

AN ASSESSMENT OF NAMIBIA'S COUNTER TERRORISM
PREPAREDNESS AND STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT

Terror events of September 11, 2001 in New York, demonstrated that the threat of international terrorism to global peace and security had become heightened. This resulted in the UN to make clarion call under the UNSC Resolution 1373 for states to mobilize resources to join hands in combatting terrorism and to protect innocent civilians from further terror attacks. The USA declared “War on Terror”. This concept was received with mixed feelings among nations in which some member states consented to ratify the UNSC Resolution 1373 to fight terrorism while others including Namibia abstained. Although Namibia seems not to be directly affected by terrorism, attempted terror related incidents have been observed nationally in Namibia. These attempts show that Namibia is vulnerable to terrorism as other countries in the world. In light of attempted terror incidents, the researcher embarked on a study to assess Namibia’s counterterrorism preparedness and strategies. This study adopted qualitative research method. The study discovered that in the absence of a comprehensive counterterrorism act in the country, security apparatuses rely on the Defence Acts such as Act No.1 of 2001; Police Act, Act No.19 of 1990; and Financial Intelligence Act, Act No.13 of 2012; Intelligence Act, Act No 10. of 1997, as well as Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act, Act No.4 of 2014 to combat terrorism. These legislations are considered insufficient to address the growing threat of terrorism. Therefore, the study recommends that the country convenes and formulates counterterrorism strategies in line with international law concerning the fight against terror threats.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ACSRT	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AFRIPOL	African Mechanism for the Police Cooperation
ASF	African Standby Force
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AU	African Union
AU	African Union
CEWC	Continental Early Warning Centre
CISSA	Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
DI	Department of Defence Intelligence
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
GA	General Assembly
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTI	Global terrorism Index
HRW	Human Right Watch

HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IEP	Institute for Economics & Peace
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INTERPOL	International Police Organization
ISDSC	Inter- State Defence and Security Committee
ISIS	Islamic state in Iraq and Syria
ISPDC	Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
MASINT	Measurements and Signature Intelligence
MCO	Ministerial Committee Organisation
MIDSA	Migration Dialogue for the Southern Africa
MNLA	<i>Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad</i>
NAMPOL	Namibia Police
NCIS	Namibia Central Intelligence Service
NDF	Namibia Defence Force
NEWC	National Early Warning Centre

NGO	Non- Governmental Organisation
NGST	National Security Grand Strategy
NOC	National Operation Centre
NSC	National Security Commission
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OIC	Organisation of Islamic States
PSC	Peace and Security Council
Res	Resolution
REWS	Regional Early Warning System
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SARPCCO	Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
UFL	Sahel Fusion Liaison Unit
UN	United Nations
UNAM	University of Namibia

UNOAU United Nations Office of African Union

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

USA United State of America

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late mother, late father, late sisters and late brothers, may their souls continue resting in eternal peace, through the power and blessing of almighty God they were always and will forever remain the source of my motivation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to all authors of works quoted in this research paper. Where mistakes are found with reference to the quoted works, I am wholly accountable and apologize for any misunderstandings or misinterpretation of their ideas, concepts, and principles.

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
DECLARATION

I, **Immanuel K. Shivute**, hereby declare that this study is my own work and is a true reflection of my research, and that this work, or any part thereof has not been submitted for a degree at any other institution.

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10 July 2019

Name of Student

Signature

Date

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

According to appendix 4, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) of 2017, African countries ranked among top 50 countries plagued by international terrorism. The Global Index systematically ranks countries according to terrorist activities taking place on a scale index ranged from zero (0) (no impact of terrorism) to ten (10) (highest impact of terrorism). The statistics shows that Iraq is ranked first with a score of 10, making it the most affected country by terrorism while Kuwait was ranked last with a score of 3.8 as the least affected country. In addition, the statistics reveals that the composition of the top 50 countries consists of more than 50% of African countries compared to countries from other continents. North Africa, the Sahel Region, Horn of Africa and West Africa are the worst affected regions in Africa.

The number of deaths caused by terrorism globally and in Africa specifically is unacceptably high. In 2017 for example, about 18 753 deaths were recorded, see appendix 5. This number could be wrong considering the fact that most deaths especially in countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Somalia, Niger, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya are often not adequately captured in several reports. Nevertheless, Global Terrorism Index illustrates that the number of deaths caused by international terrorism between 2006 and 2017 has been significant. Destruction of and damage to social, economic and political infrastructure caused by international terrorism is difficult to quantify. However, in countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon, the destruction caused

by Islamic state in Libya and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram has led to the abandonment of many villages and the paralyzing of socio-economic and commercial activities. This indicates that terrorism is a serious threat to human and national security and a further indication that Southern African countries such as Namibia, is vulnerable to international terrorism.

Solomon (2013) as well as Iroanya (2018) notes the rise in international terror attacks in Africa in recent times. Solomon (2013) believes that Southern African Development Communities (SADC) member countries will continue to be insulated from international terrorism by adopting pro-Arab foreign policy positions. Iroanya (2018) on the other hand argues that international terrorism sleeper-cells already exist in different SADC countries. These sleeper cells can be activated any time. This does not necessary have to do with the adoption of favourable foreign policy positions. This position calls for SADC member states to be adequately prepared to counter terrorism. Namibia as a SADC member may be vulnerable to terrorism in many ways. For example, its borders are porous and may be used to smuggle arms.

The intensity of terror activities in Africa prompted Global Index 2014 (see appendix 6) as well as Iroanya (2018) to classify West Africa, North Africa and the Sahel as terrorist hot spots. Terror activities by extremist Islamic group al- Shabab have rendered Somalia a failed state. In the Sahel and West African regions, Algeria, Chad, Cameroun, Niger and Nigeria, continue to battle extremist Islamic terror groups intent on overthrowing legitimate governments and replacing them with an Islamic state. Iroanya (2018) further observes that “the destabilization of Libya in North Africa has among other consequences begotten political, economic and socio-cultural instability in northern Mali

as returnee Tuaregs who fought in the Libyan war for Muammar Gaddafi revive latent struggle for independence from the Malian state under the auspices of the *Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA). Unlike in the past, the Tuareg rebels have been joined by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other al-Qaeda linked groups in the region. Even the presence of French and African forces has not deterred extremist Islamic groups from posing the greatest threat to the existence of Mali as well as the stability of neighbouring states of Niger, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. In the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram's sustained suicide bombings, mass kidnappings, killings and social media propaganda have destabilized the north eastern parts of Nigeria and communities in Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic. On this basis, terrorism constitutes an existential threat to different sub-regions of Africa.

However, the southern African region has largely remained insulated from terror attacks. Scholars including Solomon (2013) have attributed the relative insularity to the foreign policies of most SADC member states which appear neutral and in some cases sympathetic to Arab and Islamic causes. For instance, the regional economic powerhouse and political actor South Africa, adopts a seemingly pro-Palestinian position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Solomon (2013) reasons that continued neutral position on issues that motivate terrorism have mostly shielded southern African countries from terrorist attacks. Against this understanding, Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk (2004), posit that countries in the SADC region appear to grapple more with internal domestic instability than with international or even transnational terrorism. Despite perceived relative insularity from international terrorism, it is accepted by SADC leadership that terrorism is a major threat to regional and national security of

states in the region. It is against this background that this study set out to assess Namibia's counter terrorism preparedness and strategies.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

As previously pointed out, international terror activities continue to rise exponentially in different parts of Africa. Report by the GTI indicates that a total of 8 584 terrorist attacks happened worldwide, resulting in 18 753 deaths and 19461 injuries in 2017, see appendix 7. The highest number of terrorist attacks was recorded in Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries recorded 1 951 and 1 171 attacks respectively. These numerous terror attacks support the assumption that terrorism is a global security threats. According to its 2004 report, the United Nations (UN) Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, identifies terrorism as an event that can lead to the lessening of life chances and undermining of states as basic units of the international system and as such constitute a threat to international security.

In Namibia, there have been incidences related to terrorism that have been observed and reported at national and regional level. Some Namibian nationals have been reported to be involved in mercenaries operations in Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan and Syria (Ileka, 2015). In 2015, the Namibian Police Inspector General also raised concerns over foreigners and Namibians being recruited to fight along ISIS (Ileka, 2015). Furthermore, Iroanya (2018) argues that “despite the arguments of insularity from terrorism, terror threats in the SADC region have been reported, particularly in countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania”. These threats are claimed to have been linked to al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS terrorist groups. Among recently reported cases of

international terrorism in the SADC region, were attacks by a local *Al-Shabaab* Islamic terrorist group on three police stations in Mocímboa da Praia in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado in October 2017 (Fabricius, 2017; Iroanya, 2018). The attacks resulted in the death of two police officers and a community leader. Similarly, in January 2018, Mozambican police arrested 24 suspected members of the terrorist group after an extensive investigation into radical Islamic fundamentalism in the country (News24, 2018; Iroanya, 2018).

Furthermore, the *Rand Daily Mail*, a South African newspaper also reported that certain terror groups had obtained South African national passports (Hosken, 2017). Both nationally, regionally and internationally reported cases, of terrorism show the vulnerability of Namibia and SADC member states to international terrorism. This becomes evident considering that Namibia shares common border with countries such as South Africa. Thus, due to interdependence and connectedness of countries in the region, there is a strong likelihood that terror threats may spread into Namibia. SADC region's vulnerability implies Namibia's vulnerability. Terror incident in one SADC member state increases the likelihood of terror incident in another SADC member state. It is against this background that it becomes imperative to study the preparedness of Namibia to counter international terrorism.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

A study of international terrorism and the preparedness of states to combat it require suitable theoretical grounding. This study adopts a combination of theoretical perspectives that borders on state and globalization. This is necessary because as a single theoretical approach cannot adequately explain the rise in international terrorism and the preparedness of countries such as Namibia to combat it.

The study is grounded in the theory of state as propounded by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes theoretical perspective about the essence of state provides a useful guide to analysis relating to the preparedness and strategies of states such as Namibia to combat international terrorism. The theory highlights and discusses the complex nature of man and the origin and essence of state. In using Hobbes theory, only those aspects of his discussion relevant to the objectives of the study are applied. In this regard, Hobbes (as cited in Burchill et al, 2005) reasoned that in the state of nature all humans are equal. However in Hobbes assumption humans are equal only in a sense that all humans possess roughly the same level of strength and skill, and so any human being has the capacity to kill another. Humans therefore lived in a constant state of war, constant fear and danger of violent death. The way out of this predicament is the giving up of natural right to protection and entrusting this to a sovereign with the capacity to protect all and to severely punish those who disobey the laws. The state with a government and other critical attributes is essential to ensuring that humans do not lapse into the war of all against all. In the absence of state or government, human nature will inevitably bring about severe conflict.

In applying Hobbes theoretical exposition to this study, it is essential to state that, despite the existence of states, there are deviants such as terrorists who always seek not only the means of immediate self-satisfaction, but also power in order to challenge state authority and power and to achieve whatever future desires, visions or end states they crave for. Thus, terrorists attack others, especially civilians (soft targets) who pose no threat to them, purely to demonstrate a reputation of power and capability to achieve future desires. Thus, Hobbes three principal reasons for attack in the state of nature are relevant here, namely: for gain (for example to establish an Islamic state, or secede from a country); for safety (to pre-empt invaders in the case of state protecting itself); and for glory or reputation (in case of retaining citizens' belief and confidence in the state for protection) (Burchill et al, 2005).

The essence of terrorism is to create fear. Fear is presented as a source of war, the fear that others around you may try to take away your rights- the right to life; the right to live in secure environment; and the right to own property. Terror attacks aim at destroying these liberties and in order to achieve a different end-state. The reputation of a state lies in protecting these rights and in preventing invaders such as terrorists from entering its territory. This is what is called the provision of national or state security.

Thus preparedness and strategies of protection by a state are developed specifically with the aims and objective of providing safety for all citizens or perhaps preserving its existence and reputation. This is the essence of state. Preparedness and national security strategy are critical particularly in a time of relative peace and insularity from external attack or international terrorist attacks with existential threats. This is in line with the argument of Hobbes that there will be moments without actual conflict. Thus, a state of

war is not always constant fighting, but constant readiness to fight, not relax and let down guards.

Preparedness and readiness to fight in order to protect lives and property of citizens are also informed by other sources of threat which on face value seem harmless. For example, globalization and its consequences, thus, this study is further anchored on the theory of globalization. Globalization consists of those processes that join people everywhere together, thereby producing worldwide interdependence and featuring rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008). It is also considered as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual” (Held, 2005). In a globalized world, contacts among people and their ideas grow as a result of advances in communication, travel, and commerce. Under these conditions, many observers believe, states enjoy less and less control of their destinies and are buffeted by forces outside their borders and beyond their control. Free movement and increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away (Baylis & Smith, 2001) has the capacity to facilitate terrorist attacks.

Ogata (2001) argued that Globalization has added further complications to the security management by the state or for the people. While creating wealth, opportunities for work, and a better life for many, it has impacted adversely on some vulnerable groups of society. Ogata has added that, the extraordinary growth of information technology, advancement in transportation and communication and transfer of financial capital all

accelerate the movement of people. However, the distinction between desirable, lawful and safe movement of people and dangerous, illegal and criminal movement becomes difficult to make and tests the capability and preparedness of states.

Considering Hobbesian theory of perpetual danger which can be aided by external forces of globalization, it becomes necessary for a state to fashion out security strategies and to adequately prepare to counter threats from all corners. This forms what is referred to national security- considered in its broadest sense as security of persons, institutions, properties and national territory (Duterte, 2017). Global interconnection and interdependence among states also makes it necessary for the states to cooperate more and work together to counter common threats such as international terrorism.

Security is the most genuine and enduring issue in politics. At the core is the issue of people living a decent and meaningful life, free from fears, intimidation and violence? According to Heywood (2011) terrorism has underlined the development of new security challenges that are predominantly unpredictable because they ascend from non-state actors and abuse the increased interconnectedness of the contemporary world.

The foregrounding of this study on Hobbesian theoretical perspectives about the origin and essence of the state and globalization requires the formulation of suitable research questions.

1.4 Research Questions

A study into the preparedness and capability of the Namibian state to counter international terrorism requires the posing suitable research questions as a guide to systematic inquiry. Thus, the following research questions are formulated:

- a. To what extent is Namibia susceptible to international terrorism?
- b. What counter terrorism strategies exist within Namibia's laws to deal with terrorist threats?
- c. What challenges are encountered by Namibian law enforcement and security agencies in combating terrorism?
- d. What recommendations are necessary to enhance the country's counter-terrorism preparedness?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is in threefold. Firstly, the study has the potential to contribute significantly to the discipline of Security and Strategic Studies by providing a critical analysis of terrorism and showing Namibia's vulnerability to it and examining the level of preparedness of Namibia to combat it through law enforcement and other measures. Secondly, the study has the potential to contribute to existing regional and sub-regional security cooperation through its policy recommendations. Thirdly, the study will assist in strengthening strategies or internal mechanisms to monitor, detect, deflate and prevent terrorist activities.

1.6 Limitation of the Study

Due to the nature of data to be collected, accessibility to some information may be limited. Some participants earmarked might decline to participate in the study. In addition, the researcher foresees the challenge of sparse literature on the subject of terrorism in the Namibian context. However, the study of terrorism and counter terrorism is not new in Africa. Therefore extant literature in the field particularly in Africa and by African scholars will be used to provide a theoretical perspective for the study. This does not imply a complete rejection of works on terrorism by Western scholars. Scholarly works by Western scholars are critical to the study of international terrorism although their definitions or understanding of terrorism are often contradictory to Organisation of African Unity (OAU)'s definition of terrorism. In Western understanding of terrorism, activities of liberation fighters in Africa would be regarded as terrorist acts while African understanding of terrorism excludes those activities carried out as part of the struggle for independence.

This study is also limited by its exploratory nature. Little has been written with respect to the preparedness and adequacy of Namibia's legal instruments and policies to counter international terrorism. In this regard, the study as designed will make significant contribution to the body of knowledge on the effects of public policies on national security.

1.7 Conclusion

In this chapter the background to this study is provided. Explored in the background were the meanings of terrorism in the global, regional and sub-regional context. Terrorism was shown as a global threat to all regions and countries. Namibia is also shown as vulnerable to the threat due to increasing incidences of terrorism in several SADC countries. In this regard, it was pointed out that this study aims to examine the counter-terrorism capability of Namibia. The chapter further discussed the statement of the problem. It used incidences of terrorism in neighbouring countries as well as reported cases of the involvement of Namibian nationals in terror groups such as ISIS to establish the necessity to further study the phenomenon and the extent to which the Namibian state is prepared to counter it. The study as designed is therefore proactive. The problem statement was used to construct research questions and to demonstrate the significance and limitations of the study. Next chapter of the study will examine existing literature on international terrorism.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Review of existing literature on international terrorism is prerequisite to providing in-depth analysis of Namibia's counter terrorism preparedness and strategies. Several scholarly studies have been done on international terrorism globally and within the African context. This literature review therefore focuses on studies with various themes such as history of terrorism; conceptual issues; causes of terrorism; and combating of terrorism; counterterrorism strategies; and challenges of African countries in combating terrorism.

