

MIGRATION SECURITIZATION IN SADC: ASSESSING ITS IMPACT ON THE
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION AGENDA

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ABSTRACT

This exploratory study looks at migration and securitization in SADC. More specifically, the study assesses the impact that migration and securitization have on the free movement of people and on regional economic integration agenda of SADC. The study uses the securitization theory espoused by Buzan and Wæver in order to assess the how the securitization of migration affects freedom of movement and regional integration within the SADC region. The theory argues that political issues are defined as security issues that need to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as ‘dangerous’, ‘threatening’ and ‘alarming’ by a securitising actor, that holds social and institutional power to move the issue beyond politics. Further the theory argues that security issues are not simply out in the air, rather they have to be articulated as problems by securitising actors. The study draws upon qualitative data like documentary analyses, books, journals and semi-structured interviews.

The Study also sought to assess the impact of the securitization of Migration in SADC on the free movement of people and regional economic integration agenda. The study found that the impact of the securitization of migration, provides SADC governments with the ability to restrict entry of foreign nationals into their job markets, business sectors and social spaces. More-so the study also found that the migration securitization may hinder the ability of ordinary people who are not in big business from fully participating and being full beneficiaries of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The study further found that it has been witnessed that where circular migration or multiple migration is restricted, in Southern Africa, there is an impact on trade. The study also found that the overemphasis on formal channels of trade affects informal trade which is seen to be influential in the functioning of regional economies. Cross border traders are seen as key contributors to the overall economy of the region, henceforth the migration securitization continues to hinder productive integration of cross border trading, which further affects regional economic development. In relation to SADC developing a migration policy that is more human centric than state centric, the study found that, the lack of coherence between regional and national migration policies has created a huge gap between regional legislative

framework and national legislative framework. The study further pointed that, SADC needs to formulate and implement a regional migration policy framework, that is aligned to that of the African Union's Protocol on Free Movement of Persons which is seen to be more human centred. Further the study pointed out that the formulation of the migration policy framework must be crafted and implemented through wide consultations with civil society and local communities and lastly should protect the freedom of movement of migrants within and from host countries. More-so, the findings also found that there is a need for ensuring freedom of movement of all migrants including refugees and asylum seekers without fear of arrest, detention or deportation. In addition, the study also found that in creating a more human centric migration policy, SADC member states need to work together to ensure creation and protection of social security benefits of migrants and foreign nationals. In relation to how labour migration in SADC contributes to economic development of host nations; the study found that the South African mining industry has previously benefited economically from migrants Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The study also found that in a state where, there is a fertile ground for economic migrants, labour migration will be key for economic development. More-over the study also finds that despite the securitised nature of migration people will continue to move. The study recommends that the region needs to implement a centralised border management and information system, that will allow for increased data sharing, increasing legal pathways

Keywords: Migration, Securitization, Free Movement, SADC, Regional Economic Integration

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AU – African Union

ACMS – African Centre for Migration and Society

AEC – African Economic Community

AFCFTA – African Continental Free Trade Area

BNP – British National Party

CAP – Common African Position

CMA – Common Monetary Area

EAC – East African Community

EU – European Union

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arab States

GCM – Global Compact for Migration

ILO – International labour Organization

IOM – International Organization for Migration

IR – International Relations

ISS – Institute for Security Studies

OAU - Organization for African Unity

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPDS – Organ for Politics Defence and Security

REC - Regional Economic Community

SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SACU – Southern African Customs Union

UN – United Nations

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was created in 1992 as the successor to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The SADCC was created in 1980 as an affiliated group of nations that sought to reduce their dependence on the economically greater neighbour, apartheid South Africa, and also assist in bringing an end to the apartheid regime. The ascension of independence in Namibia and the democratisation of South Africa in 1994, led to the reconstitution of SADC in 1992, as a more formal group of nations under the SADC treaty and the inclusion of Namibia and South Africa as member states (Dodson and Crush, 2015). This formalisation of the regional grouping under SADC, also formalised the migration of the region's people build around a history of mining centred, ironically around South Africa.

Freedom of movement is enshrined in 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a basic right for everyone. However, this right remains a right that is enjoyed by a few people globally (Maunganidze and Formica, 2018). Furthermore, Maunganidze and Formica (2018) argue that the SADC treaty includes the progressive elimination of barriers for goods, capital, services and people as one of its main core objectives. Additionally, they state that the SADC 2005 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons is the main legal instrument designed to implement the provisions of the SADC treaty regarding the movement of people in the sub-region.

Further they state that, migration in the Southern African region is seen as a 'historical phenomenon' that stems from the demand for labour resulting from the development of extractive industries during the last two decades of the 19th century, primarily in South Africa (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). According to the African Centre for Migration and Society (2018), it could be argued that the history of southern Africa, is the history of the movement of its people. Presently, the southern Africa region continues to experience a significant rise in mixed and irregular migration, labour migration and the displacement of persons due to conflict and natural disasters. The region is said to be experiencing mostly the effects of intra-regional migration. Labour migration has been identified to be the most dominant form of migration in the region (African Centre for Migration & Society, 2018).

1.2. Statement of Problem

Actual migrant numbers are increasingly difficult to determine, due to indication of general mobility of total legal entries directed towards a single country: South Africa. Foreign sources of migrants have increased from 1 million in 1990 to 5.1 million in 1996 and 8.5 million by 2011 (Crush, 2014). Migrants are demographically diverse in-terms of origin, gender, education and skills levels. Yet the data does not disaggregate this diversity and usually groups all migrants together. Moreover, data is less easy to access that represents with certainty the economic impact of migration on migrant receiving countries such as South Africa. This is mainly due to little systematic and comprehensive econometric analysis of the effects of migration on the south African labour market and other migrant host nations (Dodson & Crush, 2015).

In addition to the above, currently SADC governments view migration as a national security threat rather than a human rights or human security issue. SADC governments, including South Africa, are increasingly leaning towards a security-based approach in dealing with migratory issues (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). Migration is now increasingly viewed primarily through a state security as opposed to a human security lens in SADC.

This has led to the development of negative perceptions and misconceptions about migrants, who are now increasingly both viewed as a national security threat, which has in turn affected the ability of SADC to develop a clear regional migration framework, which would be beneficial to all states in the region, reducing illicit migration and creating a better environment for business and policy. Hence, the researcher seeks to dispel the recurring notions on the effect of migrants in the region and identify a suitable migration framework to be adopted by SADC member states.

1.3. Research Questions

- In what way does securitization of migration affect free movement of people and regional economic integration within SADC?
- How can SADC develop a migration policy that is more human-centric than state-centric?
- In what ways can SADC transform into an institution that is equipped to deal with human security challenges facing the region?
- In what way does labour migration in SADC contribute to the economic development of migrant hosting nations?

1.4. Significance of the study

Numerous studies have been done with regards to the free movement of people, and its benefits and limitations to both the sending and receiving states. However, clear disparities still exist with regards to sufficient data on free movement of persons in the region and migration patterns. Moreover, the benefits and significance of labour migrants to migrant hosting countries have been inadequately explored. The findings of this study provide an important opportunity for advancing migration policy development and research in Southern Africa. Secondly, the findings are constructive in prompting further scholarly research on the benefits of increased labour migration across Southern Africa. Lastly, the study is significant and beneficial for general readership aiming to gain insight on the subject matter.

1.5. Limitations of the study

Partly due to the unavailability of some respondents and the distance the researcher would have to cover in order to gain access to the respondents, in the absence of face-to-face interviews, the researcher made use of questionnaires to supplement the face-to-face interviews.

1.6. Delimitations of the study

The delimitation for this particular research report was to probe the problem of free movement of persons in SADC and the significant contribution of labour migration on the economic development migrant hosting states in SADC.

1.7. Research Methodology

1.7.1 Research Design

This study made use of a single case study assessment design. The single case study will allow the researcher to make any inferences on the benefits labour migration might have on migrant hosting states. According to Crowe, Cresswell, Robertson, Huby, Avery and Sheikh (2011) The case study approach is seen to be useful in an effort to obtain an in-depth appreciation of an issue, event or phenomenon of interest in its natural real-life context (Crowe, Cresswell, Robertson, Huby, Avery and Sheikh (2011)).

1.7.2. Research Method

The study was conducted using the qualitative method. This was due to the proposed topic which required a systematic inquiry in order to obtain in-depth data for analysing the migration framework in southern Africa and the practice of securitization of migration. The researcher made use of interviews for the collection of primary data and made use of data collected by other researchers for the purpose of secondary data, to be used for comparison purposes. The researcher made use of the in-depth interviews because it allowed the researcher to probe further questions on the subject matter depending on how the respondents responded to the questions posed towards them.

1.7.3. Population

According to Simkins (2021), population growth in SADC is seen as rapid by global standards. Simkins (2021) notes that the population grew from 277 million in 2010 to 363 million in 2020, representing an average annual rate of 2.6% growth. In a region

of an estimated population of 363 million people, 6.4 million international migrants were identified mid-year 2020. Moreover, an estimated 2.9 million migrants resided in South Africa by mid-2020. This, in-part, is due to that being the most industrialised economy in the region and an attractive destination for people in search for education and better economic opportunities (IOM Global Migration Data Centre, 2021).

1.7.4. Sample

The study made use of purposive or judgment sampling in order to select the key informants for the study. The key participants were selected based on their expertise on the research matter. The study sought to interview 15 key informants for the study, however the researcher only managed to interview 10 informants due to limited availability of some respondents. These informants were comprised of key selected individuals from the following institutions; Institute for Security Studies, the International Organization for Migration, African Centre for Migration and Society, the South African Institute of International Affairs and Academia respectively. The identified institutions were chosen due to their extensive research and experience in working on Migratory matters, within Southern Africa.

1.7.5. Research instruments

During the qualitative interview stage of the research, the researcher will be directed and guided by an interview schedule. Finally, the researcher made use of a multi-media voice recording device for capturing the views of the respondents. Additionally, the researcher made use of books, journals, articles and reports for the purpose of reviewing and scrutinizing relevant literature accompanying the interview question.

Standardized instructions on how to complete the interview questionnaire and an explanation on what was expected of every respondent was provided.

1.7.6. Procedure

The qualitative interviews were characterized by the researcher posing a series of questions towards the respondents. In addition, the interview sessions were directed by the researcher and all correspondents with the respondents were recorded using a multimedia recorder. Secondary qualitative data was collected mainly from the following sources: books, journals, reports, laws and policies governing migration and free-movement of persons in the SADC region.

1.7.7. Data analysis

The data analysis followed the framework of qualitative data analysis. Once all the data was collected, a process of isolating the views and placing them into categories began. This was done through a process of in-depth analysis of the data. Information received from interviews, was transcribed orderly, in order to represent the views of the key informants and participants, secondly data extracted from secondary sources. The researcher acknowledged the source of the data in its original form, especially in the extraction of maps that represented migratory flows, sourced from another source. The data that was received through the interview process was transcribed and coded in a comprehensive manner, that allowed for participant responses to be presented in a clear and sensible manner through thematic analysis. The data sources were also subjected to a process of triangulation in order to ensure the authentication of the data received from the respondents.

1.8. Ethical Considerations

The researcher sought to guard, the research against any biased views and also guard against biased reporting. Additionally, in an instance that the researcher, stumbled upon information that was confidential nature, in which the publication of such material would have been detrimental, the researcher, sought permission from the participants before publication of such sensitive information. Furthermore, once granted permission, the researcher ensured to conceal the names of the informants in the process of transcribing the information. Additionally, the researcher further ensured that the information recorded through the multimedia voice recorder was stored in a safe, for a period of 1 year before finalization of the research and 5 years after the publication of the research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This Chapter surveys the writings on the securitization of migration which have an impact on the regional integration agenda of the Southern African Development Community. The literature contributions offer an insight into, the theory of securitization, the concept of migration, the concept of regional integration in Africa and looks into the problem of securitization of migration and illustrates how this phenomenon has an impact on regional economic integration. Finally, this chapter interrogates the discourses on the benefits of migration for the Southern African Development Community.

2.2. Theoretical approach

The securitization theory of Buzan (1998) and Wæver (1995) is a theory that belongs to the wider branch of critical security studies, which in itself is a constructivist theory of international relations. In essence, the theory focuses on the formulation of an issue as a security threat, through the speech acts of individuals. Moreover, the theory explains how the issue of security is socially constructed by ‘securitizing issues’ (Lenz-Raymann, 2014). According to Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 3-6) “a security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have the right to survive.” McDonald (2008) asserts that securitization and the securitization theory have been applied to the formation and analysing of state foreign policy behaviour, from framing transnational crime and HIV/AIDS as security threats, to various dimensions of the ‘war on terror’, and issues relating to minority rights.

Ole Wæver (1989) was the first scholar to theorise about the securitization theory. Furthermore, a securitization process is said to involve a securitising actor, an audience, and a referent object. Moreover, the audience, in this context, is defined as ‘those the securitising act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures,

because of the specific security nature of some issue', (Dos Santos, 2018, pp6). In addition, it is important to note that an issue usually becomes securitised when an audience collectively agrees on the nature of the threat and supports taking extraordinary measures to protect society and the state from the assumed threat. Furthermore, it is argued that if the audience rejects the securitising actor's speech act, it only represents a securitising move and the securitisation has failed. Henceforth, the focus on the audience and on process requires considerably more than simply 'saying security' (Eroukhmanoff, 2017).

Proponents, such as constructivists, post-structural approaches, and securitization theorists, see security as a process or activity rather than a state of being (Nyman, 2018). However, the Copenhagen School differs from more traditional approaches to security in that it does not matter if there is a genuine existential danger; all that matter is for the issue to be depicted and recognized as such. They acknowledge that dangers might be genuine or imagined, but believe that attempting to define "true security" outside of the realm of politics would not aid political understanding. (Fakhoury, 2016). The next section discusses the origins of the securitization theory, as defined by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies

2.3. Securitization

Rychnovska (2014), argues that the Copenhagen School of Security Studies under Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, 'offered a radically constructivist approach on how 'security problems emerge and dissolve' (Rychnovska, 2014, p11). She further argues that this was done by suggesting that security threats are socially constructed in a process called securitization. The Copenhagen School of Security studies is said to have originally theorised what security is by focusing on what it does, which is a speech act with presumably established connotations (Rychnovska, 2014, p11). Moreover, in an effort to understand the construction of security issues under speech acts, the securitization theory is said to usually focus on the speech acts of political actors. Political elites are known to convince the populous that an issue is an existential security threat in reference to a particular object or sector that must be protected, thereby legitimizing the resultant implementation of extraordinary measures to overcome the threat (Baysal, 2020).

