



**AN INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AT
THE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE MEDICAL AID SCHEME IN
KHOMAS REGION NAMIBIA**

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DEDICATION

This effort honours my God, my late parents, my late sister, and my family. I am dedicating it to them because they have supported me while working on this project.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CACG - Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance Guidelines

CEO – Chief Executive Officer

NAD – Namibian Dollar

OECD - Organization for Economic Development

PSEMAS - Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme

ROA – Return on Assets

ROE – Return on Equity

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Individuals who pay a month-to-month commitment for medical help receive monetary coverage for clinical expenditures. These payments are paid to a pool of insured medical aid scheme plans. These plans are built on a non-profit business concept. Hospitalization, therapies, and other medical costs are covered by medical insurance, the medical aid plan's requirements, and the member's medical aid plan type. These guidelines ensure that individuals are paying attention.

Knowing how medical aids function is an important consideration when choosing one. Medical assistance programs are essentially non-benefit organizations in which members contribute and get funds to cover various clinical charges. This monthly payment is referred to as a premium or commitment, and the plan controls it.

You can claim for in-emergency clinic care, everyday charges like GP visits, dental treatment, or prescription, as well as evaluating benefits for specific illnesses, depending on your medical aid plan.

Most medical aids plots, as a rule, have their own organisation of medical clinics and other medical care suppliers, so it is essential to see where those organisations fall inside your space of the home (Total Risk Administrators, 2020).

1.2. PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEE MEDICAL AID SCHEME (PSEMAS) AS A MEDICAL AID SCHEME

“PSEMAS” refers to the Public Service Employees’ Medical Aid Scheme established in terms of the applicable regulations to the Public Service Act, 1995 (Act 15 of 1995); Medical Aid Scheme for the Government Service Extension Act 13 of 1982 as amended by Medical Scheme for Members of the National Assembly, Judges and other Office-bearers Act 23 of 1990 Public Service Act 13 of 1995 Medical Aid Funds Act 23 of 1995 Act to extend membership of the medical aid scheme established for the government service under the Government Service Act, 1980. The members and former members of the certain executive and legislative authorities, to judges and former judges of the Supreme Court of South-West Africa, and to their widows; to amend the Medical Schemes Act, 1967, to exclude the application of the provisions thereof to the said medical aid scheme; to amend the Government Service Act, 1980, to extend the power to prescribe membership of the said medical aid scheme: and to provide for incidental matters”

A medical aid scheme is a program that coordinates and distributes the most appropriate and practical treatment from the most appropriate source. Management medical care is a framework/structure for financing and arranging medical care that deals with the costs, use, and quality (or potentially result) of the help supplied to ensure cost-effectiveness and superior quality. The primary purpose of management medical services is to create a long-term plan that provides high-quality care at a low cost. (NAMFISA, 2017)

The medical aid framework establishes a structure for authorized agreements between the Service of Account, PSEMAS's custodian, and medical service providers. The character of administration is constantly scrutinized, and tactics have been studied to determine how clients of administrations and professional organizations behave (MOF, n.d.; PSEMAS, n.d.).

The Public Service Medical Aid Scheme (PSEMAS) is a part of all government officials' salary benefits, with the goals of (1) assisting staff members with medical expenses in particular; and (2) providing public servants with wellness and chronic illness management programs.

In Namibia, the media has poorly portrayed the public service system. Several papers have stated that the system is mismanaged (Brand, 2013). The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has stated a case of deception by registered PSEMAS members who utilize their medical aid cards for personal advantage (The Economist, 2018). According to Shifidi (2014), the Governance Council of Namibia has the mandate and ability to oversee and enforce corporate governance standards across all government enterprises. Corporate governance is concerned with strategic alternatives for an organization's growth and values in its best interests (Tricker, 2015).

Furthermore, according to the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme (2019) report, millions of dollars in taxpayer funds were lost due to a lack of appropriate governance in the fund's management. There are numerous cases of corruption involving government workers who were involved in the scheme's management. According to the evidence, the Public Service Employee Medical

Aid Scheme has lost millions of Namibian dollars due to corruption (Economist, 2018). As a result, the literature researched in this thesis revealed major flaws in corporate governance standards in the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme that needed to be investigated further. As a result, it is vital to investigate the origins and effects of corruption at PSEMAS and its impact.

1.3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme system has been negatively reflected in the media across Namibia. (Brand, 2013). Millions of Namibian Dollars have been misspent or have disappeared because of corruption in the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme. Taxpayers' money worth millions were lost due to the absence of proper governance (PSEMAS, 2019).

The escalating mismanaged amount of N\$900 million (Amukeshe, 2019) has the power to break Namibia's economy. To illustrate another example, two women were arrested and appeared in the Windhoek Magistrate's Court for defrauding the Public Service Employees Medical Aid Scheme (Shikongo, 2019). The public Service Employees Medical Aid Scheme accounts for one-fourth of Namibia's healthcare budget. The Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme individuals serve just 12.5 percent of the Namibian population. The government has increased workers' contributions from April 2019, but this does not alleviate the imbalance in funding (PER, 2019).

The Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme commitment instalment was a flat figure of N\$250 per worker free of pay until recently. Workers' commitments were increased in April 2019. A similar level sum converts into a

higher level of compensation for lower-paid workers than for more generously compensated staff (PER, 2019). A total of 84 specialists have been named and shamed for taking large sums of money through the public authority's clinical guide. The Ministry of Finance has established a common activity against certain suppliers and is mulling over hitting the supposed offenders with criminal accusations, it has revealed.

In October 2021, the Ministry of Finance's representative Tonateni Shidhudhu affirmed that scientific examinations were closed in 2018 (Shihepo, 2021). This data is contained in a yet-to-be-distributed scientific report, which investigated the issue of extortion and the maltreatment of the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme. The Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme presently has more than 240 000 recipients – 50 000 individuals less than in 2019. The fund has gotten more than N\$11.9 billion from the public authority since 2016. N\$2, 5 billion is planned for the 2021 monetary year (Shihepo, 2021). In 2017, media reports show that specialist organizations asserted over N\$120 million from the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme in under 11 days asserted N\$1, 2 million during that period (Shihepo, 2021).

A once-off N\$50 could procure one product worth N\$4 000 in seven days, it has been revealed. "You can only do this once a week per medical aid to avoid being caught," Namibia's top law enforcer told The Namibian. (Shihepo, 2021). Illegal transactions are mostly done when the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme [annual cycle] is about to end. Pharmacies advise clients to do this when their medical aids are about to be reloaded. The finance ministry said it did not know about the clinical guide individuals buying products not allowed by the plan. South Africa's Health Minister Aaron Ntumba has warned government

workers not to "manhandle" their health benefits because the state may not be in a position to provide them in the future (Shihepo, 2021).

The Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme is one of the spaces exposed to public help changes, with results to be reported to general society. "The point is to accomplish inner expense investment funds and elective methods of administration arrangement," Shiimi said (Shihepo, 2021). The Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme plan has been reviewed by a specialized advisory group. The study, which seeks to investigate corporate governance practices at the public service employee medical aid scheme, aims to determine the impact of corporate governance of the performance of the Public Service Employees Medical Aid Scheme in Khomas Region Namibia.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research question of the thesis study is: what is the impact of corporate governance on the performance the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme in Khomas Region Namibia? The secondary research questions of the study are as follows:

- i. What is the impact of the factors of corporate governance on the performance of the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme in Khomas Region Namibia?
- ii. What strategies could be recommended to improve corporate governance processes at the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme in Khomas Region Namibia?

1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study will create a progressive social impact in the management of firms by emphasizing the significance of corporate governance practices on PSEMAS performance. The findings and recommendations of this study could assist the managers in securing prudent utilization of organizational resources by comprehending the variables that influence the PSEMAS' long-term performances. Regulatory authorities could also benefit from the research findings by identifying the important mechanism of corporate governance that stimulate organizational effectiveness and Namibia's economic growth. Also, the study will contribute to the existing literature by examining the relationship between the variables under study.

Furthermore, the thesis study aimed to have raised awareness of corporate governance practices at PSEMAS and their impact on the national resources. It intends to create awareness of the challenges PSEMAS is facing. The study makes a substantial contribution to tackling the long-standing issue of poor governance at the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme, which is regarded to be a result of Namibia's inadequate governance. Finally, this study has scholarly significance because it adds to the corpus of knowledge on corporate governance.

The research could contribute to the knowledge and thorough understanding of corporate governance in the public sector. The study sheds light on and broadens the development and limitations that PSEMAS faces in promoting good corporate governance.

1.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The researcher had some difficulties in acquiring information. Firstly, corporate governance issues are complex and sensitive to address; participants were unwilling to share inside information. Secondly, some participants were also not willing to participate in the study. In cognizant that these factors could influence the availability of data and the sample size, the researcher approached each participant with sensitivity and respect to gain their input.

The other limitation was the inability of participants to isolate the worldviews that are inherent in themselves, which could lead to bias. PSEMAS has regional offices throughout the country. This study purposively focused on PSEMAS, which continuously encountered intramural problems making captions in newspapers.

Therefore, the articulation error could creep into the study. To mitigate some of the issues raised, there was a communication of ethical issues highlighting the rights of the participants to take part in the proposed study.

1.7. DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The issue of corporate governance in the management of organizations affected all categories of public enterprises in Namibia. However, the proposed study was limited only to PSEMAS. This study did not involve all the employees at PSEMAS who were in

service. This is because they played a critical role in the economic development of Namibia. This study did not include employees who left PSEMAS due to retirement or resignation. This research could thus not cover all the regional offices but focused only on the head office in the Khomas region, which is the largest. Furthermore, several elements are associated with governance in the industry; hence the study focused on corporate governance.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Various corporate governance ideas informed the literature review for the thesis topic. The study discussed the evolution of corporate governance worldwide in greater depth, using a theoretical framework that includes various theories as frames of reference, including Agency theory, Stakeholder theory, Stewardship Theory, Institutional theory, Resource-dependency Managerial hegemony and the Convergence theory. The study focused on the worldwide legal framework, focusing on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States of America, prominent in the corporate governance area, and the Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom, published in 1992. Various corporate governance ideas informed the literature review for the thesis topic. The study then explored the evolution of corporate governance worldwide in greater depth, utilising a theoretical framework that included Agency Theory, Stakeholder theory, Stewardship theory, and Institutional theory.

The study also looked at Namibian-related literature. The research focused on Namibia, examining the legislative framework that affects the country's corporate governance landscape. As modified, the Public Enterprises Governance Act 2 of 2006, the Companies Act 28 of 2004, the Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003, and the Public Procurement Act 15 of 2015 are only a few. The study also looked at corporate governance codes that have influenced corporate governance practices in Namibian public enterprises. The King Reports II, III, IV), and (NamCode and

I are among them). In addition, the study highlighted the importance of corporate governance in PSEMAS, with a focus on role clarity, ownership, management, CEO duality, and inverted governance. Because of the preliminary literature study, it was discovered that literature is scarce in corporate governance practices, notably in PSEMAS in Namibia. This revealed the research gap that the proposed study aims to fill.

Corporate governance has increasingly become a boardroom concept for market professionals and financial experts. It clarifies speculators before they choose to contribute to a specific organisation. This concept has evolved and contributes significantly to the viability of businesses.

The first section of the chapter is devoted to a survey of the literature on corporate governance and its impact on the public sector. This chapter is divided into relevant categories and subheadings that provide a thorough overview of organisational governance theory and its impact on administrative

It also includes the definition, evolution, and history of corporate governance and its application in many fields. It, too, considers the state of Namibia's governing institutions. Finally, this chapter concludes with a general overview of corporate governance.

2.2. DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The process of economically organising and controlling companies and institutions for the benefit of all stakeholders is known as corporate governance. All of an organisation's stakeholders benefit from good corporate governance.

The King Report (IoDSA, 2009) defines corporate administration as a framework concerned with maintaining the balance between economic and social objectives and between communal and individual ambitions. A sound, outstanding, and excellent corporate governance framework is required to ensure that the interests of firms, individuals, and society are closely aligned. This encourages and promotes transparency, the efficient use of resources, and accountability for the oversight of these sources.

