

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION  
ON NEPAD'S PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)**

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**BY**

**SYLVANUS NAMBALA  
(200101374)**

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**SUPERVISORS: PROF. B. LINDEKE  
PROF. A. DU PISANI  
MR. L. BLAAUW**

## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to my uncle Mr. S. K Nekundi, and his wife, Mrs. E. Nekundi, who provided financial support and a supportive environment in which to work.

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### **DISCLAIMER**

All information in this study is verified to the best of the author's ability.

**Sylvanus Nambala, University of Namibia**

**January, 2006**

**DECLARATION**

I declare that **AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT’S POSITION ON NEPAD’S PEER REVIEW MECHANISM** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references and neither has it been, nor will it be, submitted for the reward of any other degree.

.....

Signature of Student

.....

Date

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHRR	African Commission on Human and People's Right
ALRN	African Labour Research Network
AIDS	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanisms
AU	African Union (previously called OAU)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development, Development and Co-operation in Africa
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council of African Union
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G8	countries such as Russia, USA, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human Immuno deficiency Virus
HSGIC	Head of State and Government Implementation Committee
ICT	International Communication Technology
ILRIG	International Labour Resources and Information Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LaRRI	Labour Resources and Research Institute
MDGs	Millenium Development Goals



MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCCI	Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPRU	Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit
NSHR	National Society for Human Rights
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development
SACU	Southern African Custom Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SAIIA	South Africa Institute of International Affairs
SARPN	Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network
SMEs	Small and Medium – sized Enterprises
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNECA	United Nation Economic Commission for Africa
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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## **ABSTRACT**

The study investigates the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Although the initiative is quite new, many contributions have been made and many articles written about it. NEPAD is the latest initiative aimed at improving economic growth and development in Africa. It is a programme of the African Union (AU) and all member states of the AU are automatically members of the NEPAD programme. The other earlier initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), amongst others, failed to address the many problems faced by the continent of Africa.

The NEPAD programme looks promising and has the potential to turn the situation around. However, issues such as lack of consultation, exclusion of civil society organizations, and marketing the programme first outside of the continent, pose a political threat to NEPAD. At the heart of NEPAD is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) aimed at improving, among others, standard of governance among the African states. Surprisingly, all African member states that are also AU member states have subscribed to NEPAD, but not to the APRM. In terms of analysis, this does not augur very well for the countries to be part of the NEPAD programme and at the same time condone the program's brainchild, which is the APRM.

The APRM is a voluntary mechanism acceded to by African countries as a self-monitoring instrument. By acceding to the APRM, a country makes a commitment to be reviewed by other member states in areas of governance and other related areas. The APRM gauges whether a particular African country's performance in the domain of

governance is within stipulated principles of NEPAD. The APRM emphasises the need for African countries to share experience, reinforce successful and best practices, identify deficiencies and assess the need for capacity building.

Although the Government of Namibia has accepted NEPAD, it has not acceded to the APRM. The stance of the government of the Republic of Namibia is explored in depth in the thesis. Many African countries accepted NEPAD, but do not accede to the APRM. They see the APRM as an attempt by the West to dictate development efforts in Africa and to prescribe who should benefit from NEPAD. Factors, such as the mechanism's voluntary nature, non-sanction measures, the time frame for signing up, the issue of sovereignty, contribution fees of US\$ 100 000, amongst others, continue to pose a threat to the universal acceptance of APRM. So far only twenty-four out of fifty - three member states of the AU have joined the APRM. The expected results of the first countries under review - Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya and Mauritius - will be a starting point of either deterring other member states from or encouraging them to sign up for the APRM as some countries have adopted a "wait and see attitude".



## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

*Africa is beyond bemoaning the past for its problem. The task of undoing the past is ours, with the support of those willing to join us in a continent renewal. We have a new generation of leaders who know that we must take responsibility for our own destiny, that we will uplift ourselves only by our own efforts in partnership with those who wish us well.* (Nelson Mandela in Herbert 2002:1)

### **1.1. Introduction and Background to the Study**

At the beginning of the new millennium, it was decided that, in order for the vision of a propitious future for the African continent to be realized, a practical programme to revive the continent of Africa should be formulated. Solomon and du Plessis (2002) indicate that in 1999, the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) gave a mandate to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and South African President Thabo Mbeki to lead a project to promote Africa's economic empowerment. At the G77 summit in 2000, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo was added to the group. Resulting from the mandate given to these African leaders, the Millennium African Renaissance Programme (MAP) was launched early in 2001.

Joseph Diescho (2002) indicated that Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade had also launched a plan for African renewal, which he called the Omega Plan. It was decided that there should be one programme for the entire continent and so the New African Initiative (NAI) was developed by merging the MAP and the Omega Plan. The NAI was accepted by the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in July 2001. In October 2001, it was decided to rename the programme the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The policy framework known as NEPAD was finalized by the Heads of States and Implementation Committee (HSIC) on 23 October 2001. The HSIC comprised of Nigerian President Obasanjo as chairperson, Egyptian President Hosni

Mubarak, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika as vice-chairpersons and South African President Thabo Mbeki.

According to Mbumba (2003), NEPAD was born at a time when the debate about the African Renaissance (African Rebirth) was taking centre stage. Thabo Mbeki, the South African President, started talking about the African Renaissance in 1994 when he was still Deputy President. The new challenge was to achieve the economic emancipation of the continent and its people. Considering the failure and lack of implementation of most of the earlier African development initiatives, a small group of leaders took it upon themselves to champion a programme for the continent's recovery.

Joseph Diescho (2002) has indicated that NEPAD is a result of a number of initiatives undertaken by African leaders to spearhead a concerted effort by all Africa to punctuate and give meaning to what was started as an African Renaissance or African Recovery in the African century. The idea of an African Renaissance was reintroduced in the new political language in Africa by the democratisation process in South Africa in 1994. In a South Africa free of settler apartheid, colonialism and white domination, most of Africa saw a window of opportunity to end the many conflicts on the continent, notably conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and parts of the Great Lakes. The South Africa President Thabo Mbeki popularised the vision of the African Renaissance. The response to this vision was reminiscent of the days of Uhuru and attendant cries for liberation.

Nangolo Mbumba, (2003) shares Disescho's sentiment. He points out that the idea of The New Partnership for Africa Development had been preceded by major and transformational developments on the African continent. One can safely start the enumeration of critical milestones in Africa's development with the independence of Ghana in 1957. At this stage, Africa's foremost Revolutionary Dr Kwame Nkrumah flagged the idea of the United States of Africa. It was this concept of the United States of Africa, which led to the birth of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) as a continental organization in 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The objective of the organisation was to secure the total liberation of the African people from colonialism and foreign domination. The focus of OAU on this objective was dictated by the reality of colonialism and foreign domination.

Barney Karuombe (2003) adds that NEPAD is built on previous initiatives like the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa (1980), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (1989), Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) 1986-1990, which later became the United Nations Programme of Actions for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) (1986), the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) in the 1990s (1991).

Ross Herbert, (2002), also indicated that NEPAD is an outgrowth of a variety of emerging ideas and earlier initiatives. Most directly, NEPAD grew from the idea of an African Renaissance, first mentioned by South African President Nelson Mandela but expanded and promoted by his



successor, Thabo Mbeki. NEPAD drew inspiration from the growing enthusiasm for regional free trade areas, particularly the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union. It also grows from a substantial tradition of Pan-Africanist thought, which from the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century began calling for a united Africa.

According to Diescho (2002), although Pan Africanism holds substantial intellectual cache, Africa has been substantially divided over the degree to which unity should be embraced since the dawn of the post-colonial period. In the years leading up to the formation of the OAU in 1963, Africa was divided into three philosophical blocs, the radical Casablanca group and the more moderate Monrovia and Brazzaville groups. The Brazzaville group represented a gradualist approach to African unity and advocated a loose association of African states.

In contrast, the Casablanca group supported the establishment of a United States of Africa based on the federalist model of government. The Monrovia group rejected any form of political integration but stressed the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference with respect to the internal affairs of the state. While the specific alignment of nations in those camps have waxed and waned, those fundamental tensions remained a part of the debate over unity for the last four decades.

