PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE NAMIBIAN DEFENCE FORCE: AN

EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE KHOMAS REGION

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE

FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

AT

THE UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA

BY

LINUS SHIIMI NAHOLE

200342584

FEBRUARY 2013

MAIN SUPERVISOR: PROF. P.H. VAN ROOYEN

ABSTRACT

The study was carried out to gauge the public's perception of the Namibian Defence Force under the title "Public Perceptions of the Namibian Defence Force: An Explanatory Study of the Khomas Region". The objectives of the study were to identify the roles played by the Namibian Defence Force in promoting public trust and the challenges it faced in promoting this trust; to assess the perceptions and knowledge of the people in the Khomas Region regarding the roles of the Namibian Defence Force in promoting public trust; and to recommend measures needed to overcome the identified challenges. The research conducted a theoretical study and then carried out a survey in the concerned area. The study used a questionnaire and the responses were collected and analysed.The main finding of the study was that the public is not fully aware of the need for the Namibian Defence Force in times of peace. Most of the respondents saw the Namibian Defence Force as a waste of state funds and they had not really benefited from its existence. Some respondents were not aware of the activities of the Namibian Defence Force. The recommendations of the study were that the Namibian Defence Force needs to educate the community to stimulate awareness of their activities and to improve public relations education among the soldiers. The study also identified need for improve discipline within theforceto improve the public's image of the soldiers, hence, improve perceptions and trust.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to the Namibian Defence Force in the Republic of Namibia for its efforts to protect the country.

DECLARATION

I, Linus Shiimi Nahole do hereby declare that I am the sole author of this project, which is entirely my own initiation and has not been submitted anywhere for the purpose of obtaining aqualification.

No part of this thesis may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by means (for example, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior permission of the author, or the University of Namibia on that behalf.

I, Linus Shiimi Nahole, grant The University of Namibia the right to reproduce this thesis in whole or in part, in any manner of format, which The University of Namibia may deem fit, for any person or institution requiring it for study and research, providing that the University of Namibia shall waive the right if the whole thesis has been or is being published in a manner satisfactory to the instititution.

_____   _____

Student signature   **Date**

LIST OF FIGURES

DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

Katutura area – It is a residential area in the north west of the City of Windhoek where most high density suburbs of the City of Windhoek are located such as Soweto, Single Quarters, Shandumbala, Okuryangava, etc.

Khomas Region – It is an administrative region of the Republic of Namibia, which is located in the central part of the country and it is where the capital city of Namibia, Windhoek is located.

Military – A body of men raised for the defence of the nation (Jemibewon 1998, p.202) or a state organisation or group of organisations permanently established by constitutional law. It enjoys a monopoly of certain categories and weapons and equipment and is responsible for application of violence or coercive to eliminate or to deter anything or body (Edmonds n.d.) as cited by Adeche 2007, p.69).

Military training institution – These are institutions established for the purpose of providing training and instruction for members of the Defence Force.

Namibian Defence Force – It is the defence force for Namibia consisting of the following armed services: (a) the Namibian Army; (b) the Namibian Air Force; and (c) the Namibian Navy. Its main roles are to ensure the sovereignty territorial integrity of the country by guarding against external aggression, both conventional and unconventional; prevent violation of Namibia's territorial

integrity, and provide assistance to civil authorities in guarding and protecting government buildings and key installations as provided in the Defence Amendment Act, 1990 (Act 20 of 1990) (Republic of Namibia, 1990, p.6).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP   -   Justice and Development Party of Turkey

CHP   -   Republican People's Party of Turkey

CIA   -   Central Intelligence Agency

CJTF   -   Combined Joined Task Force

CMR   -   Civil – Military Relations

CT   -   Counter Terrorism

CTF   -   Combined Task Force

DEA   -   Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD   -   Department of Defence

DRC   -   Democratic Republic of Congo

FACA   -   Central African Armed Forces

FBI   -   Federal Bureau of Investigation

FOMUC   -   Multinational Forces in the Central African Republic

HQ   -   Headquarters

I/O   -   Institutional/Occupational

IDASA   -   Institute for Democracy in South Africa

JTF   -   Joint Task Force

MECs   -   Members of Executive Councils

MISAB   -   Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui

MLC	-	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MoD	-	Ministry of Defence
MPs	-	Members of Parliament
NAMPOL	-	Namibian Police Force
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDF	-	Namibian Defence Force
OSI	-	Office of Strategic Influence
PLAN	-	Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia
PMO	-	Political Market Orientation
PSYOPS	-	Public Diplomacy, Psychological Operations
RAF	-	Royal Air Force
SWATF	-	South West African Territorial Force
TOE or TO&E	-	Table of Organization and Equipment
UFO	-	Unidentified Flying Object
UN	-	United Nation
UNTAG	-	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
UPDF	-	Ugandan People's Defence Force
US	-	Unites States
WWII	-	World War II (Second World War)

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a background of this study and presents the problem statement, objective of study, research question, and delimitation of study as well as the significance of the study.

From ancient times, history has been dominated by military conquests, movements and technological innovations. Kingdoms and empires, the central units of control in the ancient world, could only be maintained through military force. Weapons and armour designed to be sturdy, tended to last longer than other artefacts, and thus a great deal of surviving artefacts recovered tend to fall in this category. Weapons and armour were also mass-produced to a scale that made them quite plentiful throughout history, and thus more likely to found in archaeological digs. Such items were also considered signs of prosperity or virtue, and thus were likely to be place in tombs and monuments of prominent warriors. And writing, when it existed, was often used for kings to boast of military conquests or victories (Acemoglu, Davide & Andrea, 2008, p.14). This shows the amount of respect people had for the armies at various stages of history.

As nations and states evolved and empires grew, the increased need for order and efficiency led to an increase in the number of records and writings. The officials

and armies would have good reason for keeping detailed records and accounts involving any and all things concerning the matters, such as warfare were a matter of vital importance to the state. For all these reasons, military history comprises a large part of ancient history. Notable militaries in the ancient world included the Egyptians, Babylonians, Persians, Ancient Greeks, notably the Spartans and Macedonians, Indians, notably the Magadhas, Gangaridais, Gandharas and Cholas, Early Imperial Chinese notably the Qin and Han Dynasties, Xiongnu Confederation, Ancient Romans, and Carthaginians (Adeche 2007, p. 90).

According to Snider & Miranda (2005), the earliest recorded battle in India was the Battle of the Ten Kings. The Indian epics Mahabharata and Ramayana are centred on conflicts and refer to military formations, theories of warfare, including topics on espionage and war elephants. Alexander the Great invaded north-western India and defeated King Porus in the Battle of the Hydaspes River. The same region was soon re-conquered by Chandragupta Maurya after defeating the Macedonians and Seleucids. He also went on to conquer the Nanda Empire and unify Northern India. Most of Southern Asia was unified under his grandson Ashoka the Great after the Kalinga War, though the empire collapsed not long after his reign. While successfully dealing with foreign opponents, Rome experienced numerous civil wars, notably the power struggles of Roman generals such as Marius and Sulla during the end of the Republic. Caesar was also notable

for his role in the civil war against the other member of the Triumvirate and against the Roman Senate. The successors of Caesar -Octavian and Mark Anthony also fought a civil war with Caesar's assassins. Octavian and Mark Anthony eventually fought another civil war between themselves to determine the sole ruler of Rome (Bacevich & Kohn, 1997). Octavian emerged victorious and Rome was turned into an empire with a huge standing army of professional soldiers.

By the time of Marcus Aurelius, the Romans had expanded to the Atlantic Ocean in the west and Mesopotamia in the east and controlled Northern Africa and Central Europe up to the Black Sea. However, Aurelius marked the end of the Five Good Emperors, and Rome quickly fell into decline. The Huns, Goths, and other barbaric groups invaded Rome, Which continued to suffer from inflation and other internal strives. Despite the attempts of Diocletian, Constantine I, and Theodosius, western Rome collapsed and was eventually conquered in 476 (Bacevich & Turner).

Since then many countries in the world have established military organisations for different purposes. In post-colonial Africa, defence forces came to be viewed as a threat to democratic governance and politics, as they are numerous examples where they overthrew democratically elected regimes. In some instances, some military organisations were also responsible for killing the very citizens they were supposed to protect (Antoney, 2009). For this reason, it is questionable that

ordinary people treat the defence forces with positive attitudes as an organisation for promoting peace and public trust. The need to access the perceptions of ordinary Namibian citizens on the role of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), as an organisation for promoting public trust and safeguarding national sovereignty is, therefore, the cornerstone of this research.

1.2 Orientation and Background of the Study

The NDF was established by the Government of the Republic of Namibia in terms of Article 118(1) of the Namibian Constitution (1990) which states that there shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian Defence Force with prescribed composition, powers, duties and procedures with the mandate of defending the territory and the interest of the Namibian people. The President of the Republic of Namibia is the Commander-in-Chief of the Namibian Defence Force and is vested with the necessary powers to exercise related functions. The objective of the NDF in Namibia is to maintain peace and to safeguard the territorial integrity of Namibia as well as to defend Namibia from foreign invaders (Office of the Prime Minister, 1990).

Bartholomew and Donald (2005) explained that in modern times, war has evolved from an activity steeped in tradition to a scientific enterprise where success is valued above methods. The notion of total war is the extreme of this trend. Militaries have developed technological advances rivalling the scientific accomplishments of any other field of study.

However, it should be noted that modern militaries benefit in the development of these technologies under the funding of the public, the leadership of national governments, and often in co-operation with large civilian groups, such as the General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin corporations, in the United States (Buck, 2002). As for total war it may be argued that it is not an exclusive practice of modern militaries, but in the tradition of genocidal conflict that marks even tribal warfare to this day (Andrain, 2004). What distinguishes modern military organisations from those previous is not their willingness to prevail in conflict by any method, but rather the technological variety of tools and methods available to modern battlefield commanders, from submarines to satellites, from knives to nuclear warheads.

Soon after gained full independence from South Africa in 1989, Namibia created the Namibian Defence Force (NDF). The new constitution of Namibia defines the role of the military as defending the territory and national interests. The Namibian Defence Force comprises two of the former enemies in the 22-year bush war: the Peoples' Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South West African Territorial Forces (SWATF) (Ministry of Defence 2010). The British formulated the integration plan and began training the NDF, which consists of five battalions (South African Truth Commission, 2009, p.15). The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG)'s Kenyan infantry battalion remained in Namibia for three months after independence to assist in training the NDF and stabilize peace

in the northern part of the country (Ministry of Defence, 2010). The vision, mission and objectives of the NDF were clearly defined from its inception.

1.2.1 The mission and Vision of the NDF

1.2.1.1 The Mission of the NDF

The mission and the mandate of the Namibian army is to ensure the maintenance of Namibia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, provide assistance to civil authorities and civilian communities when required, undertake ceremonial functions and assist the process of nation reconciliation. To operate a cost effective professional and highly mobile national defence system that will safeguard Namibia's territory, inhabitants, national interests and contribute to national development and world peace (NDF, 2010).

1.2.1.2 The Vision of the NDF

The vision of the NDF is to be small, professional fighting, well trained, well equipped and ready for deployment to meet the security threats and challenges the country may face. To be a reliable and committed national defence organization with capacity and capability to defend Namibia's interest and render effective peace time support (NDF, 2010).

1.2.1.3 Objectives of NDF

The objectives of the NDF (NDF, 2010:43) are to:

- Repel the hostile land forces, operating as part of a combined national multinational force and/or as a joint force with other services of the NDF.

- Provide forces for peace keeping missions, as well as in assistance to civil communities during man-made or natural calamities affecting them.

- Have rapid reaction capabilities and improve fire power, armour and mobility.

- Guard Namibia and its inhabitants against external attacks, conventional and unconventional, and prevent violations of Namibia's land-, sea- and air space.

- Operate effectively in support of civil authorities and civil powers, if and when required.

- Undertake peacetime operations in support of civil ministries, assisting civil communities in times of threats, disaster and need, and attend to other defence and foreign policy commitments, as they arise.

- Respect and uphold the country's laws, regulations, policies and orders in line with its constitutional mandate.

- Improve the NDF contribution to national-, regional- and world peace.

- Promote civil-military relations.

- Promote inter-agency co-operation

- Strengthen NDF capacity in environmental and disaster management and relief.

- Ensure timely of NDF orders and rules.

- Improve NDF conditions of service.

The NDF is obliged to be apolitical, affordable and not to become a burden to the national economy. It is supposed to be well disciplined and accountable to the government, trained and managed to serve the government of the day and the entire populace of the Republic of

Namibia. It is supposed to be small, easy to maintain, highly mobile on the ground, air, and sea. The force should be a professional force, well trained with self-respect, consciously adherent to the moral code, loyal, honest and patriotic. In this context, the NDF has established the five motorized infantry battalions; a Presidential Guard battalion, a combat support battalion, a reconnaissance company, an engineering company, an artillery group, a logistics support brigade. Lately, the force has established in Grootfontein an army headquarters (HQ) and Army HQ Command Company for the Combat Support Battalions; in Rundu: 1 Battalion Headquarters, in Mpacha: 2 Battalion Headquarters, in Oshakati: 3 Battalion Headquarters – Danger Ashipala was in command of this battalion as a lieutenant colonel until he retired 1995 in Oamites: 4 Battalion Headquarters. There are some units that report directly to the Chief of Defence Force. These are the Military School, Composite Depot, Military police Battalion, Signal Regiment, The Air Force of Namibia and the Navy (Ministry of Defence 2011).

The Namibian Air Force was commissioned on 13 March 2005 at the Grootfontein Airbase (Ministry of Defence, 2007). The policy, mission

statements and concepts of operations envisage the development of an air force to support of the army and the navy. Five separate roles of theAir Force are: surveillance, transport of personnel and transport of supplies/equipment, support to the civil authorities or civil community, and training (Ministry of Defence, 2007). With Grootfontein as the main air base, Keetmanshoop Air Base is undergoing expansion, and a new air base is under construction at Karibib. The policy of the Air Force is to acquire dedicated air assets to undertake surveillance and transport tasks. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and NDF would train and employ their own pilots and technicians. Co-operation and co-ordination with other ministries may extend to making such assets available for non-defence tasking. In addition, consideration will be given to arrangements whereby private and other national air could be employed where appropriate or necessary.

The concept of the defence forces being there to defend the territory and the interest of the Namibian people is something that ordinary people might not understand easily. Some people, especially the old might still have a negative perception about the defence forces and it is against this background that the researcher wants to identify the perceptions of the Namibian people regarding the role of the Namibian Defence Force in promoting public trust. The level of trust that citizens have in their armed forces is paramount to good civil-military relations. In a democracy, it is the responsibility of the armed forces to gain

public confidence, because a military that is not trusted by the people lacks and will have difficulties justifying its expenses and even its existence.

1.3 Problem statement

The Namibian Defence Force was established by the new government after independence under Article 118(1) of the Namibian Constitution to protect the territorial integrity and the Namibian people. The South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) and the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), who were rival parties by then, were also united through the Policy of National Reconciliation which was meant to redress the past differences (Office of the Prime Minister, 1990: 386). The creation of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was welcomed by the public as it was the first time Namibia had its own security forces. The main roles of the Namibian Defence Force are to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country by guarding against external aggression, both conventional and unconventional, prevent violation of Namibia's territorial integrity, and provide assistance to civil authorities in guarding and protecting the government buildings and key installations as provided in the Defence Act (Ministry of Defence 2009). The Namibian citizens, however, were never tested to note their feelings about the presence of NDF. After 22 years from Independence, the researcher found that there is a need to assess the perceptions of the public and trust expressed by the public on the current NDF, taking the above into account.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

In order to achieve the aim of the researcher, the following objectives were identified:

- To assess the perceptions of the people in the Khomas Region regarding the Namibian Defence Force.
- To recommend measures needed to enable to the Namibian Defence Force to earn public trust and build a positive image.

1.5 Research Question

The concept of the presence of defence forces to defend the Namibian territory and the interests of the Namibians is something the people found difficult to comprehend, especially since the NDF came into existence after independence. Given the negative perception of defence forces, mostly held by elderly citizens, this researcher seeks an answer to the pertinent question: "What are the perceptions of the people in the Khomas Region regarding the Namibian Defence Force?"

1.6 Delimitations of the Study

The study focused on the theoretical background to find more information on how some authors wrote about the perceptions, trust and related topics. The study looked at the history of armies in some countries and how they relate with the civilians they are meant to protect. The study then also looked at the Namibian

Defence Force and how they came into being, their strengths, weaknesses, and its impact of public perception of the force and to recommend measures to overcome the identified challenges of improving public trust and perceptions.

1.7 Significance of the Study

This study will benefit the academic world by providing information on public perceptions NDF. Once this research project is completed, it will be beneficial to democratic national governments and various institutions within the country such as national legislation bodies, defence and security sectors and educational institutions. The study will also help to mitigate challenges associated with negative perceptions people might have towards Namibian Defence Force. It will further help to establish a sound relationship and trust between Namibian Defence Force and ordinary citizens. The research will motivate students in the field of political administration and security studies to carry out further in-depth researches on similar topic. Finally, the outcome of the research will enable different organisations to gain an individual's understanding of how Namibian people view and perceive the role of Namibian Defence Force.

1.8 Conclusion

The Namibian citizens were never tested to note their feelings about the presence of NDF, hence the need to assess the perceptions of the public towards the role of NDF in Namibia. Once completed, this study will benefit not only the researcher

and the Namibians, but also democratic national governments and various institutions within the country such as national legislation bodies, defence and security sectors and educational institutions.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The last chapter dealt with the background of the problem, the problem statement, the aim of the study and the objectives of the study are spelt out clearly. This chapter deals with defence forces around the world and their activities. It also looks at the literature review, which takes into account the work of other authors in the field of relationships between trained army personnel and the civilians in terms of perceptions and trust. This chapter looks at the theory of the military-civilian relationship. This is done by first analyzing the military organisations, then the relationships and other strategies in military-civilian relationships.

2.2 Defence Forces

Moskos (2006) defined defence forces as the structuring of the armed forces of a state so as to offer military capability required by the national defence policy. In some countries, paramilitary forces are included in a nation's armed forces. Armed forces that are not a part of military or paramilitary organizations, such as insurgent forces, often mimic military organizations, or use ad hoc structures.

A military organization is hierarchical. According to (Chambers 2007), formalized ranks in a hierarchical structure came into widespread use with the Roman Army. However, in modern times, Cohn (2009) said, executive control, management and administration of military organizations is typically undertaken

by the government through a government department within the structure of public administration, often known as a Department of Defence, Department of War, or Ministry of Defence. These in turn manage armed services that themselves command combat, combat support and services support formations and units.

The usually civilian or partly executive control over the national military organization is exercised in democracies by an elected political leader as a member of the government's Cabinet, usually known as a Minister of Defence. Cohen and Segal (2009) explained that in Presidential systems, such as the United States, the president is the Commander-in-chief, and the cabinet-level defence minister is second in command. Subordinated to that position are often secretaries for the specific major operational divisions of the armed forces as a whole, such as those that provide general support services to the armed services, including their dependants.

Then there are the heads of specific departmental agencies responsible for the provision and management of specific skill- and knowledge-based such as strategy advice, capability development assessment, or defence science provision of research, design and branches responsible for further agency business specialization work. In most countries the armed forces are divided into three or four armed services also called branches: an army, a navy, and an air force (Cohen & Segal, 2009).