Corporate governance is the procedures and mechanisms through which corporations control and direct their affairs. This strategy addresses issues such as how investors persuade themselves that they will obtain a return on their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), how to make long-term decisions on the various uses of organisational sources, and how to resolve conflicts among stakeholders in organisations (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). Another important consideration is what safeguards may protect investors from occasionally rash government decisions (la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000).

According to Solomon (2007), corporate governance is a system of oversight and manipulation aimed at ensuring that a company's management behaves in the best interests of its shareholders (p. 55). This concept is quite limited in that it only caters to the amusement of shareholders. According to Echanis (2002), company governance refers to the processes, institutions, and methods through which public organisations handle corporate enterprise concerns. Addressing difficulties such as how to finance suppliers and secure a return on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), determining the number of uses of organisational resources, and resolving differences among members of

organisations are all part of putting this plan into action (Daily & Cannella, Jr. 2003).

Another critical problem is establishing what safeguards may be put in place to protect outside investors from being expropriated through the use of insiders (La Porta, 2000). A set of best practices codes governs corporate governance. The King II Report, the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) Guidelines, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines, and the Good Governance Standard for Public Services are all examples of good governance in the public sector are employed in this investigation.

2.3. REPORTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FROM THE KING VERSION

The King Report on Corporate Governance is South Africa's ground-breaking corporate governance law, developed by a one-of-a-kind commission (the King Committee), chaired and supervised by judge Mervyn King. There have been three versions of King Reports released thus far. King, I was enthroned in 1994, King II in 2002, and King III, enthroned in 2009. South African governance agencies have embraced the King Reports, and it is now a requirement for corporations listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. According to the University of Pretoria's Centre for Professional and Business Ethics, the King

Report on Corporate Governance is the most advantageous and effective synthesis of the best global standards in corporate governance.

The first edition of The King Report I was a relatively rudimentary form compared to the others. It created prescribed moral behaviour concepts for boards and directors of JSE-listed banks, organisations, and certain state-owned companies. It used to be more than just about regulatory and financial risk; it also supported integrated methods that involved all stakeholders. However, it lacked the auditing function and combined sustainability reporting and risk management (IoDSA, 2002).

Published in 2002, the King Report II emphasised sustainability, corporate board member assigned tasks, and threat management functions. King II applied to national and state ministries, local authority administration, and provincial governments, in addition to the types of institutions targeted by King I.

The King III, was first released in 2009 and became fully operational in 2010, and is responsive to flaws in previous reports. Nonetheless, Mervyn King agreed that including sustainability as a separate chapter was incorrect, as it led to organisations reporting on it separately from other concepts and ideas and not in a coherent manner. According to the King III study, sustainability was coupled with governance and strategy. Instead of preparing typical yearly reports, the document advises that organisations construct a consolidated report that incorporates sustainability reporting, with those sustainability evaluations made following the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. King III impacts all commercial and public enterprises, and regulatory agencies. (IoDSA, 2009).

Furthermore, King III incorporates several global company governance characteristics, such as risk-based internal audits, board performance critiques and evaluations, alternative dispute procedures, and board remuneration.

The Institute of Directors in South Africa (IoDSA), led by retired judge Mervyn King, published the first King Code in South Africa (IoDSA, 1994). In 1999, the Kenyan Private Sector Initiative for Corporate Governance came up with a similar code of best practice to regulate corporate governance (Private Sector Initiative for Corporate Governance in Kenya, 1999).

Under the aegis of the Institute of Directors in South Africa, the King Committee on Corporate Governance was founded in 1992 to address the growing interest in corporate governance worldwide. By adopting a participative organisational governance structure in 1994, the King Committee effectively highlighted the imperative for organisations to recognise that they no longer function independently from the cultures and settings in which they operate (King Report, 2002). In the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, the King Report (2002) endorses an integrated strategy for top governance. Corporate governance goes beyond the legislative and component aspects. The King Report gives significant weight to the core notions of good financial, ethical, environmental, and social practices. The Namibian Dollar (NAD) is pegged to the South African Rand because Namibia is intrinsically linked to South Africa economically, physically, and historically.

The King Report (2002) defines corporate governance as a system concerned with maintaining a balance between monetary and social aims and between individual and shared goals, with the purpose of closely balancing the interests of businesses, society, and individuals as possible. The King Report defines corporate governance as "extensively contained organisational governance."

Finally, the business governance substructure is expected to encourage environmentally sustainable asset use while reporting accountability for resource management.

Many aspects, characteristics, properties, and variables of effective organisational governance are identified as the key determinants of corporate governance by the King Committee on Corporate Governance (2002), all of which substantially impact any organisation's overall performance. The following are the factors of excellent corporate governance, according to the King II Report (2002):

- (i) Transparency is defined as the ease with which an outsider can assess a company's behaviour, financial fundamentals, and non-financial aspects relevant to that business.
- (ii) Regulations are defined as a commitment by a company's senior management to adhere to behaviour that is commonly recognised and accepted as appropriate, acceptable, and proper.
 - a. Independence, the existence of working technique approaches established to remove or avoid potential activity conflicts, is defined as the existence of working technique approaches established to eliminate or avoid potential activity conflicts. The organisation should be self-sustaining, with an independent structure and a clear separation between the organisation and its owners.
 - b. Accountability refers to how individuals or corporations make decisions, take actions on specific topics, and want to be held

accountable for their actions; it also refers to being answerable and accountable for their actions.

- c. In terms of management, responsibility refers to behaviour that allows for remedial action and oversight of mismanagement.
- d. Fairness refers to the internal mechanisms of an organisation that must be balanced by taking into consideration all those who are interested in the organisation's development, particularly minority shareholders' interests;
- e. When a well-managed organisation is aware of and responds to social challenges while placing a high value on moral standards, social responsibility is put into effect (King Report, 2002).

According to the King II Report (2002), the features of correct corporate governance are related to the device and factors of real governance, including the board, reporting, and procedures. The following are some of them:

(i) *Boards and Directors*

The focus of the corporate governance mechanism is the board of directors, which is ultimately in charge of and responsible for the organization's performance and affairs. Although the board has delegated authority to board committees or management, this does not exonerate or relieve the board of responsibility and its directors of their tasks and obligations (King Report, 2002).

(ii) *Board Composition*

Organizations should be led by a constructive board that can both lead and govern the organization, according to the King II Report (2000). This board includes a balance of executive and non-executive directors, ideally

with the majority of non-executive directors being independent of management to protect shareowner interests, including minority interests.

(iii) *Board Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer*

The King II Report (2002) calls for a broad, straightforward division of tasks at the top of the organisation to ensure a balance of power and authority, with no single individual having unlimited risk management, decision-making, or governance powers.

(iv) *Directors*

The board must maintain a high level of strength and authority so that no single individual or group of persons can influence the board's decision-making. Non-executive directors should be people of high integrity and calibre, with the necessary experience, skills, and talent to make decisions on strategy, procedure, performance, transformation, resources, equity, and the range and requirements of conduct and performance evaluation while remaining independent of the administration. Executive administrators should only keep non-executive directorships if they do not conflict with their immediate administration responsibilities (King Report, 2002).

(v) *Remuneration*

With the help of the board, remuneration should be sufficient to entice, motivate, engage, and retain executives of the requisite calibre (King Report, 2002).

(vi) *Board Meetings*

The board must meet regularly, at least quarterly and as needed, and the number of board and committee meetings held throughout the year and

the attendance of each individual director must be disclosed in the annual report (King Report, 2002).

(vii) *Committees Of The Board Of Directors*

Board committees are essential tools for the board and administration in carrying out their tasks and responsibilities, and boards cannot hide behind them (King Report, 2002).

(viii) *Board and Director Evaluation*

In many circumstances, the board should analyse its efficacy and worth by reviewing its required combination of abilities and experience and other qualities such as diversity, uniformity, and demography through its nomination committee or a related board committee (King Report, 2002).

(ix) *Risk Management*

The Board will be compelled to quantify the risk's potential impact on the business, determine the level of risk that the organization can accept, adopt risk control and mitigation procedures, methods, and strategies, and communicate risk management coverage and policies to employees. The board is in charge of the overall risk management process and method and formulating its own opinion on its effectiveness (King Report, 2002).

2.4. APPLICATION AND REPORTING

The board must create a comprehensive control system to reduce risks and realise the organisation's objectives. Any ensuing weakness, flaw, or failure should be documented in the reports and the impact it has had or may have had on the organisation and the efforts taken to fix it.

Even though the corporate governance code is not codified, many of the King Reports' principles and concepts are now codified in the Companies Act of South Africa of 2008. The unique feature of King III is that it appeals to a wide range of entities, regardless of their form or manner of incorporation or institution, and all non-profit, public, and private sectors. As a result, this code was written to allow any organisation to establish and use the concepts and reap the benefits of excellent and constructive governance. These are, however, merely guiding concepts. Diverse sets of businesses may need to figure out how to execute them in other ways to achieve compelling corporate governance requirements, except for corporations listed on the JSE, where adherence to the King Code is a strict obligation (IoDSA, 2009).

Academics also use the King Report to build their research and studies. The Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch Business School has developed a system for measuring firms' compliance with the King III Report's Principles of Good Governance. A Governance Evaluation Matrix serves as the basis for this system. The Matrix was first validated on the JSE's Top 40 firms, and over time, it was expanded to include all of the JSE's Top 100 companies (Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2012).

South Africa's PIC has teamed up with the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa to encourage the usage of this Evaluation Matrix. This initiative combines the current PIC Governance Principles with South African corporate governance norms and reviews critical topics in terms of international best practices. The Evaluation Matrix recognises that governance is systematic, structural, and relational and that rigorous governance procedures necessitate commitment and

attention from all stakeholders. The main goals of the comparison framework effort are consistency and fairness, moulding corporate behaviour, disclosure, transparency, supporting a fundamental shift to focus on the long-term viability of organisations in society, and expanding a business governance knowledge pool. Finally, the Matrix is viewed as a development tool that aids organisations in improving their corporate governance reporting and performance (Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2012).

According to a recent study conducted in South Africa by the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa and the Hans Seidel Foundation titled "Rating Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises," South African SOEs have a low level of disclosure." The results of determining the level of governance were affected because most of the facts regarding these firms could no longer be retrieved. This includes omitting to disclose critical information, publishing annual reports late or not at all, and disclosing board operations. They also discovered a significant difference between the stage of independence of board composition of public enterprises, i.e. SOEs, and that of public sectors. On the other hand, the SOE boards performed better in terms of board variety, i.e. racial and gender range (Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2012).

2.5. COMMONWEALTH ASSOCIATION FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (CACG) GUIDELINES

The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) was founded in 1988 and is a non-binding organization of around fifty-three

independent countries that consult and collaborate in the common interest of their people. The Harare Declaration of 1991 outlines the Commonwealth's critical values, including a willingness to comprehend and recognise the need and urgency of social and monetary development. This enables the great majority of the world's peoples to realise their basic desires and ambitions and develop new solutions to the vast inequalities in living standards among its members. As a member of the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG), Namibia is expected to meet the CACG's guidelines (CACG, 1999).

The CACG specifications are made up of 15 organisational governance principles. These requirements apply to all boards of directors, whether commercial, public, family-owned, or government-owned (CACG, 1999). This study mentions ten of these goals and propositions, which are as follows:

- (i) Be in charge of the organisation's integrity and leadership in a discernible manner (CACG, 1999).
- (ii) Ensure that board appointments are made through planned and productive processes that provide an integrated proficiency of
- (iii) administrators who can add value and provide independent judgment to support decision-making processes (CACG, 1999).
- (iv) Identify the organisation's values, purposes, and intentions, as well as the methods it will employ to achieve its objectives and apply its values, in order to ensure its success and survival (CACG, 1999).
- (v) Ensure that procedures and processes are in place to safeguard the organisation's assets and reputation (CACG, 1999).