Furthermore, a security issue is identified by a securitising actor as a threat to the survival of a particular object in the country, ranging from (the nation, the state and the liberal international economic order. Once a security issue is identified as a threat to the states survival, the securitising actor, calls for the defence of that particular object claiming that the object must and should be protected from the security threat. The securitization theory, further seeks to explain the extent to which the political elite (securitizing actors) mobilize their audience through leading a security discourse in order to become capable of implementing extra-ordinary means. The theory further explains the reasons for the deployment of extraordinary means in order to stop any security threat. The deployment of extraordinary measures is said to be legitimised by the kind of security threat facing the state (Lenz-Raymann, 2014). The use of extraordinary measures to deal with a security issue or security threat, may extend to being articulated within a country's policies. The migration policies of the European Union (EU) since the 1980s, are said to have been predominantly determined by the security-oriented interests of the EU member states and societies. Sadik & Kaya (2020) argued that the migration policies of the European Union have presented a security-oriented approach through the presentation of migrants as criminals, terrorists, troublemakers, that are unable to assimilate' in political discourses and public platforms by political leaders. Furthermore, this securitization discourse is said to have increased the adoption of new control mechanisms by member states, such as external controls and measures that include selective visa granting systems, heavy penalties for illegal migrants, deployment of law enforcement agencies, military forces, and new technologies to strengthen border security (Sadik & Kaya, 2020).

Evidently, one can argue that over the past decade, many countries across the world have experienced a rise in illegal immigrants. Countries across Africa and Eastern Europe have experienced a rise in migrants as people flee conflicts, civil wars and famine in search for greener pastures. Furthermore, due to the increase of terrorist insurgency, especially in European Union and the United States; migration unfortunately for both legal and illegal migrants have increasingly been placed under scrutiny and identified as a security threat for both European and American border security(Umansky, 2016). Resultantly, countries across the European union and the United States have increased their focus on tightening border security and migration has become a heated topic within political campaigns. One can make the argument

that migration indirectly has led to increased nationalism and the resurgence of right-wing politics. Moreover, occurrences such as Brexit, and the rise of right-wing populist leaders such as former American president Donald Trump and French opposition leader Marine Le Pen, have further cemented the increase in nationalism and right-wing politics in both the United States of America and Western Europe (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021). Policy actions by the previous U.S president Donald Trump, which included plans to build a border wall and the Muslim immigration ban, exemplify that migration securitization is still heated and contested topic.

In summation, migration has further received a securitised approach ever since the proliferation of terrorist insurgency attacks over western European cities and the United States. This has resulted in people of Islamic origin being unfairly branded as a threat to the security of the state, to the security of individuals in western Europe and a threat to western life by conservative politicians and conservative right-wing groups. The securitization of migration in reference to people of Islamic origin was clearly identified in Donald Trump's Muslim immigration ban, which amounted as a religious discrimination against Muslims. The ban had an adverse effect on Muslims attempting to enter the United States and also Muslim Americans that were residing in the United States. Lastly, this denied protection towards individuals fleeing countries experiencing war, natural disasters or humanitarian crisis. The next section discusses the origins of migration as a concept.

2.4. Migration as a concept

Migration is a broad term that is defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), to include all forms of movement by people away from their normal place of residence, either across an international border or within their country of residence. According to Abebe (2017), she argued that migration exists in two forms, regular or irregular. She pointed out that regular migration means moving to another country once one has obtained an official residence and/ or work permit, which entails fulfilling the necessary legal procedures of the host country. She further went on to state that irregular means moving to another country through unofficial channels.

Migration is as old as humanity itself, and has played a crucial role in shaping our world. Recently, migration has gained prominence on the international agenda because

of its increasing scale and consequences such movements have for international affairs, including the security concerns of states (Bali, 2018). According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the number of international migrants in the world has increased from just 75 million in 1960 to 150 million in 2000, to 191 million in 2005, to 214 million people in 2015, making up 3.1 percent of the global population, or, if they were a country, the fifth most populous country in the world (IOM, 2018). Furthermore, according to the international organisation for migration, migration is closely linked to the right to freedom of movement that is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that explicitly states that one has freedom of movement within a territory of a country and has the right to leave any country and the right to return to one's own country (International Organisation for Migration , 2022).

Freedom of movement is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a basic right for everyone. However, this right remains elusive and a right that a few effectively enjoy (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). Moreover, the history of free movement can also be traced back to the 'post-war federalist determination to introduce a supranational European citizenship'. The call for a creation of a supranational European citizenship, was witnessed in the statements of Winston Churchill in 1949, when he called for a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship for Europeans. On several occasions, Churchill, was often quoted having stated a hope to reach a Europe in which men would be proud to say 'they are European.' He, moreover, argued for a Europe where men of every country would think as much of being a European as of belonging to their native land (Maas, 2015).

Additionally, the transformation towards increased integration across Europe, led to the formation of the European Union. The creation of the European Union resulted in many states adopting common policies which included, harmonization of migration policies and letting go of old national identities for United European identity embracing free-movement. This led to an increased wave of immigration in and across the European Union, region. This liberal migration agenda reached a crisis point in 2015 and brought-forth unprecedented challenges to the EU in regards to migration management and border control, further raising questions of the possible security implications (Güler, 2019).

Despite such early efforts by Europeans to establish regional citizenship, the elusiveness of such an endeavour is illustrated in two instances. Firstly, in the case of the European Union (EU) as a concept. The European Union's, concept of 'union citizenship' was realised only in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty came into force, after four decades of regional integration attempts and the development of far-reaching free movement rights. The Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab States (GCC), is the second case where national citizenship supersedes regional citizenship, despite the novel intentions of regional planners. Consequently, the GCC nationals often refrain from seeking employment opportunities elsewhere within the region despite comprehensive free movement rights (Nita, 2017). The following section, dissects the history of securitization of migration.

2.5. History of migration securitization

Farny (2016) argues that since the late 1980s dramatic changes have occurred in the global international system, ranging from the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to the construction of the European Union and the creation of the Schengen area. Due to the increased geo-political changes, the subject of migration has also grown to be increasingly politicised, especially at the European Union level. The political construction of migration increasingly referred to the destabilising effects of migration and to the dangers it implied to for public order. This has further led to evolution of EU policies on migrants and asylum seekers to increasing border security, deportations and the surveillance of immigrants. Farny (2016) further argues that, the securitization of migrants in Europe, since the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks on the United States, led to the concept of migration as a security threat emerging, (Farny, 2016). Additionally, the re-invention of security with threats emanating from a number of non-traditional sources such as terrorism, environment and health, created space for rethinking the relationship between international relations and international migration. Within this context, there is also increasing recognition of the links between international migration and security (Bali, 2018).

In the United States and the EU, immigration has been linked with the proliferation of terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling and organised crime. Political leaders, the

media and governments in both instances, have separated migrants into two categories: desirable and undesirable, which depend on their skills, education, place of origin and cultural background. Additionally, political leaders have gone further to brand immigration as a threat to economic stability and national identity. What reinforced the categorisation of migrants was the proliferation of Islamism terrorist attacks against especially, the USA and the EU (Jaskulowski, 2019). This case for demonising migrants and classifying them as security risk, was further strengthened by the Madrid bombings of (11 March 2004) and the London tube bombings (7 July 2005). In those instances, migrants or citizens of immigrant origin, were implicated. The aftermath of the London bombing saw the labour government in the United Kingdom, put forward a bill that would allow the police to detain terrorist suspects without charge for 90 days, rather than the 14-day period prescribed by the legislation that existed at the time. Furthermore, the British went on to tighten policy on and put into place, more border controls, implementation of asylum restrictions, the acquisition and removal of citizenship and deportation orders (Hampshire & Saggar, 2006).

According to Bello (2020), migration emerged as a security issue especially within the geo-political changes and shifts that were associated with the end of the Cold War. Henceforth, these changes shifted the nature of migration and the nature of thinking about migration. Moreover, the aftermath of the cold war, led to further re-imagining of borders and their importance and in areas such as the European Union borders began to lose their initial significance (Bello, 2020). Also, the end of the Cold War that was caused by the collapse of the of Soviet Union, led to significant population movements from the east to the west, as well as large numbers of refugees fleeing conflict, eventually leading European states to face new levels of migration that they had experienced since World War 2 (Trujillo, 2013). The next section discusses the history of regional integration in Africa.

2.6. Regional integration and Migration in Africa

Regional integration in Africa, dates back to the early 1960s when many African countries, across the continent received their independence. The first earlier efforts at integration by the post-independent African states was mostly about political unification of the continent. The initial unification plans, resulted in the existence of

two utterly opposing blocs, namely the Casablanca bloc (made up of 6 countries), that was led Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and the Monrovia bloc (made up of 24 countries) led by Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. The Casablanca bloc advocated for an immediate and once-off political unification of the newly-independent African states into one mega federal state and a creation of one union African government. The Monrovia bloc, however, argued for a more conservative and gradualist approach to political unification of the continent, through the creation and strengthening of Regional Economic Communities (REC's) (Leshoele, 2020). Ultimately, and African states being at the infancy of their independency, the states believed that political integration may erode their sovereignty and that states may be forced to give up their supreme power for another supra-national entity. They believed that the decision-making power will be concentrated in the supra-national government and as a result, this may prevent states from making their own decisions on their internal and external affairs (Mekuriyaw, 2016).

In addition to the above, political liberation within the African continent acted as a precursor for economic liberation and union. The need for economic liberation and economic integration found its prominence in the late 1950s with the emergence of Ghana as the first black independent state in sub-Saharan Africa in 1957. The independence of Ghana further created fertile ground for the advocating of political and economic freedom for the rest of the continent. Three Pan- African conferences that were held at the end of the 1950s were steadfast in their advocacy of freeing the African continent in every sense. The economic integration experiment is said to have begun at the sub-regional level in west Africa, east and southern Africa, central Africa and north Africa (Abraham, 2008). This laid the foundation and created the rationale for the creation of the Lagos Plan of Action. The Lagos Plan of Action was an initiative of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and was adopted by the heads of state and government on April 1980, and was supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). A decade later the creation of the 1991 Abuja Treaty provided strong support for African integration, and the treaty emphasised on African solidarity, self-reliance and indigenous development strategy, through industrialisation (Hartzenberg, 2011). The next section, dissects the concept of region-building in southern Africa.

2.7. Region building in southern Africa

The idea of regional integration and cooperation across southern Africa, received increased attention in the 1980s due to an evolving political atmosphere that emerged with the political independence of majority of countries in the region. The forerunner for regional integration in southern Africa, was the desire of the Frontline States (FLS) to rid the region of its economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. Towards that end, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, (SADCC) was founded in 1980, with the aim of reducing the economic dependency of the region on South Africa. In addition, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for eastern and Southern Africa that was signed in December 1981 as the first step towards regional economic cooperation and integration for the purpose of sustainable growth and development of member states (Clapham, Mills, Morner, & Sidiropoulos, 2001). SADCC was reconfigured as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 as a legal entity. The expressed aims of SADC, amongst others, were to promote equitable regional integration, generate resources for implementing national and inter-state policies and generate international support for the economic liberation strategy (Soko, 2007).

Both the SADCC and the PTA were initially formed against the backdrop of the perceived needs of the newly independent countries for regional cooperation against apartheid regime in South Africa and in an effort to promote mutual trade and collective strength against foreign trading partners (Simon, 2010). Both SADCC and its successor SADC emerged at the back of the context of the struggle of the fight against apartheid and colonial exploitation. The vision of SADC, which was created in 1992 as the successor of the SADCC has been based on the ideals of a common future within a regional community where people of southern Africa enjoy economic well-being, improved standards of living, freedom and social justice (Van Nieuwkerk, 2020).

Furthermore, the foundation of SADC taking over from the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), was rooted in the desire to promote political and economic independence, durable peace and security

and poverty eradication, forging intra-regional links for the purpose of creating genuine and equitable regional integration, mobilising member state resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies and act collectively act to secure international cooperation within the framework for the strategy for economic liberation (African Union Commission, 2019). Additionally, the objectives of the newly formed SADC extended beyond the legal and organisational needs of pure trade integration. The objectives further extended after the democratization of South Africa to boosting and facilitating political and economic stability, developing human and economic potentials and proceeding with integration with the world trading markets (German Development Institute , 2000). The next section discusses the concept of free movement of people and the securitization of migration within SADC.

2.8. Free movement of people and securitization of migration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

2.8.1. Conceptualization of Free Movement of People and Migration Securitization in SADC

The notion of free movement was brought into the regional forefront through the Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, introduced in 1996, which was then replaced by the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in 1997, which was further revised and adopted in 2005. The protocol ensures visa-free entry to citizens from other member states for a maximum of 90 days. However, the protocol is still not operational as only four countries (out of 16) have ratified it. On the other hand, it makes provision for member states to conclude bilateral agreements for visa exemptions. Most member states have exempted each other from visa requirements and the authorisation to reside in a territory of a member state can be obtained by applying for a permit from the authorities of the concerned country (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the case of SADC in relation to the free movement of people and the issue of securitization of migration in SADC and how that affects the overall regional economic integration agenda of the region. The chapter will provide a brief overview of how the southern African region has engaged with the

concepts of regional integration and specifically, the free movement of people. This will include an outline of the policy instruments used by SADC as a means to improve the level of mobility among community citizens in the sub-region. Moreover, the chapter will discuss the genesis of the issue of securitization of migration and how that affects regional economic development. Finally, the chapter, will venture on an analysis on the benefits of coordinated and well managed governance of migration on the overall economic development of the region.

The ideals of regional integration, has always been at the centre of the agenda of SADC from the onset of its formation. The SADC heads of state and government, were cognizant and in agreement, on improving the quality of life of Southern African citizens and alleviate poverty through regional integration of the region. Additionally, the SADC treaty of 1992 established the facilitation and promotion of the free movement of persons within the common market as one of its aims.



Figure 1: SADC member states

Source: <https://www.sadc.int/member-states/>

The Southern African Development Community is an inter-governmental organisation with 15 members of states, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and its secretariat is based in Gaborone, Botswana. The supreme body of SADC is the SADC summit of heads of states and government. The summit is supported by two organs, namely the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) and the other on Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment. Each organ is supported by clusters, each with a committee structure under it. Immigration related matters fall under the Organ of Politics Defence and Security (Mudungwe, 2016). The next section discusses the History of Mining and its contributions to migration in southern Africa.