Cohen and Segal (2009) further explained that many countries have a variation on the standard model of three or four basic armed services. Some nations also organize the marines, Special Forces or strategic missile forces as independent armed services. A nation's coast guard may also be an independent armed service of its military, although in many nations the coast guard is a law enforcement or civil agency. A number of countries have no navy, for geographical reasons, and some other variations. In larger armed forces, the culture between the different armed services can be quite different. Most small countries have a single organization that encompasses all armed forces employed by the country in question. Third World armies tend to consist primarily of infantry, while First World armies tend to have larger units manning expensive equipment and only a fraction of personnel in infantry units.

A formation is a composite military organization that includes a mixture of integrated and operationally attached sub-units, and is usually combat-capable. A formation is defined by the US Department of Defence as two or more aircraft, ships, or units proceeding together under a commander (Department of Defence (DOD), 1987). The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes a formation as an arrangement or disposition of troops. Formations include brigades, divisions, and wings. A typical unit is a homogeneous military organization, either combat, combat support or non-combat in capability, which includes service personnel predominantly from a single arm of service, or a branch of service, and it's

administrative and command functions are integrated. A smaller unit is considered a sub-unit or minor unit (DOD, 1987).

Different armed forces and even different branches of services of the armed forces may use the same name to denote different types of organizations. An example is the squadron. In most navies a squadron is a formation of several ships; in most air forces it is a unit; in the U.S. Army it is a battalion-sized cavalry unit; and in Commonwealth armies a squadron is a company-sized sub-unit. Gendarmeries, including equivalents such as internal troops, paramilitary forces and similar, are an internal security service common in most of the world, but uncommon in Anglo-Saxon countries where civil police are employed to enforce the law, and there are tight restrictions on how the armed forces may be used to assist (DOD, 1987).

A table of organization and equipment (TOE or TO&E) is a document published by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, which prescribes the organization, manning, and equipage of units from divisional size and down, but also including the headquarters of corps and armies. It also provides information on the mission and capabilities of a unit as well as the unit's current status. A general TOE is applicable to a type of unit, for instance, infantry rather than a specific unit, the 3rd Infantry Division. In this way, all units of the same branch such as infantry follow the same structural guidelines (DOD, 1987).

Epress (2010) argued that while it is recognized that there are differences between armies of different nations, many are modelled on the British or American models, or both. However, many military units and formations go back in history for a long time, and were devised by various military thinkers throughout European history.

2.3 The Military and the Defence Force

Jemibewon (1998) defined the military as: "a body of men raised for the defence of the nation" (p.202). The definition has a functional perspective and gender bias. The definition is gender-biased in the sense that it includes men and excludes women, a negation of present day defence forces that endeavours to promote gender balance with men and women serving in the force. Since the military is there to defend the nation, it is sometimes or commonly known as the defence force.

Other authors defined the military as a typical organization. The concept of the military as an organisation is supported by Edmonds (n.d.), as cited by Adeche (2007, p.69), who defined the military as the state organisation or group of organisations permanently established by constitutional law, that enjoys a monopoly of certain categories of weapons and equipment and is responsible for application violence or coercive force to eliminate or to deter anything or body. This definition concurs with the use of the term force in defence force suggesting that the military has to use to defend the country's sovereignty. From the above-

mentioned definitions and citations, it can be summed that military organisations are deliberately established by the state constitutionally, legally and mandatory to safeguard national interests of a country and its citizens.

2.4 Traits of Trusted Armies

According to Flynn (2000), an army is an environment that is defined by military training principle more than the use of professional values and business ethics. However, there are principles that have been associated with trusted armies. The following principles are positive traits for armies to be trusted by the public.

2.4.1 Corruption Free

Corruption reduces public trust and acceptance of the military. According to the Global Corruption Barometer, as cited by Transparency International (2011, p.1), between 2004 and 2010, perceptions of integrity in the military and police have improved. Yet in 2010, 58% of respondents worldwide reported the police to be corrupt or extremely corrupt, and 30% described the military as corrupt. Fighting corruption helps militaries to keep the public's trust where they have it, and build it where they do not. Just one major scandal can deeply undermine the public's perception of the armed forces, and it can take years to rebuild their reputation. Pervasive small-scale corruption, for instance, having to pay bribes to the police affects the daily life of individuals and can build resentment in a population. Pride of the civilian and military staff in their service is seriously degraded when the

staff knows of corruption in their leadership. In some cases, a poor institutional reputation brought about by corruption can make it more difficult for defence and security establishments to recruit the best individuals, further harming the sectors 'capabilities and reputation.

Dietze (2010) said corruption erodes the public's trust in the armed forces and, in some cases, the government as a whole. A lack of public trust in the armed forces and government may encourage ordinary people to look for other sources of protection – including patronage networks, tribal networks, organized crime, and even insurgencies. Some countries have made significant strides in combating corruption in their armed forces, and have been able to gain public trust as a result. One example is Colombia, where the defence sector's poor reputation was inhibiting government efforts to tackle drug and insurgency challenges.

2.4.2 Apolitical

According to Dempsey, (2012), throughout his 38-year career, he has discovered that the military, as a whole, must remain apolitical, meaning being neutral in political matters. Being apolitical is not being able to have freedom of speech. Service members around the world earned their right to vote, and that all people are entitled to private and personal opinions. But Dempsey,(2012) also stated that using the uniform for partisan purposes could damage the trust people have in their military.

Dempsey (2012) asserts that survey after survey reveals the American military is one of the most trusted and most respected institutions in the land, and maintaining that trust is important to the success of the United States. In studies of civil-military relations in America, the cornerstone of the profession of arms is that the army remains apolitical that is not a special – interest group. This applies to service members and those who have served and who may still use the title just to think about what impact their actions will have on our standing as a profession with the people if they engage in partisan political activities. They are held to a higher standard and probably should be, because many people do not make the distinction between an active duty and retired status. In America, to reinforce the military's apolitical position, the Defence department has renewed its emphasis on the limiting what troops may or may not do within the political arena (Shumake, 2012, p.65).

According to Shumake (2012), the directive outlines specific rules pertaining to cases of regular, retired and reserve-component service members holding elective or appointed office the U.S. government, including elected positions with state, territorial, county or municipal governments. Active-duty service members are strictly prohibited from campaigning for political office or actively taking part in a political campaign, even behind the scenes and the revised directives specifies what active-duty members may or may not do regarding political activities. The reasons behind the limitations on political activities are the military has to be seen as exercising unvarnished military judgment (Shumake, 2012). This makes make

sure that the people understand that the military is not influenced by the events of the day and what could be considered partisan politics.

2.4.3 Trustworthiness of Military Officers

Shumake (2012) said that a military officer is a leader, a unique type of person looking for challenges intellectually, physically and emotionally. They require conviction, decisiveness, initiative and an overwhelming desire to lead, to not only bring out the best in them, but bring out the best in others. This is what military training teaches its students. From the moment one commences Officer military training at they learn to use instinct, reason and logic to quickly assess situations and respond accordingly, no matter how complex the situation may be. At the same time, they learn to appreciate those under their command and make the most of their abilities to work in a team. With the specialist training, they learn to think on their feet and manage teamwork to work through any situation that is thrown at them. Over time they will develop intellectual strength and ingenuity. This in turn will give the ability to use reason and logic to solve more and more complex problems and build on leadership skills as their career progresses. A career as a Navy, Army or Air Force Officer will provide you with challenges unlike anything experienced in a nine-to-five job.

2.5 Public trust of the defence force

Inbody (2008) stated that with grave international and budgetary challengesfacing military organisation around the world, however, some officers might not agree that the profession should focus now on civil-military relations. Yet civil-military relations, starting with the constitutional underpinnings, is at once the most fundamental component of American military professionalism and the one most overlooked. And it is the arena where our military leaders seem to fail most often, or at least spectacularly. This is not a topic just for generals. Officers of every rank routinely make decisions that affect the military's complex relationship with society. Moreover, an officer is far behind if he only begins developing civil-military sensibilities after donning a star. Military officers need to earn trust and respect while gaining influence with civilian policy elites, politicians, political appointees, lawyers, bureaucrats, and the like who have been immersed in the domestic political milieu throughout their careers. Inbody, (2008) further demonstrated that education across the Department of Defence inadequately prepares officers for this arena, giving little attention to the civil-military relationship and its constitutional underpinnings. Even among the select field grade officers whom at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies with an in-residence military Intermediate Development Education under their belts, few have studied or even read the Constitution that they swore to defend since high school or college, even though most are hungry to engage on the topic they cannot live it.

Janowitz (2002) stated that neglect of civil-military expertise among officers manifests in views incompatible with our oath, hindering representing government and undermining the societal trust prerequisite to provisioning a strong military. General officers are known to imply that off the law are what the President and his administration say it is, notwithstanding the Constitution's contrary assertion. Officers have argued in private and in class, and one recently in print, that their personal senses of right and wrong trumps judgments made via our political process and the chain of command. The profession has permitted a blind spot to form at the centre of the officer's duty. This neglect of civil-military competence makes it more difficult for officers to serve effectively; leaving them less perceptive of the nation's needs and wants. Civil society is of course where resources are provided and where military leaders must look to decipher parameters for sustainable action and to divine unclear objectives. It will not be enough to bolt civil-military literacy onto an already constructed idea of officer professionalism framed around technical competence. Relations with civil-military relations are unhealthy, the technical competence is unsustainable or may even work against the Nation's values and interests, particularly as military measures increasingly impinge on the homeland.

A profession "way of life" will unite around its members' sense of purpose, and the profession will resist anything that detracts from that perceived purpose. In military institutions, this means that only by understanding the domestic context that gives rise to the officer's authority and mission can he understand his role.

Those in uniform agree that the military exists to bring force to bear in pursuit of the Nation's interest, but beyond that, consensus frays. An officer's conception of the military's role must begin with understanding society's values and how those values are expressed in the form and philosophy of a government that supplies and legitimates the officer's work. The officer will be a more trusted servant and thus more persuasive if his words and deeds reflect a grounding in, and a broad congruence with, the philosophy of American government and the bedrock American political compact, the Constitution (Kenosi, 2009).

Huntington (2009) penned a seminal study of civil-military relations, "The Soldier and the State", in which he defined professions as possessing corporateness, expertise, and a duty to society. Experts debate a profession's exact components, but Huntington's framework endures and captures the essence of most competing schemes. The framework provides a good vantage point for analyzing the military professional's relationship to civil society. The first of Huntington's three tenets of professionalism, corporateness, refers to the degree that military professionals perceive themselves as an institution with a set of values and standards separated from others and designed to promote the institution's purpose. Combat effectiveness demands institutional physical and psychological separateness from society that no other profession matches, transcending vocation to become a way of life. That divide is deeper still as classically conservative and communal military outlook stands apart from the classically liberal and individualistic American society that it serves.

Corporateness is an avenue to professionalism's second component, expertise. Professionalism is sometimes used as a synonym for technical and leadership expertise that puts fire on the target, but the officer requires a broader conception of expertise. The officer's expertise can be divided among the management of three key relationships: relations with entities outside the United States that include training friends and fighting enemies; internal military relations, including issues of command and doctrine; and civil-military relations. Officer professional development focuses on the first two.

Military expertise in managing all these relationships only serves the nation when geared tightly to the third component of professionalism, namely duty. It is of little value to officers to absorb vague duty to the country. Officers need a sophisticated and even theoretical sense of duty that helps them answer to what end, by what ways, and with whom duty lays amid an ever-changing context. Democracy shifts much of the moral as well as political autonomy and responsibility from the government, especially the military, and places it on the society for which the military acts. This can only be so if the military is a faithful instrument of the elected leadership. Direction from higher authority, however, is never comprehensive at any level. The officer must constantly assume ideological and material values as he crafts advice and action. Such judgments should sprout from the American political compact that the officer has sworn to defend. It is an institutional failure that the military demands more attention from the officers on

the proper use of the Internet than it demands they spend on packing this professional foundation (Kier, 1999).

The American political order centres not on geography or person, but on a set of ideas about domestic political relationships. External security being secondary, the Founders rejected the world's most powerful nation, Britain, to pursue a system of diffuse political power that would permit a classically liberal society. Our country's founders sought a government that ruled through law, written and executed by elected representatives. The Founders build our system around a suspicious and realist conception of human nature where ambition would counteract ambition among the political branches of government. The pre-eminent law is the Constitution, setting forth a Federal Government of limited powers wherein no Federal officer may act without authority tracing back to that document, usually via statue. A standing military is not required by the Constitution and was created by legislation, and thus the Armed Forces are an entirely beholden creation of the political branches without any constitutional grant of independent political power. In fact, fear that a standing army would become untethered from its masters led by many founders to look to the state militias as a check against the regular army, inspiring the Second Amendment's proclamation that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state (Bryan, 2011).

Burdened by heavy responsibility and imbued with patriotism, officers want to use power for good. Like others in government, they focus on their technical function, security, and sometimes see law as an obstacle (Lindsay & Norman 2007). Military officers find orders difficult to swallow especially when they imperil the men and women under their command without a justification the officer finds convincing. Some have concluded that the officer's duty transcends law, arguing that conscience and perceptions of national security should instead be the lodestar.

Many constitutional systems, however, cannot abide a military that reserves for itself the final say on anything. Concern for the standing military's political role is reflected in the constitutional debates and the document itself, not fear that political leaders might issue unwise or immoral orders, policies, or legislation. Moreover, safety is not the warrior's mission or even a pre-eminent military value. Military honour requires facing risk from the enemy, and Service members swear to accept the risk inherent in serving a government of dispersed powers. Commanders are to "care for" their troops, but they must also put them at risk in a combat situation and the commander does not get the final word on when or for what reasons that occurs. Where the question is between civil and military authority, the Constitution's weight falls entirely on the civil side. Officers taunt the public's trust to suggest otherwise (Mandel, 2007).

Without trust, military opinion would fall on deaf ears and society would rightly hobble the force with safeguard and oversight. Our national security apparatus already labours under myriad legislative restrictions and reporting requirements imposed partly because overzealous government officials have sometimes behaved as though they were ignorant of the American system. To navigate this uncertain political terrain, the officer needs grounding in the fundamentals of our government and the tools to conceptualize the military's role in society.

The professional officer must work to inspire trust that he will limit his craft to the means and purpose authorized by proper civilian authority – executive, legislative, or judicial (Mandel, 2008).

According to Bryan, (2011),trust in the military, although widespread today, is counter-intuitive and inorganic to a representative government jealous of its liberty, and so trust needs constant care. The no militia soldier is a danger to society by virtue of his access to and proficiency with weapons and the potential divergence of his interests from those of society, or so the Founders generally agreed. The military's privileged access to information about threats and capabilities, much of which it makes secret, likewise bequeaths power. Military information and the military opinion it stands behind influence national policy and the resources allocated to defence. The chief author of the Constitution, James Madison, began Federalist no. 41 by acknowledging the danger that so worried his countrymen, warning with regard to a standing military, a wise nation

will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger to resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

Beeson (2008) argued that the fear today is that the military and its vendors will try to shape the political landscape to their interests. Ignorance and complacency replace nefarious intent as patriotic men and women seek experience and to conveniently see in their own interests the Nation's as well. While military officers are dedicated to their mission and country, they are susceptible to the same cognitive limitations that groups typically impose on their members. The Department of Defence, Security, and every subordinate military tribe see the Nation's interests from institutional perspectives. That each faction thinks it should have more control and a larger share of the budget is as certain as celestial motion. It is silly to think that military officers are not swayed by their institutional interests. Of course, elected leaders pursue institutional and personal advantage, too, but they have a popular and constitutional mandate and are accountable to the voters.

Bryan (2011) stated that obedience is important not only for subordinating the military to civilian authority but also for creating combat power. Military effectiveness demands concentrating power at key points in time and space. Orchestrating precise movements, especially with large organisations and in the face of mortal danger, places a premium on obedience. But the question had been asked what the officers should be obedient to. That the American officer must be

a faithful servant of the people through their elected representatives does not close the issue. Under the U.S. Constitution, obedience is only allowed to proper authority and lawful orders. The Congress' and Supreme Court's legislative and judicial authorities may clash with power claimed by the Commander-in Chief, presenting the officer with a constitutional dilemma. Officer cannot delegate their constitutional duty to their legal counsel, and international or domestic crisis is hardly the time to start thinking in constitutional terms about professional duty. Officers should expect as much since they take an oath to the Constitution and to no one else and to no other end.

Bryan (2011) furthers revealed that much of what constitutes a sound civil-military basis for officer professionalism boils down to deflecting domestic political power and responsibility for policy success and failure that would come with that power. Paradoxically, this is not an abdication but the height of military duty, stemming from the institutional imperative to preserve influence and trust, and the national imperative to leave political authority in the hands of the people and their civil representatives. While an officer may be able to steer policy in the short term by leveraging information and prestige, political responsibility will damage the military's long-term ability to secure the nation's interest, potentially triggering a sustained cycle of institutional decline.

Bryan (2011) indicated that averting policy responsibility can be especially tough when politicians want to turn policy over to generals and draft behind the

military's popularity. President George W. Bush, for example, repeatedly asserted during 2007-200 that he would do just as General David Petraeus advised in Iraq. Influence is good, but public military liability for policy is not. Getting out from under policy delegation and responsibility can be tricky, but officers need the acumen to recognize it, the wisdom to fear it, and the political skills to resist it. Deflecting the nation's foreign and defence policy authority and responsibility is perhaps ironically the most legitimate purpose for which the officer can employ his domestic political advantages.

Bryan (2011) stated that the military has ridden a wave of public esteem for decades, throughout controversial action in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Trust and respect strengthens the military in many ways, from the recruitment to the sway accorded to military advice. The reputation and moral authority would not survive in the military acted as a political branch and took greater responsibility for policy.

Bryan (2011) pointed out that individuals and institutions seek power to promote their values and interests. Intellect, however, can provide the basis to retain and channel this basic drive in order to serve interests beyond the self and institution. The officer corps has either taken this intellect for granted or failed to see its importance, leaving us with inadequate civil-military competence. Society's trust is always at stake, modelling the resources and autonomy delegated to those in uniform. Moreover, the officer needs civil-military expertise to comprehend the

nation's end, to predict the domestic reaction to his ways and means, and to articulate military risks and opportunities. The civil-military foundation of officer ship is woefully under prioritized, and at least a more serious treatment in professional military education, starting with the Constitution, is justified.

2.6 Perception Management

According to DOD (1987), perception management is a term originated in the US military. The U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) and is defined as actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviours and official actions favourable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception and psychological operations.

Desch (1998) stated that perception is defined as the process by which individuals select, organize, and interpret the input from their senses to give meaning and order to the world around them. Components of perception include the perceiver, target of perception and the situation. Factors that influence the perceiver are schema that is organisation and interpretation of information based on past experiences and knowledge, motivational state: needs, values, and desires of a perceiver at the time of perception and the mood that is emotions of the perceiver at the time of perception.

Michel, (2001) pointed out that the factors that influence the target are ambiguity that is the lack of clarity. If ambiguity increases, the perceiver may find it harder to form an accurate perceptual social status: a person's real or perceived position in society or in an organisation Impression management: an attempt to control the perceptions or impressions of others. Targets are likely to use impression management tactics when interacting with perceivers who have power over them. Several impression management tactics include behavioural matching between the target of perception and the perceiver, self-promotion presenting one's self in a positive light, conforming to situational norms, appreciating others, or being consistent.

According to Montalvo (2009), the phrase perception management has often functioned as a euphemism for an aspect of information warfare. A scholar in the field notes a distinction between perception management and public diplomacy, which does not, as a rule, involve falsehood and deception, whereas these are important ingredients of perception management; the purpose is to get the other side to believe what one wishes it to believe, whatever the truth may be. The phrase perception management is filtering into common use as a synonym for persuasion. Public relations firms now offer perception management as one of their services. Similarly, public officials who are being accused of shading the truth are now frequently charged with engaging in perception management when disseminating information to media or to the general public.

