expectation of peaceful change. The effective implementation of the SIPO strategies with regard to election related violence for instance, must have a

deseccuritisising effect at state level, because the expectation is that any future post-election disputes will be handled through the established mechanisms without the need for the state to resort to any securitization moves. To this end, SADC's interventions and institutional mechanisms would have ensured that disputes at the state level remain within the political realm where they can be addressed through negotiations and the legal systems.

The reduction of securitization decisions on the part of the state minimizes unintended consequences, and to the extent that they are related to human security, SIPO would have equally reduced the insecurity. In this context, the society comes to have general expectations of peaceful change through the good efforts of SADC. The Lesotho case, with regard to the mechanisms that have been put in place to remove causes of disputes of election results, attest to the importance of SADC in creating conditions for dependable expectations of peaceful change, as per Adler and Barnett's security community framework. However, the jury is still out with regard to Zimbabwe. But the mere fact that SADC has intervened is enough cause for optimism. The greatest challenge to SADC would remain as the removal of the underlying factors of underdevelopment and undemocratic governance which are associated with the propensity for conflict.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.0 Introduction

This chapter draws the major conclusions of the study, together with an attempt to link theory with the case study. The study had set out firstly, to analytically locate southern Africa within the Copenhagen School's regional security complex framework by showing that historically the social, economic and cultural relationships between the region's political actors including its peoples had largely been characterised by their conflict generating antagonisms. However, after the demise of colonialism and apartheid, the domestic dynamics which were hitherto hidden have come to the fore, with their own set of peculiar challenges to predominate the regional security agenda.

Secondly, and owing to the above, the study had sought to place the regional history of conflict and its interaction with the post-Cold War, post-Apartheid imperatives as having motivated the regional agents to institutionalise their security transactions in a way that ensures predictability of behaviour and synergy in the regional efforts to address the mutually constituted challenges of peace, security and development, in the entity of SADC, and that its character approximates the social constructivist notion of a security community.

However, and breaking with the orthodox approaches to International Relations especially Security Studies, this study opted to open up issues of identity in the whole regional dynamic. This study therefore, locates identity within contemporary theoretical debates in International Relations by privileging post-structuralist modes

of thought. In attempting this, it has contributed a distinct analytical perspective to the SADC case.

7.1 A Regional Security Complex

The basis for a regional security complex hypothesis is mainly the decolonization period when the region was characterised by conflict generating relations between its key political actors. In a nutshell, about four decades ago, southern Africa was at war with itself. The black majority-ruled states in alliance with the respective liberation movements committed themselves to bringing an end to colonialism and its appendage, apartheid, in the quest for majority rule and inclusive prosperity within the organizational framework of the Frontline States. Determined to halt this, the 'white bloc' led by the apartheid South Africa engaged in a 'realist' inspired confrontation with 'black bloc' in order to derail the regional plan, in a way that served to delineate the sub-regional socio-political boundaries into a distinct region from the rest of Africa.

This was further complicated by superpower penetration and/or overlay of the Cold War era which, while in the Zimbabwean situation may have influenced the speedy resolution of its independence, on the Angolan/Namibia axis it led to prolonged civil war. The climax of the security complex environment could be viewed as the 1980s South African paranoia, with its defining "destabilization" strategy that is estimated to have cost the region more than a million lives, and around US\$62.42 billion in economic losses (Booth and Vale, 1995: 286). The significance in the magnitude of this cost today is not in its physicality (that is history), but lies in the bankruptcy of the orthodox theoretical approaches to international relations in fostering global

security, especially with regard to southern Africa.

In the post-Cold War period the circumstances have changed following the attainment of majority rule and independence in the rest of the southern African countries, resulting in relative interstate peace and stability. However, the region continues to generate complex security dynamics, albeit from different sets of circumstances from the previous era. Now the security complex dynamics have moved to the internal domestic environment in the context of interplays between state-building and nation-building that spill over into the region. This has become the major preoccupation of SADC on the security front. The political crisis in Zimbabwe did not only impact the region in terms of influx of illegal immigrants into the neighbouring countries and the concomitant spread of cholera, but also attracted regional interference through SADC's diplomatic intervention to promote conditions for dialogue between the stakeholders and strengthen internal state institutions. The cases of Zimbabwe and Lesotho have suggested that ethnocentric nationalism and incomplete democratisation processes will be some of the causes of this current security complex.