In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action, which was adopted by OAU, does not produce tangible benefits, just like other series of African initiatives, which followed thereby. Ainnade and Sesay (1989:168) point out that the Lagos Plan of Action, which was adopted in 1980 by African leaders and whose major objective was to accelerate the economic development of the continent

by the year 2000, was abandoned soon after its adoption. All these were aimed to help Africa get out of the quagmire of economic underdevelopment. What is also true is that these previous attempts did not succeed, and therefore Africa has a strong reason to want NEPAD to succeed where others have failed. On a similar note, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa and Third World Network Africa meeting in Dakar and Accra, April 2002, in Bond (2002) indicated that history has shown that African initiatives, in similar format to that of NEPAD were introduced, but have not produced tangible results. Hence the question of what makes NEPAD a unique initiative, that it will not follow the route of its predecessors.

Solomon and du Plessis (2002) see NEPAD as a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic.

Taylor and Nel (2002) has described NEPAD as an African body of 'new hope' that will revitalize and improve the positioning of the continent into the global political economy. The two authors further noted that, the new partnership has given a new birth to the continent and could show to the world that Africa and the West can become equal partners in development.

Diescho (2002) on the other hand, has written how NEPAD is intended to be a holistic, comprehensive, integrated strategic framework for the socioeconomic development of the African continent, articulating the vision for Africa in the new millennium and serving as a statement of the problems facing the continent and a programme of action to resolve these

problems in order to reach the stated vision. It is a plan conceived and developed by African leaders to address key social, economic and political priorities in a coherent, balanced and a forward-looking manner.

Diescho (2002) continues that NEPAD is a commitment that African leaders are making to the African people and to the international community in order to place Africa on a path of sustainable growth. It is a commitment African leaders are making to accelerate the integration of the African continent into the global economy. It is also a framework for a new partnership with the rest of the world - a call to the rest of the world - to partner Africa, as it seeks to carve out, its own development on the basis of its own agenda and programme of action.

According to Mbumba (2003), the philosophical underpinnings of NEPAD are anchored on the rich cultural heritage of Africa such as mutual support and respect amongst neighbours. With NEPAD, African leaders are seeking renewal, a new beginning and the strategic direction for their continent in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) embodies a message of hope and the spirit of the new corps of progressive leaders who are committed to transform Africa into a continent of peace and harmony. The founders of NEPAD have also come to the realisation that it is not in the best interest of Africa to delink from the ongoing process of globalisation, economic integration and liberalisation of the global economic system.

Taylor and Nel (2002) showed that a 'wind of change' has swept across Africa. There has been renewed commitment among African Heads of State, notably President Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun

Obasanjo, Abdoulaye Wade and Abdelaziz Bouteflika. These leaders have created a platform of negotiations between Africa and developed nations to craft a new developmental agenda for Africa.

Mbumba (2003) is in agreement with Taylor and Nel (2002) when he remarked that, a new development agenda for Africa has been necessitated by the dismal failure of Africa's development that attributed to a variety of complex reasons among which one may mention lack of managerial and technological capacity, lack of political will, outside interference, bad economic and political policies, and corruption. Mbumba (2003) is of the opinion that it has become clear to many policy makers, academics and activists that it has become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reverse the consistently and persistently declining living standards of the African people, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, without radical and visionary intervention at a continental level. It is the failure of previous development programs that has propelled the idea of NEPAD as a viable alternative to all previous attempts and schemes.

Diescho (2002), has noted that when the current crop of African leaders embarked upon the NEPAD journey of re-inventing Africa, the reality that faced them and that informed and fuelled their activism is that in Africa, 340 million people or half the population live on less than US \$1 per day; "the mortality rate of children under five years of age is 140 per 1000, and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years and falling. Only 58 per cent of the population has access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 per cent (2002:3)".

Mbumba (2003) has written that many African countries had gained their independence during the Cold War Era. The continent of Africa during the Cold War Era was characterized by inter-African conflicts, internal civil strife, and increased spending on military hardware. Mbumba (2003) continues to argue that, this was accompanied by a deterioration in development and economic indicators, i.e. low average per capita income, population exceeding economic growth, poor national savings and loss of exports share in the world market, and currently the HIV/AIDS pandemic worsening the situation. Solomon and du Plessis (2002) add that NEPAD sets out to establish a comprehensive strategy, which could bring about the economic upliftment of the African continent.

Diescho (2002) further noted that, the NEPAD document begins with a description of Africa's position in the world today, emphasizing that Africa is a vital resource base for the world and plays an integral role in the world as a whole. NEPAD draws attention to the way in which Africa has been impoverished through colonialism, the legacy of colonialism, poor leadership and the Cold War. The world is described as currently experiencing an economic revolution, which NEPAD believes could provide the context and means for Africa's rebirth. NEPAD recognizes the problems associated with globalisation, but nevertheless believes that the present global economic situation is one that allows for African economies to be renewed.

According to Mokoena (2003), the underlying principles of NEPAD include African ownership and leadership, the development of the continent in terms of resources and economic integration, creating conditions that will attract both domestic and foreign investment and developing a

comprehensive integrated development programme for Africa, amongst others. Mokoena (2003) went on to list the objectives of NEPAD, which are:

- “To accelerate the eradication of poverty in Africa and reduce inequalities between Africa and the developed world
- To place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development
- To halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process
- To accelerate the empowerment of women” (2003:3).

To ensure that all the inspirations and objectives are attained, a part of the NEPAD-African Peer Review Mechanism has been created to conduct self-monitoring of African governments and to improve performance by African governments and economics.

Col Fakir (2004) indicates that NEPAD leaders adopted the African Peer Review Mechanism on 11 July 2002 as a key element in the attainment of the NEPAD’s objectives. The basis for the APRM is the assessment of the political, economic and institutional aspects of governance, which is conducted through a range of indicators. The APRM is introduced to ensure a comprehensive plan to improve African socioeconomic status. Its goals are to promote accelerated growth and sustainable development, eradicate widespread and severe poverty and halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process.

Ross Herbert (2003) has indicated that the APRM therefore is a self-monitoring mechanism voluntarily acceded to by member states of the AU with the aim of fostering the adoption of

policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated subregional and continental economic integration through sharing of experience and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building. It underscores the commitment to implement the codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance issued at the inaugural meeting of the new assembly in Durban on 08 July 2002.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

There is a concern that even though the Government of Namibia had accepted NEPAD, it did not accede initially to the African Peer Review Mechanism. The APRM is an aspect attached to NEPAD; hence it is confusing for Namibia to accept NEPAD and denounce the African Peer Review Mechanism. Namibia has met the criteria set out in NEPAD such as good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, accountability, transparency, free and fair elections etc. Although Namibia has met those criteria, the government has developed a negative attitude towards the African Peer Review Mechanism.

## **1.3. Research Question**

What is the African Peer Review Mechanism and why did the government of Namibia adopt a negative attitude towards it?

## **1.4. Research Objectives**

- To understand and analyse the history and background of the APRM and NEPAD

- To analyse the APRM structure, objectives and performance
- To find out why the government of Namibia did not want to accede to the APRM

### **1.5. The Importance of the Study**

It is very important to undertake a study on the APRM because the APRM, which is an aspect attached to NEPAD is a new thing. Many Namibians including policy makers do not understand the aspect and therefore this study will provide some clarity. The study will deepen the understanding of the history and background of APRM and provide an analysis of it, and try to give some reasons why Namibia is opposed to APRM. The study will also highlight as to what has been done so far with regard to the implementation of the APRM. NEPAD is a major developmental initiative for Africa, which is expected to promote economic growth, development and increased employment, reduce poverty and inequity, and increase African integration, enhance international competitiveness and increase export, among others. Hence the study will also look into these expected outcomes, analyse them and give a presentation from a Namibian perspective. Therefore, this study is important in that it could help, among other considerations, to contribute to the creation of new knowledge, which would lead to better understanding of NEPAD's APRM, and stimulate interest on the subject that may lead to further research.