Moore (2011) argued that although perception management operations are typically carried out within the international arena between governments, and between governments and citizens, use of perception management techniques have become part of mainstream information management systems in many ways that do not concern military campaigns or government relations with citizenry. Businesses may even contract with other businesses to conduct perception management for them, or they may conduct with it in-house with their public relations staff. Just because the truth has been omitted, does not mean that it is not real.

Montalvo (2009) argued that there are nine strategies for perception management. These include:

- Preparation - having clear goals and knowing the ideal position you want people to hold.

- Credibility - make sure all of your information is consistent, often using prejudices or expectations to increase credibility.

- Multichannel support - has multiple arguments and fabricated facts to reinforce your information.

- Centralized control - employing entities such as propaganda ministries or bureaus.

- Security – the nature of the deception campaign is known by few.

- Flexibility – the deception campaign adapts and changes over time as needs change.

- Coordination – the organisation or propaganda ministry is organized in a hierarchical pattern in order to maintain consistent and synchronized distribution of information.

- Concealment – contradicting information is destroyed. Untruthful statements – fabricate the truth.

According to Mwange (2006, p.75), organisations use perception management in daily internal and external interactions as well as prior to major product/strategy introductions and following events of crisis. Life cycle models of organizational development suggest that the growth and ultimate survival of a firm is dependent on how effectively business leaders navigate crisis, or crisis-like, events through their life cycles. As suggested by studies, organizational perception management involves actions that are designed and carried out by organizational spokespersons to influence audiences' perceptions of the organisation. The definition is based on the understanding of four unique components of organizational perception management: perception of the organisation; actions or tactics; organizational spokespersons; and organizational audiences. The organizational perceptions are further classified into three major forms namely organizational images, organizational reputation, and organizational identities.

Muchow (1995) explained that perception management is often used by an organisation in major events such as dealing with perception-threatening events, which include such events as scandals, accidents, product failures, controversial identity changes, upcoming performance reviews, and introduction of new identity or vision. Another event is dealing with perception-enhancing events which include such events as positive/negative ranking or rating by industry groups, overcoming hardships, and achievement of desired goals.

The US government already has checks in place to dissuade perception management conducted by the state towards domestic populations, such as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which forbids domestic dissemination of US Government authored or developed propaganda… deliberately designed to influence public opinion or policy. Beginning in the 1950s, news media and public information organisations and individuals carried out assignments to manage the public's perception of the CIA, according to the New York Times. The CIA in the 1950s, 60s, and even in the early 70s has concentrated its relationship with journalists in the most prominent sectors of the American press corps, including four or five of the largest newspapers in the country, the broadcast networks, and the two major weekly news magazines (Bernstein, 2007).

Hilla University (2010) stated that David Atlee Phillips, a former CIA station chief in Mexico City, described the method of recruitment years later to

Bernstein: "Somebody from the agency says, I want you to sign a piece of paper before I tell what it's about." I didn't hesitate to sign, and a lot of news men did not hesitate over the next 20 years. Perception management can be used as a propaganda strategy for controlling how people view political events. This practice was refined by US intelligence services as they tried to manipulate foreign populations, but it eventually made its way into domestic US politics as a tool to manipulate "post-Vietnam-War-era" opinion. For example, in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration saw the Vietnam syndrome – a reluctance to commit military forces abroad - as a strategic threat to its Cold War policies. This caused the administration to launch an extraordinary effort to change people's perception of foreign events, essentially by exaggerating threats from abroad and demonizing selected foreign leaders. The strategy proved to be very successful. By the mid-1980s, CIA Director William Casey had taken the practice to the next level: an organized, covert public diplomacy apparatus designed to sell a new product - Central America – while stoking fear of communism, the Sandinistas, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, and anyone else considered an adversary during the Ronald Reagan presidential administration. Sometimes it involved so-called white propaganda, stories and op-eds secretly financed by the government. But they also went black, pushing false story lines, such as how the Sandinistas were actually anti-Semitic drug dealers. That campaign included altered photos and blatant disinformation dispersed by public official as high as the president himself. In 1984, the Drug Enforcement administration (DEA) became upset with

the White House, alleging the White House blew the smuggling investigation against the Sandinistas to embarrass them before a contra aid vote. The White House it was better to sacrifice a probe to catch the leaders of the Medellin drug cartel and gain a propaganda edge.

According to Hilla University (2010), the term perception management is not new to the lexicon of government language. For years the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has listed foreign perception management as one of eight key issue threats to national security, including it with terrorism, attacks on critical US infrastructure, and weapons proliferation among others. The FBI clearly recognizes perception management as a threat when it is directed at the US by foreign governments.

Hilla University (2010), further points out that deception and sleight of hand are important in gaining advantages in war, both to gain domestic support of the operations and for the military against the enemy. Although perception management is specifically defines as being limited to foreign audiences, critics of the Department of Defence (DOD) charge that it also engages in domestic perception management. An example cited is cited is the prohibition of viewing or photographing the flag draped casket of dead military as they are unloaded in bulk upon arrival in the U.S. for further distribution, a policy only recently implemented. The DOD also described perception management as intend to provoke the behaviour you want out of a given individual. During the Cold War,

the Pentagon sent undercover US journalists to Russia and Eastern Europe to write pro-American articles for local media outlets. A similar situation occurred in Iraq in 2005 when the US military covertly paid Iraqi newspapers to print stories written by US soldiers; these stories were geared towards enhancing the appearance of the US mission in Iraq.

Hilla University (2010), revealed that the US Air Force has used perception management UFO/ET events by dropping flares and claiming it was a misperception of their training activity. Years ago in Gulf Breeze, Florida, and similar techniques were used where a fake unidentified flying object (UFO) model was planted in a house. Domestically, during the Vietnam War, critics allege the Pentagon exaggerated communist threats to the United States in order to gain more public support for an increasingly bloody war. This was similarly seen in 2003 with accusations that the government established the threat and existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Hilla University (2010), further explained that perception management includes all actions used to influence the attitudes and objective reasoning of foreign audiences and consist of Public Diplomacy, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Public Information, Deception and Covert Action. The Department of Defence describes perception management as a type of psychological operation. It is supposed to be directed at foreign audiences, and involves providing or discarding information to influence their emotions, motives, and objective

reasoning in a way that is favourable to the originator of the information. The main goal is to influence friends and enemies, provoking them to engage in the behaviour you want. DOD sums it up: Perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.

According to Hilla University (2010), the US military has demonstrated using perception management multiple times in modern warfare, even though it has proven to take a hit to its credibility among American people. In late 2001 after 9/11, Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld creates the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). When it came to light, the Pentagon was initially criticized for simply using a perception management office to influence foreign states. The OSI was dismantled less than five months after its creation when sources alleged to the press that one of its goals was domestic influence, similar to the Iran-Contra era, office of Public Diplomacy. Shortly after, the Office of Special Operation and Low Intensity Conflict. In fact, strategic influence, special plans, psychological operations, and perception management are all direct synonyms within the DOD.

Tolle (2010) revealed that more recently, the DOD has continued to pursue actively a course of perception management about Iraq War. The Department of Defence is conscious that there is an increasingly widespread public perception that the U.S. military is becoming brutalized by the campaign in Iraq.

Recognizing its vulnerability to information and media flows, the DOD has identified the information domain as its new "asymmetric flank". The level use of perception management is continuing to grow throughout the Army. Until recently, specialists known as psychological operations officers and civil affairs officers, whose only purpose is to decide how to present information to the media and to the people of the current country that they are in, only held positions in high division levels of command. The army has decided that it is now necessary that these specialists be included in the transformed brigades and deal with everything from analyzing the enemy's propaganda leaflets to talking with natives to see what the Army can do to make them their friends.

Tolle (2010) argued perception management has long been a key issue in the United States government. Beginning in the 1950s, the CIA contracted out several hundred different public information and news agencies for different assignments. The practice grew, and currently operates with several thousand initiatives helping to shape public opinion of the government. Indeed, the Department of Defence views perception management as a psychological operation aimed at eliciting the behaviour you want by manipulating the opinions of both enemies and friends. Best put by the DOD directly, Perception management combines truth projection, operation security, cover and deception, and psychological operations. Since the U.S. engaged in War on Terror, perception management tactics have become vital to military success and relations with other countries.

Negonga (2000) points out that it is absolutely vital that the perception management campaign of the United States and its allies be coordinated at the highest possible level, that it be resourced adequately, and executed effectively. Properly coordinated, such a campaign could be a war-winning capability. When left uncoordinated, such operations will achieve only modest success, at best, and at worst, could seriously backfire. Even a poorly chosen word, used in the heat of the moment, can have significant negative consequences. Typical counter-terrorism (CT) thinking focuses on the violence, or it is associated threats, to identify and exploit associated avenues for meaningful response and reactions. In the years of the Reagan/Bush administration the government saw a lot of reluctance to commit military forces abroad. Warfare experts from the CIA and the CIA and the Army Special Forces were included in this plan. They accomplished this by pushing issues about the events in South America and Leftist right issues in Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

Negonga (2000) described perception management in politics as a political marketing strategy, or strategic political marketing. It originated from traditional business marketing strategies applied to politics, largely for the purpose of winning elections. Political parties and actors can choose between two fundamental methods: leading the market or following the market. Leading the market involves fulfilling underlying demands of principle, and a political actor would essentially assume the position of one who leads on their own ideas and principles. Following the market entails the political actor's reliance on research

such as public opinion surveys and adoption of those principles and ideas held by the majority of the people who the political actors wishes to influence.

Negonga (2000) explained that central to political marketing is the concept of strategic political postures positions organisations assumes to prompt the desired perception in a target group. Each strategic political posture relies on a different mix of leading and following, and includes four general types of postures the political lightweight: neither leads nor follow very well; does not represent a posture easily sustained; is not confident in own ideals or particularly concerned with adapting to the needs or wants of constituents. The convinced ideologist that leads exceedingly well, holding its own opinions and endeavouring to convince others of their merit. The tactical populist that emphasizes following to achieve power necessary to policies that appeal to a majority in order to attain the political power necessary to implement a party's goals. Then the relationship builder that is leads and follows; has confidence in own ideas but able to adapt to the needs and wants of constituents.

Negonga (2000) further explained that political market orientation (PMO) originated from commercial market orientation strategies applied to a political environment. Developed by Robert Ormrod, the comprehensive PMO model involves four attitudinal constructs and four behavioural methods which are the internal orientation: focuses on including and acknowledging the importance of current and future voters and the awareness of their needs, the competitor

orientation: focuses on awareness of competitors' positions and strengths, and acknowledges the co-operation with competing parties can advance the party's long-term goals, and the external Orientation that focuses on the importance of parties that are neither voters nor competitors, including media, interest groups, and lobbyists.

Pascal et al (2009) explained that organizational behaviours thus include: information generation; focuses on gathering information about every party involved in a given issue, information dissemination: focuses on receiving and communicating information, both formally and informally, member participation: focuses on involving all party members, through vigorous discussion and debate, to create a consistent party strategy, and consistent strategy implementation: focuses on implementing consistency, established strategies through formal and informal channels.

2.7 Perceptions on the Role of Defence Forces in Promoting Public Trust

Perception is the process whereby sensory stimulation is translated into organized experience (Lindsay & Norman, 2007). People always have different perceptions as they differ on how they interpret reality and not reality itself. According to Newstrom and Davies (2002), people look at the same object and view it differently, as a result of their different personalities in determining their views. This can be true considering the fact that most governments are putting much effort to create a long-lasting peaceful coexistence between the civilian

communities in an independent post-colonial society, but people may have a negative view of the defence force emanating from past experiences.

Negative perceptions against defence forces in Africa are portrayed by Public Opinions (2009). The publication was published by Public Opinions in Uganda to portray the democratic and pro-civilian activities of the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) both in Uganda and in foreign missions. According to Public Opinions (2009), the civilians of Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia expressed shock when they eventually realized that UPDF is an armed force which does not harass civilians, loot their properties or rape girls and women. Civilians had a negative perception of the UPDF, but they got shocked with how the army was so friendly to the civilians, a total negation of their perception of the cruel defence force of the past.

Public Opinions (2009) explained that after more than 30 years of bloodshed, the people of Afghanistan desire peace and stability in their country. Peace is what they wish to gift their coming generations, but hate mongers, criminals, extremists groups and problems such as corruption, poverty and lack of justice that do much to hinder Afghans way forward, have grabbed Afghanistan like never before. To come out of such a condition, people have a vital role to play. At the crucial juncture where Afghanistan is standing today, the Afghan government and the international community must work to strengthen voices that are raised against extremism, war and terrorism. Without public support, it would be

difficult for the Afghan government and Western backers to triumph over growing insurgency.

Public Opinions (2009) pointed out that common people, who are peace-loving, are a pivotal source of information on criminal activities. The ANSF must seek their help. Terrorists have been using Afghan towns, villages and cities as their hideouts. Therefore, in Afghan society, it is very difficult for security forces to recognize the insurgents who hide among civilian population wearing clothing resembling to that of the local people. It is the common Afghans who have better knowledge about people's activities in their district. Therefore, they are an important source of gathering information about insurgents' hideouts. There have been a number of uprisings against Taliban militants in certain provinces of Afghanistan. This establishes the fact that people are tired of being illegally ruled by insurgents who burn schools and cause development and construction works to stop. Here is where the government should give a hand to the common people and try to alleviate their problems to gain more trust.

Public Opinions (2009) argued that public awareness programs must continue. Still, the Taliban has many people on their side. The Taliban preaches against foreign presence in Afghanistan, trying to motivate common Afghans towards fighting westerns and do whatsoever it can to recruit more people into their ranks. This process will continue for many more years. It is necessary to open the mind of people and make them clearly distinguish between a democratic system and

Taliban's rule. Amid the ongoing withdrawal and transition process in Afghanistan and knowing the fact that international military and financial support will reduce in the near future, the Afghan government needs to turn towards its people and address their issues to build more trust.

Independence in African countries brought a new dimension associated with the creation of unified defence forces that were meant to defend the national sovereignty and the interests of the majority citizens. The question to be asked is the acceptance of the defence forces by the majority of citizens as organizations were meant to serve the people and promote public trust. Change of the mindset of the people is not an overnight phenomenon. The negative perceptions that developed over the years during the colonial era might still be gripping the minds of people, especially the old whom has survived both colonial and post-colonial eras. The public have limited trust in the defence forces especially in former colonized countries where the colonial armies were repressive. It might take time for the public to develop trust in defence forces even after independence. This might be the same situation with Namibia where the apartheid colonial army lacked trust from the public (Public Opinions, 2009).

2.8 Ways of promoting public trust to improve civil-military relations

Pearl (2009) explained that civil-military relations (Civ-Mil or CMR) describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the

civil authority of a given society and its military authority. Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that civilian control of the military is preferable to military control of the state. The principle problem they examine, however, is empirical: to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained.

While generally not considered a separate academic area of study in and of itself, it involves scholars and practitioners from many fields and specialists. Apart from political science and sociology, Civ-Mil (CMR) draws upon such diverse fields as law, philosophy, area studies, psychology, cultural studies, anthropology, economics, history, diplomatic history, journalism, and the military, amongst others. It involves study and discussion of a diverse range of issues including but not limited to: civilian control of the military, military professionalism, war, civil-military operations, military institutions, and other related subjects. International in scope, civil-military relations involves discussions and research from across the world. The theoretical discussion can include non-state actors as well as more traditional nation-states. Other research involves discerning the details of military political attitudes, voting behaviour and the potential impact on and interaction with democratic society as well as military families (Pearl, 2009).

The ramification of the Cold War, specifically the American decision to maintain a large standing army for the first time in its history, led to concerns about whether such a large military structure could be effectively maintained by a

liberal democracy. Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz published the seminal books on the subject which effectively brought civil-military relations into academia, particularly in political science and sociology. Despite the peculiarly American impetus for Huntington and Janowitz' writing, their theoretical arguments are often used in the study of other national civil-military studies. However, in his book, "The Man on Horseback", Samuel E. Finer countered some of Huntington's arguments and assumptions, and offered a look into the civil-military relationships in the under developed world. Finer observed that many governments do not have the administrative skills to efficiently govern which may be open opportunities for military intervention – opportunities that are not as likely in more developed countries (Mark & Roger, 2005).

The increased incidence of military coups d'état since World War II, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, brought about a growing interest in academic and journalistic circle in studying the nature of such coups. Political upheaval in Africa led to military take-overs in Dahomey, Togo, Congo and Uganda to mention just a few. Political in South America, which involved military coups in Bolivia which were 189 military coups in its first 169 years of existence, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay Peru, and Uruguay was largely a result of forces attempting to stem the increasing influence of left-wing and communist led uprisings. The 2006 military coup in Thailand engendered continued interest in this area (Pearl, 2009).

The end of the Cold War led to new debate about the proper role of the military in society, both in the United States and in the former Soviet Union. However, as before, much of the discussions revolved around whether the power of the state was in decline and whether an appropriate level of civilian control was being brought to bear on the military.

In his seminal book on civil-military relations "The Soldier and the State", Samuel P. Huntington (1957) described the differences between the two worlds as a contrast between the attitudes and values held by the military personnel, mostly conservative, and those held by civilians, mostly liberal. Each world consists of a separate institution with its own operative rules and norms. The military's function was furthermore inherently different from that of the civilian world. Given a more conservative military world which was illiberal in many aspects, it was necessary to find a method of ensuring that the liberal civilian world would be able to maintain its dominance over the military world. Huntington's answer to this problem was military professionalism (Rackvove).

Professionalizing the military, or at least the officer corps, this is the decision-making authority within the military world, emphasizes the useful aspects of that institution such as discipline, structure, order and self-sacrifice (Rackvove, 1990). It also isolates the corps in a special arena in which the military professionals would be recognized as experts in the use of force. As recognized experts not subject to the interference of the civilian world, the military's officer corps would

willingly submit itself to civil authority. In Huntington's words, such an arrangement maintained a focus on a politically neutral, autonomous and professional officer corps.

According to Rackvove (1990), in order for the civilian authority to maintain control, it needed to have a way to direct the military without unduly infringing on the prerogatives of the military world and thus provoking a backlash. Civilian leadership would decide the objective of any military action but then leave it to the military world to decide upon the best way of achieving the objectives. The problem facing civilian authority, then, is in deciding on the ideal amount of control. Too much control over the military could result in a force too weak to defend the nation, resulting in failure on the battlefield. Too little control would create the possibility of a coup, i.e., failure of the government.

Huntington's answer to the control dilemma was objective civilian control. This was in contrast to subjective control, in which direction would be intrusive and detailed. That is, the more objective civilian control the more military security. Civilian control, then, is the independent variable for the critical variable for military effectiveness; it raises the question of how civilian control is then to be determined. Huntington identified two shaping forces or imperatives for civilian control functional and societal. He broke the societal imperatives into two components, ideology and structure (Rackvove, 1990). By ideology, he meant a world-view or paradigm: liberal anti-military, conservative pro-military, fascist

pro-military and Marxist anti-military. By structure, he meant the legal-constitutional framework that guided political affairs generally and civil-military affairs specifically.

If Huntington's imperatives, as indicated by Rackvove (1990), are the independent variables, then the variable of civilian control becomes in turn an explanatory variable for military security. However, Huntington says that both societal imperatives, ideology and structure, are unchanging, at least in the American case. If that is the case, then the functional imperative is fully explanatory for changes in civilian control and subsequently military security. In short, if external threats are high, liberal ideology produces a transmutation effect that will re-create the military in accordance with liberalism, but in such a form that it will lose its peculiar military characteristics. Transmutation will work for short periods, such as to fight a war, but will not, over time, assure military security. This appears to explain well the pattern of American militarization and demobilization, at least until the initiation of the Cold War.