Applying the 'democratic turn' synthesis to the current security complex reveals that the states in the region are afflicted by an incomplete democratisation process (Matlosa 2008). The EISA framework then enables the categorization of these states along a democratic deficit calculus, where upon each state can be assisted towards the completion of its democratisation process including its consolidation, on a case-by-case basis. In this construction, democratisation is believed to hold better prospects for states to shift from traditional security concerns to real southern African

challenges of human security, like poverty, youth unemployment, the environment, disease and AIDS. This is predicated on the idea of a democratic developmental state as opposed to the neo-liberal models of democracy (Matlosa, 2008: 62).

7.2 A Security Community

This study argues that the historical development of SADC from the FLS and beyond has laid a foundation for a credible security community. The conflict generating environment of the liberation struggles and the inward looking of the FLS and SADCC have created initial conditions for mutual trust and cemented the already existing sense of solidarity based on cultural, political and ideological affinities. In the last decade or so, SADC has demonstrated an increasing commitment to peaceful change in the affairs of its Member States through organizational and institutional transformations that have impacted positively on its policy side of the peace and security agenda. This section traces the evidence for the existence of a security community through the three tier framework suggested by Adler and Barnett.

7.2.1 Tier One

The initial awareness of mutual challenges, within the sub-regional dynamics, has been shown to date back to the time of the Frontline States. The conditions of colonialism, racism and white minority rule within the sub-region and their impact on its peoples have precipitated the awareness of their common situations. This put paid to the existence of a visionary idea of a southern African identity that early in the history of the sub-region. Such an ideal should be understood within the context of a shared culture and interrelated societies emanating from the Defaqane wars and the resulting migration of peoples across the sub-region, followed by the arbitrary

demarcation of borders by the colonialist invariably cutting across ethnic communities. This produced a people whose historical identity transcends the artificial borders they are found within.

The success of the FLS in the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1979 gave the alliance motivation and self-belief in their effectiveness, thereby creating further solidarity as well as room for broader aspirations for cooperation. Furthermore, the regional economic declines post-1980 compounded by South African destabilisation policies led to changes in the perceptions of the security challenges enabling the incorporation of the economic strategy which gave birth to SADCC. This shift or expansion of focus demonstrated collective thinking, uniformity of threat perception, and changes in the interpretation of social reality that broke with the past. The FLS started to define their future and interests in both military and economic terms as evidenced by the Lusaka Declaration of 1980 -"Toward Economic Liberation".

The resultant learning from these relations, the widening economic disparity between South Africa and the rest of the southern African states coupled with the advent of new regionalism scholarship and the effects of the democratic turn of the 1980s and 1990s in the region precipitated the belief in the future based on cooperative relations. These were enough causal factors to permit for the establishment of a security community in line with tier one.

7.2.2 Tier Two

Tier two is premised on the existence of factors that enable the development of mutual trust and collective identity. These factors are grouped into structural and

process variables. With regard to power variables, it was found that the existence within the FLS alliance of two core states (in the form of Tanzania and Zambia) have ensured that the alliance persistently remained focused on the vision and committed to the cause. The influence of these states was not so much due to their military or economic power, but in terms of the leadership role of their former presidents: Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. Therefore the power possessed by these was largely soft, based on their legitimacy as the co-founders of the FLS, their charisma and their exemplary leadership. This highlights the importance of non-materialistic sources of power in influencing state behaviour. In the latter phases in the development of SADC, Presidents Mugabe and Mandela have also played some central roles in influencing the direction and strategies for the regional body. However, the post-apartheid South Africa has demonstrated some reluctance to play hegemonic role in the region (Ngoma, 2005: 160).

The knowledge dimension of the structural factors is centred on the existence of shared meaning and understanding within the regional elites. In this instance, the move from the earlier groupings, like PAFMECA, PAFMECSA, CECAC and Mulungisi Club, to the FLS, SADCC and ultimately SADC signified the influence from the broader Africa to a more refined identity of southern Africa. This refinement of identity indicates the self-awareness of southern Africa as a distinct sub-region from the rest of Africa, with specific and peculiar interests that mirror the sub-regional realities. This served as a grounding of the idea of common identity derived from shared interests.

The 'white bloc', just like the 'black bloc' identified itself in terms of southern Africa

and regarded their security as permanently imbedded in the region. This is exemplified by their own regional projects at the time, such as Malan's Africa Charter, the Central Africa Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Constellation of Southern African States (Ngoma, 2005: 217), and goes to show the extent to which each side was invested in the region. Interpreted through discourse theory, the identities had to realise at some point that they share certain chains of equivalences which can enable a construction of a new and more inclusive and transcending identity, which SADC has come to mean. This is one of the key indicators of common understanding of social reality especially as demonstrated in the formation of SADC as a community. This is in contrast to the South African strategies that were based on difference rather than commonality.

