

**EXPLORING CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAMIBIAN
DEFENCE FORCE (NDF) PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (PSOs) IN
LIBERIA (2004 – 2008)**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
OF**

THE UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA

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APRIL 2014

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ABSTRACT

This thesis frames a study undertaken to explore key management challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) during the peace support operations (PSOs) mandated by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in the period 2004 to 2008. The purpose of the study is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the management challenges that confronted the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) during these operations.

The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was involved in a number of UN led peace support operations worldwide, before its participation in the United Nations peace support operations (PSOs) in Liberia over a period of four years (2004 – 2008). During the subsequent internal review it came to light that the Namibian Defence Force experienced a number of management challenges in relation to command, control and communications (C3). The review also revealed that the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) operational requirement capabilities were not well-matched with the United Nations' standards and were not compatible with the United Nations Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs).

The peace support operations (PSOs) is expected to achieve its mandate within such constraints, support the myriad of relief agencies in its theatre of operations and to encounter the challenges which are situational dominance in this modern environment, and they are obstacles in the way to realise the objectives of the mission.

The research problem of this study was to explore the challenges associated with Namibia's peace support operations in Liberia. In this regard, the research had

reviewed the reports of problems registered by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in general, and the Defence Headquarters (DHQs) in particular.

The main objective of this research was to establish how management challenges with regard to command, control and communications affected the capability of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) to fulfil its mandate during the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

The study was guided by the United Nations (UN) Charter, which was adopted and signed on 26 June 1945. The UN Charter provides the following relevant chapters for this study: Chapter VI is applicable for peacekeeping, Chapter VII relevant for peace enforcement and Chapter VIII regulating for regional peacekeeping operations, (UN, 2012, p. 155).

The current United Nations meaningful reform is one of the serious steps taken in accordance with the *Brahimi Report*; therefore the researcher was also guided by the *Brahimi's Report* with the ideas and purpose to consolidate the arguments of both documents in this study (Brahimi et al, 2000, p. 6).

This study relied on interviews with participants involved in PSO's in Liberia and on official records of the period under consideration such as monthly reports, end of mission reports, army senior officers' visits reports submitted etc. (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 13).

The researcher interviewed the five commanding officers and their five deputies, as well as the former Chief of Staff Army Operations at the Army Headquarters (AHQs). The interview appointment was also extended to the former Chief of Staff

Defence Joint Operations, Plans and Training (COS JOPT) in the Defence Headquarters (DHQs), unfortunately he was not available during the interview period due to other commitments. Some of the staff officers who did their staff duties with the contingents and some military observers (MOs) and staff officers who were on the ground during that operation in Liberia from 2004 – 2008 were also included in the interview appointments.

All the collected data which had been captured through personal interviews, audio tape recorders and questionnaires was transcribed onto a computer data base for analysis and interpretation.

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GLOSSARY

Definition of words that features prominently in this study

Challenges: According to the Oxford Second Edition English Dictionary, challenge is a lacking or deficient in a specific respect or disability in a specific respect.

Peace Support Operations (PSOs): is the term with complete range of plans, policies and actions organised towards preventing, managing and resolving conflict as restoring and maintaining peace in conflict situations. The PSOs started with the pockets of military observation and peacekeeping, that later expanded, as identified by General Adesia, and cited by General Ogomudia, (2007, p.15) that:

Peace-keeping was originally an operation that involves military personnel. Over the years however, modern peacekeeping has now evolved to point where economic, political, and social issues are involved. This new trend is now popularly described as peace support operations.

Hill and Malik (1996), explained that the term ‘Peace Support Operations (PSOs) or Peacekeeping’ does not appear anywhere in the UN Charter, but it was just adopted during the Cold War as a substitute for collective security in response to the stalemate between the Permanent Members of the Security Council (PMSC).

Peacekeeping was previously used as a means to prevent the bipolar from becoming embroiled in localised disputes. The concept 'peacekeeping' did not come into general usage until the 1960s, and by 1988 thirteen peacekeeping operations were conducted and more than 600 men and women lost their lives in the course of peace under the UN peace support operations.

The UN Charter gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security based on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination (U N, 2009, p. 49).

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACPA	-	Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord
AHQ	-	Army Headquarters
AMIS	-	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	-	African Union
AUPSC	-	African Union Peace and Security Council
BDE	-	Brigade
BRIG GEN	-	Brigadier General
BDE HQ	-	Brigade Headquarters
C3	-	Command Control and Communication
CAPT	-	Captain
CDF	-	Chief of the Defence Force
CIVPOL	-	United Nations Civilian Police
COE	-	Contingent Owned Equipment
COs	-	Commanding Officers
COL	-	Colonel
CONOPS	-	Concept of Operations
COS JOPT	-	Chief of Staff Joint Operations Plans and Training
CRO	-	Crisis Response Operations
DHQ	-	Defence Headquarters

DPKO	-	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DDR	-	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR-		Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration and Reconstruction
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG -		Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EU	-	European Union
FARDC	-	Armed Forces of DRC
FHQ	-	Force Headquarters
GOC	-	General Officer Commanding
GOL	-	Government of Liberia
GRN	-	Government of the Republic of Namibia
HQ	-	Head Quarters
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
JMAC	-	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
JOC	-	Joint Operation Centre
LT	-	Lieutenant
LT COL	-	Lieutenant Colonel
LT GEN	-	Lieutenant General
LURD	-	Liberians Unity for Reconciliation and Democracy
MA	-	Mission Area
MAJ	-	Major
MAJ GEN	-	Major General
MOs	-	Military Observer

MOD	-	Ministry of Defence
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAMBATT	-	Namibian Battalion
NAMCON	-	Namibian Contingent
NDF	-	Namibian Defence Force
NFZ	-	No Fly Zone
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
NTGL	-	National Transitional Government of Liberia
NPFL	-	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
ONUB	-	United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUCI	-	United Nations Missions in Ivory Coast
PAK BDE	-	Pakistani Brigade
PIA	-	Policy Implementation Analysis
R2P	-	Response to Protect
RUF	-	Revolutionary United Front
PMSC	-	Permanent Members of the Security Council
PSOs	-	Peace Support Operations
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
2nd LT	-	Second Lieutenant
SHIRBRIG	-	Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
SO	-	Staff Officer
SOFA	-	Status of Forces Agreements
SRSG	-	Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations

TCC	-	Troops Contributing Countries
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
UNDPKO	-	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNGA	-	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIKOM	-	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNMISL	-	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNEF I	-	United Nations Emergence Force I
UNIFIL	-	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE	-	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea
UNMIBH	-	United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIL	-	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIK	-	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIS	-	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	-	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOMIL	-	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM	-	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPKO	-	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPROFOR	-	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	-	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	-	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
UNSAS	-	United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System
UNSCR	-	United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSG	-	United nations Secretary General
UNAVEM	-	United Nations Verification Mission in Angola
UNOMIL	-	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOL	-	United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
UNTAET	-	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNTSO	-	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USSR	-	Union of the Socialist Soviet Republic
WLA	-	Wet Lease Agreement

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Minister of Defence and his staff for according me this opportunity to study for the Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies (MA-SSS) at the University of Namibia 2009 – 2013, and for their unwavering support and encouragement throughout the course work by introducing the block release programme. I am equally grateful to all MA-SSS professors and lecturers of the University of Namibia, at the Faculty of Political and Management Science Staff as well as the Post-Graduate Committee for their support and continued guidance throughout the study time.

I am also indebted to my supervisors Professor Piet van Rooyen and his co-supervisor Professor Andre` du Pisani for their patience, and for their thorough incisive guidance throughout the entire research by sacrificing most of their valuable time to give their required supervision. I am also greatly indebted to the entire fellow students of MA-SSS block release programme. We live like a family and I will always have fond and good memories of all for their assistance of any kind.

The special appreciations go to my loving wife Helena and my children Thimotheus (Gwaangolo), Maria (Linesimano) and Katrina Ndinelago Ilwenya, for being there for me. I love you all! May you be abundantly blessed in all the coming years.

To my brother, all my sisters, friends, relatives, work mates, and colleagues, whom I could not mention their names due to time constraints and writing space, I am truly grateful to you all!

DEDICATION

To my family and friends: You inspired me to continue working hard in order to succeed in life.

DECLARATION

I, Ilwenya Thomas Ilwenya, hereby declare that this thesis is original and has never been presented in any other institution. I also declare that any secondary information used has duly been acknowledged.

Signature: _____

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1. Introduction

This thesis frames a study undertaken to explore key management challenges experienced by the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) during the peace support operations (PSOs) mandated for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in the period 2004 to 2008. The purpose of the study was to conduct an in-depth analysis of the key challenges that confronted the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) during the period under review.

The lack of international consensus in approaching the problems posed by these challenges must be phased out in order to realise these missions with their inherent problems conceivable and operative. It is, therefore, of importance to look at the many components of the issue, all of which contributed to the operational problems faced by multifunctional peace operations including the Namibian contingent. Some of the key problems were examined here and corrective measures were recommended. Among these the problems of compatibility, command, control and communications (C3), environmental conditions, weather conditions, logistic supplies, medical supplies, language barriers, and local terminologies were identified as the common challenges of the multifunctional peace support operations, and they are the specific problem areas in any given PSO. The immediate enhancements of such operations were elaborated by then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, when she noted that:

Old models of peacekeeping don't always meet current challenges. Peace operations today often require skills that are neither strictly military nor strictly police but rather a combination of the two. The international community needs to identify and train units that are able to control crowds, deter vigilante actions, prevent looting and disarm civilian agitators while at the same time winning the trust of the communities in which they are deployed (Sherman, 2007, p. 69).

This is a particular pertinent of the NDF if it intends to retain relevance in the future UN, AU or SADC led PSOs.

This thesis explored the ways how to minimise the management challenges and how to provide opportunities for enhancing the NDF achievement in modern PSOs. It highlighted areas where the improvements are required and prove the effectiveness in current and future mission accomplishments.

The United Nations (UN) Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is a dynamic peacekeeping instrument developed by the UN to assist the conflict torn countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. The first ever UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948 when the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorised the deployment of the UN Military Observers (MOs) to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, there have

been several UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) in conflict areas around the world including the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) where the NDF participated and was confronted by some notable management challenges (Wilkinson & Rinaldo, 1996, p. 41).

It is a well-known fact that the United Nations is an international organisation founded in 1945 after the second World War by 51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights. In 2013 there was 14 UN Peacekeeping operations around the globe including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, India-Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, South Sudan and Sudan's Darfur Region to mention but a few. In total, almost 100 thousand uniformed personnel (military and police) are actively employed in the UN's world-wide varied and widely distributed peace support missions. The United Nations is the most prominent intervention mechanism in the peace support operation, its foremost strategy for managing and resolving post-cold war conflicts in the global community (UN, 2009, p. 49).

1.2. Background of the study

The Liberian conflicts which resulted in the deployment of international troops to Liberia, leading to a multidimensional United Nations peace support operations, included the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) to the United Nations Mission in

Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003. The Liberian conflict started in the late 1989 to early 1990, and had escalated into a full civil war which claimed the lives of an estimated 150,000 people, mostly innocent civilian women and children. This led to a complete breakdown of law and order in Liberia. It displaced scores of people, both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 850,000 Liberian refugees to flee into neighbouring countries. The confrontations were between government forces and fighters who claimed membership in an opposition group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government Minister, Mr Charles Taylor, who was convicted in 2012 for crimes against humanity and sentenced to 50 years imprisonment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UN, 2011, p. 55).

From the outset of the conflict, a sub-regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), undertook various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement. The United Nations supported ECOWAS in its efforts to end the civil war in Liberia. These efforts included the establishment of an ECOWAS observer force, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. In 1992 the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Liberia, and the UN Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative to assist in talks between ECOWAS and the warring parties (UN, 2012, p. 55).

After ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993, the UN Security Council first established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Its task was to support ECOMOG in implementing the peace agreement and more especially to monitor compliance with and implementation of the agreement by all parties. UNOMIL was the first United Nations peace support

mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already established by the regional body of the West African states (UN, 2012, p. 64).

The delays in the implementation process of the peace agreement and the resumption of fighting among the Liberian factions made it impossible to hold elections in February or March 1994, as were scheduled in the agreement. According to UN, (2012), in some succeeding months, there were numbers of supplementary peace agreements, amending and clarifying the Cotonou agreement, to be negotiated and implemented. With the ceasefire in force, the United Nations successfully observed the conduct of the elections in July 1997. Mr Charles Taylor, the then leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), was elected as president, and inaugurated on 2 August 1997. The Liberian President then formed a new government and announced a policy of reconciliation and national unity. That marked the achievement of the principal objective UNOMIL's mandate, which was to monitor elections of 1997 (UN, 2012, p. 67).

In November 1997, immediately after the completion of UNOMIL's mandate on 30 September, the United Nations established the United Nations Post-Conflict Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL), headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. The United Nations post-conflict peace-building support office was primarily mandated to assist the new Liberian government to consolidate peace after the July 1997 multiparty elections.

With the full support of the UN Security Council, UNOL facilitated the promotion of national reconciliation and good governance and assisted in mobilising the

international support for the implementation of reconstruction and development programme. In that period, UNOL worked hard to fulfil the terms of its revised mandate, which was approved by the UN Security Council on 23 April 2003. Under the terms of that revised mandate, and in addition to its initial tasks, UNOL was to focus on assisting the Government of Liberia in addressing its expressed capacity needs in the areas of human rights and the conduct of elections, as well as on developing a peace-building strategy integrating political objectives, programme assistance and human rights considerations (UN, 2012).

However, the peace-building efforts of UNOL were seriously hindered by the inability of the government and opposition party leaders to resolve their differences over key issues of governance. Meanwhile, the promotion of national reconciliation was undermined by systematic abuses of human rights, the exclusion and harassment of political opponents and the absence of security sector reform. These elements contributed to the resumption of civil war in Liberia once more and prompted the international community to call on the warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict (UN, 2012).

On 8 July 2003, the fighting between government forces and various warring factions were intensified and humanitarian tragedy was imminent. The UN Secretary-General was left without any other options than to appoint Mr Jacques Paul Klein from the United States as his special representative for UN mission in Liberia under the UNSCR 693 of 2003. He was entrusted with the task of coordinating the activities of the United Nations agencies in Liberia and supporting the emerging transitional arrangements. On 29 July 2003, the UN Secretary-General outlined a three-phased

deployment of international troops to Liberia, leading to a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation that included the Namibian Defence Force (NDF). The UN Secretary-General also indicated that in view of the appointment of Mr Klein and the envisaged establishment of a United Nations peace support operations in Liberia, the mandate of UNOL would naturally have to be terminated (UN, 2012).

Since 29 July 2003 the PSOs in Liberia developed rapidly. On the 1st August 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1497 of 2003, authorising the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia and declaring its readiness to establish a follow-on United Nations stabilization force to be deployed not later than the 1st October 2003. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established as requested by the UN Security Council, after the resignation of the former Liberian President Mr Charles Taylor and the peaceful transfer of power in Liberia on the 11th August 2003, which facilitated the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (UN, 2012).

On the 18th August 2003, the Liberian parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra Ghana. In that Agreement, the parties requested the United Nations to deploy a multinational force to Liberia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and assist in the implementation of the Agreement. With the subsequent deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia, the security situation in the country drastically improved (UN, 2012).

The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation with a troop strength of 15,000, that included 860 Namibian contingent elements, 250 military observers including 4 Namibian military observers (MOs), 160 staff officers including 8 Namibian staff officers (SOs), up to 875 UN police officers including 7 Namibian police (Nampol) members and an additional five armed formed units each comprising 120 officers, and a significant civilian component including two Namibian UN international staff, one Namibian UN volunteer staff and other necessary support staff (UN, 2012).

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was a multidimensional operation in the sense that it composed of the following components: political, military, police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, public information and support components, as well as electoral mechanisms. The mission included a machinery for the coordination of its activities with those of the humanitarian and development community. UNMIL had coordinated closely with ECOWAS and the African Union at the beginning. In order to ensure a coordinated United Nations response to the many sub regional issues, UNMIL also worked closely with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UN, 2012).

The UN Mission in Liberia was headed by the special representative of the Secretary-General who had the overall authority for the whole activities of the Mission and of the United Nations system in Liberia. He was assisted by a senior

management team on military and police affairs, consisting of among others, two deputies, which is a force commander with the rank of lieutenant general, and a police commissioner (UN PSOs 2008).

The UNMIL mandate was to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia and the other parties in the effective and timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; to monitor the adherence to the ceasefire agreement of the 17th June 2003; to assist in extending state authority throughout Liberia; to provide security at key government installations; in particular, ports, airports, roads and other vital infrastructure; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel; to facilitate the free movement of people, humanitarian assistance and goods; to support the safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of immediate deployment of United Nations formed military units that included an NDF Battalion (UN PSOs, 2008).

The other UNMIL mandate was also to advise, train and to assist the Liberian law enforcement authorities and other criminal justice institutions and to assist the National Transitional Government during the process of the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from the ex-combatants and to assist in the subsequent disposal or destruction thereof, to help in the preparation of elections, monitor and report on the human rights situation and provide training and capacity-building in the field of human rights and child protection, provide support for gender mainstreaming including training, support the establishment and

operations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and cooperate with ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations on cross-cutting political and security issues (UN, 2012).

The transfer of power from the former Liberian president, Mr Charles Taylor to the vice-president, Mr Moses Blah and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the Liberian warring parties offered a unique window of opportunity to end the suffering inflicted on the people of Liberia and to find a peaceful solution to a conflict that had been the epicentre of instability in the sub region. While the United Nations and the international community at large stood ready to support the Liberian peace process, the effective and successful implementation of the peace Agreement remained the primary responsibility of the Liberian parties themselves (UN, 2012).

On the 19th September 2003, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1509 of 2003 that welcomed the UN Secretary-General's report of the 11th September 2003 and its recommendations. The mandate of the mission was established for a period of 12 months. The UN Security Council requested the UN Secretary-General to transfer authority of the ECOWAS led forces to UNMIL mandated forces on the 1st October 2003, by which it commended for its rapid and professional deployment. Among other things, the UN Security Council also took note of the intention of the UN Secretary-General to terminate the mandate of UNOL and to transfer the major functions performed by that office to UNMIL (UN, 2012).

During the transfer process on the 1st October 2003, UNMIL took over peacekeeping duties from ECOWAS forces and provisionally “re-hated” the 3500 strong ECOWAS/ECOMIL troops with blue helmets as United Nations peacekeepers. In his inauguration statement, the UN Secretary-General then Kofi Annan, welcomed this very important development and saluted ECOWAS for its role in establishing the security climate that paved the way for the deployment of UNMIL. The UN Secretary-General further commended the ECOWAS participated governments of Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo who were transferred to UNMIL, as well as the United States for its support to the regional force. The UN Secretary-General expressed confidence that UNMIL would be able to contribute in a major way towards the resolution of conflict in Liberia, provided all parties concerned cooperate fully with the force and the international community provides the necessary resources (UN PSOs, 2008).

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by UN Security Council resolution 1509 of the 19th September 2003 with the following mandate which were served as the shared roles and responsibilities of the multidimensional UN force in the mission area including the NDF:

- 1.2.1. To observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- 1.2.2. To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all the parties’ military forces;

1.2.3. To assist in the development of cantonment sites and to provide security at these sites;

1.2.4. To observe and monitor disengagement and cantonment of military forces of all the parties;

1.2.5. To support the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC);

1.2.6. To develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, in cooperation with the JMC, relevant international financial institutions, international development organisations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants;

1.2.7. To carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organised DDRR programme;

1.2.8. To liaise with the JMC and to advice on the implementation of its functions under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement;

1.2.9. To provide security at key government installations, in particular ports, airports, and other vital infrastructures;

1.2.10. To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities (UN PSOs, 2008).

The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was deployed at Grand Cape Mount County in Liberia in 2004, during the United Nations peace support operations (PSOs) and was charged with similar mandate as listed above.

During the subsequent internal review, it came to light that the Namibian Defence Force experienced a number of management challenges which will be revealed by this study. It was also subsequently reviewed that the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) operational requirement capabilities were not well-matched against that of the United Nations (UN) standard operational procedures (SOP). Moreover, there were logistics supplies problems, while difficult terrain and taxing environmental conditions, such as extreme weather conditions and non-compatibility with the United Nations standing operational procedures (SOPs) were among the prominent challenges that affected the management of the troops on the ground. Command, control and communication, language barriers, foreign cultural and religious values also posed daunting challenges to the United Nations peacekeepers in Liberia including the NDF (Kashopola, 2004, p. 8).

The researcher was motivated by the review of records on the PSOs in Liberia, and developed a need to conduct a thorough exploration on this subject with a view to find out the possible challenges and to come up with the solutions and recommendations. It was evident that there were deficits in the management capability of any PSOs missions including the NDF's involvement because the level of the equipment employed in the PSOs depends largely on the contributing nations and the individual field commanders. Then lastly, the study had to conclude with the

broad policy recommendations that could propose and suggest the guidance to the similar nature of the UN mandated PSOs in the future.

1.3. Statement of the problem

The research problem for this study is to explore the challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) peace support operations in Liberia in the years 2004 – 2008. This was in line with the statement of *Brahimi Report* of 2000, where some of the gaps in the UN PSOs sector were identified. However, the *Brahimi Report* did not adequately propose how to narrow these gaps and it did not also provide better options in the development of the future PSOs. Inadequate knowledge in PSOs and lack of operational capability could have possibly created the challenges that the troop contributing countries (TTC) were facing to operate in multidimensional forces undertaking PSOs, more especially the countries from the third world including Namibia.

In this regard, the study reviewed the reports of problems and setbacks registered by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Defence Headquarters (DHQs) respectively. These include reports on various management issues regarding command, control and communications (C3), logistics supplies, non-compatibility with UN Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs), sexual exploitations and abuse (SEA), as well as the environmental conditions, such as weather and geographical impacts, language barriers, foreign cultural and religious values, which had been identified through the findings of the study.

According to Best and Kahn, the most difficult and crucial step during the research process is the “identification of the problem that is to be investigated.” However, the

core research aspects rest on the formulation of well set up grounds of the statement that could generate a well-established problem related to the study (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 67).

1.4. Research objectives

The main objectives of the research of this study were:

- 1.4.1. To explore and establish how the operational challenges and issues associated with the Namibian Defence Force's involvement in the UN peace support operations in Liberia came about.
- 1.4.2. To identify management problems encountered by the Namibian contingents during its United Nations mandated peace support operations (PSOs) in Liberia, in the period 2004 - 2008.
- 1.4.3. To examine the existing challenges the PSOs in general and those encountered by the NDF PSOs in particular.
- 1.4.4. To determine the level of NDF capabilities in the UN led PSOs.
- 1.4.5. To investigate relevant issues, such as NDF management activities, Operational capabilities, logistics supply problems, non-compatibilities with the UN SOP, environmental conditions such as weather and geographical impacts, language barriers, foreign cultural and religious values, and deficiencies regarding command, control and communications (C3).

1.4.6. To analyse the NDF opportunities and benefits accrued during the peace support operations in Liberia, in terms of personnel and contingent owned equipment reimbursement under the wet lease agreement (WLA).

1.4.7. To recommend the possible solutions that may improve the future deployments of the NDF troops in the United Nations peace support operations.

1.4.8. To add the meaningful knowledge and values to the existing literature on the challenges that may be affecting the United Nations peace support operations through the NDF participations research findings.

1.4.8. To use the research results and to design a strategy that may assist the NDF in future UN mandated PSOs.

1.5. Significance of the study

The results of the study should be significant in the way that:

1.5.1. It leads to a better understanding of the UN PSOs and the challenges associated with the NDF's involvement in the UN led PSOs, and pursuing of patterns in PSOs that are provided in the literature review and explained by the participants during interviews.