2.2 Historicity of International Terrorism

With regard to the historicity of international terrorism, the US State Department (2012) points out that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the world. Even in pre-modern days, there were groups and individuals that used political violence against state authorities and political elites. The US State Department has therefore compared the assassin groups which in the Middle East killed governors, political and military leaders in the late 11th century to the present terror groups in the world.

Modern day terrorism is closely associated with anarchism and propaganda slogans such as "Freedom or Death" associated with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization which fought the Ottoman rule in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. The US State Department therefore concludes that, more than a century ago

there were many groups with different political backgrounds using different tactics and slogans ranging from extreme left to ultra-rightist nationalist separatists. Some killed heads of states and other attacked innocent civilians. Some acted only in their home towns or home regions, while others had an international agenda and operated across borders.

With specific reference to Africa, Iroanya (2008) states that “trends concerning international terrorism in Africa have varied remarkably” Thus, “non-state terror groups have been active in Africa since the 1950s, the phenomena of state and state sponsored international terrorism were also noticeable on the continent from the early 1970s (Iroanya, 2008). Based on this observation, a conclusion is drawn that what can be regarded as “international terrorism in Africa can broadly be studied within the context of three historical periods; the epoch of the Cold War, the post-Cold War era, and the new millennium (Iroanya, 2008). The trends and motivations of international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War period were different from those of the post-Cold War era and in the new millennium. Through his classification of terrorism historicity, Iroanya (2008) appears to classify activities of African freedom fighters as acts of terrorism. This is contrary to the provision of the Algiers Convention. However, classifications such as Iroanya’s may be anchored in the differential conceptualization of terrorism in general.

2.3 Conceptual Issues

Terrorism means different thing to different people. In this regard, Heywood (2011) explains terrorism in its broadest sense to refer to attempts to further political ends by using violence to create fear, apprehension and uncertainty. He further elaborates that

terrorism carries deeply negative implications in the sense that the term tends to be used as a political weapon, implying that a group or action to which it is linked is immoral and illegitimate. Ronczkowski (2012) urges that there is no common definition for terrorism, and further argues that it depends on one's position, mission and the period in which one seeks to define terrorism.

In this sense of relativity, Ewi and Aning (2006) observe that during the liberation struggle for independence and decolonization in Africa, the activities of the freedom fighters were labelled as terrorism. Therefore, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU) provides a continent-specific definition of terrorism. In the *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999* (The Algiers Convention) terrorism is defined as:

- (a) *Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to:*
 - (i) *intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce, or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain or abandon a particular standpoint or act according certain principles; or*

- (ii) *disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or*
 - (iii) *create general insurrection in a state;*
- (b) *any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).*

Iroanya (2008) as well as Iroanya (2018) point out that the difference between OAU's definition and other definitions of terrorism lies in the fact that the peculiar African historical context appears to have heavily influenced the definition of the concept. For example, while the term "sub-state actor", includes known terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, and the so-called "freedom fighters" attempting to change the prevailing political situation in a state by the use of force; the *OAU Convention* does not seem to agree that the latter group should be categorised as terrorists (Iroanya, 2008). Thus, Article 3 of the document states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.

Iroanya's (2008) and Iroanya (2018) analyses show that the OAU's definition of terrorism underscores the fact that not all acts of violence or crime constitute terrorism.

It is further stated that for an act to be regarded as “terrorist” it would need to satisfy certain criteria. First, it must be intended to intimidate, cause fear, coerce or force a government, body or institution or the general public to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint which otherwise it would not have taken or abandoned. Second, the presumed acts must be targeted at disrupting public order and service, or creating general insurrection in the state. More importantly, the OAU Convention equally regards acts such as promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to cause harm or realise a cause, as part and parcel of terrorist acts.

This study recognises that terrorism has different forms. There are for example, domestic terrorism; international terrorism; and lone wolf terrorism. Domestic terrorism refers to acts of terrorism which are carried out by individuals or groups within a state in order to achieve certain political objectives. International terrorism concerns “acts of terrorism committed by terrorist organisations across international boundaries; and which may involve people of different nationalities who nevertheless, share a common vision of the world, common (perceived) enemies, ideology, and religious belief” (Iroanya, 2008, p. 12). Good examples of international terrorist organisations are ISIS, Al Queda; Al Shalbaab; and Boko Haram.

Although the definition of terrorism as provided by the *Algiers Convention* is the accepted definition for this study, it is however, important to examine other definitions of the phenomenon in order to establish the basis for its contestation. The definition of terrorism has been much debated and written about for a very long time. Its meaning depends on one’s position, mission, and the period in which one seeks to define

terrorism. According to Ronczkowski (2012), terrorism means “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Ronczkowski, 2012).

Similarly Imre, Mooney and Clarke, (2009) defined terrorism as follows: “terrorism involves the deliberate targeting of civilians in attacks designed to cause fear among a population”. He further points out that this definition reflects the one adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1994 which defined terrorism as:

criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any instance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoke to justify them (Maja, 2008).

Imre et al., (2009) argues that terrorism violates both domestic and international law. However it is not only those who detonate explosive that are culpable. All those who facilitate, encourage, aid, promote or finance terrorist violence are also liable. Therefore states are required under binding resolutions of the Security Council to prohibit such conduct, and punish those who engage in the same.

In support of Imre at al., (2009), the Institute for Economics and Peace and African Centre for the Research Study on Terrorism, defined Terrorism as an unlawful violence or systematic use of terror against civilians or politicians for ideological or political reasons, with intention to create fear. The two in collaboration have added that terrorism

is practiced by nationalistic groups, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments.

Kraft and Marks (2012), define the following terms ‘international terrorism’ to mean terrorism that involves citizens or the territory of more than one country. Then “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents and finally “terrorist groups” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism”. These definitions are complementary to the definitions provided by organisations such as the UN and the AU.

A consideration of several definitions reveal the following characteristics: (a) The use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims; (b) the use of violence or threats of violence in order to purport political, religious or ideological changes; (c) It can only be committed by non-state actors or undercover personnel serving on behalf of their respective governments; (d) It reaches more than the immediate target victims and is also directed at targets victims consisting of a larger spectrum of society, and (e) It is both a crime that is illegal by legislation and crime that is immoral or wrong on them.

Its differential meanings relates to the purpose of its application. In this sense, the *Algiers Convention* is considered relevant to the African situation where international terrorism has led to the targeting of foreign assets in the region. This can be demonstrated for example by the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by al Qaeda operatives in 1998.

2.4 Counterterrorism

A consideration of terrorism necessitates an exploration of counter terrorism by several authors. This consideration is critical because the study is concerned with the examination of the preparedness and capacity for Namibia to counter terrorism. In this regard, Pienaar (2007) in considering the meaning and consequences of failure of counter terrorism states thus; “fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you”. Subsequently, Pienaar (2007) defines counter-terrorism simply as a strategy that the government, military or any other security entity employ to contain and prevent acts of terrorism. Similarly, Martin (2003) refers to counter-terrorism as the “proactive policies that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups.

The main objective of counter-terrorism is to prevent the loss of lives by proactively preventing, or decreasing the number of, terrorist attacks. The consequences obviously involve the hunting down of terrorist groups and targeting their movements; enhancing security domestically, continentally and internationally; and any other defensive measures seeking to contain or prevent terrorist attacks (Pienaar, 2007).

Martin (2003) grouped counter-terrorism into three policy classifications. In the first category is “diplomatic interactions, financial controls, military force, intelligence, and covert actions”. An example of this is the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In the second category is “legal, repressive, and pacifying responses to terrorism”; an example of this being South Africa’s Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2004. The third category is that of “targeted and untargeted

prevention”. Untargeted prevention refers to strategies like random law enforcement, road blocks and inspections. Targeted prevention refers to the investigation of specific terrorist movements.

The development of a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy is a critical step towards determining the preparedness of a country to combat international terrorism.

2.5 Causes of terrorism

Levitsky (2002) appears to identify globalization as a major facilitator of international terrorism when he argued that “the dark side of globalisation is the growth of transnational crime among them human trafficking”

Imre et al., (2008) indicated that in order to list the causes of terrorism, the analysts of terrorist attacks or campaigns of terror are more likely to produce useful answers than the study of terrorism as a broad phenomenon. Hence a detailed analysis of the context in which terror attacks occur would require an examination of religious, political, historical, cultural, nationalist and ideological undercurrents. Therefore, Imre et al., (2008) have highlighted the following universal causes of terrorism among others: Violations of international law; Historical grievances; International law and the rise in global terror; Foreign policy; Political Islam; Globalization and technology; Use of force in violation of UN Charter norms.

Terrorists usually regard themselves, and those whose interests they claim to be defending, as victims rather than perpetrators of terrorism. They target states and communities whom they regard as responsible for historical grievances and injustices. In cases where the international community has been unable to take action to prevent

crimes against international law (i.e. wars of aggression, genocide, brutal occupation war crimes and crime against humanity, the victims of such crimes have often taken matters in their own hands. They do so as a way of seeking justice, retribution, and an end to dispossession (Imre, et al., 2008).

Historical grievances may be compounded by flagrant violation of international laws and resolutions in favour of groups using international terrorism as a strategy of struggle. This fact is most relevant in the analysis of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, violation of international laws is considered a primary source of terrorism. It is a perception by terrorists that some wrong have been committed against them and those they claim to represent which justifies a violent response. This wrong may involve the violation of some basic human rights valued by terrorists. The right may have been broken in a historical event, such as a war of aggression, or multiple violations of international laws such as genocide and wrongful dispossession of territory. In addition, continued military occupation or foreign domination in violation of UN resolutions may also be a trigger to a resort to the use of terrorism as such behaviours cause frustrations among terrorist organizations.

Hence, their aims may be to bring an end to these wrongs. Although this factor helps us have a better grasp of the causes of international terrorism, it is not necessarily an accurate assessment because international terrorism still happen where there is no international law violations such as when a region wants to secede from a country or when a terror organisation carries out attack against the interests of a perceived enemy country in another country. For example, when the Al Qaeda terror group attacked US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 when these countries had not violated any

international laws. Similarly, presentation of violation of international laws as a causal factor of international terrorism does and cannot explain state terrorism where some governments use terror tactics to suppress, and intimidate their oppositions in order to consolidate political power. In a sense, international laws promulgation and violation contribute to the increase in global terrorism. For example, the agreement on the recognition of the right to self-determination has been used a number of non-state actors to fight for secession and recognition. Some chose to pursue self-determination by resort to terrorism.

Aggressive foreign policy choice of some states to a large extent prompts international terrorism. This can be illustrated by the illegal invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. This conduct is considered a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Military adventurism of this nature rapidly inspires acts of terror. Indeed in states where sectionalism is predominant, descent into civil war and wide spread terrorist violence may be difficult to stop. As such, the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq without prior Security Council approval provoked violent and sustained terrorist campaign.

While aggressive foreign policy is implicated in the resort to terror tactics, the pursuit of radical political Islam is equally a major source and cause of international terrorism. This is not to suggest that all Islamists advocate violence. However, attacks by radical Islamists on non-Muslims and civilian targets demonstrate that many Islamists are ideologically driven to engage in terrorism. This is not a new problem, since in the past radical Islamic organizations have used political violence in an attempt to overthrow established governments.

The spread of political Islam as well as terrorist propaganda, recruitment, training, planning and organisation is assisted by globalization and advances in technologies of communication such as the Internet and social media. Technological advance provides significant opportunities for terrorist organizations. Furthermore, instantaneous electronic communications are utilized to recruit members, coordinate attacks and build alliances with other organizations and criminal networks. The internet has been used to market and promote terrorist struggles to a global audience. It can also be used to access information, weapons technology, and other resources required to conduct sophisticated terrorist operations. Media and internet tools are exploited by states to heighten fear of terrorism for political purposes (Imre et al., 2008).

The use of military force in violation of UN Charter norms deserves specific mention in a discussion about causes of international terrorism. Unlawful use of force with impunity creates a climate of violence. This violence may be expressed through terrorist attacks.

While Crenshaw (2011), does not radically disagree with the suggestions of Imre et al., (2008), he maintains that no causal factor is precisely compartmentalized in a single nation-state; each has a transnational dimension that complicates analysis. On that note, Grabosky (1988) reasons that modernization produces interrelated set of factors that is important in analysing causes of terrorism. According to him, increased complexity on all levels of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities. Thus, sophisticated networks of transportation and communication offer mobility and the means of publicity for terrorists. Secondly, urbanization is part of the modern trend

toward aggregation and complexity which increases the number and accessibility of targets and methods.

Moreover (Grabosky, 1988) argued that cities becomes significant cause of terrorism as they provide an opportunity and recruiting ground among the politicized and unstable inhabitants. Another cause of terrorism as stated by Crenshaw is the social facilitation, this concept refers to social habits and historical traditions that authorize the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even ordering an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coup, or terrorism.

Crenshaw (2011) argues that the most noticeable political factor in the category of liberal causes of terrorism is a government's inability to prevent terrorism. The absence of adequate prevention by police and intelligence services permits the spread of conspiracy. However, terrorist organizations are considered to be small and clandestine, this places the majority of states in the permissive category. Furthermore, the absence of effective security measures is considered to be a necessary cause, since the piece of information on the subject indicates that terrorism does not happen in authoritarian societies. This is not particularly true. Countries such as China and Russia, regarded as authoritarian by Western democracies have experienced international terrorism.

Subsequently, Crenshaw (2011) makes a consideration on the direct causes of terrorism that focuses on background conditions that encourage resistance to the state and which instigates circumstances beyond creating an environment in which terrorism is possible, as these provide the motivation and direction for the terrorist movement.

Here Crenshaw focused on reasons rather than opportunities. The first condition is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. In this case a social movement develops in order to fight against these grievances and to gain either equal rights or a separate state. Hence terrorism is then the effect of an extremist faction of this broader movement. In practice, terrorism has frequently arisen in such situations in modern states, separatist nationalism and in the colonial era, nationalist movements commonly turned to terrorism. The second condition that creates the motivations for terrorism is the lack of opportunity for political participation. The regime that denies access to power and persecute dissent creates intense dissatisfaction. In this case the grievances are primarily political. In such a situation the path to the legal expression of opposition are blocked and the regime's oppression is inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely , as a permissive and direct causes coincide.

Lastly, there is a common pattern of government actions that act as a catalyst for terrorism. Government tends to use unexpected and unusual force in response to terrorism, an attempt that often compels terrorist retaliation. Such development of such action reaction condition always then establishes the structure of the conflict between the regime and the challengers.

Crenshaw (2011), have shown that we must look at terrorist organization's perception and interpretation of the situation. Terrorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option. In material sense, the means are placed at their disposal by the environment. On the other hand environments also provide the terrorists with convincing reasons for seeking political changes. Final, when an event happens that breaks the

opposition patience with the regime, the government action is then seen as intolerably unjust and terrorism becomes not only possible decision but a morally acceptable one. Due to that, the regime will forfeit its status as the standard of legitimacy. Therefore, for the terrorist, the end may now justify the result.

2.6 Preparedness to Combat Terrorism

Scholars, who have examined global, regional and national preparedness to combat international terrorism, focus mainly on existing legal instruments at global, regional and national levels. In this regard, the UN is considered as the main actor in the fight against international terrorism. The global body in 2004 identified international terrorism among six clusters of threat to international peace and security. The UN has the mandate to prevent international wars, and to promote, peace, social justice and economic development in the world. The UN in its preparation to combat Terrorism makes use its General Assembly (GA) structure- a body that passes resolutions and makes recommendations based on Article (10) of the UN Charter. The UN also relies on its Charter, a tool which is ratified by all its member states in its fight against international terrorism. By joining the UN, Member States enter into treaties and conventions, agreements, and protocols and remain or abide by commitments made on those treaties. However, the compliance to those obligations is a choice of the states. Nevertheless, states do indeed often comply with UN despite the lack of enforcement, even if the states failed to live up to their obligations.

In addition (Scott, 2010) noticed that one of the improvements by UN to deal with the issue of enforcement was the introduction of United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

UNSC is the organ of the UN responsible for the international peace and security it is the only body in the UN with the authority to take action in defense of collective security needs of the international community. The UN's powers over international security begin with Articles (24) (1) and 39 (see appendix 8 and 9 respectively), Key legal clauses of the UN Charter. Therefore the Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2012) indicates that the UNSC has issued series of resolutions on UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategies , among others (Res. 1267, Res. 1297, Res.1373, Res. 1456 and Res. 1624) which calls on states to collaborate in fighting terrorism and ensuring that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with obligations under international law.

Regionally, the efforts to combat international terrorism in Africa are anchored by the AU. The continental body strongly condemns all acts and forms of terrorism in Africa and elsewhere in the world. The Constitutive Act of the African Union also provides for, "respect for the sanctity of life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities". In this regard, Iroanya (2008) notes that the readiness to combat international terrorism in Africa started in earnest in the 1990s.