2.8.2. Mining and the history of migration in Southern Africa

Migration has played a central role in South Africa's governance and development since the 1970's. The mining industry in South Africa is said to have grown as a result of migrant labour and the economic engine of apartheid was built through forced removals and the further entrenchment of the migrant labour system. Moreover, since attaining its democracy, South Africa's economic opportunities have made it an attractive destination for migrants across Africa (Mapitsa, 2019). Furthermore, it is historically known that the major form of labour migration in southern Africa has been legal contract migration to the South African and Zimbabwean gold and coal mines, the Zambian and DRC copper mines, and the Swaziland asbestos mine. The South African gold and platinum mines are said to continue to employ migrants from other countries, particularly Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. Additionally, it is historically known that since the 1960's and 1970's (and 1920's in the case of Mozambique and South Africa) that southern African states have preferred to act bilaterally in their dealings with each other on migration. This was done when South Africa and its neighbours concluded bilateral treaties to regulate and monitor the supply of migrant mineworkers to South African mines (Crush, Dodson, Williams and Tevera, 2017).

According to Glover and Money (2021), South Africa's gold mining industry was memorably referred to as South Africa's 'labour empire', by scholars Jonathan crush, Alan Jeeves and David Yudelman (1991). Glover and Money (2021) further point that, this labour empire is said to have stretched across the entire southern Africa and at its peak, almost 500 000 migrant workers are said to have been recruited to the gold mines from as far away as Angola and Tanzania on temporary contracts. South Africa's gold industry was dependent upon unskilled African labour, recruited in large numbers to work in the Witwatersrand and later in the Free State. Since 1912, The Chamber of Mines of South Africa is said to have made use of two recruitment agencies to recruit black mine labourers into South Africa. The chamber of mines made use of the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC), which recruited from Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), South Africa and Swaziland (Eswatini), and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), which recruited labour from elsewhere in southern Africa (Glover and Money, 2021).

African contract workers from across the region are said to have been the backbone of regional integration in southern Africa and the edifice of tying the economies of the region to South Africa since the late 1800's. Peberdy (2010) argued that, Contract African workers while employed in the South African gold mines and to a lesser extent commercial agriculture, are said to have made a significant contribution to the economic development of South Africa. Migrant mineworkers from Mozambique and Lesotho are said to have made up over half of the labour force of the gold mining industry on which the South African economy was based on. Moreover, it is argued that in the early to mid-1900's a significant number of Malawian and Swazi nationals were also employed on the mines alongside Batswana and Zimbabweans. Lastly, by the 1960's black migrants from across the region are said to have been entrenched in every sector of South Africa's labour force (Peberdy, 2010).

Glover and Money (2021), pointed out that, in the 1970s, a convergence changed the political economy of South Africa and by implication that of southern Africa. This convergence resulted in a surge African Labour militancy within South Africa and the eventual transformation of the industrial economy in that country. This was further exacerbated by the USA abandoning the gold standard in 1971, which threatened to

place the gold mining industry in South Africa in crisis. By the 1970's, the gold industry is said to have become increasingly reliant on workers that were recruited from outside South Africa. Mine workers from South Africa are mentioned to have been a minority since the early 1940's, and their proportion is said to have shrunk to a low 20 per-cent for the African mining workforce by 1974. However, at this period the mining industry was faced by a sudden crisis with the withdrawal of Malawian workers and the threat that Mozambican workers would withdraw. The numbers of Malawians are said to have dropped from 108,431 in 1974 to only 571 in 1976 (Glover & Money, 2021). The following section discusses the background of regional integration and free movement in southern Africa.

2.8.3. Background to integration and free movement in southern Africa

The development of Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries and their economies was borne out of migration among member states, which began through migrant labourers moving to work in the mines in south Africa. Further the history of migration, is traced back to the regular movement of labour from other countries in the region to South Africa following the discovery of gold deposits in the Witwatersrand and diamonds in Kimberley. Additionally, male labour migration to the mines in (South Africa) that came from Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland. Further migrant labour also moved towards commercial farms and plantations in (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland) and this represented the most common forms of the legal cross-border migration within the southern African region (Crush & Williams, 2005). According to Crush et al (2017), the movement of people across borders constitutes one of the major mechanisms of regional integration in southern Africa. However, crush et al (2017), have argued that the stark differences on development and employment, across the region have caused uneven migration flows. Zimbabwe, for example, is said to have been a major migrant destination country before the year 2000, but has since become the regions single largest exporter of migrants (Crush, Dodson, Williams, & Tevera, 2017).

Southern Africa as a region has experienced many types of movements, that include mixed and irregular migration, labour migration and displacement due to conflicts and natural disasters. Additionally, due to its economic strength across the African

continent, southern Africa is said to have experienced increased volumes of migration due to work opportunities in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural industries. The industrial development that took place in countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and the oil wealth in Angola, attracted a blend of both skilled and unskilled labour migrants into the region, especially from West Africa (International Organisation for Migration, 2021). According to Dodson & crush (2015), migration has increased into SADC from across the continent over the past two decades based mainly on the regions long-established tradition of regional labour migration. Furthermore, they argue that South Africa, has become the primary destination for intra-SADC migrants. Moyo and Zanker (2022), argue that according to the 2016 Community Survey, Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) places the number of immigrants at over 1.6 million, a decline from 2.2 million in the census of 2011. This 2016 figure is said to represent 2.8% of the total South African population (Moyo & Zanker, 2022). The next section, discusses the legal pathways created for free movement of people in SADC through the SADC Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons.

2.8.4. Protocol on Free Movement of People in SADC

The legal framework on free movement of people in SADC dates back to the 1992, treaty establishing SADC. One of the treaties main objectives is said been focused mainly on the progressive elimination of barriers for goods, capital, services and people, as one of its core objectives. The first Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons was first established in 1995 and it sought to allow citizens of one state to enter freely, establish themselves and work in another state under the protection of SADC (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). According Amadi & Lenaghan (2020), this first draft protocol would offer more towards the complete movement of people, allowing all SADC citizens the right to free entry, residence and establishment of oneself in the territory of another member state. However, Amadi & Lenaghan further argue, that this proposal did not go well with the newly democratic South Africa and independent Namibia, and the economically stable state of Botswana, who declined to support this Protocol and, therefore, it failed (Amadi & Lenaghan, 2020).

Solomon (1997) argues that under the preamble of the 1995 Draft Protocol, its main objective was on attaining the free movement of people in relation to the promotion of inter-dependence and integration of the SADC region. Furthermore, he argues that the 1995 draft protocol was meant to result in the creation of a ‘community spirit’ among the SADC citizens (Solomon, 1997). According to Amadi (2019), the 1995 draft protocol was developed and championed by the SADC secretariat in the mid 1990’s under the guidance of the former executive secretary, Dr Kaire Mbuende. South Africa, is said to have been against the protocol when it was sent for comments and responses from member states. Amadi (2019) further argues that the South African government commissioned an expert opinion from the government funded Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) through its Home Affairs Department. The expert opinion published in 1995, argued that; there had never been any kind of free movement in the region, the protocol would add on South Africa’s unemployment problem, the protocol would legitimize an over inflated number of irregular immigrants. Finally, the expert opinion from the Human Sciences Research Council of 1995 concludes that the free movement of persons would lead to increased xenophobic attacks by South Africans on foreign nationals. It suggests that South Africa should rather focus on free movement of goods and capital (Amadi, 2019).

A glaring deficiency of the HSRC report on the Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of People was that it ignored the long-standing contribution that was made by labour migration to the growth of the South African economy. It also downplayed the role those southern African migrants have played in the development of the diamond mines in Kimberly and the gold mines in the Witwatersrand. Furthermore, the claims by the report that freer movement would result in irregular migration and increased xenophobia, was not backed up with clear evidence. Moreover, the report, also failed to acknowledge that freer movement relatively existed between South Africa and the high commission territories of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Lesotho, Swaziland (now Eswatini) and South West Africa (now Namibia), until the respective countries received their independence in the early 1960s and 1990 respectively (OECD, 2017).

The SADC Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons was set-up as a legal instrument to implement the provisions of the SADC treaty under 10.3 of the treaty. The protocol was crafted in the view of the need to address imbalances in the

large-scale population movement within SADC. The Protocol commits inter-alia to support, assist and promote the efforts of the African union which is encouraging free-movement of persons in the African regional economic communities as a stepping stone towards free movement of persons in an eventual African Economic Community (Draft Protocol on The Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC, 2005) (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2013). According to Dodson and Crush (2015) the 2005 SADC Protocol does not go much beyond national and bilateral agreements that are already in place and absolutely does little to establish any form of regional citizenship, with the supra-national rights and protections that such might imply. However, they further argue that despite the absence of extensive rights protections in the protocol, its implementation in combination with other SADC instruments together with the member states individual commitments to international human rights instruments, could still manage to function to enhance protection of migrant rights (Dodson & Crush, 2015).

The 2005 Protocol on The Facilitation of Movement of Persons, has only been ratified by six member states to date, namely Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, the Kingdom of Eswatini, Lesotho and Zambia (Mudungwe, 2016). This lacks the necessary two-thirds majority for implementation and remains unenforceable. Consequently, the failure to enact the protocol has affected cooperation among SADC member states with regards to safe guarding national and regional security, through ensuring exchange in crime and security intelligence, preventing the illegal movement of persons into and within the region (Parshotam & Ncube, 2017). Moreover, under the 2005 protocol, member states are responsible for individually and collectively handling migration (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). In addition, the Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement, which was proposed by South Africa, has been realised to have been more regressive than the initial protocol and included provisions that delayed harmonisation policies and valued sovereignty and national interests above the interests of the region.

Migration in SADC takes place in a large magnitude and has far reaching consequences on socio-economic development and integration of the region. According to Crush et al (2006), 'the majority of countries in the region view migration more as a threat, rather than an opportunity. Resultantly the migration policies of member states tend to focus more on control, detention and exclusion. This

increased anti-immigration stance initially goes against the realities of globalisation and global skills markets as well as local economic developmental needs and resultantly the SADC region is in danger of becoming uncompetitive in the global marketplace. Mudungwe (2014) argues that, ‘the success of this anti-immigration rhetoric or stance is very debatable, taking into consideration that past policies (in South Africa for example) have only resulted in the rise in irregular migration. This is mainly due to the regions shared colonial past that has only resulted in the inter-dependence of countries in the region and making cross-border movements inevitable.

However, SADC seems to lack a framework that governs the movement of people. Moreover, SADC states seem to continue to only enter in bilateral agreements with one another that relate inter-alia to labour migration. According to Nshimibi & Fioramonti (2013), these agreements may dampen prospects of ratifying the 2005 protocol on the Facilitation of Movement as some of the SADC member states might find the agreements to be a more desirable alternative to the regional migration regime, than what the 2005 protocol seeks to establish. They further argue that even if the protocol were ratified it would still lead to an emphasis on the bilateral agreements as because South Africa was pushing for such a bilateral arrangement instead of a regional approach. The next section discusses the flow of migrants within the SADC region and to South Africa.

2.8.5. Flow of migrants within SADC and to South Africa

Migration in the region today mostly flows towards South Africa, while all other countries in the region, mainly serve as departure, transit and destination countries. The range of factors that motivate people to migrate usually vary, including forced migration due to natural disasters and conflicts, voluntary movement to reunite with family, to study, work or trade across borders. The main driver for cross border movement is now primarily economic. According to Muanganidze (2018), in 2017 the SADC region recorded about 7.5 million migrants, excluding irregular migrants and not accounting for circular migration, with South Africa alone accounting for more than 4 million migrants according to the United Nations. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, population division, the number of international emigrants from the SADC countries continually increased through the

2000s, with about one half of them moving to other SADC countries. Even though the destination countries vary, within region migration South Africa remains the prominent destination in southern Africa (Nakayama, 2018).

South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have been identified as the most favoured destinations in the region and in 2010 hosted approximately 1.2 million, 76 000 and 76 000 respectively. While less than half of each of the country's migrants are from SADC, among international migrants from within Africa, the SADC region dominates (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2013). McAuliffe and Khadria (2019) argued that South Africa remained the most significant destination country in Africa, with approximately 4 million international migrants residing in the country. McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou (2021), however argue that while South Africa remained the major destination country in 2022, the country only hosted 2.9 million international immigrants. They further argue this signifies an estimated 9% drop since 2015 when the country had over 3.2 million international migrants (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). South Africa, remains a major economic powerhouse in the region compared to its regional counterparts and is seen as a country that offers greater stability and is further identified as more attractive for people that are in the search for a better life. Furthermore, it is noted that South Africa also receives a substantial number of migrants regionally from SADC member states, such as Zimbabwe at 39.6%, Mozambique at 20.2%, Lesotho at 11.1%, Malawi at 5.4%, Eswatini (formally Swaziland) at 2.6% and Namibia at 2.2% (Langalanga, 2019). All in all, South Africa is said to also receive international migrants from Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) data portal, the movement of people to and from countries within southern Africa has been described as largely being driven by the pursuit of economic opportunities and rising political instability in the region. In mid-2020, the region was said to have an estimated population of 363.2 million people and 6.4 million international migrants. An estimated 2.9 million of the 6.4 million migrants are said to have been resident in South Africa by mid-2020. South Africa as a country is identified as the most industrialised economy in the region and therefore an attractive destination for

migrants seeking better economic opportunities and for themselves and their families (IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2021).

Migration within the SADC region, is identified as being a mixed form of migration as people migrate across the region for various reasons. For example, this is said to be the case with the increased levels of migration particularly from Zimbabwe, which has seen an increase of migrants of all ages and various skill levels. Furthermore, though some of this migration is seen to be long-term or permanent Crush et-al (2017) argues that most of this migration is not with the intention of settling in the destination country. They further argue that similarly to the past most migration seems to be circular in nature with migrants retaining strong economic and emotional ties with their home countries (Crush, Dodson, Williams, & Tevera, 2017).

Maunganidze (2021), argues that remittances globally both in low-income and middle-income countries account for more than 10% of gross domestic product, translating to billions in revenue for African states. She further contends that in 2020, in spite of predications of massive decline due to the covid-19 pandemic, remittances still amounted to US\$540 billion globally with Africa accounting for 15.37% of remittance inflows globally (Maunganidze, 2021). According to the World Bank (2018), Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar have the highest dependence on remittances. Additionally, the World Bank argued that South Africa and Tanzania had the largest outbound remittance markets in terms of volume of remittance outflows in 2015. On the other hand, the World Bank noted that while remittances are significant in SADC the SADC region, the high cost of sending remittances to countries, is significantly higher in SADC than other parts of the world.

It is increasingly evident from the aforementioned literature, that South Africa, as a country receives the largest volumes of migrants across the region compared to its neighbours. Moreover, the countries strong economic position on the continent and its relative political stability compared to that of Nigeria, has further made South Africa, the most attractive migrant destination country on the continent. Also, the increased stark differences that exist among southern African countries and other countries in Africa, showcases the reasons South Africa, has been sceptical about allowing a liberalised free movement jurisdiction across the SADC region. Moreover, these economic differences have, however, led to the creation of securitised migration

policies, that tend to have a harsh treatment on regular migrants and asylum seekers. The next section, discusses in depth the securitization of migration within SADC country migration policies. The next section discusses migration securitization in SADC policies and within South Africa.