1.5.2. The study is important as it aims to make improvement and tries to shape the forthcoming deployment and involvement of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF).

1.5.3. The study was necessitated and motivated by the review of reports and problems registered by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in general, and the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) in particular, concerning the NDF management challenges on peace support operations in Liberia, namely command, control and communications, logistics supplies problems, tough terrain and harsh environmental conditions, hostile weather and non-compatibility with the UN standing operational procedures (SOPs), Language barriers and different cultural and religious background issues which were amongst the factors that affected the troops on the ground.

1.5.4. The study will suggest on the issues of placement of the Namibian Battalion under command and in support of the Pakistani Brigade (Pak Bde) and the non-representation of the Namibian Battalion in both Headquarters (HQs); such as in the Brigade HQ at Tubmansburg, and Force HQ in Monrovia.

There were no Namibian senior staff officer at decision making level, however there was only a liaison officer in the Bde HQ which were also among the challenges identified confronted the NDF during the UN PSOs in Liberia. It is against this background that the researcher was encouraged to conduct an in-depth investigation to explore challenges that were faced by the Namibian battalions which were involved in the United Nations Mission in Liberia during the period 2004 – 2008.

1.5.5. The study will augmenting the Namibian Defence Act 2002, Act 1 of 2002 on the formulation of policy matters on NDF's international obligation

to participate in the promotion of international peace and stability, by contributing troops to the UN missions on voluntary basis if requested by the world body to do so (Namibia Defence Act 2002, Act 1 of 2002).

1.6. Limitations of the study

The possible factors and limitations that may contribute to some difficulties in achieving the aims of this study should be:

1.6.1. Written materials: There were only very few written materials on United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and NDF involvement in the latter mentioned mission which were available in the Namibian libraries. However, information obtained from the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) members who participated in the peace support operations in Liberia were of the most importance on the subject matter.

1.6.2. Time factor: Due to the lengthy period that have passed since the participation of the Namibian contingents in peace support operations in Liberia, some respondents cited to have forgotten the important and relevant information to augment the study. (Henning, 2004, p. 205).

The time factor also affected the researcher in the sense that during the interviews some of the respondents were taking lengthy discussion to describe the events which happened in Liberia that time. The researcher has to listen careful to those versions and digest them in order to establish evidence. At one point the researcher found that some of the stories were long, irrelevant and time consuming.

1.6.3. Limited operational time frame: The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is still an on-going mission. By 2013, UNMIL had turned ten years of which the Namibian Defence Force had served a mere four years, started in 2004 and withdrawn from the mission area (MA) in 2008. Consequently, the researcher restricted the research within the four years of service the Namibian Defence Force served UNMIL.

1.6.4. Language barriers: Some of the selected participants were not in the position to articulate them and to explain in detail the challenges that affected the mission in English language. In this regard, it was difficult for such participants to study the questionnaires and to answer verbatim questions from the researcher. To overcome this kind of limitation, the interviews were conducted in the language preferred by the participants and translated into English language.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

The previous chapter covered the introduction and background of the study undertaken to explore the key management challenges associated with the NDF during the peace support operations mandated for the UN mission in Liberia during the period from 2004 – 2008. The aim of this chapter of theoretical background is to highlight the intended objectives of the study, which are:

2.1.1. To explore the key management challenges associated with the NDF peace support operations in Liberia during the period 2004 – 2008.

2.1.2. To review the challenges experienced by the NDF during the PSOs in Liberia.

2.1.3. To examine the roles played by the NDF during the PSOs in Liberia.

2.1.4. To propose a strategy for the way forward of the NDF future deployment in PSOs.

The statement of the problem outlined in chapter one formed the basis of the subtopic of the theoretical background. However, no similar theoretical study has been carried out in Namibia before concerning the challenges associated with the NDF peace support operations in Liberia from 2004 - 2008.

This chapter further interrogate the application of the existing *Brahimi Report* and other literature review to analyse the challenges experienced by the NDF during the UNMIL operations. Peacekeeping mission has been one of the main challenges the United Nations (UN) ever experienced since the end of Cold War due to the escalation of conflicts worldwide started from the 1990s.

The then United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel in 2000, to deliberate on UN peace support operations reforms. The *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Reform*, also known as the *Brahimi Report*, outlined high-priority areas of reform. The report was published in the year 2000 by a panel composed of ten experts in response to the dramatic failures of the UN peace support operations in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda in Africa and Srebrenica in the Balkans. The *Brahimi Report* was chiefly to overhaul the UN code of conduct. In alignment with Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 Agenda for Peace, the *Brahimi Report* aimed at renewing the commitment of UN member states to the "maintenance of international peace and security" (Gray 2001, p. 215).

The report made a number of recommendations aimed to develop operational and doctrinal aspects of peace support operations. It questioned the appropriateness of pre-Cold War traditional peace support operations when dealing with "new wars". This study will argue on the key challenges experienced by the Namibian Defence Force during its participation in UNMIL, Liberia.

The example of the debacle of the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) can be attributed to the allocation of only five supporting staff in the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that were less to manage 12,000 troops in the field. However, UNAMSIL was not the only peace support operations that had a shortage of supporting staff. According to Gray (2001) in 2001, the DPKO was composed of only 400 staff to cater for 58,000 troops deployed around the world. The UN peace support missions have also been unsuccessful due to variable equipment and materials pledged to UN missions by the troop contributing countries (TCCs) to carry out the mandate of the mission. The fact remains that the TCCs often take along with equipment and materiel in their disposal. In comparison with the UN requirements and what the TCCs are pledging to various UN missions are the problems that continue to hamper the effectiveness of almost of UN operations worldwide. The problem that emanated from equipment and materiel procurement posed great challenges to almost TCCs. Similarly, during the deployment in Liberia, the NDF contingents were found themselves in same situation and at one point it could not be able to match with the UN SOPs.

This issue has been worsened by the war on terror that began in 2001. The stationing of large contingents of Western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq limits the availability of forces for other peace support operations elsewhere (Williams and Bellamy 2010, p. 256).

Troops contributing countries are also more worried of deploying their own personnel to operations' risk areas. This was revealed by a number of casualties the war on terror has caused since March 2003. Nonetheless, the number of troops has been substantially increased to reach almost 100,000 in 2010, multiplied the number of troops five times more than in the year 2000 (William and Bellamy 2010, p. 122).

Despite the rapid demand to increase troops aggravated by the *Brahimi Report's* recommendations, the UN and the regional troops were found plagued by overstretch. The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) consists of 18,000 troops, and considered as one of the largest UN mission deployed in a single African country. DRC has biggest area of land larger as whole Western Europe (Gowan 2006, p. 115).

The pledges and participation of regional and international organizations in world conflicts are seen as the possible solution to the lack of personnel that restrains multifaceted missions. The 2005 World Summit reiterated the intended objective of the *Brahimi Report* and called for the implementation of the ten-year plan to build the capacity of the African Union (AU).

Another example of UN mission that emanated from the recommendations of the *Brahimi Report* is the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that was established in 2007, the first hybrid mission to involve the UN and the AU. The mandate of this mission has authorised the deployment of 26,000 personnel, making it the biggest mission in the world (UNAMID 2011). However, the *Brahimi Report* warned against the demands of modern peace support operations and the potential unpreparedness of participants in most conflict areas (UN 2000). UNAMID has not been a clear success to control the security situation in Darfur. The situation is dominated by large scale tribal conflicts and cross-border conflicts. There are various rebel and factions at random that escalating the ongoing conflicts that UNAMID is unable to control. There is an outcry that AU has lack of resources and untrained troops involvement in UNAMID operation as partly explained by (Murithi

2009, p. 234). Despite the constraints that AU enduring, strengthening collaboration of regional organisation with UN can be beneficial because it fosters the consolidation of resources available to support the mission. The holistic example is reflected when AU initiated for peace support operations in Sudan conflict. This initiative to host African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for regional campaign was not sanctioned due to the lack of funds. The mandate was thereafter authorised at a time the international partners made adequate funds and other assistance available to support the mission. According to Murithi, it was revealed that UNAMID has operational flaws of hybrid peacekeeping as a result of logistical supplies and strategically planning constraints (Murithi 2009, p. 234).

The subsequent UN missions in the post-*Brahimi Report* included the UNMIL in which NDF took part, was characterized by an increasing participation of the non-UN third parties and regional organizations. The *Brahimi Report* has also recommended that peace support operations should shift away from neutrality to become impartial and robust. In addition, immediate relief is no longer the UN peace support operations' first priority, but instead, reconstruction, development and sustainable peace have become major concerns of the organisation in achieving peace building. The UN DPKO has an obligation to continue to strengthening the peace support operations machinery and renew the commitment of states for future successes (Ban 2010, p. 85).

The intention of the *Brahimi Report* was not to declare the UN as imperialistic judge of good and evil, but rather to distinguish between neutrality, equal treatment of both parties, and impartiality, reactivity unburdened by prejudice. The mentality of

neutrality over impartiality has in the past caused some missions to fail. For example in 2004, the MONUC mission in the DRC failed to protect the town of Bukavu when the militias launched an attack and killed more than one hundred people (Johnstone, 2006, p. 95).

The peace support operations in DRC were criticised by many independent organisations (watchdogs) for having mistaken impartiality for neutrality. Rather than withdrawing the forces from DRC and repeating the mistake of Rwanda genocide, the UN Security Council has revised the mandate to establish a more robust force and “ensured the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence” (MONUC, 2011, p. 35). According to Yamashita (2008, p.65) impartiality is loyalty to the mandate of the mission and that in the face of genocide, there should be no neutrality. The missions in the post-*Brahimi Report* require the peacekeepers to identify potential spoilers of the mandate and take action against them, using force if necessary. This can be a danger to the mandate as governments, if they support militias, will feel threatened by peacekeepers and withdraw their consent (Johnstone 2010, p. 79).

The UNDPKO has to maintain both a friendly relationship with governments by making concessions to its mandates and remains impartial, that it should not appear as a supporter of a non-democratic government that violates human rights. MONUC was discredited for having cooperated with the DRC armed forces (FARDC), while the FARDC were accused of violating the human rights which the government of DRC dismissed. The international communities and watchdogs have observed the collaboration of MONUC with the DRC government forces as abandonment of

neutrality to side one part in the conflict area. Such trend was regarded as the bleaching of the UN Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) embraced in 2005 during the General Assembly World Summit (Johnstone 2010, p. 79).

Following observations on UN Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) of being violated, the *Brahimi Report* has recommended for all missions that are taking place after the recommendations were made to be strictly confined to the UN Doctrine of R2P. The emphasis was therefore put to accomplish the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. The UN Doctrine of R2P was used for the first time in Libya 2011, during peace enforcement mission to create No Fly Zone (NFL), under the UNSC resolution 1973. Since year 2000, eight new missions have been mandated, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use “all means necessary” to protect civilians (Yamashita 2006, p. 75).

The grantee of the protection of the civilian population peaceful negotiation, mitigation measures, armistice and creation of buffer zones are pre-requisite, and consideration for military intervention should be last resort. Therefore, the international community focus should be on prevention measures (Breau 2006, p. 55).

The *Brahimi Report* advocated for partnership with the regional bodies in an effort to exchange information and providing early warnings as the conflicts are likely to occur in the region. The UN obligation in this regard is to prevent the escalation of conflicts in all member states. Most important annotated UN action for prevention of conflict was a model of ONUCI in Cote d’Ivoire in 2004. During that mission the

UN troops were authorised to use force to disarm the warring parties, demobilising and re-integrating them into the society. The internal and external displaced persons (IDPs) were to be repatriated, resettled and rehabilitated to enjoy peaceful living. Despite that effort the UN was making to prevent the conflict in that country, the situation became intense again in 2006. However, the robust actions were taken to reduce the intensity of the situation not to turn into the massacres of thousands of civilians (Breau 2006, p. 55).

The UN Secretary General foresaw the importance of the *Brahimi Report*, and came up with the recommendations contained in what is called “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” the aim of this initiative was to renew the recommendations of the *Brahimi Report* for cohesiveness, robustness, speed and operating capability. However, this was a non-paper reiterates the need for creating exit strategies that were first suggested in a 2001 UN General report (UN 2009). The report has defined “an overall objective, not an arbitrary, self-imposed, artificial deadline which encourages belligerents to outwait the outside intervention” (Gray 2001). The analysis made after the presidential elections held in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010, were attribute to the efficacy of exit strategies for peacekeeping and peace building missions (Breau 2006, p. 75).

It should also be noted that the *Brahimi Report* itself was not an achievement since very few of its recommendations were not fully implemented. However, the report has greatly contributed to the progress of peacekeeping missions by highlighted its operational and doctrinal flaws. The UN and its partners realised the urgency of the situation and produced a number of reports designed to reform the conduct of

peacekeeping missions, including the 2008 Capstone doctrine that set out the principles and guidelines for PSOs. The objective to provide the principles and guidelines for PSOs is to enhance the robust operations that stirred the peace support operations away from neutrality and to engage them into impartiality, and to guide the UN troops for peace enforcement from not exploiting the mandate. The development with the *Brahimi Report's* recommendations, the dimension of peace support operations had drawn its focus on the humanitarian assistance, than concentrating in peacekeeping and peace enforcement alone.

There are successes that have been annotated following the 2000 *Brahimi Report* recommendations; however, the operational challenges were still exacerbated. The major challenges remain the funding and resources as well as the disengagement of TCCs (*Brahimi Report*, 2000, p.169). The deficiencies in resources were identified as the contributing factors to the failure of some UNPKO (UN, 2000).

Despite the challenges the peace support operations facing, the regional and sub-regional organisations have earned recognition in supporting the peace support operations' initiatives that encompasses the restoration and maintenance of peace, security and stability in conflict areas (UN 2000).

An Analyst from the International Peace Institute described that several areas of reform recommended by the report have not yet been enacted. In 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Operations released a 'non-paper' entitled "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping" This paper was released a decade after the landmark

of the *Brahimi Report*. The paper aimed to “further stimulate concrete and constructive discussions” on peace support operations reform (United Nations 2009, p. ii). In contrast of these reports, in spite of their depth, insight and influence have also provided an environment to constitute the deliberations concerning the UN peace support operations’ reforms (Smith, 2009, p. 115).

The common areas of reforms targeted by the UN peace support operations critics discussed in the *Brahimi Report* and the *New Horizon*, were the Security Council mandate that sanctioning peace support operations; the mandate that providing the legal basis of UN peace support operations and clear distinctions between authority that provided in Chapter VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter and various Security Council Resolutions. The notable UN missions that were almost flaws from the mandate were those under the UN Resolution 1325, 1612 and 1674) during the operation in Balkans (United Nations 2011e). The resolutions were crafted to reflect “the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents” that the Peacekeepers on the ground can only act according to what is explicitly written in their operation’s mandate, thus well-crafted mandates are essential to any successful operation. There is little doubt that poorly crafted mandates have played a large part in some of the UN’s most infamous peace support operations failures (United Nations 2011e). For example, Brian Urquhart argued that “muddled mandates” were responsible for the catastrophic failures of the operations in Bosnia and Somalia (Urquhart 1998, p. 7).

The UN mandates’ ambiguity were criticised and condemned by the report and the criticisms were called for the Security Council to ensure the “clear, credible and

achievable mandates” in the future UN operations (United Nations 2000, p. 10). The report further noted that ambiguity, is a result of political compromise, that “can have serious consequences in the field” and urged that the Security Council should refrain from mandating ambiguous operations, “rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions” (United Nations 2000, p. 10). Furthermore, the report found that the mandates were too often applied the “best-case planning assumptions” and were therefore too ambiguous regarding the use of force in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In response to that, the report argued that “mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force” (United Nations 2000, p. x). Generally, the report argued that “Security Council mandates...should reflect the clarity that peace support operations require the unity of effort when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations.” (United Nations 2000, p. x)

The Security Council has been unable to craft ‘perfect’ mandate until some of the Brahimi Report recommendations were implemented. Imperfect of mandates have been a source of much trouble for the UN peace support operations. The institutional reforms that were aimed at increasing the effectiveness of peace support operations, the Security Council could not be blamed for. However, it is important to acknowledge the political nature of the Security Council. Bosco (2009, p. 3) noted that, “the Council is a creature of great-power politics, not international bureaucracy.”

According to Kugel (2009, p. 89), the fundamental aspect of the Security Council is not that it merely makes the reform slow, tedious and ultimately, unlikely process, but it was also to ensure the political position of the Security Council. Smith also

urged that mandates are political compromises made by member states, were not technical calculations performed by experts (Smith, 2009, p. 85). This does not mean that all advices suggested by the experts should be incorporated in the mandate, because the process is more political than technical. The representative from Brazil urged as cited by Gray in this relation, that “the absence of an ideal Security Council should not paralyses the peace support operations activities” (Gray 2001, p. 271).

As the peacekeeping mandates were still the area of concern that needs reform, the *New Horizon* document reaffirms that the points outlined in the *Brahimi Report* recommending for “clear and achievable mandates are the foundation of an effective mission strategy” (United Nations 2009, p. 10). The Security Council should be acknowledged for having “worked to provide clearer and more precise direction” (United Nations 2009, p. 10). Mandates are political statements and as such provide international legitimacy and support for UN missions. Therefore, reforming of mandate is the core function of the UN Security Council.

The Security Council has refined its mandate to address the characteristics of ambiguity. The mandate has become specific and realistically based on the missions. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the prime example of UN mission operating without ambiguity in its mandate. It is essential to specify the mission but not to detail the minor tasks, as specificity “can obscure the overall objectives that the Security Council expects from the peacekeepers to achieve” (United Nations 2009, p. 10).

To recognise the systemic imperfections of the Security Council was essential and may be the first step towards reforming the UN peace support operations effectiveness was to increase the fund and other resources. Additional material of great importance to this study is the text of the Boutros Boutros-Ghali Agenda for Peace Report statement, (1992), on the thoughts and actions for the period ahead of the United Nations peace support operations which stated that:

The principles of collective security, international law, human rights and economic and social development were enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. For half a century and it has been the mandate and mission of the United Nations to strengthen achievements and advance common progress in each of these areas (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 8).

2.2. PSOs Concept of the study

As the concept, peace support operations (PSOs) evoke different meanings depending on the user; the term was introduced by the United Kingdom (UK) to cover peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations, (Wilkinson, and Rinaldo, 1996, p. 34). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrine uses the concept within the context of its non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO) which are operations designed to face the challenges posed by intricate crises in an uncertain strategic environment (NATO, 2001, p.16). Due to the evolving nature of the tactical environment it is expected that PSOs will be conducted impartially with the mandate authorised by the internationally recognised organisations such as the

UN or African Union (AU), Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) or Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and many others, whose mandate is to support the mission.

Wilkinson and Rinaldo (1996) also explained that the word “support” is the military activities that will be provided in support of political goals. This is because success in PSOs is not defined by military concepts of victory and defeat, but the achievement of a long-term political settlement or condition specified by the mandating international organisation. In order to fully achieve the clear mandate there is a need to respond to such crises with both military and civilian components involving in diplomatic, the rule of law and humanitarian assistance.

The essential role of the military in PSOs including NDF is to create the necessary stable environment for the civilian institutions to work freely. The PSOs concept of operations (CONOPS) includes the activities before, during and after the conflict. This will therefore embrace all types of activities to prevent conflict, intervene in a conflict, regenerate and sustain a secure environment following the conflict. This also depending on the mandate and the desired end-state, such activities may include Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping as well as Conflict Prevention. Peacemaking, Peace Building and Humanitarian Relief are an integral part of the desired end-state (Wilkinson, and Rinaldo, 1996, p.64).

The United States (US) and other nations prefer to use Peace Operations (POs) as the generic term for missions mandated by the United Nations. The US Presidential Decision Directive 25 uses the term POs and not PSOs to cover the entire spectrum

of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement (Guehenno, 2008, p. 45).

The US doctrine naturally embraces the notion of military subordination to political objectives and “support” is therefore seen as a separate way to further multinational efforts such as logistical, financial or humanitarian assistance. This has been the case in the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) when the contracted nations to transport troops were provided emergency airlift capability to ferry troops in large number on the ground including the NDF (Guehenno, 2008, p. 61).

Regardless of the definitions by the international organizations like the UN or by other regional organisation such as EU, AU, NATO, SADC, ECOWAS to mention but a few, the overall aim of the PSOs is to contain and de-escalate the conflict, while concurrently working in partnership with international agencies and organisations to address the root causes of such conflict.

The PSOs spectrum is now addressing activities in all dimensions that include the five principal activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement. The relationship between the five principal activities is as shown in figure 2-1 below, (Guehenno, 2008, p. 61).




Figure 2. 1. The Five legs of Peace Support Operations

This study is guided by the United Nations (UN) Charter, adopted and signed on 26 June 1945, effective and readily enforced as a means of better arbitrating international conflict and negotiating peace than was provided for by the old Covenant of the League of Nations. The UN Charter provides the following operating chapters to this study: Chapter VI for peacekeeping operations, Chapter VII for peace enforcement operations and Chapter VIII applicable for regional peacekeeping operations (UN, 2009, p. 49).

The Charter of the United Nations was drafted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and its first article states that the main purpose of the UN is “...to maintain international peace and security”. The Charter also provided guidelines on how various organs of the UN are to achieve this responsibility. Specifically, Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for peaceful settlement of disputes, while Chapter VII is

essentially coercive and Chapter VIII deals with involvement of the regional agencies in the maintenance of peace, security and stability. Although the terms peace keeping and peace support operations were not directly mentioned in the UN Charter, they have evolved as a pragmatic response to a variety of international conflicts that the world has witnessed in recent years. The achievements of the peace support operations have proved invaluable to ensuring that the United Nations achieves its set aims and objectives (Woodhouse and Duffy, 2007, p. 13).

The Namibian Defence Force was established in 1990, in terms of Article 118 (now under article 115 as amended in 2010) of the Namibian Constitution, the Supreme Law of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 with obligation to “defend the territorial integrity and national interest of Namibia” (The Namibian Constitution 1990, p.59). According to the Namibian Defence Policy (2011, p. 25), peace support operation (PSOs) is an area of international, regional and sub-regional obligations in which the NDF soldiers should be physically and psychologically prepared, as they may be called upon as part of their national duty to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security (Defence Policy, 2011, p. 25).

After its inception in 1990, the NDF was involved in various PSOs under the auspice of UN, AU and SADC regional bodies. The first NDF contingent in UN mission was the participation in the United Nations Transitional of Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993. Thereafter, NDF had a number of contingents involved in various UN operations. That includes the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM III), which was then transformed to United Nations

Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) from 1996, to 1998. During MONUA Namibian Defence Force deployed a combination of staff officers and peacekeepers for the first time. Subsequently, NDF further sent staff officers to United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1998.

The United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB), NDF contributed staff officers and military observers from 2003 to 2005. From 2004 to date, NDF has military observers participating in the United Nations Missions in Ivory Coast (ONUCI). NDF further was involved in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE) with staff officers and military observers from 2003 to 2007. In 1998 to 2001, Namibian Defence Force also contributed a contingent to DRC under the SADC peacekeeping operations.

In addition, the participation of NDF officers in UN missions also included the sending of military observers and staff officers to African Union Mission in Darfur Sudan (AMIS). This mission has changed to United Nations African Union Hybrid in Darfur Sudan (UNAMID) which started in 2007, and the military observers and staff officers continue participating on rotational basis. Other mission such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) the NDF has military observers and staff officers on rotational since 2004.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), NDF had a contingent of 860 peacekeeping troops, 25 military observers and staff officers and a civilian police component started in 2004 and ended in 2008. The military observers and staff officers are still participating in the mission on rotational basis.

The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) has experienced a number of challenges related to management, command, control and communications (C3), during the period the NDF participated in the peace support operations in Liberia.