### **1.6. Research Methodology**

This is a desk study in which information was obtained from secondary sources and augmented with a few primary sources. Primary sources comprised interviews with key players (officials) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NEPRU (Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit), and LaRRI



(Labour Resource and Research Institute), while the secondary sources were comprised of newspaper articles, internet, books, extensive NEPAD documentation and NEPAD presentation/discussion papers. The methodology is the historical and descriptive analysis of official documents on NEPAD, African Union (AU) and that of the Government of Namibia. The thesis also analyses input from civil society (trade unions, the business community and Non-Governmental Organisations), academic analyse, and interviews conducted with key Namibian government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **1.7. Limitations**

The Peer Review is an ongoing process and it is at the early stage in the countries in which the review is conducted. The first countries under review will not have finished the process at the completion of the thesis. The study focuses on the analysis of the early stage of the process (structure) rather than the end product of the process (performance). The study focuses specifically on the analysis of Namibia's official position on NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW**

The New Partnership for Africa's Development is the latest initiative aimed at bringing development to Africa. The literature review on the subject of NEPAD and the APRM covers official documents on NEPAD, the African Union (AU) and the Namibian Government, interest groups (trade unions, civil society, NGOs, business community), academic analyses and interviews with key Namibian government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **2.1. NEPAD**

#### **2.1.1. Official Documents on NEPAD**

The Summit of Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee on NEPAD indicated that NEPAD is a programme of the African Union aimed at improving the socioeconomic life of African countries. According to the Second Meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee on NEPAD held in Abuja, Nigeria, March 2002, NEPAD is a veritable mechanism for the reconstruction of Africa and a vehicle for the realization of the International Development Goals for the continent. Therefore, all African countries and the international community has been urged to renew their support and commitment to the programme in line with the mandate given to the Committee at the 37<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001. (<http://www.nepad.org>, 10 July 2005)

As a product of Africa, NEPAD has gained recognition and support both continentally and internationally. NEPAD is seen as a vehicle to bring development and forge a smart partnership based on mutual interest with the West. As such, all African countries should show their support

and commitments to the programme. For NEPAD to succeed, however, investment is needed from both the continent and the international community. As outlined in the document, NEPAD will make huge investments, amongst others, in areas of education, agriculture, infrastructure development and human development. The various Summit of Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee have been interested, especially in education, which is seen as key to development and facilitative of the yet unutilized full potential of the continent's resources.

According to the 2003 Policy Forum held in Accra, Ghana, the question is how the NEPAD framework will be translated at the level of each African country. While it is expected for NEPAD to facilitate and promote projects at the regional level, the objectives and growth targets of NEPAD can only be achieved if country level development strategies and programs are reformulated accordingly. The NEPAD framework document has also indicated that, the 7% annual growth rate needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) can only be pursued at the level of each country. Hence it is important to emphasize the individual country action as the first priority. This call for the realistic national development plans to be in line with the NEPAD framework, based on a clear understanding and targets to be achieved. ([www.ipacademy.org/programs/africacurr-pro-onstr-body.htm](http://www.ipacademy.org/programs/africacurr-pro-onstr-body.htm), 9 July 2004)

Starting from the First to the Fifth Communiqué issued at the Meetings of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee on NEPAD, there is a strong indication that African people lack ownership on NEPAD. The various summits held indicated the need to create ownership and popularize NEPAD with the African people. The Communiqué issued at the end of the Second Meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee on

NEPAD held in Abuja, Nigeria, March 2002 called for greater efforts at popularizing and deepening ownership of NEPAD in the continent of Africa. There is a need to promote NEPAD among all African countries in a manner that involves the leadership and the various segments of African societies. African ownership is central to the NEPAD process, which must be retained and strongly promoted so as to meet the legitimate aspirations of the African people. (<http://www.nepad.org>, 10 July 2004)

To this effect, the inaugural Meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee on NEPAD held in Abuja, Nigeria, October 2001 indicated the need to develop a strategic plan for marketing NEPAD at national, sub-regional, regional and international level. This will facilitate the mobilization of domestic support and private-public sector partnership in Africa as well as enhancing international partnership. However, the Communiqué issued at the end of the Second Meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of NEPAD, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2002, indicated that while taking cognizance that such partnership with the rest of the world are important, such partnerships must be based on mutual respect, dignity, shared responsibility and mutual accountability.

According to Graham (2003), the government of South Africa sees NEPAD as a programme that brings African people centred development. It is the program that will enable people of Africa to exploit and use the continent's natural resources and at the same time have a smart partnership with international community in order to create a better life for all. Yao Graham (2003) further indicate that Dr Nkosasana Dlamini Zuma, South African Foreign Affairs Minister has

emphasized that NEPAD presents Africa with a framework for the creation of peace, stability, democracy and good governance.

### **2.1.2. The Namibian official documents on NEPAD**

The Government of Namibia had responded to NEPAD through the speeches of founding President Sam Nuyoma, former Prime Minister Theo Ben Gurirab, and Foreign Affairs Ministers. The government had accepted NEPAD and reiterated its support and commitment to the programme. The Government sees NEPAD as an instrument created for the purpose of promoting the economic advancement and prosperity of the continent.

When former President Sam Nuuyoma visited India in February – March 2003, he indicated that NEPAD was essential for the economic reconstruction of the African continent. The president indicated the need of African ownership in the process of NEPAD, and the need to include all African governments and civil society organizations if NEPAD were to be successful. Theo Ben Gurirab, indicated that NEPAD economic targets should include capacity building, infrastructure development, land reform, agriculture and water, food security and rural development. There was a need for African governments to make NEPAD credible in order to reap maximum benefits from the initiative. The partnership of NEPAD should be a two way street based on mutual respect and mutual benefit. However, the then Prime Minister indicated that “foreign – imposed conditionalities, under the pretexts of good governance must be resisted vigorously”. (The Namibian, July 29 2002)

Founding President Sam Nuyoma again emphasized the fact that NEPAD needs to remain an African initiative supported by all Africans. He emphasized the need for development of the vast human resources on the continent so as to turn the continents' natural resources endowment into real opportunities for the Africans. For Nuyoma the important role played by regional and continental organizations such as SADC, COMESA, ECOWAS, the African Development Bank and others in developing the African continent should also be taken into account. NEPAD should therefore be developed with due recognition that there are other actors in the pursuit of Africa's development. (The Republikein, July 11 2002)

### **2.1.3. Interest groups on NEPAD**

The civil society organizations responded to NEPAD both in positive and negative ways. On the positive side, the civil society organizations see NEPAD as an instrument that will attract foreign direct investment and sustain economic growth. Dehesa (2003) has noted that the business community is of the opinion that NEPAD will benefit them greatly by finding new, more stable and more credible markets in which to expand business and investment. A conducive business environment for investment and growth in which NEPAD would be perceived, as an opportunity for linkages with the rest of the continent should be created. The same sentiment was shared by the World Economic Forum's Africa Economic Summit, held in Durban, South Africa 05 – 07 June 2002, and the Black Management Forum and Black Business Council – an independent business organization of South Africa. The emphasis of the business community is centred on a conducive environment for investments and access to markets.

Many civil society organizations came out in support of the political aspects of NEPAD, in particular the insistence on democracy, accountability and good and democratic governance. According to Chinyere (2002), there are also those civil society groups supporting the economic philosophy of NEPAD arguing that Africa is not properly integrated into the globalised world and that Africa's problem is that it does not attract sufficient foreign investment. The business community believe that development will come with increased foreign investment. Dehesa (2003) has shown based on evidence from Kenya, that Kenyan business people, alarmed by the evidence that Kenya's poor reputation for leadership and governance led to its sidelining during the period of the establishment of the NEPAD, took the initiative to approach former President Moi and insist on the establishment of a Kenyan NEPAD Secretariat with strong private sector drive. This was a good example of a business contribution to the implementation of the NEPAD.

Trevor Ngwane (2002) has reflected on how the civil society organizations have been left out during the process of formulation and implementation of NEPAD. The African people had not been consulted and therefore the initiative lacked African ownership. Ngwane and others of similar view that, the initiative is created by non – Africans for Africa. Deve (2003) has indicated that the lack of consultation has remained a thorny issue. The role of civil society is reduced to one merely supporting the initiative. In this regard, NEPAD takes a highly and discredited paternalistic approach to its people. By choosing this top down approach, NEPAD ignores lessons from past development experience. Even the World Bank and IMF, the designers of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have come around to accept that ownership of development strategies by people is critical to their success.

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa and Third World Network Africa meeting in Dakar and Accra, April 2002, in Bond (2005) has pointed out that, NEPAD ignores ‘people-centred approach’, this in turn, makes it difficult for African people to identify themselves with the NEPAD program. This has prevented the people of the continent to play a meaningful role in the conception, design and formulation of the NEPAD document. Rather the document is a reflection of “Mbekinsims”, “Wadenisms”, “Obasanjonisms” and “Bouteflikanisms” elitism as oppose to ‘people-centred end product’.

The Congress of South Africa Trade Union (COSATU) Central Executive Committee meeting, April 2002, in Bond (2002) noted that, NEPAD has been crafted and developed only through discussions between some of the African governments and outsiders, without the inputs from civil society organizations and the general African population. COSATU is of the opinion that there is a great need for NEPAD and trade unions to collaborate in order for NEPAD to bring change into the needs of workers and the poor in Africa.