- (vi) Confirm that the employer complies with all applicable legislation, laws, policies, and codes of best business practice (CACG, 1999).
- (vii) Examine and evaluate the implementation of policies, strategies, management overall performance standards, and organisational goals (CACG, 1999).
- (viii) Make sure the company interacts with shareholders and other stakeholders efficiently. Distribute the organisation's shareowners' permitted interests and fully accountable to them (CACG, 1999).
- (ix) Identify external and internal stakeholders for the firm and agree on policies for how the company should deal with them. Ascertain that no single person has undue power and that the board is well-balanced in terms of authority and power (CACG, 1999).
- (x) Regularly monitor procedures and processes to assure the effectiveness of the organization's internal control network to maintain an excessively
- (xi) high degree of decision-making accomplishments and the accuracy of its disclosure and financial outcomes (CACG, 1999).
- (xii) Evaluate its overall performance and effectiveness and that of independent directors regularly (CACG, 1999).
- (xiii) Elect the CEO and, at the very least, participate in the assignment of senior management; ensure the protection and motivation of the organization's cognitive capital; ensure enough coaching for managers and employees, as well as a succession plan for senior management (CACG, 1999).

According to Wixley and Everingham (2010), the Cadbury Report, which began in 1992, takes a slightly different approach to recognizing notable organizational failures in the UK that stem from dishonesty. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and Maxwell are spotlighted. This dispelled the notion that a lack of corporate governance was causing British and American corporations to lag behind global competitors. The Adrian Cadbury-led committee produced the Cadbury Report, titled "Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance." The document guides setting up accounting systems and corporate boards to avoid corporate governance failures and risks. Other codes, such as those in Europe,

South Africa, the United States, and many other places, have been established based on these principles. A list of the codes that followed is shown below.

The Commonwealth leader of governments decided in the late 1990s that a capability needed to be built in all Commonwealth foreign countries to support, build, and motivate organisations to promote strong corporate governance, particularly codes of acceptable standards. This has to do with corporate and public sector governance—the goal used to be to provide increased transparency and reduce corruption. The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance was formed due to this, and the CACG Guidelines, also known as Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth, were adopted and developed as a result. This has also been the most important guideline for all Commonwealth international countries to strengthen their own corporate governance rules (CACG, 1999). As a result, the Private Sector Initiative for Corporate Governance in Kenya (1999) produced the South African King Code and the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance.

2.6. THE GUIDELINES AND THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Conformance to corporate governance norms, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) paper "Principles of Corporate Governance," first published in 1999 and amended in 2004, helps to increase investor trust in both foreign and domestic markets. This is one of many messages highlighting the fundamentals of international financial balances and structures, which serve as the framework for the World Bank Group's Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes' corporate governance sections. It includes a description of prominent practices and issues in corporate governance and the OECD's adopted Corporate Governance Guidelines. This OECD file's thorough phase investigates the levels of these firms in OECD countries, their links with non-state shareholders, and the structure of their own purpose. Furthermore, the research investigates the roles of boards of directors and the activities of stakeholders in corporate transparency (OECD, 2004).

2.7. THE GOOD GOVERNANCE STANDARD FOR PUBLIC SERVICES

The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services was founded by the Office for Public Management and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, in partnership with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in London (2004). The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services (2004) Commission's objective was to create a standard code and set of concepts for good governance throughout all government services, which should result in improved performance, administration, supervision of public finances, precise public engagement, and, ultimately,

improved public safety better outcomes. According to the commission, public-sector administrators have enormous problems, and these organizations have individuals who are accountable for governance by managing, leading, and overseeing the organizations they serve. Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services (2004). Their role is to ensure that the organisation's aims and objectives are met in the public interest and that they positively influence the people who use the services while also offering outstanding value.

All public-sector institutions and partnerships that use public funds must follow the Good Governance Standard for Public Services (2004). The Standard comprises six core principles for good governance, each with its own set of the basics. Acceptable governance criteria, according to the Good Governance Standard for Public Services, include:

- (i) Concentrating on the outcomes and motivations of the organisation for citizens and service users.
- (ii) Ensuring that users have access to great facilities.
- (iii) Ensuring that taxpayers get good value for their money facilities
- (iv) Perform well in roles and features that are easily articulated facilities
- (v) Being clear about the governing body's characteristics and functions facilities
- (vi) Be clear about the responsibilities of executives and non-executives, and ensure that those responsibilities are fulfilled facilities.
- (vii) There should be a clear distinction between the governors' and the public's connections facilities.
- (viii) Promoting ideals within the organisation and using methods to demonstrate good governance values facilities.
- (ix) Put your company's values into action facilities.

- (x) Act in ways that promote and exemplify good government facilities.
- (xi) Good governance entails making informed, transparent decisions and managing risk facilities.
- (xii) Making selections and choices openly and meticulously facility.
- (xiii) Make certain that excellent risk management practices are in place in facilities
- (xiv) Risk management and making honest, well-informed judgment facilities.
- (xv) Improve the governing framework's ability and potential to be effective. facilities (Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, 2004)

Good corporate governance does not guarantee that an organization will be successful; however, it does ensure that the risks taken are adequately disclosed and that when problems and ambiguities arise, they are handled with integrity, intelligence, and wisdom in the best interests of the organization, and accurately communicated to stakeholders. Several business misconducts have occurred over the years, everywhere, worldwide, including in South Africa and Namibia. After governance was obtained, the need for a company grew due to all of these repeated crises and wrongdoing. On the contrary, as McKinsey & Company (2002) claim, company governance does not have a clear remuneration structure. On the other hand, investors consider corporate governance on par with financial indicators when evaluating investment options and typically prefer to pay a premium for shares or ownerships in a well-run company. A well-run organisation has decided to be well run when:

- (i) There is a diverse group of non-executive and executive directors, with most non-executive members being self-employed.
- (ii) Official evaluations of directors' work are available.

- (iii) Directors have a significant stake in the company, and their salaries and wages are tied to its success.
- (iv) The organisation is transparent in terms of communication, reporting, and common governance (IoDSA, 2009).

Several organisational governance ideas, concepts, policies, and codes guide these characteristics. The purpose of these good governance principles and codes is to assist organisations in developing their own unique codes of best practice in terms of properly governance in accordance with specified, sustainable behaviour to help the organisation improve.

2.8. GENERAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

The term "excellent corporate governance" can be construed in many different ways. The Anglo-Saxon model is frequently discussed, as it dates back to the first UK Companies Act of 1844. The concept of the company as a self-contained entity separate from its owners was enveloped by the authoritative structure. Other models include the Japanese mannequin and the Continental European mannequin (Wixley & Everingham, 2010).

An excessive amount of ownership is used to identify the Continental European model. Shareholders collaborate with the company and are involved in its operational control and management. Apart from shareholders, management is usually responsible for a range of stakeholders, including unions, business partners, etc. This model was adopted by Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese approach attracted investment by forming industrial corporations with similar

interests, plans, and programs. Management's accountability is demonstrated by shareholders and a robust network of loyal consumers and dealers. This resilient network structure has resulted in a complex orchestration of cooperative and antagonistic connections (Wixley & Everingham, 2010)

Governance is established in the Anglo-Saxon paradigm by the shareholders appointing an exclusive board of directors. The board then informs the organization's shareholders or directors. The management and directors then hire independent auditors to report on the fairness, rightfulness, accuracy, and correctness of the financial declaration reports. This technique evolved in the appointment of a CEO or managing director (MD), full-time government directors, and possibly a few meaningful directors in the organization and many non-executive directors (Wixley & Everingham, 2010)

Unique corporate governance structures emerged in Europe, based on the Anglo-Saxon framework, with two-tier boards of directors (Wixley & Everingham, 2010). These are the following:

- (i) A non-executive managerial board with authority to approve, appoint, or remove a board member; and
- (ii) An executive, the managerial board is responsible for reporting to the supervisory board on a regular basis and the organisation's operational management.

The majority of the South African King Report is based on the Anglo-Saxon paradigm. However, instead of a two-tier board structure, it was proposed that South Africa adopt a unitary board structure comprised of non-executive and

executive board members. This allows for interaction between the organisation's leadership, management, and people with various backgrounds, talents, and experiences.

2.9. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND CODES

The notion of corporate governance emerged from comparing corporate governance to that of towns, states, and countries. The term "representative government" was initially used in an early corporate finance handbook to highlight the organisation's specific benefit over other partnership structures.

However, no one has ever agreed on what consultant corporate governance is or whom it is supposed to represent.

Following the well-known Wall Street Crash of 1929, many American students began to ponder the changing role of a modern corporation and business in society (Berle & Means, 1932). Meanwhile, Ronald Coase of the Chicago School of Economics introduced the concept of transaction costs to understand why corporations exist and how they function and operate (Coase, 1937). Following World War II, the expansion of the United States (US) economic system saw the emergence of corporate management through the disclosure of multinational corporations (Douma & Schreuder, 2013).

The phrase "corporate governance" only became popular in the United States in the 1970s. Around the next 25 years, corporate governance became a hot topic among executives, scholars, investors, and regulators worldwide. The surge of

chief executive officer (CEO) dismissals by boards of directors in the early 1990s drew widespread media attention to the state of corporate governance in the United States. This prompted corporate shareholders to take a stance and protest, ensuring that company value would not be squandered as a result of the now-traditionally tense relationship between the CEO and the board of directors (Douma & Schreuder, 2013).

In the early 2000s, a slew of big business bankruptcies in the United States, such as Enron and WorldCom, as well as a slew of minor corporate scandals, sparked a boom in political interest in corporate governance. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act No. 2 of 2002, which was enacted in 2002, demonstrates this, in reaction to a string of such transgressions, The Act established a set of rules that affect company governance in the United States and influenced similar laws in several other countries, all to offer governance advice in the United States commercial enterprises. The financial crisis of 2008/9, as well as the levels of executive compensation in the United States, were other catalysts for increased interest in corporate governance for corporations (Douma & Schreuder, 2013).

In the 1980s and early 1990s, a sequence of events in the United Kingdom (UK) showed severe faults in the contemporary Anglo-Saxon model of government as it was implemented. This is a prevalent corporate governance paradigm in countries with Anglo-Saxon legal culture. These are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and, at a later date, South Africa (SA). Corporate governance in these countries primarily emphasises the organisations' external shareholders, and top executives are closely monitored and penalised or rewarded. As an example, in the United States, reimbursement was frequently linked to profitability. As a result, most businesses have decided to reduce their

workforce to maintain profitability. Two UK scholars, Keasey and Wright, identified the following anxiety caused by this paradigm (Wixley & Everingham, 2010):

- (i) The uncontrollable tendency to focus on short-term aspects to the detriment of overall financial performance.
- (ii) The startling upward trend in business failures.
- (iii) The rising actions of some administrators who have an unscrupulous interest in claiming monies from other parties.
- (iv) The auditors' clearly limited role.
- (v) The recently identified shaky relationship between executive pay and company accomplishments and performance (Wixley & Everingham, 2010).

2.10. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NAMIBIA

The recent uptick in the mining sector and the low overall performance of many Namibian organisations have sparked widespread interest in the importance of effective corporate governance in Namibia's public sector, especially in light of the international trend improving and strengthening corporate governance. Namibia is likewise a rapidly developing country, with a well-known fact that the country's national objectives are built on good governance. As a result, it is vital to stress that good corporate governance is one of the main drivers of national progress (Governance Policy Framework for State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia, February 2001).

The overall performance of many government organisations leaves a lot to be desired, given that the Namibian gross domestic product (GDP) grows at a typical rate of two to four percentage points per year. One of the performance variables that need attention is the good business governance of these organisations. Like

many other organisations, the government is exposed to many operational hazards because of poor corporate governance. Most of these hazards are operational, financial, and political. One of the reasons for establishing corporate governance regulation frameworks in public organisations was to address this issue (Governance Policy Framework for State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia, February 2001).

According to Boamah (2003), Namibia, like most African countries, faces similar challenges to corporate governance, which are exacerbated by a lack of human resource capability, infrastructure, administrative processes, and financial resources. This necessitates careful analysis, focusing on initiatives to enhance capacity in both the public and private sectors.