Despite those challenges, there were also problems with regard to Namcon. These problems emanated from sexual exploitation and abuse which by UN termed as (SEA). The NDF appeared also in the Liberian local newspaper, The “ANALYST” of Wednesday, 7 April 2004 (The ANALYST, 2004), due to the related problems. The article was also aired by UN Secretariat Office of the Internal Oversight (UN Secretariat Office of the Internal Oversight 2008). The prominent challenges were also identified as the problems that have contributed to the effect of the tarnishing of the good emerge of the Namibian contingent good performance, and have also affected the management activities on the ground.

According to the Namibia Defence Policy (2011, p. 25), peace support operations (PSOs) is an area of international, regional and sub-regional obligations in which the NDF soldiers should be physically and psychologically prepared, as they may be called upon as part of their national duty to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The researcher applied also in this study the concepts and ideas retrieved from the former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 “Agenda for Peace Report”, to justify the objectives of the study by exploring the management challenges and problems experienced by the Namibian Defence Force, with the aim to shape the future participations of the Namibian contingents in the United Nations

Peace Support operations elsewhere. The statement of Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace Report statement (1992), he argued that:

The principles of collective security, international law, human rights, economic and social development were enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, succeed and stimulating thoughts and actions for the period ahead of the United Nations peace support operations. For half a century, it has been the mandate and mission of the United Nations to strengthen achievements and advance common progress in each of these areas (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 8).

The researcher had conducted an exploratory work on the challenges that affected the Namibian contingent during the United Nations Mission in Liberia. By so doing, the researcher tries to identify the gaps of knowledge by investigating the challenges associated with NDF during peace support operations activities in Liberia, to suggest the innovative approaches which may assist to improve the existing knowledge for future NDF deployment in the United Nations peace support operations elsewhere.

The researcher had also followed the concepts and arguments made by McCoubrey and White (1996, p. 115), who argued that the Blue Helmets Book is the legal framework and regulations of the United Nations peace support operations. The United Nations peace support operations had emerged as an acceptable alternative to collective security in the sense of military enforcement action being taken by the international community in the face of aggression.

To understand the historical background of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations between 1946 and 1956, the researcher referred the creation of the four observation teams in the Middle East conflicts as elaborated by Professor Wiseman also cited by McCoubrey and White (1996, p.15). The reasoning of McCoubrey and White (1996) concurred with the arguments made by General Ogumodia (2007, p. 25), that the origin of the peacekeeping doctrine is rooted in the experience of the first ever organised peace keeping force known as the United Nations Emergency Force One (UNEF-1) deployed in the Middle East in 1948 (Bellamy and Williams, 2004, p. 105).

The current peace support operations are performing positive results towards the meaningful reform in accordance with the *Brahimi Report* and recommendations. The United Nations successes are always judged by its peacekeeping scorecard. The maintenance of the international peace and security is a concept that has been fundamental to the UN Charter since its inception in 1946, (Brahimi, et al, 2000, p. 6).

The United Nations has demonstrated its enforcement powers to intervene in the intra-states conflict through the interpretation of the criteria of threat or breach of peace. These interpretations in regard to internal conflicts have been criticised by the Third World, more especially by the African Union (AU). A good example is the way how the Libyan crisis was handled, whereby the United Nations authorised the Security Council Resolution 1970 and 1973 respectively, for the creation of the No Fly Zone (NFZ) in Eastern Libya that led the country into civil war, and

consequently the assassination of the former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi in October 2011 (UN, 2012, p. 65).

The researcher in this study perceived that the term PSOs is used to accommodate a range of plans, policies and actions organised towards preventing, managing and resolving conflict as restoring and maintaining peace in a conflict situation. The PSOs started with the pockets of military observation and peacekeeping that later expanded, as identified by General Adesia, as cited by General Ogomudia (2007, p. 25), who argued that:

“Peace-keeping was originally an operation that involves military personnel. Over the years however, modern peacekeeping has now evolved to a point where economic, political, and social issues are involved. The developing trend is now popular described as the peace support operations (General Ogomudia 2007, p. 25).

Hill and Malik (1996, pp. 5 - 7), argued that the term ‘peacekeeping’ does not appear anywhere in UN Charter, but it was just adopted during the Cold War as a substitute for collective security in response to the stalemate between the Permanent Members of the Security Council. Peacekeeping was previously used as a means to prevent the bipolar from becoming embroiled in localised disputes. The term PSOs describes the organised international assistance and initiatives to support the maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace and prevention of resurgent violent conflict. There are two categories of PSOs: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping operations monitor and support the establishment of peace, usually in the context of a peace agreement; and peace enforcement operations create conditions for peace and

are permitted to use force. Most PSOs are authorised by a UN Security Council resolutions under the UN Charter (UN, 2011)

Peace support operations are generally authorised under Chapter VI and peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII. UN Security Council resolution can authorise a UN PSOs, or a regional organisation or coalition of willing states to undertake PSOs. Other good examples are Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The UN Security Council resolutions determine the PSOs' mandate, which defines the operation's core tasks. A mandate may be altered only by passing a new Security Council Resolution, usually if conditions have changed in the conflict affected country or region to which the PSO was supposed to respond. The current UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 over the creation of the No Fly Zone (NFZ) in Libya is another example to be referred to.

The peace enforcement operations would generally encompass multinational forces permitted to use force to establish peace, which is a relatively recent phenomenon, including the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Libya. PSOs are usually conducted in the context of a larger effort to reform and rebuild a nation, which can include confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law and economic and social development, such as in Liberia and Ivory Coast respectively.

The UN Charter gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security, based on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination. While in Namibia, the PSOs are also provided by the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, the foreign policy and by Defence policy. It requires that PSOs plan and implement strategies to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights for all (UN/AU: 18-19 November, 2008, p. 6).

Peace Support Operations is a new concept. It came to be known and used between the years of 1987 to 1990 respectively. This was more especially during the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) PSOs in Namibia and in Central America. In the 1990s, the new forms of peacekeeping came into operation in response to significant changes and challenges in the peacekeeping arena. There was nothing of challenges on peace support operations that have been said during 1992 to 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia in 1993 to 1995, as well as in 1994 during Rwanda genocide. Apart from negative impacts that affected the UN PSOs, there were also notable successes such as Mozambique and the Ouzou strip between Libya and Chad in 1994 (UN, 2011).

From the 1990s, the UN has increasingly focused on the need to involve regional organisations such as ECOWAS/ECOMONG in Liberia crisis and the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Contemporary missions are said to be multidimensional, which means that they cover tasks and responsibilities beyond those associated with traditional peacekeeping. Apart from the term “peace support

operations”, other new terminologies include second generation peacekeeping operations, third generation peacekeeping operations or multinational peace support operations or wider peacekeeping (Lipson 2007, p. 35; Woodhouse and Duffy 2007, p. 85). Conflict prevention ranges from diplomatic initiatives to the preventive deployment of troops. Peace-making includes the range of diplomatic actions aimed at establishing a peaceful settlement once conflict is in progress or has resumed.

The point being made is that the UN Security Council mandate setting up UN peace operations must clearly state that such use of force is authorised and most importantly ensures that contingents are equipped for that purpose. This concern has been raised by those who have been directly confronted by such situations. Lieutenant General Satir Nambiar, the first Commander and Head of Missions of the United Nations Forces in the former Yugoslavia recommends that, “in the light of recent experiences dealing with intra state conflict situations, it would, however, be prudent to ensure that all future peacekeeping contingents be equipped for the “worst case scenario” so that they can respond appropriately in self-defence in case attacked” (Nambiar, 1999, p. 55).

According to the Namibia Defence Policy, Peace Support Operations is an area of international, regional and sub-regional obligations in which the (NDF) soldiers should be physically and psychologically prepared, as they may be called upon to participate as part of their national duty for the purposes of the maintenance of international peace and security (Namibia Defence Policy, 2011, p. 25).

The Namibian Defence Act 2002 (Act 1 of 2002) section 32 (2) (a) and (b) provided that Namibia's independence was the product of the international peace initiative, therefore the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) and its people will always rally behind the United Nations (UN) peace initiatives aimed at bringing about peace and stability in the world. The Namibian Defence Policy stated further that the GRN may contribute its troops in peacekeeping missions that are duly authorised by the UN Security Council in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, that include PSOs missions authorised and maintained by the African Union (AU)'s Peace and Security Council under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Namibian Defence Policy provides further the additional future missions at the sub-regional level, whereby NDF may be required to participate in the sub-regional PSOs engagements under the auspices of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) arrangements, or in conformity with the country's obligation to the SADC Mutual Defence Pact to which Namibia is a State Party. (Namibian, Defence Act 2002, Act 1 of 2002).

The PSOs principal activities (Figure 2-1) represent how a terminology of PSOs broadly encompasses the various multidimensional processes such as: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and peace building. It is therefore important to attempt to introduce the individual elements of PSOs terminology as follows:

a. Conflict prevention includes efforts to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into deadly violence. It could involve confidence building and early warning depending on the requirements of the information gathered.

Gathering of this intelligence may be either informal or formal fact-finding and may result in preventive deployment, creation of demilitarized zones or other measures to forestall conflict.

b. Peacemaking is directed to resolving conflicts in progress via means of UN good offices or diplomatically via envoys, governments or prominent personalities without use of military or police elements. The Capstone Doctrine Document (2008) notes that it “... involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those set out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.”

There are varying introductions for peace-keeping and peace enforcement. However, there is broad international agreement in the approach to what a UN operation requires and on the significant differences between both operations. The major difference is in regards to consent and the degree required of either to make the tactical environment secure. Some UN member states feature this principle of consent as the critical distinguishing criterion between the conduct of Peace-keeping and Peace enforcement.

c. Peace-keeping operations are carried out with the consent of belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The Capstone Doctrine Document links the concept with peacemaking by defining it as, “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”

These were the similar tasks the NDF had carried out during its involvement in UNMIL PSOs (Guehenno, 2008, p. 75).

d. Peace enforcement operations are carried out under Chapter VII, like the UNMIL PSOs where the NDF was involved; to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities, (Wilkinson, and Rinaldo, 1996, p. 34). It involves applying military force amongst other coercive measures with the authorisation of the Security Council in situations where such actions may restore a breach of international peace and security agreements.

e. Peace building typically comes after the success of the previous two, with the efforts to create a secured environment and self-sustenance. The peace building is now being given more prominence due to the fact that some of the countries that emerge from war lapses back into violence within short period of time while the UN does not have any institutional machinery to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, (UN Document A/59/2005, 2005, p. 114). It attempts to address the root causes of violent conflict and to strengthen the rule of law as well as address the fundamental flaws in a conflict prone society which is a long term process that is becoming increasingly prevalent in modern day PSO, such as NDF participation in UNMIL (Guehenno, 2008, p. 12).

Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential way (Guehenno, 2008, p. 12). Therefore, PSOs may be

mandated by the UNSC to forestall conflict, and at other times they have to support the implementation of a cease-fire or a peace agreement in the same way. A robust mandate may require actions to actively enforce the peace and keep the peace when enforced the same time (Guehenno, 2008, p. 12).

Consequently, for the purpose of this thesis PSOs is defined to refer to actions carried out in complexity of all 5 principal activities. To achieve the above activities, the following management action procedures should be adhered to: Observation and Monitoring, Supervision of Truces and Cease-fires, Demobilization Operations, Conflict Prevention and Military Assistance should be applied. The five principal activities' definitions include also the Humanitarian Relief, Convoy Protection, Establishment and Supervision of Protected Areas, Mine Awareness and Mine Clearance Operations, Sanctions Monitoring and Guarantee or Denial of Movement. Lastly, Counter Drug Operations, Non-combatant Evacuation operations, Counter Insurgency, Counter Terrorist and Combat Search and Rescue. It is with the definitions and activities in mind that we attempt to contextualise the evolution of PSOs to its present-day expectations and the necessity for technological change to meet those requirements (Guehenno, 2008, p. 12).

2.3. Evolution of Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

Personnel participating in PSOs are carrying out various tasks to support international mandates which vary at different levels of success. According to the UNITAR POCI course book as cited by Dorn (2007, p. 115), it was suggested that there are two categories of PSOs, namely the traditional and second generation

peacekeeping operations. However, in terms of functionality Dr. Walter Dorn, Professor of Strategic and Security Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada notes that there have been roughly four generations of peace support operations (Dorn, 2007, p. 115).

The first generation of peace support operations (traditional peacekeeping operations) can be divided into Observer Missions such as the commissions sent to Greece in 1946 and Interposition Missions first used in 1956. The Cold War period gave way to multiple hotspots that led to dramatic increases in PSOs functions and these multi-mandate missions could be described as the third generation. In the new millennium some missions have had to govern territories during a transitional period. Recent events suggest that this evolution has continued unabated and led to the formation of the first ever hybrid United Nations and African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is trying to forge a direction considering the lack of precedence (UN 2007). Each new generation of PSOs as mentioned above is precipitated by familiar fears but to meet the new requirements guides in new lessons of challenges (UN 2007).

The Traditional Observer Missions' main purpose was to observe the deployments and activities of the armed forces of two or more conflicting countries and report. They were usually based on cease fire agreements that were typically mediated by the UN and negotiated by the states themselves. A good example of this is the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) since deployed in the Middle East

in 1948 to date. The military observers on the ground were typically unarmed since they had the support of both parties (UN 2007).

Most of the mandates of such peace support operations included ‘supervision’ or ‘observe and report’ roles only. Sometimes and when necessary they were expected to quell violence using arms such as advice, aid and mediation, (Dorn, 2007, p. 114). Fortunately, such weapons still remain the basic tool of trade because regardless of which generation or the complexity of the PSOs, the UN always tries to decrease the fighting through negotiation and mediation by using the mediation diplomacy process of its good offices. However, the UN may only succeed to that extent when the parties in conflict agreed to the UN peace process.

The second generation peace support operations was exemplified first in 1956, when the UN force was mandated to separate the Egyptian army from the invading forces of Israel, France and the UK during the Sinai Peninsula mission. This operation successfully ended the Suez crisis and is a prime example of Interposition Operations in which the UN PSOs force is interposed between the conflicting armed forces for the first time. Unlike the first generation observer mission, the PSO personnel are armed and deployed in preformed units.

Since that time of conflict in Sinai Peninsula, the second generation of PSOs was recommended for its effective monitoring in the troubled zones to separate the warring parties. It is also significant to note that the PSOs must “anticipate” any

forward movements of military forces from agreed positions and possibly place themselves physically in the way of such advances.

The operational principles guiding the PSOs (and subsequent) generations were set out by the first UN Secretary General (UNSG) late Dag Hammarskjöld in his 1956 report to the General Assembly proposing the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) (UN Doc A/3289 of 1956). The forces contributed for peace support operations by the UN members' states other than the UN permanent members' states were to be placed under the control of the UNSG to avoid possible bipolar influences of the Cold War era.

During the deployment of UNEF, the Israeli Premier the then Ben Gurion, had initially refused to allow the foreign troops on Israeli soil. However, the late UNSG Hammarskjöld negotiated with the host state to agree and this became the model for future Status of Force Agreements (SOFA), (UN, 1996, p. 45). The implementation of peace support operations in the first and second generation era, the deployment was a bit difficult caused by the bureaucratic process with host nation. Initially the international communities have to consent with the host nation for possible deployment of troops and thereafter approval and invitation may be granted from the host state.

In this regard, it implies that such PSOs are not acceptable when the warring parties are determined to continue fighting, then the UN troops may be requested by the host nation to withdraw, as it happened in 1967 when Egypt asked for withdrawal of

UNEF. However, the withdrawal of forces as another phase of execution, it should abide to the principles that contained in the mandate. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had a strong mandate as well as the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) which occupied territory in both Iraq and Kuwait. They could not be withdrawn without Security Council authorization (UNOSOM/UNIKOM, 2007).

The subsequent generation of peace support operations was fostered by the end of the cold war and the unforgiving realities that have resulted. The UN became increasingly involved in internal conflicts in effort to bring peace between the warring parties and fostering for the nation building. This pattern has been carried to the contemporary peace support operations in conflict zones where the UN deploys 'multidimensional' forces to demonstrate greater diversity in roles and functions. The PSOs has gone through the succession transition, that run the gamut from traditional observation of armed forces to delivery of human aid, and from human rights promotion to supervision of elections. Consequently, the peace support operations began to demand the abundance of human resources and materiel that required for the mission. The missions were not just become the version of military oriented operations with occasional civilian responsibilities, but a mixture of both with various responsibilities. In fact the UN PSOs now had to involve in political, humanitarian, police, correctional services, security sectors reform, judicial, electoral, civic affairs, human rights and many other aspects.

The UN responsibility in the conflict zones has a great responsibility to monitor the integration process of adversaries and assisting in the security sector reform. Security sector reform is more meaningful in peace process because unreformed institutions apparatuses are prominent to pose a renewed threat to the peace process (Boltz, 2007, p. 67). To deal with insurgency, the genocide situations or civil war meant the training of new border guards, judges and prosecutors. In some occasions the missions' activities may be expanded to the supervision of certain departments of government such as defence and foreign affairs, fighting crime, cross border smuggling and enforcing UN sanctions (Boltz, 2007, p. 90).

The 3rd generation world stage is unlike the cold war times, as the major powers including the permanent UNSC members are now actively participating in multidimensional PSOs. On a historical note, a forerunner to such 3rd generation operations are those PSOs occurred from July 1960 to June 1964 in the Congo (this was called the UN operation in the Congo-ONUC). However, since 1989 when the pioneering operations UNTAG was deployed in Namibia, the deployment had over 22 elements which made it to be the multidimensional PSOs.

The 4th generation PSOs was created for the purpose of transitional administration. These actually carry out the full functions of a government. The good examples are the UN missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET). Kosovo is still under UN administration though East Timor became self-governing in 2002 (Resnicoff, 2008, p. 10). It is very important to understand that the requirements for modern peace support operations has evolved to necessitate a new approach to

peacekeeping. Consequently, there is a great need to evolve new methods and employ new technology strategies if the UN intends to remain relevant as the major conflict resolution body for present and beyond. PSOs researchers are required to do more to supplement the Brahimi's report fact findings (Resnicoff, 2008, p. 10).

2.4. Changes of PSOs several Fronts

The UN engagement in peace support operations has some variations as every mission has its mandate according to the nature of the mission to undertake. Thus the challenges that experienced in different mission also vary in nature. This is similarly to what happened with NDF when deployed in Liberia, where a number of challenges were experienced. Changing of fronts could be the contributing factor to the operational challenges which were experienced in various peace support operations, as a result of declining in monetary support of UN missions by Western countries. The western countries shifted their support and opted to put effort on NATO which took on new peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya. The similar challenges were also encountered during UN operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica in the late 1990's. The reason for the dismal trend was more than just *Africa Fatigue* as most writers suggest (Fleshman, 1994, p. 77).

However, it is not strongly believed that because of death challenges of the American soldiers in Somalia peace support operations and the Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda, but it was a matter of shifting from African conflicts to concentrate to other areas of their interest. These events only proved the inability of the UN structure to

cope with the post-cold-war increased challenges in troubled spots and mission requirements. The fact remains that NATO's military structure was better defined with a larger number of deployed troops. In addition, the level of technological support was greater, and partner nations were generally better trained, equipped and willing to support than in typical UN troops contributing countries (TCC) (Dorn, 2006, p. 16).

In order to transform the UNPSOs to face the current and future threats to world peace, urgent action was required. On 7 March 2000, UNSG Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel to undertake a thorough review of the UN peace and security activities in the hope of improving UN capacity to meet the emergent challenges (UNSC, A/55/305, 2000). This panel on United Nations Peace Support Operations was headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi and included eminent persons from around the world with vast experience in the fields of peacekeeping, peace building, development and humanitarian assistance. The panel undertook highly critical analyses of UN PSOs around the world as well as the operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Srebrenica and submitted its recommendations on 17 August 2000.

The "*Brahimi Report*" was formulated and significantly, it is known for its 20 priorities which were identified and made several recommendations. The recommendations produced by the report were crafted to shape up, improve and enhancing the future UN PSOs through all possible means of operations, in the UN's organisational structures including its organs such as the UN Head Quarters (UNHQ), Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO), Department of

Political Affairs (DPA) and Office of the United Nations High commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) etc.

The United Nations as an international organisation that was founded after the Second World War to maintaining world peace and security, developing sociable relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights, it remains tangible to the maintenance of peace and security in the war torn areas. There are currently 14 UN peace support operations around the globe including Haiti, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, India-Pakistan, South Sudan and Sudan Darfur Region to mention but a few. In total, almost 100 thousand uniformed personnel (military and police) are actively employed in the UN's varied and widely distributed peacekeeping missions (UN 20012, p. 115).

The United Nations peace support operations had emerged as an acceptable alternative to collective security in the sense of military enforcement action being taken by the international community in the face of aggression. The Liberian conflict lasted about 15 years and claimed the lives of estimated around 150,000 people and led to a complete breakdown of law and order in that western Africa country. The civil war displaced many people, both internally and beyond their national borders, it resulted in about 850,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries. The conflict began in late 1989 and by early 1990; several hundred deaths had occurred in the confrontations between the then government forces, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the rebel groups who claimed membership in opposition groups, the

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government minister, Charles Taylor.

The Economic Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) undertook various initiatives aimed at promoting peace and seek for regional conflicts settlement. This initiative encompasses the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMONG) which brought some respite to the crisis. ECOMONG eventually supervised the Liberian general elections held in 1997 won by Charles Taylor with an overwhelming majority. The Liberians were afraid that if Taylor lost the elections the country may return to civil war. Unfortunately, in 2001 another civil war broke out in Liberia, with the rebel groups accusing Taylor of lacking commitment towards the national reconciliation policy and state building. Despite that early regional and international engagement in peace talks with the warring factions, the rebel groups gained momentum and controlled two thirds of the entire country by early May 2003 as the LURD rebels threatened to seize the capital city, Monrovia (UN 2007).

In August 2003 ECOWAS intervened for the third time and deployed the ECOMIL forces with a total strength of 3566 peacekeepers. However, the deployment of ECOMIL forces were preceded by the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord (ACPA), which paved the peaceful exit of the former Liberian President, Charles Taylor to Caraba in Nigeria where he was granted political asylum. Taylor is now being held by the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecuted on responsibility of 11 counts including murder, mutilation, rape, enslavement, and recruitment of child soldiers (UN 2007).

ECOMIL had achieved its objective and duly transferred the mission to United Nations Mission in Liberia on 1st October 2003, pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1509 of 2003 which provides for the establishment of the UNMIL and called for the deployment of 15000 strong peacekeepers over Liberia, which was the largest UN deployment in the world before United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The parties to the Liberian conflict were the NPFL, INFPL, AFL and ECOMOG forces.

During 2003, Namibia was requested by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to deploy uniformed troops as peacekeepers, staff officers and military observers to the United Nations Mission in Liberia, Namibia responded positively by contributing a motorised infantry battalion later known in the mission area as the Namibian battalion (NamBatt) or Namibian contingent (NamCon) and independent staff officers and military observers in late 2003 and early 2004, under a Wet Lease Agreement (WLA), (i.e. an agreement between the United Nations and the troops contributing countries that outlines the requirements for the TCC to be self-sustainable in terms of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) except feeding.

However, in terms of Wet Lease Agreement, the troops contributing countries are required to have enough food rations to sustain their troops for the initial ninety days, i.e. the first three months, while the United Nations is studying the submitted menu and to contract the food suppliers. According to the documentations, records reviewed and the NDF members interviewed, it came to light that the Namibian

battalions had experienced a number of challenges of administrative nature, during the Peace Support Operations in Liberia (UN 2007).

The international peacekeeping response to the breaches of peace and security has evolved steadily since the first peacekeeping operation of the United Nations (UN) in 1948. UN peacekeeping operations have grown in complexity and scope from largely military observer missions to multidimensional operations overseeing the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. The tasks of the UN military components have become increasingly complex because conflicts in which they intervene no longer involve national armies alone but irregular forces, guerrilla factions and even armed criminal gangs. Consequently, the military capability under UN command has also changed and is no longer the lightly armed intervention that was typical during the organisation's first 40 years of peacekeeping (UN, 20012, p. 55).

