



**NAMIBIAN PARLIAMENT'S OVERSIGHT ROLE OVER THE SECURITY
SECTOR: A CASE STUDY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY STANDING
COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF BOTH
HOUSES**

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ABSTRACT

This study was an assessment of the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (PSCFDS) over the security sector in Namibia. The Namibian Parliament established parliamentary committees under the Standing Rules and Orders (SRO) or by resolution thereof for the duration of a parliament calendar. Every committee of the parliament established in terms of Sub-Article (1) of the Namibian Constitution shall have the power to subpoena person(s) to appear before it to give evidence on oath (Standing Committee on Rules and Orders of National Assembly, 2010). The focus of this study was on the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses whose roles are to oversee the affairs and operations of the security ministries and agencies in Namibia.

Data was collected using questionnaires, interviews, observations and literature reading and was analysed based on qualitative methodologies. The study found out the need for committee members to be grouped based on their qualifications, expertise and experiences to enable them to make constructive contributions. The study also found the need for the current two houses of parliament to be merged into one so as to strengthen committee structures. The study further discovered a need for the political parties that send members to parliament to introduce minimum academic requirements for prospective members of parliament to enable them to interact openly and freely during meetings, conferences and summits.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my late father, Lukas Nauyoma, who passed on when I was busy writing this dissertation. He instilled a sense of appreciation in me at an early age; the one that I will cherish for the rest of my life. He was a peasant farmer and with the little we had, he made us feel as if we had a lot. He taught us how to look after cattle, to work in the *mahangu* (millet) fields and above all to respect people, especially the elderly. My father was a proud man and he made me proud too. Were it not for this good foundation that he instilled in me at a tender age and his unselfish commitment to moral behaviour, I could not have been able to sit and write this dissertation today. I regard him as one of my role models. If he was alive today, I am sure he would be prouder than ever to see his child's achievement. Rest in eternal peace Daddy.

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DECLARATION

I, Venantius Simbaranda Nauyoma, hereby declare that this study is a true reflection of my own research, and that this work, or part thereof, has not been submitted for a degree in any other institution of higher education.

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Venantius Simbaranda Nauyoma

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMB	-	Ambassador
APP	-	All People's Party
AU	-	African Union
BMATT	-	British Military Advisory Training Team
CBO	-	Congressional Budget Office
CCDSIR	-	Cabinet Committee on Defence, Security and International Relations
CDF	-	Chief of the Defence Force
CG	-	Commissioner General of Prison Services
CoI	-	Chief of Immigration
CPC	-	Community Policing Committee
CS	-	Civil Society
DCAF	-	Democratic Control of Armed Forces
ECOSOC	-	Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
Hon	-	Honourable
IG	-	Inspector General of the Namibian Police
IHL	-	Institutions of Higher Learning
IPPR	-	Institute for Public Policy and Research
IPU	-	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IREDD	-	InfraRed Emitting Diode

LAC	-	Legal Assistance Centre
MASSS	-	Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies
MFA	-	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHAI	-	Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration
MoD	-	Ministry of Defence
MoE	-	Ministry of Education
MPs	-	Members of Parliament
MSS	-	Ministry of Safety and Security
NA	-	National Assembly
NANGOF	-	Namibia Non-Governmental Organization Forum
NBC	-	Namibian Broadcasting Corporation
NC	-	National Council
NCIS	-	Namibia Central Intelligence Services
NID	-	Namibia Institute for Democracy
NPD	-	National Policy on Decentralization
ODIHR	-	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OMAs		Offices, Ministries and Agencies
PNR	-	The Policy of National Reconciliation
PoN	-	Polytechnic of Namibia
PS	-	Permanent Secretary
PSCFD	-	Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security

PSE	-	Private Security Enterprises
Q	-	Question (s)
RDP	-	Rally for Democracy and Progress
SA	-	Security Actors
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	-	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADC-PF	-	Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum
SRO	-	Standing Rules and Orders
SS	-	Security Sector
SWAPO	-	South West African People's Organization
UN	-	United Nations
UNAM	-	University of Namibia
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programmes
WMNAC	-	Women and Men Network Against Crime

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The research study outlines the background information, the research question, the aims and objectives and significance of the study. Literature review will follow to review the subject under research by looking at what has been done and what needs to be done. The last part of the research includes the research methodology and procedures to be undertaken.

1.2 Orientation of the study

The work performed by parliament is diverse and significantly bulky. Therefore, the time at the disposal of Parliament to perform such work is limited. It is for this reason that the business of Parliament is largely performed by what is called parliamentary committees. The Namibian Parliament, which comprises the National Assembly and the National Council, has several committees that perform various functions. One such committee, which is the focus of this research is the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses.

The parliamentary oversight over the security sector is one of the cornerstones towards the promotion of parliamentary democracy. Oversight or supervision in this regard is meant to hold the security sector accountable and ensure that it implements public policies in an effective manner. Besides the parliament's legislative function, it is through oversight that parliament ensures a balance of

power and asserts its role as the defender of people's interests (Rockman, 1984, p. 22).

According to Schick (1976), the study of legislative oversight is focused on four basic questions: what is oversight, why is it good for a political system, how can oversight be exercised, and what its impact is. With regard to the first question, one could note that scholars have proposed fairly different definitions of what oversight is. One scholar, for example, Huyghebeart (2003) noted that oversight is not just supervision of the executive branch of government but also the supervision of the legislative branch of government. In parliamentary systems, where the executive branch of government has the power to introduce a bill, the process through which a bill becomes law, the referral of that bill to specific committees to be discussed in detail and the debates of such a bill in the plenary for parliament to amend, approve or reject it, gives the legislative branch of government the power to oversee the government plans before they are actually enacted.

This point has an obvious implication, namely that several of the activities and tasks that a legislature performs can be viewed as oversight activities. According to West and Cooper (1989) whether oversight is viewed as a sort of *ex post* review of the government policies and programmes or it is viewed instead as a supervision of government activities that can be performed both *ex post* and *ex ante*, scholars have generally agreed on the fact that effective oversight is good for the proper functioning of a democratic political system. The two scholars further argue that effective oversight is beneficial for a political system for, at

least, two basic reasons: firstly, because the oversight activity can actually contribute to improving the quality of the policies/programmes initiated by the government; secondly, because as government policies are ratified by the legislative branch, such policies acquire greater legitimacy (West and Cooper, 1989, p. 123)

Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006) stress that as the parliamentary oversight potential increases, it becomes easier to scrutinise and control the government and its activities. Since controlling the government is a key component of democratic government, the more a government is subject to potential control, the more likely it is for the political system to be democratic. In other words, oversight potential is a cause and not a consequence of democratic quality (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2006, p. 37).

Oversight entails overseeing the effective management of government institutions to improve service delivery for the achievement of a better quality of life for all citizens (Parliament, 2010, p. 19). The Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, which is the focus of this research, deals directly with the affairs and operations of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Safety and Security, Home Affairs and Immigration and the Namibia Central Intelligence Services.

1.3 Statement of the problem

The parliamentary oversight of the security sector is one of the cornerstones towards the promotion of parliamentary democracy. Oversight or supervision in this regard is meant to hold the security sector accountable and ensure that it

implements public policies in an effective manner. Despite that, members of the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security who are supposed to perform this role lack necessary expertise in the security sector, thus eroding parliamentary democracy and effective implementation of public policies. It is against this background that the researcher has found it necessary to assess the oversight role played by these two committees over the security sector in Namibia.

1.4 Objectives of the study

- The main objective of this study was to determine the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the security sector of both houses in Namibia.
- To identify the contributing factors inhibiting or enabling the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses to perform its oversight function over the security sector.
- To provide recommendations to serve as guiding tools towards the enhancement of interactions between Parliament and the security sector in Namibia.

1.5 Research question

The main research question that the study aims to answer is the following:

- What is the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over security sector in Namibia?

1.6 Significance of the study

The study of the Namibian Parliament's oversight role over the security sector is important because it will explain the link between parliament, security sector and interaction between parliament and ordinary citizens to enhance checks and balances of the legislature. The findings of this study will be used by other researchers, students, civil society and policy makers who are interested in security issues. The study further provides recommendations to policy makers on how to improve the oversight role of Parliament as well as the interactions between parliament and the security sector.

1.7 Limitations of the study

Time

This thesis has to be completed within a limited time, though it would have required more time to enable the researcher to meet key informants such as politicians, service chiefs, permanent secretaries, academics, civic organisations and members of the public for interviews. All these key informants do not work in one building and they are always busy in their respective offices, hence, a challenge to meet them. Limited time hindered the author to get basic information or data on the impact of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over security sector in Namibia.

Funds

Lack of funds has also been experienced to cover printing cost and travel to meet various respondents.

Insufficient literature

Since there is no sufficient literature on parliamentary committees in Namibia, the researcher experienced difficulties in obtaining the necessary data required for this topic.

Difficulties in data collection

Despite the fact that relevant information was received from government officials and other stakeholders, it must be put on record that the information was obtained with difficulties. Another challenge to this effect was the fixing of appointments with senior government officials such as politicians, service chiefs and permanent secretaries of the selected institutions. These people are always busy with parliament or with regional and international visits.

Bureaucratic barriers

Some offices such as of the Speaker of National Assembly, Chairman of the National Council, accounting officers and service chiefs were not easy to get through because of lengthy bureaucratic procedures.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews related literature to enable the researcher to investigate and analyse the theoretical perspective and other researches done on similar topic. The focus of the study is to assess the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the security sector in Namibia. It has been, however, discovered that not much study has been done in this field.

2.2 Establishment of parliamentary committees

The Namibian Constitution is regarded as one of the most modern and progressive basic laws, with constitutional principles, a bill of rights, the separation of powers, and democratic order (Katjavivi, 1989; p. ii). The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and normative guideline for the citizenry and its government. Constitutional democracy in Namibia has brought political stability to the country. However, democratic values as inherited principles and premises of the Constitution need to be more fully developed and democratic procedures must be upheld at all times. Economic and social challenges also need to be met to live up to the economic and social rights enshrined in the Constitution. Articles 59 and 68 of the Namibian Constitution make provision for parliament to establish parliamentary committees to enable it to conduct business and procedures.

Parliamentary committees are universally found in parliaments across the world. Parliamentary committees are a group of parliamentarians appointed by one chamber (or both chambers, in the case of joint committees in a bicameral parliament) to undertake certain specified tasks. Committees offer a setting which facilitates detailed scrutiny of draft legislation, oversight of government activities and interaction with the public and external actors. A significant part of parliamentary work is now conducted in committees rather than in the parent chamber (Yamamoto, 2007, p. 15).

IRED (2002) refer to Namibia as a country that enjoys relative peace; the peace in this context is the absence of war, a factor that is an important pre-requisite to tolerance of an alternative view. There is a democratic system of governance in Namibia, who describes herself through the constitution as parliamentary democracy. This description is intended to give a flare of tolerance, people's participation, accountability and accessibility. As a result of the shared colonial history, some countries share common elements in their legal systems. For instance, the influence of English law is pervasive whilst Roman Dutch law is shared with Zimbabwe, South Africa and to a certain extent Namibia (IRED, 2002, p.14). Most of the countries, therefore, have a Westminster type of Constitution, which is found in most Commonwealth countries from which parliamentary committees system emanate.

Soon after independence, Namibia had a unicameral parliamentary system that consisted of the National Assembly only but the country introduced a bicameral parliamentary system in 1993, consisting of the National Assembly and the

National Council after the first Regional Council Election was successful held from 30 November-December 3, 1992. This was done as a mechanism to enhance interactions between parliament and the electorate (Parliament of Namibia, 1996, p. 3).

Parliamentary standing committees are permanent committees established under the Standing Rules and Orders of the National Assembly (SRO) or by resolution thereof for the duration of a Parliament. They are re-established at the beginning of each new parliament calendar and can continue to function until the end of the day before the commencement of the next parliament. (Standing Committee on Rules and Orders of National Assembly, 2010, p. 4).