On a similar note, the African Financing for Development Caucus meeting, January 2002, in Bond (2005) noted how the civil society organization have been left out and marginalized in the NEPAD program. They are of the opinion that, for NEPAD to move forward, it is crucial that, civil society organizations are taken on board and continuously join the consultative process during NEPAD summits, Workshops, Meetings and Discussions.

The INDABA civil society meeting in Johannesburg, May 2002, in Bond (2002) has raised their concern on the NEPAD economic strategy which is premised on principles of the International



Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – the mother of neo-liberal globalisation, plundering and exploitation of African resources and her people. This will aggravate the already fragile situation in Africa and push the continent into chronic of poverty and marginalisation. Joseph Stiglitz quoted in Bond (2005) reinforces this when he writes:

“Today, it is without dispute that the Washington consensus policies have pushed policies which enhance instability. Instability on the other hand is among the most important causes as well as manifestations of poverty”(2005:44)

The INDABA civil society in Bond (2002) are of the opinion that, the assistance programme to rescue Africa’s economies have been premised on a neo-liberal approach which is responsible for what is happening in Africa today, among others, indebtedness, poverty, trade injustices, instability and marginalisation. Similar sentiments have been expressed by Deve (2003) namely that, the civil society organizations are highly critical of what they see as the neo liberal economic prescription embedded in NEPAD which, according to them, smacked of a self – imposed structural adjustment programme.

The Statement by the Civil Society participants in the Canadian International Development Administration (CIDA) meeting on NEPAD, January 2002, in Bond (2002) has indicated similar concern on NEPAD’s economic strategy, which is based on the discredited package of IMF and World Bank. The economic strategies that were implemented by African states following the intervention of IMF and World Bank have led African economies into calamity, hence there are mixed feelings on the success of NEPAD if it were to follow a similar path.

#### **2.1.4. Namibian interest groups on NEPAD**

While many Namibian interest groups have welcomed NEPAD and the creation of the AU as steps in the right direction, some skeptics have questioned NEPAD. Several reservations were raised by organizations such as the Namibian NGO Forum (NANGOF), the Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NCCI), Sister Namibia and the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR). The NGO Forum stated that the inclusion of civil society in the planning and implementation of NEPAD remains crucial if NEPAD were to succeed. The NCCI emphasized the importance of including business in NEPAD, as it is the principle drive for the success of NEPAD. Sister Namibia, mainly a gender and human rights lobby NGO advocated the inclusion of women in the NEPAD process as they bore the brunt of poverty on the continent. The NSHR argued that NEPAD created a favourable environment for the protection of human rights on the continent. (The New Era, 5 – 11 July 2002)

Some interest groups in Namibia such as the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) share the same sentiments to those of their counterparts in Africa. They argue that NEPAD's economic strategy is no different from that of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Being based on principles of liberalization and privatization, NEPAD could worsen the unemployment situation. Johan Dahl and Rehabeam Shilimela (2002) claimed that NEPAD would not benefit Namibia. They argued have indicated that NEPAD has very little to offer to Namibia. Since Namibia scores very well on both political governance and sound economic performance, the expected increase in capital inflows to Namibia as a result of improved governance and sound macro-economic is therefore not expected. Instead of relying on NEPAD to generate additional FDI for Namibia, the country may need to rely more on official rather than

private capital inflow. Namibia is also not likely to benefit from further debt relief because of her low foreign debt status.

Notwithstanding the above, Shilimela (2004) has argued that from a broader perspective, there are many benefits to be reaped from NEPAD. These include improvement in governance, the increased credibility of policies, an improved regional neighbourhood, the diversification of production and the mobilization of resources. Shilimela (2004) further states that if NEPAD is to be a success, Namibia will obviously benefit, so too, other regional countries. The benefits include that Namibia's infrastructure can be improved and this will make intra-regional trade easier and more profitable. The highways like the Trans-Kalahari and Trans-Caprivi will be better utilized and further extended to inter-link the whole region. Communication networks will make doing business cheaper all over Africa. For instance, Namibians will be able to call Senegal directly rather than through France, as is the case at present.

The interest groups in Namibia like NEPRU and LaRRI felt that lack of consultation with African people on the NEPAD process will hamper its progress. Karuumbe (2003) has indicated that, although NEPAD is supposed to be a development agenda for Africans by Africans, it is ironic that the general African populace does not know the content and intention of NEPAD. African leaders particularly those who spearheaded the NEPAD process – Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade - took the approach that “we know what our people want and we can do it for them”(2003,22). This approach raises serious questions about the ownership of the process and content of NEPAD as well as the development success that NEPAD is expected to deliver. The same sentiment was echoed by Shilimela (2004) namely that, there is little

knowledge about NEPAD among civil society. The Johannesburg Conference on NEPAD and Civil Society held on 1-3 November 2003 has emphasized the need to develop strategies to bring the NEPAD closer to civil society organizations.

#### **2.1.5. Intellectuals/academics on NEPAD**

The intellectuals and academics like Dot Keet, Joseph Diescho, Ian Taylor, Ross Herbert, and others see NEPAD as a programme of the African Union. NEPAD is a collective determination to promote African unity and the political and socioeconomic integration of the African continent. The approach of intellectuals/academics to NEPAD is both positive and negative. There are those favouring the programme and there are those opposed to it. Although they acknowledge lack of public consultation in NEPAD process, they are of the opinion that NEPAD is a powerful potential force for change in Africa. Cilliers (2003) has indicated that even though some African leaders crafted NEPAD behind closed doors, African leaders have signed many highly specific commitments to deliver good governance, independent electoral commissions, effective and independent anti – corruption agencies, fixed terms of offices for presidents, public consultations in drafting development policies and respect for human rights, amongst others. Cilliers (2003) is of the opinion that NEPAD has created opportunity to which African people will be able to hold their leaders accountable to those commitments enshrined in the NEPAD document. In all, these sentiments are shared by academics such as Diescho (2003) and Herbert (2002)

Academics also raised concern of how Zimbabwe poses a challenge to NEPAD. Given the fact that Zimbabwe violates NEPAD principles notably those relating to good governance, respect for

human rights, and free and fair elections. Cherry (2002) has indicated that the issue of Zimbabwe has already served as a reality check for many of Africa's development partners, in terms of their expectations around NEPAD and the prospects of the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism. The same sentiment is shared by academics such as Lobaido (2002), Cilliers (2003), and Herbert (2003)

Academics also argue that NEPAD is a programme that has been formulated outside the continent and been imposed on African people. The African people were never consulted and did not participate in the formulation strategy of NEPAD. Sharing similar sentiments with interest group such as COSATU, Ngwane (2002) indicated that NEPAD has not represented the will of African people from the onset. The social movement in Africa, among others, civil society, churches, political parties and parliament were never consulted. NEPAD was firstly marketed to outsiders before African themselves did not know anything about it. What makes matter more worse is that, any changes to NEPAD have been from the consultation between African elites (The four African Presidents who are the architects of NEPAD) and West. Ngwane (2002) made a reference that " For example, during the G8 Summit in Genoa where Mbeki was told to include 'good governance' in his plan. The G8 treated him with utter contempt, giving him only five minutes to make his presentation before sending him off to do his homework"(2002:60).

Notwithstanding the above, NEPAD does not belong to Africa, but is a neo liberal strategy. According to ILRIG (2003) neo-liberalism refers to a set of economic and social policies started by the government of Margaret Thatcher in Britain after 1979. In terms of these policies, the free market will ensure the greatest good if as many restrictions on the free movement of money as

possible are removed. Critics in Africa have argued that neo liberalism has worsened poverty in Africa by amongst other things, taking away the power of government to direct the movement of investment to ensure development.

Intellectuals such as Dot keen (2002), Johannes Tsheola (2002) and others has seen NEPAD as a South Africa's "thing" through which the country tries to serve its interest with the West (to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to itself) and insert the continent into a globalised world. The evidence in this regard is indicated by the South Africa economic hegemonic power in the continental economy. Tsheola (2002) is of the opinion that the insertion of Africa into a globalised world will only make the continent to rely on FDI instead of preparing the continent to be independent and self-reliant. To him, NEPAD is an agent of globalisation rather an agent of development. "The effects of that form of globalisation of Africa has been to allow a political space for external forces, particularly the Bretton Wood Institutions, to establish a network of institutions that came to reduce the State's capacity to discharge their social welfare responsibilities. Emptied of their capacity of integration for interdependence, African state did little more than wait and hope for globalisation to deliver FDI" (2002:2).