2.8.6. Migration securitization in SADC Member States

Migrants and immigrants have for many years been associated and linked with criminal activities such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and organised crime smuggling especially in the us and EU countries. Political elites, the media and governments have thus resorted to constructing immigration as a threat to national security, a contributor to economic instability and a dilutor of national identity. Moreover, migrants have also been divided into two categories, 'desirable and undesirable' on the basis of education, skill, place of origin and cultural background (Ilgit & Klotz, 2014). This has been evident recently in the Trump administration travel ban of 2016 and revised in 2018 targeted mainly Muslim countries and people of Islamic origin, further consolidating the securitization of this group of people.

The above text suggests that securitization in this context revolves around the use racial profiling in order to try, identify and track potential terrorists as part of their national security policy. Resultantly, governments have introduced restrictive border control and admission measures to try and control the flow of people across state lines. Countries such as Israel have been known for using racial profiling at airport security screenings (Hasisi, Margalioth, & Orgad, 2012). Kenya has also been identified to make use of profiling to monitor and apprehend people they consider at risk of engaging in terrorism (Odhiambo, 2019).

The securitization of migration is demonstrated through enhancing border controls and the tightening of visa policies in countries of origin or transit. Migrants face detention and deportation in destination countries, as well as a hostile environment that undermines integration and acceptance (Avdan, 2012). This has been so with the rise in xenophobic violence in South Africa, which has increasingly rendered South Africa as an undesirable destination. The securitization of migrants within SADC takes up multiple facets. These facets include the securitizing actors, that make up the traditional security cluster such as the office of the presidency, foreign, security,

defence and the intelligence policy minister. Secondly, other government officials not part of traditional security cluster such as the department of home affairs and the police. The last group is made up of the people in the grassroots, who follow through and act on the speech acts of the political elite (Hammerstad, 2012).

Additionally, it can be argued that the SADC protocol on the facilitation of free movement of people, further enhances the security and risk-based approach used by the South African government. According to Nshimbi (2013), on security, the protocol places risk and function in the custody of a committee of ministers responsible for public security, along with any committee appointed by the ministerial committee of the organ of defence, politics and security. In conjunction with article 11 of the protocol, which calls on member states to exchange information on security, crime and intelligence, this suggests that states are substantially concerned about security risks that come with migration. Williams and Carr (2006) argue that it is also clear in the protocol on facilitation of free movement, that it places emphasis on controlling or managing movement than actually facilitating it. Furthermore, the downside of the protocol, is that despite making provisions for legislative, policy and logistical adjustments, the protocol does not state clearly the extents of member states' obligations to comply with the protocol, or how to enforce the protocol domestically. Additionally, no mechanisms exist through which member states should amend their respective legislations in line with the protocol. Finally, all the protocol's provisions are subject to member states' domestic legislation (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2013).

According to Maunganidze (2018), migration in SADC is primarily viewed through the lens of national security, with some member countries willing to reinforce their borders and remove 'aliens' and 'undesirable' elements, as evidenced by South Africa's 'detain and deport policy' of undocumented migrants. Furthermore, the protocol on facilitation of movement of persons is overseen by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. Maunganidze goes on to say that this move strengthens a risk-based approach to migration that prioritizes territorial integrity over the potential of free mobility to boost regional economic development, as well as the criminalization of migrants (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). The following section discusses, the securitization of migration in South Africa and within South African immigration laws.

2.8.7. Securitization in South Africa

South Africa is a major destination for African migrants of all classes, from tourists to irregular and asylum-seeking migrants. Consequently, the country's migration policies and practices have a significant impact on the millions of people, particularly African migrants that seek refuge or travel for tourism purposes. Additionally, South Africa boasts one of the most developed economies on the continent and in southern Africa, rendering the country an attractive destination for all classes of African migrants. Hence, its policy direction is one that is fundamentally important in the region and across the continent (Mbiyozo, 2018). Similar to many European countries, South Africa has received a significant migration inflow and at the same time has resisted discourses that embrace full immigration in the region or free movement of people. Anti-immigration mobilization has risen in South Africa, as in Europe, especially with xenophobic sentiments since 1994, that extended to widespread attacks in 2008. Politicians have responded to the xenophobia evidence by being silent and resorting to blaming the victims and down-playing the role of street level gangs. For example, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, expressed surprise and shame about violence in 2008 despite widespread media coverage of xenophobic attacks (Ilgit & Klotz, 2014).

According to Mbiyozo (2018), although South Africa insists upon commitment to afro-centric ideals, on examination of current policies, there are seemingly worrying inconsistencies. Mbiyozo further argues that recent policy documents and developments, express intent to strategically harness the ability of migration to achieve national and regional goals. However, the country is practising restrictive measures that disproportionately and negatively impact African migrants from neighbouring countries. She further stresses that Home Affairs in South Africa insists that a risk-based approach is required to achieve its objectives. It is uncertain what the approach entails specifically (Mbiyozo, 2018). Additionally, South Africa is seen as an integral part of the SADC regional integration project. The fact that South Africa voluntarily ratified the 2005 protocol on the facilitation of movement of persons, demonstrates her commitment to both the SADC objectives and instruments and regional objective of promoting integration. This further demonstrates South Africa's obligation, together with other states that have ratified the protocol on southern Africa's goal of

integration (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2019). The next section looks into impact of Health pandemic's such as the recent Corona-virus pandemic on the securitization of migration.

2.8.8. Impact of the health pandemics on securitization of migration

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus pandemic in late 2019 to early 2020 has posed a serious challenge to Africa's governance systems. Additionally, this has also led to the weakening of global rules and international cooperation and has increasingly curtailed human mobility. Countries have put in place travel bans and restrictions in an effort to stop and curtail the spread of the virus. The restrictions will eventually be removed. However, the fear is that the anti-migration wave that has recently been growing, will be re-energised as migrants are more likely to be labelled a health security risk, further securitizing the treatment of migrants and refugees.

The issue of health within security is a long-standing issue and has for long been linked to migration and migrants. Countries have previously enacted border controls and travel restrictions in the past in response to pandemics. The outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic has seen a rise in xenophobic sentiments and stigma towards migrants as witnessed with pandemics such as the Zika and the Ebola crises. The Covid-19 pandemic has since been framed as a national security issue, within a global health security crisis and international travel has been identified as a key driver and a rapid spreader of infectious diseases (McAuliffe, 2020). According to Sidiropoulos (2020) restricted mobility and clampdowns on migrants will have an impact on developed world economies in terms of labour, but also on those African economies where remittances comprise a significant portion of revenue.

Chugh (2020) further argues that the covid-19 pandemic has shifted migration rhetoric amongst individuals to include health security. He further argues that the limitations on movement, though necessary to manage the spread of the virus, may create a difficult position for migrants and asylum seekers to access protection, and may increase the inequality, discrimination and exploitation of migrants and asylum seekers. He further stresses that the Covid-19 pandemic and the fear of "the other" ultimately will shift the rhetoric further, through expanding the focus to include the risk of individual health security. The increased shutting down of economies, closure

of borders and fear of the virus, may lead to stricter migration policies and a rise of 'health securitization' migration rhetoric (Chugh, 2020). Furthermore, Vearey, Gruchy & Maple (2021) was of the opinion that, though the limitation on the movement of people was necessary for toping the spread of communicable diseases, the panics related to the movement of people across borders, offered an interesting opportunity for nation states to justify implementing increasingly restrictive approaches to immigration and border control under the auspices of global health management, control and response.

According to Carciotto (2020), the global responses by states to Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, raises questions about open borders and free movement of people. He further argues that the challenge would be if governments struggle to contain the spread, strict immigration laws and militarisation of border control may be invoked, as has happened in South Africa. These types of measures would be averse to the continent's integration agenda. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to hamper investment opportunities, including those needed in infrastructure for transport and communication, especially to implement the continental free trade agreement (Carciotto, 2020). The next section, focuses on the benefits of migration and migration governance in SADC.

2.9. Benefits of migration and migration governance in SADC

Migration and migrants could play an important role if well integrated in order to harness the economic benefits that come with migration. Regional economic communities could play an important role to integrate migration and the principle of co-development into their policy frameworks. The principle of co-development considers migrants as central partners in development cooperation projects and programmes and, as a policy approach seeks to maximize the benefits of migration for origin and destination country stakeholders (Trade and Development Board-UNCTAD, 2018).

According to Crush et al (2018) in a report for the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), after interviewing 80 stakeholders on migration. The authors found that there was a unanimous response among all of the interviewed respondents

on the importance of seeing migration as a developmental issue that requires a co-ordinated regional response within Southern Africa. The respondents were of the opinion that firstly, ‘there is a pressing need for a regional approach to migration and development in SADC and the challenge is implementation. Secondly, migration within and to the SADC region is beneficial for economic development, poverty reduction, and inclusive economic growth. Thirdly, the idea that migration to and from a country within SADC is an increased asset for the development of the regional economy’. Moreover, increased development in the region will not necessarily reduce migration patterns, it could reduce economic reasons for migration and therefore mean less movement of unskilled labour (Crush, Dodson, Williams, & Tevera, 2017).

In addition, migration can also have a positive impact on receiving/host countries. South Africa as a country receives the most migrants from across the continent and the region. However, the treatment of migrants has been rather disappointing with the rise in xenophobic attacks and the increased securitization of South African immigration policies. Migrants have been tainted as people that affect economic development and ‘take away jobs’ of ordinary South Africans. However, contrary to common beliefs, studies show and suggest that immigrant workers make a significant contribution to the south African economy. Immigrants are well integrated into the labour market in terms of employment and unemployment rates and in general do not seem to displace native-born workers (OECD/ILO, 2018).

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social affairs argued that migration is seen as a global phenomenon that impacts the lives of most people. UNDESA further argues that migrants represent approximately 3 per-cent of the world’s population, but they produce more than 9 per-cent of global GDP, which is some USD 3 trillion more than if they had stayed at home. Additionally, migrants often bring significant benefits to their new communities in the form of skills, strengthening the labour force, investment and cultural diversity. Moreover, they play an important role in improving the lives of communities in their countries of origin through the transfer of skills and financial resources, contributing to positive development outcomes (IOM, 2018). The following section, focuses on the research methodology utilised for the purpose of this study.

2.10. Conclusion

It is clear that SADC is not short of the legal provisions that are meant to implement, facilitate and help propel migration governance in the region. However, political will seems to linger and lean more towards a more securitized and threat-based approach and rather seeks to push for upholding and accelerating bilateral agreements instead of multilateral agreements that could help facilitate for the ratification of the Protocol. The stance of many SADC states seems to be devoid of any understanding of reality with regards to globalisation and regional economic development and has the ability to render the region ineffective and uncompetitive in the global economic market especially without improving better consolidated labour migration and overall migration governance.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter addresses the methodology that was used to explore the research problem and answer the research questions. The research instruments used to obtain data are explained, the procedure followed to obtain data, and how data was analysed are also explained. This was done through outlining the various research components pertaining to the research design, population, sample, research instruments, procedure, data analysis as well as the ethical considerations.

3.2. Research methodology

Qualitative research is defined as research that explores and provides deep insights into real world issues. Qualitative research does not collect numerical data points like in quantitative research. Qualitative research is mostly concerned about gathering participants perceptions. The study was conducted using the qualitative research method. This was done in-order to ensure that they would be sufficient data collected, taking into consideration the nature of the topic and also to assist in ensuring the validity of the research outcomes. Qualitative interviews were utilised, mainly because the interview process enabled the researcher to understand the perspective of the participants in an in-depth manner. Open-ended interviews allowed the researcher to ask more detailed questions. In an effort to gain full understanding and perspective of the respondent, furthermore this method permitted the researcher to probe follow up questions.

3.3. Research design

This study took the form of a single case study approach of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The methodological approach taken was the qualitative methodology which is exploratory in nature. This was done to ensure that there is sufficient data collected that would consequently increase the validity of the research outcomes. Qualitative interviews were utilised mainly because the interview process enabled the researcher to understand the perspective of the participants in an in-depth manner. The interview questions afforded the researcher an opportunity to understand the perspective of the respondents, which further allowed the researcher to ask follow-up questions.

3.4. Population

The study was based on the population of the SADC region which is estimated to have increased from 318.9 million in 2015 to about 327.2 million in 2016 representing a 2.6% annual population growth rate and with about 39% of this population living in urban areas (Southern African Development Community, 2017). As of 2020, this population is projected to have grown to 363 million (Simkins, 2021).

3.5. Sample

The study utilised purposive judgment sampling. The chosen sample was drawn to increase the chances of answering the research questions. A wide range of actors and organisations were considered for participation in this study. The targeted sample size consisted of 15 key informants, from key selected institutions. A total of 10 respondents out of the targeted 15 participated in the study. The informants were comprised of key selected individuals from the following institutions; Institute for Security Studies, the International Organization for Migration, African Centre for Migration and Society, the South African Institute of International affairs, and from the academia.

3.6. Research instruments

During the qualitative interviews, the researcher was guided by an interview schedule that contained all the questions to be posed to participants in a predetermined sequence. All interviews were recorded using a multimedia recorder. Furthermore, the participants were informed well on time, through a letter on the procedure of the interview and the length of the interview process. Additionally, the researcher made use of books, journals, articles and reports for the purpose of reviewing and scrutinizing relevant literature to enrich the data, received during the interview process.

3.7. Procedure

The process of conducting qualitative interviews was characterised by the researcher asking the participants a series of questions of which they were required to respond to, if comfortable with the question posed. Additionally, the whole process during the interview sessions was directed by the researcher and all correspondents were recorded on a multimedia recorder. Furthermore, consent to have the interview recorded was obtained from the research participant before the interview could officially commence.

3.8. Data analysis

Data was analysed through the use of content and thematic analyses for the purpose of categorising data, noting areas of interest and to test the relationship between sub-themes. The research chose content and thematic analysis because it allowed the researcher to quantify and analyse the presence, meanings and relationships of words, themes and concepts important to the study area. Furthermore, the information

received from the open-ended questions had to be filtered in order to ensure that only relevant information to the researcher was kept and was adequately prepared for the presentation of the research findings.

3.9. Research ethics

An ethical problem the researcher encountered was informed consent; this means that prospective research participants were to be fully informed as to how exactly they were to participate in the research. There was no use of coercion, incentives or bribery by the researcher to propel anyone to take part in the research interviews were, not used at any moment in the data collection process. Furthermore, participants were free to withdraw from the interview process at any given time if they wished to withdraw from the interviews and were all informed accordingly upon the commencement of the interview. Information obtained from the respondents was stored on the multimedia recorder and as well as on the research document. The information recorded on a multimedia device was kept for a period of 5 years after completion of the study to allow for authentication of the information and afterwards the memory card, was destroyed, in the form of burning it. The researcher also ensured the protection of intellectual property through giving proper attribution and credit to the work done by other scholars or institutions. Ethical Clearance Certificate was obtained from the University of Namibia Decentralised Ethics Committee.