Lawless (2007) notes that the OAU (now AU) adopted a resolution in 1992 aimed at encouraging and enhancing co-operation and co-ordination among African states in the fight against all forms of terrorism on the African continent. Lawless (2007) further states that majority of AU member states embraced the international sanctions against Libya in the 1980s and 1990s due to Libya's involvement in international terrorism both as a sponsor and as a perpetrator. Furthermore, in 1994 African states adopted the AU Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, in Tunisia. This

declaration rejected all forms of religious extremism involving the use of terrorism. Another effort could also be noticed through the ratification of AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism during the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Algiers in 1999. By 2004 the Algiers Convention document had been signed and ratified by 47 African states while 36 had acceded to it.

AU member states were also encouraged to sign and ratify all international conventions and protocols relating to international terrorism as part of efforts towards the combating of terrorism. African states also support UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373, adopted as a result of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the US and in line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Iroanya, 2008) points out that the implementation of the Algiers Convention and Security Council Resolution 1373 was reaffirmed through the adoption of the Plan of Action of the African Union (AU Plan of Action) in 2002. The Plan of Action also reiterated that AU has a well-developed normative framework to combat terrorism with the 1999 AU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism and its 2004 Protocol which gives responsibility to the AUPSC to ‘co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects. In the same year, the AU established the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in Algiers as a means to centralize information and research on terrorism and to develop counter-terrorism capacity building programs.

The preceding measures were not considered enough; the AU continued finding ways and means of combating terrorism on the continent in 2003. At this point the AU

convened a meeting of experts to deliberate on modalities for the Implementation of the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. The report was drafted in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in October 2003 (Iroanya, 2008). Another effort which cannot go unnoticed, is the Third Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July 2004, in which AU adopted a Protocol to the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. This Protocol was adopted to enhance the effective implementation of the Algiers Convention of 1999 (Department of State, 2004).

In October 2010, the AU appointed a Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism and, in 2011; the AU Assembly adopted the African Model Law on Counter Terrorism to assist states in harmonizing legislation on terrorism. On September 2014, the AU further convened a Heads of State-level Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting in Nairobi, Kenya resulting in a PSC decision setting out a series of objectives for both AU Member States and the AU Commission. The PSC tasking of the AU Commission included establishing a Counter Terrorism Fund and convening an annual AU Coordination Forum to coordinate efforts in counter-terrorism. Pursuant to the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, the PSC called for the establishment of specialized joint counter-terrorism units at the sub-regional level within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF) and, pending the achievement of the ASF, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).

The PSC also welcomed efforts to enhance legislation, intelligence sharing, operational capability and coordination through the various AU-led initiatives including the Sahel Fusion Liaison Unit (UFL), the Nouakchott Process, the Committee of Intelligence and

Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The Council also welcomed the creation of the African anti-terrorism Model Law, which will seek to harmonize domestic counter terrorism legislation, and endorsed the AU Assembly decision to establish the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) in its role to enhance inter-state police cooperation, particularly in addressing transnational crime. The Council also expressed their determination to operationalize the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism and called on this Sub-Committee to develop a capacity to investigate financial support to terrorist groups and strengthen the AU sanctions regime.

The United Nations Office of African Union (UNOAU) assists the AU in operationalizing the decisions of the PSC and in ensuring coordination with the relevant UN agencies. This includes helping to coordinate the use of funds received for counter-terrorism, including that received from the Organization of Islamic States (OIC). It also includes coordination in the development of initiatives to curb the process towards radicalization and violent extremism and the convening of annual open sessions on counter terrorism to coordinate efforts. UNOAU is also liaising with the UN Security Council sanctions committee to explore assistance to the AU PSC in the operationalization of its sub-committee on terrorism and sanctions. UNOAU also liaises with and supports the AU in its efforts to further the sub-regional arrangements of the Nouakchott and Djibouti processes which regularly convene chiefs of intelligence.

At the sub-regional level, the fight against terrorism is a collective concerned anchored in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) established in 1992 and comprising 16 member states. Dube (2016) shows that SADC member states are

reported to have sought to fight all facets of terrorism through regional cooperation. The regional body has thus identified the international dimensions of terrorism being the ones among others, which ranges from terrorist recruitment and training, financing, and operations to sleeper cells operatives and human traffickers. As a result, the region combat posture necessitated the formation of regional statutory bodies like; Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), Ministerial Committee Organisation (MCO) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services for Africa (CISSA).

In addition SADC Directorate of Organs on Politics Defence and Security illustrated that SADC member states are also members of the continental body AU and international organisation UN. Therefore, for SADC to achieve its envisioned common goals and shared commitments to international UN Charter 1945 and Protocols, the SADC heads of states and government have established the followings; SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in June 1996, member states had signed the Protocol on politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in 2001. Subsequently, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was established and signed in 2004 with a view to operationalize the objectives set forth in the Protocol and for the implementation of the goals and objectives outlines in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). In order to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment, the SADC Head of States revised the SIPO I that covered 2004-2009 and updated to the version The Harmonised Strategic indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II) which covered the period 2010 - 2015. Furthermore, SADC has been developing and

strengthening regional cooperation in the Defence Sector. This cooperation supported the establishment of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) in 1977. ISDSC played an essential role in the liberation struggle against colonial and racist regimes and in maintenance of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SADC member states. In recent development, ISDSC initiated the establishment of Regional Early Warning System (REWS), which was launched in July 2010. The REWS was formed to link with National Early Warning Centres (NEWC) in all member states and the Continental Early Warning Centres (CEWC) at the African Union and also to integrate the inputs from NEWC and REWS.

2.7 Counterterrorism Strategies

Imre et al., (2008) proposed that for any state to suppress terrorism, such as state must act in accordance with the rule of law and human rights. States must resolve disputes through peaceful approaches, such as diplomacy, mediation, arbitration, and the use of the good offices of international statesmen. However, Imre et al stressed that if these methods fail and the use of force is considered necessary, it should be used within the UN Charter framework. This is critical because where states act outside international law, sooner or later those whose rights have been violated may respond through illegal means, such as terrorism. Furthermore, Imre et al., (2008), have suggested that other terrorism counter measures such as; dialogue or “talking down evil”; addressing the injustices that fuel radical Islam; strengthening internal and external security; and strengthening counter- terrorism laws and policy.

Imre et al., (2008) stressed that counter – terrorism law and policy should be in place in every state. An effective response to terrorism requires an effective legal and institutional apparatus at state, regional and international levels (see appendix 10). Law enforcement officials must have power to detain, interrogate and prosecute those who commit, motivate, finance or collaborate to commit acts of terror. Extradition laws must also be in place to enable the deportation of visitors and other non-citizens who take part in such activities, or otherwise demonstrate evident threats to national security. In addition the law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be adequately funded to effectively carry out their duties. Counter-terrorism force must be professionally trained and properly resourced. There also must be appropriate cooperation between central, regional and local authorities and agencies to facilitate the effective counter terrorism policies and practices. Furthermore, the counter- terrorism policies should involve the identification of high risk groups, protection of minorities, balancing national security and civil rights, implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Rostow (2002) echoed some of the proposed counter-terrorism measures by revealing that After September 11, 2001, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1368. The Resolution called on the international community to redouble its efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council Resolutions.

The Resolution also reaffirmed the inherent right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter 1945. The UNSC further adopted a resolution 1373 to impose binding obligations on States to prohibit both active and passive support for terrorists. The clause in the Resolution provides that states must freeze financial

transactions, asset of terrorists and their supporters. This includes tightening of border controls, increase vigilance against passport and identification forgery, deny safe haven to terrorists, and work toward enhancing international cooperation against terrorism. Hence effective implementation of this Resolution will increase capabilities to fight terrorism all over the world.

At the current moment states have now admitted that no country in the world can independently prevent, resolve and defeat terrorism (Gaddis, 1989 and Gordon, 2007). In short, terrorism is a threat to society across the globe. It is an international development which calls for combined efforts by the international community to combat terrorism.

2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter different conceptualisation of terrorism has been examined in order to establish a foundation for the analysis of Namibia's preparedness to combat the global phenomenon. The OAU's definition of terrorism was examined and adopted in this study for two main reasons. First, it is relevant to the study because Namibia is a member of the AU and as such accepts and is governed by the definition. Second, as a state that engaged in armed deliberation struggle, provisions of Article 3 of the Convention directly relates to Namibian experience (freedom fighters).

The historicity of terrorism in the context of Africa showed that there has been a shift from Cold war terrorism to what is called 'new terrorism' in the contemporary world. During the Cold war epoch, terrorism, in the context of Africa, was mostly underpinned by liberation struggle. However, in the post-Cold war, terrorism has become largely

identified by radical Islamic group intent on establishing Islamic states. Besides that, the literature indicated that Africa is characterised by more challenges in combating terrorism. Hence the practical experiences provided in this study considered as those that have happened in USA, Europe and Africa. The literature review brought several causes of international terror. Among identified causes of terrorism were violation of international laws, political exclusion and marginalization.

With respect to counter terrorism preparedness of regions and states, review of literature clearly shows that such efforts start with the enactment of counter terrorism legislation; ratification of international counter terrorism instruments, implementation of cooperation and coordination agreements with partner institutions nationally, regionally and globally. In combating terrorism it was shown that respect to the rule of law, employment of dialogue and limited use of forces are critical factors for consideration.

While literature review is critical to the study of terrorism and the preparedness and capabilities of a state to combat international terrorism, a suitable research methodology is a key to inquiries of this nature. Thus, in the next chapter, the research methodology of this study is presented and discussed.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

As indicated in Chapter 1, the main objective of this study is to assess Namibia's counter terrorism preparedness and strategies. In this regard, four research questions were set to guide the study. These questions restated below for convenience and easy linkage to the methodological approach being articulated in this chapter. Both primary and secondary questions are formulated to guide this study as follows:

Primary research question:

- a. To what extent is Namibia susceptible to international terrorism?

Attempt to answer this question warrants the posing of secondary research questions as follows:

- b. What counter terrorism strategies exist within Namibia's laws to deal with terrorist threats?
- c. What challenges are encountered by Namibian law enforcement and security agencies in combating terrorism?
- d. What recommendations are necessary to enhance the country's counter-terrorism preparedness?

In the sections that follow, the site for empirical data collection; study design and research methodology and justification for the adoption of the research methods are presented. Equally highlighted and discussed in this chapter are issues of rigour and how

the study ensured reliability of the research findings. Ethical considerations and the limitations of this study are also considered.

3.2 Study Locale

Participants in this study were drawn from mainly from the Department of Defence Intelligence (DI) and the Namibia Police (NAMPOL) as well as the academia and the Judiciary. A stepwise approach was used in selecting the study participants. This approach entailed recognising the DI and NAMPOL as the first sampling stratum and the academia and the judiciary as the second sampling stratum. Conducting research in the security sector requires negotiations with relevant authorities prior to the commencement of data collection.

Therefore, in early 2018, the researcher approached various authorities of DI and NAMPOL to request permission to conduct a study on the preparedness and strategies of the Namibian state counter international terrorism if it happens to come into the country. The researcher was required to complete security clearance application forms, which among other things required a specification of the nature and purpose of the study and an articulation of how the study would be carried out. The researcher was asked if the study would involve staff of the DI and NAMPOL and the kind of assistance required from these national security institutions. The application form was submitted and considered by both the DI and NAMPOL.

Similarly, the researcher also applied for ethics clearance certificate of the University of Namibia as a form of permission to carry out a study involving human interaction. Consequently, permission was granted to carry out the study on late November 2018

were email was the medium of communication. The authorization letters are attached as one of the appendixes.

With the ethical clearance letter and authorization to carry out the study, access was granted the researcher to key participants in the study at different police and defence intelligence gathering units; as well as various regional and national anti-terrorism legislation were also made available to the researcher. The key participants at senior positions were duly informed about the study and its purpose and the timeframes. The access process involved three stages.

The first was obtaining permission to conduct the study from the DI and NAMPOL. The second stage involved making the various departmental heads aware of the study and the purpose of the study and asking them for assistance. The third stage involved asking for the voluntary participation of study participants. This is the most critical aspect of the process. Even though permission had been granted to conduct the study by relevant authorities, it was difficult convincing identified participants to participate in the study. Thus, of about 30 possible participants identified to participate in the study, only 12 accepted to grant audience to the researcher.

3.3 Research Design

This study adopted a qualitative study design. The term qualitative research involves a broad range of methodological practices. Among these are ethnography, phenomenology, journalism, bricolage, quilt-making, or montage (Denzin, 2000; Lincoln, 2003; Ponterotto, 2005; Morrow, Costaneda-Sound and Abrams, 2012). It is an approach that specifically examines human behaviour or actions expressed through

words. This description prompts Cresswell (2007, p.37) to describe qualitative research as a systematic means of “inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem...” This implies that qualitative research is multi-dimensional. It provides for the description of human or organisational experiences from different perspectives and is often context-specific. This means that narratives are based on the studied perspective (Flick, 2015; p. 11; Kvale, 1996; Wicks and Whiteford 2006, Guba and Lincoln, 1983).

The decision to use qualitative methodology is based on the fact that investigating the preparedness and strategies of the Namibian state to counter international terrorism requires collection of data on expressed views, opinions and perspectives of security personnel directly engaged in counter-terrorism. This implies that participants in this study are critical to a holistic understanding and answering of the four questions of this study, namely, to determine the susceptibility of Namibia to international terrorism; suitability of existing anti-terrorism legislation; challenges to counter-terrorism strategies; and recommendations on the way forward.

The goal of the study is focused on understanding practices associated with counter-terrorism as opposed to explaining and predicting terrorism occurrence in the country. This is in line with Cresswell’s (2007) articulation that qualitative research aims principally at understanding how and why certain actions are taken in a given context.

The adoption of the qualitative methodology for this study, does not suggest that the approach is free from difficulties or challenges. As Silverman (2007) and Mason (2002) have observed, a major disadvantage of the qualitative research methodology is that it is

time-consuming. Again it is a methodology that relies heavily on small sample studies where multiple-factor observations are made based on interviews with comparatively few respondents. Again although human contact which qualitative research encourages is often seen as strength of the methodology, there are scholars who still view this as a weakness. The reason being that close connection or interaction between a researcher and the subjects of study can result in compromise and questions about the credibility of the study. Similarly, some have argued that as a result of close interaction, qualitative research findings cannot be value-free as the investigator may be unable to create an actual distance from the topic of inquiry.

This therefore implies that the investigators' viewpoints of actuality or reality tend to influence how data is collected, analysed and interpreted. In order to considerably reduce or prevent this, Creswell (1998) advises that qualitative researchers checkmate the biases of their subjective views of reality through reflexive position when collecting data.

Despite the shortcomings of the qualitative research design, it is the preferred methodology for this study since its merits tend to outweigh its demerits. Thus, knowledge regarding integrated diversity management practices in selected merged higher education institutions in South Africa was co-produced through rigorous interview process anchored on iterative data collection methodologies as will be described later. The adoption of the qualitative methodology enabled the investigator to also engage in active observation as the views, opinions, feelings, and ideas of Namibia's security agencies personnel regarding the country's preparedness and strategies to counter-international terrorism. Consequently, the data collection used is

allowed for description, interpretation and reconstruction of ideas, views, opinions and feelings about counter-terrorism strategies and preparedness of Namibia.

These methodologies involved the utilisation of in-depth interviews and content analysis of secondary documents. This implies that DI and NAMPOL's personnel were approached with unbiased mindset. Dominant discourses, preconceptions and assumptions regarding policies, laws, strategies and approach to security in Namibia were set aside. In other words, only the subjective realities, experiences, representations, analysis and interpretations thereof of my respondents were accepted as valid knowledge.

3.4 Sample Population

The target population of this study was personnel of Namibia's national security agencies such as the DI and NAMPOL. The study adopted purposive sampling methodology in order to interview different categories of personnel of these agencies. The purposive sampling approach adopted was in line with the proposition of Neuman (2014) who observes that purposive or judgmental sampling is a valuable kind of sampling for unique situations. Creswell (2012, p. 206) also describes purposeful sampling as "when researchers intentionally select individuals and sites to learn or to understand the central phenomenon". In this regard Patton (1990, p.169) adds that the standard used in selecting individuals and sites is "whether they are information rich". The uniqueness of purposive sampling comes from the fact that it is used in exploratory or field research where the researcher brings his or her expert knowledge to bear on the kind of interviewees or respondents selected for the study.

In the present study, the selection of respondents was based on their knowledge and differential roles in the crafting and implementing policies and strategies geared towards countering international terrorism. These respondents were also selected using a purposive sampling technique because of the scope and time limit of the study. The method also enabled the researcher to gain or learn more about the Namibia's strategies and preparedness from those directly involved or informed in its crafting and implementation or reasonably affected by the challenges it has created.

Thus, the sample population was information rich and included senior officers of DI and NAMPOL as well as knowledgeable academics in the field of security and strategic studies. Despite challenges in convincing officers to participate in the study, a sample population of 12 was selected and interviewed. They were relevant to the study because they were directly involved in the implementation of national security policies and legislation and are aware of the challenges associated with implementing security policies. Since categories from which the sample population was drawn varied in functions and responsibilities at the DI and NANPOL. The researcher used maximal variation sampling strategy.). Maximal variation sampling according to Creswell (2012, p.207) is a purposeful sampling strategy in which the researcher "samples cases or individuals that differ on some characteristics or traits". This sampling technique was necessary because the researcher intended to uncover the challenges associated with the implementation of national security strategies or policies from different perspectives.