Trevor Ngwane (2002) has indicated that, Africa had suffered enough over the past decade from plunderism, robbery, slavery, colonialism, diseases, hunger, poverty and lack of control over African's resources and destiny. Therefore, Africa does not need to suffer from another tragedy of NEPAD neo-liberalism approach. Yash Tondon (2002) has noted with concern the neo-liberal path applauded by NEPAD in its economic strategy. To him, this will require African state's economies to be integrated into the global economy which will not be to the benefit of Africa.

Adding to this, Ngwane (2002) has indicated how the integration of African economies into the global economy will be detrimental and further marginalise the continent. Ngwane (2002) had shown his support for Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and other Third World scholars who have supported delinking African economies instead of integration and indicated that: “integration leads to growing poverty and underdevelopment because the structure of insertion is designed to benefit the rich, they get richer and the poor get poorer” (2002:62)

Mbaye (2002) has echoed the same sentiment when he pointed out that NEPAD is a “bogus programme” recycling the failed development strategies and policies of the Bretton Wood Institutions, whose real objectives were to reinforce the productive patterns inherited from the colonial times under the guise of the economic theory of comparative advantage. While Melber (2002) compares NEPAD as an old wine in a new bottle. Tetteh Hormeku and Gerry Barr (2002) have reminded African people and governments that assistance programmes from outside under the pretext of Structural Adjustment Programs promoted by World Bank and IMF “have weakened and enfeebled many of Africa’s national economies and government (2002:75).

Despite its faults and limitations, NEPAD remains a powerful potential force for change in Africa. Even though they crafted plans behind closed doors, African leaders have signed many highly specific commitments to deliver good governance, independent electoral commissions, effective and independent anti-corruption agencies, fixed terms of office for presidents, public consultations in drafting development policies, and respect for human rights, among others. Now is the time for the African public to seize the opportunity created by NEPAD and truly hold leaders accountable to those pledges.

## **2.2. APRM**

### **2.2.1. Official documents on the APRM**

The official documents on the APRM indicate that it is an integral part of NEPAD. The APRM is seen as a mechanism that will ensure that African countries do not deviate far from the good principles enshrined in the NEPAD document. It is aimed for African countries to learn from each other, share best practices and experiences and to rectify weaknesses. The Communiqué issued at the end of the Fifth Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) on NEPAD, Abuja, Nigeria, November 2002 has indicated the primary objectives of the APRM. The APRM is there for African countries to learn from each other and to create constituencies within the continent and abroad for its shared vision and approaches to socio-economic development and political transformation.

([www.nepad.org.2002/files/documents\\_1156.pdf](http://www.nepad.org.2002/files/documents_1156.pdf), 10 May 2004)

At the 2003 Policy Forum on NEPAD held in Accra, Ghana, the APRM Secretariat in effect affirmed that African leaders are prepared not only to enter into the commitment it requires, but also to engage in a process of peer review and monitoring of performance. They indicated that the APRM is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by African members of the African Union (AU) for the purpose of self-monitoring. The APRM will foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional integration of the African continent. The same sentiment is shared by the Communiqué issued at the end of meetings of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee on NEPAD (2001,2002,2003)



South African Foreign Affairs Minister - Dr Nkosasana Dlamini Zuma, (SARPN 2003) has indicated that the APRM is not an instrument for punishment or exclusion, but rather it is a mechanism to identify strong points or areas, share them and to rectify weakness. The APRM is a critical instrument for advancing reforms in governance and socioeconomic development and in building capacity to implement these reforms. She reiterated that it is important to always view the APRM within the context of NEPAD as an instrument of monitoring and evaluating the progress in improving governance and development on the continent.

The various Summits/Meetings of Heads of State and government Implementation Committee on NEPAD have raised concern over the extent to which African leaders are prepared to hold each other accountable and over governments that have no intention of acceding to APRM. Modise (2004) has emphasized this position by making reference to the government of Botswana which has specifically indicated that APRM is not necessary, given the fact that Botswana already has proper mechanisms in place, e.g. well established system of domestic evaluation and its economic performance is routinely reviewed by the IMF and World Bank and other international institutions.

### **2.2.2. Namibian official documents on the APRM**

The Government of Namibia has responded to the APRM through the speeches of former President of the Republic of Namibia, the former Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and Parliamentarians. Aluteni (2004) has noted that the Government of Namibia has not responded favourably to the APRM. While Vries (2003) opined that the Government has viewed the

APRM as an initiative aimed at satisfying the interests of the West. It is indicated that the APRM was not part of NEPAD initially, but was added as part of conditionality. It means those African countries that are not living up to the expectations of the West will not benefit from NEPAD.

Former President Sam Nuyoma, like some other African leaders, is skeptical about the peer review mechanism. At a SWAPO (ruling party) Elders' Council meeting held on June 2002, the president warned people against "succumbing to foreign ideologies and influences" through structures such as NEPAD. Rejecting the notion of good governance, democracy and human rights Nuyoma said that "these people (former colonizers) cannot teach anyone anything about these virtues as they enslaved and colonised people in the past". (The Namibian, 29 July 2002)

The Government of Namibia has made its anti-APRM sentiments clear. This has been quoted in Ellis (2003), when Theo Ben Gurirab publicly consigned the peer review mechanism to the dustbin of history as a "sham, unworkable notion and disqualified it as a misleading new name for the old, discredited structural adjustment fiasco. The Prime Minister is of the opinion that APRM is neo – liberalism and will encourage Western countries to cluster African leaders into "good guys and bad guys". The same sentiment was shared by the Former Foreign Affairs Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya and his Deputy, Dr Kaire Mbuende quoted in Mageria (2004)

As with Botswana, the Namibian Government feels that it already has adequate mechanisms in place. According to Mageria (2004), the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya indicated that the government is accountable to its constitution and electorate and therefore it does not need external auditors.

### **2.2.3. Interest groups on the APRM**

The interest groups responded both in positive and negative ways. On a positive note, the interest group organizations came out in support of the political aspects of NEPAD, in particular the insistence on democracy, accountability and good and democratic governance. They indicated that APRM is a positive move that will hold African leaders accountable to each other and to the African public on principles of democratic rule and respect for the rule of law, just to mention a few.

Spice (2002), put forward the opinion of the business community who proposes that APRM should be an independent body that is free from political interference. It would have to be constituted from eminent, independent individuals selected in consultation with the business community and other civil society organizations. They indicated that the national and international community, through larger capital inflows, should immediately support countries that obtain good outcomes on APRM, so that the other countries that have not been able yet to achieve good reviews can find strong incentives to raise their governance stand and join them. The same sentiments is shared by Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in Hicks (2002)

In comparison Disthwanelo (2003), has indicated the civil society organization's opinion that the credibility of the APRM process must be guaranteed by ensuring that it is conducted in a transparent manner involving civil society organizations and independent monitors. The extremely limited involvement to date of African civil society groups in the design of NEPAD and formulation of the APRM has been to the detriment of the institution itself and public perceptions of it both in Africa and abroad. Disthwanelo further indicated that the deepening

crises in Zimbabwe have already had serious negative effects on the surrounding regions. Those countries and institutions currently considering their provision of economic assistance to Africa through NEPAD and APRM are undoubtedly watching the African response to the Zimbabwe crisis.

#### **2.2.4. Namibian interest groups on the APRM**

The interest groups in Namibia such as LaRRI, NHRS, NEPRU and others have a mixed feeling on APRM. Like official documents on APRM, interest groups indicated that APRM is a voluntary mechanism to which African countries acceded. It is an instrument that allows African countries to learn from each other, share best practices and experience and rectify weakness in the process. Rehabeam Shilimela (2004) has indicated that the mandate of APRM is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political and democratic governance values, codes and standards contained in the declarations on democracy and political governance. Shilimela (2004) continues that an effective and credible system of the Peer Review will provide more accurate information about Africa and improve the negative image of the continent, which is currently portrayed in the international press as a continent in crises.

However, the interest group like LaRRI and NEPRU are of opinion that African leaders are not prepared to hold each other accountable, citing the case of Zimbabwe. Barney Karuumbe (2003) has indicated that APRM had to undergo a serious test during the crises in Zimbabwe especially during the highly disputed presidential election of 2002, which ensured president Robert Mugabe another five years term in office. Kuteeue (2004) has indicated that Namibia's

continued reluctance to embrace the APRM is probably due to the love for Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe on the part of the political leaders.

Rehabeam Shilimela (2004) has noted that NEPAD's APRM has been tested and failed in the following areas. Firstly, the South Africa Government was asked by major donors to condemn Zimbabwe on its internal crises, but this had not happened. Secondly, the military conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which Rwanda participated militarily despite being a member of NEPAD and no caution was given to Rwanda. Thirdly, is the removal of the political and human rights review from NEPAD's APRM. Lastly, NEPAD has used the five AU groupings, which do not fully correspond with the Regional Economic community groupings on the continent.