A fundamental report titled "Report on a Governance Policy Framework in Namibia" by Deloitte & Touché (2010) set the path for Namibia's governance policy framework advancement. The Namibian Cabinet adopted this report in 2001. Concerns and attitudes about variables such as discrepancies in political interferences, governance processes, preferences, the underperformance of board members, and uncertainty about the future were revealed in the report.

The document stated that Namibia's governance reputation lags behind the private sector and that a consistent national governance system is required. The record also revealed that Namibian organisations, in many cases, fail to stay competitive due to a lack of urgency in communicating with stakeholders such as

shareholders (the government through specific ministries), suppliers, customers, regulators, and the public (Deloitte & Touché, 2010)

As a result, the findings of this study are guided by a framework that was adopted and included in the authority's legislation. The Governance Council's primary job is to advise, manage, and change governance and guarantee that risks are handled, lessons are learned, and transparency and disclosure are provided. In this sense, government bodies must account and report to the cabinet and relevant ministries for their overall performance and universal governance. Authorities demand, above all, that the entities be managed and operated in a cost-effective, desirable, and profitable manner (Deloitte & Touché, 2010).

Despite incorporating these laws and regulations into ministry operations, there are still unanswered questions about management and board responsibilities and the distinction between social, administrative, and political strains in the professional operation and management of these organisations. This area needs to be developed further, particularly in promoting accountability, openness, professionalism, and overall performance management of these organisations to maximise profits (SOEGC Act No of 2006).

Except for the annual report, it is also possible to conclude that the ministries do not comply with the guidance on public disclosure and publication of documents, as it only includes "submitting an annual report to the minister and National Assembly." However, there is no mention of sustainability reporting in the report.

The report also fails to mention the board of committees. Despite this, the report strongly suggests that performance assessments and a governance agreement with the government be implemented (Deloitte & Touché, 2010).

The extent of performance evaluation of many aspects of the organisation needs a strong focus since it instils a sense of accountability within the boards. In addition, the acquisition of created procedures and method assessments must be investigated. When it comes to evaluating business performance, numerous indicators may be used. Employee turnover, financial success, and company image are traditional measures. In addition, in today's world, issues and difficulties, including governance, environmental issues, corporate and social responsibility, and sustainability, may be incorporated. The Corporate Governance Evaluation Matrix, as previously stated, is one of the basics (Deloitte & Touché, 2010).

Deloitte & Touché (2012) just released a report based on a 2011 poll on "Corporate Governance in Namibia," emphasising the importance of better corporate governance in Namibia. These are functional rules that cover board member selection, training, and inferences, as well as executive and board member compensation and overall performance evaluation. These are also in line with Ashipala's (2012) thesis, "An Analysis of Corporate Governance under the Framework Governance of Namibia," which advocated for board performance evaluation.

The Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX), in partnership with First National Bank (FNB), recently released NamCode, a governance code branded "The Corporate Governance Code for Namibia." This Corporate Governance Code is based on international best practices, particularly the South African King III Report. It underlines the significance of corporate governance in achieving long-term financial and sustainability goals. (Deloitte & Touché, 2014).

2.11. THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The corporate governance assumptions presented in this section include the Principal Agency theory, Steward Theory, Resource Dependency Principle, and Stakeholder Theory.

Stakeholder management, stewardship, and organisational assumptions are all Eurocentric concepts.

2.11.1 The Principal Organisation Theory

The principal-agency theory is based on the principal-agency concerns that result from corporate governance's goal of aligning the interests of individuals, companies, and society as much as possible. According to McGuigan, Kretlow, and Moyer (2006), the principal-agency issue is when management's interests and those of the stakeholders are at odds (p. 77). According to the theory, the firm's goal is to grow shareholder wealth through productive, dynamic, and allocative efficiency, i.e. the organisation's goal is to increase profits. The organisation's market cost (i.e. shareholder value) can undoubtedly be used as the standard by which overall performance is measured in this premise. As a result, directors,

managers, and administrators are obligated to run the company in the best interests of its shareholders.

McGuigan, Kretlow, and Moyer (2006), the principal-agent relationship resulting from the separation of beneficial ownership and executive decision-making is the fundamental problem with corporate governance in this idea. Due to this divide, the firm's behavior deviates from the profit-earnings maximizing ideal. When ownership, possession, and authority are separated, the primary (investors) and agent (managers) pursue divergent aims and objectives. Because the executives are not the company owners, they do not incur the total cost of their accomplishments or reap the full advantages of their positions. Managers may have extra ambitions and aims, such as facilitating and maximising their salary, increasing market share, or being attached to a specific funding initiative, notwithstanding traders' fascination with optimising shareholder value.

2.11.2 *The Stewardship theory*

According to this concept, "managers are good stewards of organisations who work relentlessly to produce high levels of firm profit and shareholder returns."

(Donaldson & Davis, 1994, p. 64). The management stewardship notion is a master plan technique for corporate organisation theory. The stewardship concept of management administration and the organisation principle, according to Olson

(2008), are both centred on the leadership ideas held by a company's owners. Olson (2008) emphasised the owner's importance in deciding how much authority and control to offer to the managers. The absence of focus on the supervisor's skill and knowledge in the organisational concept and the need to invest in training to develop the manager's skills is highlighted by Oslon (2008) and Hendry (2002). While the concept of corporate structure has economic foundations, the concept of stewardship does not. Table 2.1 below summarises the two theories.

Table 2.1: Evaluation flanked by Principal-agency theory and Stewardship theory

	PRINCIPLE - AGENCY	STEWARDSHIP THEORY
Owner (holder)	Principal	Principal
Managers as	Agents	Stewards
Approach to governance	Economic	Sociological and psychological
Model of Man's conduct	Unique self-serving	Socialists trustworthy
Managers encouraged by	Their own aims	Principal goals
Manager's and principal's	Deviate	Unite
Structure that	Governor and monitor	
Owner's attitude	Risk aversion	Risk tendency
Main Manager	Governor	Reliance
Psychological Mechanisms		
Inspiration and Motivation	Minor order requirements	Advanced order requirements
Social Evaluation	Additional managers	Key
Identification	Slight worth committed	Excessive worth committed
Power	Institutional	Personal
Situational Mechanism		
Management Philosophy	Control focused	Participation focused
How to deal with increasing uncertainty and risk	Added management and supervision Superior governance	Empowering, training and permitting people. Reformatting jobs to be more stimulating and motivating.
Risk orientation	Governing mechanisms	Confidence and Trust
Time Frame	Short term	Long term
Goals	Cost control	Performance improvement
Cultural Variances	Distinctiveness	Collectivism

Source: Alfonso Vargas Sanchez (2001), based on Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997)

As shown in the table above, the owner-manager connection is based on each owner and manager's behaviour and practices (Davis et al., 1997). Managers typically behave as marketers, agents, or stewards based on personal attributes and traits, non-public traits, and their personal judgments of certain situational elements. Principals choose to form one of two types of relationships based on their awareness of the same environmental elements and their manager's psychological approaches.

The perspective of an organisation's stakeholders, on the other hand, differs from that of managers and basic owners. According to the stakeholders' perspective, employees, investors, suppliers, stakeholders, and clients contribute to and profit from an organisation. Different parties, such as unions, trading associations, political groupings, and even government officials, might be enmeshed in interactions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The various domains of corporate governance vision can also be linked to the intellectual background, unique cultural circumstances, and academic interests (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).

Corporate governance is a relatively recent field of study. Individuals who work in the corporate governance area come from various educational backgrounds. The integration of the many disciplines is usually incomplete or non-existent. In some respects, this encapsulates the rarely spoken convergence of corporate governance with various disciplines. In other circumstances, the overlap is so faint that it is impossible to notice (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).

2.11.4. The Resource-Dependency Theory

According to Pfeffer (2003), the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) was created to provide an unconventional perspective to economic theories of mergers and board interlocks and precisely understand the type of inter-organizational association that has played such a large role in recent market disasters and failures. See p.87. Those in charge of the organization were motivated by the desire to ensure their existence and strengthen their personal liberty while maintaining a balance in its trade ties. Many of the organisation's identified behaviours were motivated by and driven by these motivations and drivers.

The RDT has three main designs: (1) the social context is important, (2) businesses have strategies and techniques to increase their autonomy and pursue interests, and (3) the resource dependence assumption emphasizes power and authority, which sets it apart from other approaches like transaction cost economics. According to Pfeiffer (2003), the theory's underlying history of exchange-based power was once taken from Emerson's 1962 parsimonious perspective that A's influence over B stems from the management of resources that B values but are no longer available elsewhere (p. 87). In this statement, power and dependency are diametrically opposed; B is dependent on A to the extent that A has power over B, and power is no longer zero-sum because A and B can both have power over each other, resulting in interdependence.

2.11.5. The Institutional Theory

According to Scott (2001), the beginning point of the institutional theory route via the emerging years of enlistment, social sciences, and embrace the creative awareness from the men of letters ranging from Marx and Weber, Cooley and Mead, to Veblen and Commons (p. 29). From classical to modern theorists,

institutional theories reflect similar tendencies in reasoning about social structures and movements (Alexander, 1983, p. 92). It looks into how systems like schemas, rules, norms, and routines become accepted as authoritative cues for social behaviour. It looks at how these aspects are created, disseminated, adopted, and altered across locations, time, and space and how they decay and go out of favour.

2.11.6. *The Stakeholder Theory*

According to the Stakeholder Theory (Clarkson, 1994), "the firm is a machine of stakeholders working within the larger machine of the host society that supplies the key criminal and commercial infrastructure for the firm's activities." The challenge with traditional stakeholder management is that ensuring that a firm organisation meets these broad objectives is difficult, if not impossible. According to this stakeholder theory, corporate governance is primarily concerned with the effectiveness of various governance systems in generating long-term commitment and investment from various stakeholders. According to Solomon (2007), the stakeholder theory has been progressively evolving since

1970, and it was founded by Freeman (1984), who gave a broad concept of business that included corporate responsibilities to a diversified group of stakeholders. This theory combines perceived overall social performance with corporate behaviour to explain corporation behaviour.

2.12. ELEMENTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

2.12.1 Leadership and Board Effectiveness

With the exception of board structure and conformation with size, overall performance, and independence, empirical investigations have used board structure and conformation with size, overall performance, and independence as the key framework. Due to tighter communication and decision-making, a board of constrained dimensions is projected to operate better than bigger ones, resulting in improved performance. However, Brown and Caylor (2004) propose an advantageous relationship, and this consensus has not been achieved uniformly. However, as Brown and Caylor (2004) demonstrated in their research, co-effectiveness goes hand-in-hand with board independence, but others (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) have found that a couple of directorships has no discernible effect on performance.

An optimistic governing Board and/or executive management skills and capacities of direction are required to guide the organisation's affairs. Furthermore, an effective structure necessitates the articulation and clear recognition of responsibility and a genuine appreciation and understanding of various relationships between the organisation, stakeholders, and those tasked with managing and controlling resources and delivering the required results. Executive management must also have the ability to give leadership, coordinate a consistent set of governance principles and policies for the duration of the business, and ensure that the necessary counterbalances are in place. The most effective way to foster accountability, responsibility, and improved performance is for executives to lead by example (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).

2.12.2 Accountability

Accountability of the professional and expert management to the ejected board is a crucial part of governance quality. Corporate governance standards demand that those involved identify, recognise, and articulate their tasks, responsibilities, and relationships; review who is responsible for what, to whom, and when; review stakeholders' knowledge, information, and relationships with those assigned to manage and control resources; and deliver the required results. It paves the way for persons in the public and private sectors who appear to be involved in more unusual relationships than they have in the past.

2.12.3 Directors' Remuneration

Even though improved performance is expected, the general consensus is that increased executive compensation will motivate executives to perform their tasks and roles more successfully. Some (Conyon & Schwalbac, 2000) have determined the existence of such a relationship, while others (Conyon & Schwalbac, 2000) have failed to establish empirical support for such a relationship. Duffhues and Kabir (2008), for example, disagree that there is always a link between the two variables, as they no longer report any substantial relationship between company performance and CEO salary.