The alliance formation through the FLS started the reduction of fear of each other among the participating parties and by incorporating the liberation movements, it also started to train and socialise the future elites of the region into the same realisation. This partly explains why it may appear that there is more coherence between the SADC states than within them, as a result of earlier start to region-building than to nation-building within some states. This coherence has reduced possibilities for interstate wars, which is the main essence of a security community.

The initial association with the idea of universal human rights, self determination and pacific settlement of disputes from the FLS and its continuance to SADC further reflects the shared understanding between the states. This shared understanding was not only projected as the basis for regional anti-colonialism, but was also deployed to establish common ground with the global community as shown in the Lusaka

Manifesto, and has become the source of trust among the Member States, that disputes among them will always be handled by pacific means. In the liberation war the resort to violence was only instigated by the obstinacy of the apartheid South Africa.

Further proof of inter-subjective meaning is attested by mediatory interventions in Member States, by SADC, pointing towards the transformation of the understanding of sovereignty within the region. In the first place, as suggested by Adler and Barnett, it points towards growth of transnational responsibility, where every member state assumes responsibility not just for its citizens, but also for the citizens of the other states and therefore the general regional good. However, this transformation is largely limited to interstate relations with non-state or civic community still being denied policy space by the regional elites, especially in the security sphere.

Secondly, the interventions and their intended impact may point towards the ability of the regional body to limit the "rights, obligations and duties" of those members that transgress the regional normative structure (1998: 36). This is to say that, while the regional body may be demonstrating transnational responsibility, it may also be showing the ability to punish wayward behaviour by violating the sovereignty of the culprit states, for instance Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar. In actual fact, Madagascar was immediately suspended from the organization upon its falling into a political crisis (Cawthra, 2010: 7). The importance of these interventions also rest on the ability of the regional body to constrain the behaviour of members. The apparent lack of this ability in the past has been cited by analysts as one of the reason for their pessimistic evaluation of SADC's prospects for a security community (see Van

Nieuwkerk 2008).

On the category of "process", SADC has developed procedural mechanisms for regional transactions, institutions, organizations and organizational learning. The proliferation of institutions and the transformation of the organizational structures have increased the "dynamic density" of regional transactions with regard to regional security. The hierarchy of authority in the structure from summits downwards, the mechanisms and the level of consultation that has been demonstrated in the examination of the OPDSC in chapter five have compounded the levels and intensity of communication between different state agents in the execution of the regional security agenda. These become the sites for socialisation of the regional elites and their subordinates, leading to convergence in understanding and meaning which underpin the growth of mutual trust and common identity.

In SADC, the processes of social learning through its organizations and institutions have just become intensified and their effects are still to be witnessed, such as in the case of Zimbabwe. The extent to which regional norms are being ingrained in the social fabric of the Zimbabwean elites through the on-going mediation process will be mostly realisable after-the-fact, in the new Zimbabwe that will emerge from the process. In Lesotho, the peaceful conduct of the May 2012 elections, on the background of constitutional changes is testimony to grounding of institutional learning. Institutional learning is expected both ways: within SADC structures and institutions as well as within the organizations and institutions of the target states.

The extent of SADC's involvement in the regional security challenges shows the extent to which it views itself as representing the aspirations of the regional

collective. Compliance with the institutionalised processes of the regional body by target states promotes the perception by the other members as trustworthy. For instance, the initial reluctance of Zimbabwe (Mugabe regime) to accept regional diplomatic assistance had other states questioning its motive and regard for SADC and the Zimbabwean people. That it has now accepted mediation, challenges notwithstanding, puts it in good stead by the other members. On the other hand the general convergence of normative perceptions through the actions of the regional body encourages the development of mutual trust which should improve from generation to generation.

7.2.3 Tier3

The variables discussed above are all building towards mutual trust and collective identity. The application of discourse theory, especially, on the moment of the formation of SADC has allowed for useful understanding of identification process as articulation of free elements from the other dislocated discourses around some empty signifiers and nodal points of the hegemonic project. The empty signifier of "community" in this case and the accompanying narratives of a common unjust past that has failed the realisation of fullness, juxtaposed with the luring promise of full identity in the future, "a future within a community" have been deployed to both scare and grip the audience around this hegemonic project. By articulating elements that were previously associated with the "Other", the hegemonic discourse is actually "reaching over" to the "Other" and this is what SADC did when it defined its identity in terms of equality for all. This was the moment of establishing the basis for trust and collective identity all at the same time. SADC has therefore established the

conditions for dependable expectation for peaceful change.