The challenge for NEPAD and the concept of Peer Review is who has the moral high ground of saying what against whom. Barney Karuuombe (2003) further indicated that "the sad reality is that most of the current African leaders do not have the moral high ground that would allow them to throw stones at each other or anyone else"(2003:25).

#### **2.2.5. Intellectuals/Academics on the APRM**

Intellectuals and academics like Jackie Cilliers, Joseph Diescho, Ayesha Kajee and others, felt that, the APRM is a positive step towards democracy and governance in Africa. They indicated that APRM is potentially the most innovative initiative ever to emerge from Africa. Its purpose is to build more stable and prosperous countries. That means sharing ideas that works, identifying deficiencies and rectify them.

Ross Hebert (2003), although sharing the same sentiment, went further that APRM system is not intended to serve as an instrument for exclusion or punishment. The intention of peer review mechanism is to supply the information and establish the systems, which would make it possible for African countries to advise and support one another.

Some academics and intellectuals raised concern over the voluntary nature of the mechanism. They indicated that given the voluntary nature of the mechanism, African countries with a worse record of democracy would avoid it. Landsberg (2003) emphasized that the APRM is a voluntary plan, there will be major problems with compliances, obligations and commitments. In practice, the APRM is likely to be characterized by many pitfalls, many changes and many setbacks.

They also feel that APRM is a conditionality attached to NEPAD by the West. APRM will further interests of the West and violate the AU principle of “non – interference”. Zrimwabagabo (2004) has indicated that APRM will legitimise Western conditionalities of good governance and free market based economic policies for donor funding by affording an African stamp of authenticity. The same sentiment is echoed by Mathoho (2003) and David Lamba in Zrimwabagabo (2004)

Diescho’s (2002) critique of NEPAD is its peer review mechanism, which he charged could be like “brotherly meetings of leaders who know and understand each others problems” (2002:52). African leaders may not have the courage nor the moral high ground to challenge each other on human rights or governance issues, which will render the peer review mechanism worthless. Henning Melber (2002) on the other hand, has indicated that peer review mechanism allows

interference in internal affairs of individual African countries. This will be problematic, as Diescho (2002) noted that, the AU's constitution has encouraged non-interference in internal affairs of other African states. Interference is only permitted in cases of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. For Melber (2002), the peer review mechanism will be hampered, amongst others, by its exclusion of human rights groups, lawyers and churches amongst others. Graham (2002) has added that, the confusion over the APRM is highlighting the dangers inherent in the failure of the programme to roof their continental development vision in a broad-based and credible democratic process.

Graham (2002) is of the opinion that, from the beginning, African reformers – South African President Thabo Mbeki, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika have undermined the credibility of NEPAD and the peer review process now emerging from it. They have oversold it, raising impossible expectations about its ability to fix what are profound social, economic and political problems. They have also hidden the process behind closed doors. Officials have given out very little information to the public or the press, feeding widespread skepticism.

### **2.3. Summary**

Literature review of official documents and debates among interest groups and academics and intellectuals indicate both positive and negative views on the programme of African Union, NEPAD. The different viewpoint that have raised at various platforms by different stakeholders on NEPAD is more on substantive matters that are associated with Western style of Bretton Wood Institutions that have led economies of some African countries into calamity.

There are divergent and congruent views that have been reflected on different themes of the programme. On the positive note, literature reviews of both groups indicated that NEPAD is seen as a positive step to move Africa forward. The attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular areas such as education, health, tourism, agriculture, infrastructure development, poverty eradication, just to mention a few, are seen as positive steps to remove African states from “trap” of bad socioeconomic performance. The programme is also seen, as a mechanism that will market African states to the whole world and make an African issues that have never discussed at global level to be discussed at that level.

To the contrary, some interest groups such as NEPRU indicated that NEPAD would not be of great benefit to some African countries such as Namibia, which already scored very well in areas of political governance and economic performance. However this statement has to be treated with caution to a certain extent. Given that, some of the African governments such as Namibia are still nascent states and still in the process of learning. By this way, these countries could project good images and create credibility to the outside world and encourage their neighbour to be positive about NEPAD.

Literature reviews of both groups have raised concerns about the way by which the programme bypassed the African people during the formulation and implementation stages. They felt that African people have never been consulted and as a result lack ownership of the process. The programme was first marketed to the outside world before even the African people learned about it. They felt that NEPAD is a programme created by non – Africans for Africa and has been imposed on them. They also see NEPAD as neo – colonialism, whereby the West will try to



recolonise Africa again and dictate what Africa should do. Hence, there is a call particularly from some official sources to resist vigorously foreign imposed conditionality under the pretext of good governance such as NEPAD. They also indicated that if NEPAD is to succeed, greater efforts of popularizing and deepening ownership of NEPAD on the continent of Africa should be undertaken vigorously. The programme must be based on a two-way partnership rather than the other way round.

What raised more eyebrows is the African Peer Review Mechanism. The APRM requires African countries to review each other's performance, identify deficiencies and provide solutions to rectify what is not appropriate. While some interest groups and academics/intellectuals support APRM and political aspects of it, some official documents are highly skeptical about it. They indicated that APRM is there to serve the interest of the West and want to recolonise Africa again. "The West cannot teach African people good governance and democracy as they have enslaved and colonized African people in the past, and that Africa will never be colonized again" said Sam Nuyoma, former President of Namibia ([The Namibian](#), 29 July 2002). It is further indicated that the APRM was not initial part of NEPAD, but was insisted to be there by donors as part of conditionality. The APRM may cluster African leaders into "good guys and bad guys" and to them this will divide Africa.

Literature reviews of both groups have raised similar concerns that the voluntary nature of the mechanism might delay the progress of NEPAD's benefit to be realized within the expected time frame. Given the fact that countries are at different stages of performance in various areas, some countries will take a longer time to sign up or some might even not sign up. Some countries such

as Botswana and Namibia have indicated that they already have proper mechanisms in place such as the constitutions, elections and well established systems of domestic evaluation and economic performance, which are routinely reviewed by both external and internal institutions. These make the APRM redundant, hence there is no need to accede to it. There is concern about the extent to which African countries are prepared to interfere in the internal affairs of each other and whether African leaders are prepared to criticise each other publically, given the prevailing circumstances. Literature reviews indicated that the case of Zimbabwe is a testimony. While the West were criticizing President Robert Mugabe for violating NEPAD principles of good governance, respect for human rights, free and fair election etc, most African leaders were praising him.

## **CHAPTER 3: THE STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM**

*The African Peer Review is a unique feature of NEPAD that signals the commitment of African leaders.* (Available at <http://www.gca-cma.org/epolicy.htm>. Accessed on 10/09/2004)

### **3.1. Introduction**

The 37<sup>th</sup> Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the New African Initiative, subsequently renamed NEPAD, in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia (Cilliers 2002:2). At that point NEPAD officially became a programme of the OAU and the Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government became the governing structure of NEPAD to which it reports annually. Later that year, in October 2001, the first meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee met in Abuja, Nigeria and agreed that African leaders should set up parameters for good governance to guide their activities at both the political and economic levels, hence an appropriate peer review mechanism and a code of conduct was considered. The APRM was adopted at Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC) meeting in March 2002. The third (HSIC) meeting in Rome, June 2002 subsequently approved a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. Both the APRM and the Declaration were eventually submitted to the African Union (AU) founding Summit in Durban as the final governing authority of NEPAD. The summit encouraged all member states of the AU to adopt the Declaration and accede to APRM. ([www.iss.coza/Af/Reg Org.nepad/index/index.html](http://www.iss.coza/Af/RegOrg.nepad/index/index.html), 10 Aug. 2004)

### **3.2. What is African Peer Review Mechanism?**

The APRM base document (AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex 2) defined the African Peer Review Mechanism as an instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union as an

African self-monitoring mechanism. ([WWW.NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI](http://WWW.NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI), accessed on 01/02/2004)

Chris Landsberg (2003) has asserted that the OECD defines peer review as the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal(s) of helping the reviewed state improve its policy making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards and principles. Borrowing almost verbatim from the OECD, The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) said the APRM is designed to help the designated state improve its policy – making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards, principles, codes and other agreed commitments. It is just not UNECA or the recent APRM in which one can find established standards, principles and other agreed commitments. There are also bodies such as SADC, AU etc, which have established certain standards i.e. SADC election guidelines and other agreed commitments onto which African states are being gauged and benchmarked against.