2.12.4 Audit Quality

It is sometimes considered that a higher-ranking audit quality encompasses a competently controlled system. Auditors and audit committees are important in overseeing the financial management of an organisation's overall performance. Almost all empirical studies (Ho, 2005) found a positive relationship between financial performance audit quality and governance, while others, such as Brown

and Caylor (2004), found that, while there is a link between financial performance audit quality and governance, the importance of the relationship now lies with dividend yield and high-quality audit, not with operating performance.

2.12.5 Transparency and Disclosure (Openness)

The administration and management of entities should be characterised by openness and transparency in contacting members (Harvey, 1995). This criterion reflects the dedication of a society's elected director in particular. Organizational directors must instil complete trust in decision-making procedures among stakeholders. Being open through meaningful discussions and consultations with stakeholders and full transmission of transparent and accurate information leads to effective and timely action, which improves scrutiny. Transparency is also necessary for ensuring that public bodies are completely accountable, making it critical for effective government. Significant declaration and openness improve the reliability of financial data transmitted and reported, minimizing information asymmetry and leading to higher-quality earnings expected by investors. Loh (2002) unwind a list of probable benefits stemming from a higher magnitude of transparency, based on the notion that improved corporate transparency and disclosure leads to superior performance. This increases organisational performance, broadens the investor base, improves capital availability, and increases management trustworthiness.

2.12. 6 Social Responsibility

Corporate social responsibility is enhancing and becoming a growing necessity of any organization as it discovers a degree of interconnection between various stakeholders and the broader society. As a result, moral behaviour would transmit the appropriate message and gesture to all stakeholders, influencing performance.

For example, in his observation, Ho (2005) outlined a higher performance criterion for businesses serving these fundamentals.

2.12.7 Integrity

Integrity, which is based on objectivity and honesty, as well as high standards of the property, earnings, and profits in the allocation of public funds and the management of an organization's affairs, underpin the effectiveness of the control framework and the personal standards and professionalism of individuals within the organization. This is reflected in the organization's decision-making methodologies, procedures, and applications and its overall performance reporting credibility and quality (Ho (2005).

2.12.8 Commitment

Too much emphasis has been placed on the form of corporate governance rather than the substance of corporate governance in both the public and private sectors. In order to accomplish desired objectives, practical and effective corporate governance includes more than simply putting in place structures such as committees and reporting procedures. Rather, effective implementation of all areas of corporate governance necessitates a strong commitment from all parties (Ho (2005).

A constructive and productive framework is people-centred, encompassing and needing organization management, a significant emphasis on organization values and risk management, ethical conduct, and first-rate service delivery. Buyer relationships are also crucial.

2.12.9 Integration

The fundamental problem is ensuring that the many parts of excellent corporate governance are holistically blended into a well-organized corporate approach through individual requisitions that are properly recognized, understood, and used throughout the organization, rather than simply specifying them. When correctly implemented, corporate governance provides the integrated strategic management framework required to achieve the results of overall performance standards necessary to meet the company's objectives and goals (Ho (2005).

2.12.10 Corporate Performance Measurements

Performance measures assist in the attainment and maintenance of controls. According to Kaplan and Atkinson (1998), control refers to the tactics, processes, and instruments that companies employ to stay on track in achieving their goals and objectives. According to Harrington (1991), non-financial and financial metrics are important management and control instruments (p. 82). The commonly utilized accounting ratios in corporate governance writings, notably return on assets, return on capital employed, and return on equity, are frequently used in the financial assessment for business performance. Similarly, economic value-added can be used as a substitute for solely accounting-based ways of calculating shareholder value by analysing an organization's profitability after accounting for the total cost of capital, equity, and debt. Management, capital adequacy, earnings and liquidity asset, and salary are more courses of action for financial performance in profit-making organizations and are usually referred to as the CAMEL Model (Harrington, 1991),

2.13. GENERAL FAILURES IN THE GOVERNANCE PROCESS

According to a report by McKinsey & Company (McKinsey & Company, 2002), the following are possible vulnerabilities and issues for boards of directors:

- (i) Systems for reviewing the remuneration practices of CEOs;
- (ii) There is no succession planning for CEOs.
- (iii) A lack of preparedness in coping with risks.
- (iv) There is no official board performance evaluation.
- (v) Executive board members and non-executive members have a poor understanding of the companies' operations and environments.
- (vi) Fear of legal repercussions and director accountability (McKinsey & Company, 2002).

According to the study, firm boards of directors have strong feelings that major adjustments are needed to address deficiencies in corporate governance.

- (i) Existing defects can be discovered in a variety of ways, and governance issues at the corporate level can result from the following:
 - (ii) The top management and board of directors are disintegrating
 - (iii) Internal operating system vulnerabilities; and
 - (iv) Inadequate operating systems on the outside (McKinsey & Company, 2002).

2.14. COLLAPSING OF THE BOARD AND GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT

These failures are caused by various factors, some of which are tied to firm governance, such as an ineffective board of directors, which lacks clear strategic direction, competencies, and a feeling of accountability. The board's dimensions must be correct. The presence of conflicted CEOs is another important factor.

When the CEO is also chosen as the chairperson of the board of directors, this happens by chance. If not handled well, such dual positions can jeopardize organizational management structures (McKinsey & Company, 2002).

2.15. WEAKNESSES IN INTERNAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS

The company's operational controls to create working monitoring mechanisms are internal operational structures and systems. Technically linked programs and policies that are supposed to offer proper checks and balances, which are factors in a sound governance process, should be used to steer these. The firm is prone to failures and troubles if these policies are not implemented. Risk management, internal audits, and good accounting systems are all part of these internal operational policies (McKinsey & Company, 2002).

2.16. SHORTCOMINGS IN EXTERNAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS

Uncontrollable variables might also have a negative impact on the organization. The survival of all organizations is dependent on the environment in which they function. External factors might also contribute to organizational issues.

Regulatory processes, such as environmental regulations, operational regulations, and compliance directives are examples of operational systems for external elements. External auditing is most often associated with external control systems (McKinsey & Company, 2002).

2.17. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

Two broadly defined theories coexist in corporate governance publications. A looming prospect of a hostile takeover or leveraged buyouts of a company is reason enough for management to guarantee that all production aspects are used efficiently. The financial markets step in to restore good governance when managers fail to invest in projects that bring value to the company and its shareholders instead of diverting resources to their personal gain. Several measures have been advocated, including demanding cash flow payments in debt servicing arrangements, tying senior management compensation to performance through equity and options, and dismissing senior executives from underperforming firms.

Klapper and Love (2004) examined data from 14 expanding inventory markets to indicate a high-level positive association between improved governance and working performance, using return on assets as a proxy for working performance. However, they noted that this could vary by nation. On the other hand, Brown and Caylor (2004) discovered a correlation between their profitability assessments and corporate governance. Furthermore, Selvaggi and Upton (2008) argue that good corporate governance boosts business performance in the UK and that the two variables are linked.

To evaluate organizational performance, empirical studies on firm governance employ one of two accounting-based measurements or market-based indicators. As working performance metrics, Lo (2003) uses return on equity (ROE), and Klein (1998) uses return on assets (ROA). Return on equity and return on assets are the two running total performance measurements used by Brown and Caylor

(2005). The return on assets ratio can be used to evaluate an organization's operating success because it reflects the amount of income created by investing capital assets (Epps & Cereola, 2008).

Managers and senior managers are in charge of the company's day-to-day operations; thus, it is up to them to use its assets efficiently, effectively, and correctly. The return on assets ratio, as a result, stimulates and assures business-like management of the organization, allowing users to check how well a company's corporate governance mechanism is working. Net revenue interest expense fee for the fiscal period divided by total costs for the same time is how the return on assets is calculated.

Profit and income for the benefit of common investors are some of the key motives for running a corporation (Epps & Cereola, 2008). Return on equity (ROE) is a measure that indicates an investor how much profit a company produced with the money he or she invested. Divide the income before interest expenses for a fiscal period by the total shareholders' equity for the same period to get the return on equity. In addition to the return on assets, the return on equity and return on assets can both be useful indications of PSEMAS success. A lack of public facilities and services, which directly contradicts poor overall performance, could also be referred to as poor overall performance.

Rogers (2006) carried out a study entitled "Corporate governance and financial performance of selected Ugandan commercial banks." According to the report, Rogers (2006) looked into the relationship between financial performance and corporate governance in Ugandan commercial banks. This result reveals that corporate governance accounts for 34.5 per cent of the variance in Uganda's commercial banks' overall financial performance. Nonetheless, the most

significant drivers to economic performance value transparency and dependability. The aspects of corporate governance that assess stakeholder trust and confidence in the organization are openness, loyalty, trustworthiness, and reliability.

An empirical analysis of corporate governance and business performance was published by Chiang (2005). The relationship between corporate governance pointers, working and operating performance metrics, and transparency, as well as whether the pointers might be utilized to forecast operation performance, were investigated in this study. According to the research, corporate openness had a considerable impact on operating success, and it was one of the essential elements for evaluating corporate performance.

Bocean and Barbu (2007) researched "corporate governance and firm performance". The goal of this post was to help people better understand corporate governance and how it affects economic and overall business performance. As a result, it investigated some of the fundamental aspects that contribute to efficient corporate governance and the economic implications of alternative corporate governance systems. It was discovered during their research that the study provides a framework for understanding and interpreting how corporate governance might affect organizational performance. According to the research, outside ownership awareness (which undermines market value), insider ownership, and direct ownership make a difference in economic success. Total factor profitability, a study based on market pricing, and accounting ratios are the three most important methods to the business level performance that have been created in social science research.

2.18. CONCLUSION

The literature on corporate governance and its impact on PSEMAS's business performance is examined in this chapter. This chapter examined the definitions of corporate governance, theories of corporate governance, and elements of corporate governance, as well as corporate performance indicators and governance's impact on business performance. According to empirical research, there appears to be a correlation between company performance and corporate governance.

Corporate governance, as previously stated, has become a decisive element for investors since it exhibits trust and confidence. An investor will first look at the leadership system of a company to see how accountable and transparent it is.

The literature reflects how far the world has progressed and investor and general public expectations. People want to know everything about a company; thus, transactions must be transparent. There are numerous studies on corporate governance available, including the global evolution of the concept of corporate governance, which includes Namibia and South Africa. These contributions help people learn more about corporate governance.

Many countries utilize a two-tier board of directors' structure, such as South Africa and Namibia, which follow the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model. Namibia's governance has been challenged, and as a result, the guidelines have been developed. This is a governing body that has embraced the King III code in accordance with Namibian governance through instructions. These ideas and notions of good governance were recently incorporated into the NamCode, a local

code used as a framework for company governance in the country beginning in 2014.

This chapter assessed the literature on corporate governance and its impact on PSEMAS. The definitions of corporate governance, theories of corporate governance, and elements of corporate governance, as well as corporate performance measurements and governance's impact on business performance, were all covered in this chapter.

The next chapter studies the methodology, which includes the research approach, method, and research process, as well as the study's design, which includes strategies, instruments, and data collection and analysis methods, as well as the phases and processes involved in the study.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This section gives an overview of the investigation by describing the research method used in this study. This section demonstrates the study's research design, philosophy, and the research method approach. Survey and sampling are covered in this chapter. Data collection instruments, and analysis is also covered in this chapter. Issues of reliability and validity, and research ethics are also discussed in this chapter. This chapter is very important since it gives an overview of how the research was conducted. It gives admissible information on the methods used to acquire and analyse data. Furthermore, this information aided in the developing the next chapter 4 of the study.

3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research used Postpositivism philosophy, a belief that to understand a problem, it needs to be broken down into small parts, instead of trying to understand a problem. The research adopted quantitative research method approach. Quantitative research methods investigate methods that rely primarily on the systematic collection of numerical data and the application of inferential statistical techniques to test hypothesis.