3.5 Research Instruments

As previously stated, qualitative research methodology involves a broad range of data collecting techniques which include interviews, observations, documentary analysis, audio-visual materials, diaries, memoirs, newspapers, biographies, historical documents and autobiographies (Creswell, 2013, p.160). In carrying out qualitative research, a researcher may utilise one or a combination of these as deemed suitable to what is being investigated (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In respect of this study, two of these data collecting methods were employed. Semi-structured or in-depth interviews were used to generate empirical data while secondary data analysis was used to contextualise the situation of emerging threat of international terrorism in Namibia. The semi-structured interviews were valuable in obtaining scientific evidence regarding the threat of international terrorism and Namibia's preparedness and strategies to counter it. The use of semi-structured in-depth interviews was necessary because it enabled triangulation of results. By definition, triangulation is "the process of corroborating evidence from different individuals, types of data, or methods of data collection in descriptions and themes in qualitative research" (Creswell 2013, p.629). Thus, in this study, a response from one respondent to a particular question was evaluated against the response of others to the same question. Therefore, various perspectives on security strategies and their impacts and implementation challenges were obtained through semi-structured interviews. Moreover, the method of in-depth interviews was employed because it allowed for opinions, views, and ideas or suggestions about security threats to be obtained through "dialogic exchange" between the researcher and the respondents (Creswell, 2003; Creswell and Clark, 2011; Curtis and Curtis, 2011, p.31). The use of the interview method requires a certain degree of expertise in order for it not to be

become mere conversation. Therefore, the researcher relied on extensive knowledge and skills developed over many years in the defence forces in interviewing research participants. Well-developed research skills enabled the researcher to infer meanings and to interpret findings from statements made by respondents about security threats and Namibia's preparedness and strategies to counter them and what challenges encountered in the process of counter-terrorism policy implementation. Based on recommendations by Yin (2003, p.2), and Amin (2005, p.195) that researcher utilise multiple sources of evidence to generate and analyse data, this study collected empirical evidence from diverse primary and secondary data sources as described subsequently.

3.5.1 Secondary Data

Secondary data was required in this study in order to contextualise the study within the academic field of security and strategic studies. Secondary data was obtained from document analysis which is a non-interactive approach. This involved both official documents and scholarly publications in the field of security and strategic studies. With regard to the analyses of official document sources, multiple documents were consulted and compared in order to enhance validity of findings. Furthermore, for theoretical perspectives, data was collected from a range of research reports and other publications produced by international and intergovernmental organisations as well as by experts in the field. Secondary sources examined included the Namibian Constitution; International anti-terrorism legislation; and national policies on national security. Others included published materials on security threats as highlighted in the literature review section. Content analysis was employed in examining these documents and in evaluating

interview results to determine the extent to which the reality on ground conform or differ from existing policies and legislation.

3.5.2 Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews

The main empirical data collecting method used in this study was semi-structured or in-depth interviews. Greef (2005, p.298) describes semi-structured or in-depth interview as a “conversation with a purpose.” Curtis and Curtis (2011, p.29-32) further regard in-depth interview as a “case-centric” approach which allows for the collection of thick data with detailed descriptions. This study utilised this method because it allowed the maintenance of balance between flexibility and consistency in data collection as confirmed by Curtis and Curtis, (2011, p.29-32) as well as Greef (2005, p.299). The flexibility of semi-structured interviewed was critical for detecting and for eliciting responses to questions regarding Namibia’s preparedness and counter-terrorism strategies. It was also necessary to ensure reasonable degree of consistency on the kinds of questions posed, the depth and detail, and the amount of exploration versus confirmation as Greef (2005, p.299) insists. In this regard, the researcher followed a semi-structured in-depth interview guide. This guided contained “a set of questions formulated in advance, which can be asked in a variable sequence and perhaps slightly reformulated in the interview to allow interviewees to unfold their views on issues” (Flick, 2015, p.271). Semi-structured interviews are described as flexible because it encourages revision of the variables (to add themes or questions) as the research progresses.

The variables in the context of this study are the issues regarding international terrorism threats which were asked study participants. Although there were a set of predetermined questions on thematic issues on interview schedules, the interviews were not dictated by these schedules. Rather they provided a guide on how the interviews were conducted. This is in line with what Bryman (2012, p.471) advised. According to him semi-structured interview guides ensured variation or alternating of interview patterns or processes. This enabled the capturing of the responses of the study participants in detail. Alternating of interviewing processes helped in eliciting detailed response to questions on threats of international terrorism and the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies and challenges being encountered. They also revealed information in response to interview questions as a dialogue and introduced subjects which originally were not included in the interview schedules. In this way, a semi-structured interview guide enhanced better understanding of international terrorism threats to Namibia and how prepared the country is to counter the phenomenon through formulated strategies. Providing different insights for analysis helped in enriching data collection. Participants in the study were therefore conceived of as experts on national security strategies.

It can be seen from the foregoing that the semi-structured interviews used to generate data in this study has several advantages. Among numerous advantages of the method include firstly, the studying of issues of national security threats from the perspectives of study participants. This confirms assumptions by Bryman (2012) and Curtis and Curtis (2011). Secondly, the adoption of semi-structure interview allowed for confident building between the researcher and the participants in the study. It also allowed participants to willingly volunteer or share personal information, experience and feelings

regarding implementation strategies of counter-terrorism strategies and results on the ground in the country. Like Bryman (2012) points out semi-structured interviews allow researchers more time to pursue new information and themes arising from the interview process. This was experienced in this study through member checks to verify and validate findings.

The highlighting and discussion of the main advantages derived from semi-structured interview, does not imply that the method is free from certain limitations. Scholars have identified certain disadvantages associated with in-depth or semi-structured interviews. For example, confidence building measures which are regarded as the strength of in-depth or semi-structured interviews also serve as its weakness because it can create an extra burden for the researcher to ensure that the participants remain comfortable during and after the interview. Fears may be raised regarding disclosure of personal information provided during the interview to a third party. In this study some participants expressed doubts about the researcher protecting their information and identities. They were thus, reassured over and over again about the confidentiality of the information they provided.

Another weakness of the method which was experienced in the course of the study is that in-depth interviews require extra care and skill to keep the discussions focused on the subject of the inquiry. The relative political nature of this study, made some participants to express views and opinions which were not relevant to national security threats and strategies for countering threats. Personal frustrations with the DI and NAMPOL over matters not relating the subject were vented out by some participants. This meant that a number of irrelevant data were gathered in the recording devices. As such, it was difficult transcribing, reducing and analysing the gathered data. This kind of

difficulty was aptly described by Denzin and Lincoln, (1994, p.33). Despite the weaknesses of in-depth interviews, the dialogic approach entrenched in it increased deep appreciation of national security threats, especially of international terrorism without the imposition of prior categorisations which could have limited data analysis. Bryman and Cassell, (2006) succinctly recognised this strength of in-depth interview in their work.

The study selected 12 respondents for semi-structured interviews as shown in the table below.

Table 1, shows the group and number of respondents who participated in the study.

Table 1 Sample Size of Representation

Group of Critical Stakeholders	Number of Respondents
National Defense Intelligence	4
Namibia Police	4
Retired Defense Intelligence Official	2
Academics	2
Total	12

Two main questions regarding qualitative research were confronted in conducting the semi-structured interviews. The first question concerns whether it is necessary for qualitative investigators to pre-determine sample size of their study before embarking on data collection or not (Thomson, 2011; Mason, 2010). The second question relates to how many times interviews can be conducted (Creswell, 2013) based on sample size. In response to the first question, the sample size for the semi-structured interviews was not predetermined in this study. However, categories of possible respondents or participants

were identified. Thus, several respondents were interviewed until data saturation was reached. Thereafter, responses were grouped according to themes/questions and respondents providing similar answers numbered and grouped according to positions of responsibility the DI and NAMPOL. These respondents were described as critical stakeholders.

Data saturation method has been used in qualitative research over a long period of time. The concept was first introduced by scholars such as Glaser and Strauss (1967), and Strauss and Corbin (1998) in their analyses of grounded theory. Basically, data saturation occurs when a qualitative researcher reaches a point in his or her inquiry where no new or relevant data seems to emerge regarding a category or when respondents appear to provide similar or same answers to questions regarding a category. Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.212) note that data saturation is reached when a category is well developed in terms of its different aspects been extensively discussed.

In support of Strauss and Corbin (1998) and other scholars such as Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) posit that saturation point is not only reached when no more new information seems to be emerging from additional interviews but also when no new themes are observed in gathered data. In the present study, the saturation point was reached on each objective of the study when the researcher started getting same or similar information as more and more people were interviewed. This means that cut-off point for sample population was drawn when no new information was forthcoming from new sampling units or informants regarding Namibia's preparedness to counter-international terrorism as well as its strategies. As earlier explained the approach adopted identified categories of staff to be interviewed and not necessarily the number of

participants. The sample population was then determined during the data collection process. This approach also confirmed that there is no standard prescriptive number of interviews necessary in qualitative research.

The adoption of the saturation point approach in the interview process, does not imply a lack of knowledge of its weakness as scholars such as Boddy (2016) and Guest et al., (2006, p.59) have succinctly pointed out. These scholars maintain that saturation point approach implies that data collection should continue as long as new information continues to emerge. However, there is no standard or practical guide to determine when saturation point is reached (Guest et al., 2006, p.59). Boddy (2016), acknowledged the usefulness of saturation point approach in data gathering, but reasons that it is almost impractical from a cost and timing point of view. Boddy (2016) is supported by earlier studies which point out that saturation point approach assumes researchers have unlimited time and resources. In practice, most research endeavours have limited timeframe which may not be compactable with saturation point approach.

Every research has an agreed timeframe, especially at the postgraduate level in the university. Experience in this study is that saturation point was reached at the early stage of the investigation. This confirmed what Guest et al., (2006) also found in their study of reproductive health care study among African women. Their findings led them to argue that because of differences in study designs, there is no specific method to reach data saturation. Data saturation can be reached at early stage of the interview process or later. In their view the purpose of study largely determines what kind of information is needed when saturation point is reached. Thus, the sample size of a study does not necessarily guarantee that data saturation point can be reached.

Despite the shortcomings of data saturation point approach in determining sample size, it was preferred in this study because the main objective of the study was not necessarily to produce generalizable results but to gain better understanding and explanation of national security threats and vulnerability, preparedness of states such as Namibia to counter-threats such as international terrorism and the strategies currently adopted to combat it. It was necessary to interview several people within the security sector in order to evaluate earlier responses. This helped strengthened or validated findings at the end of the study. It equally conformed to the observation of Dibley (2011), that focus in research interview should be about “rich and thick” data as opposed to sample size. Fusch and Ness (2015) also support this conclusion by noting that “rich and thick data” removes attention from quantity and place it on multi-layered, intricate, detailed, and nuanced data. Fusch and Ness (2015, p.1409) further assert that the number of people (sources of data) interviewed matter no more than the quality of data derived from them because “One can have a lot of thick data that is not rich; conversely, one can have precious data but not a lot of it. The trick [...] is to have both”. Following these scholars, data saturation approach was used to determine the number of in-depth interview carried out.

3.6 Data Analysis

Analysis of information gathered from semi-structured or in-depth interviews was necessary in order to make a larger meaning or sense of them and to use them to answer the main research questions of this study. This section therefore describes the data analytic technique that was used in this study. As previously pointed out, thematic

analysis was used in the study. All interviews were audio-recorded. This was complemented by copious notes made in English. The data gathered was analysed according to important steps for qualitative data analysis suggested by Creswell (2012, p.236). Firstly, the data was prepared and organised for analysis according to tools used in collecting them and in line with the research objectives stated in the first chapter.

The process of data organization entailed typing notes made during interviews as well as transcribing audio taped interview. Secondly, data gathered from the interview process was coded. This basically entailed going through the data carefully and trying to make sense of what the interviewees were saying about national security threats, Namibia's preparedness to counter-international terrorism and its strategies for this this. Thereafter, the data was reduced to description and themes of ideas where they appear relevant to the study. Thirdly, coding made from the data was used to build themes that presented larger and broader abstraction and meanings than ordinary coding. This second coding was done in order to show how identified issues are interconnected and interdependent. Fourthly, interpretation of the findings was done in relation to research objectives. In interpreting the findings from data analysis, personal views and, review, and comparisons of past studies were employed.

Transcribing of interviews with participants of the study involved translating what was said from oral language to a written language. The transcripts of this study were decontextualized conversations that provided critical window into Namibia's counter-terrorism preparedness and strategies.

In order to ensure the validity of transcripts, it was necessary to follow guidelines on transcription. For example, interviews were transcribed verbatim. However, where audio tapes were not clear, the inaudible portions of the audio file were noted by way of numbering and labelling. The researcher replayed and listened to the inaudible sections over and over again. The thorough approach was time-consuming. Nevertheless, listening to the tape again and again in order to ascertain what the respondents were actually saying enhanced the validity of the study. Rather than assuming what was said in an inaudible tape and thereby providing misleading report, phone calls were made to respondents concerned to clarify what was said in the recording. Part of ensuring exactitude in data management and analysis in the present study included scrutinising observational notes made during semi-structured interviews.

Systematic packaging or structuring of the interview transcripts involved the use of Atlas ti. This programme was used for analysis. The transcripts were examined several times to develop a good understanding of them. Examination of the transcript entailed careful reading, editing, and note making. Thus, unnecessary repetitions or data which did not fall within the purview or objectives of the study were removed at this stage. Creswell (2013) describes this process as data pruning. Editing of the transcripts entailed correcting grammatical errors, shortening and rephrasing of sentences in order to remove ambiguity and clearly bring out the central meaning of what the respondents communicated. It also involved reducing the data to manageable set of emerging themes. This process helped the researcher in selecting, abstracting, focusing, simplifying and transforming collected data.

The transcribing stage was followed by the coding stage. In coding the transcribed and condensed data, large piece of data were rearranged and broken down into separate parts and assigned codes, labels, concepts, names, and thematic headings.

3.7 Technical and Quality Issues

According to Lohr (2004), technical and quality issues refer to the scientific processes that show how findings of a study are related to the methods used and questions asked. These aspects are collectively referred to as the rigor of the intellectual exercise. It is therefore necessary in this section to demonstrate how rigor was ensured in this study. This is critical because as Morse et al., (2002, p.14) have noted “without rigour, research is worthless, becomes fiction, and loses its utility”. Questions about rigour principally relate to two concepts in research, namely, “validity and reliability”. Rigour is also described by other terms. For example, Guba and Lincoln, (1989); and Lincoln and Guba, (1985), are not comfortable with the terms therefore instead of using reliability and validity in describing the thoroughness of research product they prefer to use the term trustworthiness”.

The reason for the adoption of a different term is based on lack of precise definition of the terms. In this regard Golafshani (2003) opines that the meaning of “reliability and validity” in research depend on applicable methodological approach. This means that how these terms are defined and how they are achieved in research depends on a researcher’s disciplinary background or theoretical orientation. Therefore for scholars of the positivist school of thought and those of constructivist/interpretivist school the terms suggest different meanings. Positivists believe in the study of stable and unchanging

reality while constructivists believe in the study of a changing reality (Neuman, 2014). The implication of this philosophical difference is that criteria for determining rigour differ for both schools of thought. The present research is a qualitative study and constructivist/interpretative in nature. Therefore the prescriptions of scholars such as Creswell (2012); Guba and Lincoln, (1989); Lincoln and Guba, (1985) were followed.

Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.290) have identified four features that define rigour, namely, credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Several strategies have been developed to establish each of these features, some of these include audit trail, and member checks during coding, confirmation of results with study participants, peer debriefing, negative case analysis, structural corroboration, and referential material adequacy. However, in order to enhance the rigour or reliability and validity (trustworthiness) of the findings of this study, the methods of triangulation; reflexivity, prolonged engagement and member checks were used. These methods are briefly discussed subsequently.

3.7.1 Triangulation

In the context of this study, the application of the method of triangulation simply implies that data on issues of national security threats, particularly international terrorism were collected from different sources, using different methods and analysed from different theoretical perspectives (Neuman, 2011, p.150). From the literature, about four types of triangulation can be identified. These are triangulation of data (collection and comparison of data from several sources); triangulation of researchers (basically the use different researchers on same research team); Triangulation of theories (application of

multiple perspectives to interpret the results of a study); and triangulation of methods (application of mixed methods- quantitative and qualitative methodologies). This study specifically utilized triangulation of data collection sources, triangulation of theories and triangulation within methods to establish the reliability and validity of its findings.

Thus, in-depth or semi-structured interviews with multiple stakeholders were used to collect data in this study. Semi-structured interviews were complemented by analysis of secondary documents on the issues of national security threats and counter-terrorism strategies. Responses to interview questions differed in the way and manner in which they were presented, however, analysis showed similarity of emerging themes in the answers provided. Data collected from interviews and those gleaned from documentary analysis were placed side-by-side, then compared and contrasted. This was done with the intention of checking for stability or accuracy and similarity of interviewees' responses through repeated questioning during the interview.