Jakkie Celliers (2002) has pointed out that APRM is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by African members of the African Union for the purpose of self-monitoring. A concerned country has to sign up to the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, and undertake to submit to and facilitate periodic peer review and generally be guided by agreed parameters for good governance at both the political and economic levels. APRM will foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional integration of

the African Continent. This will ensure that the APRM is independent, effective, professional and credible.

Rehabeam Shilimela (2003) has noted that the African Peer Review Mechanism is an aspect attached to NEPAD to ensure that African countries adhere to policies laid down in NEPAD's documents. This requires countries to be subjected to review by other African member states to ensure that civil war, human rights abuse, lack of transparency and accountability, lack of good governance and corruption are curtailed.

Ross Hebert (2003) has added that the APRM is generally considered the most innovative aspect of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). It represents an ambitious attempt by key African countries to raise themselves out of the cycle of poverty and instability to which the continent has been condemned, by taking responsibility for the maintenance of appropriate standards of conduct.

### **3.3. The Purpose of APRM**

Henning Melber (2003) has indicated that the New Partnership for Africa's Development onto which APRM is attached is a new initiative aimed to bring about good governance, democracy, transparency, accountability, free and fair electoral process, respect for human rights and other essential attributes necessary to attract foreign investment and facilitate economic growth, development and improve the living standards. Murithi (2005) see APRM as a commitment to self-monitoring and accountability for promoting inclusive governance and institutional government by relying upon peer pressure in which governments monitor each other. This

process is inviting governments and their citizens to take part in a self-assessment process in order to progressively move towards the desired objectives.

The APRM's primary purpose is to foster the adoption of policies, standard and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experience and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building. "Problem in one country hinder success in other countries even if they are a far away, hence the need for collective responsibility to uplift all" (Interview 2004). That necessitate the importance of APRM and to get out of some of the problems such as bad governance and corruption, just to mention a few.

The ultimate goal of the APRM is for all participating countries to accelerate their progress towards adopting and implementing the priorities and programmes of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), achieving the mutually agreed objectives and compliance with best practices in respect of each of the areas of governance and development. This can only be achieved through the sustained efforts of the country itself, involving all stakeholders. The official APRM guidelines (2003) requires that each country carefully develops a programme of action with time bound objectives, and linked to national budgets to guide all stakeholders in the actions required by all governments, private sector, and civil society to achieve the country's vision. (NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, accessed on 01/02/2004)

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism. The mandate of the APRM is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standard contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The APRM is the mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member government. ([www.au2002.gov.za](http://www.au2002.gov.za), accessed on 2004 July 12)

According to Stals (2005:5) the overviews of countries should cover the following four basic policy disciplines:

- The democratisation process and good governance at the political level;
- Socio-economic development providing for the basic needs of people such as education, shelter and health care;
- Macro-economic policies, including fiscal, monetary, trade and labour policies;
- Corporate governance, including licensing, regulation, competition policy, ownership protection, solvency and liquidation rules and good corporate governance.

The APRM aims to promote inclusive governance informed by the principles of accountability, transparency and popular participation. The principle of the APRM is that every review exercise carried out under the authority of the mechanisms must be technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation. Participation in the process is open to all member states of the African Union. After adoption of the declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and corporate governance by the African Union, countries wishing to participate in the APRM will

notify the chairman of the NEPAD Heads of States and Government Implementation Committee. This will entail an undertaking to submit to periodic peer reviews, as well as to facilitate such reviews and be guided by agreed parameters for good political governance and good economic and corporate governance.

( [www.au2002.go.za](http://www.au2002.go.za), accessed on 2004 May 11)

The African Peer Review Mechanisms requires members to be scrutinized by other member states. This would mean that Kenya, for instance, could be examined by such countries as Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda and Burundi, in which case a judgement would be entered on issues to do with governance, economy and social welfare, amongst many others. ([http:// all Africa.com/stories](http://allAfrica.com/stories), accessed on 2004 July 12)

#### **3.4. APRM Organizational Component**

Smunda Mokoena (2003) has indicated that, the African Peer Review Mechanism organization and processes was approved by Head of State Government Implementing Committee on 09 March 2003. The APRM is comprised of different organisational components such as African Peer Review Forum (Participating Head of State and Government), African Peer Review Panel (Panel of Eminent Persons), The African Peer Review Secretariat, African Peer Review Team (Country Review Team) and African Peer Review Partner institutions.

Chris Stals (2005) pointed out that the operation of the APRM is directed and managed by a panel of between five and seven eminent persons selected and appointed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Review Mechanism. The members of the panel are Africans



who have distinguished themselves in careers that are considered relevant to the work of the APRM. In addition, members of the panel are persons of high moral stature that have demonstrated commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism.

According to Stals (2005:5), the following seven persons were appointed to the panel in May 2003:

- Ms. Marie-Angelique Savane (Senegal, Chairperson)
- Prof. Adebayo Adebeye (Nigeria)
- Amb Bethuel Abdu Kiplagat (Kenya)
- Dr. Graca Simbine Machel (Mozambique)
- Mr. Mourand Medeki (Algeria)
- Dr. Dolothy L. Njeuma (Cameroon)
- Dr. Chris Stals (South Africa)

The selection and appointment of these APRM panel were made on the basis of their background and experience related to the work of APRM. Their selection and appointment should not be seen to represent a particular country or national government, neither serving certain vested interest.

In addition to the criteria mentioned above, the Heads of State and Government participating in the Review Mechanism should ensure that the APRM panel they are selecting and appointing has expertise in the areas of political governance, macro economic management, public financial management and corporate governance. The composition of the panel should also reflect broad

regional balance, gender equity and cultural diversity. (African Peer Review Mechanism Base Document (AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex II], 2003)

Members of the panel will serve up to four years and will retire by rotation. One of the members of the panel will be appointed Chairman by the Heads of State and Government of participating countries. The Chairperson will serve for a maximum period of five years. The criteria for appointment to the position of Chairperson will be the same as for other members of the Panel, except that the candidate will be a person with a proven leadership record in one of the following areas; Government, public administration, development and private sector. (African Peer Review Mechanism Base Document (AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex II], 2003)

The panel will exercise the oversight function for the review process, in particular to ensure the integrity of the process. Its mission and duties will be outlined in a charter, which will also spell out reporting arrangements to the Heads of State and Government of participating countries. The Charter will secure the independence, objectivity and integrity of the panel. The panel will be supported by a competent Secretariat that has both the technical capacity to undertake the analytical work that underpins the peer review process and also conforms to the principles of the APRM. The function of the Secretariat will include maintaining extensive database information on political and economic developments in all participating countries, preparation of background documents for the Peer Review Teams, proposing performance indicators and tracking performance of individual countries. ([www.isa-africa.com/nepad/nepad-aprm](http://www.isa-africa.com/nepad/nepad-aprm) pdf, 2004 May 11)

At the point of formally acceding to the peer review process, each state should clearly define a time bound programme of action for implementing the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate governance, including periodic review. There four types of review are:

- The first country review is the base review that is carried out within eighteen months of a country becoming a member of the APRM process.
- Then a periodic review takes place every two to four years.
- In addition to these, a member country can, for its own reasons, ask for a review that is not part of the periodically mandated reviews.
- Early signs of impending political or economic crisis in a member country would also be sufficient cause for instituting a review. Such a review can be called for by participating heads of states and government in a spirit of helpfulness to the government concerned.

( <http://www.au2002.gov.za>, 2004 May 11)

### **3.5. The APRM Process**

Rehabeam Shilimela (2003) has indicated that the APRM process will entail periodic reviews of the policies and practices of participating states to ascertain progress being made towards achieving mutually agreed goals and compliance with agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards outlined in the declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and corporate governance.

To facilitate the measuring of performance and progress, the following components have been identified in each of the four substantive areas of the Declaration (democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio – economic

development), key objectives, standards, criteria and indicators. Key objectives that have been prioritised in the NEPAD Framework Document and the Declaration are defined as specifically as possible. Then the codes and standards that are referenced in the Declaration are those agreed to by the AU with regards to the area and key objectives of democracy and political governance and those that are internationally recognised with regard to other areas and the key objectives of governances and socio economic development. (NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, 01/02/2004)

Many of these codes or standards include detailed tools, templates and methodologies for self-assessment of compliance by countries. The criteria are whether the government has taken the necessary steps to achieve the objective and attain the standards and the effects or results of these actions. Criteria have been articulated in terms of questions about these matters and can also be seen as issues to be addressed and reference points for targets to be established. Indicators are used as the means by which it is determined whether the criteria have been met. (NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, 01/02/2004)

Rehabeam Shilimela (2003) adds that the overall responsibility of APRM is vested with the member states of AU, who have voluntarily chosen to participate in the process. Reviews of individual states will start with a careful analysis of the governance and development environment in the countries-drawn heavily on the existing country self assessment-a country visit by a country review team, discussion of the review findings by the participating heads of states and the respective government and a formal and public tabling of the peer review reports. Reviews will be made regularly and at signs of impending political and economic crisis.