The study adopted a survey research design. A survey design that provides a quantitative description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample was used in this study. The design allowed the researcher to generalize or draws inferences to the population based on the results obtained from the study sample. The survey design allowed the first parts of the methods section to introduce readers to the basic purpose and rationale for the research.

The design identifies the purpose of survey research; this purpose is to generalize from sample to a population so that inferences can be made. The survey design indicate why is survey is the preferred type of data collection procedure for the study. It further indicates whether the survey design will be cross-sectional or longitudinal, where, in this research it is cross-sectional. The design enables the specification of the form of data collection; options include telephone, mail, Internet, used in this study.

3.3. POPULATION AND SAMPLING

The population was composed of PSEMAS Board of Directors, and the board Committees. The total population of the study was 50 participants. Since the study adopted a survey research design, simple random sampling techniques was used to select the sample for the study. The total sample for the study was 30 respondents.

3.4. RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

The research used a structured survey questionnaire, with scales anchored on both sides. The research instrument was used to collect primary data. A structured research questionnaire is used in the quantitative research method approach to collect primary data

3.5. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The researcher obtained consent to carry out the study from PSEMAS. The request for consent from PSEMAS was done after the researcher obtained ethical clearance to do research from the University of Namibia Research Ethics Committee (UREC). The researcher administered the research instruments during data collection through survey monkey. The questionnaires were completed using

the online Monkey Survey research instrument management considering the COVID-19 epidemic.

3.6. DATA COLLECTION

The researcher used a structured questionnaire to collect primary data from the respondents. The research instruments were administered by the researcher through survey monkey data collection procedures. The use of using survey monkey was justified based on strict observation of COVID-19 protocols, pronounced by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in Namibia. Secondary data were acquired from various sources, including organizational publications, the Board of directors meeting minutes. The secondary data gathered provided in-depth information on the actions and successes of the boards of directors.

3.7. DATA ANALYSIS

The research used both descriptive and inferential data analysis in analysing the primary data collected. Frequency tables were generated for easiness of reading by others and interpreted. In addition to the use of descriptive statistics in primary data analysis, inferential statistics were performed through One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).

One-Way analysis of variance is like a t-test but is used when two or more groups are used in the study, and they need to compare their mean scores on a continuous variable. It is called one-way because the research focuses on the impact of only one independent variable on the dependent variable. In this research, one-way ANOVA was used to determine the impact of corporate governance on PSEMAS in Namibia.

3.8. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The researcher observed all ethical considerations during the process of doing research. Issues of confidentiality, and trustworthiness, were observed during the research process. Individual and organizational consent were obtained from PSAMAS and the respondents. The primary data obtained in this research will be kept in a security safe by the research for 5 years. The secured primary data will be destroyed by the researcher through shredding after 5 years.

3.9. CONCLUSION

Chapter 3 provided the research methods for the study. The research method approach for the study, as well as the research philosophy, and design are discussed in this chapter. The research instruments that were used to collect primary data are discussed in this chapter. The chapter highlighted how primary data was collected and analysed. A structured research instrument was used to collect primary data. Data analysis techniques were discussed in this chapter. Research ethics that form the cornerstone of this research are discussed in this chapter. The chapter leads the reader to the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance on PSEMAS. The main research question of the study was to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the Public Service Employee Medical Aid Scheme in the Khomas Region Namibia? The secondary research questions of the study are as follows:

- i. What is the impact of the factors of corporate governance on the performance of PSEMAS in the Khomas region of Namibia?
- ii. What strategies could be recommended to improve corporate governance processes in PSEMAS in the Khomas region of Namibia?

The following key variables were determined during the investigation and are taken from Appendix 5. In PSEMAS, the variables that affect the corporate governance process are examined in Chapter 5.

- (i) Board of Directors
- (ii) Board of Directors
- (iii) Procedures and practices
- (iv) Performance evaluations regularly
- (v) Timely and accurate disclosure
- (vi) System for effective performance management

4.2. PRIMARY DATA PRESENTATION

The goal of gathering critical information was to frame respondents' perceptions of the impact of corporate governance on PSEMAS, through analysis of primary data collected. The research used quantitative data analysis software SPSS IBM

version 24 to analyse collected data. Frequency tables were generated from data analysis. Analysis of variance was used to determine the variables that seek to explain causation, in the context of corporate governance on company performance IPSEMAS). The following sections present the findings of the study.

4.2.1 RESPONSE RATE

It was feasible to get a 100% response rate. The researcher`s constant phone calls and the speed with which the surveys and individualized follow-ups were done, helped in achieving a high response rate.

Table 4.1: Gender of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Male	12	40	40	40
Female	18	60	60	60
Total	30	100	100	100

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.1 above shows that 60% of the respondents who participated in the study were female. The research also shows that the remaining 40% of the respondents were males.

Table 4.2: Age of respondents

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
20-30	3	10	10	10.
31-40	7	23.3	23.3	46.6
41-50	13	43.4	43.4	53.4
51-60	7	23.3	23.3	100
Total	30	100		

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.2 shows that 10% of the respondents who participated in this research were between the ages of 20 and 30 years respectively. It further shows that 23.3% of the respondents were between the ages of 31 and 40 years. The research further shows that 23.3% were between the ages of 51 and 60 years respectively.

Table 4.3: Marital Status of respondents

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Married	12	40	40	40
Widowed	2	6.7	6.7	46.7
Divorce	2	6.7	6.7	53.4
Separated	2	6.7	6.7	60.1
Single	12	40	40	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.3 above shows that 40% of the respondents were married, and another 40% were single. The results further showed that 6.7% of the respondents were divorced. The other 6.7% of the respondents were widowed. The remaining 6.7% of the respondents were separated.

Table 4.4: Academic Qualifications

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Diploma	12	40	40	40
Bachelors	15	50	50	90
Master's	3	10	10	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.4 above, shows that 40% of the respondents had obtained a Diploma academic qualification. The results further shows that 50% had a bachelor's degree. The remaining 10% had Master1s degree.

Table 4.5: Job Classification of respondents

Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
General Worker	2	6.7	6.7
Skilled worker	10	33.3	40
Supervisor	10	33.3	73.3
Manager	6	20.	93.3
Other	2	6.7	100
Total	30	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.5 above, shows that respondents categories in terms of job classifications were that 2% of the respondents were general workers. It also shows that 10% were skilled workers. The other 19% were supervisors. The results further shows that the remaining 2% of the respondents fall into unclassified job category.

Table 4.6: Period in Employment

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
<1 year	9	30	30	30
2-3 years	6	20	20	50
4-5 years	3	10	10	60
6-10 years	7	23.3	23.3	83.3
>11 years	11	36.6	36.6	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.6 above shows that 30% of the respondents had 1-year service at PSEMAS. Has a particularly young staff, which could indicate a higher employee turnover rate. Thirty percent (30%) of the respondents had less than one year of experience working for the company. When it comes to solid corporate culture, this is frequently a serious problem, and it may help explain why the organization was not functioning effectively. Furthermore, 36.6 percent of respondents had worked with PSEMAS for more than 11 years. The remaining 10% had 4-5 years of job experience. Furthermore, the results show that the remaining 20% had between 2-3 years of job experience, while 23.3% had between 6-10 years of work experience.

Table 4.7: Impeccable Leadership

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	14	46.6	46.6	46.6
Neutral	14	46.6	46.6	93.2
Strongly Disagree	2	6.8	6.8	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The results reflected in table 4.7 above, show that 47% of the respondents agreed that the organization has supreme leadership, and the other 47% of the respondents remained undecided. The remaining 7% strongly disagreed about the leadership style

Table 4.8: Board of Directors

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	17	56.6	56.6	56.6
Strongly Agree	3	10.	10.	66.6
Neutral	2	6.7	6.7	73.3
Disagree	6	20	20	93.3
Strongly Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The results shown in table 4.8 above show that (57%) of the respondents agreed on the importance of the board of directors in providing direction and support to the organization. The other 10% of the respondents, strongly agreed that the board of directors had shown respect for the organization. The respondents agreed that the board adds value to the association's decision-making process. However, 20% of the respondents disagreed with the statement, while 7% strongly disagree that the board of directors adds value to the association's decision-making process.

Table 4.9: Employment of Corporate Standards

Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	4	13.3	13.4
Neutral	11	36.6	49.9
Strongly Disagree	15	50	100
Total	30	100	

Source: Survey Data

The findings reflected in table 4.9 above show that 50% of the respondents strongly disagree that PSEMAS has an employment of corporate standards. The other 37% of the respondents remained neutral. The remaining 13% agree that PSEMAS has an employment of corporate standards. The overall results suggest that PSEMAS employment corporate standards are positive.

Table 4.10: Processes and Practice in place

Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	16	53.3	53.4
Strongly Agree	10	33.3	86.7
Disagree	4	13.3	100
Total	30	100	

Source: Survey Data

The results reflected in table 4.10 above show that 53% of respondents agreed that PSEMAS had implemented initiatives to ensure the company's processes and practices are in place. Excellent processes and practices can help a company maintain its market position while enhancing its reputation and growth. This was supported by 33%, of the respondents who strongly agree that processes and practices can help a company maintain its market position while enhancing its reputation and growth. The remaining 13% of the respondents disagree that processes and practices can help a company maintain its market position while enhancing its reputation and growth. This simply means that more needs to be done to protect the company's assets and image.

Table 4.11: Comply with Relevant Laws

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	12	40	40	40
Neutral	12	40	40	80
Disagree	6	20	20	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Although corporate governance is not a legal notion, 40% of the respondents agreed that PSEMAS complies with relevant laws. The other 40% of the respondents remained neutral on the issue of compliance with relevant laws. The remaining 20% of the respondents disagree with the view that PSEMAS complies with relevant laws.

Table 4.12: Communication Process

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	16	53.3	53.3	53.3
Strongly Agree	6	20	20	73.3
Neutral	4	13.3	13.3	86.6
Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	93.3
Strongly Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The results shown in Table 4.12 above show that 53% of the respondents agree that the PSEMAS communication process is effective. This was supported by 20% of the respondents who strongly agreed that PSEMAS communication is effective. The other 7% of the respondents disagreed that the PSEMAS communication process is effective. The remaining 7% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the PSEMAS communication process is effective. Given the responses of the survey participants, corporate governance emphasizes timely corporate disclosure, and PSEMAS appeared to be on the right track.

Table 4.13: Stability of Power and Authority

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.3	33.3	33.3
Strongly Agree	6	20	20	53.3
Neutral	10	33.3	33.3	86.6
Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	93.3
Strongly Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	100
Total	30	30	30	

Source: Survey Data

PSEMAS did not appear to have a solid control and authority structure. PSEMAS had a reliable control system, the results reflected in table 4.13 above show that 33% of the respondents agreed that they are stable and power of the board of directors in PSEMAS. The views are supported by 20% of the respondents that they are stability and power of the board of directors in PSEMAS. Whilst 33% of the respondents remained neutral. The other 7% of the respondents disagreed with the view that they are stability and power of the board of directors in PSEMAS. The remaining 6.7% of respondents vehemently opposed the idea that PSEMAS has a control balance. The remaining 7% of the respondents strongly disagreed that they are stability and power of the board of directors in PSEMAS.

Table 4.14: Effective Inner Organisation of Control

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	6	20	20	20
Strongly Agree	2	6.7	6.7	26.7
Neutral	6	20	20	46.7
Disagree	10	33.3	33.3	80
Strongly Disagree	6	20	20	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The findings reflected in 4.14 above, show that 33% of the respondents disagreed that PSEMAS contained compelling internal control mechanisms. The other 20% of the respondents remained neutral on this view. The other 20% strongly disagreed that PSEMAS contained compelling internal control mechanisms. The remaining 20% of the respondents agree that PSEMAS contained compelling internal control mechanisms. Whilst 7% strongly disagree that PSEMAS contained compelling internal control mechanisms.