With the understanding that the rise of the Soviet Union created a long-term threat, Huntington concluded that the liberal society of the Unites States would fail to create adequate military forces to ensure security over the long term. The only circumstance he could foresee that would permit adequate military security was for the United States to change the societal imperative. The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the

long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism. The only way the United States could adequately provide security in the face of a long-term threat such as the Soviet Union, in other words, was for American society to become conservative (Rackvove, 1990).

According to Rackvove (1991), the other principle threat within the civil-military theoretical debate as which was generated in 1960 by Morris Janowitz in "The Professional Soldier". Janowitz agreed with Huntington that separate military and civilian worlds existed, but differed from his predecessor regarding the ideal solution for preventing danger to liberal democracy. Since the military world as he saw it was fundamentally conservative, it would resist change and not adapt as rapidly as the more open and unstructured civilian society to changes in the world. Thus, according to Janowitz, the military world benefitted from exactly what Huntington argued against – outside intervention. Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence, arguing that the military, despite the extremely slow pace of change, was in fact changing without external pressure. Convergence theory postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization of society. However, despite this convergence, Janowitz insisted that the military world would retain certain essential differences from the civilian and that it would remain recognizably military in nature. Janowitz agreed with Huntington that, because of the fundamental differences between the civilian and military worlds, clashes would develop which would diminish the goal of civilian control of the military. His answer was to ensure that convergence occurred, thus ensuring that

the military world would be imbued with the norms and expectations of the society that created it. He encouraged the use of conscription, which would bring a wide variety of individuals into the military. He also encouraged the use of more Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programmes at colleges and universities to ensure that the military academies did not have a monopoly on the type of officer, particularly the senior general officer and flag officer leadership positions, in the military services. He specifically encouraged the development of ROTC programmes in the more elite universities, so that the broader influences of society would be represented by the officer corps. The more such societal influences present within the military culture, the smaller the attitudinal differences between the two worlds and the greater the chance of civilians maintaining control over the military. Janowitz, like Huntington, believed that the civilian and military worlds were different from one another; while Huntington developed a theory to control the difference, Janowitz developed a theory to diminish the difference.

In response to Huntington's position on the functional imperative, Janowitz concluded that in the new nuclear age, the United States was going to be able to deliver both strategic deterrence and ability to participate in limited wars (Rackvove, 2010). Such a regime, new in American history, was going to require a new military self-conception, the constabulary concept: "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international

relations, rather than victory. Under this new concept of the military establishment, distinction between war and peace is more difficult to draw. The military, instead of viewing itself as a fire company to be called out during emergencies, would then be required to imagine itself in the role of the police force, albeit on the international level rather than domestically. The role of the civilian elite would be to interact closely with the military elite so as to ensure a new and higher standard of professional military education, one that would ensure that military professionals were more closely attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian society.

Charles Moskos developed the Institutional/Occupational (I/O) hypothesis as a means to promote comparative historical studies of military organisation and military change. This hypothesis evolved into the Postmodern Military Model, which helped predict the course of civil-military relations after the end of the Cold War. The I/O hypothesis argued that the military was moving away from an institutional model towards one that was more occupational in nature. An institutional model presents the military as an organization highly divergent from civilian society while an occupational model presents the military more convergent with civilian structures. While Moskos did not propose that the military was ever entirely separate or entirely coterminous with civilian society, the use of a scale helped better to highlight the changing interface between the armed forces and society (Reed & Segal, 2000, p.76).

The Vietnam War opened deep arguments about civil-military relations that continue to exert powerful influences today. One centred on a contention within military circles that the United States lost the war because of unnecessary civilian meddling in military matters. It was argued that the civilian leadership failed to understand how to use military force and improperly retained the use of force in achieving victory (Reed & Segal, 2000). Among the first to analyze the war critically using Clausewitz as the theoretical basis, Harry Summers argued that the principle reason for the loss of the Vietnam War was a failure on the part of the political leadership to understand the goal, which was victory. The Army, always successful on the battlefield ultimately did not achieve because it was misused and misunderstood. Summers demonstrated how the conduct of the war violated many classical principles as described by Clausewitz, thereby contributing to failure. He ended his analysis with a quintessential strategic lesson learned: that the Army must become masters of the profession of arms, thus reinforcing an idea along the lines of Huntington's argument for strengthening military professionalism.

McMaster observed that it was easier for officers in the Gulf War to connect national policy to the actual fighting than the case during the Vietnam War. He concluded that the Vietnam War had actually been lost in Washington D.C., before any fighting occurred, due to a fundamental failure on the part of the civilian and military actors involved to argue the issues adequately. McMaster, who urged a more direct debate between civilians and the military on defence

policies and actions, and Summers, who argued for a clear separation between civilians and the military, both pointed out controversies over the proper roles of civilian and military leaders (Reed & Segal, 2000).

Despite those controversies and the apparent lessons learned from the Vietnam War, some theories recognized a significant problem with Huntington insofar as it appears question the notion of a separate, apolitical professional military. While there is little argument that separate civilian and military worlds exist, there is significant debate about the proper interaction between the two. As discussed above, Huntington proposed that the ideal arrangement was one whereby civilian political leaders provided objective control to the military leadership and then stepped back to permit the experts in violence to do what was most effective. He further stated that the most dangerous arrangement was one whereby civilian leaders intruded extensively in the military world, creating a situation whereby the military leadership was not politically neutral and security of the nation was thus threatened both by and ineffective military and by provoking the military to avoid taking orders (Reed & Segal, 2000).

Arguably, however, and despite Huntington's urging otherwise, U.S. civilian leadership had been intrusive in its control over the military, not only during the Vietnam War, but also during much of the Cold War. During that time, the military elite had been extensively involved in the politics of defence budgets and management, and yet the United States had managed to emerge successfully from

the Cold War. Despite that, none of Huntington's more dire predictions had proven true. In response to this apparent puzzle, Feaver (2008), laid out an agency theory of civil-military relations, which he argued should replace Huntington's more institutional theory. Taking a rationalist approached, he used a principal-agent framework, drawn from microeconomics, to explore how actors in a superior position influence those in a subordinate role. He used the concepts of working and shirking to explain the actions of the subordinate. In his construct, the principal is the civilian leadership that has the responsibility of establishing policy. The agent is the military that will work/carry out the designated task or shirk evading the principal's wishes and carrying out actions that furthers the military's own interests. Shirking at its worst may be disobedience, but Feaver (2003), included such things as foot-dragging and leaks to the press.

The problem for the principal is how to ensure that the agent is doing what the principal wants done. Agency theory predicts that if the costs of monitoring the agent are low, the principal will use intrusive methods to control. Intrusive methods include, for the executive branch, such things as inspections, reports, reviews of military plans and detailed control of the budget, and for Congress, committee oversight hearings and requiring routine reports. For the military agent, if the likelihood of shirking will be detected by the civilian principal is high or if the perceived costs of being punished are too high, the likelihood of shirking is low. Feaver (2003) argued that his theory was different from other theories or models in that it was purely deductive, based on democratic theory

rather than on anecdotal evidence, and better enabled analysis of day-to-day decisions and actions on the part of the civilian and military leadership. It operated at the intersection of Huntington's institutional approach and Janowitz's sociological point of view. Huntington concentrated on the relationship civilian leadership and the military qua institution while Janowitz (1982) focused on the relationship of the military qua individuals to American society. Agency theory provided a link between the two enabling an explanation of how civil-military relations work on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, agency theory would predict that the result of a regime of intrusive monitoring by the civilian leadership combined with shirking on the part of the military would result in the highest levels of civil-military conflict. Feaver (2003) suggested that post-Cold War developments had so profoundly reduced the perceived costs of monitoring and reduced the perceived expectation of punishment that the gap between what civilians ask the military to do and what the military would prefer to do had increased to unprecedented levels.

After observing that most civil-military theories assume that the civilian and military worlds should necessarily be separate, both physically and ideologically, Schiff offered a new theory, Concordance as an alternative. One of the key questions in Civil-military Relations (CMR) theory has always been to determine under what conditions the military will intervene in the domestic politics of the nation. Most scholars agree with the theory of objective civilian control of the military, which focuses on the separation of civil and military institutions. Such a

view concentrates and relies heavily on the U.S. case, from an institutional perspective, and especially during the Cold War period. Schiff provides an alternative theory, from both institutional and cultural perspectives, that explains the U.S. case as well as several non-U.S. civil-military relations case studies (Reed & Segal, 2000).

While concordance theory does not preclude a separation between the civilian and military worlds, it does not require such a state to exist. (Reed & Segal, 2000) argued that three societal institutions namely the military, political, elites and the citizenry must aim for a co-operative arrangement and some agreement on four primary indicators:

1. Social composition of the officer corps.
2. The political decision-making process.
3. The method of recruiting military personnel.
4. The style of the military.

If agreement occurs amongst the three partners with respect to the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. In her book, "The Military and Domestic Politics", she applied her theory to six international historical case studies: U.S., post-Second World War period, American Post-Revolutionary Period (1790-1800); Israel (1980-90); Argentina (1945-55); India post-Independence and 1980's; Pakistan (1958-69). At the heart of civil-military relations is the problem of how a civilian government can control and remain safe

from the military institution it created for its own protection. A military force that is strong enough to do what is asked of it must not also pose a danger to the controlling government. This poses the paradox that because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection (Richard, 2009).

The solution to this problem throughout most of the American history was to keep its standing army small, relying on augmentation from militias, the predecessor of modern day reserve forces, to include the National Guard and volunteers. While armed forces were built up during wartime, the pattern after every war up to and including World War II was to demobilize quickly and return to something approaching pre-war force levels. However, with the advent of Cold War in the 1950's, the need to create and maintain a sizable peacetime military force engendered new concerns of militarism and about how such a large force would affect civil-military relations in the Unites States. For the first time in American history, the problem of civil-military relations would have to be managed during peacetime (Pollard, 1985).

In Federalist No. 8, Hamilton worried that maintaining a large standing army would be a dangerous and expensive undertaking. In his principal argument for the ratification of the proposed constitution, he argued that only by maintaining a strong union could the new country avoid such a pitfall. Using the European experience as a negative example and the British experience as a positive one, he

presented the idea of a strong nation protected by a navy with no need of a standing army. The implication was that control of a large military force is, at best, difficult and expensive, and at worst invites war and division. Hamilton (2009), Foresaw the necessity of creating a civilian government that kept the military at a distance.

James Madison, another author writer of several of the Federalist Papers, expressed his concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in June 1787: In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence against foreign danger have been always been the instruments of tyranny at home. Amongst the Romans it was standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people (Hamilton, 2009).

The United States Constitution placed considerable limitation on the legislature. Coming from a tradition of legislative superiority in government, many were concerned, that the proposed Constitution would place so many limitations on the legislature that it would become impossible for such a body to prevent an executive from starting a war. Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 26 that it would

be equally as bad for a legislature to be unfettered by any other agency and that restraints would actually be more likely to preserve liberty. James Madison, "in Federalist No. 47", continued Hamilton's argument that distributing powers amongst the various branches of government would prevent any group from gaining so much power as to become unassailable. In "Federalist No. 48", however, Madison warned that while the separation of powers is important, the departments must not be so far separated as to have no ability to control the others (Madson 2010).

Finally, in "Federalist No. 51", Madison argued that to create a government that relied primarily on the good nature of the incumbent to ensure proper government was folly. Institutions must be in place to check incompetent or malevolent leaders (Madson, 2010). Most importantly, no single branch of government ought to have some control over any single aspect of governing. Thus, all three branches of government must have some control over the military, and the system of checks as well as balances maintained amongst the other branches which would serve to help control the military.

Hamilton (2009) and Madison (2010) thus have two major concerns: the detrimental effect on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and the ability of an unchecked legislature or executive to take the country to war precipitously. These concerns drove American military policy for the first century and a half of the country's existence. Until the 1950s, the maintenance of a large

military force by the Unites States was an exceptional circumstance and was restricted to times of war. Following every war up to and including World War II, the military was quickly demobilized and reduced to near pre-war levels. Most debates in civil-military relations assumed that a separation between the civilian and military world was inevitable and likely necessary. The argument had been over whether to control the gap between the two (Huntington) or to minimize the gap by enacting certain policies (Janowitz 1982). Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, however, the discussion began to focus the nature of the apparent gap between civilian and military cultures and, more specifically, whether that gap had reached such proportion as to pose a danger to civilian control of the military. Part of the debate was based on the cultural differences between the more liberal society and the conservative military society, and on the recognition that such differences had apparently become pronounced than in past years.

Alfred Vagts had already begun the discussion from an historical point of view, concentrating on the German/Prussian military experience. He was perhaps most influential with his definition of militarism, which he described as the state of a society that ranks military institutions and ways above the prevailing attitudes of civilian life and carries the military mentally into the civilian sphere. Louis Smith, whose work pre-dated Huntington's, discussed issues of congressional and judicial control over the military as well as executive civilian control of military matters. However, all the discussions pre-dated a general recognition that the American experience was going to change in the post-world War II era. Once it

came apparent that the American military was going to maintain historically high levels of active duty personnel, concerns about the differences between civilian and military cultures quickly came to the forefront. The ensuing debate can be generally divided into three periods with different emphasis on each. The first period, roughly beginning with the end of World War II and ending in about 1973 with the end of the military draft in the United States, was primarily concerned with defining civil-military relations, understanding the concept of professionalism, and learning how civilians actually controlled the military.

The second period started in about 1973, with the end of conscription and the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, and continued until the end of the Cold War. This period was concerned with the supposed lessons of the Vietnam War, how the volunteer force changed the nature of the armed forces, and whether those changes led to wider gaps between military and civilian societies.

The third period, beginning with the end of the Cold War and continuing today, has seen an increasing interest in and concern about the existence of a civil-military culture gap. The discussion has centred around three questions according to Finer 2008:

1. Whether such a gap exists in the first place.

2. If it does exist, whether its existence matters, and

3. If it does matter, what changes in policy might be requires to mitigate the negative effects of such gap.

Most agree that a gap does not exist, but there is widespread disagreement as to whether the gap matters. There has been even less discussion about what policies may be required to mitigate any such gap. However, few have predicted disaster in civil-military relations and most of the discussions have centred on the nature of the gap and what might be causing it. Most discussions has concentrated on the third period and debate tended to lie around three principal questions, according to Huntington (2007):

1. What is the nature of the gap?
2. Why does the gap matter?
3. How can the problem be corrected?

While the debate surrounding a presumed culture gap between civilian and military societies had continued at least since the early 1950s, it became prominent in the early 1950s with the conclusion of the Cold War. The promised peace dividend led to a debate over changes in American national security strategy and what that would mean in terms of the transformation of the mission, composition, and character of the armed forces.

The gap debate revolved around two related concepts:

1. The notion of a cultural gap, i.e., the differences in the culture, norms, and values of the military and civilian worlds, and

2. The notion of connectivity gap, i.e., the lack of contact and understanding between them.

Few argued that there was no difference between the two worlds, but some were convinced that the difference itself was the primary danger. Maynes (2007), worried that a military force consisting primarily of enlisted personnel from the lower socio-economic classes, would ultimately refuse to fight for the goals of the upper classes. Tarr and Roman, on the other hand, were concerned that the similarities between military elites and civilian elites enabled a dangerous politicizing trend amongst the military. Chivers (2008), represented a small number who believed that the difference between cultures were as small as essentially to be irrelevant.

Reasons for the cultural and connectivity gaps vary widely. The self-selective nature of the All-Volunteer Force is seen by some to have led to the unrepresentative nature of the armed forces. One argument, put forward by a Navy Chief of Chaplains, was that the drawdown in the size of the military was exacerbating differences and making the separation between the military and civilian societies potentially even more divisive. He worries that unless an effective dialogue could be maintained between the civilian and military branches of society, especially in the area of ethical decision-making, the American military risked losing the support of society or becoming dangerously militaristic. Others argued that the increase in diversity amongst military personnel has

actually strengthened ties between society and the military, especially those ties weakened by the Vietnam War. Most were persuaded that the societal effects of the Vietnam War remained central to the cultural differences. One unique view, which does not fall neatly into either of the cultural- or connectivity-gap categories, centres on the organizational differences between the military and civilian societies. This view claims to explain much as to why the military has been or may be used to press ahead of society's norms. This view goes beyond the simpler cultural-gap approach and emphasises the ability of the military society to control the behaviour and attitudes of its members in ways not possible in the more open civilian society, as evidenced by such phenomena as desegregation of the military and inclusion of women in the military (Decalo, 2007).

Ultimately, the cultural gap matters only if it endangers civilian control of the military or if it reduces the ability of the country to maintain an effective military force. Those who concentrated on the nature of the gap tend not to be concerned about dangerous trends. However, those who are concerned about the lack of understanding between the civilian and military worlds are uniformly convinced that the civil-military relationship in the United States is unhealthy. Specifically, they have voiced concerns about a military that may become openly contemptuous of civilian norms and values and may then feel free to openly question the value of defending such a society. Others worry whether an

experienced civilian government will undermine the military by ineffective or inappropriate policies, thus threatening U.S. national security (Morten, 2008).

Schiff (1995) narrated the debate has generally settled on whether or not the gap is too wide. If too wide, civilian control of the military may be jeopardized due to serious misunderstandings between the two worlds. While most agree that such a gap is to be expected and, in and of it, is not dangerous, some do concede to aspects of that gap have led directly to misunderstandings between the two worlds. In particular, some have argued that the culture of political conservatism and the apparent increase in partisanship of the officer corps has approached a dangerous limit. Nearly all agree that it is possible for the cultural gap to be either too wide or too narrow, but there is wide disagreement as to where the current situation rest on that continuum. While Kier (1999) argued that structure and function do not determine culture, most agree that a difference between the two is necessary because civilian culture was incommensurate with military effectiveness.

Schiff (2005) argued that assuming that a problem exists, many have offered suggestion for narrowing the gap and correcting the problems arising from it. In general, those suggestions are along three lines. The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world. Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around. The second is that civilians must

articulate a clear vision of what they expect in terms of the military mission. And the final suggestion is that the most practical and effective means of bringing about dialogue and understanding, is to be bilateral education, in which both military and civilian elites would jointly attend specialized schools. Such schools would emphasise military-strategic thinking, American history and political philosophy, military ethics, and the proper relationship between civil and military authorities. Some argue that the root problem is that the military is self-selecting, rendering the culture of a self-perpetuating one. Solutions such as the reinstatement of the draft and a European-style national service obligation have been offered, but none appear to have made any progress towards adoption.

Historically, Namibia experienced colonial regimes, first under German colonial rule and secondly under South African apartheid rule before entering the most recent wave of democratization in 1990 at independence. The regimes were associated with undemocratic repressive military organizations that lacked public trust due to their activities that were not welcome. The long-established lack of trust may also take long to regain despite drastic and positive changes in the democratized defence force. According to Montalvo (2009), one evident factor that may affect the levels of trust in the armed forces is the degree of political repression experienced by citizens during dictatorial regimes. Lack of trust from the public may have negative effects on the public view of the Government and political stability in a democratic country. Kenosi (n.d.) stated that the level of trust that citizens have in their armed forces is paramount to good civil-military

relations. Kenosi (2009) further explained that in a democracy, it is the responsibility of the armed forces to gain public confidence, because a military that is not trusted by the population lacks legitimacy and will have difficulties justifying its expenses and even its existence. The concept of public education is also supported by Mwange (2006), who stated that there is no need to educate the civil society on the role of the defence force to improve the relationship between civilians and the military.