For the purposes of exercising its powers and performing its functions, any committee of the Parliament established in terms of Sub-Article (1) of the Namibian Constitution shall have the power to subpoena persons to appear before it to give evidence on oath and to produce any documents required by it (Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 59, p. 46).

2.3 Objectives of parliamentary committees

Johnson and Nakamura (2006) view parliament committees as smaller units or groups of MPs set up within the parliamentary system. They allow parliament to perform several functions simultaneously, and also provide the opportunity for more detailed investigation and discussions before findings and outcomes of these committee meetings are presented as committee reports to the broader group for debate and conclusions. Parliamentary committees, sometimes are called commissions or councils, are units of organisation within the legislature that allow

groups of legislators to review policy matters or review bills more closely than would be possible by the entire chamber (Johnson and Nakamura, 2006, p. 44). The roles of the committees vary from country to country depending upon the governing system, strength and organisation of political parties, available resources, and other political factors.

Ayensu and Darkwa (2006) describe parliamentary committees as the engines of parliament as it is intended to be the vehicle for research and investigation as well as a platform for public participation in the legislative process. According to these two authors in the case of the Ghanaian Parliament, consistent with this belief, Article 103 (subsection 6) of the 1992 Ghana Constitution gives committees the “powers, rights and privileges of the High Court or a Justice of the High Court” as well as the power to subpoena witnesses and documents (Ayensu & Darkwa, 2006, p. 27).

Longley and Davidson (1998) advocate that today’s parliamentary committee systems have emerged as a creative way for parliaments to perform their basic functions. They serve as the focal point for legislation and oversight. In a number of parliaments, bills, resolutions, and matters on specific issues are referred to specific committees for debate and recommendations are made to the house for further debate. Parliamentary committees have emerged as vibrant and central institutions of democratic parliaments of today’s world. Parliaments across the globe set up their own rules on how committees are established, the composition, the mandate and how chairpersons are to be selected but they do have certain characteristics in common.

Schreiner and Linn (2006) state that often, committees have a multi-party composition; they examine specific matters of policy or government administration or performance. Effective committees have developed a degree of expertise in a given policy area, often through continuing involvement, and stable memberships. This expertise is both recognised and valued by their colleagues. They are both able to represent diversity and reconcile enough differences to sustain recommendations for action. Also, they are important enough so that people inside and outside the legislature seek to influence outcomes by providing information about what they want and what they will accept. Furthermore, committees provide a means for a legislative body to consider a wide range of topics in-depth, and to identify politically and technically feasible alternatives.

According to Limon and McKay (1997), these committees ensure transparency and openness of executive activities. Parliamentary committees shed light on the operations of government by providing a public arena in which the policies and actions of government are debated, scrutinised, and subjected to public opinion. The committees further hold the executive branch accountable whether the government's policies have been implemented and whether they are having the desired impact and approve and scrutinise government spending by highlighting waste within publicly-funded services. The executive may not necessarily be fully aware of the security issues which are priorities for citizens; therefore, parliamentarians are in regular contact with the population and are well-placed to ascertain their views. They can subsequently raise citizens' concerns in parliament

and see to it that they are reflected in security laws and policies (Limon & McKay, 1997, p. 80).

Due to their representational function, parliamentarians have the unique possibility to give or to withhold democratic legitimacy to government's decision about security policy and security reform (Limon & McKay, 1997, p.112). Parliamentary debates may fulfil a catalytic role in creating or diminishing public support for, among other decisions, the government's decision to contribute troops to multinational peace support operations. This is done with the aim to improve the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure and uphold the rule of law. It is through this means that parliament protects the rights of citizens by monitoring policies and examining potential abuses of power, arbitrary behaviour, and illegal or unconstitutional conduct by government (Limon & McKay, 1997, p.120).

Mattson and Storm (1996) stress that the widespread use of parliamentary committees in a number of parliaments is seen as a very recent development. The use of parliamentary committees was historically mainly in the United States Congress. Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States, was quoted as saying in 1885 that "Congress in its committee rooms is at work". This is because most of the work of Congress was referred to committees for detailed review to inform debate on the floor of the House (Mattson & Storm, 1996, p.45).

2.4 Functions of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security

The functions of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (PSCFDS) concentrate on the affairs and operations of the security sector in Namibia such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Safety and Security, Home Affairs and Immigration and the Namibia Central Intelligence Services (Standing Rules & Order of the National Assembly, 2010–2014, p. 38). The most important functions of these committees are to review international and regional co-operation, peace and security and advise parliament accordingly. The Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are also charged with the responsibility to review and monitor the defence and security policies and oversee the defence and security issues of the country and advise both Cabinet and National Assembly on matters pertaining to defence and security (Namibia's Defence Policy, 2011, p.30). The Committee further reviews Namibia's foreign policy and makes recommendations to parliament, deals with questions falling within the ambit of the above-mentioned institutions and to provide a link between Parliament, security sector and the Namibian people through the conducting of public hearings to collect the views of interested groups and citizens on a specific security related bills. (Research, Publication and Editorial Services of Parliament, 1996, p.3).

In addition to the above-mentioned responsibilities, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security perform functions, tasks, and duties relating to parliamentary supervision over the security sector in a form of

receiving and considering legislative proposals over the security sector and make appropriate recommendations to parliament. The Committee also secures attendance from officials of Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMAs) of the security sector in order to receive reports on the performance of the respective Offices, Ministries and Agencies and thereafter advises parliament accordingly (Standing Rules and Orders of National Assembly, 2010-2014, p.12). Not only that, the Parliamentary Standing on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security also receives and considers policy documents and statements from the security sector as well as submissions from individuals and groups, regarding the operations of the security sector. The Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security further organise meetings between citizens, community groups, sectoral organisations, members of parliament and representatives of Offices, Ministries and Agencies as may be necessary to facilitate an exchange of views regarding the operations of the security sector and their implications on state and people (Parliament of Namibia, Research and Information Service, 2006, p. 7).

2.5 The Law making process of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security

The Parliamentary Standing Committees must ensure that the security sector and stakeholders are involved and consulted in any particular aspect or decision in the law making process. The law making process results in policies/laws that are affected in the development process, and for sustainability there is a need for security sector to own and manage all the processes that affect their affairs. It is of paramount importance for security institutions to be informed, proactive and

empowered to be in a better position to advocate and lobby for inclusion of their views and contribution to the policies, which are passed by parliament in the form of laws. The Government of the Republic of Namibia has acknowledged the critical role of civil society in public debate and socio-economic development. Acceptance of government policies and legislation is greatest when the people themselves are able and eager to make inputs (Nujoma, 1993).

The work of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are part of the democratic process, which seeks to compliment the work of the executive. These policies appear in the form of development plans, presidential decrees and acts of parliament. It is important for the security sector to participate in the law making process since the laws that are promulgated by parliament affect them in their everyday work, and therefore they should give an input in the formulation of these laws. People's participation in the affairs of their nation is a precondition for a democratic government. Throughout the struggle for national independence the goal has been to provide the people with the opportunity to participate in national decision-making, especially those decisions which affect their daily lives. (Nujoma, 1993).

2.6 Parliamentary oversight of the security sector

Luciak (2008) articulates that the legislature exercises parliamentary oversight by passing laws that define and regulate the security services and their powers and by adopting the corresponding budgetary appropriations. Such control may also include establishing a parliamentary ombudsman or a commission that may launch investigations into complaints by the public. However, the crucial issue is the

degree to which oversight translates into real influence over the decisions of the executive. Parliamentary authorisation is an important instrument of influence. In many countries parliamentary authorisation is required for the purchase of major weapon systems, which in effect equates with participation in the decision (Luciak, 2008, p. 50). He further argues that several parliaments have the constitutional requirement to be informed on the deployment of forces abroad, a few have the right to participate through formal authorisation. The new missions will increase the demand for parliaments to be kept informed on a more time urgent basis and to be consulted on the terms of deployment. This will further test the balance between democracy and military efficiency (Luciak, 2008, p. 55).

Rockman (1984) describes parliament as the legislative branch of government that authorises, or chooses not to authorise, major policy decisions of the executive, for example the budget. According to him parliamentary oversight functions include subjecting executive plans, policies and actions to public debate, and posing questions to members of the executive. Parliaments are also tasked with vetting and approving key government ministers and other key national appointees (Rockman, 1984, p. 27). Therefore, Rockman views parliament's oversight of the executive as one of its most important functions. Parliamentary committees enable legislature to monitor the activities of the government, and check the quality of governance. The role of the executive and the legislature is therefore to complement each other: the executive must govern, while the legislature asserts its key role by acting as people's representative. Thus, the use of the committee system to scrutinise and

investigate whether the executive or its authorised agencies have acted properly in the implementation of public policies and programmes is crucial.

Various scholars have given different definitions of the concept of legislative oversight. Legislative oversight consists in the legislative supervision of the policies and the programmes enacted by the government. Oversight is not just a supervision of what the executive branch of government has done but is also supervision of the executive's legislative proposals (Schick, 1976, p. 27).

In parliamentary systems, where the executive branch of government has the power to introduce a bill, the process through which the bill becomes a law, the referral to that bill to a specific committee, the discussion of the bill within such committee, the debates of a bill in the plenary and the fact that the parliament has ultimately the power to amend, approve or reject a government's legislative proposal, gives the legislative branch of government the power to oversee the government plans before they are actually enacted. This point has an obvious implication, namely that several of the activities and tasks that a legislature performs can be viewed as oversight activities (Maffio, 2002, p. 55)

Regardless of whether oversight is view as a sort of *ex post* review of the government policies and programmes or whether is view as a supervision of government activities that can be performed both *ex post* and *ex ante*, scholars have generally agreed on the fact that effective oversight is good for the proper system for, at least two basic reasons, firstly, because the oversight activity can actually contribute to improving the quality of the policies/programme initiated by the government, secondly, because as the government policies are ratified by the

legislative branch, such policies acquire greater legitimacy (West & Cooper, 1989, p. 110).

Trapans (2000) stresses that it should be understood that in democratic countries, parliament has no direct involvement to influence the military on their business. On the other hand, parliament should be kept fully informed through regular and timely consultation; and all areas should be open to parliamentary oversight and scrutiny. The executive should have the flexibility to exercise power responsibly but must always be mindful that parliament is watching. Similarly, the use of force in conditions short of war, for example, during the air campaign against Yugoslavia, or the operation in Afghanistan reflect this need. He continued to stress that in all Alliance countries, irrespective of the formal powers of consultation, parliamentary support is a precondition for involvement in such contingencies.

Winslow (2002) argues that in order for parliament to exert real influence on the executive, it should have a well-developed committee structure. The parliamentary oversight of the security involves not only one committee but several committees which may be found under different names in different parliaments. Winslow further identified some common names of these committees such as the defence committee – which generally deals with all issues related to the security sector, for example, the mission, organisations, personnel, operations and financing of the military and with conscription and procurement; committee for foreign affairs – which deals with decision to participate in peace missions or accept their presence on national territory, international security, international/regional organisations, treaties and arrangements; budget or finance committee – which has a final say on

the budget of all security sector organisations, possibly the public account committee which reviews the audit reports for the entire national budget, including the defence budget; committee of interior/home affairs – which deals with the police, border guards and, often, other paramilitary organisations and committee on intelligence services and matters – which often convenes behind closed doors (Winslow, 2002, p. 45).

The Legislature exercises parliamentary oversight by passing laws that define and regulate the security services and their powers and by adopting the corresponding budgetary appropriations. This describes the idea of systematic parliamentary involvement in monitoring the security sector, referring specifically to parliamentary institutions consciously and bureaucratically maintaining the forums, knowledge bases and staff necessary to overview the government and its security sector policies, as well as setting broad guidelines for the government and its security agencies (Hans, 2003, p. 17).

Hans (2003) further alludes that in the post-Cold War era, the security services are confronted with a new security environment, today's security threats include failed states, terrorism, uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, political threats and organised crime. Particularly after 9/11, a whole series of new anti-terrorism legislation and measures are put in place. Hans therefore argues that it is important for the security services to make the right choices under democratic guidance. Hence, parliaments have to ensure that the security services are up to the demands of the new security environment. Secondly, parliaments have to oversee that the new directions and actions of the security services are at all times consistent

with the constitution, international humanitarian and human rights law (Hans, 2003, p. 140).