Table 4.15: Operative Implements of Performance Management

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	2	6.7	6.7	6.7
Neutral	6	20	20	26.7
Disagree	14	46.6	46.6	73.3
Strongly Disagree	8	26.7	26.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Based on the results, 7% of the respondents agree that PSEMAS has operatives who implement performance management. The results showed that 20% of the respondents agree that PSEMAS has operatives who implement performance management. The other 47% of the respondents disagreed that PSEMAS has operatives who implement performance management. This was supported by 27% of the respondents who strongly agree that PSEMAS has operatives who implement performance management.

Table 4.16: Consistent Performance Valuation

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	6	20	20	20
Strongly Agree	2	6.7	6.7	26.7
Neutral	6	20	20	45.7
Disagree	6	20	20	66.7
Strongly Disagree	10	33.3	33.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.16 shows that 33% of respondents strongly disagreed with the premise that the organization conducted routine employee evaluations. This concept is also opposed by 20% of the respondents. At the time of the survey, 20% of respondents agreed that the organization conducted a routine execution review of its employees. A small 7% of respondents agreed that the organization conducted an execution appraisal. The remaining 20% of respondents preferred to remain neutral. It appears that both the company's board of directors and the Chief Executive Officer were perceived as incapable of evaluating employee performance.

Table 4.17: Excellent Organisational Performance

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	4	13.3	13.3	13.3
Neutral	8	26.7	26.7	40
Disagree	14	46.7	46.7	86.7
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Given the responses of the previous respondents, it is evident that most respondents (47%) were opposed to the notion that the organization was performing very well. This was backed up by the 13% who vehemently rejected the concept, despite the corporation having a stellar track record. According to the total number of responses, 60% opposed this plan, claiming that the company was performing well. Given previous reactions to organizational performance, it was not surprising to recommend such a reaction.

Table 4.18: Assurance of Timely Truthful Exposure

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	8	26.7	26.7	26.7
Neutral	12	40	40	66.7
Disagree	6	20	20	86.7
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The results show that 40% of respondents remained neutral on assurance of timely truthful exposure at PSEMAS. The results show that the other 27% of the respondents agreed with the views of assurance of timely truthful exposure at PSEMAS. Furthermore, 13% of respondents strongly disagreed with this proposal, citing the company's stand on timely disclosure of money-related execution. Some of the pillars of effective corporate governance in a system are transparency and straightforwardness.

Table 4.19: Financial Report Practice

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.3	33.3	33.3
Strongly Agree	4	13.3	13.3	46.6
Neutral	2	6.7	6.7	53.3
Disagree	6	20	20	73.3
Strongly Disagree	8	26.7	26.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.19 shows that 33% of respondents agreed that the corporation follows a clear strategy in presenting financial information to shareholders. This was backed up by the other 13% of respondents who stated firmly that the corporation follows clear techniques and strategies in preparing financial statements for shareholders. Regardless, 27% of respondents strongly disagree with this attitude, and an additional 20% strongly opposed this idea. Finally, 27% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the corporation did not follow clear methods for generating and arranging shareholders' financial statements.

Table 4.20: Review and Risk Committee

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Strongly Agree	2	6.7	6.7	6.7
Neutral	8	26.6	26.6	33.3
Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	40
Strongly Disagree	18	60	60	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The fact that 60% of respondents strongly opposed the corporation having a Review and Risk Committee is shocking. This was backed by the fact that 6.7% of respondents also opposed the idea of the corporation having an active Review and Risk Committee. According to the findings, 7% of those polled strongly agreed that the organization had a Review and Risk Committee. Processes and procedures may be jeopardized, making this a serious situation. This study supports previous findings that show the corporation has a poor performance management system and does not provide shareholders with useful financial data. Corporate governance in an organization suffers because of such circumstances.

Table 4.21: Acceptable Documentation of Inner Control

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.4	33.4	33.4
Strongly Agree	4	13.3	13.3	46.7
Neutral	6	20	20	66.7
Disagree	6	20	20	86.7
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

The information reflected in Table 4.21 above shows that 33% of respondents believed the organization's internal controls were effectively documented. 13% of respondents agreed unequivocally that the company's internal controls are well documented. Furthermore, 20% of respondents were undecided, while the remaining 20% disputed this position, claiming that PSEMAS had enough documentation of internal control systems. However, 13% of respondents flatly denied that PSEMAS provided sufficient internal control documents.

Table 4.22: Resolve Inner Reviewed Matters

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.3	33.3	33.3
Strongly Agree	2	6.8	6.8	40
Neutral	10	33.3	33.3	73.3
Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	86.6
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Source: Survey Data

Table 4.22 above, shows that 33% of respondents agree that PSEMAS resolves review-related problems matters. The other 7% strongly agree that PSEMAS resolves review-related problems matters. The results further show that 13% of the respondents remained neutral that PSEMAS resolves review-related problems matters. The other 13% of the respondents disagree that PSEMAS resolves review-related problems matters. The remaining 13% of the respondents strongly disagree that PSEMAS resolves review-related problems matters.

Table 4.23: One-Way Anova Statistical Results

One Way Anova Statistics Results Summary					
Parameter	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p-value
Board of directors brings value	14.371	4	4.836	6.752	.030
Procedures and principles in place	9.448	4	7.271	5.542	.036
Regular performance assessment	11.310	6	6.605	5.785	.048
Assurance of time accurate disclosure	12.010	4	7.602	3.145	.044

Source: Survey Data

The results shown in Table 4.23 above, reflects an Analysis of Variance results. The results show the variables that are significant at .05, and hence relevant to the study. The variables that emerged from the analysis at a .05 significant level are discussed here. Board of directors brings value is significant at .030; procedures and principles in place are significant at .036; regular performance assessment is significant at .048; and finally, assurance of time accurate disclosure is significant at .044 respectively. The outcome variables are significant to the study and can impact the Public Sector Employee Medical Aid Scheme in Khomas Region Namibia.

4.3 CONCLUSION

Chapter 4 provided data analysis and interpretation of the results. The research uses descriptive analysis, Analysis of Variance in the analysis of primary data collected through the structured research questionnaire. The findings presented in this chapter lead to the discussion of the findings in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The focus of this study is on the impact of corporate governance flaws on PSEMAS. The following were the recognized basic variables that have an impact on corporate governance practice in PSEMAS, as shown in Table 4.23 in chapter 4, summarized below:

- (i) Board of Directors
- (ii) Procedures and practices
- (iii) Performance evaluations regularly
- (iv) Accurate and timely disclosure
- (v) System for effective performance management

The findings are supported by the literature reviewed which suggests that the board of directors brings value to a company if it remains effective. According to the results derived from the One-way Anova quantifiable results: $F = F 6.752$ with a p-value of .030 According to the King II Report (2002), good corporate governance's framework and components, including the board, procedures and methods, and recording, are the hallmarks of good corporate governance. These are included:

- (i) Boards and Directors

The board of directors is the heart of the corporate governance structure, and it is ultimately responsible for the organization's success and operations. Although the board has delegated expertise to board committees or managers, this does not negate or cancel the roles and responsibilities of the boards and senior management.

(ii) Board Composition

Companies should be led by a compelling board that can both lead and control the organization, according to the King II Report (2000), a board that includes a balance of official and non-executive executives, ideally with a majority of non-executive executives, of whom an adequate number should be free of management to protect the shareholder interface.

(iii) Board Chairperson and Chief Executive Officers

A clearly defined division of duties at the top of the company, according to The King II Report (2002), creates a balance of control, power, and competence, guaranteeing that no single person has entire decision-making authority.

(iv) Directors

The board should maintain a correct balance of authority and control so that no single person dominates and overwhelms the board's decision-making process. Non-executive directors should be of high calibre and integrity, with the required abilities and experience within the organization. Only if new non-executive directorships conflict with their immediate management responsibilities should executive directors be urged to quit them.

The importance of putting procedures and practices in order as a key arrangement is further supported by one-way Anova measurable results: The sum of squares is 9.448, the degrees of freedom is four, the mean square is 7.271, the F value is 5.542, and the p-value is .036. According to Figure 4.10, 60% of respondents said that PSEMAS had tactics to secure organizational

resources and notoriety. These are good business strategies for securing its market position and enhancing its reputation and growth. This was backed up by 13.3% of respondents who said they are confident with the measures to safeguard organizational resources and notoriety. The majority of respondents (26.7%) oppose this concept and acknowledge that the organization has no strategies to protect its resources and reputation.

The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Administration (CACG, 1988) provides 15 corporate governance guidelines. These requirements apply to all boards of directors, whether commercial, public, family-owned, or state-owned. PSEMAS should focus on the following five (5) standards:

- (i) Ensure that techniques and practices for safeguarding the organization's resources and reputation are in place. To inspect and evaluate the implementation of the methodology, agreements, management execution criteria, and business strategies;
- (ii) Govern the corporation's mission and standards, as well as the mechanism for achieving its purpose and putting its values into action, to ensure its survival and growth.
- (iii) Determine the organization's internal and external partners and agree on policies and procedures for dealing with them. Ensure that no single individual has complete influence over the board and that authority is exercised in a balanced and consistent manner.
- (iv) Appoint the CEO and, at the very least, participate in selecting senior officials; ensure the inspiration and protection of rational capital essential to the firm; ensure that employees and management receive enough training inside the organization.
- (v) Ensure that the business complies with all applicable laws, rules, and

codes of good business practice.

5.2 SUMMARY

PSEMAS has a long way to go in terms of improving corporate governance between the organization and its shareholders, especially in the areas of Board of Directors operations, methods, and practices, conducting standard performance evaluations of personnel, timely precise disclosure of financial statements to shareholders, and putting in place a compelling performance management framework. To move PSEMAS' corporate governance ahead, the overwhelming majority of respondents (86.7%) believed that much should be abolished.

They agreed that the corporation needed to implement mechanisms to advance corporate governance. Currently, 13.3% of people are against it. This indicated that 86.7% of those polled had issues to be addressed. PSEMAS thus had much work to improve corporate governance and organizational effectiveness. 86.7% of respondents thought PSEMAS's corporate governance standards were lacking and needed improvement. Currently, 13.3% of people are against it. This means that 86.7% of responders had a valid argument to make.

5.3 CONCLUSION

The study's key findings confirmed most of the empirical findings of this study covered in Chapter 2. The findings of this study showed that the following variables have a significant impact on corporate execution at .05 significant level. Board of directors brings value is significant at .030; procedures and principles in place are significant at .036; regular performance assessment is significant at .048; and finally, assurance of time accurate disclosure is significant at .044 respectively.

The research concluded that PSEMAS must put together a board that is well balanced, diversified, and large enough to help the organization achieve its long-term goals.

According to the majority of respondents who took part in this poll, a well-organized board of directors is crucial to moving the business forward.

(i) Methods and practices

The respondents also agreed that proper organizational procedures for disclosing critical organizational budgetary data in a timely and easy manner must be implemented. PSEMAS should pay attention to the respondents' suggestions for future strategies and procedures.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The study's main recommendation is to:

- (i) Encourage PSEMAS to revisit the organization's completely corporate governance process and work on the distinguishing aspects that are factually significant to this study. Making strides in the structure, adapting, differences, and estimating the PSEMAS board of executives are among the factors.
- A performance management framework emerged as a big worry, with 86.7% of respondents indicating that the organization should focus quickly to enhance the process.
- (ii) If the organization wants to gain esteem from its shareholders, timely disclosure of organizational data, notably budgetary reports, must be improved. Corruption, exploitation, and accountability are bred by the indiscriminate release of timely organizational data.

5.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This research study recommends that more research be done to uncover other relevant aspects, that contribute to the achievement of the goals specified but are not covered by the scope of this study. For example, the current research concentrated on PSEMAS;

therefore, expanding the research to account for PSEMAS based in other segments can improve the understanding of Corporate Governance and performance in a broader sense.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Interview Guide



**AN INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCES PRACTICES
AT THE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE MEDICAL AID SCHEME IN
KHOMAS REGION NAMIBIA**

Interview Guide

Number.....

Introduction

My name is Siobhan van Wyk, student number 218352942. I am a Masters Candidate at the University of Namibia. I am pursuing a Master's degree in Public Sector in the Faculty of Accounting and Economics.