Military forces serving in UN peacekeeping operations, called "blue helmets" or "blue berets" because of their distinctive headgear, are a critical part of the multidimensional response. The primary function of the military component is usually to provide a secure environment so that other elements of the peace process can be implemented, including the monitoring of human rights, national reconciliation and institution building, and the distribution of humanitarian assistance (UN, 2007, p. 14).

Military capability can also be used to provide the space and opportunity for peace making and political negotiations to take place by preventing further violence. In places where a ceasefire or agreement with the military of the host nation, the UN component has responsibility to oversee the implementation, provides monitoring and liaison expertise and should serve as an interlocutor with local armed forces (Guehenno, 2008, p. 42). The UN peacekeeping operations military components have greatly increased to work in coalition with forces of other international bodies and regional military groupings to implement a common international strategy for peace in a country or a region in conflict. The exponentially increasing in number of participating actors and the widening scope of work in multidimensional peacekeeping operations require a broader interface between military and civilian components. The complexity of the environment in which the military components are operating for UN peace support operations must increase the need for rapid and sustained military deployments emerged the new challenges that should be addressed to make the peacekeeping operations more effective (Dorn, 2006, p. 16).

Basic Principles for Military Activities: The troops contributing countries' forces are operating under their national doctrine and guiding principles. However, when these troops are deployed as part of the UN peace support operations there are certain basic international principles that preside over their actions. The principles are stipulated in the Handbook for UN Multidimensional peace support operations, and the following clauses are outlined:

Impartiality: Impartiality and even-handedness should always guide the actions of a military component of the UN peacekeeping operations. Impartiality is understood as an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of provocation or challenge. Impartiality does not mean inaction or overlooking violations. UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate, i.e., they must actively pursue the implementation of their mandate even if doing so goes against the interests of one or more of the parties (Guehenno, 2008, p. 42).

In the instance where the peacekeeping force is perceived as partial, people may lose confidence in the UN's ability to act as a neutral party, which can damage the credibility of the mission and threaten the peace process. At worst, a perception of UN partiality could lead parties to the conflict to withdraw their consent to the presence of the mission and return to violence what the inflicted party assumes as a means to resolve the conflict. In the mid-1990s, following the peacekeeping experience in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it became obvious that UN forces cannot keep peace where there is no effort to keep peace. In such circumstances, the Security Council judges it wisely to authorise an enforcement action by a coalition of willing states, directed by a leading nation that have the military capability and political will to bring the conflict to an end using the necessary means. Although the interventions by the coalition forces into conflicts are authorised by the Security Council, they are not conducted under UN direct command (Dorn, 2006, p. 16).

In some instances, such interventions have occurred alongside or in support of UN peace support operations, for example the United States-led forces sent to Somalia under the UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) and the French-led forces authorised by the Resolution 1484 (2003) for eastern Congo. In other instances, a coalition of the willing states may deploy into a conflict area first to establish a basic level security and hand over the operation to UN peace support operations. Another example includes the international forces sent to Haiti in 1994 and the Australian-led forces authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) to quell the violence following the referendum in East Timor. In some instances, the troops that form part of the coalition of the willing states may be assimilated into the UN peace support operations and be “rebranded” as “blue helmets”. For example of ECOWAS/ECOMIL forces in Liberia were transformed into UNMIL forces (Guehenno, 2008, p. 45).

There are significant differences between the UN-commanded operations and military interventions by coalitions of allied states. “Blue helmets” are under the operational command of the UN and report to the UN Secretary-General. Their mandate will typically be set out in a UN Security Council Resolution. The coalitions of the willing states on the other hand, remain under the command of a leading state or alliance or regional organisation and report to their national or allied chain of command. Their intervention is approved in a decision of the UN Security Council, which will then authorise them to take necessary measures to achieve a specified objective. The holistic example is the authorisation of UN Security Council

Resolution 1973 of 2011, for the creation of “No Fly Zone” in Easter Libya (Guehenno, 2008, p. 52).

Consent and cooperation: Peace support operations and progress towards a just and sustainable peace rely on the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. In the absence of freely given consent, the military component and the peacekeeping operation as a whole will find it hard to implement its mandate. There is often very little trust between parties in the immediate post-conflict phase, and consent for a UN intervention may be uncertain. While political and military leaders may consent to a UN military presence, groups of combatants lower down the chain of command may disagree with their leaders and challenge the authority or mandate of the peace support operations through violence or other acts of non-cooperation (Dorn, 2006, p. 16).

Consent may be withdrawn when a party or parties decide not to abide to terms of the ceasefire or peace agreement. In case the consent is withdrawn or uncertain erupted between the coalition forces and warring parties, the UN Security Council is often facing the challenges to opt for a robust, deterrent military capability that may restore consent and close the option for war. Consent, at all levels should be encouraged to building confidence among the warring parties and enhancing the stake of ownership in the peace process. Impartiality is the best practice to guarantee that a mission will gain and retain the consent of all parties (Dorn, 2006, p. 16).

Appropriate use of force: Since peace support operations need the consent of the parties to a conflict, military forces under UN command are not usually required to use force beyond that necessary for self-defence. Self-defence includes the right to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN protection. The use of force by the military component will depend on the mandate of the peace support operations and the Rules of Engagement (ROE), sometimes the UN Security Council may authorise peace support operations to use armed forces in situations other than in self-defence. The rules of engagement for the peace support operations are one that clarifies the different levels of force that may be used in various circumstances. It provides how each level of force should be used and any authorisation that may need to be obtained from the commanders (Guehenno, 2008, p. 61).

Unit and international character: To be effective, a peace support operations should function as an integrated unit reflecting the role and presence of the entire international community. It is natural true that the military components in peace support operations are composed of several different national contingents. Military forces under UN command are obliged to adhere to the international rules as far as their duties are concerned, and should not serve any national or other interests. International forces may be vulnerable to attempts of the parties to the conflict as they try to exploit the differences between the peace support operations' contingents. To maintain the unit with an integrated character, the strict international temperament for the peace support operations is the means to safeguard against such attempts. By so doing, it enhances the legitimacy of the overall mission.

The UN Security Council may authorise a UN peace-enforcement operation without the stated consent of the parties to the conflict if it believes that the conflict presents a threat to international peace and security (Guehenno, 2008, p. 65).

Respect for principles of international humanitarian law: The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to military forces under UN command. In case of violations of international humanitarian law, UN military personnel are subject to prosecution under their own national systems of military justice. Military forces under UN command must make a clear distinction between civilians and combatants and direct military operations only against combatants and military objects. The right of the UN forces to use means and methods of combat is also not unlimited, but depends on the prevailing circumstances. The UN forces must apply the rules that prohibit the use of certain weapons and the methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. The treatment of civilians, women and children require special protection because they are vulnerable to rape, enforced prostitution and other form of indecent and criminal assault.

Respect for local laws and customs: All peace support operations personnel should respect local laws and customs, and should maintain the highest standards of integrity in their personal conduct. When the peace support operations include military components, especially formed military units of several thousand personnel, the presence of the peace support operations is seen and felt throughout the mission

area. Therefore, respect for the host country laws by the peacekeeping forces is directly contributing to the success of the mission. This has much to do with the maintenance of high standard of professionalism, integrity, impartiality and general behaviours that fosters the good relationship with the local population. The respect of local laws is required to sustain the cooperation and consent with the local population. Although the peace support operations personnel are enjoying certain privileges and immunities accorded to them by the UN to carry out and to facilitate the effective operations, this does not change the obligation of personnel in the mission to respect local laws, social and cultural as well as the religious norms. In particular, military personnel must always be minded to maintain exemplary standards of conduct in accordance with the UN code of conduct. Those that found breaching the code of conduct must be duly disciplined by their national authorities, including the imposition of legal sanctions, when appropriate (Guehenno, 2008, p. 72).

Types of Military Personnel: The military component of a peacekeeping operation can include any combination of the following:

- a. Military advisers
- b. Military observers
- c. Military liaison officers
- d. Formed military units
- e. Military Tasks in Peace support Operations
- f. Support to peace-making and political negotiations
- g. Secured environment

- h. Observation and monitoring
- i. Interposition
- j. Preventive deployment
- k. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- l. Demining
- m. Enforcement of sanctions
- n. Security sector reform and training
- o. Restoration and maintenance of law and order
- p. Support to humanitarian activities
- q. Human rights monitoring
- r. Force Generation
- s. Protection of civilians

Military advisers: The military advisors normally come in the situations where the peace support operations has not been authorised, but the Secretary-General has appointed a Special Representative or an Envoy to undertake political negotiations and provide good offices for peace-making or conflict prevention. The smaller number of military officers may be assigned to advise the Special Representative or envoy on military issues. A political or peace building UN presence that remained behind after a peace support operations has withdrawn may also retain military advisers to provide expertise on security sector reforms, elements of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), recruitment and training criteria for newly formed armed forces and other military tasks (Guehenno, 2008, p. 73).

Military observers: The UN military observers are unarmed military officers generally deployed to monitor and supervise any military arrangements that parties to a conflict may have agreed to, such as ceasefire or armistice, withdrawal of forces or the preservation of a demilitarised or neutral buffer zone. The primary task of military observers is to monitor and report on the parties' observance of these military arrangements and the military situation in general in their area of responsibility (AOR).

The position of being unarmed and not part of a formed military unit, the military observers do not have any coercive authority and depend entirely on the cooperation of the conflicting parties for their security and effectiveness. Since they represent the moral authority of the international community, they exercise a degree of moral of understanding and can be an effective deterrent to violations of peace agreements. In peacekeeping operations where military forces are also present, the military observers work in conjunction with the forces but under a separate chain of command. Since military observers can be drawn from any country, they can enhance the international character of a peace support operations.

Military liaison officers: In peace support environment where security is being provided by the military forces not under the UN command, such as a regional peacekeeping force or coalition forces of the allied states, the UN will often deploy military liaison officers to maintain the link between the largely civilian UN peace support operations and the non-UN military forces. Military liaison officers can also be used in UN peace building missions or offices to liaise with national military

authorities. The good example is the case of UNAMID in Sudan (Guehenno, 2008, p. 73).

Formed military units: The Member States contribute also the formed military units, which correspond to traditional military formations, such as companies, brigades or battalions. This contribution is called a contingent. The UN uses military contingents of varying strengths and capabilities in its peacekeeping operations, depending on the mandate. In situations where a visible international military presence is required to build confidence or maintain momentum in a peace process, the military forces provided to the UN are typically lightly armed and rely on the consent and willingness of the parties to the conflict to honour their obligations under a peace agreement. Lightly armed military peacekeeping forces are neither equipped nor expected to use force to prevent a resumption of hostilities.

The UN military observer missions in the Syrian Golan Heights, Indian-Pakistan, and Iraqi-Iranian borders, in Georgia, Prevlaka peninsula and in the former Yugoslavia are some of the examples of the past and on-going military observer missions. The typical example of a smaller formed military unit deployed for the United Nations mission is the military components that were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was responsible for maintaining security in those places and acted as a liaison to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led forces. Namibia has also contributed staff officers to UNMIK peace support operations from 1998 to date.

The deployment such as: The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) since 1964, The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia from 1989 to 1990, The United Nations Transition Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993, and The United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) III from 1995 to 1997 are all examples of missions that were mandated to use the light armed formed military units in the UN peace support operations. The robust mandated military forces under UN operational control can also be used to deter a resumption of hostilities by their presence, establishing and maintaining a secure environment to support the implementation of peace process. In such circumstances, the military forces are required to be appropriately armed and structured to present credible military deterrence (Guehenno, 2008, p. 75).

Military Tasks in Peace Support Operations: The tasks of the military components of the UN peacekeeping operations can vary from technical activities relate to military action and assisting in political negotiations or engaging in the peace process.

Support to Peace-Making and Political Negotiations: the military technical expertise is more essential to the successful conduct of peace-making and peace negotiations in the situation of armed conflicts. A small number of military officers can provide technical support to political mediators to conduct negotiations. The advice could range from the practical arrangements for monitoring the ceasefire

agreements to establishing the feasibility of proposals for the use of military capability. The military expertise is mostly effective in areas such as weapons-free and demilitarised zones, zones of separation, disarmament and demobilisation process.

Secured Environment: The military forces that are forming up part of the UN peace support operations are having responsibility to provide a secure environment. This is done to implement the mandate that resorts in peace process to achieve the mission objective. A secured environment is generally a precondition for moving ahead on several elements of peace agreements. These elements include the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, cantoning the armed factions, monitoring the disarmament and demobilisation process, securing of free movement for persons and goods and delivery of humanitarian assistance. As part of the task for providing a secure environment, the military components may be asked also to provide a visible deterrent presence, control movement and access through checkpoints, provide armed escort for safety and to facilitate access, conduct cordon and search operations, control crowds or confiscate weapons (Guehenno, 2008, p. 77).

Observation and monitoring: The military component in a peace support operations has primary tasks, to monitor and supervise, through observation, patrolling and reporting, any military arrangement such as truce or ceasefire agreement, a demilitarised zone or buffer zone. This is done through both static (observation posts) and mobile (regular patrols, inspections and investigations of suspected violations) means. There have been several UN peace support operations

in which observation and monitoring are the only tasks of the military component. The operations covers a complex of various elements but, observation and monitoring may be just some of the elements of the military component activities. The holistic example is an on-going UN Observer mission in Lebanon.

Interposition: In circumstances where conflict is between two or more conflicting states or parties, an interposition operation may be authorised. It involves the placing of the UN military presence between warring parties to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. Interposition often leads to the creation of a buffer zone or zone of United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) are good examples of missions with robust military mandates.

The first UN peace support operations were established in the context of the Middle East conflict in 1948. Following the outbreak of hostilities in April 1948, the Security Council called for establishment of Truce Commission for Palestine to supervise the ceasefire. As the situation worsened, the Truce Commission, which was comprise of consular representatives from Belgium, France and the U.S., asked the UN Security Council to send military observers to assist it in supervising the ceasefire.

Through the UN Security Council Resolution 50 (1948), the Council reiterated its call for a cessation of all acts of armed forces and decided that the truce should be supervised by the UN mediator, who had been appointed by the UN General

Assembly to promote, with assistance of robust military observers, a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine. This became the basis of what would be the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

The first unarmed military observers were deployed in the region in June of 1948. They operated with the consent of the parties to the conflict and were depended on the cooperation of the parties for their effectiveness. Although there was no element of coercive in their functioning, their presence was a deterrent to violations of the truce. They represented the will of the international communities, and have exercised a degree of moral determination. These elements remain the basis unarmed military observers in the UN peace support operations and involvement of military observers in the UN peace operations today.

After the assassination of the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, in September 1948, Ralph Bunche, a senior UN official, took over as Acting Mediator. By early 1949, his efforts resulted in four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and its four Arab neighbours including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The UN Security Council assigned new responsibilities to UNTSO in line with these agreements. The role of the mediator was ended and UNTSO became operational autonomous. In any way, officially it is a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council, responsible for assisting the parties in supervising the application and adherence to the agreements. In 1951, the head of UNTSO was given an appointment as a senior official of the UN Secretariat, which gives the UN Secretary-General a greater control over UNTSO.

In two separate occasions, the armistice arrangements include the establishment of demilitarised zones the UNTSO observers were responsible for monitoring the full implementation of those provisions. In addition, UNTSO continued to be responsible for the supervision of the ceasefire. UNTSO's roles became increasingly important because disagreements between the warring parties often led to deadlock over sensitive issues and the military representatives of the parties to the conflict found it difficult to cooperate. The wars in the following years starting from 1956, 1967 and 1973, the functions of the observers changed along with the circumstances. However, the observers remained in the area, acting as go-betweens for the hostile parties and means by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts (Guehenno, 2008, p. 85).

Preventive deployment: The peace support operations are preventive measures in nature as the major objective to deploy the formed military units is to prevent conflicts from recurring in certain instances. However, the military forces could be deployed immediately as the conflict breaks out to prevent it from occurring or spreading further. Preventive deployments also serve as confidence-building measures and may be purely military in nature or should have a combination of military and civilian elements.

Some of the best examples of the preventive deployments of military forces by the UN occurred in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the Balkans wars in 1990s. In December 1992, the UN Secretary-General requested an

expansion of the mandate and strength of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which until then had been operating only in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to establish a preventive presence of the UN in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate was to monitor and report any developments along the border areas of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (which comprised Serbia and Montenegro) that could undermine confidence and stability in the republic and threaten its territory. Although the conflict had not been spread to the republic, the international community was concerned that without such an international military presence, the republic would be engulfed in the same inter-ethnic conflict that was ravaging Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In conjunction with its major tasks of monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders, the military component of UNPREDEP cooperated with civilian agencies and offered ad hoc community services and humanitarian assistance to the local population.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): It is mandatory that the UN peace support operations mandate suppose includes the supervision of DDR programme, the military component will be merely involved in the disarmament phase and partially involved in the demobilisation phase. The reintegration task is the civilian function normally undertaken by the national authorities assisted by the international communities. The three phases of DDR are inter-linked and interdependent. However, the reintegration of former combatants into a viable civilian life has important repercussions for the peace process and can often

determine the extent to which the disarmament and demobilisation phases will be successful. Therefore, the DDR process needs to be properly planned as a continuous process and be appropriately resourced from the outset.

Demining: The military component will be responsible for mine and explosives clearances in areas of operations to provide peacekeepers access of free movement, deployment of troops and other personnel in the mission area. It also provides accessibility to the maintenance and supply routes to deployment sites and increase access to all parts of the mission area. The military will normally not undertake demining for strictly humanitarian purposes, such as reclaiming land for agriculture and the return of displaced persons, but it serves to decrease maiming of persons and set free the community movements. Hence these are seen as civilian activities requiring long-term and sustainable solutions, demining programmes became necessary for implementation at national authorities level.

Enforcement of sanctions: The enforcement of sanctions authorised by the Security Council, particularly arms and materiel embargoes, may be tasked to a military component of a peace support operations to curb the infiltrations of arms and ammunitions and funds into the conflict areas. This includes illegal supplies and trading of prohibited commodities for example the drugs substances.

Security sector reform and training: The military component may be asked to provide advice on security sector reform and related issues.

Restoration and maintenance of law and order: In situations where lack of institutional capacity at national and international level to maintain law and order in the conflict area, the military component may be tasked to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. This is not necessarily the military task, but requires significant specialised training. For these reasons, maintenance of law and order will be a task for the military only in exceptional circumstances, with the aim to restore the rule of law to civilian police as soon as possible.

Human rights monitoring: In conflict area the maintenance of law and order, the monitoring of human rights is a specialised essential civilian function and the military forces are not trained to act as human rights monitors. The military components can assist in this function, however, by observing, gathering information and reporting to UN civilian or political authorities. Human rights violations are a good indicator of the potential threats in area of operation, and the military components collect essential data for threats and risks assessments.

Support to humanitarian activities: The military components will not be structured, trained or funded for the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance, relief or aid, which is a civilian task. The military is more likely to be asked to provide a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance can be delivered successfully, or to provide security and protection for humanitarian relief operations. This may take the form of ensuring freedom of movement, convoy escorts, protection of humanitarian personnel and storage sites among other assistance. The military components often have assets and capabilities, such as transport and other logistical

support, which are useful in a humanitarian effort. The use of military assets for humanitarian tasks should be coordinated by an appropriate civilian authority as part of a coordinated plan of emergency relief. Within the UN system, management of humanitarian assistance is normally the task of the humanitarian coordinator in that particular mission area and for the military a Civil-Military Cooperation should undertake the responsibility of coordinating these operational requirements.

The military contingents also undertake humanitarian activities on their own initiative, using their own resources. Some governments consider the humanitarian dimension an essential part of their peacekeeping contribution and, often, an important factor in mobilising national support for the military deployment. The humanitarian projects undertaken by the military can contribute significantly to improve the relationship with the local population and the parties to the conflict, thereby increasing security and building consent. These activities should be based on the international humanitarian objectives and policy framework in the mission area and avoid duplication of effort with humanitarian agencies. It is vital that the initiatives help build local capacity and be sustainable in the long term (Guehenno, 2008, p. 99).

Protection of civilians: In specific circumstances, the mandate of a peace support operations may include the need to protect vulnerable civilian populations from imminent attack threats. The military component may be asked to provide such protection in its area of responsibility as the mandate may dictate.

Force Generation: The identification and assembling of military components for deployment in a peace support operations is called force generation. Since the UN does not maintain military capability of its own, it depends on the contributions from member states. The costs of the UN peace support operations are shared among the entire members of the organisation according to a pre-agreed scale of assessments; with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council pay a slightly higher proportion because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Contributing states are reimbursed by the UN for their personnel and equipment they provide for peace support operations service.

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) coordinates the organisation needs for military expertise and capability. Immediately the UNDPKO becomes aware of the need for the military element in any particular situation, it establishes informal contacts with potential troop and personnel-contributing states. Based on a proposed concept of operations, the UNDPKO identifies the type and capability of military elements needed. The UNDPKO should also consider various political issues when sourcing contributions for a specific mission, including the stated preferences of the parties to the conflict, the need for broad geographic representation and the historical or cultural ties a potential contributor may have with the region or state in question. For example, UNAMSIL and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were specifically crafted to afford protection of the civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within their capabilities and areas of deployment (Guehenno, 2008, p. 112).

2.5. Types of Military Forces, Formations and Units forming up PSOs

The armed forces of the troop contributing countries are normally the forces which form up the peace support operations contingents and they are broken down into three broad categories as indicated below:

- Combat forces, which generally include the infantry, tank forces, combat aircraft, offensive and defensive naval platforms (ships, boats and submarines) and marines and Special Forces;
- Combat support forces, including artillery and engineers, airborne and maritime surveillance platforms and command and control facilities; and
- Logistics and service support forces, including communications, medical support, air, land and maritime lift and transportation capabilities.

The land forces, which are the most commonly contributed forces for UN peace support operations, are grouped by size as follows:

- A section, squad or brick is the smallest unit and generally consists of seven to 12 individuals, commanded by a corporal or sergeant;
- A platoon or troop generally consists of three to four sections or squads, totalling 30 to 40 personnel, and is commanded by an officer, normally a lieutenant;
- Companies, squadrons and batteries consist of companies (infantry), squadrons (cavalry) and batteries (artillery), which are generally commanded by a captain or major. They consist generally of three to four platoons or troops totalling 120 to 150 personnel;

- Battalions and regiments consist of approximately 500 to 1,000 personnel (four to seven subordinate companies, squadrons or batteries) and comprise all elements necessary for self-sustainment. These include combat and support elements, such as specialists in heavy weapons, communications (signals), logistics and engineering. In some armies, battalions and regiments specialise in a particular activity, e.g., artillery, engineering or armour (tanks); and
- Brigades generally consist of three combat units of infantry and/or armour, an artillery regiment, a squadron of combat engineers, a headquarters and communications (signals) squadron and a logistics company. Brigadier-generals may command brigades. Depending on prime function (parachute brigade, infantry brigade, artillery brigade, etc.), brigades consist of anywhere between 4,000 to 10,000 personnel. Rapid Deployment: the General Assembly has endorsed a requirement to be able to establish a traditional peacekeeping mission within 30 days and a complex mission within 90 days of the authorisation of a Security Council mandate. To improve the response time of the UN to deploy a peacekeeping operation, a system has been developed under which countries earmark in advance specific contributions for a potential UN peacekeeping operation.

The system is called the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) and consists of conditional pledges of military units, equipment and individuals by member states. UNSAS allows DPKO to know ahead of time what types of contributions countries are willing to make on short notice.