Scholars agree that data collected from different sources and methods have a higher degree of accuracy than those collected from one source. Furthermore data collected through the method of triangulation increases the confidence of qualitative research findings. The method also has the capacity to resolve contradictions which may arise in the process of data collection, analysis of results and findings. Crosschecking of responses to questions which the triangulation method encourages enabled fairness in the interpretation of interview results.

3.7.2 Reflexivity

Reflexivity was another strategy used in this study to enhance reliability and validity (rigour). As Creswell (2013) notes, reflexivity in qualitative research refers to possible influence of bias or ways of thinking over the research process. Researchers may be influenced by several factors which include research interests, expectations, perceptions and theoretical persuasions as well as political, socio-cultural factors, historical antecedents, race, gender, class, and age, among several others. Being aware of this fact according to Neuman (2011) and Nadin and Cassell (2006) is critically important to the establishment of the reliability and validity of research findings. Reflexivity therefore invites qualitative researchers to acknowledge, disclose, critically examine, and reflect on ways and manners in which unconsciously internalized beliefs; values and intellectual orientations can influence research process and findings.

The idea about acknowledgement and disclosure of existing beliefs, values and orientations which could influence research findings brings to question the view of researcher's neutrality in qualitative research. The issue of neutrality is common in quantitative or natural science research because it deals with stable and unchanging reality and researchers are physical objects detached from objects being studied. This is not true of qualitative research. In view of this, it is critically important that qualitative researchers disclose reflexive position in order for reviewers of their studies to have an understanding of possible stances that may have influenced their findings.

According to Wolcott (2010, p.36), consumers of research findings have the right to know about investigators; understand their interests and motivation in the issues they study, to whom they report, and what they stand personally to gain from their study

(Wolcott, 2010, p.36). Disclosure of a researcher's dispositions hinges on the fact that internalised theoretical persuasions have the capacity to unduly influence a researcher's interpretation of research findings. Therefore, making a researcher's subjective judgement known is critical to establishing the credibility of their findings. Reflexivity also requires that researchers describe in detail how the research process was carried out. Different approaches to reflexivity have been offered by scholars such as Lincoln and Guba (1985). They suggest that a researcher keeps a journal or diary throughout the duration of the study in which their daily experiences are recorded. Other suggestions include keeping of methodology log in which decisions regarding methods chosen and reasons for their choice are recorded. Most importantly, these journals are necessary also for noting a researcher's thoughts, feelings, ideas and hypotheses formulated as he or she interacts with study participants. Doing this, enables the research to conduct effective self-audit.

In this study, the investigator's professional, political, socio-cultural and intellectual orientations were revealed to study participants. It was important to let study participants know that the researcher is a member of the Namibian security agencies and specifically interested in intelligence gathering for effective national security provision. The reasons for carrying out research into Namibia's preparedness for international terrorism and its counter-terrorism strategies were revealed in the aims and objectives of the study. It was clearly stated to the study participants that the researcher had both personal and institutional interest in the subject as a member of the security agencies. It was also against the background of pre-existing knowledge of challenges of implementing national security policies in the country that prompted the researcher to sometimes make

interjections during the interviews process. The reason was to gain clarity on views expressed by respondents and also to keep the interview focused. Through self-reflection, pre-knowledge and experience of the researcher were kept in check throughout the study.

Diary was used as a tool for self-reflection. This diary was a Samsung Tablet with diary features. In it a detail schedule of appointments, office locations of study participants, venues for interviews, emails and phone numbers were kept. This diary system helped in keeping a systematic track of the data gathering process of the study. It also helped in identifying aspects of the study which needed rearrangement or to be discarded altogether. Keeping track of the research process illustrated the study's epistemological observance of constructivist/interpretivist theoretical prescriptions and responsibility. Constructivism invites a researcher to present as transparent as possible the subjectivities that influenced the execution of research processes and the interpretations generated from analysed data. The diary method enabled the researcher to carefully note the methodological issues such as how the interviews unfolded; to reflect on the quality of responses, as well as the emotional state, assumptions, values, and beliefs and how these influenced interpretations at every stage of the research process.

Reflexivity in this study began with a truthful expression or reflection on the researcher's professional training as well as intellectual background as a member of Namibia's national security agencies and perception as an interested party in the subject of national security threats, perceptions, preparedness and strategies to counter-international terrorism. Knowledge of this guided the entire research process. Interjections made during interview processes were measured and aimed at preventing

digression. This was necessary in order not to appear as overbearing or seen as pushing a different agenda other than academic. The participants were always reassured that the study was specifically for academic purposes. Again, the use of informed consent process also assured participants that they were participating in the study voluntarily and could withdraw at any time from it. Being a member of national security agencies was also advantageous in some ways in the study. For example, it helped in building rapport easily with the participants. Careful framing of interview questions with the help of the study supervisor and attention to how the questions were asked helped in reducing the chances of misinterpretation of intentions.

3.7.3 Prolonged Engagement

Prolonged engagement was another method used to ensure reliability and validity. It entailed the collecting of data over a reasonable period of time. The method was used because during data collection stage of this study, interview appointments were scheduled, cancelled and rescheduled based on the availability and willingness of participants to be interviewed as well as delayed ethical clearance from the university. Participants were thus, visited severally to convince them to participate in the study. Work related matters and other activities equally meant that data collection spanned a long period of time. However, during this time, the researcher gained in-depth knowledge of national security threats perceptions among security agencies as well as built rapport with study participants.

Rapport was built through the strategy of keeping in touch through extended phone calls, emails, visits, and discussions with study participants. Technically, this is called

prolonged engagement in qualitative research. Its importance lies in the fact that it helped in identifying recurring patterns of perspectives and interpretations. However, in staying close to the study participants and being submerged in their world to a reasonable extent, efforts were made not to compromise the interpretation of the findings. Thus, experience of the researcher as a security expert was never confused with those of study participants. Thus, closeness and limited friendship with both colleagues and study participants did not hinder the researcher's ability to study the implementation of Namibia's counter-terrorism strategies.

3.7.4 Member Checks

Member check refers to the process of going back to study participants to confirm, verify, test data, preliminary analytical categories, formulated assumptions and interpretation of research findings (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007). Two methods of member check were employed in the study. The first method employed was iterative questioning as identified by Shenton (2004). This is the process of establishing the accuracy of information on the spot during in-depth interviews. This was done through repeated questioning or probing/interjections. Sometimes respondents were asked to repeat their answers or to provide more clarity on them. At other times questions were rephrased in another way to test the understanding of the respondents as well as the consistency of their answers. This approach helped in identifying contradictory statements or information and in detecting dishonest answers, and consequent elimination of suspect data. Detection and elimination of false data during the interviews helped in condensing and interpreting the meaning of what the respondents described.

Follow up questions were meant to confirm or reject the answer and to establish authenticity on the spot.

Although diary keeping and audio recording helped in capturing data during the interviews, these methods were still limited in some ways. For example, information in the diary was not detailed and not all portions of the recordings were clear or audible enough. This necessitated the employment of the second method of member check. This implied going back to the respondents for clarifications or confirmation of interpreted answers. This was possible because the researcher is a member of the security agencies. Being a member of the security agencies presented the researcher with some advantages as well as challenges. The disadvantage came in the form of suspicion of the intentions of the study and its implications for national security of Namibia. Withdrawals and reluctance to participate in the study by some members of staff of DI and NAMPOL were largely informed by suspicion and mistrust.

The advantage of being a “colleague” on the other hand, came in the form of having access to the locale or sites of the study- the DI and NAMPOL offices, and knowing participants at official capacity. Thus, to ensure credibility and trustworthiness of findings of this study; the researcher went back to the study participants to verify findings. This was possible because the researcher was not constrained by financial limitations, logistics, and unavailability of participants due to distance after interviews. Resources of the University of Namibia such as Internet were used to make calls, send emails, book appointments and physically revisit study participants. This reflexive approach was advantageous in three ways. Firstly, it provided an opportunity for the respondents to reflect on the information they provided and to add more information that

were contained in their initial response. Secondly, this approach allowed the researcher to keep all participants on record, and thirdly, the researcher was able to confidently summarize and categorize the data.

3.7.5 Generalizability

Generalizability basically describes the degree to which study findings can be applied to similar situations in other places than the one in which they were originally conducted (Creswell, 2012). However, Yin (2004, p.119) claims that broad generalizations from a particular study cannot be extrapolated or replicated in its entirety. This notwithstanding, research in the field of security and strategic studies in different places has demonstrated that certain key driving factors tend to be present and applicable in national security provision, preparedness of countries and formulation of counter-threats strategies. Thus, although this study was specifically concerned with the preparedness of the Namibian state to counter-international terrorism; its counter-terrorism strategies and challenges it faces in implementing these strategies. Therefore, findings of this study may be replicable in other countries given similar circumstances or conditions.

3.7.6 Ethical Consideration

This study was carried out in the highest ethical manner. Creswell (2012, p.230) describes ethics as precisely relating to “right and wrong”. Succinctly stated, ethics precisely refers to method, procedure, or perspective for deciding how to act and for evaluating difficult problems or situations. Patton (2002) suggests that general ethical issues in research include confidentiality, informed consent and data access and ownership. Creswell (2013) further adds that ethical issues in qualitative research are

considered in three identifiable stages. The first stage is the beginning of the study; the second stage is during data collection and analysis; and the third stage is report writing.

The approval of the proposal of this thesis by the supervisor and the postgraduate committee of the University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek was followed by application for ethical clearance from the ethics committee of UNAM. Ethical clearance was necessary for this study because the study involved human interaction. Thus, the research proposal provided detailed explanation of the study's feasibility, methodology for data collection and analysis as well as approaches to protect study participants. Approval for the study was granted in late November 2017.

The first ethical issue observed in this qualitative study involving the use of in-depth interviews for primary data collection was 'informed consent'. This was voluntarily obtained from study participants. Informed consent implies that study participants were provided with sufficient information about the study, its purpose, aims and objectives, and interview questions or kind of information required from them in order to help them decide whether to participate in the study or not. In this study, informed consent was obtained verbally from the participants. The essence of informed consent was to demonstrate that study participants exercised reasonable degree of power over the study process.

To help participants who happen to be security agencies personnel decide on whether to participate or not in the study, it was important to explain to them likely costs and benefits of the study. As a member of national security agencies, the researcher shared understanding and experience of implementing national security policies. It was also

important to inform the participants that neither them nor the researcher stand to make personal financial or other forms of direct benefits in the study. However, since the rationale of the study was to contribute to policy making and implementation and countering national security threats they stand to gain indirectly from findings of the study and its recommendations.

Obtaining of informed consent required the researcher to protect the privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity of the study participants. Privacy in the context of this study refers to “control over others’ access to oneself and associated information and preservation of boundaries against giving protected information or receiving unwanted information” (Sieber and Tolich, 2013, p.154). Similarly, confidentiality refers to legal constraints as well as agreements between the researcher and study participants regarding how information provided to the researcher might or might not be used during and after the study. By anonymity the researcher refers to the absence of identifiers, symbols, indicators or information that would reveal which member of staff of DI and NAMPOL provided which information. This is in line with the arguments of (Sieber & Tolich, 2013, p.155).

Ethics of research was also respected at the final stage of report writing. In the presentation of results the researcher avoided statements or opinions or views which could be traced back to the people who participated in this study. Thus, at the end of the data collection, statements or phrases commonly associated with any of the participants were removed or hidden away in presentation. As the study participants were members of the DI and NAMPOL; efforts were made to protect their identities, offices, departments and positions. The identities of study participants were further protected by

ensuring that, responses to interview questions could not be linked to them. Thus, the researcher ensured that pseudonyms such as “respondent” were used during the coding and reporting stage. Again research transcripts were stored in the form of audio files transcribed and saved in word document format. These files were only accessed by the researcher and thesis supervisor.

With respect to the use of information from secondary sources, the researcher ensured that double quotation marks were used to indicate borrowed expressions; long quotations were indented and exact pages, authors’ names, title of materials were corrected cited in the body of the work as well as in the reference list.

3.8 Conclusion

The chapter 3 specifically discussed the research methodology followed in this study. From the discussions, it is clear that qualitative research methodology was followed. The rationale behind the employment of qualitative methodology was justified because the study sought to understand how prepared Namibia is to counter-international terrorism as well as its counter-terrorism strategies and challenges being faced. Since qualitative research methodology entails several data gathering methods, it was necessary to specify the exact data gathering tool used in the study. The study employed semi-structured, in-depth interviews as the primary data gathering tool. This method was complemented by content analysis of relevant secondary documents. With respect to data analysis, the researcher combined a number of strategies enunciated by several scholars such as Creswell (2012) and Cresswell (2013) in order to achieve rigour in the study.

Finally, involvement of human subjects necessitated the seeking and obtaining of ethical clearance from UNAM to carry out the study. Ethical issues observed in the study were highlighted and discussed. Among these were informed consent, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. These were carefully observed in four stages, namely, at the beginning of the study, data collecting stage, and reporting stage.

Having discussed the research methodology of this study, the next chapter will provide an analysis of interview results.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter specifically presents the empirical findings of this study. As stated in the preceding chapter on methodology, data analysed in this study was collected by mean of semi-structured, in-depth interview and content analysis of relevant secondary documents and observation as complementary methodology. The study utilized thematic data analysis in which the evident meanings (simple descriptions) were presented alongside implicit meanings. This approach required a careful interpretation in order to ensure that explanations offered were internally and externally valid. The study ensured validity of findings, through regular reference to respondents' views and theoretical proposition in the existing literature. Data was collected from 12 information-rich participants in total. The sample population was composed as follows: 4 senior members from NDF and other 4 senior members from NAMPOL, retired intelligence officials and 2 academics.

The semi-structured interview was designed to determine the preparedness of Namibia to counter-international terrorism and the strategies for doing that. Preparedness and adoption of specific strategies entail a good understanding of terrorism- in terms of its nature and kind of threat it poses to the Namibian state. Such understanding can only be determined through threat perception by the country's political and security leadership. In view of this, it was necessary to begin the interviews by asking participants about their definition or understanding of terrorism in general and international terrorism in

particular. The reason for posing a question on definition of terrorism is that a good grasp of the phenomenon is critical to determining how well Namibia is prepared to deal with terrorism; what challenges Namibia's law enforcement and security agencies face in combating terrorism and whether the Namibia state is making adequate investment towards funding law enforcement and security agencies to ensure public safety and security. Furthermore, the semi-structured, in-depth-interview was aimed at ascertaining the type of laws regulating security agencies' mandate to combat international terrorism and the effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation and coordination of activities relating to combating international terrorism. Another objective sought through analysis of interview results is the determination of best practices or strategies needed by Namibia in combating international terrorism.

4.2 Terrorism Perception in Namibia

Acknowledgement of a problem is a critical first step towards solving the problem. Participants in the study had a good understanding of the meaning of international terrorism. They also agree that the AU definition of terrorism is elaborate and relevant to African history and political circumstances. The general agreement among participants on the AU definition of terrorism is not surprising as most of the participants were former liberation fighters. In addition, the Namibian government organized a workshop on terrorism awareness in 2017. The workshop brought together several government ministries; Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and concerned members of the public who were sensitized about international terrorism. Awareness of the definition of terrorism by study participants as well as the organisation of a workshop on the subject of terrorism may be taken as an indication of clear understanding and appreciation of the

type of threat posed by international terrorism to several countries including the Namibian state. But this did not seem to be the case as responses to follow up questions proved. Thus, in response to questions regarding Namibia's perception of the threat of international terrorism to the country, the respondents maintained that the Namibian state does not face the problem of international terrorism as one of the respondents severally stressed:

...at the moment...and I think even in the future...Namibia does not face eminent terrorist attack or any sort of activities from terrorist organizations that are documented and well known all over the world... the only activity that took place in Namibia since independence...which we can call terrorism because of its nature and conduct, was the Caprivi secession (today Zambezi) attempt in 1999...

In support of the respondent's view the Namibia's Defence Policy, identifies potential threats to the country to among others:

...include sentiments of secessionism ...a case in point the Caprivi issue; claims of ancestral land and the agitation for the land redistribution to the landless; unstable labour market environment; plight of ex-fighters; unemployment among the youth; environmental degradation and unsustainable use of the environment in communal areas, such as uncontrolled grazing and deforestation; illicit trade and trafficking in small arms and light weapons; usage of the country as a conduit for contraband items to neighbouring countries; effect of global warming on

domestic food security; dwindling non-renewable natural resources; impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the lack of accessibility of the majority to economic resources of the country...

While in the Defence Policy, the NDF recognizes, international terrorism as a threat to global peace and stability, it is clear this citation, that the NDF does not consider international terrorism a direct threat to Namibia or understand how international terrorism constitutes a threat to the country. The NDF's main concern is the preservation of domestic peace and stability by preventing domestic insurrection and protection of the country from crisis that might result from lack of access to land; illicit trading and natural disasters. The NDF also appears more concerned about deforestation; the use of Namibia for trafficking of contraband goods; and proliferation of weapons. There was no mention of the use of Namibian territory for establishing sleeper terror cells; recruitment, indoctrination; training and funding of terrorists. The non-highlighting of these equally dangerous aspects of international terrorism in the Defence Policy document implies that the institution places less attention on them. This low level of perception of the problem, can explain why the country's anti-terrorism legislation has remained largely dormant since it was enacted into law in 2014.