3.10. Conclusion

This chapter focused on the research design that was used to carry out the research. The population, sample size, research instruments, data collection procedure, data analysis and ethical considerations were also focused on in-depth in this chapter. The

next chapter focuses on the presentation of data, analysis and the discussion of findings.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presented the findings of this study. The findings integrated both primary and secondary data. The information in this chapter was placed into themes or categories which emerged during the data collection period. The themes of this study were developed using the research questions that underpin this study, namely; In what way does securitization of migration affect regional economic integration within SADC, in what ways can SADC transform into an institution that is equipped deal with human security challenges facing the region, and In what way does labour migration in SADC contribute to the economic development of migrant hosting nations.

4.2. Securitization of Migration: An Assessment of its Effects on Regional Economic Integration within SADC

According to respondent one, immigration regulations across the region are quite inflexible. “There is a popular assumption that South Africa alone is the most restrictive and uncooperative country when it comes to supporting more openness to migration”¹ (Personal communication, November 5, 2021). One could argue that this is in line with the argument by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019) with regards to the fact that the 2005 Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons has only been ratified by only four of 16 countries. This demonstrates that South Africa is not the only country that is restrictive and uncooperative in supporting open migration.

¹ Head of Special Projects (ISS Africa), Personal Communication, November 5, 2021

Respondent one further argued that securitisation allows governments to restrict the entry of foreign nationals into their job markets, business sectors and social spaces (religion, culture, arts etc.). SADC is lagging behind when it comes to promoting the free movement of persons. This argument is in agreement with the argument by Dodson and Crush (2015), that the 2005 SADC protocol, does not go beyond existing national and bilateral agreements that are already in place and does little in establishing any form of regional citizenship.

Respondent two argued that SADC has not managed to ratify a protocol on free movement of person, yet the regions appear eager to gain from the free movement of goods². Respondent two further argued that trade is facilitated by people. Exchange of ideas and skills are facilitated by people. The people who need to benefit the most from open trade, especially now, with the AFCFTA should be ordinary SADC citizens. However, the absence of immigrant friendly policies may hinder people who are not in big business or pre-existing cross-border arrangements from benefitting fully from the initiative.

The respondent further stated that, SADC states highly safeguard access to permanent residency, business permits, dual citizenship within the region and open travel within the region. Further they state that should by now be able to emulate the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC), which do not have tight restrictions like, visitors from the region are only permitted to stay in another SADC country for not more than 90 days per year. Respondents two wonders if SADC would ever reach the EU's level of integration in terms of opening up borders and economies to everyone living in the region.

Respondent 3 argued that SADC as the regional bloc is learning towards a securitised approach to migration, however there are specific countries within the region opting for more securitised policies, especially countries like South Africa and increasingly Botswana and more recently Namibia³. The statement by the third respondent is congruent to the argument by Amadi and Lenaghan (2020), that the prospects of complete abolition of border controls on people's movements have never set well with

² Lecturer (University of Cape Town), Personal Communication, November 17, 2021

³ Researcher-1, Institute for Security Studies, personal communication, November 10, 2021

South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Amadi & Lenaghan (2020) argued that the three countries did not support the initial 1995 Draft Protocol relating to free movement of people, hence the protocol failed.

Respondent 3 further argued that, part of what informs the shift to more securitized migration has been influenced by the fact that these countries are the primary destination countries for migrants. The respondents states that some migrants enter as undocumented migrants and some enter legally and end up over-staying in the destination countries. The above statement by the respondent is highlighted in the argument by Mbiyozo (2018), that South Africa is the major destination for African migrants ranging from tourists, to irregular and asylum-seeking migrants.

Respondent 1 was also of the opinion that, the closing down of borders is done through the creation of fences or by increasing the barriers to entry even for short stay visas, such that one can have a three-month period within the year, but not extended beyond that provision. Respondents 1 further stresses that, the closing down of borders through creating fences and increasing barriers to entry, has had an adverse effect when it comes to irregular migration. Respondent one also states that instead of reducing the numbers of people migrating South Africa still witnesses and increase of people not using formal or legal channels for immigration despite heightened security. In addition, the respondent made the point that people are increasingly taking risks and the numbers of people migrating are not reducing. This argument is in concurrent to the argument that, despite heightened border security, Maunganidze (2018) argued that in 2017 of the 7.5 million recorded migrants in the SADC region, South Africa alone accounted for more than 4 million migrants. Additionally, it is also in concurrent with the argument by the IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (2021), that an estimated 2.9 million migrants were said to be resident in South Africa by mid 2020.

Respondent 3 was of the opinion that securitizing migration stifles potential for equal participation in the regional economy, therefore hindering development prospects. Ease of doing business within the region for people of the region is negatively affected by securitization migration and movement. Respondent 3 further claimed that there is almost a direct impact between, adopting securitized approaches to migration to questions around regional integration and to trade and development. Sidiropoulos (2020) in consensus argued that restricted mobility and clampdowns on migrants

would have an impact on developed world economies in terms of labour, but would also affect African economies where remittances comprise a significant portion of the revenue.

Respondent one, maintained that ‘South Africa has previously argued that it advocates for its own economic development and also for regional economic development. She further stated that what has been witnessed is that where circular migration has been restricted in other parts of the continent including southern Africa, there is an impact on trade. Further she argued there is over emphasis on formal channels of trade, however the reality on the ground is that many sub-regional economies are heavily dependent on other forms of trade that are regarded as informal, but are in-fact influential to regional economics’. (Personal communication, November 5, 2021)

On the issue of cross border traders, respondent one further argued that, cross border traders between Mozambique and South Africa, Eswatini and South Africa, Lesotho and South Africa and likewise Zimbabwe and South Africa are key contributors to the overall economy of the SADC region. She further discussed that the restriction on informal trade essentially criminalizes informal trade as a practise and at the same time criminalises other forms of migration. further she states that the efforts at regional level to have better integration of border management and creation of efficient trade routes have been affected by securitised migration policies by SADC member states. Moreover, she argues, “while it is important to note the importance of border security for migration governance, the problem is related to the fact that border security has been implemented in a manner that ostracizes migrant communities. She further argued the securitised approach towards migration yields far worse results than intended and complicates migration governance, which resultantly affects regional integration, trade and regional economic development.” (Personal communication, November 5, 2021)

4.3. The Role of non-state actors in facilitating regional immigration policy

The second respondent from University of Cape Town explored that “civil society organisations have the ability aid in migration policy through collaborating, gathering research findings on potential benefits for societies, and thereafter approaching the SADC secretariat. Further she argued that the SADC-Council of Non-governmental

Organisations (SADC-CNGO) and other relevant SADC affiliated entities can be instrumental in coordinating such work. Moreover, she stated that the business sector actors should be part of such plans, although they tend to interact directly with politicians and often have little regard for concerns relating to freer movement of persons within the region. Further she argues that, there are some big businesses which would be willing to cooperate. Ultimately, non-state actors have to appease summit (heads of state) and relevant council of ministers (e.g., Ministers of trade, transport, foreign affairs, etc.) Because it is our leaders who make the final decisions.” (Personal communication, November 17, 2021).

The fourth respondent from the Institute for Security Studies argued that civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations or non-state actors are recognised as a heterogenous group. The respondent argued that some organizations can exist within the legal fraternity and are able to assist the state and regional economic communities with the drafting of the correct types of frameworks that are required to be in place and ensuring that the laws are harmonized within the region. In addition, the respondent notes that, ‘laws on their own do not make the change, but most of the work needs to go to ensuring that policy and practice are consistent in order to ensure that there is no disorganisation in policy management and implementation. Also, the fourth respondent argued that “from the experience of the institute for security studies, the institution has witnessed that when, you are able to work with like-minded organizations across borders, one is more likely to get better outcomes and that it is not enough for an organization to be a lone voice advancing and advocating for improved policies and it aids to have the ability to come together with other organizations. Unfortunately, while there is a SADC-CNGO which is basically a council of non-governmental organizations that is attached to SADC, a lot of the focus has been on human rights violation questions, which is an important mandate. However, the collaboration across borders of NGO’s in one country working together with other NGO’s in another country does not happen as often, so the trilateral or bilateral NGO collaboration is said to be less effective and collaboration happens at member state level meetings, which does not lend itself to really crafting a clear

guidance to states from an NGO perspective on the way forward⁴.” (Personal communication, November 12, 2021)

The Respondent from the Institute of Security Studies, recommended for more bilateral collaboration at civil society level in order to foster integrated research from a civil society perspective to aide better migration governance and management (Personal communication, November 12, 2021).

4.4. Contribution of Labour Migration to economic development of host states in the SADC Region

A programme officer with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) argued that, “it would depend on the level(s) of organisation in the host state. South Africa for example, might gain more, because the country has a history to tap into. Think about their mining industry and farming sector for example. The former benefits greatly from migrant workers from Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, while the latter benefits a lot from migrant workers coming from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The labour space is defined as a “labour market”, therefore the rules of supply and demand apply. If there is no demand for farm labourers in Eswatini, then the kingdom would not benefit much from labour migration. But maybe, Eswatini and Lesotho may benefit from labour migration if citizens from say Zimbabwe, migrate to these kingdoms and fill up vacant spaces in the education and health sectors”. The programme officer further argued that, “In a state where opportunities are scarce and industries are struggling to survive, economic development will not be achieved. Take Zimbabwe for instance. So, facilitation of labour migration is key, but the host state needs to provide fertile ground for economic migrants. So, movement patterns will be skewed towards destinations where more opportunities lie⁵.” (Personal communication, November 10, 2021)

⁴ Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Personal communication, November 12, 2021.

⁵ Programme Officer, International Organization for Migration, Personal communication, November 10, 2021.

Respondent one, the Head of Special Projects with the Institute for Security Studies, argued that “in the West African region, there is greater circular migration, disputes have ensued between countries such as Ghana and Nigeria on cross-border trade and part of it has to do with informality and irregularity. Circular migration is not without challenges but much can be done on especially with regards to what are joint labour migration agreements which relates more to actual labour.”

The respondent further made a point that, “Lesotho and South Africa, have had bilateral agreements with regards to seasonal labour in the wine-lands and in the farms. Historically mineworkers across the region, from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi worked on each other’s mines, Malawian and Zimbabwean miners, working in gold and platinum mines in South Africa and likewise South African and Malawian in the Zambian copper-belt”. As well she states that the “facilitation of labour migration was due to existing bilateral arrangements. Moreover, in order to get labour migration right, there would be a need to identify the labour needs within individual countries and across the region.” (Personal Communication, November 5, 2021)

The fourth respondent from the Institute for Security Studies argued that since the mid-90s there has not been enough effort to properly map, what the labour needs are across the region. For example, the respondent stated that “what South Africa lists with regards to critical skills, the country does not factor infrastructural labourers and they focus on architects and they do not factor that in order to build roads, there is a need for construction workers”. Further, the respondent stated that, “South Africa does not have bilateral arrangements with neighbouring countries, where the builders and road-layers come from like neighbouring Zimbabwe”. The respondent from the Institute for Security Studies argues that, “this is not sustainable because, the questions around unemployment in South Africa continue and if companies employ on an ad-hoc basis, foreign nationals without a standing bilateral arrangement, local communities do not view the existence of foreign labourers as being beneficial to them, which, creates spaces for xenophobic violence to rise.” (Personal Communication, November 12, 2021)

The third respondent argued that “the reality is that few people will migrate into a neighbouring country and go to a rural area, unless it is for farm labour and mostly people would move towards urban centres. This prompts the need to be able to have

bilateral discussions between countries. Moreover, cross-border trade must be encouraged as part of the regional international trade agenda. SADC as a bloc and individual states do not have registration for individual cross-border traders and mostly these individual cross-border traders enter with a tourist visa, which in turn means that their goods are not secure and if the police confiscate their goods, they do not have a registration document that authorises them to trade. This means that in such a context individual cross-border trade is seen as unprotected labour.” (Personal Communication, November 10, 2021)

Further the third respondent states that, “what we usually call informal or unregulated labour or traders, contribute significantly to the state income in southern Africa and the challenge is on the state to regularise trade that already exists and ensure that the income that is generated goes towards the national fiscus and is not kept ‘under a mattress’. The state needs to recognise while multinational companies are provided permits for cross-border trader purposes, there is a need for similar models for individual traders but at a low-cost.” Arguing further the respondent stressed that, “Zimbabwe and Zambia do not have a formal cross border trade arrangement but people cross between Zambia and Zimbabwe as if there was a formal agreement in place. This takes place due to a recognition between the two states that this trade is normal, people do not get stamps in their passports and people are issued a paper on which the border authorities stamp on the one side and also border authorities stamp on the other side, which helps people not to fill up their passports. This is an informal agreement between states that makes cross-border trade easier and also encourages, local and sub-regional tourism which serves as a major income source for both countries and a lot of southern African countries” (Personal communication, November 10, 2021).

A common view amongst interviewees is that migrants will migrate regardless of the frameworks in place. As such, states need to put in place frameworks that do not criminalise migration. Likewise cross border traders are bound to trade regardless of the measures put in place. Further, the interviewees states that the main question from a policy maker point of view is whether, we would like the trade or the movement to take place illegally or lawfully? The preferred form of movement and migration from

the perspective of the interviewees is movement done legally and lawfully to ensure better migration governance.

4.5. SADC and Human Security Challenges

The second respondent, from the University of Cape Town argued that, “The first human security challenge that faces the region relates to state insecurity and instability. Further the respondent stated that human security is an umbrella term, the number one challenge is unemployment, and the second major challenge is the absence of peace. The region is relatively stable but the seemingly few pockets of unrest in say the DRC and Mozambique, have a huge impact because of the effects. If we also look at the lack of stability in Lesotho and Zimbabwe which are prone to episodes of internal conflict, that’s a peace problem. More recently, we have been watching pro-democracy uprisings in Eswatini.” (Personal communication, November 17, 2021)

Further the interviewee from UCT adds, “since leaders have been trusted and have promised to do something about the challenges facing their people, they should work out solutions regarding achieving peace. Dealing with bad governance is one way. Ensuring equal access to opportunities is another solution. Cooperating meaningfully when it comes to regional protocols is also important. And the last but most important is the building of economies: industrialization, education & skills development, and of course job creation. Part of the ‘equipment’ is deliberate and relevant policies, allocation of funds and effective management of resources dedicated to the projects.” (Personal Communication, November 17, 2021)

The second challenge confronting the region relates to the nature of the migration embraced by both SADC as a collective and the divergent migration policy of individual countries.