2.5.1. Stand-by High Readiness Brigade: The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) is a multinational brigade consists of military units from various member states trained on the same standard, using the same operating procedures and inter-operable equipment. The SHIRBRIG normally involves in combined exercises at regular intervals to maintain level of readiness for immediate deployment in peace support operations within 15 to 30 days' notice. The recommended full deployment should contain strength of 4,000 to 5,000 troops and is designed to be on operation for maximum of six months and hand over to other UN forces. As other UN forces take over, the SHIRBRIG returns to stand-by state. SHIRBRIG is supported by permanent planning element based in Denmark and consists of small multinational staff responsible for developing standard operating procedures for the brigade. The staff members will continue working on the concept of operations, re-organising the brigade for future deployments and conducting joint exercises for perfection. During the deployment of the brigade the planning element forms the nucleus of the deployed SHIRBRIG headquarters staff.

In November 2000, SHIRBRIG had its first deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The composition of the brigade consists of units from Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands. The units were deployed to the horn of Africa for the newly established United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The forces remained on the ground for six months and were instrumental for successful mission establishment. In 2003, SHIRBRIG provided headquarters staff to support the interim force headquarters of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

and assisted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plan their UN-authorised operation in Côte d'Ivoire (Guehenno, 2008, p. 102).

The consistent SHIRBRIG concept of operation is widely supported by the UN as being encouraged to be used in other regions of the world, particularly in Africa, Europe and Asia. This concept was developed by the members' states to SHIRBRIG include Austria, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden, who are the founding members of the brigade. The countries including Argentina, Italy and Romania have joined later, while Finland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain had signed various documents of membership in the group.

Part of the force generation process involves visiting potential contributors to provide advice on equipment, preparedness and training for peacekeepers. The stand-by resources are used exclusively for peace support operations. When specific needs arise, stand-by resources are requested by the Secretary-General and, if approved by participating member states, are rapidly deployed to set up new peace support missions or to reinforce existing ones. To improve the organisation's ability to deploy for peace support operation rapidly, the UN maintains a roster of candidates for a rapid deployable mission headquarters.

2.5.2. Logistics and Support: The logistics aspect is an important to the military components deployed in the mission area, to support the troops. It is imperative to consider the first line logistical issue before the deployment is executed. As military planner should enormously consider for the sustainment supplies as the troops may

stay longer in the mission area than necessary depends to the prevailing situation. The UN also secures logistical support for its peacekeeping operations from stocks of UN-owned equipment, commercial contracts for logistics or other arrangements by which a third country provides direct or bilateral support to specific national contingents that may lack certain logistic assets.

Logistics as an essential enabling service for the peace support operations, in early 1990s, the logistic planners have invented an integrated logistical support system. The system has integrated the logistical support system of the military components, civilian administration and support component, including external contractors. Integration and consolidation of support resources is important to UN to rely on as it provides temporal infrastructures and other basic necessities in a ravaged mission area.

The support units, such as engineer squadrons, transport units, hospitals and evacuation units, maintenance units and other enabling units are part of UN integrated logistical system. Thus the private contractors should also be incorporated to effectively render support to all components of the mission. The management and control of these joint resources is the responsibility of the chief integrated support services or the chief technical services, who report directly to the mission's chief administrative officer.

Despite the logistical support that lies in the hands of other various officials, the force commander has an overall control on the resources and directs them through

the established chain of command. The integrated support structure, however, provides the ability to carry out the coordinated planning effort which provides the mission with necessary support to achieve mission objective.

2.5.3. Command and Control: The command and control of TCC military personnel contributed to UN peace support operations remains under command of their national armed forces commanders. However, the operational authority over these forces is vested in UN Secretary-General, under the UN Security Council. UN operational authority includes issue of operational directives within the limits of a specific mandate, geographic area (the mission area) and agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification (Guehenno, 2008, p. 114).

The Head of Mission is appointed by the UN Secretary-General with the approval of the UN Security Council and the Head of Mission exercises UN authority on behalf of the UN Secretary-General. He or she determines the further delegation of authority in consultation with UN Headquarters in New York. In the same way, the head of the military components for peace support operations, the force commanders and chief military observers are also appointed by the UN Secretary-General, (Annan, 2006, p. 65).

In situations where peace support operations are carrying out a strictly military mandate, the head of the military components may be designated as the Head of Mission. Usually, the Head of Mission is a civilian appointed by the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The SRSG exercises UN authority vested in him/her over the mission components on behalf of the UN Secretary-General. The head of the military components is responsible to the SRSG for the implementation of the tasks assigned to the military component. In circumstances the head of the military component is not serving as the Head of Mission he/she reports to the Head of Mission. The force commander exercises “operational control” over all military personnel, including military observers, in the peace support operations. For the smooth running of personnel administration, the force commander may delegate “operational control” of the military observers to the chief military observer, (Annan, 2006, p. 67).

Commanders of the different contingents formed up the UN peace support operations force report to the force commander on all operational matters. They are strictly forbidden to accept instructions from their own national authorities, as this regarded as contrary to the mandate of the peace support operations. In the field, common sense and sound management practice dictate the Head of Mission and force commander to ensure that national contingent commanders are involved in operational planning and decision-making, particularly where their respective contingents are concerned. As such the involvement should take the form of regular consultations in a unified force (Guehenno, 2008, p. 112).

2.5.4. Relations with Other Mission Components: In multidimensional peace support operations, it is a must that the military components should interact with all other mission components. The interaction with the political components includes the

joint strategic planning for the mandate implementation and adjusting the tasks of the military components following the realities of political changes on the ground. The military components also interact frequently with the administrative and support components of the mission on joint logistics and supply issues (Guehenno, 2008, p. 112).

The public information is another area that requires close cooperation in the mission area. The military components may have own public information personnel and spokespersons who coordinate the information to the concerned personnel. It is essential for the contingents' information officers to strategise the mode of information dissemination and filtering of messages they should work closely with the mission's public information officials. The designated spokesperson in the mission is responsible for media relations for entire mission. The close coordination between the military components and other mission components is also necessary to facilitate DDR, humanitarian activities, human rights monitoring, civil affairs and the restoration of law and order in the fragile mission area (Berman & Sams 2000/3, p. 85).

There are several mechanisms that may be employed to ensure that the work of the military components is integrated into efforts made towards the mission that include the following:

- strategic planning and coordination cell that includes military experts as part of mission headquarters, ideal to report directly to the Head of Mission;
- integrated support service sections under the authority of the mission's chief administrative officer/chief technical services, which include the civilian and military logisticians;
- integrated joint operations centre (JOC) which coordinates the daily mission activities, concerning the military, political, civil affairs, human rights, public information and other mission components. The JOC is also coordinating with other elements outside the mission support the mission;
- integrated civil-military coordination cell, harmonise activities with other civilian actors in a mission area, such as UN Development Funds, programmes and specialised governmental and non-governmental agencies, international financial institutions, donors and local civil society representatives. The integrated cell may also facilitate information sharing, mutual support, joint assessments, integrated planning and common strategies that are particularly useful during times of crisis, and
- The mission should establish a structure and staff process that optimises civil and military information management and analytical processes through the mechanism of a joint mission analysis cell (JMAC). The JMAC is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and

distribution of information and reports) of the mission's civil and military information in order to support the SRSg's and force commander in decision-making process.

The role of the military component in peace support operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities. To stay relevant in the mission areas, troop contributing countries and UN DPKO, with the assistance from the donor governments, should work together to improve the readiness and capability of troops for the complex challenges in multidimensional peace support operations. To some extent these challenges have been met through the creation of new mechanisms promoting coordination and joint planning and improved training (Guehenno, 2008, p. 115).

The peace support operations preparedness, rapid deployment and logistical support work, remain a responsibility of the contingents to improve their equipment interoperability and compatibility to meet the UN standing operating procedures. The troop preparedness and self-sustainment requires a continuous attention, (Annan, 2006, p. 68).

The military components should work in close cooperation with all components of the mission, because the success of a multidimensional peace support operations is not only measured by the absence of conflict but also by other aspects. The re-establishment and further development of strong democratic institutions, the respect for the rule of law and human rights of all citizens are also important measures of

success. The military component must work with all other partners in this wider context to help consolidate peace (Guehenno, 2008, p. 142).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

Chapter two covered the theoretical background and perspectives of the peace support operations in general and detailed UNMIL where the NDF participated. During this mission, the NDF has experienced some of the challenges associated with the peace support operations which are being explored in this study. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology and techniques used to conduct the study. The exploratory research method was used and the study had applied the qualitative techniques in the gathering and analysis of the data (Firestone, 1987, p. 12; Struwig and Stead, 2007, p. 45).

This is an exploratory qualitative study which also relied on primary and secondary information obtained from different sources. The sources conducted are such as face to face interviews, questionnaires, books, journals, official records, reports, Acts, internet posted information and other publications. Therefore, this chapter outlines the methodology used in this study to obtain the required data.

The subjective views and experience of the former NAMBATT commanders, staff officers and military observers served with UNMIL, are perceived to be vital in the assistance of shaping the PSOs policies both in the NDF and for the UN system

respectively, (Firestone, 1987, p. 12). An explorative qualitative study is an outcome of analysis and interpretation of collected facts, evidence and behaviours of the targeted population under study. The advantage of qualitative research method approach rests in its explorative character to discover the meaningful events based on individuals experience. The explorative approach holds the view that the “reality is socially constructed through individual or collective definition of the reality.” Bell, (1987, p. 14) and Firestone, (1987, p. 12).

3.2. Research design

The exploratory qualitative and interpretive mixed approaches utilised by the researcher in this study is an attempt to understand the subjective reality from the perspective of an insider as opposed by the outsider that is predominant in the quantitative approaches, Henning (2004, p. 25).

The research design for the data collection and analysis was guided by the underlying scientific commitment, which is a cross – sectional time dimension and the particular data collection method (Firestone, 1987, p. 12; Struwig and Stead, 2007, p. 45).

This study is based on an explorative qualitative research design. The researcher explored the challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force motorised infantry battalions that took part in UNMIL for five times at separate occasions on rotational basis during the period under review. Some of the commanding officers and their second in command, contingent staff officers and other staff officers not part of the contingent worked in the Force Headquarters and military observers in the field, after the missions they were not consolidated in certain unit. The members

served in UNMIL returned to their respective units countrywide, mostly in Windhoek and Grootfontein. The advantage of using the mixed qualitative approach is that the researcher attempts to understand the participants' behaviours, thoughts and feelings on the matters relating this topic. The researcher has personally conducted an interview with relevant selected officers and individuals to obtain the correct data (Punch, 2006, p. 70).

The views and shared experience by the former Namibian battalion commanding officers second in command, staff officers and military observers who served in the United Nations Mission in Liberia, perceived as vital information in shaping the future peace support operations policies in the United Nations system. The views should also be directed to help improving the conduct of NDF capability to serve in PSOs. The researcher's own personal observation while serving with United Nations Mission in Liberia assisted the study to obtain the required data and to reach its objectives, by adding it to the exploratory interpretative study which was relied on people's words and meanings as the data for analysis to exemplify the rich possibilities of research investigations that are conducted from a discovery mode.

The advantages of the desk study research method done out of problems report documents to be applied by the researcher, rest in its interpretative character of discovering the meaningful events from individuals who experienced them. According to Henning (2004, p. 25), the interpretive approach holds also the view that "reality" is socially constructed through individual or collective definition of reality. The researcher will also attempt to understand the subjective reality from the

perspective of an insider as opposed by the outsider that is predominant in this study approach (Henning, 2004, p. 25).

The researcher conducted interviews with the Namibia Defence Force officers who were doing peace support operations tour of duty in Liberia. The researcher intended to interview also the former Chief of Staff Defence Operations, Plans and Training (COS DOPT) who coordinated the peace support operations during that time of UNMIL who was also involved in the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York. The former COS OPT was not available when the interview was conducted, due to workload as he is now heading the entire NDF. However, the researcher had received permission to conduct the research within the NDF premises and got also an opportunity of access to the official correspondence and report documents from the mission area filed in the Defence Headquarters. Some of the former Namibian Battalion commanding officers and their deputies, staff officers and military observers are working in the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek and surrounding Units. These officers were the potential sources of data collection required to answer the research question.

The Namibian Motorised Infantry Battalions that participated in the United Nations Peace Support Operations in Liberia were from the army, therefore most of the commanding officers or their deputies, who were commanding those battalions and some staff officers and military observers are from the Army Formations and units at Grootfontein and beyond. Therefore, the researcher conducted interviews with some

of the respondents in Grootfontein Army Headquarters, 26 Brigade Headquarters and military hospital.

3.3. Research population

In this study, the target population group were the Namibian Defence Force Officers of a total number of 15 commanding officers (COs) and their second in command (2ICs) and the other 30 respondents were military observers and staff officers in various fields of specialisation, who participated in the Peace Support Operations in Liberia. The above mentioned NDF officers of various levels of leadership in the defence force were identified and selected for this study. The sampling procedures used to select these respondents are discussed here below. Best and Kahn (2006, p. 13), defined the research population as a group of individuals who have one or more characteristics in common that will attract the researcher's interest.

The research invitations had been widespread to the following Namibian Defence Force officers such as the former Chief of Staff Defence Operations, Plans and Training (COS OPT) who had coordinated the operation activities at that time (unfortunately he was not interviewed due to time constraints), the selections of the former Namibian Battalion commanding officers and their deputies, who were leading the PSOs in Liberia from 2004 – 2008, various staff officers who served in the Force Headquarters in Monrovia independently from the peacekeepers, and the Military Observers, who served also independently from the peacekeepers and staff officers in the field in several sectors of Liberia during the period under review. All

the above mentioned officers are those who served with the United Nations Mission in Liberia during the period from 2004 - 2008.

During the data collection process through personal interviews with the respondents the researcher was reading the required set up questionnaires to the participants, write down and tick the selected responses onto the answer sheet. During the time of the open ended questions then the responses were written verbatim on the answer sheet. However, the researcher had requested the authorisation from the office of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to enter the field of research into the military places, to conduct the interviews and to submit the questionnaires. The researcher had also to obtain the consent from the participants and respondents themselves in order to conduct the interviews with them.

3.4. Sample

The issue of sampling is very important because it was rarely the case to find a researcher who has sufficient time and resources to conduct a research and interview on individuals who are potentially included in the study. In this study, all 15 commanding officers and the second-in-commands who commanded the Namibian Motorised Infantry Battalions during the period under review were interviewed. Included in the interviews were other 30 respondents and the former Chief of Staff Army Operations. Other key personnel who were also interviewed were some staff officers and military observers serving UNMIL at Force headquarters in Monrovia, including some officers who served the contingents as

staff officers in Liberia between 2004 and 2008. The former Chief of Staff Defence Joint Operations, Plans and Training (COS JOPT) at Defence Headquarters (DHQs), was also selected for interview for this study, however he was not available for interview due to the time constraints and workload. In addition, the samplings only included 45 officers who were available during the time of interview. According to Struwig & Stead (2007, p.109), sampling is a selected group of people drawn from the researched population to whom the research was focused on and the results obtained by testing the sample could be generalised.

Not all of the officers mentioned in the study population above were found at the expected places during the time of interview. Based on this background and due to logistical reasons the gathering of data for this study was restricted to selected officers who were available and willing to participate during the period of research interviews. However, not all of the available Namibia Defence force officers who participated in the peace support operation in Liberia were interviewed due to the respect of ethical norms.

The sample of 45 individual male and female officers who participated in the peace support operations in Liberia were selected from the DHQ, AHQ 21 Bde HQ, 26 Bde HQ, and some of the medical staff was drawn from the Military hospital in Grootfontein for interview. The size of the sampling also confirmed to the time frame of the study required by the University of Namibia to submit a complete study thesis within a three month time limit. These were regarded as the first sampling groups. However, the subsequent data collection was guided by the theoretical sampling principles of the ground theory.

3.5. Sampling techniques

The first group was for NDF senior management respondents. This was a group comprised of the chief of staff army operations and contingent commanders and their second in command; these were the group of key NDF policy making body and the issuance of orders during the period under review. The second group was for NDF middle management comprised of contingents staff officers who were involved in daily administration and oversaw the implementations of policies and orders during the operations period. The third group was that of military observers and staff officers who worked independently from the contingent and they observed the contingent activities from the different angles during their participation in the UNMIL peace support operations in Liberia. The sampling techniques used in this study were interviews; review of mission related reports, UN information manuals, documents and interviews of key respondents who were directly and indirectly involved in UNMIL peace support operations in Liberia and were aware of the challenges that affected the NDF during that particular time of operations. In this connection, samples were obtained from the various Namibian Defence Force headquarters, formations and units where the respondents were serving during the research time. Therefore, they were the focal point of the research and the information and experience were cardinal to the success of the objectives of the study.

3.6. Research instruments

The researcher used multiple instruments of data collection for this study such as: documents, audio tape recorders, questionnaires, documents and interviews; they were conducted in the parameter of explorative, interpretive-descriptive qualitative frame work (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 85).

The researcher conducted the interviews with selected Namibia Defence Force Officers who were doing peace support operations tour of duty directly or indirectly in Liberia. The researcher also selected to interview the former Chief of Staff Operations, Plans and Training in the Defence Headquarters (DHQs). However, he had not made himself available due to time constraints and work overload (Bell, 1997, p. 132).

The researcher used also the snowball research method as he did not know all the respondents who participated in the UNMIL peace support operations although he had also participated in those operations at a certain time. The snowball research method was the best known theoretical approach of multiple techniques of data collection process (Maree et al, 2007, p.80).

Interview and observations schedule were also used during the data collection process for this study; it was characterised by the closed and open ended questions. The interview was organised into four parts to facilitate the research process. The first part captured the background information of the research, the second part consisted of the views and perceptions of the participants and respondents' concern, the third part had drawn out the problems and experiences identified and raised by

the participants, while the final part was seeking the best options and advice from the participants, to address the problem in future United Nations Peace Support Operations, in conjunction with the research question (Bell, 1997, p. 41).

3.7. Research data collection procedure

This study used the exploratory qualitative research methodology to explore the challenges experienced by the Namibia Defence Force during the peace support operations in Liberia. The researcher opted to employ the qualitative approach to gain some advantages of the techniques.

The data collection processor started immediately after the proposal of this study was approved by the Post Graduate Studies Committee, and the researcher received a letter of authorisation from the University of Namibia to start with the collect of data. As the research was to be conducted within military duty stations, the researcher applied again for permission from the Chief of the Namibian Defence Force (CDF) to collect data within the force, which was granted. The researcher started with the data collection activities first in the Defence headquarters and 21 Brigade HQs, then later at Grootfontein Army HQs base and military hospital.

The study was guided by the research ethic policy and procedures. Consent of utilisation of audio tape recorders and any other interview instruments of data collecting was obtained from the participants. Participation in the study was done on voluntary basis, and respondents who changed their minds and decided not to take

part in the study were not forced to participate. According to Gordon (1997, p. 85) and Jarvis (1997, p. 145), ethics is the universal good of respecting persons as an overriding moral principle that guide all education practice including research. During the data collecting process of this study undertook to fully respect the rights of the respondents to anonymity. The researcher had always to make sure that informed consent is gained throughout the research process (Oliver, 2004, p. 205).

Immediately after the permission to enter the territory of research was granted, then the purpose of the study was explained to the participants prior to the commencements of the interviews. Respondents were kept at ease and the assurance of confidentiality was maintained by informing the participants that no information would be divulged and no identity would be disclosed. Finally, the rights of interviews and observations were made known to the participants. Interviews were used as the main data collection instrument, together with written records of the time under consideration (Bell, 1997, p. 45).

The researcher's own personal observations while serving with United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had also assisted the study to collect and obtain the required data and to meet its objectives, (Ilwenya, 2006, p. 6).

The views and experiences of the former Namibian Battalion commanding officers (COs), second in commands (2ICs), staff officers (SOs) and military observers (MOs) who served with the United Nations Mission in Liberia, are perceived as vital sources of information that were used in the shaping of the Peace Support Operations

policies both in the Namibia Defence Force and in the United Nations system respectively (Ilwenya, 2006, p. 6).

The study had collected data through all means of applied methods of collecting data procedures such as: conducting personal interviews, probability and non-probability sampling and through the literature review to demonstrate the relationship and comparative arguments between the different authors. However, the research procedure for this study was comprised of the mixture of primary and secondary information from the research material obtained from the available printed works, media, books, papers, magazines, articles, internet sources, etc. (Bell, 1997, p. 45).

The research interviews were mostly conducted within the military places; however some of the interviews were conducted at other places outside the military bases. To gain access to these military bases, a written authorisation to enter military installations was required from the NDF top management authority; in this case it was obtained from the Chief of the Defence Force in Windhoek before the start of any research activities. After the permission was granted the researcher started to conduct the interviews and administered the questionnaires to the respondents. The identity of the researcher, the aim and the purpose of the study were introduced and explained to the respondents before they participated in the study.

3.8. Research data analysis

All the data collected through documents, personal interviews, audio tape recorders and questionnaires was transcribed onto a computer data base for analysis and interpretation with the purpose to depict the clear findings and the analysis thereof, while the other themes that came out during the data collection were noted and further explored for clear understanding, (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) as cited by Maree, (2007, p. 37). In response to the research question outlined, the data analysis was based on qualitative method of research, meaning that a number of data analyses were taken in the form of comparisons to determine the frequencies of distribution of values. Data analysis includes the interpretation thereof, were detailed, examined, and categorised to provide the meaningful data. The aim of this chapter was to get the correct information from various sources consulted during the study (Alreck & Settle, 1995, p. 119).

The data analysis process was processed in the following three stages:

- 3.8.1. Organise the information from the documents, questionnaires and interviews into the data base.
- 3.8.2. Synthesise, evaluate and integrate the data.
- 3.8.3. Interpret and analyse the data to give the relevant conclusions, (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 19).

3.9. Research data presentation

The research data presentation was based on the four main groups which comprised of the general staff officers, senior management level consisting of commanding officers and their second in command, the middle management level of independent staff officers and military observers, and the lower management level of junior staff officers on various levels as respondents. These were further grouped into general information regarding the respondents and various samples which were explored. The process included gender, age, job positions, ranks, categories, years of service, causes, effects and main factors contributing to the key challenges associated with the NDF PSOs in Liberia (Lapan & Quartaroli, 2009, p. 35).

3.10. Information on respondents

The number of respondents that participated in the interview process were 45 participants, and they were comprised of chief of staff army operations, contingent commanders and their second in command, senior staff officers, staff officers and junior staff officers. As is stated in Chapter three of the research methodology, the respondents in this study were selected from the following areas of defence such as the Defence HQs, Army HQs, formations and units where the respondents to this study were deployed. The respondents expressed their views and opinions on what they thought could be the key grey areas that could be the possible causes, effects or factors that contributed to the key challenges associated with the NDF PSOs in Liberia as it will be elaborated in Chapter four of this study.

3.11. Research Ethics

According to Gordon (1997), as a researcher anticipate data collection, the researcher needs to respect the participants and sites for research, and some of the ethical issues that arise during the research stage which include among others: not subjecting participants, getting permission to involve the respondents in the study, avoiding disturbing the participants and to give due considerations to their rights to participate or not. The research ethics starts immediately after the proposal of this study was approved by the high authority of the University of Namibia. The research was conducted within NDF working premises; therefore, the other permission was also applied and granted from the Chief of the Namibian Defence Force, at the Defence Headquarters in Windhoek (Gordon, 1997, p. 155).

The study was guided by the research ethics policy and procedures throughout the study period. Consent to interview and utilising audio tape recorders and any other interview instruments of data collecting was obtained from the participants. Participation in the study was done on voluntary basis, and respondents who changed their minds and decided not to take part in the study were not forced to participate. According to Gordon (1997, p. 85) and Jarvis (1997, p. 145), ethics is the universal good of respecting persons as an overriding moral principle that guides all education practice including research. During the data collection process for this study, the rights of the respondents to anonymity were taken into consideration and were fully respected. The researcher has the responsibility to see to it that a well-versed consent was gained throughout the research process (Oliver, 2004, p. 205).