2.7 Definition of the security sector

According to Fry (2005), the security sector is a collective term encompassing both national defence and foreign relations. Specifically, the condition provided by a military or defence advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; a favourable foreign relations position; or a defence posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. So traditionally, the definition of security sector has been confined to include the armed forces, police, border guards and intelligence services, together with their policy and administrative structures only.

For Hendrickson (2000) security is an essential condition for sustainable development and a strong concern of the poor. The role of the state and its security forces directly impact upon the opportunities for sustainable development and peoples' physical security. There is a growing consensus that security needs to be approached just as much from the perspective of protecting individuals and communities from violence as from the degree to which defence spending crowds out development expenditure. The more affluent people are increasingly concerned about cyber security, invasion of privacy via internet based systems; people are concerned about cross border crimes involving drugs, human trafficking, money laundering, pyramid schemes and so forth (Hendrickson, 2000, p. 34). To this end, it is important to understand the composition of the security sector as a whole, the roles and responsibilities of the various actors, and the relationships between them.

More recently, some analysts have argued that the definition should be expanded to include civil structures responsible for the management and oversight of those institutions. Others would add judicial and penal systems as well as civil society in general, which also plays a significant role in democratic control. A definition as broad as this touches on wider questions of governance in the broader sense. However, Chuter (2002) warns that it tends to blur important distinctions relating to legislative and executive functions of government. It is, however, theoretically more appealing and reminds us that, in many state structures outside formal government do have an influence on the security sector, and that institutions such as parliament and civil society actors need to be critically examined (Chuter, 2002, p.4).

2.8 Relevance of parliamentary oversight

There is a widespread belief that security policy is a natural task for the executive as they have the necessary knowledge and can act quickly. According to Dahl (2003), parliament tends to be regarded as a less suitable institution for dealing with security issues, especially given its often time consuming procedures and lack of full access to the necessary expertise and information. However, as with any other policy area, parliament is entrusted with reviewing and monitoring the executive. Dahl (2003) pinpoints four reasons why such oversight in security matters is crucial:

- a) A cornerstone of democracy to prevent autocratic rule

Former French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau once stated that “War is a much too serious matter to be entrusted to the military”. Beyond its humorous side,

this statement recalls that in a democracy, the representatives of the people hold the supreme power and no sector of the state should be excluded from their control. A state without parliamentary control of its security sector, especially the military, should, at best, be deemed an unfinished democracy or a democracy in the making. The most fundamental and persistent problem in politics is to avoid autocratic rule. As the security sector deals with one of the state's core tasks, a system of checks and balances is needed to counterbalance the executive's power. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is thus an essential element of power sharing at state level and, if effective, sets limits on the power of the executive or president (Dahl, 2003, p. 76).

b) No taxation without representation

To this day, one of parliament's most important mechanisms for controlling the executive is the budget. From the early days of the first assemblies in Western Europe, parliaments demanded a say in policy matters, their claim being: "No taxation without representation". As security sector organisations use a substantial share of the state's budget, it remains essential that parliament monitor the use of the state's scarce resources both effectively and efficiently (Dahl, 2003, p. 76).

c) Creating legal parameters for security issues

In practice, it is the executive that drafts laws on security issues. Nevertheless, members of parliament play an important role in reviewing these drafts. They can, if need be, suggest amendments so as to ensure that the proposed legal provisions adequately reflect the new thinking about security. Moreover, it falls to parliament

to see to it that the laws do not remain a dead letter, but are fully implemented (Dahl, 2003, p. 77).

d) A bridge to the public

The executive may not necessarily be fully aware of the security issues which are priorities for citizens. Parliamentarians are in regular contact with the population and are well-placed to ascertain their views. They can subsequently raise citizens' concerns in parliament and see to it that they are reflected in security laws and policies (Dahl, 2003, p. 77).

2.9 Tools and mechanisms for parliamentary oversight

Hänggi (2002) states that in both long established and new democracies, the parliament is given the power to oversee the government through a number of tools and mechanisms. Typically, these tools and mechanisms are outlined in the constitution and other regulatory texts such as the parliamentary bylaws and/or internal procedures. The specific of how a parliament can manipulate its oversight prerogative depends upon the existence of a legal framework, which consolidates the position of the parliament as an oversight institution and guarantees its powers and independence within the political system. Thus, while reforming the structure of the political system to increase a parliament's constitutionally given oversight capacities may not always be feasible, in some instances, parliaments can improve their oversight capacities by reforming their own rules. For example, a good practice for committee systems is to assign a single committee to each government department (Hänggi, 2002, p.31).

According to Von Beyme (2000), parliaments have an array of tools at their disposal for conducting their parliamentary oversight roles. The most common tools which is also applicable to the Namibian parliament is the conducting of public hearings on specific issues either in plenary or committee meetings to obtain information related to specific policies or issues. Supreme audit institutions, such as the auditor general or board in Commonwealth countries, or Cours des Comptes in Francophone countries facilitate ex-post budget oversight by playing a “watchdog” role and reporting its findings either publically or directly to parliament. Supreme audit institutions monitor how the government uses the public purse and informs the parliament of its observations. In Commonwealth countries, the auditor general reports to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which scrutinises the findings of the audit and makes recommendations to the Ministry of Finance accordingly (Von Beyme, 2000, p. 32).

According to Caparini (2002), some tools to conduct oversight roles in other parliaments especially in Commonwealth countries are through interpellation, vote of no confidence, impeachment and the possibility for the parliament to establish ad-hoc committees and commissions of enquiries. Interpellation refers to a formal procedure used by parliamentarians to require the justification of a certain policy by an individual member of government or, in some countries, the government in full. It can give way to broad debates on the policy at hand or lead to a vote approving or disapproving the issue discussed. This may be followed by a vote of no confidence. Caparini defines a vote of no confidence, or motion of censure, as a motion presented by parliamentarians which results in either the withdrawal or the

confirmation of the parliament's confidence in the government or one of its cabinet ministers. When a parliament withdraws its confidence in the government, the cabinet usually resigns or seeks a parliamentary dissolution. In some countries, withdrawals of confidence lead to a process in which the Head of State either calls for the resignation of the government or the dissolution of the parliament. When a parliament withdraws its confidence in a single minister, that individual typically resigns. There are many variations to the procedures governing votes of no confidence (Caparini, 2002, p. 32).

Flori (2003) is of the view that parliamentary questions are one of the most commonly used oversight tools. Security related questions are intended to security ministries and institutions to clarify or discuss government policies on security and may lead to interpellation if the answer is not satisfactory. In order to properly oversee the executive on security matters, it is essential for the parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs, defence and security of both houses to be properly informed of the policies of the executive and its ministries. Government responses to parliamentary questions may lead to the publication of valuable information. Flori further suggests that questions can often be asked in oral or written form, although oral question and answer sessions may provide a dramatic atmosphere and opportunity for response and follow-up by either side. Consequently, the organisation of these sessions is essential to effective parliamentary oversight (Flori, 2003, p. 15).

Huyghebeart (2003) also pays some attention to the tools that parliaments and legislatures can employ to oversee the government and the government's activities.

Huyghebeart underlines that the legislatures may adopt several tools to oversee the actions of the executives such as hearings in committees, hearings in the plenary assembly, the creation of inquiry committees, parliamentary questions, question time, the interpellations and the ombudsman. This scholar has noted, however, that the presence of the oversight tool is necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight. Effective oversight, as was observed, depends not only on the availability of oversight tools, but also on additional conditions. Effective oversight may depend on the specific oversight powers given to the parliament, whether parliament has the ability to modify legislation as eluded by Loewenberg and Patterson (1979). Effective oversight may depend on the specific oversight powers given to the parliament, on whether the parliament has the ability to modify legislation. It is also important for parliaments and parliamentarians to be given proper information to perform their oversight tasks adequately on the role of individual MPs, on the role of committee chairs, on the saliency of issues and on how aggressively the opposition performs its role (Rockman: 1984, p. 5).

According to Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006), the international organisations have done some studies towards strengthening and improving parliaments' oversight capabilities to see whether oversight is beneficial to the functioning of a given political regime. The studies found that most countries have some instruments to oversee the actions of the government and that legislature in parliamentary regimes have on average a greater number of oversight tools than legislatures in presidential and semi-presidential regimes. They further emphasised that the number of oversight tools that a legislature can employ to oversee the executive provides an

indication of the oversight potential of that legislature, but it does not provide any indication as to whether that oversight potential is then translated in effective oversight. This is why they argued that some countries may have a great oversight potential and yet be non-democratic. In these countries, legislatures have several oversight tools at their disposal but they are either unwilling or unable to use them effectively or to use them at all. This is why in some countries like Gabon, Indonesia and Zambia, the oversight potential does not seem to have any effect on the democratic quality of the regime (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2006, p. 6). However, the evidence presented in these international organisations' publications was at best suggestive. It showed that, on average, liberal-democratic regime had more oversight tools and oversight potential than formally or quasi-democratic regimes and in turn, had a greater oversight potential than non-democratic regimes. But the fact that more democratic regimes tend to have, on average, more oversight tool than less democratic regimes does not tell us the adoption of a larger number of oversight tools is a consequence or a cause of the higher democratic quality in a given country (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2006, p.12).

2.10 Challenges for parliamentary oversight of the security sector

Flori (2003) states that in sharp contrast between the desirability of parliamentary oversight of the security sector, the actual state of affairs of parliamentary oversight in many countries both in consolidating and consolidated democracies which are common in security sector is the secrecy laws which may hinder efforts to enhance transparency in the security sector. In emerging democracies or conflict-torn countries, laws on secrecy may limit or jeopardize parliamentary oversight of the

security sector; this is also due to the absence of legislation on freedom of information (Flori, 2003, p. 55).

The security sector is a highly complex field, in which parliaments have to oversee issues such as weapons procurement, arms control and the readiness or preparedness of military units. Not all parliamentarians have sufficient knowledge and expertise to deal with these issues in an effective manner. Nor may they have the time and opportunity to develop them, since their terms as parliamentarians are time-bound and access to expert resources within the country and abroad may be lacking (Trapans, 2002, p. 72).

Huntington (1991) states that one of the challenges towards effective parliamentary oversight is the question of whether legislatures actually oversee governments' actions and activities and whether the oversight function has an impact on the political system, more specifically, on the government behaviour. For him it is correct to speak of actual oversight when legislatures have the powers and instruments to oversee government activities regardless of whether these powers and instruments are properly used.

2.11 Making Oversight Democratic: The necessity of parliamentary involvement

Hans, Flori and Lunn (2003) characterise the security sector services as a *Janus*-faced organisation. On the one hand, the security sector has to meet their functional demand, which is to maintain law and order, protect the national interest and civil rights. The security sector, be it the military, intelligence services or border guards, all have to be prepared and show readiness to fulfil their national duties.

On the other hand, Jelusic and Malesic (2002) indicate that the security sector have to comply with normative societal, democratic and legal standards. All security services have to operate within the law and are accountable to the democratically legitimate political leaders. In other words, democratic governance applies to security services as well. When it comes to civilian supremacy and democratic governance, parliaments fulfil a crucial role. Due to parliamentary involvement and debates, civilian oversight becomes democratic oversight. It is a way to give voice to the people's needs and concerns in the debates about security. In fact, parliamentary involvement makes the difference between civilian oversight and democratic oversight, or, between good governance and democratic governance, hence important to make this distinction.

Hans (2003) views civilian oversight is a pre-requisite, but insufficient condition for democratic oversight. This is what the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century have been advocated. For example, Hitler and Stalin had perfect civilian control over their military, but their type of oversight is not really desirable in a democratic society. In this respect, parliament plays an important role in safeguarding the democratic element of overseeing the security sector (Hans, 2003, p.9).