A Senior Researcher with, the South African Institute for International Studies argued that “migration issues in the SADC region continuously get pushed under the carpet and because for member states the discussion of migration might create a lot of controversy, member states would rather shy away from it and not discuss it. Further, the respondent added that member states have resulted to short-term calculations

rather than looking at the long-term development interests⁶.” This is in line with the argument that more developed countries in the region, for instance South Africa would like to have a more controlled process of migration into the country. In accordance with above, Mbiyozo (2018), argued that the National Assembly of South Africa passed the Border Management Authority Bill of 2016 on 8 June 2017 as an aim to address threats to the country’s territorial integrity and improve border security through addressing the fragmented nature of border management.

The interviewees contend that, politically it works perfectly for everybody to blame migrants for everything. They add that, to some extent there is seemingly denial on the part of member states in actually dealing with migration and the responses there-to have been seen to be ad-hoc, lack-lustre and more restrictive, notably in terms of asylum and migration in general.

The third challenge that SADC faces relates to the status of the ratification of the protocol on the facilitation of the free movement of persons.

A Senior Researcher with the African Centre for Migration and Society argued that, “not ratifying communicates that a state does not feel ready, or they do not want to commit yet. These states’ reasons are based on their foreign policy agenda and economic interests. If the protocol appears to be misaligned with their interests, they are less likely to comply. Some may only ratify if their ‘friends’ ratify. Remember that SADC states also engage with each other on a bilateral basis. In doing so, they influence each other on what to support and what to not support. Some member states might already be benefiting from the non-operationalisation of the protocol owing to state-centric views⁷.” Maunganidze and Formica (2018) in acquiescence argue that due to nationalist sentiments promoting ‘us versus them’ negative perceptions and misconceptions about migrants have been created, resulting in perceptions of

⁶ Senior Researcher, South African Institute for International Affairs, Personal Communication, November 20, 2021.

⁷ Senior Researcher, African Centre for Migration and Society, Personal Communication, November 25, 2021.

migrants as both a threat to national security and the South African economy. In addition, Maunganidze and Formica argue that an overview of member state migration policies in SADC reveals that, firstly free movement is not a primary objective for SADC member states and secondly, while various migration management practices exist, SADC countries continue to emphasise the securitisation of migration.

In relation to the challenge of ratification, Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2013), argue that the continuous emphasis on bilateral arrangements in relation to Labour migration, may further dampen the prospects of members states ratifying the 2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement as member states may view the bilateral arrangements as more desirable. Lenaghan (2020) in agreement to the argument by the senior researcher from the African Centre for Migration and Society, argues that “the SADC approach is one that encourages bilateral negotiations as opposed to a mutual regional agreement to a more comprehensive and gradual approach. Further he argued that there is an ignorance to regionalism and globalisation as well as a view that potential foreign entrants to the professions are unnecessary competition, and a desire to bar them from penetrating the jealously protected national markets, is viewed as a strategy to preserve opportunities for citizens” (Lenaghan, 2020, p63).

Finally, the challenges that SADC still have to overcome before the implementation of the Protocol on the Free Movement of People are numerous. The first obstacle that the institution has to overcome relates to the lack of commitment by some member states. Towards that end, respondent 1 noted that it is all linked to lack of commitment. “If the relevant ministries within each state are not willing to cooperate and develop a workable framework and operationalise the Protocol then existing challenges will persist. Ministries of course have to work with parliament, rely on consultations with civil society and business actors, and comply with what the president of the day has on his agenda.” (Personal communication, November 5, 2021)

4.6. Remittances and Migration in SADC: An Assessment of its Importance

The Respondent was required to state the extent of the importance of remittances on both the host and sending countries in SADC. Respondent one, stated that "remittances have saved many lives in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Eswatini. This financial cushion has shielded such economies from extreme financial struggles, especially for

Zimbabwe which rakes in up to us\$2billion during a good year. Host states benefit from the participation of migrants in their economies; these migrants pay taxes in one form or another. Migrants tend to commit a large portion of their lives to working in the host country, contributing towards the GDP, reducing unemployment in some sectors and promoting the sharing of business and cultural ideas” Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

A 2018 study by the World Bank, titled The Market for Remittance Services in Southern Africa, argues in consensus that remittances have the potential to make a significant contribution to poverty reduction and economic development in SADC. The study further states that according to World Bank (2011) research, remittances have the ability to raise incomes and enable households to increase consumption as well as invest in better quality care and education. Lastly the study highlights that Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Madagascar have the highest dependence on remittances among all SADC countries (World Bank, 2018).

Respondent one added that “when it comes to remittances, globally, in low income and middle-income countries, remittances are said to account for more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Further she states that for African countries this translates to billions in revenue annually. In addition, she stated that, when we look at the year 2020, despite the hardships faced by people due to the covid-19 pandemic, remittances still accounted to us\$540 billion globally, with the African continent accounting for 15.3 percent of global remittance inflows” (Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

Respondent one further contended that there was seemingly an increase in remittance inflows in African countries in 2020 compared to 2019. She stresses that countries in Southern Africa, like Zambia and Mozambique, were seen to be recording 37 and 16 percent respectively with regards to remittance inflows in the year 2020. For a country like Zimbabwe, she argued, remittance inflows are said to far exceed Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) combined. More-over adds that the world bank, is seen to regard remittances as the most important source of external financing in low- and middle-income countries (Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

She recommended that there is a need to regularise remittance channels that are currently dominated by the private sector, through reducing the cost of sending remittances, incentivising methods of money transfer such as mobile and other digital channels, and improving access to banking services.

According to the World Bank, sub-Saharan Africa is the most expensive region to send money to with an average commission of 8.2 percent. The highest cost is recorded in eastern and southern Africa: for example, sending money from Tanzania to Uganda is said to cost 24 percent; Angola to Namibia 22 percent; and from South Africa to neighbouring Botswana 19.6 percent, to Angola 19 percent, to Malawi 16 percent and Zimbabwe 14 percent (World Bank, 2018).

4.7. Challenges to access to Migration Data in the SADC Region

The respondents were required to reflect on the challenges that persist with regards to access to migration Data in the SADC region. According to a researcher with the South African Institute for International Affairs "the region has many porous borders. Many people travel without documentation between SADC states. Some move legally, then overstay in the host state. Others acquire fraudulent documentation. So, there is no accurate data base. If there was a SADC passport which more people would be keen to apply for, perhaps the count could be better. Further the respondent states that what affects availability of data, in individual countries and across countries, is due to a lack of documentation and record keeping of migrants that cross borders"⁸ (Personal communication, November 17, 2021).

The third respondent from the Institute for Security Studies argued that "proper border management and governance means that majority if not all people go through the legal ports of entry which means that the people are then counted. In addition, the respondent argues that at the moment because that is not done and only legal travellers are counted, it means that the data will always be flawed. In addition the interviewee adds that improvement of data, is based on two issues, firstly encouraging and making legal pathways to migration better and secondly, it is about data sharing and the

⁸ Researcher, South African Institute for International Studies, November 17, 2021

creation of a central data point for southern Africa, so that for example a country like Zimbabwe knows what its outflows are but also is aware the number of people that are coming in and is able to rather not have to share this information with its neighbour Zambia, but they have a single portal that always both countries to track migration better” Personal communication, November 17, 2021).

The second respondent claims that it would help for the countries to know the number of people within their borders but also the number of people moving between both countries, but would also aid as a good crime detection tool as well. Because this would allow countries to track the flows of organized criminals that are stealing cars in South Africa and taking them into Mozambique. She adds that with the current system it is extremely difficult to do that, henceforth it is important for there to be a centralized data portal that mirrors a similar portal that has been adopted for the European union through Frontex, which is a platform that enables that there are individual border authorities within countries but these border authorities share a single data portal and are able to use this portal without having to request this from their neighbouring country. Moreover, they argue contemporarily for South Africa to be aware how of the number of people that have left Zimbabwe, they have to request this information from Zimbabwe and do not have easy access to that information (Personal communication, November 17, 2021).

The interviewees contend that there is a need for the creation of a conducive climate for all persons to have access to the right documentation. Promoting freer movement and exchange of skills through flexible entry, work, and stay conditions and cracking down on fraudulent officials and border security.

4.8. The Role of the SADC Protocol on Facilitation of Free Movement in Facilitating regional migration

The ninth respondent was expected to discuss the role of the SADC Protocol on Facilitating Free Movement in the region. The second researcher from the African Centre for Migration and Society reasoned that the aspirations of the SADC region towards regional and continental integration especially with regards to the free movement of people, have over time been diluted especially due to the power given to

member states to implement the protocol. The fact that the Protocol is not legally binding on member states and no negative or positive incentives exist for member states that decide to or not to implement the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons, makes it difficult to hold member states accountable for lack of implementation of the protocol (Personal communication, November 16, 2021).

The ninth respondent further stressed that the lack coherence between regional and national migration policies has created a major gap between the regional legislative framework and the national legislative framework. The respondent further added by stating that the various instruments at the regional level have paved way for the reinforcement of national sovereignty, through leaving the implementation of policies at the discretion of the individual governments⁹.

The Seventh and ninth respondent argue that migration is seen to be critical to the continents development and the recognition of its importance in Africa's regional integration agenda, the policy frameworks at the regional and the continental levels, including the African Union's migration policy framework, are said to have been designed in-order to enhance the free movement of persons and labour between member states (Personal Communication, November 16 & 25, 2021). The first respondent, was of the opinion that economic development is central to migration and that countries tend to trade and invest more with countries from which they have received migrants. Further she stated that "trade is an important mechanism through which intra-African migration contributes of the economic development of the continent" (Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

4.9. The Role of IOM and International Organisations in Migration Policy in SADC

According to a Senior Policy and Research Officer with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), "the IOM as the principal united nations agency for migration,

⁹ Researcher, African Center for Migration and Society, Personal Communication, November 16, 2021

is instrumental in influencing and assisting with regards to migration governance, not only in Southern Africa, but across the continent and globally. The respondent further stated that, IOM in 2018 released its global compact for migration, which saw the un member states agree to common goals in terms of managing international migration in all its dimensions.” Additionally, the respondent noted, that the IOM does not dictate policy for member states nor does it dictate policy for SADC, the IOM works with partners in the international community to assist with regards to meeting operational challenges of migration, advances the understanding of migration issues amongst its partners, encourages social and economic development through migration, and seeks to uphold human dignity and ensure the well-being of migrants¹⁰ (Senior Policy and Research officer, Personal Communication, November 16, 2021).

According to the fifth respondent from the IOM, “the international labour organization, according to the respondents is instrumental in advising and influencing labour policy and labour legislative framework within SADC and its member states. The ILO seeks to advance and ensure that international labour standards that respect the rights of workers and also ensure that the rights of migrant labourers are not violated and that migrants are not exploited for their labour.” In addition, the respondent argued that the SADC Labour Migration Policy, was drafted under the guidance of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and the ILO multilateral framework on labour migration, which is a non-binding guiding document on managing labour migration in order to meet the effective needs and the rights of citizens. Further the respondent argued, that the SADC labour migration policy was further influenced by the ILO-SADC decent work programme (Personal communication, November 10, 2021).

According to the second respondent, the European Union have traditionally provided support to SADC with its regional integration agenda, since the early 2000s, in addition to providing bilateral funding to SADC member states. Additionally, she stated that both SADC and the European Union usually are involved in regular exchanges through technical and political dialogue. Lastly, she added, that the EU’s

¹⁰ Senior Policy and Research Officer (IOM), Personal Communication, November 16, 2021)

support was historically focused on promoting regional economic integration and infrastructure and at some point, expanded to cover peace and security (Personal communication, November 17, 2021).

The second and fifth respondent contend that stated that the SADC legislative framework on labour migration has been influenced by the declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work of the international labour organisation. The interviewees agree that the declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work, commits member states to respect and promote the principles and rights of the eight core ILO Conventions. Lastly the interviewees, noted that the norms of social rights were imported from outside SADC the institution and were disseminated among the SADC member states through their ratifications of the ILO Conventions.

4.10. The Role of Bilateral agreements in facilitating migration in the region

According to the first respondent, several national and multilateral accords, particularly South Africa's bilateral agreements with its nearest neighbours, control labour mobility in the region. Migrants must show that they have a job or school offer and that they will be able to sustain themselves financially throughout their stay in order to be granted entry for a longer term. Work, internal state violence, and trade, among other factors, have historically drawn international migrants to Southern Africa. Large-scale migration to the diamond fields in Kimberly in the 1860s predates the organized labour migration system that came with the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s (Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

She further adds that, "the SADC Treaty calls for the gradual removal of "obstacles to the free movement of labour and of the people of the region generally, among member states," among other things. This clause of the SADC Treaty is implemented through the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC (hereinafter known as the facilitation protocol). As a stepping stone toward the African Economic Community, the protocol promotes the African union's ambitions for free movement of persons in African Regional Economic Communities (REC's) (Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC, 2005)

The second respondent, argued that Zimbabwe–South Africa joint Commission for Economic, Social, Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Cooperation, for example, does not address migration but establishes the framework within which Zimbabwe and South Africa have signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) on employment and labour as well as cooperation and mutual assistance on immigration matters. South Africa has traditionally had labour memorandums of understanding with its neighbours. The MOU signed on December 24, 1973, with Botswana notes that rules governing the employment of Batswana in South Africa and the movement of people across their shared boundaries have been in place since July 1, 1963. The MOU established a labour representative office for Botswana in South Africa. The office provides advice on a variety of topics, including Batswana employment in South Africa, entry compliance, identification and documentation requirements, remittances and workers' welfare funds for Batswana working in South Africa, and assisting with the repatriation of sick, injured, or destitute Batswana formerly employed and others unlawfully present in South Africa, among other things. Similar MOUs exist between South Africa and Lesotho, Mozambique, and Eswatini. Since their signing, such accords have guided labour movement throughout Southern Africa (Personal communication, November 17, 2021).

4.11. Measures to improve regional migration in SADC

The first respondent and seventh respondent identified that there are a number of measures that can be implemented and put in place in order to improve migration across the Southern African region.

Firstly, the first respondent argued that SADC needs to formulate and implement a regional migration policy framework. Further she identified that in order for freedom of movement to be achieved in Southern Africa there is a need for SADC to express and adopt measures (through negative and positive incentives) in order to ensure that ratification and implementation is done by all member states. Further she stressed that this policy needs to be aligned to the African union’s protocol on free movement of persons (Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

She, moreover, pointed out that the successful implementation of this framework will require wide consultations with all relevant actors including states and non-state actors such as civil society organizations, business and labour, women and youth associations and local communities. She argued that the formulation of a regional migration policy framework must be followed by the promotion of regional citizenship across the region such as what has been done in the Economic Community for West African states (ECOWAS) region (Personal communication, November 5, 2021).