Public confidence can also be gained through a shift from combatant-orientated army to people-centred army inclined to non-combatant socio-economic development activities that significantly contribute to socio-economic development. This narrows the gap between the public and the defence forces thereby increasing confidence and trust from the public. The relationship between development and public trust has been elaborated by Montalvo (2009, p.109), who stated that government output has been found to increase levels of trust in other public institutions, especially in countries where armed forces are now playing an actual role in development.

2.9 Public Trust of the NDF in Developed Communities

In 2003, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) initiated ground-breaking research on compliance and the implementation of codes of conduct outlined above in national and provincial government. Ethics in post-apartheid South Africa highlighted a number of challenges and weaknesses. Although this

report reliably established the state of implementation in the national and provincial spheres of government, it did not shed light on the local sphere. IDASA is currently pursuing a follow up study in this regard. The research showed that in the national sphere the codes of conduct have been implemented well, although implementation still faces a number of challenges. In the provincial sphere, while some provinces are outstanding, others are lagging behind in complying with the code. There are currently two contested areas on ethics in South Africa. These are business ventures between government departments and the immediate families of executive members, and post-employment restrictions (Segal, 2008).

Concerns have recently been raised about the spouses of ministers and MECs doing business with government departments. When relatives of ministers win contracts from government departments, it raises the suspicion of irregularities. Segal (2008), raises the questions; "Does this mean that these ministers are inherently corrupt? Do they always look after their own interests instead of the people they represent?" (p.198). Some argue that spouses of government ministers should not be allowed to do business with government because members of the executive have a relationship with each other and have the power to influence the allocation of public resources. Furthermore, spouses of ministers are said to be connected to the executive through their familial relationships. The Ministerial Handbook asserts that awarding a contract to a spouse is only considered a conflict of interest when the husband or wife is in charge of the

relevant department, but some assert that awarding state contracts to the spouse reflects badly on the department concerned and inevitably raises questions about the conduct of the relevant official. Proponents of this view call for a rule excluding the immediate family of government ministers from bidding for contracts with government departments.

It is also important to note that implementation of ethic regulations needs to be improved. The study conducted by IDASA (2003) on the implementation was a serious challenge. In some instances, the required annual disclosures were not submitted to the relevant offices. This means that public officials should ensure that they comply with the regulations by submitting their declaration of interest forms in time. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the declaration of interest laws and regulations depends heavily on oversight and monitoring. More often than not implementing agencies do not have the necessary capacity to monitor records filed with them. For instance, The IDASA report noted that in the Office of the Public Service Commission there were only two employees responsible for processing more than 3000 declaration of interest submissions (Snider, 2001, p.291). Lack of capacity in the implementing agencies could mean that they are unable to identify any potential or actual conflict of interest. In addition, the conflict of interest's code does not make provision for review mechanisms. Effectively submitted disclosures are not checked against activities of the official in question. This also limits opportunities of identifying conflict of interest. The IDASA report noted that the media and civil society organizations have an

important role to play in this regard as the only institution that can help implementing agencies identifying any conflicts of interest.

2.10 Conclusion

The literature review in this chapter examined relationships between defence officers and the civilians in terms of perceptions and trust.Looking at the case of Namibia that has gone through successive colonial regimes that lacked public trust, it might take time to shed off that long-standing mistrust of the defence force by the public. Literature examination in this chapter, however, has revealed that in a democracy it is the responsibility of the armed forces to gain public confidence. Through this literature review the study identified the need to educate the society on the role of the defence force to build positive perception and trust. The review also revealed the need for the defence force to "shift from combatant-orientated army to people-centred army inclined to non-combatant socio-economic development activities that significantly contribute to socio-economic development. Hence, the purpose of this study to gauge the public's perceptions and trust in the Namibian Defence Force.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the methodology used in the research process. It focuses on the kinds of tools and procedures used. It also focuses on the individual steps followed in the research process. Leedy and Ormrod (2010, p.12), stated that research methodology is the general approach the researcher takes in carrying out the research project.

3.2 Research Design

Collis and Hussey (2003, p.113), defined research design as a science or art of planning procedures for conducting studies so as to get the most valid findings. Akpo (2006, p.113), stated that the design of the research provides answers to the research questions. Akpo (2006) further explained that the research design spells out the type of research that would be suitable, the persons or situations from which to collect the data, the type of data needed, and how to collect and analyse the data. The research design can be summarised as an outline of all procedures to be used and the reasons for using them. The research design presents in technical terms, how the researcher proceeded in addressing the research questions and objectives. The researcher gathered information by the use of a desk to study the fieldwork. The researcher used qualitative data to establish the amount of public perception in the Khomas Region of the Republic of Namibia. The information

was quantified using the Rickert Scale to measure trust and perception. The gathered information was then analysed.

This research is a qualitative study that uses a descriptive research strategy. Leedy and Ormrod (2010) stated that qualitative approaches focus on phenomena that occur in natural settings and involves studying those phenomena in all complexity, then putting the information in numbers so that it is analysed. By using descriptive research strategy, the researcher attempted to describe the characteristics of the existing phenomenon. The researcher sought to find answers to questions relating to the fundamental characteristics that define the research subject of motivation and its impact on employee motivation. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, (2003) indicated that the object of descriptive research is to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations. Therefore, the descriptive strategy was used for this study since it was found to be the most appropriate as it aims at describing the qualitative relationship between public confidence and trust in the Namibian Defence Force.

3.3 Population

Welmann and Kruger (2001, p.46), referred to a population as the study object, which may be individual persons, groups and organisations. Akpo (2006) also defined population as the entire group of persons or set of objects and events of interest to the researcher. The population as a whole, though the characteristics of the population are defined by different geographical location, gender, level of

education, profession, occupation and personality. All these different factors in one way or the other could influence the outcome of the study,so a target population had to be defined.

The study was conducted targeting people who had some knowledge about the Namibian Defence Force. This target population was chosen so that the researcher would not have a lot of answers from people who have no idea of the issue at hand. The target population, hence, was mostly adults above school-going age. The study was meant to discuss issues at social level with the people. Given this, the study sought working adults or adults who were informed about the activities of the Namibian Defence Force.

3.4 Sampling and Sample Size

Due to large population of the residents of Khomas Region, the study targeted 200 residents. A sample of 200 respondents was selected from the residents of Khomas Region. Welmann, Kruger and Mitchell (2005, p. 71), stated that the smaller the total population, the relatively larger the sample size should be large to ensure satisfactory results. Gall, Borg and Gall, as cited by Leedy and Ormrod (2010, p.2013), stated that for smaller populations, say N=100 or fewer, survey the entire population and for the population size of around 500, 50% should be sampled. In this case, the sample size is relatively large contributing to about 50% of the total population of which is 340 900 people (Namibia 2011 Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results).

Stratified random sampling was used in the study. Gay et al (1996, p. 223), stated that a stratified random sample is one in which individuals, who have something in common,are grouped then a random sample is drawn with all the individuals in the group having an equal and independent chance of being selected as a member of the sample. Leedy and Ormrod (2005), stated that stratified random sampling is easy when the population is small and all its members are known.

Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were used to select a total sample of 200 respondents. The Khomas Region was purposely selected as the area of study to select a sample size of 200 respondents. Systematic random sampling strategy was used in the study to intercept ordinary people or citizens for responding at selected points in the Khomas Region.

The target populations of the study per constituency were as follows: Katutura Central 24 600 (18 respondents), Katutura East 18 600 (15 respondents), Khomasdal North 43 400 (22 respondents), Moses /Garoëb 45 500 (21 respondents), Samora Machel 49 700 (24 respondents), Soweto 15 100 (10 respondents), Tobias Hainyeko 45 800(27 respondents), Windhoek East 22 600 (12 respondents), Windhoek Rural 22 200 (15 respondents), Windhoek West 53 400 (36 respondents) (National Planning Commission, 2011, p.160).

3.5 Research Instruments

A questionnaire format was utilised to collect the data for the study in a personally administered manner. Sekaran (2003, p.236), emphasised that questionnaire are an efficient data collection mechanism when the researcher knows exactly what is required and how to measure the variables of interest. This implies that administering a questionnaire, too large numbers of respondents at the same time is cheap and takes less time and it does not require special skills to administer. It was also administered because it ensures anonymity of the respondents as the researcher needed personal data on opinions and knowledge.

The suitability of using questionnaire is supported by Bell (2004, p.119), who stated that questionnaire are a good way of collecting certain types of information quickly and relatively cheap as long as you are sufficiently disciplined to abandon questions that are superfluous to the main task. A questionnaire format was utilised to collect the data from the sampled size because it is an efficient data collection mechanism which is cheap and takes less time and it does not require special skills to administer. The questionnaire will be formulated in such a way that the perception regarding trust is establishes. In this regard the role of the Namibian Defence Force in providing assistance at elections or during disasters like odd fires and floods will be tested.

3.6Data Collection Procedure

The questionnaire method was utilised to collect the data for the study. However, the questionnaire was written in English and provision was made if the respondents could not read English, an interview was conducted based on the questionnaire and the researcher would be filling in the questionnaire. The interviews were conducted by the researcher who is fluent in Afrikaans, Oshiwambo, and Otjiherero native languages. The research went ahead with the help of fellow students who spoke Damara/Nama, Rukangali, and the Caprivian languages. These were the languages which were necessary to complete the study. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that the questions provided answers to the research questions and the objectives.

The pilot study was carried out to identify areas that may require revision and correction, to refine the questionnaire instrument and data analysis procedure. Six % (12 respondents) of the study sample was used in the pilot study. The researcher found that the respondents did not have any problems in responding to the questions. Since there was no problem for respondents in the pilot study, 6% were included in the study.

The questionnaire was handed personally to individual respondents. Respondents were individually educated about the purpose of the study and anonymity was emphasised to the respondent. Respondents were asked to return questionnaire through the messenger. Some respondents did forward the questionnaire through

the messenger and others did not. The researcher had to make a follow up and personally collected the unreturned questionnaire. Late returns of some questionnaire by the respondents delayed the processing of the data by the researcher. However, all questionnaire provided were filled in and collected although some respondents omitted some of the questions in the questionnaire. The response rate was 97-100 % on question items of the questionnaire.

3.7 Data Analysis

The responses to all items were classified and tabulated in different categories using the Excel spreadsheet computer package. The tabulated data was then converted into pie charts and bar graphsin Excel spreadsheet for easy analysis. The tables and graphs of analysed data are portrayed as findings in Chapter 4.

3.8 Ethical Consideration

Leedy and Ormrod (2010) stated that researchers should not expose research participants to unnecessary physical or psychological harm. Furthermore, Leedy and Ormrod (2010) stated that researchers must keep the nature and quality of the participants' performance strictly confidential. This means that ethical issues of participants' right and privacy need to be considered in a research. It is against this background that the information gathered in this study is confidential and identity will be anonymous for the sake of protecting the interviewees' jobs and dignity. However, the information gathered has been used solely for purpose of

this study. The researcher applied for permission from the relevant authorities to conduct the study and approval was obtained before the study was carried out.

The residents in different parts of the Khomas Region, where the research was conducted, were visited and sensitised on the intentions and benefits of the study. Selected members of staff within the target population were educated about the survey as well. Emphasis was put on anonymity of respondents so as to increase their willingness to participate. Assistants to the researcher were also trained and sensitised on ethical issues that were to be observed during the conduct of the process.

3.9 Reliability and Validity

3.9.1 Reliability

Sekaran (2003, p.203), maintains that the reliability of a measure indicates the extent to which it is without bias (error free) and hence ensures consistent measurement error time and across various items in the instrument. The reliability of the questionnaire's instrument is a measure to remain the same over time despite uncontrollable testing conditions or the state of the respondents themselves is indicative of its stability and low vulnerability to changes in the situation. The inter-rater reliability was used to rate uniformity of the questionnaire. Two experts were identified and asked to rate the reliability of the

questionnaire. The degree of agreement of the two experts determined the reliability of the questionnaire.

3.9.2 Validity

Cooper and Schindler (2003, p.231), defined validity as the extent to which differences found with a measuring tool, reflecting the true differences amongst respondents being tested. One widely accepted classification consists of three major forms of validity such as content validity, criterion-related validity and constructs validity. Content, as indicated by Sekaran (2003, p. 206), ensures that the measure includes an adequate and representative set of items that tap the concept. The more the scale items represent the domain or universe of the concept being measured, the greater the content validity. Content validity goes back to the ideas of conceptualization and operationalization. If the focus is too closely on one type, then it may be conceivable that other indicators were ignored. Content validity is making sure that the researcher has covered all the conceptual space.

Face validity and content validity are the two forms of validity that were used to measure what was set out in the questionnaire. Colleagues to the researcher were asked to comment on the validity of the questionnaires. The use of experts is supported by Leedy and Ormrod (2010), as they stated several experts in a particular area are asked to scrutinise an instrument and give an informed opinion about its validity for measuring the characteristics in question.

3.10 Elimination of Bias

Awareness of many sources of bias will enable interviews to obtain relatively valid information. Biased data will be obtained when respondents are interviewed while they are extremely busy or are not in good humour. If the interview is conducted during the organisational restructuring, immediately after the strike or layoffs, the response could be biased.

There are many factors that can influence responses, one way or the other. According to Cooper and Schindler (2003, p.332), biased results grow out of three types of error, sampling error, non-response error and response error. The sampling error occurs when the sample is not a true representative of the whole population under study. Non-response error occurs when there are differences in the responses of those who did not participate in the study. The response error occurs when the data produced different results from the actual data.

According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), bias is any influence, condition, or set of conditions that singly or in combination distort the data. The potential bias identified by the researcher was the possibility of overview bias. In light of the aspects of inter bias, the researcher used the self-administered questionnaire to collect data from respondents. The type of a bias likely to creep in with the use of questionnaire was the response error and non-response error. The research instrument was personally administered and this helped to minimise the response error and non-response error.

3.11 Limitations of the Study

The study was conducted over a period of one year. It must be realised that this is a short time that might determine or not determine attitudes and perceptions as these are affected by several factors. The researcher then used their personnel experience and the experience of their colleagues who have been in the army over a very time and used their experience. The study defined certain terms as tried to qualify them but some of the definitions are open to interpretation. The researcher sought some opinions of the fellow academics and the other trained army personnel thus gave a rounded opinion that would be a conclusive report. The study was conducted by a trained soldier and this is a challenge as there is need to look at events as an untrained person in order to understand the relationship between the army personnel and the public.

The time for administration of questionnaires was limited to day time to avoid interfering with the respondents 'routine operations. Time factor delayed the distribution and administration of questionnaires and did not give enough time for the research to fully educate respondents on the subject matter as he wished. Furthermore, some respondents did not forward their complete questionnaires through the messenger as required. The researcher had to make a follow-up and personally collected the unreturned questionnaires and this further delayed the data collection.

3.12Conclusion

The study used both quantitative and qualitative data collection. Through stratified random sampling, data was obtained from the 200 respondents in the sample using a questionnaire. The population of study was drawn from the Khomas Region and the sample was narrowed to adults above school-going age to ensure quality of the responses.

CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study from primary research. The chapter represents the analysed primary data obtained through the research instrument. The data is presented in bar and pie charts for easy interpretation of responses. The results of each questionnaire item of the research instrument were tabulated before being presented graphically. Below each graphical presentation of results and a brief description is given and linked to literature where applicable. An analysis of the outcome is also givenfor each graph.

4.2 Presentation of Findings

Section A: demographic and general social information

The respondents were mostly females (59%), while 41% were males. This showed the distribution of residents in the Khomas Region and that most of the residents are femaleis assumed to be a true representation of the population distribution of the regionand, hence, the sample was considered to be a perfect sample. The random selection of the residents represents the population distribution in the area. Questions were asked to assess the impact of the defence forces since the forces are usually associated with males, as the military profession is considered to be aggressive. The study then wanted to assess the

impact of the NDF in the female-dominated community. The force is supposed to protect the whole community, but since it is male-dominated there was a need to assess the impact of the profession on all members of the community. The findings are illustrated below.

**Question 1: Gender of respondents**

Figure 1: Responses according to gender

The research first established the gender of the respondents, as this was assumed to have an impact on the way one perceives and trusts. To balance the views of bothsexes, a gender balance that represents the actual distribution of the population was chosen. The results showed that respondents were 41% males and 59% females.

Question 2: Region of the origin/rural home region

Figure 2: Classification of residents according to region of origin

The respondents were asked about their origin, that is, their home region and this was meant to assess the distribution of the respondents, as the place of origin was expected to have an impact on their perceptions, interests and attitudes. The findings showed that the Erongo, Hardap, Karas, Ohangwenaand Kunene regions were not represented and the highest number (28%) was from the Omusati region. This wasassumed not to have a bearing on the outcome because the other regions were fairly represented and their outcomes would, therefore, cover the regions not represented.

NB:*Caprivi Region has since changed name to Zambezi and the Kavango Region has been split into East and West.*

Question 3: Age categories of the respondents

Figure 3: Age of respondents

The ages of the respondents were ascertained, as age was expected to have an impact on the outcome. The older generation was expected to have some experience with armed forces during the liberation struggle and the younger generation would not be expected to have had much interaction with the armed forces. The target respondents, however, were those within the 40 to 50 age group- contributing about 70% of the respondents.

Question 4: Highest academic (primary/secondary) level of education

Figure 4: Highest education attained

The respondents' highest level of educationwas ascertained, as this was expected to have an impact on their perceptions, attitudes and views. The assumption was that the higher the level of education, the more balanced and objective the reasoning was and the more informed one was about events. The respondents showed a very high level of education because most of them (78%) had Grade 12. This was because the people with no education usually do not want to participate in issues that require them to write, as they would feel inadequate.Most of them would also not want to give their opinions, as they felt they were not informed enough to say anything.

Question 5: Highest level of tertiary/professional qualification.

Figure 5: Educational qualifications

The respondents were asked about their professional qualifications. Professional training was presumed to have an impact on the way one perceives situations as well as deductive and inductive reasoning. Most of the respondents had certificates and diplomas. This showed the distribution of educational qualifications in the community and the society at large.

Question 6: Status of employment

Figure 6: Employment status

The respondents were asked about their employment status and this was deemed to have an impact, as it was presumed that employed people have a say in what happens around them. The outcome showed that all respondents were employed with 11% being self-employed and there was no respondent who was unemployed. This is an indication that the respondents were qualified to respond to the issues at hand.

Question 7: Professions/job titles of respondents

Figure 7: Job titles

The respondents were asked about their highest level of professional qualifications. Professional training was presumed to have an impact on the way someone perceives situations and their deductive and inductive reasoning. Most of the respondents had certificates and diplomas. This showed the distribution of educational qualifications in the community and the society at large.

Section B: Knowledge of activities of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF).

Question 8: Have you ever seen the NDF soldiers?

Figure 8: Soldier visibility

All the respondents had at one point or another seen a soldier. This showed how visible soldiers were in the community. The fact that they all had seen a soldier meant there was a heavy presence of soldiers in the community either as community members or as officers on duty. This means a soldier is not only

associated with war or with films, people have seen soldiers and have something to say about them since they know them.

Question 9: Feeling of respondents after seeing NDF soldiers

Figure 9: Sentiments

Most of the respondents (86%) said that they were happy whenever they saw a soldier; and this showed a good relationship between soldiers and members of the community. However, 14% of the respondents said they were not happy with the soldiers and this indicatedthat some members of the community do not rejoice with the people who are supposed to protect them. The respondents were asked if they are afraid of the soldiers and all the respondents said that they are not afraid of the soldiers. This showed that the soldiers do not intimidate the community.

They are actually viewed as members of the community. The respondents were asked if the soldiers are trustworthy and 67% said they trust them, but this means 33% do not trust the NDF, which indicates a high level of mistrust, as the NDF is meant to defend the territorial integrity of the country and if the people they are meant to protect do not trust them, then that is an issue of concern.