Full identity is illusive and transient. The community is always in a process of identification with instances of dislocation providing both disruptions and opportunities for further sedimentation of the hegemonic project. Today SADC is identifiable with the region, challenges notwithstanding. The sedimentation of SADC identity rests on the ability of its constituency to identify with it, and this is the ultimate test of common identity and mutual trust necessary for the existence of a security community. However, SADC with its OPDSC mechanisms only conforms to a loosely coupled security community.

7.2.4 A Nascent Security Community

Having established the existence of precipitating conditions for a security community in southern Africa; isolated the factors that underpin the development of mutual trust and collective identity as necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change, the next sub-section attempts to locate SADC within the three phases in the development of a security community by employing its five indicators (Multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, common definition of the threat and, discourse and the language of community), that Adler and Barnett consider to be "sensitive to the different phases of the security community" (1998: 48).

Firstly, on *multilateralism*, SADC has, through its protocol establishing the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, established organizational structures, institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution that it currently continues to employ and modify in its preoccupation with the conflicts and political crises in its

Member States as exemplified in the Zimbabwe and Lesotho cases. Through the SADC Troika and the Organ Troika, the regional body has developed mechanisms and institutions for consensual decision-making with regard to the regional security agenda. Through the process of institutional learning it also continues to improve these mechanisms and add more institutions as demonstrated in the creation of the Panel of the Elders and the SADC Electoral Advisory Council. This multilateralism is further broadened by its affiliation to the continental peace and security architecture. However, SADC as demonstrated in the cases of Zimbabwe and Lesotho, still needs to improve its processes to meet the standards of best practices with regard to mediation.

Secondly, the indicator of *unfortified borders*. Evidence here rests in the demilitarization of borders since the demise of colonialism and apartheid. This is the extent to which Member States have come to trust each other, eliminating the possibility of seeing each other as enemies. Today military and other security deployments along the borders are for transnational security challenges like drug trafficking, poaching, organized crime like small arms smuggling, and these are coordinated through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements, under the auspices of the OPDSC. However, this development is counter balanced by the erection of physical barriers by some states: Botswana on its border with Zimbabwe; South Africa on its borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique - and the general reluctance to implement the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC (Matlosa, 2006: 20).

Thirdly, the indicator of *changes in military planning*. The member states through the

mechanism of the SSF have developed strategies for doctrinal interoperability between the regional security forces. This points towards convergence (not commonality) in military procurement and deployment decisions. Furthermore, the extensive institutional and organizational growth (e.g. ISDSC, SSF and REWC) with the accompanying collaborative efforts in each area means that the individual militaries have access to similar information and share intelligence leading to national security decisions that are influenced by similar understanding. To this end, SADC can be viewed as only moderately able to coordinate its security policies, which is one of the reasons for locating it within the nascent phase.

Fourthly, the indicator of *common definitions of threats*. The establishment of bilateral defence and safety mechanisms to address transnational security challenges points to a common understanding of mutually shared threats like trans-border crime, and has therefore led to emergence of "common security culture" between the Member States. The general reliance on SARPCCO and INTERPOL in addressing trans-border safety and security issues is further proof of the existence of inter-subjective meanings about international threats. However, in the internal domestic environment, this value system may be lagging behind as demonstrated in the Zimbabwean crisis where the military and youth militia were used to suppress political opposition rather violently, prompting international condemnation and sanctions against President Mugabe's regime. This goes to show disparity of the value systems among the regional elites, which betrays the general belief in peaceful change.

Fifthly, the indicator of *discourse and the language of community* have been

demonstrated in the analysis of the Windhoek Declaration. It has been argued that the hegemonic discourse of SADC with its metaphors points to growth in the notion of collective identity.

The major letdown in this regard is the lack of internal peace within some states which are still bogged down with issues of state- and nation-building. The other misgiving regards the tendency for states to pursue national interests that are counter to the regional good, as when states initially pursued Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) negotiations on an individual basis, even when it was clear that the move encouraged competition rather than cooperation. The point is that cooperation and regard for each other do not yet come naturally. (Mushiri, 2008: 120-5). Additionally, the ethnocentric nationalist discourses prevalent within the Zimbabwean crisis also betray the development of a language of community in which the different particularities (interstate and intrastate) can recognise and uphold the right of each other to coexist. This is where democracy may be expected to effect the greatest impact to elevate SADC towards a robust security community.

In sum, this concluding analysis suggest that SADC has moved well beyond considering "how they might coordinate their relations in order to: increase their mutual security; lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges; and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 50) towards a more institutionalised cooperative interdependency that supports the presence of regional-wise mutual trust and common identity. The expressed desire and its accompanying empirical demonstration, to forge a common future are suggestive of social actors that see themselves as one, with common interests and common

challenges.