In line with the reasoning that international terrorism does not pose threat to Namibia, another respondent enthused that, "what can be perceived as terrorist threats in Namibia is any armed actions that are aimed at challenging the security system of the government and those who carried out such terrorist activities are called terrorists". Contrary to the views of insulation from international terrorism expressed by majority of the respondents, one particular respondent acknowledged a broader implication of

international terrorism even though it is not happening currently in Namibia. The respondent expressed the view that:

Namibia is not an island. It is part of the international community. Therefore, what is happening globally can equally affect Namibia in one way or the other. This is because terrorists do not respect borders and do pick what they feel is their target.

The acknowledge of Namibia's susceptibility to international terrorism as a result of being a member of the international community is line with the findings of several sources for example, Martin (2003); Iroanya (2008); Ogbonnaya (2016); and Iroanya (2018) cited in the literature review. These actors argue that terrorists operate in several countries. In some countries they are active and some they are dormant. They are also highly motivated individuals who exploit weaknesses in the security architecture of countries. Through their extensive network of willing suicide bombers, they can attack any country in any region of the world. Furthermore, there is a general agreement among scholars that modern terrorism is a multifaceted and ever-changing phenomenon which poses a threat to a state at different levels, - individual, and national, regional and global. In this regard, terrorists manipulate the communication systems and technology for destructive purposes for example cyber-attacks and exploitation of financial systems and physical destruction of strategic infrastructure.

4.3 National Anti-Terrorism Legislation

A good understanding and definition of given social problem, its nature, manifestations and threat to a society is crucial to the introduction of specific legislation to combat the problem. Thus, legal instruments are important aspects of national security strategy in the fight against international terrorism and the dangers terrorists can pose to the Namibian state. The absence of specific anti-terrorism legislation implies the according of less important status to the problem of international terrorism in the strategic thinking of the country's political and security leaderships. Existence of anti-terrorism legislation and national security strategy also show the extent of preparedness and seriousness of a country to deal with an existential threat. Respondents offered varied opinion on how well Namibia is prepared to deal with international terrorism through effective law and strategy. Some expressed the view that the country does not have a unified or comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation. This information is not accurate. Namibia does have national anti-terrorism legislation- the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act (Act No.4 of 2014). The legislation gives effect to the international conventions, Security Council Resolutions, instruments and best practices concerning measures to combat terrorism and proliferation activities. It also addresses measures to prevent and combat the funding of terrorist and proliferation activities; investigative measures concerning terrorist and proliferation activities; measures to proscribe persons and organisations that conduct terrorist and proliferation activities; and to provide for incidental matters.

Poor or lack of enforcement of this legislation as a result of lack of explicit terror activities in the country might explain the confusion among participants regarding the

existence of national legislation on terrorism. However, one of the respondents argued that the existing legislation is not comprehensive enough and is geared towards combating financial crimes. Besides, Namibia's anti-terrorism legislation of 2014, the country also has other national legal instruments that can be used to fight different manifestations of international terrorism. These legislation include the Defence Acts (Act No.1 of 2001); the Police Act, (Act No.19 of 1990); Financial Intelligence Act (Act No.13 of 2012); and the Intelligence Act, (Act No 10. of 1997).

The existence of anti-terrorism legislation supports earlier observation that Namibia's political and security leaderships understand and are quite aware of the existential threat of international terrorism. However, these leaders do not yet consider international terrorism as a serious threat to the existence of the Namibian state because the country has not yet experienced serious terrorist attack. This approach to international terrorism glosses over the fact that terrorism does not only involve detonation of bombs, shooting, kidnapping, or even hostage taking but also largely unobservable issues sleeper cells and the use of a country as a safe haven. Namibia is susceptible to being used as a safe haven.

4.4 Absence of National Security Grand Strategy

A single legislation may not be sufficient to deal with matters relating to the use of violence for political ends. Thus, as part of its effort to fight international terrorism, the Namibia Constitution of 1990 as amended, provides in Chapter 4 the basis for dealing with various national emergencies which include civil wars and insurrections using terror tactics. The constitution makes provision for state of emergence laws in which the

military and law enforcement agencies can rapidly apply to deal with issues relating to international terrorism and the like. This constitutional provision as well as other legislation regulating the use of military force to maintain peace and stability in the country, may still not be adequate or sufficient in tackling international terrorism should it come to the shores of Namibia due to legal technicalities and absence of a national security strategy. For example, the defence lawyer may exploit several legal technicalities when dealing with the prosecution of terrorists in combating terrorism. This issue was appreciated by the participants. One participant for example, stated:

Namibia will be in a reactive position in case a terror situation unfolded...Namibia does not have National Security Grand Strategy in place. That means there are no proactive measures in place and we cannot be at a position to claim readiness in dealing with terrorism.

The importance of a national security strategy cannot be overemphasized. It is critical to safety and security of any state. This is more so when the Namibia state exists in an anarchic international environment where states seek to achieve their national interests at the expense of one another and at the same time need greater cooperation among themselves in both military and non-military spheres. Therefore, the development of an effective and functional national security strategy informed by national interests and existential threats to Namibia is critical.

Another participant disagrees with the view that Namibia is not well prepared to tackle the issue of terrorism if it happens in the country due to lack of a national security

strategy. The participant argued that country's security forces are capable of dealing with such threats. In this regard the participant pin pointedly argued that:

Namibia has NAMPOL, NDF and National Intelligence. These institutions are following what is happening in the world. They are also working hand in hand with other agencies around the world. So in the absence of a national security strategy the country can still deal with the problem of terrorism...

The argument of the participant is not out of place. The point raised confirms findings of other studies (Imre et al., 2008; Iroanya, 2008; Scott, 2010; Crenshaw, 2011; and Iroanya, 2018) that combating international terrorism demands cooperation and collaboration among countries and the sharing of intelligence on terrorists' movements around the world. Namibia is a member of the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and through this organisation and in association with INTERPOL runs numerous initiatives which support member states in efforts to protect nations from terrorism in its numerous forms. Through SARPCCO Namibia collects, stores and examine data about suspected persons and groups and their actions. SARPCCO has also established the Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre, which works to prevent the enrolment and activities of terrorists. Namibia is also a signatory to a number of SADC instruments which deal with terrorism and some of them include the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,

Respondents were divided on Namibia's mechanisms to fight international terrorism. There were those who expressed the view that strategies such as sharing of information

on international terrorism with other nations particularly SADC member is a proactive strategic prevent and combat international terrorism. Furthermore, they outlined that coordination of activities among security agencies at national, regional and continental levels would equally help forestall international terrorism in Namibia. Such mechanisms they pointed out enable the country to get early warning to prepare in case a response is needed.

Furthermore, DI Department had pointed out that the combating of terrorism in Namibia is aligned with the principles of international communities that include the UN, AU and SADC. The relationship between these organizations prompted the nation states to coordinate the movement of terrorists. The DI Department underscored that UNSC had made a call on all member states to prevent the financing terrorists' activities and combating financing terrorist organization, by passing a UNSC resolution 1373 and 1267 respectively. Hence, this is carried out through coordination among states depending on which region or continent it occurred.

4.5 Pro-activeness of Namibian Security Agencies

A frequently mentioned theme in the course of the interviews was the pro-activeness of the security agencies responsible for countering international terrorism in Namibia. The issue of pro-activeness came up because the clandestine nature of terrorism makes it difficult to identify terrorists or would be terrorists who do not have any specific combat front. Coupled with this, is the existence of different terrorist organisations having sophisticated network and operating through conventional and unconventional means to recruit and organise criminal or terror activities.

Pro-activeness shows a high level of preparedness of security agencies. It also means staying some steps ahead of would be terrorists. This involves nipping terrorists' plans from the bud- thwarting of terrorists' plans; quick execution of arrests; prosecution and sentencing of suspects if found guilty. Pro-activeness entails good organization, training, and effective intelligence gathering capacity on the part of the Namibian state. It also involves an effective judicial system.

From the responses provided during the interview, it was revealed that the task of fighting terrorism in Namibia was the core business and domain of NAMPOL. The NDF is only involved when the police request assistance from the NDF. It was the view of most participants that Namibia does not have proactive measures to deal with terrorism.

According to a respondent:

Placing the fight against terrorism in the police domain means that the NDF can only deal with a terrorist event after the event had already taken place- or when the damage is already done. This to me is not proactive action but reactive action...

There was a general agreement among respondents that Namibia is a small nation faced with several challenges necessary for being proactive in fighting international terrorism. One of these challenges is technological advancement in intelligence gathering. It was repeatedly stated that Intelligence gathering these days is a multifaceted operation involves which involves SIGINT, ELINT, COMINT, IMINT, MASINT and Geospatial knowledge. These methods are more advanced than the traditional HUMINT gathering method. Furthermore intelligence operations are hampered by budgetary constraint and

lack of equipment and insufficient training in Intelligence appears as can be deduced from responses of some the participants. For example, a respondent stated that:

...the general lack of preparedness in terms of training and having appropriate equipment is a major challenge in combating terrorism...it becomes difficult to deal with events of terrorist threats if we have not trained and equipped ourselves with necessary equipment...

As a result of these challenges respondents agreed that there is a general lack of pro-activeness on the part of the Namibian state to fight international terrorism. This conclusion seems to come from the fact that no terror incident has been publicly reported in the country. This does not mean that sleeper cells do not exist in Namibia, or that terrorist recruitment and indoctrination and training may not be going on in the country. An indication that these activities may be taking place in the country is the report that a Namibian who left the country allegedly to further his studies abroad ended up being killed as part of ISIS (Hamata, 2015). There had also being reports about some Namibians have been recruited as mercenaries in conflict zones.

These revelations prompted a respondent to argue that although identification of someone as a terrorist is a difficult challenge in the fight against international terrorism, “Namibia is faced with a challenge of monitoring capacity of the activities carried out by other Namibians who are living in other parts of the world”. The discussion on pro-activeness of security forces in combating international terrorism falls in line with findings in the literature on terrorism. In this regard, Rostow (2002) states that September 11, 2001 in the US, occurred due to intelligence failure and lack of pro-

activeness of the US counter-terrorism forces despite having Intelligence regarding possible terror attacks and those behind the plot. The fact of pro-activeness is also reinforced by scholars such as Gaddis (1989) and Gordon (2007).

4.6 The Consequences of Globalisation

Globalization is synonymous with the interconnectedness and interdependence of people and countries. It is a process that has been made possible through changes in state and institutional policies as well as the opening up of borders to facilitate the flow of goods and services, people and ideas. Although globalisation is portrayed as good for economic development, it also creates and facilitates several global problems. In this regard, Levitsky (2002) observes that “the dark side of globalisation is the growth of transnational crime...” international terrorism is regarded as a transnational crime due to its nature. International terrorist organisations have different nationalities in their membership. The organisation, planning and executive of terror activities such as the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US involves different countries. In this respect respondents in this study were of the views that:

...terrorists are difficult to detect because they are just like any other ordinary citizen of the country...globalization which allows for the free movement of people around the world makes identification of who is a terrorist more challenging...

Another aspect globalization that the respondents equally expressed views about was the Internet and communication technologies. Countries such as Namibia, they pointed out have not come up with a good strategy on how monitor and control the use of these

technologies in carrying criminal activities. One respondent in particular succinctly noted that:

...electronics such as computers, cell phones and many others pose major challenges because terrorists make use of them as a means of communication to connect and plan their activities...among such kind activities are electronic banking transactions...they are pose difficult challenge to banking institutions in terms of controlling the movement of the money and to detect whether or not money was sent to the terrorist...

In addition, unavailability of resources such as human, finance and equipment can also hinder the combating of international terrorism. Other challenges include, but not necessarily limited to, false information, ineffective counterterrorism legislation and non-effective criminal justice system which are essential not only to combating terrorism but also for deterrence of crime and corruption in the country.

4.7 Access to Improvised Explosive Devices (Ieds) Materials

It is a well-known fact that terrorist use locally source-able materials to make improvise explosive devices (IEDs) which plant at target places to achieve maximum destruction and attention to their cause. Participants in this study expressed fears that Namibia does not have the capacity to control access to these materials. Therein they claimed, will lay the biggest challenge to combating international terrorism. Should international terrorism starts to manifest in the country, they all maintained that it will be a serious existential threat to Namibia. As a respondent argued:

...since terrorists use non- conventional means to produce explosive devices...one cannot detect if a person who used to buy certain materials from shop X, will use the materials to make an explosive device...it is also very simple to acquire the knowledge of producing an explosive device...they use Internet to learn... a person does not need to go to school to learn it...

From the citation it is obvious that technology cannot be ruled out from the challenges Namibia faces in combating international terrorism. On this point, respondents noted that Namibia needed to have updated technology to be able to detect suspicious activities taking place in the country in particular and in the SADC region in general. This assertion is in agreement with assertions in the literature, for example, Iroanya (2018) and Solomon (2013) and Pienaar (2007). These authors maintain that keeping abreast with technologies of monitoring and control in addition to other measures is critical to the fight against terrorism. Solomon (2013) and Iroanya (2018) specifically call for effective regulation of the use of Internet and the social media.

Beside the problem of control the use of technology, respondents were also quick to point out that terrorist can obtain weapons from Namibia or neighboring countries because illegal weapons trafficking is a major problem in the SADC region due to the history of armed struggle and wars. The vulnerability of Namibia to this threat is amplified by its vast territory which presents serious border policing challenges. Thus, the Namibian has the problem of porous borders. This is not however, unique to the country as other countries of the region are equally face with this challenge (Iroanya,

2018). Porous border facilitates uncontrolled movements across border and its consequences of illegal weapons trafficking, and contraband goods.

Respondents generally agreed that detective equipment needed to be placed around strategic points of entry and ungoverned areas of the country where there is less police presence. While the suggestion made by the respondents seems good, there is the tendency to over the fact that detective equipment are costly. When too much fund is spent on equipment acquisition to the detriment of other pressing social infrastructure, public resentments are often aroused. As a result of this a respondent added that:

“...too much complains among citizens over poor economic performance already exist, therefore government should not waste money buying detective technologies to fight terrorism because Namibia is not under the threat of international terrorism like other countries such as Nigeria, Kenya or even Somalia...we are safe at least for now...”

4.8 Funding Public Safety and Security

Scholars emphasize cooperation, collaboration and coordination of activities among states in the fight against international terrorism, particularly in Africa because fighting terrorism involves a lot of funding which poor countries in the region cannot afford in the context of serious economic crisis. Sufficient funding is important to developing an effective standby force to tackle international terrorism. The funding of security forces takes large portion of the budgets of most countries African countries. Thus, in examining challenges facing Namibia in the fight against terrorism, and determining its

preparedness to confront the problem it was necessary ask questions relating to the funding of the NDF, NAMPOL and the Intelligence agencies.

Responding to questions on funding, participants expressed that the view that Namibian government is fairly allocating funds to the military, law enforcement and security agencies for clandestine operations. However, the allocation to the military and these agencies are heavily debated in the parliament and often results in budget cuts. Therefore, there is no ratio to equate what is enough and less funding for these agencies. In addition, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) output is small at 14.00 USD billion and allocation of heavy budget to defence and security agencies may result in the neglect of other public agencies and ministries and the opportunity for holistic growth and development.

Despite taking a larger chunk of the country's budget, majority of the respondents noted that the government of Namibia is not making sufficient investment in security. According to one of them:

...many people believe the NDF is well funded because it takes largest portion of the budget...but the truth is that for many years $\frac{3}{4}$ of NDF budget is apportioned towards personnel and only $\frac{1}{4}$ for equipment acquisition, training and others functions...in 2017/18 and 2018/19 Financial Year the NDF personnel budget was more than 80%. This is indicating that the allocation towards operational and capital projects was very little... how can one say the NDF is well funded...

Namibia has been facing serious financial constraint as a result of slow economic growth. As of 2017 and 2018 the country underwent economic recession and still struggling to come of recession. Namibian economy is tied to the South African economy which is also not doing well. Thus, decline in economic growth explains why the NDF, NAMPOL and other security agencies are not receiving sufficient funding to carry out some of their missions. Again no military can claim to be fully and sufficiently funded to the extent it wants. Even the military of most advanced countries suffer from insufficient funding. The world is evolving and situations are not remaining static. Therefore, security institutions such military, NAMPOL and others needs to be adequately funded to be able to respond to any security situation. In this regard, one participant responded thus:

...weaponry of the World War II cannot be used in the modern world...the government has not given much effort in terms of funding security agencies adequately to ensure that they are current in terms of modern equipment...the government need to sufficiently fund the NDF.

Another participant agrees that there is need to adequately fund the NDF and other security agencies. But the respondent also noted that:

...there is a general economic decline in Namibia at the moment and all sectors of government including police have to manage with inadequate funding ...for issues like terrorism we as a country have not yet faced a real and present threat we are only able to allocate bare minimum resources and rely more on regional bodies...