Question 10: Do you like their uniform and their appearance?

All the respondents liked the uniform and the appearance of the soldiers, indicating the pride the people have in their NDF. When people do not love their defence forces they tend not to see anything good in them.

Question 11: Did you like their appearance?

Figure 10: NDF uniform and appearance

All respondents confirmed that they liked the uniform and the appearance of the

soldiers.

Question 12: What were they doing when you saw them?

Figure 11: Activities of NDF officers

The respondents were asked what the soldiers were doing when they saw the

soldiers. This was meant to assess the amount of interaction they had with the

soldiers. The responses showed that most of the respondents had seen soldiers on

duty, as most of them (82%) had seen them either patrolling, on cleaning

campaigns, training or marching.However, 18% have had more social contact

with soldiers,as they had seen them in transit to work. This showed that the

soldiers are known in the community and they are also known in their duties in the community. So the duties of a soldier are not strange to local community members, as they engage in everyday activities that the people see. This is a factor that promotes trust and improves the public's perception of the soldiers. This means an average community member is aware of the soldiers' responsibilities and expectations in the community. This is a good sign for soldiers in times of peace.

Question 13: Any good things you know or remember that the NDF soldiers have done for the Namibian nation?

Figure 12: Good done by NDF officers

The respondents were asked if they knew of anything good that has been done by the Namibian Defence Force. The responses showed that 9% was not really aware

of current NDF activities, as they still associate them with the liberation struggle, which ended more than 20 years ago. However, 27% was aware of the current floods where the soldiers have helped in rescuing people who were trapped in flood zones and evacuating the people before theywere caught in the floods.

This is a positive factor that would encourage the people to trust the Namibian Defence Force to help them in times of need. Another 27% could remember the Namibian Defence Force's involement in the UN peacekeeping missions in various countries. This means if the Namibian Defence Force is joining forces with other armies to maintain peace in other countries, peace will always be maintained in Namibia as other forces will be available to join the Namibian Defence Force if need be.

The NDF's ability to join other defence forces shows that it is internationally accepted, and this builds trust in the local people that their own force is adequately trained and has enough skills. The other 18% thought the Namibian Defence Force has done a good job in protecting the country against possible invasion of its territory. The other 18% thought that the force has done well in protecting the nation. All this showed that the people have trust in the Namibian Defence Force and can look up to them if they need help.

Question 14: Does the involvement of the NDF in United Nations (UN) peackeeping operations help or benefit Namibian citizens?

Figure 13: Benefits of NDF involvement in UN peacekeeping missions

The respondents were asked whether the involvement of the Namibian Defence Force in the peacekeeping operations really benefited the country or it was an expense. 89% of the respondents thought that their involvement was beneficial. This showed that the people perceived the defence force as a worthwhile institution that is beneficial not just to them, but to the world as a whole.

Question 15: Briefly explain why you think peacekeeping operations help or benefits the Namibian citizens.

Figure 14: Types of benefits of peacekeeping involvement

The respondents were asked what they thought were the real benefits of engaging in peacekeeping operations,to which some respondents (43%) thought that the exercise was just done so that one day if Namibia needs the service in return, it will get it. This meant that if one day Namibia's peace is disturbed there is need for some people to come and help restore peace, just as Namibia was there when other countries needed help. This gives the impression that people do not think that the troops benefit from the exercise, but they are just forming a union. The other people, however,thought that it is only for international solidarity that is so that Namibians would be seen to be working together with other countries and get a good standing. This also implies that the people do not think there are other

benefits to the troops themselves, but it is just a service to the international community to buy favours. These two sentiments formedopinions of the majority of the respondents, and showed that the majority of the respondents were not sure of other internal benefits of the troops on international peacekeeping missions. The other 10%thought that since Namibia is a member of the United Nations,it has to fulfil the obligations of the charter. This also revealed that the people were not aware of the needs of the troops and they saw some of their activities as obligations rather than helpful. This showed thatsome people perceive the Namibian Defence Force as an unnecessary activity; an activity that is an expense to the community; hence, they view the activities negatively. Only 10% of the respondents thought that the Namibian Defence Force benefits in the form of perfecting their skills by participating in the peacekeeping exercises. Through exposure though, the officers who have been on missions gain better understanding of real war situations and are more likely to perform better than those who have never been in real life threatening situations.

Question 16: Briefly explain why you think peace keeping operations does not help or benefit the Namibian citizens?

To respondents that said that the Namibia is a nation at peace and there was no need for the army,the work of the army was not clear. They argued that the money being spent building an army could be better spentonproviding education and housing to the poor. This indicated that the community was somehow not

convinced with the work of the army. For some it seemed the army was a way of providing employment, but not an essential service.

Question 17: Did the defence against the Caprivi secession attempt in 1999 by the Namibian Defence Force make you trust the NDF and their activities?

Figure 15: Trust in NDF during Caprivi crisis

The respondents were asked whether the defence against the Caprivi secession attempt in 1999 by the Namibian Defence Force make the trust the NDF and their activities. All the respondents confirmed yes, indicating that they felt protected by NDF from the disturbance likely to disturb peace in the region. The illustration that follows shows the results of the responses.

Question 18: Did the involvement of the NDF in escorting people along the Caprivi highway soon after the Caprivi secession attempt make you trust the NDF?

Figure 16: Trust in NDF escorts during Caprivi crisis

All the respondents thought that it was one of the factors that helped build trust with the force. The respondents thought that the people could build trust with the force. The respondents thought that the people could trust the army to protect them from all possible attacks from within and from without the country.

Section C: Public knowledge and opinions on the roles of the Namibian Defence Force

Question 19: NDF is there to serve the interests of the government and not the ordinary people

Figure 17: NDF service

The respondents did not think that the NDF served the interests of the government more than the people. In total, 69% of the respondents thought that the Namibian Defence Force is not serving only the interest of the government, but also of the people. On the other hand, 31% of the respondents were not sure or in support of the opinion that the Namibian Defence Force is serving the interests of the government. This is a big proportion and might lead to the people

not trusting the force as they feel that the force is there to serve the government and at times, personal interests of the people.

Question 20: NDF provides security during elections

Figure   4.18:   NDF   security   provision   during   election

Figure 18: Security during elections

The respondents were asked if they believed that the NDF provides security during elections. Most of the respondents thought that they did, but 29% of the respondents thought that the force did not provide the required security. This showed that there are members of the community who are not satisfied with the work of the defence force.

Question 21: NDF is there to ensure peace in the country

Bar chart showing percentages for each response: Strongly Agree 50%, Agree 30%, Neutral 0%, Disagree 15%, Strongly Disagree 5%.

Figure 19: Maintenance of peace and security

The issue of providing peace was presented to respondents and most of them (80%) agreed that the Namibian Defence Force provides peace in the country. However, 20% of the respondents did not believe that the Namibian Defence Force provides security in the country.

Question 22: NDF provides security to the nation/country

Figure 20: NDF and security

Most of the respondents were in agreement that the Namibian Defence Force provides security to the nation. This was only disputed by 10% of the respondents. This showed the high level of trust the public has in the ability of the Namibian Defence Force.

Question 23: NDF defends the nation/country against external aggression

Figure 21: NDF and defence of nation

The ability of the Namibian Defence Force to defend the nation against external aggression was brought into the spotlight and 80% of the respondents thought that the force was able to protect the country. This showedhigh levels of trust in the force. This also showedthat the people have a good perception of the force. 20% did not have a comment and no one was certain that the force was not able to protect the nation. This showed that public perception of the force is very good and the level of trust is very high.

Question 24: NDF is there to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in times of disasters such as floods

Figure 22: NDF and humanitarian assistance

On the ability of the army to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilians in times of disaster such as floods, all the respondents thought that the force was very helpful and the civilians could rely on them. This showed a great level of trust in the force and its ability to protect.

Question 25: NDF is there to help the police to combat crime in the country

Figure 23: NDF and police

The respondents were asked if it is the responsibility of the NDF to combat crime in the country and work together with the police. To this, 80% agreed and 20% thought that the responsibilities of the force and the police do not have anything in common. This showed that most of the respondents are aware of the activities of the force and they have seen them in action.

Question 26: NDF provides safety and security to ministers and high-rankinggovernment officials

Figure 24: Ministers and government officials' security

Most of the respondents (86%) were aware that it was one of the responsibilities of the force to provide security to the ministries and high-ranking government officials. A few respondents (7%)did not believe it was the responsibility of the police to provide security to government officials. Only 7% of the respondents remained neutral. The fact that most of the respondents were aware meant that the public is informed on the work of the Namibian Defence Force. This improves the trust of the people in the force and it encourages the people to perceive the force positively.

Question 27: NDF helps to protect natural resources such as wildlife?

Figure 25: NDF and natural resource protection

Most of the respondents (70%) disagreed that the NDF helps to protect natural resources such as wildlife. Only 20% of the respondents agreed with the statement and the remaining 10% were neutral. This showed that the respondents were not aware that the NDF has a duty not only to prepare for war, but also to protect the resources for the nation.

Question 28: NDF provides safety to the people.

Figure 26: NDF and public safety

The majority of the respondents (81%) agreed with the statement that the NDF provides safety to its people. Only a few (5%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement and 4% remained neutral. This indicated that there is trust among the people in the NDF since they feel protected by them.

Question 29: NDF maintains political order in the country.

Figure 27: NDF and political order

The respondents were asked if the NDF maintains political order in the country.

Most of the respondents (60%) agreed with the statement that the NDF maintains

political order in the country and only 30% of the respondents disagreed. The

remaining 10% were neutral. The NDF has proved that it can maintain political

order in the country by their reaction and success in stopping the Caprivi

secession attempt.

The fact that a defence force is meant to be apolitical, but the officers are allowed

to vote, gives them room to choose a political party - meaning they cannot be said

to be apolitical. The leadership in the army detects the pace, and since most of the

leaders are clear on whom and which political parties they support, they cannot be good examples of being apolitical to their juniors. Moreover, political parties do not always accept or tolerate each other. Besides, in most cases, the ruling party wields the most power in the running of the army. This discredits the defence force to the people who are not in that party. This takes away the trust of the people in the defence force, as it would appear the force is there to protect the interests of the ruling party or certain individuals. This resultsin a bad perception of the Namibian Defence Force by the public. During the elections, the Namibian Defence Force controls political stability, but it is viewed by many as a way to protect the interests of certain parties or individuals. However, there has been no evidence that theforce has ever used violence or other unethical means to achieve its goals. The force is known to be peaceful and achievesits goals in an ethical and professional manor.

Section D: Public trust in the Namibian Defence Force.

Question 30: To what extent do you trust the Namibian Defence Force?

Figure 28: Trust in NDF

The respondents were asked if they trusted the Namibian Defence Force. The responses showed that 50% of the respondents trusted the NDF to a certain extent, 40% trusted the NDF a lot and 10% had no idea. None of the respondents indicated that they did not trust the NDF at all. Although trust takes time to build, it only takes a few seconds to break. The force needs to assess why some members of the public trust them to a certain extent and not wholly. This means that they should work to restore public trust. Trust often comes with a good perception, hence, mistrust leads to bad perception. The fact that 40% trust the NDF a lot follows that they would perceive the NDF positively.

Question 31: If your answer to question 30 is "Not at all", briefly explain why you did not trust them?

None of the respondents indicated that they did not trust the NDF at all, hence, this was a sign that most people trusted the force and perceived it positively.

Question 32: Does the NDF's current involvement in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, the DRC, etc. make you trust the NDF and its activities?

Figure 29: NDF and UN peacekeeping missions

The respondents showed confidence in the force because if the members can participate in the United Nations missions, it means they are of international

standard in terms of their training and service delivery. This shows that the Namibian Defence Force does not exist in a vacuum and that it is part of the global village. This boosts public trust in the force. This also means should Namibia need help, other countries would be forthcoming.

Question 33: Can you give reasonsfor your answer to question 32?

Figure 30: Public sentiments on NDF-UN missions

The reasons given for trusting the NDF were mainly restoration of peace and security (56%), encouraging peace (22%), defending the country constitutionally (11%) and protecting people against enemies (11%). The reason supported by the majority (50%), which is "restoration of peace and security", supports the need

for public trust inthe NDF because it is playing a vital role in promoting world
peace.

Question 34: Do you think trust of the NDF by the public is important in the country?

Figure 31: Importance of trust

All the respondents thought that it is very important for the public to trust the force, as they work together. If the public does not trust the defence force, then it is likely that there will be political instability and this could lead to an unsafe environment of the whole community. The respondents were aware of the importance of trust.

Question 35: Briefly explain why you think trust of the public is important in the country?

The bar chart shows three categories with values: Motivates NDF 29%, Encourages public and arny cooperation 43%, Defends the public agaist aggression 29%.

Figure 32: Importance of public trust

The majority of the respondents (43%) felt it was important for the public to trust the NDF,as it encouraged public-army co-operation,29% felt it motivates the NDF and defends the public against aggression. Promotion of public-army co-operationis important in the country, as it removesnegative public perceptions. The people need to feel protected to be able to go about their day-to-day activities. The army will then have the power to control the country because its activities have an impact on the whole nation. The army is there to protect the leaders and communities at large and is also important for providing employment.

Question 36: Briefly explain why you think trust of the NDF by the public is NOT important in the country?

None of the respondents indicated that trust of the NDF is NOT important in the country, hence, this is a sign that most people trust the force and perceive that trust promotes public-army co-operation.

Question 37: How do you compare the activities of the NDF officers with the army before independence?

Figure 33: Comparison of NDF activities

The results show that only two comparisons were favoured by the respondents. Respondents felt that the NDF soldiers were different from the army before independence (56%) and they are friendlier than the army before independence

(44%). This also indicates a positive view of the NDF by the public, which in turn promotes trust of the NDF by the public.

Question 38: Briefly explain any good things that NDF soldiers are doing for the nation?

Figure 34: Soldiers' activities

According to the opinions of the respondents, the public views the defence force positively, as they could identify a number of good things done by the NDF. The good things identified include provision of security in times of conflict (31%), helping people during floods (23%), developing youths (15%), stopping the

Caprivi uprising (9%), participating in national events (6%) and provision of humanitarian assistance (6%).This also indicated the positive view of the NDF held by the public, which in turn promotes public trust.

Question 39: Does the civilian control ofthe NDF by the President of Namibia and the Minister of Defence make you, as a civilian, trust the NDF and its activities?

Figure 35: Trust in NDF and its activities

The majority of respondents (89%) confirmed that the civilian control of the NDF by the President of the Republic of Namibia and the Minister of Defence makes them, as civilians, trust the NDF and its activities. Only 11% responded

negatively. This also indicates a positive view of the NDF by the public, which in turn promotes public trust in the NDF.

Section E: Public opinions and perceptions on the Namibian Defence Force

Question 40: The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is cruel to ordinary people (civilians).

Figure 36: NDF-civilian relationship

The results showed that the majority of respondents (81%) disagreed with the statement that the NDF is cruel to ordinary people (civilians), only 9% agreed with the statement and 7% remained neutral. This indicates that the NDF is not

cruel to the civilians and this gives a positive view of the NDF by the public, which promotes trust of the NDF by the public.

Question 41: NDF, like other military organizations in Africa, harasses ordinary people (civilians).

Figure 37: NDF and civilian harassment

The results showed that the majority of the respondents (70%) disagreed with the statement that the NDF, like some military organizations in Africa, harasses ordinary people (civilians), only 30% agreed with the statement and no one was neutral. This indicates that the NDF is not cruel to the civilians and it gives a positiveimpression of the NDF by the public, which promotes the public's trust in the NDF.

Question 42: The public trusts the NDF as an organization that promotes the interests of the people.

Figure 38: NDF and public interests

The majority (60%) of the respondents agreed with the statement that the public trusts the NDF as an organisation that promotes the interests of the people. Only 10% strongly disagreed and 30% remained neutral. Almost all of the respondents were of the idea that the Namibian Defence Force is an organization that promotes the interests of the people. Only a few did not think so. This shows the high level of trust the people have in the organization.

Question 43: NDF promotes democracy

Figure 39: NDF and democracy

The majority of the respondents (60%) agreed with the statement that the NDF promotes democracy. Only 30% strongly disagreed and 10% remained neutral. This showed that most of the respondents thought that the organization promotes democracy and hence it is trustworthy. This promotes trust in the organization.

Question 44: NDF helps to develop the country

Figure 40: NDF and national development

Most of the respondents (60%) agreed with the statement that the NDF helps to develop the country. No one disagreed and 40% remained neutral. However, those who remained neutral are a large proportion suggesting that a large proportion of the public doubts whether the NDF helps to develop the country or not. However, the majority were of the opinion that the NDF does help to develop the country. This is a sign that the organization is perceived positively.

Question 45: NDF participates in the civil matters such as floods which improves civil-military relations.

Figure 41: NDF participation in civil matters

The majority of the respondents (70%) agreed with the statement that NDF participation in civil matters such as floods improves civil-military relations. Only 10% disagreed and 20% remained neutral. This shows that the respondents thought that the Namibian Defence Force's participation in civil matters such as floods improves civil-military relations. This is an indication that the public was aware of the activities of the force and how beneficial they are to the livelihood of the force. The trust is boasted with the element of belief.

Question 46: NDF is transparent in its activities

Figure 42: NDF and transparency

The majority (80%) of the respondents agreed with the statement that the NDF is transparent in its activities. Only 10% disagreed and 10% remained neutral. This shows that respondents thought that the NDF was funded by public funds and is always transparent with its expenditure. This is a good sign that the organization is transparent in its dealings. Transparency in finance leads to transparency in all other activities and this leads to a trustworthy organization. The transparency is also a pillar of trust.

Question 47: NDF intimidates people

Figure 43: NDF and intimidation of people

The majority (80%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement that the NDF intimidates people. Only 10% agreed and 10% remained neutral. This showed that most respondents thought that the NDF does not intimidate people. This improves the people's perception of the organization in terms of trust and civil-military relations.

Question 48: NDF educates the public about its activities.

Figure 44: NDF and education

The respondents were asked if the NDF educates the public about its activities. The respondents had mixed feelings on whether the NDF educates the public about its activities or not. Most respondents (50%) disagreed with the statement that NDF educates the public about its activities, 30% agreed and 20% remained neutral. This shows that the education of the public by NDF on its activities is limited. However, to a certain extent, NDF educates the public about its activities which is a good sign that some people are aware of their activities and this builds trust and improves perception.

Question 49: Is it necessary to have NDF since Namibia is independent?

Figure 45: Necessity of NDF

All the respondents thought that the Namibian Defence Force was important in the well-being of the country. This makes the people view it as a necessary organization and not as a machine milking the tax-payer's money and hence they respect the organization.

Question 50: NDF is so friendly and helpful to the public

Figure 46: NDF and friendliness with the public

All respondents thought that the Namibian Defence Force was helpful to the public. This builds a positive image and public trust in the force.

4.3 Conclusion

From the findings presented and analysed in this chapter, it can be summed up that the majority of the respondents were adults aged between 41 and 50 years, mostly females who confirmed that the NDF serves the interests of both the government and the public. The results also show that the majority of the respondents have trust in the Namibian Defence Force. However, the NDF needs

to work at improving public perception and earn total trust. The defence force also needs to make its presence more visible and raise public awareness on its activities.

CHAPTER 5: THE NAMIBIAN DEFENCE FORCE (NDF)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the establishment of the NDF in terms of the Constitution and the Defence Act. It also looks at the roles of the NDF, its achievements, strengths, weaknesses and military professionalism.