2.12 Parliamentary support services

Drewry (1989) states that appropriate support service including staffing is essential if parliamentary committees are to function effectively. Committees often need different categories of staff if they are to achieve their optimum best. Parliamentary Committees often need staff to assist with procedural issues, administrative matters, assist with drafting bills, and provide expert opinion and analysis on major policy

issues. They need clerks, researchers, legislative reporters, legal draftsmen, and other support staff. Committees are managed by committee clerks who give procedural advice to the committee; take minutes of the committee meetings; receive and store documents on behalf of committees; and carry out administrative duties. They also assist in record keeping, arranging witnesses, advising members on procedures. In essence the committee clerk is responsible for coordinating affairs and ensuring that the committee chairperson and members have the needed support to be effective. In parliaments where private members' bills are encouraged, parliamentarians inevitably have to rely heavily on the staff for expert knowledge and advice in any new policy they recommend for legislation. Staff also assists committees in monitoring the implementation of legislation that has been passed (Drewry, 1989, p. 59).

According to Drewry (1989), in order for Parliamentary Standing Committees to perform their functions effectively and efficiently, the British parliament had established Committee Support Services to assist chairpersons and members of such committees, in respect of administrative and procedural supports which is also a practice in Namibian parliament. Among the support services being rendered to the committee members are the briefing materials to enable members to discuss a broad range of policy and other issues and the linkage between members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees with other stakeholders including security sector (Drewry, 1989, p. 65).

The United States Congress is often cited as an example of a parliament that has support staff with varying expertise. Committee staff plays a key role in assisting

committee members in recommending new policy. The United States Congress employees qualified personnel that provide a wide range of support to Congress and its Committees. These include staff of the Library of Congress, which includes staff of the Congressional Research Service. There are also staff members of the office of the Chief Administrative Officer, and those at the Clerk's office as well as the staff of the Congressional Budget Office and many others. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) alone currently employs about 230 economists and public policy analysts who support committees on budget issues (CBO, 2002, p. 7).

Generally, committee research staff members are charged with analysing and preparing research papers, and proposing possible questions for committee members. Research staff also helps improve the general efficiency of the legislative process by collecting and analysing data; they identify problems of relevance for members; suggest alternative course of action; and prepare studies and committee reports on legislation. (Johnson & Nakamura, 2006, p. 123)

2.13 The role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security as actor of foreign relations

According to Namibia's Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management (2004), the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security exercises the overall oversight functions with regard to Namibia's foreign policy and its relations with other States on matters of defence and security, investigate issues relating to the policies, standards and procedures followed by the Namibia Central Intelligence Services, investigate issues relating to human rights violations, obtain information from government or other sources regarding any real or

perceived threat to the security of the country and monitor international protocols, conventions and agreements that may affect Namibia's foreign policy, defence and security and make recommendations to Parliament.

Functions and works of the parliamentary standing committees are important in any democratic country because they perform the supervisory roles over cluster ministries and other government institutions and advice parliament accordingly. This is done through the conducting of public hearings on a specific bill that affect the community. In this perspective, the parliamentary standing committee on foreign affairs, defence and security oversees the activities of the security sector in Namibia. Through this process, security sector are given opportunity to express their views and opinions on the security matters of the country (Standing Committee on Rules and Orders of the National Council, 1994, p. 9).

2.14 Bringing parliament to the security institutions

According to Mugabe (1999), parliamentary standing committees are essentially in a democratic government because thus bring parliament closer to the security sector in a transparent and accountable manner. It entails the devolution of power and responsibilities to a smaller group of Members of Parliament to focus on a specific issue, encouraging participation from stakeholders, recognising the diversity of communities and societies, and the promotion of openness and elimination of corruption in managing public resources.

2.15 Active parliamentary committees

Hubbard and Ramshotham (2004) view parliament as an oversight body of the State that requires a vibrant and active parliamentary standing committees to represent

the people, not the one which is controlled by the president, prime minister, bureaucrats or the military, it requires an independent judiciary, well-functioning political parties and electoral systems, a professional security forces, an accessible media that is free, independent and unbiased which is accompanied by a vibrant civil society that can play a watchdog role on government and interest groups and provide alternative forms of political participation.

The above-mentioned two authors further argue that the activities of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security should be accompanied by transparency which refers to the openness which gives parliament credibility in the eyes of the security sector and members of the public. Security sector should have access to important information and including the activities of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. Security sector must be able to know and understand what the committee does as this will promote trust and confidence in parliament on the part of the security actors. Openness gives government credibility in the eyes of the public. Openness means that the Standing Committee will be open for criticism. Criticism may come from the members of parliament, media, or from the public. Criticism can help to make parliamentary standing committees strong. For example, criticism can identify weaknesses in the manner in which such standing committee had conducted its business that can be corrected. Criticism can also help to prevent corruption and abuse of power (Hubbard & Ramshotham, 2004, p.5-6).

Since independence, to certain extent, parliament has established parliamentary standing committees to oversee functions of line ministries including the security

sector. It is up to every sector or institution or ministries to use the opportunities to influence decision makers. Many sectors or institutions may not know how to participate in the decision making process. Some may not wish to use this platform thinking that the politicians must do their work to govern the country, while in reality every sector/institution have a role to play in governing the country (Parliament of Namibia, Research and Information Services of National Assembly, 2006, p. 4).

Mosé Tjitendero alludes that the biggest threat to democracy does not come from the weakness of the parliamentary standing committees, but from the ignorance of the institutions and members of the public about their role in the legislative process. Non-governmental organisations have a very special role to play when it comes to inculcating a democratic culture in society. “Knowledge of democratic principles is a pre-requisite for meaningful popular participation. As we move towards the year 2000, and as our people become more politically and socially aware, we will see an upsurge in advocacy groups interested in lobbying to make an active input into the affairs of parliament. With this increase in legislative interest comes greater public pressure upon the individual members to produce the goods which will satisfy the needs of the citizens. It is therefore, our responsibility as parliamentarians to make a conscious effort to move towards this common goal” (Tjitendero, 1996, p. 7).

2.16 Inclusive participation in the law making process of the security sector

Participation means taking part in the decision-making process. In a strong democracy, the security sector gets involved in decision-making processes because they care about the outcome of the decision. They get involved because they want

to help make their country the best country it can be. A good democracy includes security actors' views in the public decision-making processes then security actors throughout the country feel that their opinions are being considered. No parliament decision will make security actors happy, but security actors are usually more satisfied with a decision if they feel that their needs and interests were taken into account by parliament (Hubbard & Ramshotham, 2004, p. 6-7).

2.17 Accountability of members of parliament

IREED (2002) view the involvement of the security sector as a means to ensure the accountability of parliamentarians who in most instances access positions through the people's vote. It also strengthens the governance structures and systems since the security sector and the public will not be taken for granted by legislature. However, such active participation of security sector in the business of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign affairs, defence and security depends upon the availability of platforms.

One of the important aspects of parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs, defence and security is the generation of public inputs in the democratic governing process. South Africa parliamentary committees have within the short period of six years, made tremendous inroads in developing public participation in the law-making process. A range of participation of projects have been initiated, while a variety of publications that inform and educate the public have been printed and circulated (Lewis, 2001, p. 25).

In Namibia, the activities of the parliamentary standing committees was initiated by the First Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr Mosé Tjitendero way back in the

90s with the view of taking Parliament closer to the people in order to create a platform of exchanges between the Central and Regional and Local Authority Governments (Sioka, 2009, p. 6).

2.18 Parliamentary legislative framework

It is important for a parliament's institutional and legal framework to encourage MPs to make effective use of their powers of oversight. Aside from the provision of oversight tools, this framework should provide for the independence of the parliamentary institution and the immunity of the MPs. In Namibia, duties, privileges and immunities of Members of Parliament are clearly stipulated in Articles 60 and 63 of the Namibian Constitution. These protections allow MPs to challenge the executive without fear of retaliation against their persons. The parliamentary control over the executive and making them accountable is one of the principal objectives of the parliamentary committees. Furthermore, parliamentary committees should attempt to secure executive accountability on the one hand, and inbuilt system of checks and balance on the other. The parliament's legal framework should also include rights, such as access to information, that give them the capacity to conduct inquiries that reach the heart of the government (Luciak, 2008, p. 78). Even in this functional area, the nature of the linkages between parliamentarians and citizens can have a strong impact on MPs' incentives to conduct effective oversight. For example, an electoral design in which political party leaders determine which operatives will obtain the top positions on the party's electoral lists may encourage a passive back-bench. When MPs' re-election depends entirely on the party leaders, it is unlikely that they will challenge the

authority of their leaders. Systems in which the party rank and file selects their party's candidates through the vote may permit the eventual MP more freedom to question her party and government leaders (Luciak, 2008, p. 80).

2.19 The security sector and State interface

Du Pisani (2003) argues that it is now widely acknowledged in the literature that an understanding of the security sector provides important insights into the nature of the state. As social and political constructs, the state and the security sector are intimately connected, both at the operational and at the level of ideas and images. Also, significant dimensions of security, development and governance can be rendered more meaningful if the security sector itself is properly understood. Firmly embedded within the imagery and operations of the state, the security sector and its transformation, has recently emerged as an important area of research (Du Pisani, 2003, p.10).

According to Du Pisani (2003), the growing scholarly interest in security sector transformation in different regions of the world has been preceded by a widening of the concept of security. Security is now understood as multidimensional and interdependent, with environmental, social, economic and human security dimensions, among others. While the broadening of the concept of security has validity, it only emphasises that ultimately the referent for security should be people and not states, and to remind policy makers of resource allocation priorities that there is also a danger that the vital issues associated with the more traditional security sector will escape scholarly attention. In this context, the security sector is defined as the defence, policing and intelligence functions of the state, and the

management of 'threats to and breaches of the peace' through multilateral and bilateral processes (Du Pisani, 2003, p.10).

2.20 The security sector and civil society interface

Groups within civil society such as academic institutions, think tanks, human rights organisations and NGOs can actively strive to influence decisions and policies with regard to the security sector. Governments can encourage the participation of NGOs in public debate about national security, the armed forces, policing and intelligence. Such debate, in turn, enhances further the transparency of government. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are generally private non-profit organisations, aiming to represent social aspirations and interests on specific topics. As to research institutes, these may either be NGOs independent of government, or on the contrary have links with government, for example, through state funding. According to Edmunds (2001), democratic oversight can only be effective, as a principle of good governance, if the public is aware of major issues open to debate at parliamentary level. The effectiveness of public communication on security issues is dependent upon by both government and accuracy of the information released to the public. The parliament should take a special interest in necessary level and quality of information so as to be able to understand both the current state of affairs and the outcome of the decision-making process in parliament (Edmunds, 2001, p. 45).

According to the survey that was conducted in Namibia's civil society by Van Zyl and Keulder (2001) it shows that the Namibian state enjoys a high level of formal legitimacy from its citizen. The Security Sector, too, is held in high regard, with the youth expressing positive trust in the military expressed the view that the military

could always be trusted, and that the military could just about always be trusted. The Namibian Police, too, enjoys significant levels of trust from the youth; combined, some of young Namibians would always trust the police to do what is right, while others felt that the police could just about always be trusted (Van Zyl & Keulder, 2001, p. 63).

Civil society agencies, such as the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC), as well as the print media, do comment on security issues. Their role, however, is often difficult. For example, the involvement of Namibian troops in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was first reported by the print media but denied by the government. It was only much later that government confirmed this to be true (Amuphadi, 1999, p. 3). Even then government officials blamed the press for being irresponsible, and for putting the lives of NDF troops at risk. On 29 December 1998, for example, the then Prime Minister was reported as accusing the media of “propaganda, advocacy and manipulating and doctoring news to the detriment of the safety and morale of our soldiers fighting in the DRC”. Although troops were engaged in a war outside national borders, there were concerns in government circles that press revelations were an issue that put national security in jeopardy (Bukurura, 2002, p. 15).