Immediately after the permission to enter the territory of research was granted, then the purpose of the study was explained to the participants prior to the commencement of the interviews. Respondents were kept at ease and the assurance of confidentiality was maintained by informing the participants that no information will be divulged and no identity will be disclosed. Finally, the rights of interviews and observations were made known to the participants and respondents.

The research ethics had been adhered to as the procedure had started immediately after the proposal has been approved by the Post Graduate Studies Committee and endorsed by the high authority for the University of Namibia.. The research was conducted within military places, therefore, the other permission was also granted by the Chief of the Namibian Defence Force, Defence Headquarter in Windhoek (Gordon, 1997, p. 155).

3.12. Validity and Reliability of data

In the research process, the requirements of validity and reliability as discussed by Welman & Kruger (1999, p. 100) were applied. These include reliability of research instruments and the consistence of the challenges associated with the NDF in the UNMIL peace support operations for the period 2004 – 2008. All the possible efforts were made to ensure that the collected data was valid, while adhering to the important ethical considerations as follows:

3.12.1. Validity

The interviews were directed to all respondents including the Chief of staff Army operations who coordinated all the operation activities with the

Namibian contingents in the peace support operations in Liberia, some contingents commanders, some senior staff officers who worked direct and indirect with the peace support operations, senior officers who served independently from the Namibian contingents as military observers and staff officers respectively, Junior officers comprising those officers who served with the contingents in various levels of specialisations. The sampling of data on challenges associated with the NDF PSOs in Liberia was obtained from all the selected respondents in HQs of Defence force, formations and units of the Namibian Defence Force. The UNMIL mission is still going on in Liberia, however this study only concentrated on the four years of the Namibian Defence Force's participation in the peace support operations in Liberia between the year 2004 and 2008. In this regard, validity refers to the extent to which a study experimental was appropriately conducted, which is further referred to the extent to which the results of the research can be generalised and be linked to the sampling procedures, time, place and conditions in which the research was conducted (Struwig and Stead, 2007, p. 150).

3.12.2. Reliability

The data were collected from four different groups of respondents of the Namibia Defence Force officers only. Each respondent was interviewed separately. Questionnaires were read to the respondents for clarification purposes, and they were allowed to ask questions to clear their doubts. In other words, reliability refers to the extent to which the test scores are accurate, consistent and stable. The test score's validity is dependent on the score's reliability if the reliability is inadequate, then the validity will also be

poor. Therefore, throughout this study, the researcher has to take into account that the score and the method used were reliable before he starts with the practical part of the research process (Struwig and Stead, 2007, p. 150).

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter covered and outlined the research methodology used to conduct the study, the techniques and data analysis for this study. The purpose of the preceding chapter was to give a full understanding of the research procedures including selection of the population for this study, while Chapter four presents the data collected through the interview process as it was guided by the set up questionnaires and findings obtained through official records, questionnaires, and interviews conducted with the respondents and the researcher's own observations while serving as military observer in the mission area, which contributed to the achievement of the objective of the study and its statement of the problem. Through the objective and statement of the problem of the study the researcher has selected certain groups of respondents from the Defence Headquarters, Army Service Headquarters, Formation Headquarters and Unit Headquarters who participated on separate occasions in the UNMIL between the years 2004 and 2008.

The participants represented were the NDF officers of various levels who participated in the peace support operation in Liberia during the period under review. The study was focused the categorised groups of officers who were directly or indirectly involved in the UNMIL operations. The analytical questionnaires were formulated to be answered by the respondents to bring out their views on challenges

associated with the Namibia Defence Force during UNMIL operations. In this regard, the researcher intended to establish the type of challenges that were experienced by the Namibian Defence Force during the operations, to identify the contributing factors and to suggest the way forward how the challenges should be avoided in future peace support operations. To this effect, the data were noted according to the respondents' group categories. The data collected from the respondents are categorised and presented in the exploratory and descriptive approach through introductory remarks that are followed by figures based on how a specific questionnaire was addressed by each category groups of respondents.

4.2. Research Findings from the Command group

In this group, the researcher found out that most of the respondents interviewed served in the position of contingent commander or contingent second in command during the UNMIL between the years 2004 and 2008 respectively. The study also revealed that the commanders and second-in-commanders had served in the mission for a period of six months on rotational basis. However, some of the commanders and their second-in-command have been noted repeating the command responsibility in UNMIL for more than one term. The research has also revealed that the UNMIL was operating under the mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution 1509, as the legal frame work in which the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was serving.

During the interviews, the respondents in the command group revealed that during UNMIL, the Namibian Contingents starting from NAMBATT-1 to NAMBATT-6

experienced some administrative problems that posed challenges on personnel and contingent owned equipment (COE). The challenges were related to command, control and communications, also known as C3 in military terminology. The interview also revealed that the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) operational requirement capabilities were not matching with the United Nations' standards, and were also not compatible with the United Nations Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs).

Some respondents in the command group also disclosed that the UNMIL was a multi-dimensional operation that composed of various components. The components were as listed: political, military, civilian police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender and child protection, disarmament, demobilisation and re-integrations, public information and support elements as well as electoral components. The composition of the mission at the outset provides a clear picture of its complexity. Hence, this made it the largest mission in the world at that time, followed by the current United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

The respondents also explained further that due to the complexity of the UNMIL, the Namibian contingent was struggling to adapt in the earliest period of deployment. First of all were the aspects of cultural diversity that includes various cultural and religious beliefs, climate variation that includes temperature and precipitation. Geographical location of the host country in tropical zone had significant impact on personnel and equipment. Multiculturalism was another problematic issue on forces integration. The religious difference between the Muslims and Christians had also an effect on the deployment of the Namibian contingent, as most of the contingent

members were Christians, they had mixed feelings on how they would operate under the Pakistani Muslims' command. In addition, the military culture and ethics of the two nations' forces was another challenge.

The socio – economic status of the host country due to the conflict posed a great challenge in terms of sourcing the stores and other commodities. The UN policy of zero tolerance on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of women and children negatively affected the Namibian contingents. With this, some of the Namibian contingent's members were found on the wrong side of the international law and were tried while others are pending UN investigation. Based on the revealed challenges, the peace support operations (PSOs) is however expected to achieve its mandate within such constraints in support of the myriad for relief agencies in its theatre of operations and to encounter the situational dominance challenges in that argumentative environment, on its approach to realise the objectives of the mission.

The respondents also revealed that the Namibian contingent that served in UNMIL had been subordinated under command of the Pakistani Brigade and its General Officer Commanding (GOC) in charge of the military sector No. 2. In this regard, some respondents mentioned about the average relationship between the two different nation's forces operating under one command.

Some other respondents revealed that there was some sort of friction that had developed as the Pakistani counterparts found out that the first Namibian contingent commander and his deputy were trained in India. For that reason, the Pakistani felt discontented to operate closely with the Namibian contingent commanders who received military training in a hostile country. Historically, Indian and Pakistan are

political rivals over Kashmir disputed region. Pakistan regards India as her major military rival in the Caucasus region.

The respondents also indicated that the Namibian contingent was not represented in the Brigade headquarters staff elements by any senior officer from the rank of colonel, equivalent and above.

The absence of representations in the Brigade headquarters had resulted in some report worth activities specifically conducted by the Namibian contingent were not recorded as done by the NamBatt. Instead the reports were generalised as activities carried out by sector No.2 or by the Pakistani Brigade. The respondents in this group level have also given their suggestions and opinions how to address those challenges in the future PSOs. Some of the suggestions and opinions mentioned require the involvement of the NDF high command. The respondents of this command group have also exposed that the Namibian contingents were not also represented at Force headquarters in Monrovia. The absence of representative at FHQ resulted in decisions taken towards the Namibian contingents to receive or to implement actions. There were also no forums in which the Namibian contingents could make consultations and defend themselves on bias reports and mission related allegations.

Operating in absence of representatives at both the brigade and force headquarters has disadvantages of individual contingent operating in multidimensional forces. All forces are supposed to have equal representation in both deliberations and decision making process, as far as the mission is concern. For example, during the initial deployment plan it was agreed that the Namibian contingent will serve jointly with the Nigerian troops, and due to none representation the Namibian contingent was

informed while already in the mission area that it would serve jointly with the Pakistani forces.

The respondents of this command group expressed also that the deputy commander of the Brigade in sector No.2 and some of the Brigade staff officers should have been composed of the Namibians in order to balance the command structure. The respondents suggested further that the situation of operating without representatives in both Brigade headquarters and Force headquarters should be avoided in future operations. The NDF command should consider including the NDF contingent representatives in the memorandum of understanding (MoU) and Status of force Agreement (SOFA). The respondents in this command group have rated some of the NDF personnel performances as good during the UNMIL operations.

According to the respondents of command group the UN logistics supplies system for food and medicines was good and no setbacks were experienced throughout. The respondents in the command group have observed the deficiencies in the following issues; Standard operational procedures (SOP), contingent owned equipment (COE), administrative and personnel requirements with regard to the participation in the UN peace support operations. The deficiencies were ranging from defects with potable water purification system; ambulances not equipped with intensive care unit (ICU) equipment and some ambulances roofs leaking during rain. Also the NDF armed troops' carriers (APCs) were not compatible with the terrain in Liberia. The tents were leaking along the seams which were disturbing the soldiers when resting. This situation also caused hygienic hazard to the troops and equipment.

The respondents emphasised again that the above mentioned issues need to be improved during the NDF mission pre-preparation stage. The respondents also stressed that the contingent should be well updated in terms of mission related regulations upon their arrival in the mission area during the induction training. The command group respondents also put more emphasis on UN policy of none tolerance on sexual exploitations and abuse (SEA), as misconducts relating to SEA are serious offences in any PSOs. Therefore, the contingents should be educated on the related UN peacekeeping code of conduct.

The example of how the Namibian contingents implicated in SEA allegations for the first time was exposed in some of the Liberian local newspaper articles namely “The ANALYST” of Wednesday, 7th April 2004 and “DAILY TALK NEWS” which labeled the Namibian contingent members of involving themselves in buying prostitution with young Liberian girls. These were some of the actual challenges experienced by the Namibian contingents. In relation to the newspaper article, the participants also revealed that the UN policy of none tolerance on SEA was introduced in UNMIL during the year 2005. The dissemination of SEA code of conduct was not effectively sensitized to members of the Namibian contingent, as a result certain individual from the Namibian contingent were implicated for consented love affairs with some Liberian ladies. However, the implication was in a prostitution manner (See Annex I here under).

The command group respondents exposed further that they learnt a lot of experiences from peace support operations in Liberia. In a nutshell the respondents brought up the constructive suggestions, recommendations and advise how the NDF will

improve the conduct of future peace support operations. They recommended and suggested as follows:

- 4.2.1. Full representation in all the management headquarters level,
- 4.2.2. To consider the vacation and compassionate leave for contingent members during tour of duty in the missions area,
- 4.2.3. Increase the mass of individual personnel kit issue from 40kg to 100kg.
- 4.2.4. The Namibian contingent to be self-sustained in terms of air transportation of goods and personnel,
- 4.2.5. All soldiers to undertake the same mission should rehearse together,
- 4.2.6. All members who have been prosecuted for misbehaviours in previous missions should not be allowed opportunities to go for future PSOs missions,
- 4.2.7. Modern sport and recreational facilities to be considered for all future PSOs missions,
- 4.2.8. All members undertaking a mission should be taught SOPs for that specific mission.
- 4.2.9. All contingents mission related reports should be combined as one and filed for reference purpose.
- 4.2.10. The health pre-conditions for troops returning from the missions should be taken into consideration very seriously before reuniting with their families,

4.2.11. The dissemination of the UN missions related information should be upgraded further to reach all members of the Namibian Defence Force,

4.2.12. All contingent members who will be found guilty of abusing alcohol or drugs while on mission area should be repatriated home without further delay,

4.2.13. All the contingent members should be taught to stay away from indulging in love affairs with beneficiaries of assistance and treating the inhabitants of the host country with respect,

4.2.14. The contingent members should be educated to respect the human rights and abide by the local laws,

4.2.15. The contingent should be taught to avoid illicit dealings in the host country's natural resources,

4.2.16. All the contingent members should be cautioned to safeguard the information concerning the operations, and treat it as confidential to none UN members.

The recommendations, suggestions and advice proposed by the command group respondents will be incorporated in Chapter five of this study.

4.3. Research findings from the military observers and staff officers group

In this group category some of the respondents revealed that they observed the operational problems and weaknesses that have negatively impacted on the NDF

contingents during the peace support operations in Liberia, which may also affect other peace support operations in future. The respondents cited also the poor preparation of personnel, NDF contingent placed under command of the Pakistani brigade and contingent owned equipment (COE).

4.3.1. Poor preparation of personnel: One of the factors that they observed which affected the Namibian contingent during the UNMIL was the poor preparation of personnel, both the officers and other ranks. The respondents observed that the pre-training and rehearsals of the contingent troops was not effective during preparation, which resulted in poor discipline among the troops. The other issue of concern cited by the respondents in this group category was the lack of proper medical screening of personnel and as a result the contingent experienced a high death rate and massive repatriations of contingent members on medical grounds. It is reckoned that Namcon-I had high death rate during the first three months of deployment in the mission area comparing to other contingents in UNMIL. This was also coupled with repatriation of personnel due to various tropical related illnesses. The contingent members mostly suffered from diseases such as malaria, high fever, dry skin disease, fungus and others. The respondents in this category group spelt out that Namcon-I and II were the most affected contingents amongst the NDF contingents deployed in Liberia. The failure to emphasise lessons on UN Code of conduct during the preparation was also one of the

aspects that was observed by the respondents as putting the contingent members in chaos. Another issue of troop preparation was the absence of troop's education on UN policy for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), which resulted in some members to be involved in love affairs with local women, with some ending up cohabiting in local suburbs, while others impregnated the local women. Those cases were labelled as prostitution activities against the Namibian contingent. The respondents in this group category expressed their state of shock following the embarrassing and scandalous behaviour of their countrymen in UNIMIL. They also regarded these general conducts as unethical and unprofessional in military culture. Another aspect also connected with troop's poor preparation, the respondents gave a practical example of one day when a group of approximately forty (40) NamBatt-I members were celebrating a colleague's birthday in Sinje township. Sinje is a small township in Grand Cape Mount County where the NamBatt contingent headquarters were located. The group was singing the revolutionary songs, chanting, dancing and drinking in public, embracing and fondling local women. The respondents described the scene as irritating and also not expected from any professional soldier.

4.3.2. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE): According to the respondents of this group category, they observed that there was a lack of effectiveness in some of the NamBatt COE. In observation, the respondents noted that some vehicles, for example the armed

personnel carrier (APC) Wolf Mark-III were not suitable for Liberian terrain, due to muddy, marshy and thick forest type of terrain which was posing unfavourable condition for mobility. It was also established that the study of the terrain was not conducted before the deployment. The respondents also identified that there was a serious shortage of spare parts which resulted in some COE to be grounded. The grounded or unserviceable equipment had financial implication on reimbursement during the UN COE inspection. The respondents giving some example singled out the Namcon water purification system that could only work for a short period of time and was disqualified by the UN inspection team citing the quality of water produced not suitable for human consumption. This resulted in the removal of the water purification system from the reimbursement equipment list. However, according to the respondents' observation, Namcon was better equipped in contrast to some contingents from other troops contributing countries.

4.3.3. NDF Contingent Placed Under Command Of The Pakistani Brigade: The respondents in this group category observed that the subordination of Namcon to the Pakistani Brigade (Bde) had negatively affected the Namcon relating to social and religious aspects. The religious difference of the Muslim Pakistanis versus the Christian Namibians was one of the contributing factors which made

the Pakistanis to stand against the Namcon members' social behaviours. They perceived that the Namcon members' social behaviours and public conduct such as the use of alcohol was wrong in their presence. It is commonly known that the use of alcohol, shaking hands with females for greeting, associating with females and other cultural aspects are serious offences or taboo in Muslim culture. In turn, some of the social behaviour and conduct of the Pakistani Muslims were also peculiar in the presence of the Namibian contingent members. Based on the above information, the military observers are suggesting for global and cultural awareness lessons to be incorporated in the pre-training of the troops before undertaking the mission.

The respondents also divulged further on social relations by giving a holistic example in which a female Namcon officer delegated to represent the contingent at a farewell party that took place at the Bde HQ. The Pakistanis regarded it as a breach of culture in accordance to the Muslim customs. The officer was not accorded hospitality; therefore her presence was ignored due to cultural diversity. The respondents discovered that the Pakistanis counterparts lacked gender sensitivity. It was also observed that they were not prepared to mingle with female soldiers from other troop contributing countries during the UNMIL.

The respondents also observed that the corridor towards the Sierra-Leone border where Namcon was deployed was regarded as another thorn in the flesh of the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis attempted to degrade the good conduct of the Namcon on several occasions by not giving a credit where it was due. Another factor that nearly worsened the relations under the subordination was the time Pakistani discovered that the first Namcon commander and his deputy were trained in India. The respondents had also observed that there was a need to improve the following military aspects within the NDF formations and units:

- a. maintaining military professionalism in all NDF formations and units.
- b. Intensifying pre-deployment training emphasising more on UN Code of Conduct, Rules of Engagements (ROE), Stress Management, HIV/AIDS, The dos and don'ts in the host country, UN policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).
- c. Emphasising the military discipline code among troops by identifying common offences.
- d. Improving the welfare and recreational amenities of troops and consider incentives for individual members on missions. This should include the home mission allowances to be reviewed and suggested to increase from 50% to 85% or 50%to 90% as part of the UN reimbursement allowance and should be paid directly into individual account.
- e. Mitigating various measures to manage stresses during operations.

- f. The appointment of any Namibian contingent commander, he/she should be a well-trained officer who possesses the knowledge in both PSOs and conventional warfare.
- g. During the deployment of troops for PSOs the management should consider the factor of physical and mental fitness.
- h. NDF management should select members for PSOs who are ready to serve the interest of PSOs and building the country's reputation. The tendency of seeking financial benefits by individuals should be discouraged.
- i. The selection of the Contingents Owned Equipment (COEs) should be in accordance to the UN COE standing operational procedures (SOP) and consider the spare parts to sustain the COE.
- j. Integrations and insubordination of NDF contingent into other foreign countries formations and units should be well scrutinised and to be entered in the MoU. Consideration should be made on religious, cultural and diversities.
- k. The NDF leadership should study the reports and recommendations submitted by the contingent commanders, staff officers, and military observers and try to implement some of the recommendations.

4.4. Research findings from the Doctors and medical staff officers group

In this group category the respondents expressed their observation concerning some of the operational problems, weaknesses and challenges that may have affected the NDF negatively during the peace support operations in Liberia and they are cited below.

The establishment of the level-1 field hospital was one of the challenging factors that affected the NDF deployment to meet the UN set up standard. The medical staff officers in the advance group revealed that they were not initially aware of their responsibility that it includes the establishing of the level-1 field hospital in the mission area.

According to the respondent in this group category the advance group arrived in the mission area without necessary material to construct the structure of a level-1 field hospital. The group had to wait for the shipment of material from Namibia thorough port Monrovia. The arrival of material took time to reach Liberia, and the medical officers were left with no option, other than to improvising by using local crafted materials and reeds to erect the temporary shelters and storages as the situation forced them to do so as one of the requirement stipulated in the UN SOP. There was also a failure to provide two medical doctors and nurses in time to operate the level-1 field hospital as provided in UN SOP.

The respondents in this group category also indicated further that at the time of deployment in Liberia, the NDF had no medical doctors readily available for the

mission. Despite the requirement of the establishment of level-1 field hospital was a pressing issue for the NDF, the staffing of the level-1 field hospital as required by the UN SOP was another problem. The option left was to source a medical doctor from the Republic of Zambia. The views of the respondents indicated that the NDF preparation for the mission in Liberia was not sufficient. The respondents also perceived that NDF was not self-sustained. This resulted in Namcon-I tour of duty ending up being served by a single medical doctor instead of two as required. The respondents also revealed that there was a shortage of medical equipment, and the ambulances were not provided with the standard equipment, such as the intensive care apparatuses and they were leaking water on the roofs during rainy season.

The respondents were also concerned that Namcon-I had severely suffered ill health personnel in the mission area, because some members were deployed without proper medical screen for certain diseases. Liberia being a tropical country, as the humidity weather persistent, a large number of contingent personnel were affected by the weather condition and repatriated on medical ground. In addition four death cases also occurred during the first three months of initial deployment in the mission area.

The respondents also expressed that the Namcon was challenged by the seasonal clinical diseases, such as malaria, high fever, dry skin disease, fungus to mention but a few. These types of diseases are normally occurring during the rainy season and when humidity temperature rises. The respondent have also pinpointed out that some

contingent members suffered from fatigue generated from homesickness, and other various causes including drug abuse, addiction to the local brew, sycohoruses, and the habits of illegal dealings. The respondents however elaborated that the level-1 field hospital was effective and managed to handle most of the ailment cases experienced and very few sicknesses that were referred to level-2 hospital.

4.5. Gender balance of the respondents

According to UN definition, gender balance is expressed as equality of human rights that empowering women is also an indispensable tool for advancing development. For the purpose of this study the researcher intends to bring out the statistical gender analysis of the composition of officers served in command positions during peace support operations in Liberia. The researcher approached the commanding officers (COs), second-in-command (2ICs), staff officers (SOs) served in UNMIL headquarters and those who served at contingent headquarters as well as the military observers. It for the reason mention above that the researcher did not focused on the issues of gender balance due to the fact that all the NDF commanding officers and the second-in-command participated during UNMIL peace support operations that time were male officers.

There were few female staff officers who served at various levels during UNMIL; apparently they declined to participate in the research. The ethical rights and rule of the thumb of research as stated by Struwig and Stead, (2007, p.66) is that the universal good behaviours of respecting persons must be an overriding principle that

should guide all educational practice including research. It is unfortunate that there were no NDF female officers who served in UNMIL as military observers or in command position between the year 2004 and 2008. The researcher is therefore acknowledging the forty five (45) male officers who contributed to this research.

4.6. Respondents age groups.

To establish the results of the study according to the age group the researcher categorised the interviewees into three categories. The study revealed that out of 45 persons (NDF officers) interviewed 10 participants were between the age of 35 and 40 years old, 15 participants were between 41 and 45 years of age while 20 participants were of the age between 46 and 57 years old. Based on the above the study results showed that all the respondents interviewed were matured enough and regarded as NDF officers with long service history and experience in the field of their specialisations and leadership, therefore the responses they gave is based on the long service experiences and technical knowhow gained.

4.7. Rank categories of the respondents

The researcher for the purpose of this study categorised the rank parameters of the respondents according to NDF rank structure that include junior, senior and general officers. The junior officers' ranks are ranging from second lieutenant (2Lt), lieutenant (Lt) and captain (Capt), however only selective junior officers of the ranks of captains (Capt.) were interviewed for this study. The senior officers' ranks are ranging from major (Maj), lieutenant colonel (Lt Col) to colonel (Col) and this are the officers' categories that mostly participated in the interview. The general officers

are ranging from the ranks of brigadier general (Brig Gen), major general (Maj Gen) and lieutenant general (Lt Gen). In this ranks category only two brigadier generals who were interviewed for the purpose of this study. The researcher did not interview the junior officers such as lieutenants and non-commissioned officers who participated in the UNMIL during the period under review, due to the chain of command in the Namibian Defence Force.