7.3 Conclusion

Based on the objectives of the study, the theoretical explanations rendered in the analysis and the above concluding remarks, a few main points deserve reiteration. Firstly, that identity in international relations problematizes the orthodoxy of the state as the primary referent, especially for the developing South, where domestic legitimacy is still contested, pointing to identities within the states as some of the sources of conflicts. However, identities and interests are socially constructed and as such are in eternal development – always amenable to deconstruction and reconstruction – a fact that carries opportunities for solutions.

Secondly, that overall and in the context of the democratic turn, most southern African countries have embarked on the path to democratisation and their problems are largely specific to each country, relative to its locus in the democratisation process. This puts the challenge facing SADC, to cascade and internalise democracy, in a useful perspective and improves the prospects for overcoming the challenges, based on convergence of values which improves trust, allowing states to move beyond the traditional security concerns towards concerns for fears and wants of the multitudes of the peoples of southern Africa.

Thirdly, that the “fantasmatic” narratives of the region based on its political, economic, social and cultural history within the context of a promise for a better future as implied in the metaphor of “a shared future” may continue to hold the particularities within SADC together and legitimize its institutional policy processes within the region. This is necessary and buys time as SADC labours to cascade and

internalise its norms within its Member States amid potentially disruptive discourses of “Africa for Africans”.

Fourthly, that the changed patterns of security interdependencies from the polarised Cold War configurations to a more inclusive pattern means that southern Africa can no longer be understood in terms of the orthodox power-security dilemma of the Cold War. At the very least southern Africa has been transformed from a conflict-ridden security complex to an interstate security community (Vayrynen 2000). This optimism rests in the realization that regional security debates are moving away from interstate relations towards more nuanced conceptualisations around realities on the ground. That is, it now focuses on new threats (and referents) to include "population growth, the environment and the competition for scarce resources, mass migration, food shortage, drugs, disease and AIDS, ethnocentric nationalism, crime and small arms proliferation, the crisis of liberal democracy, the role of armed forces, poverty and economic marginalization" (Soderbaum 2009: 80; see also Matlosa 2008; Booth and Vale 1995; Vale 1996).

Fifthly, that the cases of Zimbabwe and Lesotho attest to the fact that SADC has not only established the legal framework for a security community, but has also embarked on policy implementation to make its vision a reality. Notwithstanding, most analysts have lamented the lack of practical progress to operationalize the institutional and normative structures through the implementation of its strategic roadmaps -RISDP and SIPO. The eagerness for progress in this regard, however, needs to be juxtaposed with the prevailing institutional challenges, so well articulated by the same analysts and researchers (see Van Nieuwkerk 2008, 2009: 109-114;

Ngoma 2005: 230-2; Van Schalkwyk, 2005: 36-41; Nathan, 2004: 22; Vale 1996: 387-8). These have been identified as lack of funding, inadequate human resource complement and expertise to match the mandate of SADC, lack of political will and tendency for states to advance their national interests at the expense of regional integration, and the conspicuous absence of civil society in the decision making processes of the regional body allowing the states to continue to privilege state security issues rather than regional human security concerns, and in the process robbing these policies of a wide and true regional ownership.

Lastly, that the southern African regionalism is shaped by a dynamic interaction of forces from the national, regional, continental and global spheres and as suggested at the beginning of this thesis, the result is transnational, multidimensional and multilateral patterns of regionalisation. However, owing to the infancy of statehood and regionalisation, state elites and states remain the primary determinants of progress. The resulting regionalisation, therefore, is a negotiated process which cannot be fast-tracked without penalties on regional integrity.

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Appendix 1**Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted by the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States,
Lusaka, 14-16 April 1969.**

1. When the purpose and the basis of States' international policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony, disagreements, conflicts of interest, or different assessments of human priorities, which provoke an excess of tension in the world, and disastrously divide mankind, at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we the leaders of East and Central African States meeting at Lusaka, 16th April 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto.
2. By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organization.
3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognize that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals - without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination - there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.
4. None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organisation which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human of the human race for support.
5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.
6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective Administration in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organising their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.
7. Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.
8. Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding and opportunity for all the people of these States, working

together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.

9. As an aftermath of the present policies it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organisations may well take account of these fears, and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter exclusively for the peoples of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting - that the arrangements within any State which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.

10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the people in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in Southern Africa shall be freed from an environment posed by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men - not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men.

11. Thus the liberation of Africa - for which we are struggling - does not mean a reverse racialism. ...

12. On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore, that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another. ...

The Union of South Africa is itself an independent sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.