Dear Respondent

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. This survey is being undertaken as part of my studies to better understand the Investigating of Corporate Governance Practices at the Public Sector Employee Medical Aid Scheme in Namibia's Khomas Region.

Your honest and accurate response is critical to the survey's success.

PSEMAS		
Department		
Designation		
Civil Status	Male <input type="checkbox"/>	Female <input type="checkbox"/>
	Start Time	Finish Time
Level of Cooperation	High.....; Low.....	Medium.....
Date:		

SECTION A: INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION

1. To begin with, we would like to know a little bit about you. Would you please kindly tell us your length of service in the current division?
2. Could you tell us your reporting structure?
3. How many employees directly reports to you?
4. Was it essential to meet certain requirements for this position?
5. To whom do you directly report?

**SECTION B: UNDERSTANDING EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP
SUCCESSION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN
COMMERCIAL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES**

1. Now we would like to know more about the corporate governance procedures in your division. Can you perhaps elaborate more on the interference, if any, decision-making and so forth?
2. In your view, please direct on the structure, dimension and composition of the PSEMAS Board of Directors? Do you think they own the right combination of experience, capabilities, abilities, and skills to successfully serve PSEMAS and its shareholders?
3. Do you have confidence that the independent directors of PSEMAS are truthfully autonomous from the Chairperson of the board of controlling shareholders?
4. In your opinion, does the Board provide strategic guidance to the CEO and management of the organisation by means of revising their implementation plans?
5. Do you think that the Board of Directors are dynamic, contribute to managing the organisation, and are dynamically involved in articulating continuing strategies?
6. Who do you think has the most grounded voice in choosing and rejecting autonomous directors, evacuating an ineffectively performing CEO, and selecting a new CEO?

7. In your view, whom do you think sets the Board outline/ agenda for board meetings?
8. Does the Board spend a suitable quantity of time discussing and deciding on the continuing future/plans of the company?
9. Do you think the Board communicated the calculated objectives and directions of the company to the CEO and the administration?
10. Do you think the Board members add adequate time learning approximately the company's trade and gets it well enough to supply basic oversight?
11. Do you think the Board ceaselessly examine management's success/development in accomplishing the company's key goals utilizing the concurred performance management measurements?
12. If you have any other comments or data concerning corporate procedures and strategies in PSEMAS, it would be ideal if you feel free to share with me at this minute.

May I please take this opportunity to thank you for taking your time to share with us information on the Investigation of Corporate Governance Practices at the Public Sector Medical Aid Scheme in Khomas Region in Namibia? Thank you once more.

Appendix 2: Results 1

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Male	12	40	40	40
Female	18	60	60	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
20-30	3	10	10	10.
31-40	7	23.3	23.3	46.6
41-50	13	43.4	43.4	53.4
51-60	7	23.3	23.3	100
Total	30	100		

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Married	12	40	40	40
Widowed	2	6.7	6.7	46.7
Divorce	2	6.7	6.7	53.4
Separated	2	6.7	6.7	60.1
Single	12	40	40	100
	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Diploma	12	40	40	40
Bachelors	15	50	50	90
Master's	3	10	10	100
Total	30	100	100	

Job Classification				
Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
General Worker	2	6.7	6.7	6.7
Skilled worker	10	33.3	33.3	40
Supervisor	10	33.3	33.3	73.3
Manager	6	20.	20.	93.3
Other	2	6.7	6.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
<1 year	9	30	30	30
2-3 years	6	20	20	50
4-5 years	3	10	10	60
6-10 years	7	23.3	23.3	83.3
>11 years	11	36.6	36.6	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	14	46.6	46.6	46.6
Neutral	14	46.6	46.6	93.2
Strongly Disagree	2	6.8	6.8	6100
Total	30	100	100	

Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
17	56.6	56.6	56.6
3	10.	10.	66.6
2	6.7	6.7	73.3
6	20	20	93.3
2	6.7	6.7	100
30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	4	13.3	13.3	13.4
Neutral	11	36.6	36.6	49.9
Strongly Disagree	15	50	50	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	16	53.3	53.4	53.4
Strongly Agree	10	33.3	33.3	86.7
Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	12	40	40	40
Neutral	12	40	40	80
Disagree	6	20	20	100
Total	30	100	100	
Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	16	53.3	53.3	53.3
Strongly Agree	6	20	20	73.3
Neutral	4	13.3	13.3	86.6
Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	93.3
Strongly Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.3	33.3	33.3
Strongly Agree	6	20	20	53.3
Neutral	10	33.3	33.3	86.6
Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	93.3
Strongly Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	100
Total	30	30	30	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	6	20	20	20
Strongly Agree	2	6.7	6.7	26.7
Neutral	6	20	20	46.7
Disagree	10	33.3	33.3	80
Strongly Disagree	6	20	20	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	2	6.7	6.7	6.7
Neutral	6	20	20	26.7
Disagree	14	46.6	46.6	73.3
Strongly Disagree	8	26.7	26.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	6	20	20	20
Strongly Agree	2	6.7	6.7	26.7
Neutral	6	20	20	45.7
Disagree	6	20	20	66.7
Strongly Disagree	10	33.3	33.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	4	13.3	13.3	13.3
Neutral	8	26.7	26.7	40
Disagree	14	46.7	46.7	86.7
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	8	26.7	26.7	26.7
Neutral	12	40	40	66.7
Disagree	6	20	20	86.7
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.3	33.3	33.3
Strongly Agree	4	13.3	13.3	46.6
Neutral	2	6.7	6.7	53.3
Disagree	6	20	20	73.3
Strongly Disagree	8	26.7	26.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Strongly Agree	2	6.7	6.7	6.7
Neutral	8	26.6	26.6	33.3
Disagree	2	6.7	6.7	40
Strongly Disagree	18	60	60	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.4	33.4	33.4
Strongly Agree	4	13.3	13.3	46.7
Neutral	6	20	20	66.7
Disagree	6	20	20	86.7
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100
Total	30	100	100	

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	10	33.3	33.3	33.3
Strongly Agree	2	6.8	6.8	40
Neutral	10	33.3	33.3	73.3
Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	86.6
Strongly Disagree	4	13.3	13.3	100

Total	30	100	100	
-------	----	-----	-----	--

Valid	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Agree	16	53.3	53.3	53.3
Neutral	14	46.7	46.7	100
Total	30	100	100	

Appendix 3:

Results 2

		Sum Square	of df	Mean Square	F	P-Value
GENDER	BETWEEN	185	12	0.92	313	735
	Groups					
	Within	3448	18	295		
	Groups					
	Total	3633	30			

Age Category	BETWEEN	4551	12	2176	1814	204
	Groups					
	Within	14048	18	1154		
	Groups					
	Total	18599	30			

Marital Status	BETWEEN	5210	12	2555	2069	156
	Groups					
	Within	14590	18	1124		
	Groups					
	Total	19800	30			

Academic Qualifications	BETWEEN	287	12	142	553	574
	Groups					
	Within	2048	18	253		
	Groups					
	Total	2335	30			

Job Category	BETWEEN	1518	12	750	631	543
	Groups					
	Within	14114	18	1085		
	Groups					
	Total	15632	30			

Period of Employment	BETWEEN	2586	12	1243	373	686
	Groups					
	Within	42048	18	3487		
	Groups					
	Total	44634	30			

Board of Directors brings Value	BETWEEN	12671	12	3736	4652	0.2
	Groups					
	Within	16262	18	1338		
	Groups					
	Total	28933	30			

Achievement and implementation of Corporate	BETWEEN	8186	12	3143	2262	135
	Groups					
	Within	20048	18	1654		

Values	Groups					
	Total	28234	30			
Procedures and Practices in place	BETWEEN	9743	12	5271	4442	0.34
	Groups					
	Within	13190	18	1083		
	Groups					
	Total	22933	30			

Corporation Complies with relevant laws	BETWEEN	2810	12	1355	834	420
	Groups					
	Within	17690	18	1458		
	Groups					
	Total	20500	30			

Effective Communication	BETWEEN	8886	12	4843	2268	135
	Groups					
	Within	24048	18	1087		
	Groups					
	Total	32934	30			

Balance power Authority	BETWEEN	2805	18	854	412	
	Groups					
	Within	22929	12	1894		
	Groups					
	Total	25734	30			

Effective Internal System of control	BETWEEN	619	12	260	152	760
	Groups					
	Within	27214	18	2251		
	Groups					
	Total	27833	30			

Effective Tools of Performance Management	BETWEEN	5043	12	2021	3642	0.54
	Groups					
	Within	8690	18	708		
	Groups					
	Total	13733	30			

Regular Performance Assessment	BETWEEN	12410	12	5705	3885	0.47
	Groups					
	Within	19190	18	1583		
	Groups					
	Total	31600	30			

Excellent Organisation Performance	BETWEEN	2519	12	1660	1202	208
	Groups					
	Within	15214	18	1251		
	Groups					
	Total	17733	30			

Assurance of timely accurate disclosure	BETWEEN	10015	12	4502	3145	0.42
	Groups					
	Within	14929	18	1227		
	Groups					
	Total	24944	30			

Financial Reports Procedures	BETWEEN	2571	12	1236	319	0.667
	Groups					
	Within	37262	18			
	Groups					
	Total	39833	30			

Audit and risk committee	BETWEEN	1138	12	1059	799	0.433
	Groups					
	Within	13262	18	1088		
	Groups					
	Total	14400	30			

Adequate documentation of internal controls	BETWEEN	10143	12	5471	3211	0.62
	Groups					
	Within	19120	18	1.583		
	Groups					
	Total	29626	30			

Resolve internal audit issues	BETWEEN	7500	12	3250	1448	0.127
	Groups					
	Within	19733	18	1636		
	Groups					
	Total	27233	30			

Corporate Governance and Performance within PSEMAS	BETWEEN	1076	12	1037	1037	0.87
	Groups					
	Within	13857	18	1138		
	Groups					
	Total	14933	30			

Appendix 4: Permission Letter to Conduct Research

Siobhan F van Wyk

P. O. Box 22448

Windhoek

Namibia

October 2021

Windhoek, Khomas Region, Chief Executive Officer Public Service Employee
Medical Aid Scheme

Greetings, Sir/Madam

RE: Permission to conduct research request

My name is Siobhan F van Wyk, and I am a student at the University of Namibia pursuing a Master of Business Administration - Public Sector Management degree.

I am researching to learn more about corporate governance in the public sector. This is part of the Master of Business Administration – Public Sector Management degree requirements.

As a result, I want permission to research your organization to obtain information relevant to my study. Your aid is greatly appreciated in this respect.

Yours faithfully

Siobhan van Wyk

(Researcher)

Appendix 5: Originality Index

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Word document titled "SIOBHAN F WANI WYK-21832942 - Word". The document content is as follows:

Original

Document Information

Analysed: 05/06/2021 10:45:00 AM - SIOBHAN F WANI WYK-21832942 - 123456789
 Document ID: 123456789

File Size: 201-0-070904-00-0000000
 File Created by: [Name]
 File Created on: 05/06/2021
 File Location: [Path]
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Sources included in the report

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Page 1 of 1 | 133 words | English (United States) | 60%

Appendix 6: Proof-editing Confirmation

EDITING CONFIRMATION

To whom it may concern:

This memo serves to confirm that the manuscript/research project detailed below has been language-edited and proof-read.

Best Regards,



F. Saruchera (Ph.D.; Cert. Lang. Ed.)
Professional Editor
sarucheraf@gmail.com

Manuscript Title:

AN INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AT THE
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE MEDICAL AID SCHEME IN KHOMAS REGION
NAMIBIA

Author:

SIOBHAN F VAN WYK

Issued on:

December 20, 2021

Disclaimer:

The editor/proofreader makes no claim as to the accuracy of the manuscript contents nor the objectives of the author. While all possible efforts have been made to ensure the text as edited is readable and grammatically correct, the author(s) have the option to accept or reject suggestions and trackable changes made to the document before submission.



Sarchcot Language Editors

sarchcot@gmail.com