2.21 Civil Society as stakeholder I n the formulation of security policy

The term civil society refers to autonomous organisations that lie between the state institutions, on the one hand, and the private life of individuals and communities, on the other. It comprises a large spectrum of voluntary associations and social movements, that is, a broad range of organisations and groups representing different

social interests and types of activity (Edmunds, 2001, p. 27). Civil society plays an important role in ensuring accountability of the security sector and how they contribute to parliamentary oversight. Civil society is both important to, and an expression of, the process of democratisation and plays a strong and increasing role in the functioning of established democracies (Edmunds, 2001, p. 30). It actively reminds its political leaders that there is a multiplicity of competing demands and interests to be taken into account when deciding on public expenditures and state policies. This is why a vibrant civil society is a basic requirement for democracy. It has the potential to provide a counterweight to the power of the state, to resist authoritarianism and, due to its pluralistic nature, ensure that the state is not the instrument of a few interests or select groups (Edmunds, 2001, p. 33).

2.22 A gender perspective on security sector

Gender equality is a relatively recent public concern. According to Rocklyne (2004), gender perspective on security sector is now regarded as an important parameter in relation to security issues as well. Not only because the vast majority of those affected by any armed conflict, including refugees and internally displaced persons, are women and children, but also because women - who represent over a half of the world's population - have equal rights with men and much to contribute to resolving security issues (Rocklyne, 2000, p. 41). Factoring in women's talents and insights will lead to responses to security challenges that are more people-centred and consistent with a human security approach and are therefore more sustainable (Rocklyne, 2000, p. 42).

Therefore, when aiming at gender equality in security policy it is essential to approach this aim from two different angles. Firstly, security policy has to focus on and address gender- sensitive issues. Possible solutions have to be presented and structures introduced to ensure the respect of women's rights and interests. Secondly, it is essential to promote women's participation at all levels of decision-making and in the fields related to security sector.

A survey that was conducted by IPU in 1997 on women in politics revealed that women are still largely absent from, or underrepresented in security sectors including parliamentary defence and security committees (Ibrahim, 2012, p. 43). Needless to say, they rarely occupy the function of presiding or deputy presiding officer or rapporteur in such committees. This survey showed that, of 97 parliaments which provided data on women in parliamentary committees, only 3% had a woman chairing their defence and security committees. Generally, women represented only 18.6% of presiding officers of all parliamentary committees (Ibrahim, 2012, p. 44). This situation may be explained by two key factors. First, there are still very few female parliamentarians worldwide (14.3% in May 2002). Second, the view that war and peace and security issues in general are less women's business than men's is still deeply entrenched in mentalities all over the world. This view is problematic as wars most certainly affect the entire population of a state, often women are even victimised to a greater extent than men (Ibrahim, 2012, p. 45).

2.23 Women's involvement in security sector as a mechanism for gender mainstreaming

The government's security sector could be assessed from the point of view of gender mainstreaming. At the 4th UN World Conference on Women in Beijing, the UN established gender mainstreaming as a global strategy for promoting gender equality. The UN (ECOSOC) defines gender mainstreaming as "...*the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area at all levels to achieve gender equality*" (Freeman, 1996, p. 45).

Women's increasing involvement in the armed forces may in turn contribute to the shift from traditional defence to human security: increasing emphasis is placed on research, information technologies and intelligence. This trend offers new opportunities to women, especially in countries where men and women have equal access to education and training (Freeman, 1996, p. 55).

2.24 Organisations and individuals that influence security sector

Following Chuter (2002), it may be useful to identify and functionally classify different organisations and individuals with an influence on the security sector. Such a functional typology could conceivably include: The *Executive* part of the security sector which is concerned with the development, management and implementation of security policy and its political direction, and corresponds to the traditional definition of the security sector (Chuter, 2002, p.23). It is this definition that will mostly inform the analysis presented in this contribution on the security sector in Namibia.

The *Consenting* part of the security sector comprises those structures whose approval is necessary, by law or custom, for policy to be put into practice. It includes parliament in general, its standing and select committees, as well as independent auditors and ombudsmen, and judges to the extent that they might be asked to pronounce on the legality or constitutionality of defence policy and security-related practices (Chuter, 2002, p. 24).

The *Aspirational* part of the security sector consists of those who seek to have influence although they have no direct mandate. They include civil society agencies, NGOs, academics and journalists (Chuter, 2002, p. 25).

It is important to remember that the agendas of the above distinct categories will differ in every case. For example, the *executive* component may be more interested in the domain of defence and security policy, the restructuring of armed forces and the management of human and financial resources. The *consenting* part might be more interested in training with a view towards more effective parliamentary oversight and accountable financial resource management, whilst the *aspirational* part generally might need significant education in security related issues before it can play a part in the debates on them and expect to have influence (Chuter, 2002, p. 25).

In most Southern African countries, these components of the security sector have traditionally been closed to public debate and scrutiny for reasons to do with the ideological context of the Cold War, the protracted armed struggle against apartheid, the material interests that underpin the security sector and the state and the character of governance, especially in the context of one- and dominant party

systems (Chuter, 2002, p. 26). Although some degree of transparency and accountability has been introduced over the past several years, progress has been uneven and, because of previous exclusion, the capacity of government officials, civil society, parliamentarians, the media and academics to engage with security issues remains limited. As a result, security sector policy and management issues are not widely discussed or understood, although they are key to transparent, democratic governance and sustainable development (Chuter, 2002, p.27).

2.25 Security sector in Southern African Development Community's perspective

Du Pisani (2003) is of the view that the deficiency of the security sector is replicated also at sub-regional level, with the result that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has evolved forms of security cooperation often without involving parliaments or civil society, and in many cases, government officials or security practitioners themselves. "This phenomenon of not involving a diversity of agencies stems largely from the liberation struggles that profoundly shaped the institutional memory and culture of the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) from 1980 to 1992 and subsequently of the Southern African Development Community since then. Security continues to be the preserve of the head of state or a select few in the executive arm of government, especially since the survival of state elites is often the greatest security concern" (Du Pisani, 2003, p. 7).

Du Pisani (2003) emphasises that in a liberal democracy, such as Namibia, security governance may be conceptualised as involving three interactive domains of

influence: the state, political society and civil society. As an ensemble of institutions and power relations, the state encompasses the security sector agencies such as the intelligence agency, military and the police, as well as a civilian executive and legislature. Political society comprises political parties, while civil society embodies the associational life of society, such as religious organisations, trade unions, professional bodies, business associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)” (Du Pisani, 2003, p. 8).

2.26 Actors in the security sector governance

According to DFID (2000), in a liberal democracy, there is ideally an open, dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the legislature, the executive, political parties and civil society agencies. It is, however, not merely the form and contours of power between the various actors which needs to be considered when assessing security sector governance. Various principles have been developed for the effective governance of security in democracies. Again these are ideal, and need to be contextualised, but there is general consensus that they include the following:

- a) The constitution should provide for clear lines of authority for security governance, specify roles and functions, and establish a constitutional framework consistent with international law.
- b) Security forces and agencies should be accountable to elected civil authorities (the executive and the legislature) and to independent agencies that provide oversight.

- c) The executive should exercise political control over the security forces/agencies and establish a clear policy framework for their activities in consultation with other actors through a transparent and consultative process.
- d) The legislature has an oversight role, to pass laws, approve budgets, reviews security related policies.
- e) Accountability requires a significant degree of transparency although this may be limited in some respects.
- f) Security and defence policy should be translated into integrated plans, strategies and budgets.
- g) Budgeting and procurement should be transparent, integrated with national budgeting processes and subject to scrutiny by parliament and civil society.
- h) Conditions should be created to allow civil society agencies to monitor and comment on security issues and where appropriate to assist in the delivery of security services.
- i) The security forces and agencies should be adequately trained and resourced to carry out their activities professionally and in a manner consistent with democratic norms and human rights (DFID, 2003, p.3).

2.27 Typology of the Namibian security sector

The security sector in Namibia, comprises the following agencies: the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that provides civil management and oversight over the Namibia Defence Force (NDF), the Ministry of Safety and Security (MSS) under whose

oversight the Namibian Police (NAMPOL) and the Namibian Prison Services (NPS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) whose oversight the relationship between Namibian and other states, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration (MHAI) that oversee the border guards, the National Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) that investigates, gathers, correlates, evaluate and retain information whether inside or outside Namibia for the purpose of identifying any threat or potential threat to the security of Namibia, executive, legislature and judiciary, Private Security Enterprises (PSE) and civil society actors with an interest in security related issues (Du Pisani, 2003, p. 12).

2.28 Democratic/political control of the security sector in Namibia

Erasmus (2002) states that as a citizen based liberal democracy, Namibia is one of the countries that conform to the notion of liberal democratic model of security sector governance (p. 25). Lamb (1998) agrees with Erasmus because the state itself is both historically and socially constructed. Lamb, however, identifies three traditions of civil supremacy that can shape the nature of security sector governance in Namibia which are: a) *the colonial legacy*, b) *the revolutionary/insurgent tradition* and c) *the democratic tradition*. The democratic tradition has become pre-eminent in the post-independence period, although the remains from the two other traditions can also be found (Lamb, 1998, p.20).

The politics of national reconciliation, the design of the transition to independence in 1990, especially the security provisions of the transition, the involvement of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) shortly after independence, as well as the provisions contained in the Constitution all conspired to ensure that

Namibia broadly mirrors a model of democratic control of the armed forces (Nathan, 1990, p. 9).

The mandate of the democratic control of the security sector is based on the provision of Article 1 (2) of the Namibian Constitution that recognised the sovereignty of the people as the foundation for state power and provide for effective subordination of the armed forces to civilian political control, by entrusting political office bearers with overall policy making responsibility, including those relating to defence and foreign policies (Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 1, p. 10).

The Defence Act (2002) also makes provisions for limited direct involvement of NDF in political society and provides for a civilian led Ministry of Defence, and a NDF composed of professional and non-partisan members. Democratic governance of the security sector is somewhat diluted by the tendency of executive dominance in the National Assembly. The Executive, through the President, Prime Minister, as leader of government business in the National Assembly, and the Cabinet Committee on Defence, Security and International Relations (CCDSIR) are arguably more important for policy coordination and democratic control than legislative oversight. The function of the CCDSIR is to coordinates the activities of the Ministries of Defence, Safety and Security, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Immigration and the Namibia Central Intelligence Service (Cabinet Handbook, 1995, p.31).

The Defence Act (2002) further makes provision for the President to engage the Defence Force on such service as he/she may determine and provides for service

outside Namibia. Section 32 (1) of this Act provides for any member of the Defence Force to perform service at any place outside Namibia whenever it is necessary:

- a) “to combat, prevent or suppress any attack or act of aggression which is directed at Namibia in any manner by any armed force or group of persons, or any threat of such attack or act of aggression; or
- b) to prevent the recurrence of any such attack or act of aggression or any threat of such attack or act of aggression.

Taking the above into account, the President as the Commanding-in-Chief of the Namibian Defence Force may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, deploy members of the Defence Force outside Namibia of which he/she is expected to inform Parliament within 30 days after the deployment was ordered under subsection (2) of the same Act. If a deployment contemplated in subsection (2) is ordered at a time when the National Assembly is not in session, the President must forthwith summon the National Assembly to meet as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the deployment was ordered.

Upon being informed in terms of subsection (3) of a deployment referred to in that subsection, the National Assembly may by resolution, proposed by at least one third of all the members of the National Assembly and passed by a two thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly, disapprove of the President’s decision to deploy members of the Defence Force. In the event of disapproval under subsection (5), the President is obliged to withdraw the members of the Defence Force not later than 30 days from the date of such disapproval. If a resolution contemplated in

subsection (5) is not proposed or carried, the deployment in question is deemed to have been approved by the National Assembly. Based on the above-mentioned provisions, it can be clearly seen that the President is vested with more executive power as the Commander-in-Chief of the Namibia Defence Force.

The practice is that deployment of the NDF, while provided for in the Defence Act (Act 1 of 2002) is an executive privilege; often confined to a few members of the executive, notably the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security (CCDS). Parliament, however, does debate defence and security related issues, while the opposition parties field questions to the responsible minister or a person designated by him/her. For example, there was a lively debate on the floor of the National Assembly following Namibia's military engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998.