Table: 4.1. Rank group category of respondents referred to a paragraph 4.7 above


Serial No.	General Officers	Senior Officers	Junior Officers	Total
1	2	35	8	45
Total	2	35	8	45

4.8. Number of years for respondents in NDF service

The respondents' numbers of years in the NDF service were also important to determine the achievement of the study's objectives, as long the serving officers having broad experience than those who recently enlisted. The long serving officers at various level of leadership according to fields of specialisations have worth contributed to this study by identifying some challenges associated with the deployment of NDF in peace support operations in Liberia. The research found the number of years in service of various respondents as follows: The brigadier generals who interviewed have served the NDF for more than 22 years at various command levels.

Thirty five (35) respondents of the senior officers level have also served for more than 22 years in NDF at various positions, while four (04) respondents from the junior rank category have served above 15 years and the other four (04) served only for 12 years in NDF. The results indicated that 82.2% of the respondents have served more than 22 years. It is worth to note that the long serving participants experience had added more value to this study.

Figure: 4.3. Illustration of respondents' years of service in NDF



4.9. Previous participations in peace support operations else where

The previous participation in other UN, continental and regional led peace support operations also played a major role to the respondents who contributed data for this study. The respondents who participated in more than one peace support operations elsewhere have the vast experience in PSOs and contributed more significantly to

unveiling the challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force peace support operations in Liberia, than those who participated for the first time in the peace support operations.

Table: 4.2. Indicating the figures of respondents who participation in previous peace support operations elsewhere

Serial number	Other UN PSOs	SADC PSOs	UNMIL PSOs	Total
1	26	30	44	45

The findings indicated that 57.7 percents of the respondents participated in different UN led peace support operations elsewhere, while 66.6 percents of the respondents have previous PSOs experience from the SADC led peace support operations and 99 percents of respondents were UNMIL participants. Based on the findings above the respondents were in position to provide meaningful information for this study. They were interviewed based on their roles and responsibilities during the peace support operations in Liberia. The role of the former chief of staff Army operations (COS A OPS) had overall responsibility to coordinate current army operations, administration and the movement of the contingent. The contingent commanding officers had overall responsibility for command and control of troops in the mission area, while the second-in-command supports the commanding officer's to run the contingent day to day administration. The officer commanding had a role to exercise command and control of the company, while the staff officers play administrative roles. The

military observers who were deployed with UN headquarters in Monrovia were responsible for field duties for observing, monitoring, assessing and report the situation. The information provided by the respondents help the researcher to reach the objectives of the study.

4.10. Causes of what is known as challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force PSOs in Liberia 2004 – 2008

The findings have revealed out that a country in general and a national defence force in particular when preparing for the international peace support operations it have to be ready for the possible challenges which will face the force from the beginning of the PSOs and up to the end of the mission. The challenges identified among others were: command, control and communications, logistics supplies, non-compatibility with UN standing operational procedures (SOPs), as well as the environmental conditions, such as weather and geographical impacts, language barriers, foreign cultural and religious values, were among the challenges identified through the study findings the first Commanding Officer of NamBatt– 1 and 5 of 2004 & 2007respectively.

2. According to NamBatt – I & V commanding officer, the mandate of the mission was decided under the United Nations Resolutions 1509 of 2003 to set up a United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and to be deployed under Chapter VII of the United Nation Charter. The tasks given to the Namibian Defence Force was to support and maintain the cease fire agreement between the belligerents and the

specific mission for the NamBatt was to provide security support to PSOs, Humanitarian activities as well as to provide assistance to the formation for the national security reform including the National police service. To provide patrols, escorts, guarding and manning of check points and to protecting of None Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Military Observers, (CO NamBatt –I & V, 2004 & 2007).

3. The respondents revealed that the challenges posed by personnel were: Hostile weather conditions that had affected the health conditions of NamBatt personnel and had also contributed to the reduction of the life span of some equipment and materials of the contingent owned equipment (COEs) and sometimes the weather effected the equipment and makes it not compatible to meet the UN required standard as they started to rust beforehand.

Culture was also one of the important challenges identified confronted the NDF members in the executing of their duties in the mission area because of cultural differences with other role players in the mission and as well as some members of the community of the beneficiaries of assistance. Environmental conditions had negatively affecting the vehicle operability of Namcon during off road and long distance patrols as it requires to keep all the vehicle movements on the road or on tracks otherwise if they used the off road system the vehicle may stuck in the mud or slip into the ditches, that was regarded as another challenge.

The religious issues were identified by some respondents as a challenge due to the fact that NamBatt served in Liberia under command of the Pakistani Brigade and the Pakistanis are Muslims by religion which is defiantly to the Christian beliefs, as a results the Pakistani ends up blaming the NamBatt of wrong doing behaviours because of different religious and cultural beliefs.

Some of the respondents felt that the language barriers were another challenges with the point that some NamBatt members were not fluent in spoken English and they were not acquainted with the accent of Liberians and the Pakistanis English. Some of the respondents had cited the conflict of interests of some other stakeholders represented in both headquarters as the challenges that had spoiled the game all together, there were an unknown competition whereby some stakeholders want to see other nations leaving the mission area first and pave the way for them to remained until the end of the peace support operations over.

The respondents expressed the issue of none representations of NamBatt in both headquarters was also regarded as the other challenges affected the NDF in the PSOs. Without a representative in both high headquarters such as the Force HQs and at sector HQs level was a big challenges resulted into a contingent not being represent during the very important decision making meetings regarding the contingents as some decisions concerning the activities are being discussed in the absence of the contingent. To balance the command structures there is also a need of

a representative in the Brigade HQs and Sector HQs by a high ranking NDF official rather than the liaison officer.

Some respondents raised their concern on the sexual exploitation and abuse as another challenging factor affect the PSOs negatively. The issue of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), labelled to the Namibian Contingent and as alluded by the Liberian local newspaper “The ANALYST” of Wednesday, 7 April 2004, that “the Namibian contingent of the United nations missions in Liberia (UNMIL) in the Grand Cape Mount county is involved in uncontrollable prostitution with young girls in the area (“The ANALYST”, 2004, p. 2).

The NamCon had suffered a lot through this type of challenges not only on the natural phenomena, culture or religious related issues, but suffered also in the hands of selfish individual Namibians who are trying to advancing their unknown agendas via the deployment of the defence force to the international peace support operations. The aims and objectives of the UN to deploy the international forces were to alleviate the suffering of the Liberia people and to bring to an end the Liberian conflict through peaceful means.

4.11. Factors contributing to the challenges associated with the Namibia Defence Force PSOs in Liberia

The researcher has taken it up to inquire into the factors contributing to the challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force in Liberia peace support operations 2004 to 2008. To this end the respondents argued as follows: 20 respondents cited that the memorandum of understanding (MoU) entered between the United Nations and the troops contributing country Namibia was signed and executed without being thoroughly studied and scrutinised upon by the experts led to the contributing factors of the challenges of the contingent being deployed under command and in support to the Pakistani Brigade.

The respondents further indicated that the challenges of not being represented in both high level HQs namely the Force headquarters and the sector headquarters was a serious failure to be blamed on the NDF managements who signed the MoU it was supposed to be indicated in some sections of the MoU.

The other ten respondents referred to the lack of proper preparedness at home to take up the mission seriously as the contributing factors to the challenges affecting the NDF during UNMIL operations. Five respondents replied that favouritisms in the selections process of contingent members as one of the factors contributing the challenges confronted by the NDF during the operations under review.

The other five respondents indicated that the lack of proper command, control and communication (C3) was the contributing factors to the challenges as some of the commanding officers are being appointed verbally when there is only some few days

for the mission to take off. While 2 respondents referred to the lack of coordination and sharing of information gained from the previous peace support operations as one of the factors contributed to the challenges, the other 2 mentioned that most of the participating contingent members not rehearsed and trained together to take up the mission as a team could be one of the contributing factors to the challenges, as some members are just being met by others at the airports. 1 other respondent referred to the members who have previous indiscipline records allowed to participate in future missions and continue to behave the same as previously could be the factors contributing to the challenges affecting the force during the peace support operations.

The results in this regards shows that 20 respondents out of 45 participants interviewed are representing the 44.4% which indicated that the signing of the unstudied MoU by a team of experts is the key contributing factors to the challenges associated with NDF during the peace support operations in Liberia. The other 10 respondents who are representing 22.2 percents of the participants referred to lack of preparedness at home as the other factors contributing to the other challenges affected the force, and the rest 15 respondents mentioned the other different issues as the contributing factors to the challenges confronted the NDF during the UNMIL PSOs. To this existent 100 percent of the 45 interviewed respondents was achieved, that include the former chief of staff army operations, the four commanding officers and their second in commands, staff officers and military observers were interviewed in the process.

Most of the tasks assigned to NamCon during tenure were successfully carried out, though we were subordinated under the Brigade of another country. Nambatt has managed to operate under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to force through the rebel controlled areas of Kley where the rebels tried to block and to prohibit the advance of Nambatt to be firm on the ground on 22 February 2004 and secured Gba and continue further advanced to secure Sinje on the 23 February 2004. Then later to Bo Water Side near the Sierra Leon boundaries and Roberts' Port on the west coastal line. Therefore Nambatt was proud for this notable success.

NamBatt had served under the Pakistani Brigade in a military sector – 2 which was divided into three sub sectors where by two were in charge of the two Pakistani Battalions while one subsector were under the Namibian Battalion. The Units were deployed very far from each other and there were no much of interactions to each other except on some occasions. However there were problem experienced and worth to mention like that of operability techniques including command control and communication, cultural differences and language barriers. Apart from the above the general military relationships were regarded good and normal, this was indicated by the recommendations made through the confidential report given to Nambatt - I & V Commander.

To mitigate these challenges the NDF have to prepare itself in order to accommodate these challenges. First there is a need to have a senior country representative in the mission high HQs such as the Force HQs in order to represent the contingent during decision making meetings regarding the contingents as some decisions concerning

the activities are being discussed in the absence of the contingent. To balance the command structures there is also a need of a representative in the Brigade HQs and Sector HQs by a high ranking NDF official rather than the liaison officer.

The Namibian Battalion not well represented at the Sector HQs as well as at the Force HQs. If the contingent is not properly represented in both HQs the activities what the contingent had carried out is ending up not being reflected well in the sector reports or being reported as sector -2 activities where by Nambatt who is a main role player is being left out not being mentioned in that specific report

The NamCon activities were graded as very good in the sense that all the tasks given during the tenure of some NDF contingents were successfully carried out as per UN mandate and UNMIL had awarded them with certificates of mission accomplishments.

The UN logistic supplies in term of food and medicines to Nambatt were excellent and were delivered on time.

On the improvement of the PSOs, its recommended that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any future PSOs should be signed by experts from all the fields to be involved, such as Operations, Human Resources, Logistics, Medicals, to mention but a few. The good recommended procedures to avoid the unnecessary

sufferings of the troops on the ground, is to study, explored and exhorted well in advance all the pros and cons of the operations, before the signing of the MoU is put in force.

The six months maximum tour of duty (TOD) rotation needs to be extended to twelve months maximum, whereby the air transportations capacity are improved and put in place; to facilitate the transportation of troops to and from leave to the operational areas and home country after spending un-interrupted six months tour of duties in the mission areas.

The COEs should be selected and prepared in such a way to suite the operational environment, that including paintings, utility, mobility and manoeuvrability of the COEs.

It was also recommended that the NDF requires to employs and to deploying the COEs and troops that may fit and suite the UN missions operational environment.

The issue of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), labelled to the Namibian Contingent and as appeared in the Liberian local newspaper article of the “The ANALYST” of Wednesday, 7 April 2004, that “the Namibian contingent of the United nations missions in Liberia (UNMIL) in the Grand Cape Mount County is involved in uncontrollable prostitution with young girls in the area.

According to commanding officer Nambatt – I interviewed on the matter he vehemently denied that the above allegation of SEA was a pure lie done deliberately to tarnish the good name of the Namibian Contingent (NamCon), contrarily to the SEA allegations appeared in the local newspaper article, the Governor of the Grand Cape Mount County Mr Foley Kiatamba, were the NamCon was operating released a press statement on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, whereby the concern citizens of that county disassociated themselves from the above mentioned newspaper article, and they further condemn the article in the strong terms, that “at no time has the Namibian contingent of the United Nations mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in the county been involved in “uncontrollable” prostitution with young girls in the area.

The concerned citizens also challenged the ANALYST newspaper reporter that the Namibians in the constant habit of hiring people to search for women (young girls) for US\$10.00 or US\$20.00 per night. In the same vein Mr Edwin N. Dumber of Power House Grand Cape Mount Co. wrote a letter of apology to the Namibian Contingent at Gbah Point whereby he stated that “the news reported on the 7th April 2004 about the Namibian contingent involved in prostitution was not done by him and he cannot physically or mentally fight UNMIL but it was a serious, serious accident on his part” CO Nambatt – I (2004).

However on a separate note the majority citizens of Grand Cape Mount County have disassociate themselves from the article in the back page of Vol. 5 No. 90, Wednesday, April 7, 2004 of the ANALYST newspaper caption.

Every UN mission is varying from one another, but the most important of all is preparedness to undertake such mission and its challenges, the other thing is to share the information and experiences acquired during the previous UN PSOs.

The Contingent Commanders should be appointed in writing rather than verbatim approach. A mission command post should be created and manned in Namibia for easy coordination of mission related matters.

The advice or recommendation on how to improve the challenges encountered during UNMIL PSOs.

- a. Full represented in all high HQs levels.
- b. Leave for troops to be considered, including the compassionate leave.
- c. Luggage weight to be increased from 40Kg per person to 100 Kg per person.
- d. The contingent should be self-sustainable in terms of air transportations of troops.
- e. The troops meant for the same mission should be rehearsed together.
- f. Members who have previous bad records in earlier UN/AU missions not to be allowed to go for other future PSOs missions.

- g. Sport facilities to be considered for all PSOs missions
- h. Mission SOPs to be written and to be made known to all contingent members including the troops.
- i. All the mission related reports to be compiled together and be filed in a single ark file as such.
- j. Health preconditions for troops returning back from the missions to be considered before they reunite with their families.
- k. UN mission information share ring to be upgraded.
- l. Improving of the air transportations facilities of troops.

The first challenges encountered were weather condition which was very hostile and has a terrible reduction in the health of Nambatt personnel and life span of the equipment and other materials. According to the 1stNambatt command, during the first two months the Namcon lost three members due to the environmental and weather related sicknesses.

The weather caused also the problem of some equipment not met the UN standard as stipulated in the UN SOP because they started to rust at the early time before even the commencement of the inspections, the common interests of the other stakeholders was another challenges on its own. Environmental conditions were again another challenge.

The first Namibian Contingent of UNMIL on 8th June, 2004 observed their medal day as a mark of respect in restoring peace to Liberia, at Sinje, Garwular District, in Grand Cape Mount County. See annex – N, here bellow.

The mission was characterised by many challenges and the following notice board article placed in the central Monrovia the capital city of Liberia, was also one of the notable examples of that kind of challenges. It was quote and reads as follows:

4.12. Press release by the Governor of Grand Cape Mount County (GCMC)

“The concerned Citizens of the County want to advise the ANALYST NEWS PAPER that if the paper cannot do any good for the people of the County or the County itself, then the paper should never publish such on the County and its Citizens. See annex – N.

4.13. Data presentation

The following discussion were based on presentations of the results of the qualitative analysis of the exploration of data and contents analysis of the technique from the in-depth study of challenges associated with the NDF peace support operations in Liberia between the year 2004 – 2008 respectively. The interpretation of the data is presented in accordance to the overall objective of this study. The first section deals with information of the challenges experienced by the Namibia Defence Force obtained from the records during the peace support operations in Liberia for the duration of 2004 – 2008. The second section deals with the data obtained through

interviews concerning the challenges associated with NDF in peace support operations in Liberia. The third section deals with the information obtained from the respondents through questionnaires. The fourth section deals with the data obtained through observations by military observers, staff officers and the researcher himself during their participations in UNMIL 2004 to 2008 respectively.

4.13.1. Findings from the records

Based on the previous definitions, the study attempted to determine in an objective and scientific way of doing things if there is a specific relationship between the challenges and peace support operation in Liberia where the NDF participated in 2004 – 2008. It was considered necessary to employ a qualitative approach, as this may facilitate the possibility to determine the pre-defined constructs in a tangible way. This is more authoritative than relying on descriptive survey approach. The records survey was conducted to determine the challenges associated with the NDF in PSOs in Liberia through the written report such as the end of mission reports by Nambatt commanding officers, mission visit reports by senior NDF officers who visited the Nambatt during the PSOs in Liberia in the period 2004 – 2008, internet information concerning the PSOs in Liberia and other media information on NDF participations in the PSOs in Liberia. The research has revealed that there was no a good proper recording procedures in place, were most of the challenges are systematically recorded. Moreover, the participants expressed their opinion differently as follows; 25 participants indicated that challenges are not an easy thing to be recorded as they are happen on daily basis, 10

respondents cited that the challenges were not recorded due to the negligence of those who were responsible to record them, 7 respondents felt that some of the challenges were already known during the preparations and were supposed to be corrected in advance beforehand, the other 3 respondents expressed that some of the challenges has been experienced from the previous PSOs and supposed to be avoided not to be repeated again during the UNMIL mission.

4.13.2. Findings from Interviews

Data was collected with a recognised interview procedure, using a convenience questionnaires sample method. Data collection involved distribution of interview questionnaires to the willing participants to study them and generating an opportunity for interview and data capturing on a qualitative procedures. The data generated was then analysed on a qualitative methods to determine the relations between the two different variables representing the research construct on the challenges associated with the NDF PSOs in Liberia during the period 2004 – 2008.

4.13.3. Findings from the questionnaires

The questionnaires made available for this study were open-ended questionnaires and were consist of some other sub-questionnaires. This form of questionnaires is often used for a research purposes on grounds of good correlations with the long and shorter response time. The shorter response time seems to be a very important factor considered by people when making a

decision to participate in a study or not. The multi factor questionnaires evaluate the factors that have been identified to contribute to a certain interview style.

4.13.4. Findings from the observations

The criterion that was observed during the data collection that was stipulated was that the participants of this study should form part of the NDF officers at the management level who were directly or indirectly participated in the UN led peace support operations in Liberia in 2004 – 2008. For the purpose of this study only the job position (chief of staff army operations, commanders, their supporting staff officers and military observers group) were selected for interview and no other variables were identified as sources of information assisted in the exploration of the challenges associated with the NDF peace support operations in Liberia.

The objective of this study clearly stipulated that the main focus of explorations should be aimed at the concept “challenges associated with the NDF peace support operation in Liberia” that applies to a certain job position involving a certain level of responsibility and ranks categories. This is independent of gender or cultural background, contrary to the other approaches followed by other different studies.

After fifteen weeks period of struggling with appointments through telephone calls and personal visits, only 45 out 64 planned appointments were

successful constituting a response rate of 70.31 percent. Some of the earmarked participants refused outright to be interviewed claiming time constraints, work overload, unwillingness to participate and the other restrictions in NDF related institution prevented them to participate.

All the 70.31 percent of the participants were male NDF members and no female counter parts were willing to participate although they were formed part of the NDF contingents participated in the UN led peace support operations in Liberia. However a ratio was affected by the convenience sampling method used for this study. This would nevertheless indicate that a relatively balanced gender equality exist among the participants group of NDF commanding elements, military observers and staff officers who served in the peace support operations in Liberia between the year 2004 and 2008 respectively and had experienced some of the challenges explored in the study. The group of NDF officers interviewed and shared their experiences to this study consisted of seven (14) commanding officers (COs) and their second in command (2ICs), staff officers in various field military expertise and military observers participated in the mission. Most of the participants contacted were Oshiwambo speaking NDF officers.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

This chapter has provided the overall framework for this study through the discussion of the introduction and background of the study chapter, the theoretical background chapter, the research methodology chapter and the data presentation and discussion of the findings chapter, which were linked to research objectives and the statement of the problem. The research questionnaires were examined and compared with the related literature reviewed throughout the process of the study with a view to answer the entire research questionnaire in line with the research objectives.

Furthermore, the peace support operation in Liberia is still an on-going process, and the Namibian contingent has already withdrawn from the mission area. Therefore, the objectives of the study were to explore only the key challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force peace support operations in Liberia during the confined period from 2004 – 2008. The study revealed that challenges associated with the NDF during the UNMIL peace support operations were hampering the genuine procedures of the operations, therefore it required to be addressed urgently and seriously to avoid similar problems in the future PSOs to be conducted elsewhere.

5.2. Conclusion

To this end, the study has achieved its objectives; the target groups were contacted and interviewed and revealed what they think could be the key challenges associated with Namibian Defence Force (NDF) peace support operations (PSOs) in Liberia. The researcher also obtained balanced views of the respondents such as the former contingents commanding officers and their second-in-command, staff officers and the military observers, but did not obtain the gender balance due to the fact that the interviews were aimed at a certain job position or level of appointments, therefore many of the females who were eager to participate did not qualify as they were not at those levels of appointments during the period under review. These positions were such as contingent commanding officers, contingent second in command, contingent staff officers, Force headquarters staff officers and military observers. However, those who were qualified did not want to participate for one reason or other and they could not be forced to participate in accordance with the ethical policy and procedures.

The respondents had pin pointed out the key challenges which they viewed as the problem grey areas that hampered the previous UNMIL operations under review and it will continue to do so in the future operations if these challenges were not addressed on time as indicated in the recommendations below.

5.3. Recommendations

It was recommended that every UN mission is varying from one country to the other, but the most important of all is preparedness to undertake such mission. The other important thing is to share the information and experiences acquired during the previous UN peace support operations, therefore the Namibian Defence Force is hereby urged and advised to follow suite to be prepared to undergo the endurance of the peace support operations and to act as follows:

1.3.1. The Contingent Commanders should be appointed in writing rather than verbatim approached.

1.3.2. A command post should be created and manned from home that is for an easy planning and coordination purposes.

5.3.2. The advice and recommendation on how to improve the challenges encountered during UNMIL PSOs.

5.3.3. Full representations in all HQs levels by the senior NDF staff officers is highly required.

5.3.4. Annual vocational and compassionate leave for troops to be considered.

5.3.5. Luggage weight for the contingent members to be increased from 40Kg per person to 100 Kg per person.

5.3.6. The contingent should be self-sustainable in terms of air transportation of its troops.

5.3.7. The troops for the same mission should be trained and rehearsed together.

5.3.8. Members who have previous bad records not to be allowed to go for future missions again.

5.3.9. Sport facilities to be considered for all the contingents to be participating in future PSO missions.

5.3.10. Mission SOPs to be written and to be taught and to be made known to the all troops to be participating in the missions.

5.3.11. All the mission related reports should be compiled together and made as one at the end of every PSOs missions.

5.3.12. Health preconditions for troops returning from the missions to be considered.

5.3.13. Information sharing with regard to PSOs missions to be upgraded and extended to all NDF services and other formations and units.

5.3.14. Improving the air transportation capacity for all intended missions.

5.3.15. Preparing in advance the two medical doctors for level one hospital and their replacing counterparts during rotations.

5.3.16. Preparing in advance of COE servicing and replacing parts.

These recommendations were delivered from the fact findings of this study as they were obtained from the respondents interviewed.

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ANNEX-A

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES FOR CONTINGENT COMMANDERS
AND THEIR 2ICs OF THE NAMIBIAN DEFENCE FORCE (NDF)
BATTALIONS SERVED IN UN MISSION IN LIBERIA FOR THE PERIOD
FROM 2004 - 2008**

NB: Major Ilwenya is a final year post graduate student and currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme, with UNAM. His research topic is to **“Exploring the Challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), during the UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Liberia (2004 – 2008)”**. The questionnaires will be explained to the respondents during the interviews before the recording of the information by the researcher who will write all the answers verbatim or tape recording them to avoid misinterpretation of the collected data.