There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid policy adopted by its Government, and supported to a greater or lesser extent by almost all its white citizens, is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position of privilege or the experience of oppression in the South African society depends on the one thing which it is beyond the power of any man to change. It depends upon a man's colour, his parentage, and his ancestors. If you are black you cannot escape this categorization; nor can you escape it if you are white. If you are black millionaire and a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws and still excluded from political activity. If you are white, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation, will lead you only to the segregation, and the comparative comfort of a white jail. Beliefs, abilities, and behaviour are all irrelevant to a man's status; everything depends upon race. Manhood is irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. And the system is maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population - and thus, inevitably of all.

These things are known and are regularly condemned in the Councils of the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that to many countries international law take precedence over humanity. Therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a government which rejects the manhood of most humanity. South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations' Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient, if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.

The signatories of this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Union of

South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established in this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every action, and in every state there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.

We reaffirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity, and to the doctrines of self-determination and non-racialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.

ANGOLA-BOTSWANA-LESOTHO-MALAWI-MOZAMBIQUE-NAMIBIA-
SWAZILAND-TANZANIA-ZAMBIA-ZIMBABWE: DECLARATION
REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY*

[August 17, 1992]

+ Cite as 32 I.L.M. 267 (1993)+

I.L.M. Content Summary

TEXT OF DECLARATION - I.L.M Page 268

[INTRODUCTION] - I.L.M. Page 268

[Expression of commitment to the establishment of the SADC]

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CONTEXT - I.L.M. Page 268

[Noting the nationhood of Namibia, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the cold war. Expressing the need to restructure and integrate the region's economies and relations to achieve development]

THE SADCC EXPERIENCE - I.L.M. Page 269

[Noting the contributions of the SADCC (established in 1980) to regional development. Political commitment and effective institutions and mechanisms are needed to mobilize the region's resources]

A SHARED FUTURE - I.L.M. Page 269

[A framework of cooperation will provide for: economic cooperation and integration; common economic, political and social values and systems; and strengthened regional solidarity]

STRATEGIES - I.L.M. Page 270

- a) Human Resources, Sciences and Technology
- b) Food Security, Natural Resources and Environment
- c) Infrastructure and Services
- d) Finance, Investment and Trade
- e) Popular Participation
- f) Solidarity, Peace and Security

INSTITUTIONS - I.L.M. Page 272

[Regional decisionmaking is required]

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION - I.L.M. Page 272

COMMITMENT - I.L.M. Page 273

[Economic cooperation and integration require commitment to the mission of the SADC]

[Done at Windhoek, Namibia, on 17 August 1992]

[Authentic texts: English and Portuguese]

*[Reproduced from the Declaration, "Towards the Southern African Development Community," provided by the Secretariat of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, done at Windhoek, August 17, 1992, appears at 32 I.L.M. 116 (1993).

[The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, done June 3, 1991 among member states of the Organization of African Unity, is reproduced at 30 I.L.M. 1241 (1991).]

In the Declaration: *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation*, adopted in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1st April, 1980, the Heads of State or Government of independent states of Southern Africa committed themselves to pursuing policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of the economies of the region. This Declaration gave rise to the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).

Our common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations, remain a firm and enduring foundation for common actions to promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and integration; in the spirit of equity and partnership. This firm foundation is necessary for the attainment of our cherished ideals of economic well-being, the improvement of the standard and quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security, for the peoples of Southern Africa.

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Southern African States hereby commit ourselves and our governments to the establishment of a *SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)* to achieve these ideals, and to serve as a vehicle for the development and integration of the region. We also offer and commend this Declaration to the peoples of Southern Africa, and call upon them to make the same commitment, and to participate fully in the process towards regional integration. Furthermore, we call upon the international community to continue to support the efforts of the countries of Southern Africa to realise this ideal.

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CONTEXT

Since the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration, Southern Africa has changed, and is still changing. The quest for democracy and popular participation in the management of public affairs is entrenched, and spreading fast and wide. The management of

economic affairs is being reformed to allow for efficiency, economy and competitiveness, and to enable individuals to innovate and to take the responsibility for improving their own lives and their communities.

The attainment of independence and sovereign nationhood by Namibia, formally ended the struggle against colonialism in the region. In the other countries, concerted efforts to end internal conflicts and civil strife are bearing positive results.

In South Africa, the process is underway to end the inhuman system of apartheid, and to bring about a constitutional dispensation acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole. It is, therefore, only a matter of time before a new South Africa is welcome to join the family of free and majority-ruled States of the region.

The developments outlined above will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of cooperation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development, and for the improvement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of the region.