The policy and legal frameworks that govern the respective functions and responsibilities of the NDF and the Namibian Police provide for fairly clear divisions of labour between them, except for the provisions contained in the Defence Act (section 5, subsection (b) and subsection (4) (a-c) and subsection (5)). These important provisions enable members of the Defence Force to be employed on police functions with such powers and duties as are by law conferred or imposed on a member of the Police Force in terms of section 13 of the Police Act (1990).

In a nutshell, it can be concluded that the executive does exercise more political control over the security institutions such as the Namibian Defence Force, the Namibian Police and the Namibia Central Intelligence Services more than the legislature and establish policy framework for their activities because by law, the

head of these institutions reports directly to the President, who is part of the executive.

2.29 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a better understanding of the concept of the security sector and assessed the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (PSCFDS) over the security sector in Namibia. It has been realised that many researchers relate or align parliamentary oversight with accountability. This can be concluded that parliamentary accountability is crucial to enhance the parliamentary standing committees' oversight role over the security sector. The next chapter presents the research methodology of the study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter shows how data was collected and interpreted to assess the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the security sector in Namibia. A number of methods such as interviews, observations and literature readings were used as data sources.

3.2 Research design

The research adopted a qualitative research method to gain relevant information on the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over security sector in the country.

The qualitative method is descriptive and can reveal the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationship systems and people. This research method enables a researcher to gain new insights and information on a specific topic to be researched (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 97). Akpo (2006) states that the design of the research provides answers to the research questions. The research design spells out the type of research that would be suitable, the persons or situations from which to collect the data, the type of data needed, and how to collect and analyse the data (Akpo, 2006, p.113). The research design can be summarised as an outline of all procedures to be used and the reasons for using them. The research design presents in technical terms, how the researcher proceeded in addressing the research questions and objectives. Qualitative research is not easily defined although it has

certain features that distinguish it from quantitative research method (Struwig & Stead, 2003, p 71).

3.3 Population

Research population is a group that is subject of research interest or wants to study (Melville & Goddard, 1996, p. 29). It is not possible to study the whole population hence the researcher can determine the average of a group to consider for the study and to make general findings based on the sample. Sampling is the method used to select a given number of people or things from a population. The researcher endeavours to collect data from a small group of the population in such a way that the knowledge gained is representing the total population in the context of the study (Cohen & Manion, 1994). Therefore, the research population for this study consists of about 100 people from the security sector.

3.4 Sampling

The study applied the technique of non-probability sampling when selecting sampling units. The study targeted 20 respondents and the researcher used his discretion to select sampling unit based on own conveniences. The sampling units for the study were as follows: the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the National Assembly (1) and two of its members from opposition parties (2), the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the National Council (1) and one of its member from the opposition party (1), senior officials and Service Chiefs from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (1), Defence (1), Safety and Security (1), Home Affairs and Immigration (1) and Namibia Central

Intelligence Services (1), interviewees from the University of Namibia (UNAM) (1), Polytechnic of Namibia (PoN) (1) and the International University of Management (IUM) (1) who have knowledge on the topic, interviewees from the Institute for Public Policy and Research (IPPR) (1) and Namibia Non-Governmental Organization Forum (NANGOF) (1), interviewees from Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) (1) and the Namibian newspaper (1), and interviewees from the members of the Community Policing Committee (CPC) (3).

3.5 Research instruments

The researcher used multiple instruments and techniques within the qualitative approach of data collection. The following research instruments were employed: a questionnaire, semi-structured interviews, observations on proceedings of parliament and committee meetings, and documentary analysis such as the Hansard, parliamentary journals, speeches and statements, discussion papers and annual reports of the affected institutions. Goddard and Melville (2002) state that document analysis is important because it gives the researcher a general background on the subject that is being studied. Since official records are vital sources of data, it is necessary to include the documents which will also enhance the interview. This gave the researcher an opportunity to assess the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over the security sector. The collected data was read, scrutinised and presented in a narrative form to reflect findings from the field.

3.5 Research procedure

Both primary and secondary data were used to collect data from the respondents. The researcher used primary data by means of a structured questionnaire and interviews. Interviews were used to obtain views and opinions from the target population. Responses of face to face interview were recorded and transcribed accordingly. Secondary data such as documentary analysis and books such as the Hansard, parliamentary journals, speeches and statements, discussion papers and annual reports of the affected institutions were also used. The identity of the researcher, aim and purpose of the study were disclosed to the respondents' prior taking part in the study. Questionnaires were distributed to the target population in advance before the interview took place.

3.6 Data analysis

Data analysis is an explicit step in theoretically interpreting data collected by using specific strategies to transform the raw into a processed form of data (Thorne, 1997, p. 27). According to Bagdan and Biklein (1982), data analysis involves working with data, organising it, breaking it down, searching for patterns discovering what is important and what is to be learned and deciding what a researcher will tell others. The collected data were analysed and interpreted to depict solutions to the research question. This was compared with the information collected through interviews, observations and literature readings. The researcher finally interpreted the collected data into a useful dataset through processing and analysis in order to draw conclusions based on the findings.

3.7 Research ethics

Ethics is a discipline that deals with what is good and bad or right and wrong with moral duty and obligations (Grinnell and Williams, 1990, p.304). The researcher informed the interviewees the purpose of the research and their participation was based on the principle of voluntary basis. Written requests were forwarded to heads of the affected institutions to get permission to conduct interviews with their subordinates. The interviewees were assured that their names will not be revealed in the paper. The information gathered through this study were kept and presented with utmost confidentiality to be used only for the specific purpose of this study. Therefore, the study was conducted taking into account that ethic is the application of values to human relations and transaction (Levi, 1993, p. 23).

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter provides a theoretical framework of the research methodology which the researcher considered as a key aspect of the study. The research design, which includes the qualitative research approach were used as guiding principles for this study. The research population and sampling procedures as well as the research instruments that were used to collect data were presented and described. The next chapter focuses on the presentation and analysis of data based on the findings collected through interviews, observations and literature readings.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the data that was collected through interviews, observations and literature readings to assess the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over the security sector in Namibia. The chapter also presents views of the affected individuals from various institutions and comparative views from observations and literature readings. This analysis, therefore, gives an insight into the manner in which the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and security sector liaises and coordinates on security-related matters.

4.1 Data Presentation

4.2.1 Members of Parliament

According to a member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the National Assembly, from the ruling party, SWAPO, the Committee was established in terms of Article 59 of the Namibian Constitution, and that it has the duty to examine, consider and report on any matters pertaining to OMAs under its oversight mandate, including the ministries of Safety and Security, Defence, Veterans Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs and Immigration, and the Namibian Central Intelligence Service. The overall mandate is to see to it that the executive implements the laws pertaining to the security sector, as enacted by parliament, to the benefit of the people of Namibia. Being the elected representatives of the people, members of Parliamentary Standing Committee on

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security have the duty and responsibility to oversee the implementation of policies and legislation of the security institutions, which they themselves have adopted/passed. That involves getting regular feedback from the executive and officials of the security OMAs, investigating progress of specific projects and general conditions by field visits.

The above said member further argued that at the infant stage of parliamentary committees, the oversight role of the committees were not easily understood by the security sector, given the complex nature of the field shrouded in secrecy. He further indicated that many a times, efforts to enhance transparency are construed as attempts to compromise national security. Nevertheless, as democracy started to gain momentum in Namibia, the security sector began to understand the existence of the committee and its role. As of now, members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are exchanging views and opinions on security aspects with OMAs falling under the security sector. To strengthen the existing relationship between parliament and security OMAs, he proposed that a focal person be identified in the security OMAs to serve as a liaison between the two to avoid a government bureaucratic process, which, according to him, hampers interactions between the two. Due to insufficient budgetary allocation to the security ministries, most of the programmes and projects could not be undertaken, hence, he called to the Ministry of Finance to increase the budget of the security ministries.

His counterpart from the ruling party who the National Council is of the view that the majority of the Namibian people understand that national security issues affect

people's lives, welfare and values and should not be left to the judgment of security agencies alone. New types of armed conflicts and transnational organised crime across states have prompted new thinking about the concept of security where governments increasingly confront non-state actors. He said that people also understand that the security of today is not only about protection of the border and preventing or acting upon the criminal activities but it encompasses human security in the neighbourhood, hence the emergence of Women and Men Network Against Crimes (WMNAC), which has been established in most regions, constituencies and villages. As far as the security sector is concerned, there seems to be strides in achieving a good understanding by the concerned role players on the oversight function of the Committee.

A member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the National Assembly and a member of the opposition party, All People's Party (APP) observed that members of the public know the security sector although some might not know if the security sector is accountable to parliament, as the degree of understanding may vary greatly; depending on the traditional and/or ideological view different people have on security sector. The parliamentary outreach programmes that were initiated with the purpose to take parliament closer to the people in a transparent manner also serve as a platform for the Committee to explain its oversight role to the public. Although committee members are in regular contact with the members of the public, this does not imply that all members of the public know that the security sector is accountable to parliament because there has been no thorough study done to determine the extent to which members of the public know this subject.

According to another member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, who is also a member of the official opposition party, the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), members of the committee are properly constituted and have the necessary level of literacy to understand the role of the security sector, both locally and internationally. He argued that as a country that has just gained its political independence, most members of parliament prescribe to the Policy of National Reconciliation (PNR), which demonstrates their acquaintances to the notion of the security sector. Therefore, they have a unified opinion on the policy parameters, under which the security sector should operate and their oversight role of the security sector in the country. After all, it is a political role which the MPs are called upon to fulfil; however, mechanisms are in place for new members to be informed and advised by technical experts in the field and supported by sound research with regard to topics concerned.

Both politicians stressed that the work of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security cannot be over-emphasised, as it plays an oversight role over the security sector to ensure that security policy frameworks encompassing all components of the security sector are developed and implemented in a transparent and accountable manner. The budgetary allocation to the security OMAs is small as they implement their projects and programmes with difficulties due to financial constraints. The Committee is aware of the call by the Minister of Finance to learn to do more with little resources but the security institutions in Namibia are continuously underfunded. Therefore, security ministries are faced with a number of challenges, such as lack of adequate transport, shortage of office

and domicile accommodation, communication equipment, etcetera (Parliament of Namibia, 2009, p.13).

With regard to the level of education for members of parliament, only a few fortunate members had the privilege to study and obtain better qualification as majority of them have sacrificed their school life to the liberation struggle of this country in exile.

According to these four politicians, security ministries need to be funded adequately so that their officials do not compromise the security of the State and are not involved in bribery and corrupt activities which are common in some African countries due to low salaries. It is clear from the above that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security is important, taking into account its oversight role over the security sector.

4.2.2 Academics

According to a part-time lecturer from the University of Namibia (UNAM) and a political analyst, the role of academics over the security sector is to advise parliament on how best the security sector can work together with the public or civilians as stakeholders in security matters. He further argues that academics also create platforms where civilians can come together and express their views on the conduct of security institutions. During preparations for elections, academics inform members of the public to understand the importance of participating in election at public lectures and seminars organised by politicians. In the event of transition of governments, academics also assist in the reintegration and resettlement of former security forces into the society. This is done to improve the

relationship between security institutions and its former forces with the civilians. The understanding of the security sector depends on the readiness of a member to serve in that specific committee. Furthermore, he is of the view that there are some members who are well conversant with the concept of security sector, especially those who have served in the committee for many years, yet there are also some who are struggling to understand this concept. Although mechanisms are in place for members of parliament to be advised by officials and experts on parliamentary matters, there is a need to give them extensive training on this subject, including security aspect to be arranged by parliament, SADC-PF, AU and IPU. This will help the committee members to advise security ministries/institutions on alternative methods to address the common security issues in the country. It will again improve the existing relationship between the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and academics in terms of advising parliament on security laws and policies.