4.9 Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination

Cooperation and coordination of activities among various security agencies are necessary to the fight against international terrorism. It is a critical part of a country grand strategy as well as an indication of a high level of preparedness to combat any form of security threat. This fact is confirmed by several scholars in the literature. For example, Iroanya (2018) argues that cooperation and coordination of activities among different security agencies nationally and regionally minimizes the risk of Intelligence failure and enhances proactive response to terror threats; whereas a lack of cooperation and coordination of activities among security agencies maximises the risk of intelligence failure and reactive response to terror threats.

Questions regarding the level of cooperation in the form of Intelligence sharing and coordination of activities in terms of joint operations among Namibian security agencies were posed to participants in this study. In response to these questions, it became evident that discrepancies exist in cooperation, collaboration, and coordination among security sector agencies in Namibia. This is because respondents were divided on whether there is cooperation and coordination of activities among various security agencies in the country. On one hand some responded that “actors in the security sector are very effective and their activities are professionally coordinated”. It was also revealed that there are coordination mechanisms between Namibia security agencies in the area of profiling of suspects, sharing of intelligence relating to combating of terrorism and other relevant information nationally and internationally. Thus, the respondent further observed:

The same coordination we use in dealing with other crimes is the same we use in counter terrorism but probably the challenge will be a lack of practical experience in dealing with the challenge but as for coordination there is very good coordination.

Another respondent however, contradicted this view on effective cooperation and coordination of activities among security agencies in Namibia. According to the respondent, nationally, Namibia does not have a forum where responsible actors converge and jointly discuss issues relating to combating of terrorism. The respondent further asserts that:

...unlike in SA whereby there is an appointed person responsible for such kind of joint effort... Namibia security sector personnel from the Police, Defence, NCIS and Immigration only meet at SADC Joint Commission... however; nationally there is no such platform apart from the Joint intelligence Committee (JIC). In JIC only general security issues are discussed since the JIC was not created to deal with specific issues ...

Other respondents confirm the existence of JIC, but insisted that it is a body where only chiefs of security and Cabinet Committee on Defence, Security, International Relations and cabinet ministers sit. It is therefore a top-down coordination approach. On the basis of this, another respondent reasoned that:

At the ground level Namibia does not have coordination mechanisms among the operatives...for example, if we are told that today there is an aeroplane that has been hijacked at Hosea Kutako airport, the whole

country will panic...reason being that first and foremost the Head of State will look for the NDF and the police will claim it is their responsibility.

The question is, who is going to start and how to start...

The absence of a coordinating forum for security operatives indicates that the country's security sector structures are not adequately linked together. A frequent reference to regional level security architecture shows that Namibia relies more on cooperative security arrangements and considers such collective security thinking as the best approach to provide national security. Thus, at the regional level there are various committees and subcommittees established through Joint Commissions with neighbouring countries with the sole purpose of deliberating and sharing information relating to defence and security in the region including issues of terrorism and cross boarder crimes. This explains why NAMPOL is a member of the international Police organization or INTERPOL and other regional structures such as SARPCCO. The country is also a signatory to several international conventions in areas of peace and security, and has engaged in multi-lateral and bi-lateral relationships with other countries for defence and security purposes.

There is a need for mechanisms, protocols, and means or coordinating activities of operatives nationally. The absence of this will support the assertion that coordination among the security actors remains a grey area that needs to be understood and covered. Cooperation and coordination as already highlighted are critical to the combating of international terrorism as experience from other countries have shown.

4.10 Process of Intelligence at Joint Intelligence Centre

It was critical to ascertain from respondents how they thought the Namibian state can be better prepared to confront the problem of international terrorism. Identifying challenges is important, but solving those challenges should be considered as of utmost importance. In this regard, respondents proposed that there should be a proper coordination mechanism among security actors by operating together.

Intelligence gathering they argued is key to combating international terrorism. The Joint Intelligence Centre can be made more effective if information is acquired, processed or analysed, developed into Intelligence and disseminated timely among relevant agencies and operatives. Information processing requires the involvement of all actors. A respondent opined that cooperation and coordination of activities at the Joint Intelligence Centre could be made effective through:

...coordination mechanism in case of terror event, when something happens, who is to first to respond and when the first actor is responding, which security agency should be the next to carry our action and what...where should the next actor be, etc., ...these are things that are lacking in terms of coordination...therefore in the absence of this Namibia cannot effectively combat the threat of terrorism...

This suggestion appears to contradict the suggestion made by some respondents and that there is effective cooperation and coordination among the country's security agencies. Majority of the respondents accepted that Namibia does not need to introduce anything new in its counter-terrorism strategy. Instead they were of the opinion that there is a

need to keep on improving measures that are already in existence from time to time. Namibia does not have counter-terrorism strategy, even though it does not have experience in fighting terrorism. Since terrorists are operational and terrorism is dynamic there is the need to be proactive than reactive in responding to the threat of terrorism.

Despite Namibia's relative insularity from international terrorist attack, respondents in this study expressed the view that country's security forces need to be prepared at all times to fight against possible terrorist attacks. According to a participant:

...we need to sit down and understand the world around us...we must anticipate that though we are not a target today, we can be a target in the future...due to the present situation a ready-made strategy cannot be in place...we should realize that the world is in danger of terrorism and Namibia is not an exemption... There is need for Namibia to have a National Security Grand Strategy as a tool to fight terrorism (NGST)...

This suggestion was echoed by another respondent who enthused that security awareness needs to be created around issues of international terrorism. Attacks are physical manifestation of terrorism. However, before any attack can occur, a lot of planning and organization go into it. In this regard, the territory of a country can be used for planning, training, recruitment and indoctrination. Therefore, it is important to conduct sensitization nationally, in order to make people aware of other aspects of terrorism which do not necessarily involve violence. The security mechanisms should be strengthened by empowering security agencies and forces to be able to fight terrorism

through providing adequate resources and training on counterterrorism. Some respondents were also of the view that even the design of public building and shopping malls should take into consideration possible terror attacks in creating safety measures. A respondent stated that “Namibia has some shopping malls with only one access, making it difficult even for security officials to rescue people in the event of terror attack”.

The need to establish a coordination centre, in the event of terrorist attack was equally emphasized by another respondent. According to the central coordination centre needs to be established. This can be called:

National Operation Centre (NOC), where security operatives from different security organizations will sit, analyse security issues and in case something detected, all actors are represented and immediately they can inform the police makers to be on standby, vigilant and take corrective actions.

The respondent further proposed for the government to have a legal framework which can be called national security strategy, formulated from national security act. The national security strategy will identify and clearly spell out issues of coordination and responsibilities. The respondent, in support of the proposition, noted that, at the moment Namibia has a National Security Commission (NSC) and according to the constitution the role of NSC is to advise the President on the employment of the Chief of Defence Force, Chief of the Police, Chief of the Correctional Services and the other one, is only

to sit when deploying personnel. On the basis of the NSC, the respondent rhetorically asked:

...is this security; is that all about our national security?" For effective security there is a need to develop national security strategies within a particular period that either runs for 5 years or 10 years or regularly reviewed...

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter analysed data collected through semi-structure, in-depth interviews with a sample population drawn mainly from the security sector and the academia. The semi-structured interview was designed to determine the preparedness of Namibia to counter-international terrorism and the strategies for doing that. Preparedness and adoption of specific strategies entail a good understanding of terrorism- in terms of its nature and kind of threat it poses to the Namibian state. Such understanding could only be determined through threat perception by the country's political and security leadership. It was clear from the responses that the respondents knew and precisely understood Namibia's security situation, the country's preparedness, strategies for combating threats such as international terrorism, challenges confronting the country's security agencies and how they can be overcome. One of such suggestions made in the course of the interview were the need to develop a national security strategy and the creation of Intelligence Coordination Centre to harmonise collection, analyses, and distribution of intelligence among security agencies. Such as centre can be headed by national security

and intelligence coordinator who will oversee and coordinate intelligence sharing among national stakeholders.

What these suggestions show is that much as Namibian has not experienced physical terrorist attacks like some African countries, there is still need for the country to be adequately prepared for such eventuality. The need for pro-activeness instead of reactiveness came up again and again in the course of the interview. When one looks at terrorist attacks that have occurred in other parts of the world one realizes that one thing that works in favour of the terrorists is element of surprise and complacency on the part of security agencies. One of the ways to forestall this danger is to improve training in all aspects of intelligence gathering and exchanges as well as collaboration with international partners and countries whose counter-terrorism strategies are well developed.

In the next chapter, will focus on summary of the chapters; evaluation of the research questions, conclusion and broad recommendations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This study has assessed Namibia's counter terrorism preparedness and strategies. The study approach was qualitative and relied on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with information rich sample population of 12 to gather and analyse data on Namibia's preparedness, and strategies to tackle international terrorism as well as the challenges confronting the country's security sector in this regard. International terrorism is a global issue with serious existential threat to all countries. While some countries in the African region such as Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Chad, Cameroon, Algeria, Mozambique, to mention a few, have continued to suffer terrorist attacks of immense proportions, others such as Namibia have generally appeared insulated from international terrorist attacks. In this regard, this study has argued that the absence of violent manifestations of international terrorism does not imply the absence of non-violence forms of international terrorism in these countries. Being found in a region where international terrorists operate makes countries such as Namibia vulnerable to international terrorism.

Therefore, as the issue of international terrorism is not going away anytime soon, countries which appear insulated currently, need to adequately prepare for any eventuality. Part of this preparation involves improvement of legislation, policy frameworks, training, cooperation, coordination, monitoring and regulatory mechanisms governing the security sector of countries such as Namibia. Broadly, the study aimed at making

thorough assessment of Namibia's preparedness to combat all forms of international terrorism in its territory as well as the sub-region of SADC. This chapter provides a summary of previous chapters, an evaluation of findings in order to determine the extent to which research questions posed in the introductory chapter were answered. A general conclusion and broad recommendations on the way forward are also provided.

5.2 Summary of Chapters

Chapter one provided a background to this study. Among the issues explored in the background was the meaning of terrorism in the global, regional and sub-regional context. Terrorism was shown as a global threat to all regions and countries. Namibia was also shown as vulnerable to the threat due to increasing incidences of terrorism in several SADC countries. It was pointed out that this study aimed to examine the counter-terrorism capability of the Namibian state. The chapter further discussed the statement of the problem. It used incidences of terrorism in neighbouring countries as well as reported cases of the involvement of Namibian nationals in terror groups such as ISIS to establish the necessity to further study the phenomenon and the extent to which the Namibian state was prepared to counter it. The study as designed was therefore proactive. The problem statement was used to construct research questions and to demonstrate the significance and limitations of the study.

Chapter two of the study focused on literature review. In the review, different conceptualisation of terrorism was examined in order to establish a foundation for the analysis of Namibia's preparedness to combat the global phenomenon. The OAU's definition of terrorism was examined and adopted for the study for two main reasons.

Firstly, Namibia is a member of the AU and as such accepts and is a signatory to its conventions and protocols. Secondly, as a state that engaged in armed liberation struggle, provisions of Article 3 of the Convention directly relates to Namibian experience (freedom fighters). The chapter also examine the historicity of terrorism in the context of Africa. It was noted that there had been a shift from Cold war terrorism to what is called 'new terrorism' in the contemporary world. During the Cold war epoch, terrorism, in the African context was mostly underpinned by liberation struggle. However, in the post-Cold war, terrorism in Africa became largely identified with radical Islamism intent on establishing Islamic states.

The Literature review indicated that Africa was characterised by more challenges in combating terrorism and equally brought several causes of international terrorism. Among the identified causes of terrorism were violation of international laws, political exclusion and marginalization. With respect to counter terrorism preparedness of regions and national governments, it was clear from the literature that such efforts should start with the enactment of counter terrorism legislation; ratification of international counter terrorism legal instruments, implementation of cooperation and coordination agreements with partner institutions nationally, regionally and globally. To combat terrorism it was shown that respect to the rule of law, employment of dialogue and limited use of forces are critical factors for consideration.

Chapter three discussed the research methodology followed in the study. The study followed the qualitative research methodology. The rationale behind the employment of qualitative methodology was justified because the study sought to understand the preparedness of Namibia to counter-international terrorism as well as its counter-

terrorism strategies and challenges being faced. Since qualitative research methodology entails several data gathering methods, it was necessary to specify the exact data gathering tool used in the study. The study employed semi-structured, in-depth interviews as the primary data gathering tool. This method was complemented by content analysis of relevant secondary documents. With respect to data analysis, the researcher combined a number of strategies enunciated by several scholars such as Creswell (2012) and Cresswell (2013) in order to achieve rigour in the study. Ethical issues observed in the study were highlighted and discussed. Among these were informed consent, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. These were carefully observed in four stages, namely, at the beginning of the study, at data collecting stage, and at the reporting stage.

Chapter four analysed data collected through semi-structure, in-depth interviews with a sample population drawn mainly from the security sector and the academia. The semi-structured interview was designed to determine the preparedness of Namibia to counter-international terrorism and the strategies for doing that. Preparedness and adoption of specific strategies entail a good understanding of terrorism- in terms of its nature and kind of threat it poses to the Namibian state. Such understanding could only be determined through threat perception by the country's political and security leadership. It was clear from the responses that the respondents knew and precisely understood Namibia's security situation, the country's preparedness, strategies for combating threats such as international terrorism, challenges confronting the country's security agencies and how they can be overcome. One of such suggestions made in the course of the interview were the need to develop a national security strategy and the creation of

Intelligence Coordination Centre to harmonise collection, analyses, and distribution of intelligence among security agencies. Such as centre can be headed by national security and intelligence coordinator who will oversee and coordinate intelligence sharing among national stakeholders.

5.3 Evaluating Questions Formulated in the Study

Four research questions were formulated in chapter one of this study. It is therefore necessary in the following sub-sections to evaluate these based on the findings of the study. The research questions are restated as follows:

- a. To what extent is Namibia susceptible to international terrorism?
- b. What counter terrorism strategies exist within Namibia's laws to deal with terrorist threats?
- c. What challenges are encountered by Namibian law enforcement and security agencies in combating terrorism?
- d. What recommendations are necessary to enhance the country's counter-terrorism preparedness?

5.3.1 Namibia's Susceptible to International Terrorism

Question 1: To what extent is Namibia susceptible to international terrorism?

Namibia does not have cases of violent international terrorism. The only cases that respondents recalled were during the secession attempt of the Caprivi region (Zambezi Region) in August 1999. Findings of the study show that the Namibian state acknowledges existential threat of international terrorism. Acknowledgement of

international terrorism is reflected in the acceptance of the definition of terrorism, signatory of international conventions such as the Algiers Convention of 1999; and the adoption of anti-terrorism legislation- the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities (Act, No. 4 of 2014). This national legislation gives “effect to the international conventions, Security Council Resolutions, instruments and best practices concerning measures to combat terrorist and proliferation activities”. Furthermore, in 2014 there was a workshop on terrorism which aimed to sensitize the Namibian public on the dangers posed by international terrorism confirms. These concrete actions indicate the acknowledgement of Namibia’s vulnerability to international terrorism. Acknowledgement of a problem is a critical first step towards solving the problem. Contrary to views of insulation from international terrorism as a result of lack of violent manifestation of the phenomenon, Namibia remains susceptible to international terrorism as a result of being a member of the international community and a member of the SADC region in particular, where some member states are experiencing terrorist attacks which often result in massive destruction and disruption of socio-economic activities in those countries.

Namibia’s susceptibility to international terrorism is amplified by its geographical proximity to countries in the SADC region where international terrorism is present. As shown in the study there have been reported incidents of international terrorist attacks in South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania. The borders of Namibia were found to be poorly protected which encourages cross-border crimes and free movement of people possibly including international terrorists. A Namibian national had reportedly been killed in ISIS held areas in Syria, indicating a possible existence of sleeper terrorist

cells in the country and possible recruitment online. Thus, exposure to the Internet and a weak cyber security further amplifies Namibia's vulnerability to international terrorism. Terrorists are highly motivated individuals who exploit weaknesses in the security architecture of countries. Through their extensive network of willing suicide bombers, for example, they can attack any country in any region of the world.

Furthermore, there is a general agreement among scholars that modern terrorism is a multifaceted and ever-changing phenomenon which poses a threat to a state at different levels. The lack of violent actions such as arson, detonation of bombs, kidnapping and hijacking, hostage taking, shooting, etc, does not imply the absence of other aspects of terrorism in the country. Thus, news about a Namibian who left to study abroad but ended up being killed as an ISIS fighter is an indication of recruitment, and indoctrination either by means of the Internet or existence of sleeper cell in the country. Based on these findings, it can be reasonably concluded that even though no violent manifestation of terrorism so far in Namibia, the country is to a large extent susceptible to more subtle forms of international terrorism, which in the future might transform into violence forms. This is in line with the conclusion of Imre, et al (2009) who argued that it is not only those who detonate explosive that are culpable. All those who facilitate, encourage, aid, promote or finance terrorist violence are also liable. Therefore, the first research question relating to the extent of Namibia's susceptibility to terrorism is reasonably answered.

5.3.2 Namibia's Preparedness to Combat Terrorism

Question 2: What counter terrorism strategies exist within Namibia's laws to deal with terrorist threats?