These changes taking place in the region are also bringing about a greater convergence of economic, political and social values across the region, and will help create the appropriate environment for deeper regional cooperation.

On the African continent, efforts continue, principally under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to promote closer economic relations.

Both the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, signed by OAU Heads of State or Government, in June 1991, make Regional Economic Communities (RECs) the building blocks for the continental community.

We, therefore, view our efforts at regional integration in Southern Africa as part of this continental effort.

On the global scene, fundamental and far-reaching political and economic changes are taking place. The cold war has ended, and world affairs are increasingly being managed on the basis of consultation and consensus, rather than confrontation and competition.

In addition, economic and social progress in the world is increasingly based on the mastery of science and technology, advanced human skills and high levels of productivity.

Integration is fast becoming a global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe are organising themselves into closer economic and political entities. These movements towards stronger regional blocs will transform the world, both economically and politically. Firms within these economic blocs will benefit from economies of scale provided by large markets, to become competitive both internally and internationally.

Colonialism, racism, especially apartheid, and destabilisation have left Southern Africa a legacy of wide disparities, deep economic dependence and social dislocation. This situation is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term, because it is both unjust and wasteful. It is also a potential source of tension that could lead to future instability in the region. There is, therefore, an urgent imperative to restructure regional economies and relations towards balanced, equitable and mutually beneficial growth and development.

THE SADC EXPERIENCE

SADCC was established as a vehicle for the reduction of economic dependence and for equitable regional integration; an appropriate sequel to the political emancipation of the region. SADCC has

made commendable achievements since its founding in 1980, particularly seen against the national economic problems, the hostile international economic environment and the massive destabilisation and military aggression of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Of all the contributions SADCC has made to regional development, the greatest has been in forging a regional identity and a sense of a common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa.

However, progress towards reduction of the region's economic dependence, and towards economic integration, has been modest. The organization has, so far, not been able to mobilize to the fullest extent possible, the region's own resources, for development. Yet this is one of the central objectives, as well as strategies, for effective and self-sustaining regional development. This requires political commitment and effective institutions and mechanisms to mobilise the region's own resources.

A SHARED FUTURE

In the light of its peculiar circumstances, and international changes in the organisation of production and trade, Southern Africa needs to arrange and manage its affairs in a manner that will provide opportunities to all its peoples, on the basis of equity and mutual benefit; to invest and to become effective actors in the regional and international market places.

The economies of Southern African states are small and underdeveloped. The countries of the region must, therefore, join together to strengthen themselves economically and politically, if the region is to become a serious player in international relations. No single country of Southern Africa can achieve this status on its own.

STRATEGIES

Southern Africa has also been an arena of conflict and militarisation, associated with the struggle for political liberation, and the fight against apartheid and racism, aggression and destabilisation. A new Southern Africa, concerned with peace and development, must find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and cooperation, in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region; and to free resources from military to productive development activities.

a) Human Resources, Science and Technology

The most binding constraint to development of the region is inadequate professionally and technically qualified and experienced personnel, to plan and manage the development process efficiently and effectively.

The countries of Southern Africa will, therefore, work out and adopt a framework of cooperation which provides for:

- a) deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of production, goods and services across national borders;
- b) common economic, political, social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty;
- c) strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony.

There is, therefore, a critical need to develop, among all the countries and peoples of Southern Africa, a vision of a shared future, a future within a regional community.

Human development is a life-long process of developing an individual's potential to the fullest, through education and training, improved health, ability to earn a decent living, the exercise of economic and political choices, and guaranteed basic human rights; to afford him/her full involvement in the development process.

The region also lacks an adequate scientific and technological base, and is substantially dependent on imported expertise and technology.

A high priority for the region must, therefore, be to develop effective national and regional policies on science and technology, setting realistic goals and identifying practical, cost-effective instruments for achieving these goals. In formulating policies and programmes, close links will need to be developed with the business sector which utilises the technology and skilled people.

Appropriate measures will be taken to improve the region's scientific and technological base, through curricula improvement; establishment of centres of specialisation and concerted efforts in the promotion of research and development.