1. The selected target group for this interview are contingent commanders and their second in command: Have you served as a Contingent Commander of the Namibian Battalion (NamBatt) under the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)? **Tick the correct answer by marking the given space below with (X):**

a. YES: ☐

b. NO: ☐

C. IF YES, WHICH YEAR?

2004	2004-2005	2005	2005-2006	2006	2006-2007	2007	2008
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GENDER:

2. What was the UN mandate and mission given to the Namibian Battalion (Nambatt) in the area of responsibility during your term as Contingent Commander?

Elaborate with your own

words:.....

3. Have the Namibian Contingent under your command experienced some problems or difficulties that posed challenges on personnel and equipment during the UN Mission in Liberia? **If “yes” elaborate those problems or challenges encountered:**

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4. As a Contingent Commander can you also elaborate briefly on the successful activities that the Namibian Contingent has achieved during the deployment in Liberia?

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5. The Namibian Contingents served in Liberia have been subordinated under the command of the Pakistani Brigade/and Commander in charge of the military sector - 2. In this context, have you noticed problems between your troops and the Pakistani Brigade? What was the relationship between the two Defence Forces from different countries deployed together under one command? **Elaborate your experience:**

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6. In your opinion what is your suggestions to address those challenges the Namibian Contingent has encountered in Liberia in terms of hierarchical command systems; **elaborate your recommendations:**

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7. Based on your experience on the UN Mission in Liberia, was the Namibian Continent properly represented at various headquarters of the UN establishments for example at Sector - 2 HQs and in Force HQs respectively? **Tick the correct answer**

by marking the given space below with (X) with supporting comments to augment your answer:

a. In Sector -2 HQs (i) YES: ☐

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b. In Sector - 2 HQs (ii) NO: ☐

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c. In Force HQs (i) YES: ☐

[illegible]

d. In Force HQs (ii) NO: ☐

8.a. If your answer in paragraph 7 (a & c) above is “yes” what were the advantages for the NDF Contingents in your views? **Mention five (05) advantages:**

[illegible]

8.b. If your answer in paragraph 7 (b & d) above is “no” what were the disadvantages for the NDF Contingents in your views? **Mention five (05) disadvantages:**

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9. How do you grade the level of NDF personnel performances during UN Mission in Liberia? **Give your grading by marking with (X) one choice on the ratings given below with supporting comments to augment your grading:**

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....
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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....
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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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10. How do you compare the levels of UN Logistic Supplies (food and medicine) given to the Namibian Contingent while serving under the UN Mission in Liberia? Give your grading by marking with (X) one of the given ratings below with comments on your answer:

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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11. Based on your experience have you observed deficiencies in the standard operational procedures, contingent owned equipment (COE), administrative and personnel requirements with regard to the UN peacekeeping or peace support operations which you think require some improvements to make the UN Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) more effective to sustain troops in the mission area and carry the mission successfully? **Elaborate your comments and give recommendations to improve on these elements by both the TCC and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO):**

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12. The UN has introduced some strict regulations including no tolerance on Sexual Exploitations and Abuse (SEA) and in relations to the newspaper articles appeared in the Liberian local newspaper “The ANALYST” of Wednesday, 7 April 2004 attached here. What is your comment on this issue regarding the Namibian Contingents served in Liberia? **Elaborate your comment:**

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13. Having acquired relevant military experiences in the conduct of the UN peacekeeping operations what other issues or lessons learnt that you want to recommend to the NDF commanders at various levels to improve in future UN missions (contingents, staff officers and military observers) during pre-deployment

phase, while in mission area and during termination of the mission? **Elaborate your answers and give recommendations:**

[illegible]

14. In conclusion, having answered all the questions on this interview schedule, the last question you are requested to give your advice or recommendations on how to improve on the problems and challenges encountered during the UN mission in Liberia for the benefits of the NDF headquarters, commanders, officers and men in uniforms in all fields of military profession? **Give at least ten (10) recommendations/and advises or more:**

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NB: Lastly, thank you very much for your great contribution to this research. I assure you that the information you have shared will benefit the NDF once my Thesis is published.

SIGNATURE OF THE RESEARCHER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ANNEX-B**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STAFF OFFICERS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS SERVED THE IN UN MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) FROM 2004 – 2008.**

NB: Major Ilwenya is a final year post graduate student and currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme, with UNAM. His research topic is to **“Exploring the Challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), during the UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Liberia (2004 – 2008)”**. The questionnaires will be explained to the respondents during the interviews before the recording of the information by the researcher who will write or tape recording all the answers verbatim to avoid misinterpretation of the collected data.

1. The targeted population group for this interview are the Staff officers and military observers during the period under review: Have you served as a Staff Officer / Military Observer during the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)? **Tick the correct answer by marking the given space below with (X):**

a. YES: ☐

b. NO: ☐

[illegible]

[illegible]

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05. How do you rate the performance of the NDF Contingent in Liberia in terms of Personnel Preparations? **Give your grading by marking with (X) one of the given ratings below with comments on your answer:**

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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06. How do you rate the performance of the NDF Contingent in Liberia in terms of COE preparations? **Give your grading by marking with (X) one of the given ratings below with comments on your answer:**

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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07. How do you rate the performance of the NDF Contingent in Liberia in terms of Logistics Supply System? **Give your grading by marking with (X) one of the given ratings below with comments on your answer:**

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE:

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD:

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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08. How do you rate the performance of the NDF Contingent in Liberia in terms of Command, Control and Communication System? **Give your grading by**

marking with (X) one of the given ratings below and give comments on your answer:

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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NB: Lastly, thank you very much for your contribution to this research. I assure you that the information you have shared will benefit the NDF once my Thesis is published.

SIGNATURE OF THE RESEARCHER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ANNEX-C

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES WITH THE FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF
JOINT OPERATIONS PLANS AND TRAINING DURING THE UN MISSION
IN LIBERIA THE PERIOD FROM 2004 – 2008**

NB: Major Ilwenya is a final year post graduate student and currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme, with UNAM. His research topic is to **“Exploring the Challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), during the UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Liberia (2004 – 2008)”**. The questionnaires will be explained to the respondents during the interviews before the recording of the information by the researcher who will write all the answers verbatim or tape recording them to avoid misinterpretation of the collected data.

1. The selected targeted group for this research questionnaire is the former COS JOPT: The Question number 1 is directed to the Chief of Staff Defence Joint Operations Plans and Training. General, Sir; as a former Chief of Staff OPT and had been in charge of operational coordination and you was also part of the signatories of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations which facilitated the NDF participation in UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) over the period of four years from 2004 – 2008 respectively;

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2. General; during UNMIL operations the Namibian Contingent was placed in a joint deployment with the Pakistani Brigade which provided the overall command and responsibilities of the assigned UN Military Sector in Liberia. What were the

challenges, shortcomings and implications to the NDF Contingents as far as your concern in terms of joint concept of operations and the aspects of command, control and communications (C3) in the multinational environment? **General; can you kindly shed some highlights from your strategic operational experiences with regard to this question:**

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3. In the same vein, may the General also shed more lights on the challenges the NDF Contingents have encountered for not being directly represented by the high ranking officials at the UN Force Headquarters in Liberia where the strategic operational decisions are initiated before assigned to the troops on the mission area for implementation? **General, what are your views on this scenario?**

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4. The UN standing operational procedures (SOP) is strict on medical conditions among other operational requirements concerning personnel undertaking the UN missions. **General, what are your views on this requirement and how it often impacted the troops on the ground in the case-study of Namibia?**

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[illegible]

6. Any military operations including peace support operations will be successful depending upon the scale of logistics supplies and administration in the field and capabilities in terms of well-prepared personnel, equipment, firepower, transport, welfare conditions and information supported by effective command, control and communication elements. **General, what are your experiences on these challenges when troops were deployed in Liberia, some thousands of kilometres away and very far from home?**

[illegible]

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8. Last question, General, Sir; to wind-up this interview, what are your final comments to address those pertinent challenges, shortcomings and limitations being encountered in the UN peace support operations in the context of Namibia as one of the Troop Contributing Countries, for example the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Standing Operational Procedures, Concept of Joint Operations in multinational environment that need strategic considerations?

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NB: Lastly, General, thank you very much for availing me this opportunity.

SIGNATURE OF THE RESEARCHER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ANNEX-D**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES WITH THE FORMER ARMY HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS DURING THE UN MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) AS FROM 2004 - 2008**

NB: Major Ilwenya is a final year post graduate student and currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme, with UNAM. His research topic is to **“Exploring the Challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), during the UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Liberia (2004 – 2008)”**. The questionnaires will be explained to the respondents during the interviews before the recording of the information by the researcher who will write all the answers verbatim or tape recording them to avoid misinterpretation of the collected data.

1. The selected target group for this research questionnaire is the former COS Army operations: General, Sir, the Army Headquarters was charged with direct preparations, supervision and execution of command, control and communication (C3) with the NDF Contingents deployed in the UN Mission in Liberia during the period from 2004 – 2008 respectively. General; as a former Army HQs Chief of Staff Operations what were the pertinent challenges or shortcomings in terms of force preparations, concept of joint operations in multinational environment, logistical requirements, administrative supports as well as aspects of command and control arrangements experienced by the NDF Contingents while serving under the UN

Mission in Liberia? **General, can you kindly shed some highlight on your operational experiences on this question:**

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2. General, based on the reports received in your office by then, how the NDF Contingents operational images were projected in Liberia and how you are rating their level of performance?

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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3. Which Namibian Contingent (Nambatt) performed extremely better than others during the UN Mission in Liberia and the reasons why?

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4. What were the successes stories by the NDF Contingents for their contribution in the restoration of peace and stability in Liberia?

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NB: Lastly, General, thank you very much for availing me this opportunity.

SIGNATURE OF THE RESEARCHER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ANNEX-E

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES WITH MEDICAL DOCTORS ASSIGNED
TO SERVE AT LEVEL 1 HOSPITAL DURING NDF OPERATION IN
LIBERIA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS**

NB: Major Ilwenya is a final year post graduate student and currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme, with UNAM. His research topic is to **“Exploring the Challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), during the UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Liberia (2004 – 2008)”**. The questionnaires will be explained to the respondents during the interviews before the recording of the information by the researcher who will write all the answers verbatim or tape recording them to avoid misinterpretation of the collected data.

1. The selected targeted group for the research interview is the former NDF Doctors and their enrolled nurses served with NDF during the period under review. This questionnaire is dedicated for medical doctors and registered nurses served with the Namibian Contingents during 2004 – 2008 UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). As a health specialist, what was your appointment at the Namibian Contingent Level 1 Hospital in Liberia? **Tick the correct answer by marking the given space below with (X):**

a. MEDICAL DOCTOR: ☐

b. REGISTERED NURSE:

c. GENDER:

2. During your term of service in Liberia, what were the major health challenges and shortcomings encountered from the NDF Contingent in the mission area? **Can you please elaborate your views on this question?**

[illegible]

3. As a medical doctor or registered nurse, how do you rating the health conditions of the NDF Contingent served the UN Mission in Liberia during your tenure of duty at the NDF Level 1 Hospital in the mission area? **Give your grading by marking with (X) one of the given ratings below and give comments on your answer:**

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....
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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....
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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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4. During your deployment in Liberia have you discovered clinical diseases that affected UN personnel? If “yes” what are those diseases and how can we sensitized our personnel against these diseases?

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5. During deployment in Liberia have you discovered any kinds of battle fatigue or mental stress among personnel served in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)? If

“yes” what are your recommendations to mitigate this challenges in the future when deploying members in the UN missions?

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6. How do you rating health pre-deployment preparations in Namibia for NDF Contingent served in UN operations? **Give your grading by marking with (X) one of the given ratings below and give comments on your answer:**

a. POOR: ☐

Comment:.....

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b. AVERAGE: ☐

Comment:.....

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c. GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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d. VERY GOOD: ☐

Comment:.....

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e. EXCELLENT: ☐

Comment:.....

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7. Last question, Doctor/or Registered Nurse, to wind-up this interview, what are your final recommendations to address those pertinent health challenges being encountered by the NDF Contingents during the mission in Liberia?

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NB: Lastly, General, thank you very much for availing me this opportunity.

SIGNATURE OF THE RESEARCHER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ANNEX-F

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES WITH AMBASSADOR, MR. T
KALOMOH, FORMER UN ENVOY TO LIBERIA AND FORMER DEPUTY
TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

NB: Major Ilwenya is a final year post graduate student and currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme, with UNAM. His research topic is to **“Exploring the Challenges associated with the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), during the UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Liberia (2004 – 2008)”**. The questionnaires will be explained to the respondents during the interviews before the recording of the information by the researcher who will write all the answers verbatim or tape recording them to avoid misinterpretation of the collected data.

1. This questionnaire is directed to Ambassador Kalomoh who served at the UN HQs in New York as Deputy to the UN Secretary General on Political Affairs during the NDF Contingents serving under the UN Mission in Liberia and former UN Envoy to Liberia. Mr Ambassador how did the conflict in Liberia started and how the UN intervened from political, diplomatic and military perspectives? What are your comments Mr Ambassador?

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2. Mr. Ambassador in your own views, what were the major challenges at the political and diplomatic levels required restoring peace, security and stability in Liberia? Mr Ambassador could you shed more light on this question and what were the potential sources of that conflict?

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3. Namibia has immensely contributed some peacekeepers, staff officers and military observers during 2004 – 2008 under the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). How do you recall Namibia's contributions to that international obligation in views of the United Nations HQs in New York and what are your recommendations thereof?

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NB: Lastly, Ambassador; thank you very much for availing me this opportunity.

SIGNATURE OF THE RESEARCHER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ANNEX - G

Private Bag 13301, 340 Mandume Ndemufayo Ave, Pionierspark, Windhoek, NAMIBIA

Faculty of Economics and Management Science

24 April 24, 2012

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This letter services to inform you that Mr. **Ilwenya Thomas Ilwenya** is a final year Master's degree student at the University of Namibia. Mr. Ilwenya is currently busy with his thesis and the University humbly requests your good office to give him the necessary access and support for him to obtain the required information.

Thank you for your support.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "V. L. Tonchi".

V. L. Tonchi

Head: Department of Political and Administrative Studies

ANNEX – H**NAMIBIAN DEFENCE FORCE**

Tel: (061) 204 9111
 Fax: (061) 204 2124
 E-mail Address: cdefence@mod.gov.na

Enquiries: Maj TI Ilwenya
 CDF/600/20/1
 Our Ref:.....Your Ref:.....

Chief of the Defence Force
 Private Bag 13307
 WINDHOEK


29 May 2012

See Distribution

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A FIELD RESEARCH BY MAJOR T.I. ILWENYA MA-SSS FINAL YEAR POST-GRADUATE STUDENT AT UNAM


1. This serves to inform you that the above mentioned officer is currently busy writing his thesis as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the MA-SSS degree programme. The subject to be researched on is; "THE NAMIBIA DEFENCE FORCE (NDF) IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (PSOs); A CASE STUDY OF LIBERIA (2004 – 2008)". The exercise will be carried out over three months starting from June 2012, in Windhoek, Grootfontein and Okahandja.
2. The target population for this interview are the DHQs Generals and Senior Officers such as the former COS OPT now CDF, the former Army Chief of Operations now GOC 26 Brigade, all former Namibian Contingent Battalion Commanding Officers (Bn. COs) and their 2ICs, the former level 1 hospital Doctor now COS Medical Services, Military Observers (MOs), Staff Officers (SOs) and last interview to be done with former UN Envoy to Liberia Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomho, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign.
3. In the DHQs the student would like to access the related official documents, and to interview some individual officers on Liberia PSOs.
4. For the benefit and success of the research exercise, valuable information from various sources will be required as well as the utilization of MOD/NDF resources including transport.
5. In view of the above, permission is hereby granted to Major Ilwenya Thomas Ilwenya to carry out the research as required and you are herewith requested to render him all the necessary assistance he might require to make his research a reality.

BRIG GEN P HEITA psc (Zim) ndc (K)
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE: LT GEN



ANNEX - I

ARTICLE OF LOCAL NEWS PAPER "THE ANALYST" ON
PROSTITUTION



In Prostitution

Reports emanating from Grand Cape Mount County say the Nambian contingent of the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) in the county is involved in "unconformable" prostitution with young girls in the area.

According to the reports, the Nambians are in the constant habit of hiring people to search for women (young girls) for US\$10 or US\$20 per night.

The reports also indicate that in Sini, Obah, Modima and Bo Warleste where people keep cars, they often let people to rent their houses or use them as motels to rent their houses or use them as motels for this practice while in other instances, they sex these girls in rough areas, such as upon benches.

The reports say most of these acts of sexing young girls in Cape Mount is meant to be alarming on a high proportion.

Citizens are apprehensive of the fact that the Nambians are from South Africa and the Nambians are from South Africa and perhaps they might have AIDS which the girls are likely to contract. South Africa is one of the leading AIDS infected countries in Africa.

The report added that Cape Mount County citizens are deeply worried because they feel many of their girls should might be infected with the deadly disease.

The reports noted that many of the

See Story on Page 6

The citizens of the county prefer the citizens of the county rather than the Pakistani contingent to be extended or deployed in the county rather than the Namibians.

The citizens are therefore urging the

SOSR, Jacques Paul Klein; UNMIL, Future Commander, Daniel Opatowicz to investigate the circumstances surrounding the reported sex trade because such acts are prohibited under international laws.

Reading The Analyst is a Right, Not Privilege

ANNEX -J**DAILY TALK AND QUESTION NEWS DISPLAY BOARD**

ANNEX – K**ARMY HQ's REACTIONS LETTER ON THE ISSUES OF PROSTITUTION**

13-APR-2004 16:40

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RESTRICTED

Telephone : 2491111
 Extension : 1284
 Enquiries : Col KE Amupolo

Army Headquarters
 Private Bag 2011
 GROTFONTEIN

13 April 2004

NAMIBIAN PEACE KEEPERS IN PROSTITUTION

1. This HQ has received the article in Liberian local news paper "THE ANALYST" with dismay over the alarming and high proportion and acts of sexing young girls at Cape Mount in Liberia and the general behaviour of NAMBAT troops regarding sex as has been quoted in Wednesday 07 April 2004 publication.

2. This HQ contacted Comd NAMCON-1 and hinted on the matter as follows:-


a. That the situation has been exaggerated out of jealousy by the Pakistani Bde members for having not been welcomed by the Liberian locals and the warring factions who prefer to hand over their equipment and weapons to NAMBAT as part of the Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRR) process.

b. As these weapons are registered at the receiving HQ, the Pakistani Bde receives very few while NAMBAT receive them in mass. In UN generally, the receipt of weapons adds value and credibility to the performances of that HQ and the Pakistani Bde feel not doing much in this field. It is out of jealousy that the matter is exaggerated to tarnish the image of NAMBAT in Liberia.

3. This HQ will inform you on the outcome of the proposed SGSR Jacques Paul Klein and Gen Daniel Opande's investigation urged by the locals.


7 M SHALLI
 ARMY COMMANDER, MAJ GEN

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ANNEX – LNDF UNMIL 1st MEDAL DAY ON 8th JUNE 2004

NAMBATT-1 Observes Medal Day




NAMBATT-1

The Namibian Contingent of UNMIL on 8th June, 2004 observed their medal day as a mark of respect in restoring peace to Liberia, in Sinje, Garwular District, Grand Cape Mount County.

Speaking at the ceremony, Namibian Contingent Commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Erastus Kashopola, extended thanks to God for the opportunity. Lt./Col. Kashopola said since the arrival of the troops in Liberia, they had patrolled and protected the general area of Grand Cape Mount County which is their area of assignment.

He said the Namibia Troops has the capability of lifting up all its



Lt./Gen. Daniel Opande

personnel and double lifting its equipments and recovery capability for all its vehicles. The establishment strength is 860 including gallant ladies of all ranks. Lt./Col. Kashopola stressed that the unit has been on theatre of operation since January 15, 2004 and is expected to return to Namibia in August after the completion of its tour of peace-

Cont'd on Page 6

ANNEX- M

THE SPEECH OF NAMBATT – I COMMANDER AT THE 1st MEDAL PARADE

NAMBATT-1

keeping mission in Liberia.

He also indicated that half of their unit was formed and drawn from the Namibian Defence Force of which Lt./Gen. Daniel Opande was instrumental in its formation and two thirds of it had previously served in different foreign peace keeping missions in the following countries: Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and now Liberia.

He boasted that members of his troop are from 12 Brigade, 4th Artillery Brigade and some members are from the Engineering Regiment.

The Namibian Contingent Commander then disclosed that Namibia has been a member of the United Nations since its independence in 1990, and in 1993 started contributing troops to peacekeeping missions in the region and beyond the continent just three years after independence.

"Today the world is faced by many challenges, namely new technology and HIV/AIDS pandemic, therefore, we must equip ourselves with the new sophisticated and modern weapons which will enable us to win the second phase of our struggle that is; to fight hunger poverty reduction, illiteracy and ignorance," Lt. Col. Kashopola emphasized.

The Namibian Commander in a sad mood informed the gathering that three of their soldiers died during the course of their mission following a short period of illness.

The ceremony was marked by the distribution of medals, inspection of parade by the Deputy Secretary General Special Representative to Liberia, Mr. Serydarian and was graced by top brass of UNMIL including the Deputy Force Commander.

Attract Investors

Mr. Jawhary further said that

ANNEX -N

**PRESS RELEASE BY GOVERNOR OF THE GRAND CAPE MOUNT
COUNTY**

P R E S S R E L E A S E

The concern Citizens of Grand Cape Mount County have disassociated themselves from the article in the back page of the Vol. 5 No. 90, Wednesday, April 7, 2004 of the ANALYST NEWS PAPER Caption "IN GRAND CAPE MOUNT : NAMIBIANS PEACE KEEPERS IN PROSTITUTION" the concern Citizens of the County want to advise the ANALYST NEWS PAPER that if the paper can not do any good for the people of the County or the County itself, then the paper should never publish such on the County and its Citizens.

The concern Citizens of Grand Cape Mount County are not only disassociating themselves from the article, but also condemn the article in the strongest term, because at no time did any Cape Mountainian discussed with the ANALYST NEWS PAPER which of the peace keepers the United Nations should send to Cape Mount County.

The Concern Citizens want to inform the ANALYST NEWS PAPER that at no time has the Namibian contingent of the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) in the County been involved in "uncontrollable" prostitution with young girls in the ~~####~~ area. We challenge the ANALYST NEWS PAPER reporter that the Namibians are in the constant habit of hiring people to search for women (Young Girls) for U S \$10.00 or US \$20.00 per night.

The concern Citizens also want the ANALYST to understand that the reporter that wrote the story whose name was not mentioned in the paper did not only do an unprofessional reporting or writing, but also embarrassed the Citizens, the Namibians contingent, and their Government on the other hand.

The Concern Citizens finally want to advise the ANALYST NEWS PAPER not to create division between the peace keepers and the Citizens of Grand Cape Mount County, As all Liberians know the people of Grand Cape Mount County are peace lovers and ^{NOT} trouble makers.

FOLEY KIATAMBA
FOR THE CONCERN
CITIZENS

ANNEX - O

**OPEN LETTER OF APOLOGY BY POWER HOUSE SHOP OWNER IN
THE GRAND CAPE MOUNT COUNTY**

Open Letter of Apology.
Namibian Contigent Gbah Fiont
Grand Cape Mount Co.

Dear Captain,

I do here by apologist to you and you gallant men for fighting one of your officer and promising to take the issure to the media.

I do apologist that the news reported on the 7th of April 2004 about your contegent was not done by me and I can not physically or mentally fight UNLIL but it was just a serious, serious accid-ent on my part.

I do hereby promised never to do such act against the Namibian or any peacekeeper. and please forgive me.

I pray that you will allow your men to stay visit my shop and do business as usual.

It is because of the Namibian contigent I can over there to sell and if this discussion remain like this, my family and myself are going to find thing hard.

Received on 01-06-04
94 16:16
LHSL

Respectfully yours

Edwin N. Dumber
Power House.