Although there is a degree of transparency and accountability over the past years, he has observed little progress because of the exclusion of the capacity of government officials, civil society, parliamentarians, the media and academics to engage with security issues. As a result, security sector policy and management issues are not well understood, despite the fact they are key to transparent, democratic governance and sustainable development. Even though in some cases, security ministries could not clearly explain to the public how they spent the allocated funds and the public only learns from the media how funds were misappropriated or disappeared, this does not mean there is no transparency in the

security actors in the conduct of their business. It was alleged that there is little transparency in the security ministries in the budgeting and procurement of security items and instruments. However, the tabling of the intelligence bill to parliament is seen as a mechanism to improve transparency in this regard. Furthermore, in Namibia, the concept of security sector is publicly spoken as citizens are exercising their right to either criticise or commend security forces on their work in the media.

On budgetary allocation to security institutions in Namibia, he is of the view that it is high time to prioritise budgetary allocation to social ministries like agriculture and rural development, labour and social welfare in order for Namibia to fight its own internal war of unemployment, poverty, hunger, water shortage, flood, drought, etcetera, which are a serious concern to the nation. Over the past years, the Ministry of Defence has received the third largest allocation after education and health, the situation that should be revised so that more funds are diverted to economic and social ministries to expedite the decentralisation of government services to the people. The security ministries and institutions should now concentrate on cementing relationship with institutions such as UN, AU and SADC in terms of providing officers to serve in peace-keeping missions and other areas of assistance.

He indicates that members of the committees do not have more power to influence the activities of the executives. A vivid example cited in this regard was the deployment of the Namibian Defence Forces to DRC in 1998, which needed consultation from the legislature who were not consulted and the decision was

taken at executive level and parliament was only informed later after the soldiers were already deployed to DRC.

According to a lecturer from the International University of Management (IUM), there are those members of the public who know the existence of the committee particularly those that live in towns and there are some members of the public that are not aware of this committee and its role. His view, with regard to the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the security sector, is that the committees have little influences on activities of the executive, because these security ministries are headed by the executive. During the budgeting of programmes in the security ministries, members of the committees are not invited, they only learn on the budget books how the security ministries divided their budget into various programmes and projects. He concludes that while appreciating work of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, the committee members should embrace the spirit of being national leaders and not politicising the security issues based on their political differences. The committee members should be able to advice executive correctly and scrutinises budgets and policies tabled in parliament as well as to tackle issues of misspending of funds and miss prioritising of activities by security ministries and institutions. Another proposal for the committee to work better is to consider merging two houses of parliament so that the committee structure can be expanded and strengthened to make constructive inputs to parliamentary business, including the security sector.

4.2.3 Security ministries/institutions

A respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that there is a smooth relationship between the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Defence and Security and security-related OMAs because there is an ongoing consultation between the two on security-related matters. He observed that there is a political bias among some members of the committee that might take issues based on their political ideologies instead of addressing the security issue at hand, for example, some members of the committee from the opposition parties might only criticise the ruling party instead of proposing possible solutions to the issues. This might also be the same with some ministers heading the security OMAs not willing to take advice from certain members of the committee because they belong to an opposition party.

According to him, not all officials of the security OMAs understand the concept of security sector and whether it is accountable to parliament. Some officials in the security OMAs associate security sector with police and soldiers and are not aware that security sector includes their ministries. However, senior managers of security OMAs, who are consulted by the committees on certain aspects of security nature, are aware that the security sector is accountable to parliament. He stressed that the current formation of committee members who are drawn from various political parties in Parliament, which is not based on member's expertise and experiences also contribute to poor performance of such a committee. In the current system, you might have a member who has a background on health matters but ends up serving on the security committee, so his/her contribution will not be as meaningful as it would have been on health committee. He expressed a need to provide members of

the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security with necessary training on security aspects for them to make constructive contributions in their duties as national leaders. This can be coupled with enough budgetary provision to the security-related ministries and institutions in order for them to carry out their activities and implement programmes and projects timely.

A respondent from the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration, in order to improve the relationship between members of the committee and the security ministries, there should be regular consultation on security matters not only with senior officials but also with junior officials of line ministries/institutions who are in most cases the implementers of the recommendations of the committees. He indicated that most members of the public, especially those that are living in urban areas are aware of the existence of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security because members of the committees travel to various municipal towns during public hearings, but as for its oversight role, they are not informed on that responsibility. He expressed the relevancy to give basic security training to the officials of the security OMAs in order for them to understand the oversight role of the committees and for them to influence executive on security-related matters. This can also be coupled with enough budgetary provision, which in many cases hinders the implementation of programmes for the ministries. He further observed that there are some members of parliament, who, due to the past academic history of this country, could not express themselves properly in official language despite their brilliant ideas that could have an impact on the issue on the table, but due to language barriers, their message could not be

well understood. He, therefore, proposed that political parties that send members to parliament consider setting up minimum academic requirements for upcoming members of parliament to enable them to make constructive contributions and interact openly and freely with others in meetings, conferences and summit on issues of common interest as this also has a negative impact on the effectiveness of such a committee.

4.2.4 Civil society

A respondent from the Institute for Public Policy and Research (IPPR) argued that there is a limited role the civil society can play over the security sector due to few experts and academics on the subject. He emphasised also that the absence of a union or body that unites security sector in Namibia also contribute to the limited role of civil society over the security sector in Namibia. According to him, the majority of the committee members understand the concept of the security sector. Some of the members have served in this committee for many years and now understand the security sector dimension on a regional and global context. However, there are some members, especially the new ones, who have limited understanding on security sector despite a short induction course given to members. With regard to the budgetary provision to the security ministries; he is of the opinion that the government should consider allocating more funds to the social ministries instead of security ministries.

He indicated that the issues related to the security sector in Namibia are now spoken publicly at schools, meetings and even at coffee shops. The tabling of security-related ministry's budget in parliament proves that it is openly discussed. In

Namibia, members of the public are at liberty to express their views on security laws and policies in the print and electronic media, the vivid example here is the SMS column in The Namibian newspaper, where members of the public express their opinions on issues of national interest, including security issues. In Namibia, soldiers or police officers who contravene laws are dealt with in the same way as any other citizen of this country.

However, he was aware of the claim by the Human Rights Organisation that some people, who were picked by the security officers for questioning during the UNITA banditry activities in Kavango Region (1998-2000) disappeared till today and security officials in the OMAs remained silent on the matter and did not inform the public what happened to these people (Inambao, 1998, p. 7). This is one of the few examples of secrecy in the conduct and activities of the security ministries, but this does not mean there is absence of transparency among security officials in the OMAs in the conduct of their businesses. He argued that the joint project between the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) and the members of the civil society in the distribution of drought relief food, evacuation of flood victims and the joint efforts between the Namibian Police and civil society to fight against criminalities through the establishment of Community Policing Committees (CPC), clearly proves transparency, coordination and trust in the security ministries and institutions in Namibia. He concluded that there is a sound general relationship between the two due to the fact that the Namibian security sector is highly respected by the members of the public and civil society.

4.2.5 The media

Members of the media from the two selected electronic and print media of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) and The Namibian newspaper expressed their concern on high budgetary allocation to the security ministries in Namibia 23 years after independence. A journalist from NBC responsible for the parliamentary and political desk voiced concern on the yearly recruitment of the Namibian Defence and Namibian Police Forces for a population of less than 2.5 million. Her view on the budgetary allocation to the yearly recruitment of soldiers and police while Namibia is at peace with her neighbours and beyond, could be used to address social amenities challenges such as to build clinics, schools, roads and many others facilities.

Another journalist from The Namibian newspaper alluded that not all people in Namibia are aware of the role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and whether security sector is accountable to parliament. Moreover, he argued that even the concept of security sector is not properly understood by the majority as some associate it with soldiers and police. Since security ministries are using public money, he urged them to be transparent in the conduct of their businesses. He, therefore, concluded that a lot should be done to educate and sensitise people on the security sector aspects and other parliamentary terminologies such as oversight role, parliamentary accountability, bi-cameralism, vote of no confidence, bill, chamber and many others. He called upon parliamentarians to engage the Ministry of Education (MoE) to ensure that these terminologies are taught in schools so that learners are acquainted with them at a

tender age. He proposed that members of parliament should go on local radios to explain these terminologies and their constitutional right to the people.

4.2.6 Selected Members of the Community Policing Committee (CPC)

According to a respondent from the Khomas Regional Community Policing Committee, members of the public, especially those from the informal settlements are aware of the parliamentary committees but not on their constitutional obligation and their oversight role over the security sector and whether the security sector is accountable to parliament. According to her, during the Committee's visits to the public, the Committee does not explain their mandate and oversight role to the public but concentrate only on the bill on the table that requires public inputs at a particular time.

However, a member of the Community Policing Committee stated that although members of the public are aware of the existence of the parliamentary standing committees, their understanding on the security sector is minimal, as most of them associate this concept to the uniformed forces such as police, defence forces and prison and correctional services only. This also makes the ordinary members of the public to regard the concept of "*security*" as top secret to be discussed by uniformed officers only. According to him members of the parliamentary committees are properly constituted as they represent all political parties in parliament although their understanding on the concept of security sector may vary from one member to the other. He proposed provision of in-service training to the members of the committee so that they have a clear and common understanding of the security sector as well as the volatile and ever-changing nature of security in the

contemporary world. There is a need to increase budgets of the security ministries in order for them to undertake their activities accordingly.


A retired Police Officer, who is also a member of the Community Policing Committee, pinpointed that parliamentary committees have the mandate to carry out their tasks based on the provision of Article 59 of the Namibian Constitution. They have been carrying out this constitutional mandate for many years and brought some improvements on their cluster ministries because their recommendations have addressed some challenges faced by the security ministries such as renovations of accommodation facilities of officers at border posts/entry points, renovation of army and police barracks. It is, therefore, pertinent to maintain regular consultation with the members of the public to exchange views and opinions on the aspects of security issues and so as to bring government services closer to the people. He indicated that Members of the Public (MoP) are always willing to work closely with their leaders and it is easy with the members of parliament because they are highly respected and trusted by the public. He cited the smooth relationship between the members of the public and security agencies when they report suspicious or strange people in their communities, vandalising of government properties, and disappearance of livestock and others to the security agencies.

4.3 Data analysis

References were made to the literature review while analysing data obtained from respondents. Sets of questionnaires were prepared, for politicians, academics,

security ministries/institutions, civil society, media and selected members of the community policing committee.

Figure 1: The views of respondents on the research topic.



Key: See Figure 1

Figure 2: Questions and responses

Questions	Yes	No	Explanation
Q1. Do you think members of the parliamentary standing committee on foreign affairs, defence and security knows their oversight role over the security sector?	6	2	They travel to the regions to inspect security sectors and come up with recommendations that are forwarded to them for implementations.
Q2. According to your observations, does the Security Sector in Namibia understand the role of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs,	6	3	They knows as they give inputs to the security related bills and policies that are needed by the committees

Defence and Security?			
Q3. Do you think members of the public know and understand the concept of security sector and whether security sector is accountable to parliament?	4	7	Only few understand, hence don't know if such committees are accountable to parliament. During visits to regions to explain their oversight function and when conducting public hearings, they exclude people in the rural areas who constitute bigger size of the population
Q4. Do you think whether members of the public are aware of the existence of parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs, defence and security and its oversight role over the security sector?	5	3	They might be aware on the existence but not on the oversight role
Q5. Do you think members of the parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs, defence and security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the security sector in Namibia?	6	3	The composition is not based on their experiences and educational background
Q6. Is there a need to have parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs, defence and security in Namibia?	5	2	Since they are elected members, such committee should continue exchanging views with the public
Q7. View on the current budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institutions in Namibia, to be increased or not?	4	7	More are calling for decrease and shift funds to social ministries
Q8. Do you think members of the parliamentary committees on foreign	3	5	No power to influence activities of executives, because decision is taken at

affairs, defence and security have power to influence activities of the executive?			Cabinet attended by members of executive only.
Q9. According to your observations, is there transparency among the Security Actors (e.g. NDF and NAMPOL) in Namibia in the conduct of their activities?	6	3	NDF and NAMPOL are also accountable to parliamentary and auditing committees and they are open for criticism like any other public institution.
Q10. How do you see the concept of “Security” being spoken in Namibia, is it openly discussed or not?	5	3	The tabling of security related bills to parliament is a testimony to this although they are some respondents who associate the concept with forces only and think that it has nothing to do with the public.