Preparedness in the context of this study simply means the state of readiness for any terrorist eventuality in Namibia. It involves at a minimum issues such as awareness of the threat of terrorism, enactment of national anti-terrorism legislation; adequate training in intelligence gathering with state-of-the-art technologies; development of a national grand strategy and combat readiness of the security forces. Other requirements include sufficient funding of security forces; coordination and cooperation of security agencies on information sharing and partnership with regional bodies and organisations dealing with international terrorism. Findings from the study suggest that although Namibian leadership is aware of the dangers posed by international terrorism, it does not seriously consider Namibia to be in danger of terrorist attack. This is because Namibia has not experienced violent terrorist attacks such as suicide bombing, shooting, kidnapping, and killings like some African countries.

In terms of measuring preparedness through enactment of national legislation to give effect of existing international legal instruments, Namibia adopted a national anti-terrorism legislation in 2014. This is an indication of awareness of the threat of international terrorism and an agreement to join forces with the rest of the world to combat it. However, adopting anti-terrorism legislation is one thing and effectively implementing the legislation is another. From data analysis, it emerged that some of the respondents were not aware of the existence of Namibia's anti-terrorism legislation. This can be explained from two perspectives. Firstly, it implies that the law has mostly been

dormant since its enactment in 2014. Secondly, it also partly implies that the Namibian security forces may be focusing more attention on violent aspects of terrorism and not on more subtle aspects of the phenomenon such as recruitment, and indoctrination through for example, the Internet. Heavy reliance on information sharing through INTERPOL, Continental Early Warning Centres (CEWS), Regional Early Warning System (REWS) and National Early Warning Centre is a good strategy. However, such an effort needs to be complemented by national grand security strategy as intelligence failure does occur and false information can be easily shared among regional agencies.

Development of a national grand security strategy ensures pro-activeness instead of reactiveness in response to security challenges such as terror attacks. Terrorists employ surprise attack strategy as a result of poor preparedness on the part of security agencies of target countries. One of the ways to forestall this danger is to improve training in all aspects of intelligence gathering and exchanges nationally and in collaboration with international partners and countries whose counter-terrorism strategies are well developed. Weakness is noticed in the area of training. Again, combating of terrorism involves effective cooperation and coordination of efforts among national security agencies- DI and NAMPOL, specifically. Findings from this study indicate that there is poor coordination of intelligence sharing among the security forces in the country. It was also found that the country is lacking on modern techniques, training and technologies to gather intelligence necessary for fighting terrorism.

While Namibia appears to be anticipating violent manifestations of international terrorism, other more subtle, forms of international terrorism such as financing of terror activities; membership recruitment, indoctrination, and establishment of sleeper cells

may be occurring. The killing of suspected Namibian ISIS fighter supposed to be studying abroad demonstrates the possibility of these activities. Furthermore, the presence of Namibian nationals in conflict zones as mercenary fighters equally indicates that other forms of international terrorism may be taking place in the country.

Thus, based on the existence of anti-terrorism legislation, constitutional provision on defence; cooperation with SADC countries in terms of information sharing, it can be concluded that Namibian does have a strategy which could be used to combat international terrorism. But these strategies are not well integrated into a coherent whole. Thus, as previously alluded to, the existence of a strategy does not necessarily imply sufficient readiness to combat terrorism. For such a strategy to be significant it needs to be integrated into a Grand National Strategy and effectively implemented. The belief that Namibian does not face immediate threat of international terrorism; and poor enforcement of existing national anti-terrorism legislation, among others; reasonably leads to the conclusion that Namibia is not sufficiently prepared to combat international terrorism.

5.3.3 Challenges in Combating Terrorism

Question 3: What challenges are encountered by Namibian law enforcement and security agencies in combating terrorism?

International terrorism is a complex global phenomenon as shown in the study. From the review of literature, no country can on its own be able to effectively combat it. Hence, countries are enjoined by international conventions, regional and national legislation to combine forces in various forms such as in intelligence sharing in the effort to combat

terrorism. Analysis of data collected through in-depth-interviews for this study showed that numerous challenges confront countries such as Namibia to combat international terrorism. Identified challenges are highlighted and discussed subsequently.

The study revealed that Namibia aligns its counter-terrorism strategies with those of the UN, AU and sub-regional body the SADC. Its anti-terrorism legislation, as previously noted, gives effect to the UN Conventions and Resolutions relating to terrorism. Beside specific anti-terrorism legislation, the country has also other pieces of legislation which can be used to prosecute various forms of terrorism. For example, following the Caprivi secession attempt in 1998, the country was faced with legislative quagmire on how to deal with the secessionists for using terror tactics in advancing their course. Due to lack of legislative clause concerning terrorism in the Namibia Constitution it was not possible to charge the culprits under terrorist act. Instead the 1998 secessionists are being prosecuted under Martial Law, as provided for in Chapter 4 of the Namibian Constitution. Prosecution of terrorism in Namibia can be equally be dealt with through the Defence Act (Act No.1 of 2002 for NDF); the Police Act (Act No. 19 of 1990 for NAMPOL); and the NCIS Act, (Act No.10 of 1997).

Other pieces of legislation include the Financial Intelligence Act (Act No. 13 of 2012) and Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act (Act No. 4 of 2014). In many cases although the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act (National anti-terrorism legislation) criminalizes the sponsorship or funding of terrorist activities, it has hardly been applied in practice, possibly because it is designed to deal with violent manifestations of terrorism. Against this background, the Financial Intelligence Act is used to prosecute criminal activities

such as money-laundering. Experience from countries where terrorist activities are taking place such as Somalia and Nigeria, shows that money laundering is a strategy used by terrorists to fund international terrorism. Thus, prosecuting culprits under Financial Intelligence Act may help terrorists escape adequate justice. This therefore calls for harmonization of this legislation into one legal instrument and using only the anti-terrorism legislation to deal with issues of money laundering. This is what is implied by harmonisation of provisions of this legislation. In another sense, different legal system makes it difficult to keep track of Namibians who reside outside the country. This explains why some have been reported to be found in ISIS territories where they were not supposed to be found.

Poor coordination of activities among relevant Namibian security agencies was also discovered in the course of the study. While it was clear from data analysis that Namibia aligns its national anti-terrorism strategies with those of the international community, it was revealed that poor coordination and cooperation in the terms of intelligence sharing is a serious challenge to Namibia's effort to combat terrorism. It emerged that Namibia does not have a national counter – terrorism grand strategy which can effectively coordinate activities of relevant security agencies responsible for fighting international terrorism. The importance of a national security strategy cannot be overemphasized. It is critical to safety and security of any state. The Namibia state exists in an anarchic international environment where states seek to achieve their national interests at the expense of one another and at the same time need greater cooperation among themselves in both military and non-military spheres. Therefore, the development of an effective

and functional national security strategy informed by national interests and existential threats to Namibia is critical. Its absence is a clearly noticeable finding of this study.

The problem of globalization does also have a direct bearing on efforts to combat international terrorism in the context of Namibia. Globalisation has brought about increased interconnectedness and interdependence among countries of the world. The world is now described as a global village as a result of globalization. Though globalization has its merits, it does also have its demerits. Increased migration into countries results into increase in populations and increase in social problems such as unemployment and poor service provision. Free movement of people does not only lead to high number of migrants from other countries to Namibia and similarly, but unhindered movement of potential terrorists as well. One of the al-Qaida terrorists who bombed US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 crossed undetected to South Africa and lived in the country for two years before he was arrested.

As part of globalization, the Internet and its attendant consequence of unhindered social media interactions have helped the growing trend of the foreign nationals, including Namibians joining terrorist organisations. Thus, in countries such as South Africa terror group members have been found to obtain South Africa passports. This may also be happening in Namibia due to the presence in the country of people from difference regions of the world including those where terrorism is happening. Furthermore, it has also be found that Namibians are joining foreign forces. By law Namibian are not allowed by law to serve as mercenaries. But there are reported cases of Namibians serving as mercenaries in conflict places such as Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan and. Mercenaries can pose a danger to the Namibian state in different ways. Firstly, they may become

domestic insurgents in the future. They can help in training terrorists and may turn into terrorists themselves.

Other challenges identified in the study and which is also related to the problem of globalization is porous border and possible corruption among border agents. The study found that patrol and control mechanisms at Namibian ports of entry are sometimes relaxed. The border areas are stretched and most are not fenced.

Insufficient training of law enforcement agencies has also been identified as a major problem confronting Namibia. The study found that some Namibian intelligence operatives lack adequate training and certain expertise in information gathering. Due to this challenge, the information being collected are not always related to security issues. The consequence of this challenge is that leaders may be misled into making uninformed decision that may compromise Namibia's national security. Beside regular or traditional military, intelligence and policing training; training in the use of sophisticated modern technologies are lacking among the security agencies. The world is driven by technology and technology evolves daily. Terrorists take advantage of new technologies and devise means to adapt to them by changing their tactics or *modus operandi*. Training in the use of modern technologies is critical to detecting suspicious activities and monitoring potential terrorists.

Poor training and lack of knowledge on the use of modern technologies may be related to the problem of funding of the security forces. Although serious efforts are being made to fund the security sector in Namibia, the budgetary allocations to security institutions such as NAMPOL, NDF and others each financial year are never sufficient as discussed in chapter 4 of the study. No specific fund is devoted to fighting terrorism. The

phenomenon is fought using general budgets of the security forces or as part of the fight against crime. This indicates low level of seriousness attached to the problem of terrorism by the Namibian state.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Namibia is faced with serious challenges in the fight against international terrorism. Therefore, the question “what challenges are encountered by Namibian law enforcement and security agencies in combating terrorism?” has been sufficiently answered.

5.3.4 Propositions for Improvement

Question 4: What recommendations are necessary to enhance the country’s counter-terrorism preparedness?

One important objective of this study is to make broad recommendations on how to improve Namibia’s preparedness in the fight against international terrorism. It emerged from the study that Namibia like countries in the SADC region are faced with serious challenge of how to combat terrorism. Terrorism pose existential threat to all countries in the region. Several suggestions were made in response to questions targeted at finding how and means of improving Namibia’s preparedness to combat international terrorism.

Firstly, it was revealed that there should be a full acknowledgement of the danger pose to the Namibian state by international terrorism. Although Namibia’s political leadership acknowledge possible threat of terrorism, the general consensus appears to be that the country is not in immediate threat of international terrorism because no violent terror incident has happened in the country. This conclusion is erroneous as the absence of violent manifestation of terrorism does not suggest the absence of other forms of the

phenomenon. Reported cases of Namibians found in ISIS controlled territories gives credence to the fact that based on the definition of terrorism by the UN, OAU, and other regional organisations, sponsorship, recruitment, harbouring, indoctrination, and facilitation of movement of terrorists may be happening in Namibia. The exposition of the country to the Internet amplifies its vulnerability to international terrorism, thus, the Namibian state should acknowledge this reality and act accordingly.

Secondly, while acknowledging the existence of terrorism is important, effective harmonization and implementation of pieces of legislation relating to terrorism and other threats is equally necessary. Effective implementation and harmonization of laws are critical to the fight against any social phenomenon. Attention should be focused on more subtle non-violent aspects of the phenomenon than on its violent manifestation. The current strategy of focussing on violent aspects of the phenomenon appears to suggest that terrorists are welcome to live and operate from Namibia, provided they do not carry out violent activities in the country.

Thirdly, the Namibian state exists in an anarchic and ever changing global system where trainings that were useful in the past may not be useful in the present; technologies that were useful in gathering information in the yesterday may have become obsolete today. Therefore, updating of the training of intelligence operatives and military personnel in the use of modern technologies and irregular warfare strategies is imperative to the fight against terrorism.

Fourthly, the fight against international terrorism requires effective cooperation and coordination of the activities of security agencies both at the national level and at the

international level. Ineffective cooperation and coordination at national level will result in ineffective cooperation and coordination at international level. Thus, while cooperation and coordination of activities to combat terrorism should be highly encouraged at the international level, it is also imperative that cooperation and coordination of activities among local security agencies be strengthened. One should not be done at the expense of the other.

Fifthly, improvement in the funding of the security agencies to such an extent that special funds can be set aside or devoted for intelligence, surveillance and monitoring of suspected members of terrorist organisations living in Namibia is critical. Training should involve identification of indicators for identifying or profiling terrorists or potential terrorists.

The sixth recommendation would be for Namibia to develop a national security grand strategy and to incorporate training for terrorism in regular military training. A national security grand strategy will facilitate effective cooperation and coordination of information sharing among security agencies

Based on the broad recommendations made, it can be concluded that the fourth research question regarding possible ways to improve Namibia's preparedness to combat terrorism is carefully answered.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, summaries of the chapters were provided as well as the evaluation or answering of the research questions as posed. The central conclusion is that Namibia is not yet sufficiently prepared to combat international terrorism. While it can be argued that the country has not yet experienced violent manifestations of terrorism such as arson, detonation of bombs, kidnapping and hijacking, and hostage taking, other forms of terrorism may be happening in the country. The reasons for this conclusion include the broad definition of the phenomenon as well as reported case of Namibian who left to study abroad but ended up being killed as an ISIS fighter. Similarly, Namibia shares land borders with countries such as South Africa where sleeper cells exist and where recruitment and indoctrination by means of the Internet are taking place. Putting into practice some of the measures recommended would be critical in the fight against international terrorism.

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Appendices

Appendix one: Permission Letter Request

FACULTY OF SCIENCE: SCHOOL OF MILITARY SCIENCE

Dr Vincent M. Mwangi: Senior Lecturer/Associate Dean

University of Namibia, Private Bag 13301, Windhoek, Namibia

3401 Mandu, mc Ncomufayo Avenue, Pioneerspark

☎ +264 61 206 4843; Fax: +264 61 206 3791; ✉-mail: vmwangi@unam.na; URL: <http://www.unam.edu.na>



TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

26 October 2017

This letter serves to confirm that **Immanuel K. Shivute (Student No: 200003976)** is a final year candidate for the Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies (MASSS), Faculty of Science, School of Military Science. In this regard the student is required to conduct a research project as part of the requirement to complete the Master's program successfully. The topic of the thesis is **An Assessment of Namibia's Counter Terrorism Preparedness and Strategies.**

Therefore, the University of Namibia is requesting your good offices to grant the student all the necessary assistance for him to obtain information required to write his theses. The research findings will be used for the masters study purpose only and the participant opinions/views will be kept confidential.

Thank you for the support

DR.V.M.MWANGE
ASSOCIATE DEAN: SCHOOL OF MILITARY SCIENCE



Appendix Two: Approval letter from the Ministry



REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Tel: (+26461) 2049111
Fax: (+26461) 232518 / 220523

Private Bag 13307
WINDHOEK

Enquiries:

Our Ref: Your Ref:

27 November 2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IRO MR IMMANUEL K SHIVUTE

Mr Immanuel K Shivute is doing his final year towards a Master Degree in Security and Strategic Studies with the University of Namibia. As part of the fulfilment requirements for this programme, he is required to conduct an academic research on the topic "*An assessment of Namibia's counter terrorism preparedness and strategies*". The Ministry of Defence is one of the target institutions for his research.

This serves therefore to inform that Mr Immanuel Shivute has been duly authorised to interview the staff of the Ministry of Defence on his research topic. Please take note that the topic is relevant to the mandate of the MOD and may contribute to Body of Knowledge required for the improvement of national strategies on counter terrorism.

Please render him the necessary assistance.

Handwritten signature of R Adm Peter H Vilho.

R Adm Peter H Vilho
PERMANENT SECRETARY




All official Correspondence must be addressed to the Permanent Secretary

Appendix Three: Interview Questions


- a) What perceived as terrorist threats in Namibia?
- b) What proactive measures that Namibia's law enforcement and security agencies employ to deal with terrorist threats? In short how well Namibia is prepared to deal with terrorism?
- c) Dealing with terrorism is believed to be hard task to accomplish. What challenges do you see Namibia's law enforcements and security agencies faced with in combating terrorism?
- d) Do you see the Government of the Republic of Namibia making adequate investment towards the funding of law enforcement and security agencies to ensure public safety and security?
- e) What laws are there in Namibia regulating law enforcement and security agencies in combating terrorism?
- f) How effective is the coordination of matters relating to terrorism among security actors/ stakeholders?
- g) What do you suggest as the best practices or strategies that Namibia need in combating terrorism?

Appendix four: The Top 50 Countries Ranked by Global Terrorism Index for 2017




Source: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), (2018, p.8)

**Appendix Five: Number of Fatalities due to Terrorist Attack Worldwide between
2006-2017**




Source: National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; US Department of State (2017; p.6)

Appendix Six: Terrorist Attacks by Region 2014



Source: IEP (2018, p.37)

Appendix Seven: Number of Terrorists Attacks 2017



Source: Source: National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; US Department of Homeland Security (2017, p.6)

CHAPTER V

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Source: Charter of United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice

(1945, p.7)

Appendix Nine: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, and acts of aggression

CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO
THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE,
AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39


The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Source: Charter of United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice

(1945, p.9)

Appendix 10: Alignment of Counter - Terrorism Strategies and Cooperation in

Africa



Source: Pienaar (2007, p.93)