- Policies will also be implemented to release the innovative potential and entrepreneurship of the peoples of the region, and to encourage self-application and a strong work ethic.
- b) Food Security, Natural Resources and Environment
- Land, agriculture and food security are synonymous with life and livelihood. Most of the people of Southern Africa remain dependent on agriculture as a source of food and income. Agriculture is also critical to the industrialisation of the region, by ensuring availability of raw materials for local industries, and a source of purchasing power for the people. Agricultural development will, therefore, need to provide for increased production and productivity, and intra-regional trade in food and other crops, to guarantee food security and enhance the quality of life of the peoples of the region.
- The exploitation and utilisation of natural resources, especially land, water and minerals will contribute to human welfare and development. However, such exploitation requires good management and conservation, to ensure that development does not reduce or impair the diversity and richness of the region's natural resource base and environment.
- In this context, policy measures will be taken, and mechanisms instituted to protect the environment, and manage natural resource utilisation with a view to achieving optimum sustainable benefits for the present and future generations of Southern Africans.
- c) Infrastructure and Services
- In order to enhance services to the peoples of the region, to support industrial development and growth, and promote intra-regional trade; the rehabilitation and upgrading of existing, and development of new transport and communications and energy systems will remain a priority.
- Emphasis will also be placed on increased and effective operational coordination, towards efficiency, cost-effectiveness and competitiveness; in order to ensure economic viability of the systems.
- d) Finance, Investment and Trade
- The creation of an environment conducive to increased investment, particularly in the material productive sectors of the regional economy, is central to the strategy for regional integration.
- The experience gained in regional cooperation so far, shows that collective self-reliance with respect to the mobilisation of regional resources, is one of the areas where the gap between the declared aims and practice has been widest. Appropriate measures will be instituted urgently to address this issue, in order for the region to achieve its aims and objectives.
- Although the creation of a regional market under existing circumstances could lead to only a modest increase in intra-regional trade, its most important impact will be to spur new types of investment in more productive and competitive industries, to supply the regional and international markets.

The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.

INSTITUTIONS

Successful regional integration will depend on the extent to which there exist national and regional institutions with adequate competence and capacity to stimulate and manage efficiently and effectively, the complex process of integration.

Integration will require mechanisms capable of achieving the high level of political commitment necessary to shape the scope and scale of the process of integration. This implies strengthening the powers and capacity of regional decision-making, coordinating and executing bodies.

Integration does imply that some decisions which were previously taken by individual states are taken regionally, and those decisions taken nationally give due consideration to regional positions and circumstances. Regional decision-making also implies elements of change in the locus and context of exercising sovereignty, rather than a loss of sovereignty.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

This Declaration is a statement of commitment and strategy, aimed at economic development and integration of Southern Africa, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit. However, Southern Africa is still a developing region which will continue to need the support of the international community to realise its plans and aspirations. Every effort will, therefore, be made to consolidate the goodwill which the Southern African states have established with their international cooperating partners, and to justify and stimulate enhanced practical international cooperation, for mutual benefit.

Continuing policy and management reforms, the restructuring of production at higher levels of enterprise, productivity and competitiveness; are accordingly identified as the main pillars of a strategy capable of engendering increased investment in production and trade.

It is evident that for this to take place, the countries of Southern Africa will need to harmonise their economic policies and plans, and ensure that regional integration becomes an intrinsic and integral part of the management of national affairs. In this regard, particular attention will be given to factors which impinge on intra-regional investment and trade flows, such as payments and clearance, monetary and financial relations, and mechanisms for the mobilisation of the region's own resources.

e) Popular Participation

Regional integration will continue to be a pipe dream unless the peoples of the region determine its content, form and direction, and are themselves its active agent.

Measures will, therefore, be taken, and appropriate mechanisms and institutional framework put in place; to involve the peoples of the region in the process of regional integration.

f) Solidarity, Peace and Security

War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare.

Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment for regional cooperation and integration.

COMMITMENT

Underdevelopment, exploitation, deprivation and backwardness in Southern Africa will be overcome only through economic cooperation and integration. The welfare of the peoples of Southern Africa, and the development of its economies, require concerted and higher levels of coordinated regional action.

The primary responsibility for upliftment of the welfare of the peoples of this region rests primarily with them and their Governments. Member States recognise that the attainment of the objective of regional economic integration in Southern Africa will require us to exercise our sovereign right in empowering the organisation to act on our behalf and for our common good. This is the challenging mission of SADC.

This Declaration is produced in two original copies in the English language, and two in the Portuguese language; all of which are equally valid.

Done in Windhoek, Republic of Namibia on 17th August, 1992.

- PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
- REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA
- KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
- REPUBLIC OF MALAWI
- REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
- REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
- KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND
- UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
- REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
- REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

05TH April 2012

I, the undersigned, hereby confirm and state that Mr. Lucky Ramokgadi Bogatsu (Student Number 201085003) is a registered student for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies at the University of Namibia (UNAM).

In my capacity as the supervisor of his thesis, I kindly request you to cooperate with Mr. Bogatsu when he visits you for interviews.

Please accept my warmest regards and best wishes.

Prof. Andre du Pisani

Department of Political & Administrative Studies