The questions were designed to know the oversight function of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the security sector and whether the security sector is accountable to parliament, their views on the budgetary allocation to the security ministries, etcetera. A sound knowledge and awareness of the meaning of security sector surfaced among the respondents with limited knowledge of some members of the public on the research questions. It was evident from the respondents, even though the definition and explanations were somehow different, that they all shared a common understanding of the concept of the security sector. To the majority of respondents, the definition of security sector was explained to encompass the armed forces, police, border guards, intelligence services and prison warders.

It is worth mentioning here that out of 100 respondents; only 20 have been interviewed due to hectic time schedules of others. Members of parliament

interviewed expressed their concerns over the limited budget allocation to the security ministries that hinders these ministries to implement their plans and programmes effectively. On the contrary, a level of dissatisfaction was registered by members of the academia, civil society and the media during the interview, arguing that Namibia should consider increasing the budgets of social ministries to address issues of unemployment, poverty, hunger, water shortages, flood and drought and not to the security ministries anymore taking into account that Namibia is at peace with her neighbours. Therefore, they propose that Namibia strengthens her bilateral relations with regional and international agencies in areas of mutual benefit.

Most respondents indicated that not all members of the public know the oversight function of the Parliamentary Standing Committees and whether the security sector is accountable to parliament. Concerns were raised that although members of the public, especially those living in urban areas, are aware of the existence of the Parliamentary Committees, they are not informed on their responsibilities regarding their oversight role. Another concern was raised over high budgetary allocation to the security ministries, hence calling for reduction.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the different opinions of the research participants on a variety of themes as indicated in the introduction. There are various issues raised in relation to the oversight role of the parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs, defence and security over the security sector in Namibia. A number of issues were identified such as limited knowledge on the concept of “security sector”

by stakeholders as some regard security sector as “a *thing of police and defence forces*”. It was also found that political parties that send members to parliament should consider introducing minimum academic requirements so that members of the committees can easily express themselves in parliament, meetings, conferences and seminars in official language freely. The next chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations on the study of the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over the security sector in Namibia. It sought to identify the contributing factors inhibiting or enabling the smooth cooperation and coordination between Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses and Security Sector in Namibia. Finally, recommendations thereof will be presented.

It should be indicated that conducting this kind of research where there is not enough materials on the topic was a difficult undertaking. It was discovered that some of the key informants such as Members of Parliament, permanent secretaries/accounting officers and service chiefs of the affected institutions were not available for interview for various reasons depending on their schedules, which resulted in some appointments being cancelled. Despite all these challenges, the researcher managed to come up with the following conclusions and recommendations to serve as a tool to enhance interactions between Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses and Security Sector in Namibia.

5.2 Conclusions

The findings reveal that Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are crucial despite limited knowledge on the security sector by some stakeholders.

Since members of parliament are expected, among others, to make public policy statements and in some cases at international forums, the study found a need for political parties in Namibia, which are sending members to parliament based on their party lists, to consider introducing minimum academic entry requirements so that they can easily interact in parliament, meetings, conferences and seminars in official language.

The study has been particularly focusing on the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the security sector in order to develop better strategies to harmonise interactions between the two. It is important to note that the majority of the people who are stakeholders in the security sector such as members of the public and junior officials of the security in the OMAs, who could make meaningful contributions to the whole spectrum of the security sector, did not know what “*security sector*” entails as they associate the concept with police and defence forces only. Not only that, they also are not aware of the oversight role of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses over the security sector in Namibia.

Finally, while parliament has a mechanism to give basic parliamentary course to the new Members of Parliament, the author’s view is that it should engage the Ministry of Education to include basic parliamentary course in the school curriculum so that

learners get acquainted with basic parliamentary terminologies while at primary schools. This will enable future members of parliament to better understand the parliamentary terminologies, including the concept of the security sector and many others. It will also assist them to follow the current global security challenges and enhance effective and efficient interaction with other law makers at national, regional and international meetings and conferences.

5.3 Recommendations

The following are recommended based on the findings of this study:

- That the members of the public and junior officials of line security ministries be well informed on the concept of the security sector and the oversight role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security;
- That security ministries and institutions concentrate on cementing relationships with institutions such as SADC, AU and UN in terms of providing officers to serve in peace-keeping missions and other areas of assistance;
- That the current two houses of parliament be merged into one to expand and strengthen committee structures;
- That Namibia considers reducing budgetary allocation for security ministries and allocate sufficient budget to social ministries and agencies in order to

address the issues of unemployment, poverty, hunger, water shortage, flood, drought, etcetera, which are a serious concern to the nation;

- That Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security cover rural areas also when conducting public hearings and parliamentary outreach programmes;
- That focal persons be established in all security line institutions to serve as a liaison between the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and the security OMAs;
- That the political parties consider introducing minimum academic entry requirements for Members of Parliament;
- That members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security be given adequate training on the security aspects to enable them to make meaningful contributions when discussing security-related issues;
- That parliamentarians sensitise members of the public on their constitutional mandate as law makers;
- That parliament engages the Ministry of Education to include parliamentary terminology in school curriculum so that learners are acquainted with them from primary schools.

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APPENDICES

Appendix (i)

Letter seeking for approval to conduct interview with informants.

P. O. Box 2986

Windhoek

15 May 2013

To Whom It May Concern

Dear Sir/Madam

**RE: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO CONDUCT INTERVIEW WITH
OFFICIALS WITHIN YOUR MINISTRY/INSTITUTION**

My name is Venantius Simbaranda Nauyoma and I am a student studying for the Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies (MA-SSS) at the University of Namibia (UNAM).

I am carrying out a research on the “Namibian parliament’s oversight role over the security sector: A case study of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses”. This is in partial fulfilment for the requirements of the award of Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies.

I am therefore asking permission and approval to undertake a research in your ministry/institution. The research is only a social study for academic purposes and has no political implications.

Your assistance towards achievement of the objectives of the research is greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully

Venantius Simbaranda Nauyoma

(Researcher)

Appendix (ii)

Introduction and Questionnaire to the affected Ministries/Institutions to undertake the said research in Windhoek.

Introduction

Attached herewith kindly find the questionnaire drafted by the researcher, Venantius Simbarabnda Nauyoma for the study of the “The Namibian parliament’s oversight role over the security sector: A case study of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of both houses”.

You are kindly requested to arrange suitable date for the researcher to come and conduct interview with person(s) that have knowledge on the research topic. The collected information will assist the researcher to complete the research topic and come up with some recommendations to serve as guiding tools towards the enhancement of interactions between Parliament and the Security Sector in Namibia.

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Yours Faithfully

Venantius Simbaranda Nauyoma

(Researcher)

A. QUESTIONS TO THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (POLITICIANS)

1. What is the level of your education?

2. What is the oversight function of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security on Security Sector?

3. According to your observations, does the Security Sector in Namibia understand the role of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security?

4. Do you think members of the public know and understand the notion of Security Sector and whether Security Sector is accountable to Parliament?

5. Do you think whether members of the public are aware of the existence of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and its oversight role over the Security Sector?

6. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the Security Sector in Namibia?

7. Is there a need to have Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in Namibia, explain your answer?

8. What is your view on the budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institutions in Namibia?

9. Due to the fact that members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are drawn from legislature and not from

executive, do you think they have the power to influence the activities of Security ministries in Namibia which are headed by members of executives?

10. How can you describe the relationship between the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and the Security Sector in Namibia?

B. QUESTIONS TO ACADEMICS

1. What is the role of academics over the Security Sector in Namibia?

2. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security understand the notion of Security Sector in Namibia?

3. Do you think members of the public know the Security Sector in Namibia and whether Security Sector is accountable to Parliament?

4. Do you think whether members of the public are aware of the existence of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and its oversight role over the Security Sector?

5. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the Security Sector in Namibia?

6. Due to the fact that members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are drawn from legislature and not from executive, do you think they have the power to influence the activities of Security ministries in Namibia which are headed by members of executives?

7. According to your observations, is there transparency among the Security Actors e.g. NDF and NAMPOL) in Namibia in the conduct of their activities?

8. Is there a need to have Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in Namibia, explain your answer?

9. Is there any relationship between the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and academics in Namibia, explain your answer?

10. How do you see the concept of "Security" being spoken in Namibia, is it openly discussed or not?

11. What is your view on the budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institution in Namibia?

12. Can you provide any suggestion on how Parliament and academics can work together to improve the oversight function over the Security Sector in Namibia?

C. QUESTIONS TO SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS AND SERVICE CHIEFS

1. What is the relationship between the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and your Ministry?

2. Do you think officials of your Ministry know and understand that Security Actors including your Ministry is accountable to Parliament?

3. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security understand the notion of Security Sector in Namibia?

4. Do you think whether members of the public are aware of the existence of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and its oversight role over the Security Sector?

5. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the Security Sector in Namibia?

6. Due to the fact that members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are drawn from legislature and not from executive, do you think they have the power to influence the activities of Security ministries in Namibia which are headed by members of executives?

7. How do you see the concept of Security being spoken in Namibia, is it openly discussed or not?

8. Is there a need to have Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in Namibia, explain your answer?

9. What is your view on the budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institution in Namibia?

10. Can you provide any suggestion on how Parliament and Security Ministries can work together to improve the oversight function over the Security Sector in Namibia?

D. QUESTIONS TO THE CIVIL SOCIETY

1. What is the role of Civil Society over Security Sector in Namibia?

2. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on foreign Affairs, Defence and Security understand the notion of security sector in Namibia?

3. Do you think members of the public know the Security Sector in Namibia and whether Security Sector is accountable to Parliament?

4. Do you think whether members of the public are aware of the existence of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and its oversight role over the Security Sector?

5. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the Security Sector in Namibia?

6. How do you see the concept of “Security” being spoken in Namibia, is it openly discussed or not?

7. According to your observations, is there transparency among the Security Actors (e.g. NDF and NAMPOL) in Namibia in the conduct of their activities?

8. What is your view on the budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institution in Namibia?

9. Is there a need to have Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in Namibia, explain your answer?

10. Due to the fact that members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are drawn from legislature and not from executive, do you think they have the power to influence the activities of Security ministries in Namibia which are headed by members of executives?

11. Can you provide any suggestion on how Parliament and Civil Society can work together to improve the oversight function of the Parliamentary Standing

Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security over the Security Sector?

E. QUESTIONS TO THE MEDIA

1. What is the role of media over the Security Sector in Namibia?

2. Do you think whether members of the public are aware of the existence of Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and its oversight role over the Security Sector?

3. Do you think members of the public know the Security Sector in Namibia and whether Security Sector is accountable to Parliament?

4. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the Security Sector in Namibia?

5. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security understand the notion of Security Sector in Namibia?

6. How do you see the concept of “Security” being spoken in Namibia, is it openly discussed or not?

7. According to your observations, are there transparencies among the Security Actors e.g. NDF and NAMPOL in Namibia in the conduct of their activities?

8. What is your view on the budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institution in Namibia?

9. Is there a need to have Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in Namibia, explain your answer?

10. Due to the fact that members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are drawn from legislature and not from executive, do you think they have the power to influence the activities of Security ministries in Namibia which are headed by members of executives?

11. What can be done to strengthen the relationship between the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and the Media?

F. QUESTIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY POLICING COMMITTEE

1. Are you aware of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and its oversight role over the Security Sector?

2. Do you think members of the public understand the notion/concept of Security Sector in Namibia?

3. Are you aware of any relations between the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign, Defence and Security and members of the public?

4. How do you see the concept of “Security” being spoken in Namibia, is it openly discussed or not?

5. Do you think members of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are properly constituted to oversee the activities of the Security Sector in Namibia?

6. Due to the fact that members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are drawn from legislature and not from executive, do you think they have the power to influence the activities of Security ministries in Namibia which are headed by members of executives?

7. Is there a need to have Parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in Namibia, explain your answer?

8. What is your view on the budgetary allocation to the Security Ministries and Institution in Namibia?

9. Can you provide any suggestion on how Parliamentary Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and members of the public can work together to improve the oversight function over the Security Sector?