5.2 The Constitution and the Defence Act

Chapter 15 of the Namibian Constitution, particularly Article 118, provides for the establishment of the national Defence Force (NDF) and its composition, powers, duties and procedures to defend the territory and national interest of Namibia. Article 119 empowers the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force, to appoint the Chief of the Defence Force, and through Article 32(4) (c) (aa) obligates the CDF to provide, inter alia, for the balanced structuring of the Defence Force.

The National Defence policy is derived from the Namibian Constitution, especially Article 32 (3)(i)(bb), which functionality is developed in the Defence Act, 2002, especially Articles 5 (11)(1)(2); 5(12)(1)(2)(3); 5(14)(2)(a-f) and Section 3.5(xi).

Among other things, the Defence Act, 2002, makes provision for the Minister to:

- Acquire, hire, construct and maintain defence works, ranges, buildings, training and land required for defence purposes.

- Establish, maintain and operate factories for the manufacture and repair of arms, ammunition, vehicles, aircrafts, vessels, military clothing and other stores and equipment.

- Subject to laws relating to seashore, aviation and harbours, the Minister may acquire, construct, maintain, mange, and control harbour docks, quays, jetties, aerodrome and any facility necessary for the defence of national defence,.

- Acquire arms, ammunition, vehicles, aircrafts, vessels, clothing, animals, stores and other equipment required for defence purposes.

- In consultation with relevant OMA's, sell, let or otherwise dispose of any land building, or animals.

5.3 The role of the NDF

The role of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), as prescribed by Article 118(1) of the Namibian Constitution (1990), which states that there shall be established by Act of Parliament, a Namibian Defence Force with prescribed composition, powers, duties and procedures with the mandate of defending the territory and the interestsof the Namibian people. The objective of the NDF in Namibia is to maintain peace and safeguard the territorial integrity of Namibia as well as to defend Namibia from foreign invaders (Office of the Prime Minister, 1990). The mission of the NDF also supports its prescribed roles.

According to MoD (2009), the mission of the NDF is to guarantee Namibia's territorial integrity by guarding against external attack, conventional or unconventional, land helping to prevent violations of Namibia's land-, sea-, and airspace; operate effectively in support of the civil authorities if required; undertake peacetime operations in support of civil ministries, assisting civil communities in times of threats, disaster and need, and attend to other defence and foreign policy commitments, as they arise. The concept of defence forces being there to defend the territory is also shared by defence forces of neighbouring countries, e.g. Botswana where Kenosi (n.d.) stated that the protection of Botswana's territorial integrity was a critical motivating factor in the establishment of a defence force. In this case, the key role of defending territorial integrity against external attack or aggression is the same as provision of national security. This is also supported by Goodpaster (1977), who stated that military establishment is designed, operated, and supported to serve security goals and interests of the society at large.

5.4 The Achievements of the NDF

The NDF is obliged to be apolitical, affordable and not to become a burden to the national economy. It must be well disciplined and accountable to government, trained and managed to serve the government of the day and the entire populace of the Republic of Namibia. It shall be small, easy to maintain, highly mobile on the ground, air and at sea, should be a professional force, well-trained, self-

respectful, consciously adhere to the moral code, loyal, honest and patriotic. It should be an excellent force, able to excel in combat and a pillar for national defence and security. The NDF thus continues to be faced with the mammoth task of maintaining security along thecountry's borders with the neighbouring states, peace-keeping mission in the Liberia and the protection of the territorial integrity, so that peace and stability continue to prosper inside the country (Ministry of Defence, 2010).

Locally, noted achievements of the NDF include:

- Successful establishment of the NDF, that is, the integration of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF).

- Establishment of Army, Air Force and Navy.

- Promulgation of the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20of 1990).

- Establishment of the Defence Industries and the creation of research and development capacity within NDF.

- Establishment of Defence Health Services (DHS) and two military hospitals.

- Formulation of the Development of the national Defence Policy Statement.

- Establishment of Military School (MS) and training facilities.

In accordance with international obligations, to reinforce its stand on security, collective defence, democracy and peaceful coexistence the NDF has participated in several United Nations and SADC peacekeeping operations, entered into a number of bilateral/multilateral agreements with other countries. It has registered with the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Stand-by Arrangement. It has also successfully contributed to elections monitoring, and provided observers and verification missions as well as peacekeeping forces to various countries and also a number of joint permanent commissions of defence and security.

5.5 NDF Strategy

The NDF falls under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), one of the 24 ministries in the current Cabinet of the SWAPO-led government. MoD was established soon after independence as the department of state responsible for the organisation and administration of the Namibian Defence Force. Its main mandate includes formulating and implementing defence policy for the government, providing a central operational and administrative headquarters for the NamibianDefence Force, overseeing its effective administration, financial management and accountability, ensuring conducive staff welfare and procuring its equipment. MoD is tasked to implement Namibia's defence policy; deliver professional services, advise and administratively support the Namibian Defence Force and ensure that the Namibian people enjoy "peace and security" in line with the

provisions of the Constitution, as stipulated in Articles 118-120 and as elaborated in the Defence Act, 2002.

As part of the government-wide performance management drive in offices, ministries and agencies (OMAs), MoD is supposed to implement the public sector performance management system, and in consequence, develop its five-year strategic planning framework (SPF) to guide OMA in the five-year strategic plan formulation and implementation. OPM's common framework ensures consistency across the public sector and experts that OMA's vision and mission will be aligned with their mandates and other high level government policy statements such as Vision 2030, NDP3, MTEF, including the SWAPO Party Manifesto. To address the performance management objectives, the SPF incorporates the balanced scorecard (BSC) methodology, which is a management tool to assist OMAs to align their strategies, mission objectives with stakeholders' values and to translate the corporate goals into operational plans for departments and individual staff members. The balanced scorecard also provides a common language for OMAs to communicate with staff and stakeholders measure their deliverables and assess their services, in terms of quality, value, timeliness and impact on the Namibian public.

5.6 The Strengths of the Namibian Defence Force

The NDF is a standing army. A standing army is a professional permanent army. It is composed of full-time career soldiers and is not disbanded during times of

peace. It differs from army services, who are enrolled for the long term, but activated only during wars or natural disasters, and temporary armies, which are raised from the civilian population only during a war or threat of war and disbanded once the war or threat is over. Standing armies tend to be better equipped, better trained, and better prepared for emergencies, defensive deterrence and, particularly, wars. The term dates from approximately 1600, although the phenomenon it describes is much older (Wills, 2009).

Historically, governments had misused standing armies in two ways, both of which ultimately subjected the citizenry to tyranny. One was to engage in faraway wars, which inevitably entails enormous expenditures, enabling the government to place ever-increasing tax burdens on the people. Such wars also inevitably entailed "patriotic" calls for blind allegiance to the government so long as the war was being waged.

The second way to use a standing army to impose tyranny was the direct one – the use of troops to establish order and obedience amongst the citizenry. Ordinarily, if a government has no huge standing army at its disposal, many people will choose to violate immoral laws that always come with a tyrannical regime; that is, they engage in what is commonly known as civil disobedience, the disobedience to immoral laws. But, as the Chinese people discovered at Tiananmen Square, when the government has a standing army to enforce its will, civil disobedience becomes much more problematic.

More and more people are finally recognizing that the anger and hatred that foreigners have for the United States is rooted in morally bankrupt, deadly, and destructive foreign policies that have been enforced by America's enormous standing military force. The resulting blow-back in terms of terrorist attacks, such as those on the World Trade Centre in 1993 and 2001, have been used as the excuse for waging more wars thousands of miles away, and those wars have produced even more anger and hatred, with the concomitant threat of even more terrorist counter-responses. All that, in turn, has provided the excuse for more foreign interventions, ever-increasing military budgets, consolidation of power, increasing taxes, and massive infringements on the civil liberties of the American people.

The Namibian Defence Force, however, has used the time of peace to establish companies that benefit it and the community and cut its cost on the National Budget. NDF is actively involved in the textile, manufacturing, tourism and communication sectors.

The Namibian Defence Force also participates in the Namibian economy and its stakeholderscomprise individuals, groups and institutions with vested interest in, or benefitting from, NDF's operations. The stakeholders include the Office of the President, Council of Defence, Defence Staff Council, Parliament, Security Commission, Public Service Commission, Office of the Attorney General, NCIS, NAMPOL, Training Institutions, SADC, AU, UN, citizens, NGOs, GIPF,

Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, OMAs, Cabinet and Office of the Prime Minister.

These stakeholders fall under three clusters reflecting their interests, perspectives and influence. The three perspectives relate to the power, the legitimacy and the urgency with which they pursue their expectations. Stakeholders of the NDF are characterized as LATENT – those having low influence, DORMANT – those having power, DISCRETIONARY – those only having legitimate interest and DEMANDING – those having only demand.

Other opportunities of the NDF are the good political and support relations, Namibia's sustained peace, good macro-economic policy and political stability, fairly adequate and consistent MoD budget, excellent communication, gender integration well accepted in the NDF, good foreign policy and attractive as well as an investment friendly environment.

5.7 The Weaknesses of the Namibian Defence Force

The Weakness of the NDF are: the conduct and discipline of workforce below expectation, inactive functional structures, HR-relations not up-to-date, lack of capacity to acquire good intelligence, outdated NDF-related laws and regulations are, shortage of critical equipment, over-stressed infrastructure, insufficient

skilled workforce, aging workforce, budget constraints, resource management issues, capacity of transportation and logistics heavily stretched, lack of research and development capacity, low literacy workforce, aging workforce, inadequate staff housing and accommodation, conditions of service needs review, workforce diversity issues, relations with civil society needs improvement, force exit strategy not defined, succession issue not addressed, air and sea lift capabilities inadequate, information sharing not optimum between agencies, shortage of specialist skills in health and other key areas, brain drain, poor human resource development, low IT skills, and health care facilities are inadequate.

5.8 Military professionalism in the Namibian Defence Force

The greater the sphere of responsibilities that are apportioned to the armed forces, the greater the possibility of active military involvement in politics. Conversely, the more limited their responsibility, the greater the potential for their subordination to civilian control (Welch, 1976). Therefore, a clear distinction should exist between the duties of the armed forces and the civilian government. "Professionalizing" the military, has the effect, according to Huntington (1957), of improving civilian control as such a process renders the armed forces "political sterile and neutral" (p.84). This is a process whereby the professional characteristics of the armed forces are encouraged through enhancing the military's specialization and expertise in the management of violence, increasing

the educational opportunities available to the officer corps, and boosting the corporate nature of the military.

The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was established by the Defence Amendment Act (ACT 20 of 1990) which was in amendment to the South African Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957). The Act is complimented by a Military Discipline Code, which provide the practical framework for the administration of the armed forces. According to the Statement on Defence Policy (1993), the NDF's role is as follows: to ensure the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity; to provide assistance to civil authorities and to the civil community when required; to undertake ceremonial functions and to assist the process of reconciliation. Over the past eight years the strength of the NDF has varied between 5000 and 9000 personnel. An internal defence review and restructuring programme envisages an optimal defence force as being comprised of 10 000 personnel. The NDF aspires to be a highly mobile, robust, professional force that can be deployed fairly rapidly (Shiweda, 1999).

The NDF is lightly equipped and its structure is currently based on four Infantry Battalions under the central control of an army Head Quarters, supported by a Logistic Support battalion and supplied via a Composite Depot. Recently, the Namibian Air Wing was commissioned. It consists of two squadrons: one fixed wing and one helicopter squadron. A maritime wing has been created, but is more of a coastguard than a navy as it falls under the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine

Resources. This maritime wing is staffed with 100 personnel and has three patrol crafts.

The NDF has been involved in three military encounters. First, the NDF had a brief confrontation with the Botswana Defence Force over the Kasikili (Sidudu) Island in the Linyani (Chobe) River in 1995. Second, the NDF was deployed in conjunction with the Angolan and Zimbabwean armed forces in support of Laurent Kabila's regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in July 1998. Third, the NDF, together with the Namibian Police (NAMPOL) and the newly-formed Special Field Force (SFF) were deployed in the Caprivi Strip to quell two secessionist uprisings (November 1998 and August 1999) by a small insurgent force known as the Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM). The DRC and Caprivi missions are considered below.

5.8.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The NDF envisage the DRC campaign to be a short- and medium-term operation comprised of two phases. The objective of phase one was to protect the Kabila government in Kinshasa and prevent it from being overthrown by rebel forces, as well as to secure the western economic corridor, Kinshasa's vital link to the Atlantic Ocean (Shiweda, 1999). The NDF in conjunction with the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) and other allies successfully completed phase one within a few weeks (Namibian 1/4/99). Phase two's objective was to contain the rebel forces in the eastern region of the DRC and prevent them from capturing towns

and other strategic areas (Shiweda, 1999). Phase two was less successful than phase one as from November 1998 the allied forces in support of the Kabila regime sustained heavy casualties and was unable to secure any significant victories against the Ugandan and Rwandan backed rebels. However, it appears as though the Kabila alliance did not suffer any major defeats either (Internal Crisis Group, 1999).

By late March in 1999, President Nujoma, readily admitted that this was could not be won militarily, and favoured a negotiated settlement instead (Namibian, 31/3/99). By September, after several months of intensive diplomatic bargaining, a ceasefire agreement was eventually signed by most of the important parties. This ceasefire agreement stipulates that all foreign troops, including the approximately 2000 NDF soldiers, must withdraw from DRC territory by February 2000 (DOD, 1999). From the onset of this operation, the NDF did not perceive its deployment in the DRC to be a waste of resources, but rather a challenge, as well as a valuable experience that would enhance and refine their military skill (Shiweda, 1999).

5.8.2 The Caprivi Rebellion

In October 1998, the BDF with the support of the SFF stumbled onto a small insurgent training camp of the Caprivi Liberation Movement, which was alleged to be in the Mudumu National Park (Namibian, 3/8/99). Following this discovery, the over-zealous security forces, in their attempt to capture secessionist rebels,

caused some 2500 Caprivi residents, many of them members of the marginalized Khoë (San) community, to flee into Botswana (Mail & Guardian, 17/11/98). Amongst the refugees were leaders of the CLM, namely Mishake Muyongo and Mafwe Chief Boniface Mamili. By June 1999, several hundreds of refugees were repatriated, while Muyongo and Mamili were granted asylum in Denmark. The remaining refugees still reside in Botswana.

In the early hours of 2 August 1999, the Namibian Security Forces were caught off-guard when armed insurgents (6) from the CLM attacked the Wenela border post, local NDF bases, a police station, a shopping centre and offices of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation in the Caprivi town of Katima Mulilo. Street battles ensued, but by the afternoon the rebel forces had been repulsed by the Namibian security forces (Namibian, 2/8/99). A State of Emergency was declared the next day and remained in place for the next three weeks. During this time, the Namibian security forces undertook intensive mopping up operations to flush out and capture CLM insurgents. By early September, some semblance of normalcy had returned to Katima Mulilo, but the Namibian security forces remained deployed in large numbers in the region to maintain peace and security. In both incidents, members of the NDF the NAMPOL and the SFF were implicated in intimidation, assault, torture and even murder of civilians.

5.9 Other Operations

The NDF has also rendered the following services in support of civil authorities and communities since its inception; mine clearance; repatriation of Namibian nationals from Botswana; control of locust invasion in the Caprivi (now Zambezi) region; apprehension of trawlers illegally fishing in territorial waters; joint operations with the Namibian police force; and fire-fighting services. NDF personnel were also involved in peacekeeping operations; namely in the UN mission to monitor the elections in Cambodia in 1993 (National Planning Commission, 1995, p.486). In addition, the NDF has participated in regional peacekeeping exercises such as Operation Blue Crane in South Africa (April, 1999).

5.10 The relationship between the NDF and members of the public

Ordinary citizens may associate the defence forces as organizations of individuals, whose operations are associated with the use of force, as the term "force" in defence force suggests. Acemoglu et al. (2008), stated that a repressive military is a double-edged sword, however, once created, it has the option to establish a military dictatorship, seizing power from democratic or oligarchic governments. In the case of the 1999 Caprivi secession attempts in Namibia, the Namibian Defence Force the sovereignty of the citizens and provided the needed security, hence, the Namibian Defence Force acted within its constitutional mandate to safeguard the nation.

Huntington, as cited by Epress (2010), expressed his concern on the spate of post-independence military coups in the new states of Africa and Asia from the late 1950s and to him; this prompted a more critical examination of the relation between civil government and the military. This is the sort of repressive military states by Acemoglu et al. (2008) earlier. Acemoglu et al. (2008) suggested that, military coups may be more likely when the external role of the military is more limited. In this case, it may suggest that the role of the military must not be limited to the defence of the state, but to other civilian roles.

A close analysis of the roles played by the defence force in relation to the promotion of public trust has been identifies as a key element by Hilla University for Humanistic Studies (2004, p.1). Some selected defence forces in Africa including the Namibian Defence Force can be said to be supporting and promoting public trust. In Namibia, and other countries in Africa, most defence forces fulfil key elements by helping peaceful elections through provision of security to the electoral process. The Namibian Defence Force also engages in peacekeeping operations in the Southern African Development Community and beyond (Ministry of Defence, 2000).

5.11 Conclusion

From the above point of view, it can be concluded that the Namibian Defence Force help to promote public trust. However, this notion can be viewed

differently by the majority of citizens; hence the need to assess their perception on the role of the defence forces in promoting public trust is very important.

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions of the findings from both primary research and secondary research done to explore public perceptions and trust of the Namibian Defence Force. After conclusions and recommendations are given to strengthen public trust on the Namibian Defence Force.

6.2 Discussion of Findings

The study found that the Namibian Defence Force is really working to win the favour of the public. The force is not totally dependent on public funds, as it has established its own institutions to generate funds. The organization still takes up the responsibility in the community of providing security for government officials, monitoring elections and helping in times of disasters. The interaction between the members of the force and the public has been so good that the people are not intimidated by them and the people look up to the members of the force for the country's security. The force is seen to be world class because it relates well with other forces around the world, as time and again the United Nations call the NDF officers to help maintain peace in troubledpartsof the world. When they go on such missions they benefit from exposure to real war zones where they exercise and improve their skills.

6.4 Recommendations

The recommendations for the study are:

- Improve capacity of the NDF officers to acquire good intelligence needed to build good relationships with the public.

- Improve infrastructure in the NDF that allows them to render their service to communities in remote areas.

- Improve relations with the public by giving all necessary assistance the people might need such as water and medication.

- Improve information sharing between the NDF and the public so that they can trust each other.

- Improve conditions in the NDF so that the officers are psychologically prepared for their duties and make the public respect them.

- Improve employee diversity in the NDF so that all tribes, races and ethnic groups are equally represented in the force to ensure that no group feels left out as this would create negative perceptions about the NDF.

- Design the NDF to be apolitical, that is, all the members must not affiliate with any political party publically. They should support whoever is in power and protect all the people regardless of their political, religious, tribal, colour, creed or any other affiliation.

6.3 Conclusion

The findings reveal that the public is aware of the need of the NDF in times of peace. The people love the force and perceive them as a symbol of peace in the country. The public's trust in the force is still high, though there are some members of the public who are beginning to see the force as unstable. There are changes that the force needs to make so as to remain respectable.

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D., Davide, T. & Andrea (2008). *"A Theory of Military Dictatorship"*. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13915. Retrieved May 18, 2001 from http;//voxeu.org.

Adeche, E. A. (2007). Nigerian Military and the Challenges of the Democracy Consolidation. *The Nigerian Army Quaternary Journal Vol. 3. No. 1. March 2007.* Lagos, Nigeria.Institute of Army Education.

Akpo, S. (2006). *Research Methodology: Module RMA411S.* Polytechnic of Namibia.

Andrain, F. C. (1194) Comparative Political Systems: *Policy Performance and Social Change,* Armonk, New York; M. E. Sharpe.