The seventh respondent from the African Centre for Migration and Society, argued that the migration policy framework of SADC needs to protect the freedom of movement of migrants within and from the host countries. The interviewee stressed that SADC member states need to ensure that migrants that are living legally in their territories, including refugees and asylum seekers need to be allowed to move freely within their territories without fear of arrest, detention, or deportation (Personal Communication, November 25, 2021).

Additionally, the interviewee also argued that in order to ensure freedom of movement of migrants and migration protection, the SADC member states need to build or strengthen their ability to control their national borders and enforce the rule of law within their territorial authorities. The interviewee also stressed that “the failure to ensure the strengthening of the national borders results in the existence of endemic corruption, the exploitation of migrants through unfair labour relations, solicitation of bribes from desperate migrants, smuggling of people, trafficking of persons and migrants being denied access to services and opportunities to which they are supposed to be entitled to, if they refuse to offer a bribe to the immigration officials” (Personal communication, November 25, 2021).

All the interviewees agree that SADC member states need to work together to ensure the creation and protection of social security benefits of migrants and foreign nationals. Further the interviewees stated that host SADC member states working together with civil society organizations need to curb xenophobia and its various manifestations. They stressed that xenophobic exclusion creates a threat not only to the livelihoods of migrants in the host countries, but also affects regional stability and

socio-economic integration, through affecting trade patterns, when nationals attack foreign owned trucks that transport goods. Lastly the interviewees affirmed that SADC needs to put in place measures that ensure holding accountable member states such as South Africa that have demonstrated the lack of political will in terms of addressing xenophobic violence, which continues to be rife across the country.

4.12. Conclusion

Overall, these results indicate that the issue of migration and free movement of people is a seemingly contentious issue across the SADC region. There are multiple problems and reasons that have resulted in migration securitization within the region. These problems include, uneven/unequal development across the region, uncontrolled movement of people, state insecurity and instability, nature of migration embraced by SADC and divergent migration policies and lastly the status of ratification of the protocol on the facilitation on free movement of persons.

These afore-mentioned challenges have affected the effectiveness of the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons that was adopted in 2005. The findings reveal that the issue of liberal migration and movement of people is not of high importance for SADC member states. Secondly the continuous state insecurity and instability in the region has resultantly led to migration and the movement of people being viewed as a security risk by member states. Lastly the persistence of these problems has further created divergent migration policies among member states.

The study further reveals that as long as insecurity and state instability continue in the region, migration liberalisation and the protocol ratification by all member states will only exist as a pipe dream within SADC.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

5.1. Introduction

This Chapter focuses on discussions of the findings of the study and themed around the research questions: in what way does securitization of migration affect regional economic development within SADC? ; how can SADC develop a migration policy that is more human centric, than state centric? ; In what ways can SADC transform into an institution that is equipped to deal with human security challenges facing the region? ; in what ways does labour migration in SADC contribute to the economic development of migrant hosting states?

5.2. The Impact of securitization of migration on regional economic integration in the SADC region.

It has become increasingly clear that southern African states, that are the largest migrant receiving states, have decided to adopt a securitised approach to migration, through other putting up fences or making the barriers of entry restrictive and difficult for people. The SADC bloc as an institution, has attempted through its various protocols and its treaty of 1992. This inclination towards a securitised approach to migration is said to stem from the generally negative perceptions and misconceptions about migrants, who have been seen as both a threat to national security and the economy. Furthermore, it has been realised that there is almost a direct impact between the adopting of a securitised approach to migration and its effects on regional integration and development across the SADC region. In addition, the reality in the region is that informal or unregulated migration by individuals provides a significant

contribution to the SADC economy and provides incomes for many families across the SADC region.

In reviewing the literature, Crush, Dodson, Williams and Tevera (2017) argue that there are considerable numbers of migrants that run small and micro-enterprises or being employed in these businesses in cities and towns across the region. Further they argue that according to the Quality-of-Life Survey of 2013, 11% of Johannesburg residents owned their own businesses and 65% of all business owners operated in the informal economy. Lastly, they argue that, the African Union and numerous individual countries increasingly recognise that the diaspora is an important actual and potential development resource for remittances, investments, philanthropy, tourism, training and skills transfer (Crush, Dodson, Williams, & Tevera, 2017).

Cross border traders have existed for decades, especially between South Africa and Lesotho, South Africa and Eswatini, South Africa and Mozambique and South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, due to the securitised approach that has been implemented by SADC states, these cross-border traders are not protected from exploitation and arbitrary arrests, as they are forced to use tourist visas to enter and this type of visa does not protect their goods and their form of labour. Moreover, it is worth noting that countries, like Zambia and Zimbabwe have through an informal agreement acknowledged the importance of cross border traders and their contribution to both neighbouring countries.

In reviewing the literature, Moyo (2020) argues that there is an informal architecture of informal cross border activities that exist and occur between Botswana and Zimbabwe and between South Africa and Zimbabwe. He adds further that, however the securitization and maintenance of the coloniality of borders by SADC states, stands

in the way of enhancing activities of these actors. He further argues that multinational actors operate with ease, which begs to question whether the structure differs from the colonial structure that exploited the resources, including cross border trade from Africa and yet African people, were oppressed and suppressed by multitude of laws and institutions such as borders (Moyo, 2020).

Additionally, it has also become important to know that, remittances (money sent home by migrants) are said to account for a substantial share of the economic development of the SADC region. Furthermore, it has been identified that remittances generate economic and in turn political stability in the sending countries. Further it results in less people moving and the hosting of economic migrants becomes less of a burden for the receiving countries. However, it is worth noting that there are high costs to transferring money in the SADC region and that there is immense potential for SADC to harness even more economic development by reducing the remittance transaction costs and opening up formal channels for remitting income and goods for undocumented and low-income clients.

According to the World Bank (2018), in spite of the relatively large inflows of remittances to the SADC region, the cost of sending money to and within the region is significantly higher than any other regions in the world. Further, the World Bank argues that resultantly, relative to the low incomes of migrant workers, such high costs can be prohibitive. In addition, the World Bank, stresses that consequently remittances within the region are channelled through unregulated or informal channels, such as transport companies or carried in hand by friends and family. Lastly the bank argues, while aforementioned methods may be convenient and affordable, they present risks to both consumers and the financial system (World Bank, 2018).

5.3. SADC developing a migration policy that is more human centric than state centric.

It has become increasingly evident that regardless of the legal framework in place, people are going to move and migrate. Furthermore, even with the securitised approach to migration by some SADC member states, it is noteworthy to realise that this has not decreased the number of people migrating but the numbers of people migrating continues to increase and is set to increase in the next decade. Furthermore, it is also important to note that due to the securitised approach and the difficulty in accessing traveling documents, people have resorted to make use of the illegal pathways to migration such as “border jumping”, and resort to being smuggled over borders. Further, it has become clear that most migrants are not using the legal pathways to migrate but have opted for the illegal routes.

It is important to note that when countries make it difficult for people to move, criminal activities such as smuggling and the creation of informal routes of migration become created. However, once movement is made easier it becomes automatically safer. Furthermore, SADC needs to ensure that creates and adopts a migration governance framework that ensures proper management of migration and ensure country collaboration and resource sharing across member states with regards to migration governance and management. Lastly, SADC needs to ensure that migration management is viewed primarily as an economic issue as opposed to a security concern and migration management should be managed by SADC’s economic development, social and human development department, instead of the organ for politics, defence and security department.

The issue of a human centred migration regime in the region, is mainly linked to the idea of protection of the rights of migrants. According to the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) (2018), in order to advance a pro-migration agenda, there is often a strong focus on the reform of policy and laws as well as the public education about rights. Further the ACMS argues that, the lack of political will and weak state capacity to implement existing laws leads to worse protection outcomes. In addition, the ACMS, argues that without sustained political will and administrative capacity to properly interpret, implement and enforce existing legal and policy frameworks, migrants protection will always be compromised (African Centre for Migration & Society, 2018).

5.4. The contribution of Labour migration to economic development of host countries.

It has become common knowledge across the continent and the region that labour migration has grown with regards to its significance in terms of its complexity and its scope. As a result, governments, the Regional Economic Communities and the African Union Commission, are said to be attaching great importance with regards to designing effective governance systems and rights protection measures that are meant to help the opportunities for migrants and contribute to development. Migrants at an individual level or at a household level through opportunities for employment away from home, aids in the generation of incomes for the migrants and their families. Furthermore, migrant remittances are seen to be extremely important with regards to economic growth and economic stability across the SADC region and the reduction of remittance charges can be beneficial for the host countries.

In addition to the above identified advantages, in the destination or host countries, labour migration has been identified with having a positive impact on economic growth, productivity and employment. Countries need to identify essential skills and formulate a regional skills partnership amongst states that helps to strengthen efforts towards promoting legal labour migration pathways, that respond to the needs within the labour markets, while enhancing skills for people in the less developed countries in the region. Furthermore, this would ensure that mobility contributes to development through bilateral and multilateral programmes to exchange and advance skills and meet the labour needs. Furthermore, migrants have been identified to have an impact with regards to increasing native-born employment rates and an increase in monthly wages, as well as helping in decreasing the unemployment rates through providing employment. With regards to productivity, it is argued that labour migrants in South Africa have had a positive impact on the GDP per-capita and that labour migrants have the ability to raise income per-capita by up-to 5 percent. Furthermore, the labour migrants that are employed in the formal economy, their employment can have a positive effect on public finance through payment of taxes and contributions to social welfare systems.

According to a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Labour immigration's economic contribution goes beyond potential changes in the overall labour market. Firstly, the study identifies, that immigration can have an impact on the overall income of native-born individuals through affecting labour productivity. Secondly, the study presents that immigration typically raises the share of employed individuals in the total population due to high concentration of immigrants in the working age population. In addition, the study states that resultantly, this leads to a growth, of the labour force and consequently increases the GDP per-capita (OECD/ILO, 2018).

Migrants have been identified as having the ability to facilitate trade and investment flows between origin and destination countries and as consumers that represent large communities, they can create new demands for goods and services. A study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the OECD, states that in most countries, with exception to those with a large share of older migrants, evidence demonstrates that migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in individual benefits. Additionally, the study notes that international migration does have both a direct and indirect effect on economic growth. The study notes that given the age structure of inflows, migration does tend to expand the workforce henceforth contributing to the overall GDP growth (ILO/World Bank, 2015).

5.5. Conclusion

This Chapter discussed the findings of the study by reflecting them against the research questions of the study. The findings may help us understand the effects of securitization of migration on regional integration within the SADC region. Consequently, there is a lack of political will among SADC member states to liberalize freedom of movement and migration amongst SADC member states. It is also discussed in this chapter that migrants have the ability to facilitate increased trade flows and investment, which is a crucial element for regional integration.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

This study was aimed at establishing whether the securitisation of migration with the SADC region affect SADC's overall regional economic integration agenda and the aspirations for free movement of persons across the region, as envisaged in SADC's founding treaty of 1992. This question was posed against the background that SADC governments, since the first Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of People (1995), were hesitant to allow for a scenario that allows, for complete freedom of movement, without the member states having control over who is allowed in their territories, and henceforth opted for the protocol to be re-worked and later agreed for a watered-down version in the name of the 2005 SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons. Under the 2005 Protocol, SADC member states, are left to be responsible for individually and collectively handling migration. Furthermore, although adopted the protocol has not come into force due to only six member states have ratified the protocol, short of a majority that would require it to come into operation. Currently SADC member states are seen to favour bilateral arrangements and as of practice most countries have managed to comply with one of the core-aims of the protocol which ensures granting visa-free entry, with lawful purpose, to citizens from other member states for a maximum of 90 days. However, in practice, the power of granting of visa-free entry for a maximum of 90 days, the discretion has been left with the immigration officers, who due to negative perceptions against migrants, can decide to allow or reject one's entry, and place restrictions based on the number of day's they may willingly decide, which further forces people to sometimes use the illegal avenues of migration, instead of the legal channels.

Interview schedules were used to collect data. 10 interview schedule questions were distributed out of 15. This was due to the lack of availability from other respondents, hence the researcher only had access to 10 respondents from the initially targeted number of respondents. The interview schedule which was used to collect data from individuals from key stakeholder organisations and migration research centred institutions such as the Institute for Security Studies, the African Centre for Migration and Society and the International Organization for Migration. The questionnaires, which were aimed at the key informants from these institutions and other institutions, wanted to reflect issues relating to migration problems that the region is facing, understanding why these problems persist and, what could be done to address these issues, from a multi-sectoral and stakeholder perspective. There were, 10 respondents in this study. The section below provides an account of the conclusions of the study as guided by the research questions listed in chapter one.

6.1. Conclusions:

SADC, as a bloc has made strides with regards to ensuring, that free movement of people is achieved and achieving a free movement zone within the region. The removal of the current controls will go a long way in ensuring that migration governance, is done properly, moreover this would allow SADC member states to clamp-down on criminal activities such as human trafficking and the illegal transportation of stolen vehicles across borders. What is note-worthy is that people, are bound to migrate regardless of the legal frameworks put in place and people have been migrating for decades and will continue to do so, regardless of what the laws state. Moreover, in order to maximise on this reality, SADC states need to ensure that they provide for more legal pathways for people to travel. Resultantly, improving the

legal pathways for migration would aid in the reduction of opportunities for personal enrichment by corrupt state administrators on both sides of the borders, eliminate the high levels of corruption and abuse in the immigration system and reduce the current exploitation of migrants who currently enjoy few rights and protections. Furthermore, while it is evident that migration is taking place across the region and most migrants in the region originate from within the region, there is a lack of a proper structure that is devoted to ensuring that there is proper migration governance in the region. Moreover, it is increasingly clear, that the persistent instability and socio-economic disparities between member states continues to be a major impediment to adopting a more collective approach when it comes to migration management. Furthermore, it is clear that the lingering disparities, have resulted in the lack of political will especially from the high migrant receiving states, of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. Additionally, the lack of reliable data on migration continues to complicate an effective approach to migration management.

In addition, the region needs to adopt a regional policy based on collective responsibility with regards migration management and this would lead to more economic and political stability in the region. There is a need for a more progressive regional migration policy framework, that emphasises on effective migration governance and effective data collection, as it is clear that migration flows are most likely going to increase than decrease. The idea of free movement and effective migration governance is fundamental to development and stability across the region.

6.2. Recommendations

Based on the findings, this paper has found the following recommendations to be relevant.