Antoney, L. P. (2009). *Politics in Africa,* Longman, Johannesburg.

Bacevich, J. A. & Kohn. H. R. (1197). "Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the U.S. Military Become a Partisan Force?"*The New Republic 217 (23-8) Dec):22ff.*

Bartholomew. T. & Donald, W. (2005). *Military Technology.* New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited.

Beeson, M. (2008), "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines: Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?" *Armed Forces & Society. 34(3): 474-490.*

Bell, J. (2004). *Doing Your Research Project.* 3rd Edition.New Delhi; Viva Books Private Limited.

Bernstein, C. (2007). The CIA and the Media. Retrieved December 29, 2012, http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine cia and media.php.

Bryan, I (2011). Know Yourself Before the Enemy: Military Professionalism's Civil Foundation. *Issue 62, 3rd quarter 2011, p. 32-36.* Retrieved December 29, 2012, from http://www.ndu/press/lib/images/ifq-62/JFQ62 32-36 Bryan.pdf

Buck, S. P. (2009). *"New Evidence of the Militarization of America".* National Council Against Conscription.

Burk, J. (2002). "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society. 29(1): 7-29.*

Chambers, J. W. (1987). *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America.* New York: Free Press.

Chivers, V. (2008). *Military History,* New Delhi: Viva Books private Limited.

Clausewitz, C. (1989). *On War.* Princeton. Princeton University Press.

Cohen, J. And Segal, W. (2009). *"Veterans, the Vietnam Era, and Martial Dissolution: An Event History Analysis."* Armed Forces & Society.

Cohn, J. (1999). *"The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate." A paper prepared for the TISS Project on the Gap between Military and Civil Society. The organization for this section is based on Cohn's detailed discussion and survey of the Culture Debate literature.* (11th Ed.) New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Collis, J. and Hussey, R. (2003). *Business Research Methods: A practical guide for undergraduate students. 2nd Edition,* Palgrave-MacMillan Publishers, New York.

Cooney, J., Segal, M., Segal, T. And Falk, K (2003). "Racial Differences in the Impact of Military Service on the Socio-economic Status of Women Veterans." *Armed Forces & Society. 30(1): 53.85.*

Cooper, D. R. And Schindler, P. S. (2003). *Business Research Methods, 8th Edition.* New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill.

Danzig, R. (1999). *The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and how to Address Them.* Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

David, T. & Roman, P. (1998). *"The Military is still in Close Contact with Civilians."* Biloxi Sun Herald October 19, 1998.

Decalo, S. (2007). *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dempsey, T. (2012). *Modern Civilizations.* New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited.

Department of Defence (DOD), (1999). Department of Defence Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff *JCS Pub 1 (1999).* Retrieved December 29, 2012 from http//www.psywarrior.com/glossary.html.

Desch, C. M. (1998). "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control. *"Armed Forces & Society. 24(3): 389-405.*

Desch, C. M. (2001). *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment.* Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press.

Dietze, G (2010). *The Federalist: a Classic on federalism and Free Government.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Eitelberg, J. M. & Little, G. R. (1995). "Influential *Elites and the American Military After the Cold War." U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crises or Transition.*

Epress, (2010). *Democracy and the Military in Comparative Perspective.* Retrieved June 18, 2011 from http://eprss.anu.edu.au/mdap/mobile_devices

Farrand, M. (1911). *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1: 465.

Feaver, P. D. (1996). "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control". *Armed Forces & Society. 23(2): 149-178.*

Feaver, P. D. (2003). *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Feaver, R. K. H. (Eds.) (2001). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Finer, E. S. (1988). *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics.* Boulder, Colorado: West View Press.

Flynn, Q. G. (2000). *The draft, 1940-1973.* Lawrence , Kansas: University of Kansas Press.

Goodpaster, W. (1977). *Military and Associated Terms.* Department of Defence (DOD) Joint Chiefs of Staff *JCS Pub 1 (1987),* Retrieved December 29, 2012 from http://www.stanford.edu/.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.* Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Janowitz, M. (1982). "Consequences of Social Science Research on the U.S. Military." <u>*Armed Forces & Society.*</u>*8(4): 507-524.*

Jemibewon, D. (1998). The Military, Law and Society: Reflections of a General. Spectrum Books Ltd. Ibadan, Nigeria.

Kenosi, l. (2009). *The Botswana Defence Force and Public Trust: The Military Dilemma in a Democracy.* Retrieved December 29, 2011 from <u>http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Kenosi.</u>

Kier, E. (1999). "*Discrimination and Military Cohesion: An Organizational Perspective.*" In Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Judith Reppy, eds. 1999. *Beyond Zero Tolerance: Discrimination in Military Culture.* New York: Alexashan.

King, A. (2009). The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Power."<u>*Armed Forces & Society.*</u> *35(4): 646.*

Leedy, P. D. & Ormrod, J. E. (2010). *Practical Research; Planning and Design. 9*<u>*th*</u> *Edition),* PearsonEducationInternational*,* New Jersey, USA.

Lindsay, P. And Norman, D. A. (2007). *Human Information Processing: An Introduction to Psychology.* Retrieved June 04, 2011 from http://www.sapdesignguild.org/resources/optical_illusions/.

Mackuban, T. O. (2003), "Civilian *Rumsfeld: Overseeing the Military," National Review.* Retrieved june18, 2011 from http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens071703.asp.

Madson, M. (2010). *Military Training*. Lecture at University for Humanistic Studies January 21, 2004. Retrieved June 04, 2011 from http://www.stanford.edu?.

Mail & Guardian. (1998). Changing Military Environment. *Mail & Guardian 17/11/98.*

Mandel, R. (2008). "The Wartime Utility of Precision versus Brute Force in Weaponry."

Armed Forces & Society. 30(2): 171-201.

Mandel, R. (2007). Reassessing Victory in Warfare. *Armed Forces & Society. 33(4): 461-495.*

Mark, S. & Roger, U. (2005). *Military Environments around the world.* Lecture at Hilla University for Humanistic Studies January 21, 2004. Retrieved June 4, 2011from http://www.stanford.edu/.

Martin, B. (1993). *Who Will Fight The Next War?* Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution.

Maynes, X. (2007). *African Defence Forces.* Retrieved January 29, 2012 from http://www.sapdesignguilkd.org./resources/optical_illusion/.

McIaasc, F. J. & Verdugo, N. (1995). *"Civil-military relations: A domestic perspective."* In D. M. Snider & M. A. Carlton-Carew (Eds.), U.S. Civil Relations in Crises of Transition? (pp. 21-33). Washington D. C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

McMaster H. R. (1998). *Declaration of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.* New York: Harper Perennia.

Ministry of Defence. (1990). *The Namibian Defence Force.* Retrieved March 29, 2011 from http://www.mod.gov.na/framesets/hitlaunch.htm.

Ministry of Defence. (2000). *The Namibian defence Force.* Retrieved March 29, 2011 from http://www.mod.gov.na/framesets/hitlaunch.htm.

Ministry of Defence. (2009). *The Namibian Defence Force.* Retrieved December 29, 2011 from http://www.mod.gov.na/.

Montalvo, D. (2009). *Do You Trust Your Armed Forces?* Retrieved December 29, 2011 from http://www.vanerbilt.edu/lapop/insights/10827en.

Moore, V. (2011). *The Military Development.* Retrieved December 29, 2012 from http://www.sapdesignguild.org./resources/optical_illusion/.

Morten, M. (2008). *Military Organisations.* Retrieved December 29, 2012 from http://www.sapdesignguild.org./resources/optical_illusion/.

Moskos, C. C. (1977). "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization."*Armed Forces & Society. 4(1): 41-50.*

Moskos, C. C. (1986). "Institutional/Occupational Trends in armed Forces: *An Update."Armed Forces & Society. 12(3): 377.*

Muchow, D. K. (1995). "*A Preliminary Analysis of American Values of Life and Community."*JSCOPE 95.

Mwange, V. (2006). Civil-military Relations in Namibia, 1990-2005. Retrieved December 29, 2011 from http://www.fesnam.org/pdf/2006/reports_publications/Civil-militaryRelationshipNamibia1990_2005.

Namibian. (1999). The NDF at 10. *Namibian 3/8/99.*

National Planning Commission. (1995). *Namibia Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results 1995.* National Planning Commission: Windhoek.

National Planning Commission. (2011). *Namibia Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results 2011.* National Planning Commission: Windhoek.

Negonga, E. I. (2000). *Namibian Civil-Military Relations in the New Millennium.* Retrieved December 29, 2011 from http://www.iss.co.za./pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Negonga.

Newstrom, J. W. & Davies. K. (2002). *Organizational Behaviour.* Human Behaviour at Work.

Office of the Prime Minister. (1990). *Ministry of Defence.* Retrieved March 29, 2011 from http://www.op.gov.na/Decade_peace/mod.htm.

Ojo, O.E. (2009) "Guarding the Guardians: A Prognosis of Panacea for Evolution Stable Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria."*Armed Forces & Society. 35(4): 688.*

Pearl, T. (2009). *War in Peacetime.* Retrieved December 29, 2012 from http://www.sapdesignguild.org./resources/optical_illusion/.

Pollard, A. R. (1985). *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War. 1945-1950.* New York; Columbia University Press.

Public Opinions. (2009). *UPDF and Corporate Social Responsibility.* Retrieved June 4, 2011 from http://www.pubopinions.org.Kampala-Uganda.

Rackove, J. N. (1990). *Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent.* Boston; North-eastern.

Reed, D. & Segal, D. M. G. (2000). "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention." *Armed Forces & Society. 27(1): 57-78.*

Republic of Namibia. (1990). *Namibian Constitution.* Government Printers, Windhoek.

Richard, V. (2009). *African Development.* Retrieved December 29, 2012 from http://www.sapdesignguild.org./resources/optical_illusion/.

Schiff, R. L. (1995). "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance."*Armed Forces & Society. 22(1): 7-24.*

Schiff, R. L. (2008). *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations.* New York, New York: Routledge.

Segal, D. M. G. (2008). "Sociology in Military Officer Education."*Armed Forces &Society. 35(1); 3-15.*

Sekaran, U. (2003). *Research Methods for Business. A skill-building approach.* 4th Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Shiweda, B. (1999). *Military Relations.* New York, New York: Routledge.

Shumake, O. (2012). *Namibian Defence Force.* New York: Routledge.

Smith, L. (2001). *American Democracy and Military Power.* Chicago; University of Chicago Press.

Snider, D. M. & Miranda, A. C. (2005). U.S. *Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?* Washington D. C.: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Sorokin, K. E. (1993). "Conversion in Russia: The need for a Balanced Strategy."*Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 12(2): 163-179.*

Sparrow, H. B. and Inbody, S. D. (2005). *Supporting Our Troops?* U.S. *Civil-Military Relations in the Twenty-first Century.* Prepared for the annual meeting of the American.

Stiehm, J. H. (1996). *"The CivilianMind." in Judith Hicks Stiehm, ed. It's Our Military, Too!* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Summers, G. H. (1984). *On Strategy; A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.* New York: Dell Publishing.

Tasker, F. (1990). *"Who Are Today's Soldiers – and Why?"*The Seattle Times, F1. 1990, September 27.

Telle, P. (2010). *Military Careers.* New York: Routledge.

Transparency International (2011), Public Trust, Retrieved December 29, from http://www.ti-defence.org/our-work/why-it-matters/public-trust.

Vagts, A. (1937). *A History of Militarism. A Romance and Realities of a Profession.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Vennesson, P., Breuer, F., de Franco, C. & Schroeder, C. U. (2009). "Is There a European Way of War? Role Conceptions, Organizational Frames, and the Utility of Force." <u>*Armed Forces & Society.*</u> *35(4): 628.*

Victoria, B. (2009). "Effecting Discrimination: *Operational effectiveness and Harassment in the British armed Forces."* <u>*Armed Forces & Society.*</u> *35(4): 728.*

Welman, J. C. And Kruger, S. J. (2001). *Research Methodology for Business and Administrative Sciences,* 2nd Edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Welmann, P., Kruger, F. And Mitchell, B. (2005). *Research Methodology .* 3rd Edition. Oxford University Press, Cape Town, South Africa.

Will, G. (1997). *"Lott, and Others, Need to Butt Out".* The Plain Dealer, 5F. May 25, 1997.

William, C. M. (1998). "The Perils Of (and for) an Imperial America." *Foreign Policy. 111 (Summers): 36-47.*

Wills, Q. (2009). *Military Training.* New York, New York: Routledge.

Zeki, S. (2009). "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity." *Armed Forces & Society.* 35(4): 709.

APPENDICIES

Appendix I: Approval letter

P. O. Box 2699

Windhoek

15 November 2011

Attention: The Honourable Governor

Khomas Region

Windhoek

Dear Sir

RE: LETTER OF APPROVAL

My name is Linus Shiimi Nahole and I am a student studying Masters of Arts in security and Strategic Studies (MASSS) at the University of Namibia (UNAM).

I am carrying out a research on the "Public perception on the Namibian Defence Force: an exploratory study of the Khomas Region. This is in partial fulfilment for the requirements of the award of Masters of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies.

I am, therefore, seeking permission and approval to carry out a research in the constituency. The research is only a social study for academic purposes and has no political implications.

Your assistance towards achievement of the objectives of the research is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Yours faithfully

Linus Shiimi Nahole

(Researcher)

Appendix II: Introduction and Questionnaire for Khomas Region residents in Namibia.

Attached is a questionnaire drafted by the researcher, Linus Shiimi Nahole for the study of the "Public perception on the Namibian defence force: an exploratory study of the Khomas Region residents in Namibia."

You are kindly requested to fill in the questionnaire to assist with the information that will help the researcher to explore the public trust on the Namibian defence Force. Once the public opinions have been explored, identified and analysed, the information will help to mitigate the negative public perceptions towards the defence force. Furthermore, it will help to improve the relationship between the public and the defence forces.

The information obtained will be treated confidentially and only for the purpose of this research.

Your co-operation is greatly appreciated. Thank you in advance.

Yours faithfully

Linus Shiimi Nahole

(Researcher)

QUESTIONNAIRE

Section A: Demographic and general social information

1. Gender (Please tick applicable)

Female	
Male	

2. Region of origin/Rural home Region (Please tick applicable)

Caprivi	
Erongo	
Hardap	
Okavango	
Karas	
Khomas	
Kunene	
Ohangwena	
Okakarara	

Omaheke	
Omusati	
Oshana	
Oshikoto	

3. Age group (Please tick applicable)

15-20 years old	
20-30 years old	
31-40 years old	
41-50 years old	
51-60 years old	
61 years and above	

4. Highest academic (primary/secondary) level of education (Please tick applicable)

Never attended school	
Primary up to Grade 5	

Primary up to Grade 7	
Secondary up to Grade 10	
Secondary up to Grade 12	

5. Highest tertiary /professional qualification (Please tick applicable)

Tertiary Certificate	
Diploma	
First Degree	
Post Graduate Degree	
Master's Degree	
PhD	

6. Status of employment (Please tick applicable)

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Housewife	

Other not in table above (please specify) ....

7. Profession/job title (Please state) ....

Section B: Knowledge of the activities of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF)

8. Have you ever seen the NDF soldiers? (Please tick applicable)

Yes	
No	

9. If your answer in question 7 is "Yes", how did you feel?

Feeling	Yes	No
Were you happy?		
Were you afraid?		
Did you trust them		

10. Did you like their uniform and their appearance? (Please tick applicable)

Yes	
No	

11. If your answer in question 10 is "No", briefly explain why you did not like their appearance?

....

....

....

....

....

12. What activities were they doing when you saw them? (Please state)

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………..

13. Briefly mention any good things you know of that the NDF soldiers had done for the Namibian Nation?

....

....

....

....

....

14. Does the involvement of NDF in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations help or benefit Namibian citizens?

Yes	
No	

15. If your answer to question 14 is 'Yes", briefly explain why you think peacekeeping operations help or benefit the Namibian citizens.

....

....

....

....

....

16. If your answer in question 14 is "No", briefly explain why you think peace keeping operations does not help or benefit the Namibian citizens.

....

....

....

....

....

17. In 1999, the Namibian Defence Force defended the Caprivi secessionist 'attempt. Does this make you trust the NDF and their activities?

Yes	
No	

18. The NDF was involved in escorting people along the Caprivi highway
    soon after the Caprivi secessionists 'attempt. Does this make you trust
    the NDF?

Yes	
No	

Section C: Public knowledge and opinions on the roles of the Namibian Defence Force.

For questions 18 – 28, please out a cross (**X**) or tick ( ) in the appropriate box to show your opinion.

Key: SA - Strongly Agree

A - Agree

N - Neutral

D - Disagree

SD - Strongly Disagree

No.	Item	SA	A	N	D	SD
19.	The NDF is there to serve the interest of the Government and not the ordinary people.					
20.	NDF provides security during elections.					
21.	NDF is there to provide					

	peace in the country.				
22.	NDF provides security to the nation/country.				
23.	NDF defends the nation/country against external aggression				
24.	NDF is there to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilians in times of disasters such as floods.				
25.	NDF is there to help the police to fight crime in the country				
26.	NDF provides safety and security to Ministers and high Government officials.				
27.	NDF help to protect natural resources such as wild life.				

28.	NDF provides safety to the people.					
29.	NDF maintain political order in the country.					

Section D: Public trust on the Namibian Defence Force.

30. To what extent do you trust the Namibian Defence Force? (Please tick applicable)

Not at all	
To a certain extend	
A lot	
No Idea	

31. If your answer in question 30 is "Not at all", briefly explain why you did not trust them?

....

....

....

....

....

32. Currently, the NDF is involved in Unite Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in other countries such as Somalia, Sudan, DRC, etc. Does this make you trust the NDF and their activities?

Yes	
No	

33. Can you give reasons for your answer in question 32.

....

....

....

....

....

34. Do you think that trust in the NDF is important in the country?

Yes	
No	

35. If your answer to question 34 is "Yes", briefly explain why you think trust of the NDF by the public is important in the country.

....

....

....

....

....

36. If your answer to question 35 is "No", briefly explain why you think

trust of the NDF by the public is **NOT** important in the country.

....

....

....

....

....

37. How do you compare the activities of the NDF soldiers with the <u>army</u>

before independence in Namibia? NDF are:

Comparison	Yes	No
The same as the army before independence.		
Different from the army before independence.		
Soldiers just the same as the army before independence.		
Friendlier than the army before independence.		

38. Briefly mention any good things that the NDF soldiers are doing to the

Namibian Nation.

....

....

....

....

....

39 The NDF is under civilian control of the President of the Republic of Namibia and the Minister of Defence. Does this make you to trust the NDF and its activities?

Yes	
No	

Section E: Public opinions and perceptions on the Namibian defence Force.

For questions 40 - 50, please put a cross (**X**) or tick ( ) in the appropriate box to show your opinion.

Key; SA - **Strongly Agree**

    A - **Agree**

    N - **Neutral**

    D - **Disagree**

    SD - **Strongly Disagree**

No.	Item	SA	A	N	D	SD
40.	The Namibian Defence Force is very cruel to ordinary people (civilians).					
41.	NDF like other military organizations in the rest of Africa, harass ordinary people (civilians).					
42.	The public trust the NDF as an organization that promotes the interest of the people.					
43.	NDF promotes democracy.					
44.	NDF helps to develop the country.					
45.	NDF participation in civil matters such as floods improves civil-military relations.					
46.	NDF is transparent in its activities.					
47.	NDF intimidates people.					
48.	NDF educates the public about its activities.					

49.	It is not necessary to have the NDF since Namibia is independent.					
50	NDF is friendly and helpful to the public.					

Thank you for your co-operation and participation.