6.3. Recommendation 1.

SADC needs to establish a border management information system, that will aid data collection of the people that move across borders of member states and would be beneficial in formulation of strategic and tactical intelligence, which will inform migration policies and also aid as a crime detection tool as, migrant numbers will be effectively recorded. Furthermore, this border management information system needs to be an integrated border management system across member states such as the European Union's Frontex. This will guarantee safe, secure and well-functioning borders across SADC as SADC border officials will be able to track the numbers of people leaving and entering their countries effectively.

6.4. Recommendation 2.

SADC, will need to ensure that it encourages its member states to harmonise their regulations regarding money transfers and remittances in order to make them more accessible and less costly and offer the use of alternative money transfer technologies and platforms offering lower costs and transactions.

6.5. Recommendation 3.

SADC should ensure that it encourages member states to expand legal pathways for SADC citizens to travel and to move and ensure that there is protection of migrants and cross border traders through bilateral agreements between states and ensure cross border traders and migrants are afforded protection, together with their goods. Moreover, SADC states through bilateral agreements need to come up with trading permits for individual cross border traders, which will help formalise individual cross

border trading and ensure that proceeds from this form of cross border trading go towards enriching the public fiscus.

6.6. Recommendation 4.

Migration should be viewed across SADC as an economic issue and not a security threat and should be moved to SADC's economic development, social and human development department.

6.7. Recommendation 5.

SADC needs to make use of existing labour migration that exists in the region, especially the visa waivers, the bilateral labour migration arrangements and the existing SADC protocols as a way to boost regional migration governance and would be helpful in harnessing the development potential of migration in the region.

Lastly, SADC needs to establish a global skills partnership, for the region, which would aid in strengthening the efforts towards promoting legal labour migration pathways that respond to the needs within the labour markets, while enhancing development for the people in the less developed countries.

6.8. Directions for future research

SADC member states having increasingly acknowledged on numerous platforms at the regional and continental level that the movement of persons in the region is critical for regional and continental integration and that for SADC to effectively fully implement free movement of persons in and the adoption of an African passport, SADC states need to relax visa restrictions that make it difficult for people to move. The next stage with regard to having a comprehensive protocol that facilitates for the free movement of persons, across regional borders, there is a need for further research

on, SADC's commitment to residence and establishment of SADC citizenship and how this helps with operationalisation and implementation of the AU agenda 2063 and the African passport.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Ethical Clearance Letter to Conduct Research



ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

Ethical Clearance Reference Number: DEC FOC/09/04 **Date:** 17/09/2021

This Ethical Clearance Certificate is issued by the University of Namibia Ethics Committee (REC) in accordance with the University of Namibia's Research Ethics Policy and Guidelines. Ethical approval is given in respect of undertakings contained in the Research Project outlined below. This Certificate is issued on the recommendations of the ethical evaluation done by the ethics committee.

Title of Project: Migration and Securitization of citizenship in SADC: Assessing its impacts on the free movement of people and regional economic integration agenda

Student: Moyo Sindiso

Student Number: 201407916

Supervisor(s): : PROF LESLEY BLAAUW (UNAM)

Centre for Research Services

Take note of the following:

1. Any significant changes in the conditions or undertakings outlined in the approved Proposal must be communicated to the ethics committee. An application to make amendments may be necessary.
2. Any breaches of ethical undertakings or practices that have an impact on ethical conduct of the research must be reported to the ethics committee
3. The Principal Researcher must report issues of ethical compliance to the ethics committee (through the Chairperson) at the end of the Project or as may be requested by the ethics committee
4. The ethics committee retains the right to:
 - i) Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance if any unethical practices (as outlined in the Research Ethics Policy) have been detected or suspected,
 - ii) Request for an ethical compliance report at any point during the course of the research.

The ethics committee wishes you the best in your research.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Precious Mushendami', is written above a horizontal line.

Precious Mushendami (Chairperson Ethics Committee)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Davis Mumbengegwi', is written above a horizontal line.

Prof. Davis Mumbengegwi (Head, Multidisciplinary Research)

Appendix 2 – Sample: Instrument – brief information about the research and participation

**PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LEAFLET AND CONSENT FORM
ANNEX 5**



TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT: MIGRATION AND SECURITIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN SADC: ASSESSING ITS IMPACTS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGENDA

REFERENCE NUMBER: 201407916

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: SINDISO VALENTINE MOYO

ADDRESS: P.O. Box 1844, Caprivi Street, Klein Windhoek, Namibia

CONTACT NUMBER +264815524524

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Please take some time to read the information presented here, which will explain the details of this project. Please ask the Principal Investigator any questions about any part of this project that you do not fully understand. It is very important that you are fully satisfied that you clearly understand what this research entails and how you could be involved. Also, your participation is **entirely voluntary** and you are free to decline to participate. If you say no, this will not affect you negatively in any way whatsoever. You are also free to withdraw from the study at any point, even if you do agree to take part.

This study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee at The University of Namibia and will be conducted according to the ethical guidelines and principles of the international Declaration of Helsinki, South African Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice and Namibian National Research Ethics Guidelines.

1. What is this research study all about?

The purpose of this study is to better understand the effects of the securitization of migration on the free movement agenda of the Southern African Development Community, commonly known as (SADC). The concept of Securitization was developed by the 'Copenhagen School' of thought, and initially places priority on speech acts, stressing that the very utterance of 'security' is more than just saying or describing something but also the performing of an action. Furthermore, according to the Copenhagen school of thought and other securitization scholars, there are two principal constituents in the securitization process, namely; a securitizing actor and the audience whose interactions, in fact trigger securitization. Henceforth this study seeks to explore the effects of SADC member states, actions acting as securitizing agents framing migration as a 'security threat' on the facilitation and promotion of the region's free movement of people and regional integration agenda. This inquest will be done through the use of the Copenhagen school of thought and the neo-liberal theory of international relations. The research will be conducted in Windhoek, Namibia primarily but will represent views of a wide array of experts chosen from select key institutions that work around migratory issues. During the interview you will be asked a set of questions. Only Discuss things that you a familiar with. Your participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous. If you further wish to clarify a certain aspect of the interview, you are at all times encouraged to contact the student in order make any additional comments or revise your statement. If you agree to participate, the interview will begin as soon as you give consent, and your participation will be no longer than 2 hours in this study. You may choose to withdraw from the study at any time. Upon your request all information collected will be destroyed.

2. Why have you been invited to participate?

You have been selected as a possible participant because of your expertise, Knowledge or experience which permeates the scope of the study in the field of migration and particularly migration in the Southern African region. Owing to this, your participation and contribution to this study in the of face-to-face interviews are of great significance.

3. What will be your responsibilities be?

Your Participation in this Study will be through face to face interviews wherein you are required to answer questions on the subject matter, if comfortable. When you agree to participate, the interview process will last 1 hour to 1 hour 30 minutes. Your answers to the questions are appropriate in shaping the findings for this study, hence you are humbly requested to provide sincere and accurate information/responses as far as possible.

4. Will you benefit from taking part in this research?

There are no direct benefits to you as a participant. The expected benefit will be to the development dispensation of the SADC region and as this study will lighten up the scope on the impacts of securitization of migration in the SADC region on regional economic integration and growth. Moreover, the study will illuminate the economic benefits associated with better managed migration and free movement of people in the region. This understanding will foster government and regional policy initiative to maximize migration management and migration liberalization.

5. Are there in risks involved in your taking part in this research?

There are no risks involved in partaking in this study

6. If you do not agree to take part, what alternatives do you have?

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, hence it is at your liberty to refuse participation, refuse to answer certain questions you are not comfortable with or withdraw from participation at any time.

7. Will you be paid to take part in this study and are there any costs involved?

Participation in this study will not be done in exchange of a payment, nor are there any costs involved for the participant.

8. Is there anything else that you should know or do?

- a) Otherwise you can contact the Research Ethics Committee at +264 61 2064673; research@unam.na if you have any concerns or complaints that I have not adequately addressed.
- b) You will receive a copy of this information and consent form for your own records.

9. Declaration by participant

By signing below, I agree to take part in a research study entitled *(Migration and Securitization of Citizenship in SADC: Assessing its impacts on the free movement of people and regional economic integration agenda.)*

I declare that:

- a) I have read or had read to me this information and consent form and it is written in a language with which I am fluent and comfortable.
- b) I have had a chance to ask questions and all my questions have been adequately answered.
- c) I understand that taking part in this study is **voluntary** and I have not been pressurized to take part.
- d) I may choose to leave the study at any time and will not be penalised or prejudiced in any way.
- e) I may be asked to leave the study before it has finished, if the study doctor or researcher feels it is in my best interests, or if I do not follow the study plan, as agreed to.

Signed at (*place*) on (*date*) 20

.....
Signature of participant

.....
Signature of witness

10. Declaration by investigator

I (*Sindiso Valentine Moyo*) declare that:

- I explained the information in this document to
- I encouraged him/her to ask questions and took adequate time to answer them.
- I am satisfied that he/she adequately understands all aspects of the research, as discussed above
- I did/did not use a interpreter. (*If a interpreter is used then the interpreter must sign the declaration below.*)

Signed at (*place*) on (*date*) 20

Appendix 3 – Research Questionnaire



Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

Interview Schedule Stakeholder Organizations

Institution: SADC secretariat

Researcher: Mr. Sindiso Moyo

Course: Master of Arts in Political studies

Topic: MIGRATION AND SECURITIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN SADC: ASSESSING
ITS IMPACTS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION AGENDA

Section A

Structured Questions

- In what way does securitization of migration affect regional economic development within SADC?
- How can SADC develop a migration policy that is more human centric than state centric?
- In what ways can SADC transform into an institution that is equipped to deal with human security challenges facing the region?
- In what way does labour migration in SADC contribute to the economic development of migrant hosting nations?

Interview Schedule 1: SADC Secretariat

1. What are the socio-economic consequences of securitization of migration on the economy of the SADC region?
2. What are the major impediments of securitization of migration on regional trade?
3. What could be the potential regional economic benefits brought upon by the harmonisation of migration policies in the region?
4. Why are SADC member states reluctant to cede border control and migration management to the SADC secretariat?
5. What role does the SADC secretariat play in ensuring the implementation of the Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of persons?
6. In what way can SADC enhance the facilitation of movement of persons in the region?
7. ECOWAS created an ECOWAS passport to enhance the free movement of ECOWAS residents. In your view can the creation of a regional SADC passport enhance the free movement of SADC residents?
8. What are the most Important Features of Labour Migration frameworks at the regional level?
9. What are the most relevant governance frameworks at the regional level and what provisions do they include?
10. What is the degrees of regionalism permeating national labour migration legislation in the SADC region?
11. What are the reasons migration under the organ of politics, defence and security instead of SADC immigration structures?

Appendix 4: Research Questionnaire



Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

Interview Schedule Stakeholder Organizations

Institution: African Centre for Migration and Society

Researcher: Mr. Sindiso Moyo

Course: Master of Arts in Political studies

Topic: MIGRATION AND SECURITIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN SADC: ASSESSING ITS IMPACTS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGENDA

Interview Schedule 2: African Centre for Migration and Society

1. What are the most relevant migration governance policies and frameworks in Africa at the continental level and in the selected RECs and what provisions do they include?
2. What are the difficulties in developing and implementing regional protocols on population migration?
3. How can the state of regional migration in SADC be improved?
4. To what extent do/can international actors e.g. international non-governmental organizations, and development partners influence existing and potential legislation and policy agendas in SADC?
5. What would be the benefits for SADC if it was to formulate and implement a comprehensive regional migration policy framework?
6. In your view is the SADC protocol on facilitation of free movement of persons aligned to the AU protocol on free movement of persons?

7. In what way can the harmonization of migration policies in SADC combat social ills such as Human trafficking and xenophobia?
8. How can the region achieve increased economic development, regional integration in the absence of free movement of persons?
9. What does the ratification of the African continental free trade area mean for regional developments with regards to migration and free movement of people mean for SADC?
10. What are the major migration issues due to the progression of major continental developments like the AfCTA?

Appendix 5: Research Questionnaire



Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

Interview Schedule Stakeholder Organizations

Institution: IOM

Researcher: Mr. Sindiso Moyo

Course: Master of Arts in Political studies

Topic: MIGRATION AND SECURITIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN SADC: ASSESSING ITS IMPACTS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGENDA

Interview Schedule 3: IOM

1. What role do international organizations such as IOM, ILO and EU play with regards to migration policy in SADC?
2. What is the degree of consistency between of international policies e.g. IOM, ILO, EU and existing legislation and policy agendas dealing with Labor migration in the SADC region?
3. What impact does the securitization of migration policies have on individual migrants?
4. How do specific bilateral agreements between South Africa and neighboring countries impact labor migration in Southern Africa?
5. What would be the socio-economic impacts on the SADC region if SADC implemented an immigration framework that embraces SADC citizenship?
6. Does IOM play a role in influencing national Immigration policies?
7. What is the role of IOM with regards to liberalization of migration within the SADC region?

8. In your opinion what are the major challenges with regards to migration governance in SADC?
9. In your assessment, is it beneficial for SADC to implement a European Union migration policy framework?
10. What are the major economic benefits for host countries with increased labor migration in SADC?

Appendix 6: Research Questionnaire



Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

Interview Schedule Stakeholder Organizations

Institution: Institute for Security Studies

Researcher: Mr. Sindiso Moyo

Course: Master of Arts in Political studies

Topic: MIGRATION AND SECURITIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN SADC: ASSESSING
ITS IMPACTS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION AGENDA

Interview Schedule 4: Institute for Security Studies

1. What is your general view on the securitization of migration within the SADC region?
2. In your view, do you think that securitizing migration, can affect regional economic development within the SADC region? If yes how?
3. Is it possible for SADC member states to develop coordinated migration policies that are more human centric?
4. In your view do you think the facilitation of labor migration in the SADC Region, can contribute to increased economic development in host states? If Yes or No explain why?

4. In your view is SADC equipped to deal with the human security challenges faced by the region?
5. What is SADC's view with regards to liberalizing migration in the region?
6. In your view, what is the main cause for only six SADC member states ratifying the Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of persons?
7. What Challenges Face the SADC secretariat with regards to implementing the Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of persons?
8. In your view what has been the economic benefit of remittances of migrants on both host and sending countries in the region?
9. The Institute of Security Studies argues that migration is not a prominent issue on the political agendas of states in the region! In your view what are the effects of political will with regards to securitization of migration in the region?
10. According to the Institute of Security Studies, there isn't enough reliable data and accurate information regarding migration in Southern Africa! What challenges persist with regards to effective Data collection with regards to the movement of migrants across the region?
11. In your view what should be done to improve the data collection and accurate information regarding migration patterns?
12. The African Union, seeks to establish an African Economic Community, which embraces and entails free movement of people! In your view, will free movement of people lead to substantial development benefits for the SADC region?