In contrast to APRM, Landsberg (2003) made reference to OECD state's peer examinations that are conducted on a non-adversarial basis, and they rely heavily on mutual trust among the states involved in the review, as well as their shared confidence in the process. The peer review can give rise to peer pressure through for example (i) a mix of formal recommendations and informal dialogues by peer countries. (ii) public scrutiny, comparisons and in some instances even ranking among countries, and (iii) the impact of all the above on domestic opinion, national administration and policy makers.

The Peer Review process will spur countries to consider seriously the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on neighboring countries. Bearing in mind that African countries are at different levels of development, on joining the mechanism, a country will be assessed (the base review) and a timetable (programme of action) for effecting progress toward achieving the agreed standards and goals must be drawn up by the state in question, taking into account the particular circumstances of that state. Participating countries will encourage and support each other and exercise constructive peer dialogue and persuasion where necessary to ensure that all countries achieve full compliance by a mutually agreed date. ([www.isa-africa.com/nepad/nepad-aprm.pdf](http://www.isa-africa.com/nepad/nepad-aprm.pdf), 10 August 2004)

The five stages (Mokoena 2003) of the African Peer Review (APR) process are:

Stage 1: "Information gathering and Draft Programme of Action

Stage 2: Country Review Visit

Stage 3: Preparation of APR Team's Report

Stage 4: Consideration of the APR Team's Country Review Report

## Stage 5: Implementation and Public Release of the APRM Report”

Mokoena (2003) went further to describe these stages of peer review process in detail as follows:

Stage 1: This involves a study of the political, economic and corporate governance and development environment in the country to be reviewed, based principally on up to date background documentation prepared by the APRM Secretariat and material provided by national, sub-regional and international institutions.

Stage 2: The review team will visit the concerned country where its priority order of business will be to carry out the widest possible range of consultations with the government, officials, political parties, parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organisation (including the media, academia, trade union, business, professional bodies)

Stage 3: This is the preparation of the team report. The report is prepared on the basis of the briefing materials prepared by the APRM Secretariat and the information provided in country by official and unofficial sources during the wide-ranging consultations and interactions with all stakeholders. The report must be measured against the applicable political, economic and corporate governance commitments made and the programme of action.

The Team’s draft report is first discussed with the government concerned. Those discussions are designed to ensure the accuracy of the information and to provide the government with an opportunity both to react to the Team’s findings and to put forward its own views on how the

identified shortcomings may be addressed. These responses of the government will be appended to the Team's report.

The Team's report will need to be clear on a number of points in instances where problems are identified. Is there the will on the part of the Government to take the necessary decisions and measures to put right what is identified to be amiss? What resources are necessary to take corrective measures? How much of these can the government itself provide and how much is to come from external sources? Given the necessary resources, how long will the process of rectification take?

Stage 4: This stage begins when the team report is submitted to the participating Heads of State and government through the APRM Secretariat. The Panel of Eminent Persons takes over the process during this stage, writing recommendations for policy reforms based on the findings of the review team. The heads of state in the APR Forum then discuss the panel's recommendations with the leaders of the country under review.

Stage 5: Six months after the report has been considered by the Heads of State and government of the participating member countries, it should be formally and publicly tabled in key regional and sub-regional structures such as the Pan African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, the envisaged Peace and Security Council and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the African Union and other relevant bodies. The APR Secretariat also follows up on commitments made, holds regional workshops to share best

practices identified in the reviews and offers technical support to assist countries in fulfilling their APR plans.

The duration of the review process per country should not be longer than six months, commencing on the date of the inception of the stage one up to the date the report is submitted for the consideration of the heads of state and government. (<http://www.au.gov.za>, 2004 May 11)

David Mageria (2004), the reviews will take six to nine months. The evaluators will send questionnaires and later visit countries for three weeks to talk to the government, opposition politicians, civic bodies and donors before they make a report. Mageria went further that analysts say it will be interesting to see the evaluator's report on Angola, where internationally agencies say as much as \$4 billion in oil revenues have been lost to graft over the past five years. They have also set their eyes on Nigeria where corruption has eroded billions of dollars in oil earnings. This pose a challenge to NEPAD and APRM as unwealthy countries might view principles established under NEPAD not essential. This will be so because the wealthy nations although not adheres to NEPAD principles, they are still continue doing very well. An important measure of APRM credibility will be whether such notorious practices will be challenged or glossed over.

### **3.6. Funding and Countries Acceded to the APRM So Far**

According to Jackie Cilliers (2002), initial funding for the APRM is to come from two principal sources – assessed contributions from member governments on the basis of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and assistance from development partners, including from donor governments



and multilateral agencies without conditionalities. African Finance Ministers at their meeting at Sandton, South Africa, 2002, urged that the APRM be entirely funded from African sources to ensure ownership by the continent and reduce perceptions of foreign influence.

Cilliers (2002) further noted that, it is essential for the APRM to do not rely on external partners for funding, although such partnership could be welcomed if they are managed in a way that clearly respects African ownership of the APRM and all its processes. Support from external partners should be sought mainly for the implementation of the country programme of action and capacity building to improve performance in the weak areas.

With the intention to fully integrate NEPAD into the AU, future funding for both the NEPAD and APRM will become part of the regular budget of the Union. Countries participating in APRM are also required to deposit a contribution of US\$ 100 000 to the panel's treasury, while some funding would come from the international donor community, including the G8 countries.

In The Namibian (2004), the UN Secretary General's Annual Report on NEPAD's implementation indicated that, progress has been made in advancing the African Peer Review Mechanism. So far more than twenty - four (24) African countries have acceded to APRM. Amongst these countries are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Cameroon, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Zambia. The article also reported that another three African countries had expressed interest in joining, and the country review process

had started in Ghana and Rwanda, and would shortly commence in Mauritius and Kenya. (The Namibian, 23 September 2004)

### **3.7. Experience from OECD countries**

To Kajee (2003), the African approach to peer review appears to be a multi-objective process, defined by multiple criteria and standards, covering multiple countries, involving multiple stakeholders and reporting to multiple principals. In comparison, rather than conduct one all encompassing reviews as the APRM doing, the OECD's various committees operate independent peer reviews for different sectors, which makes these processes more focused and manageable. For example environment assessments are separated from economic reviews and assessors can specialise rather than review all aspects of governance. The OECD also employs permanent review staff as opposed to Africa's plan to use temporary staff.

Ayesha Kajee (2003) continues that the OECD approach to peer review has evolved steadily over time to accommodate changing circumstances. Initially only a few OECD member states acceded to the anti-bribery reviews, which are now mandatory for all members. Over time, peer review has developed a culture of its own. Though initially wary, OECD member states now embrace the consensual, non-judgemental and knowledge-sharing aspects of the process. "It is all about deploying the right team to conduct a review and getting the right people involved is the key", says Michael Ruffner of the Public Governance Directorate of the OECD (2003:11).

OECD countries attribute the success of their review process to these key factors: limited scope, transparency and inclusiveness, demonstrated political will and sufficient human, financial and technical resources.

### **3.8. Lessons learnt**

The OECD experience shows that it has not started as easily as one may think. There has also been a difference among OECD countries with regard to accedation. These differences are the same that have been experienced among African countries with regards to acceding to APRM. The OECD reviews gained credibility overtime, but not immediately after it was initiated. Lessons worth noting are that APRM will need to be reformed within the context of Africa, notably in areas of the multiple objectives to be precisely defined for different sectors, make some areas of reviews mandatory, employ competent full time staff who will devote sufficient time to the tasks, establish watchdog to APRM exercises and ensure the deployment of the right review team with the right people at the right place at the right time. There is no doubt that APRM can evolve, develop acceptable culture and have the same effects of success as that of OECD.

“If peer review is taken seriously by countries, and if they devote enough resources to the process when they are examining and when they are being examined, then there is no reason that it should not succeed in Africa,” said Fabrizio Pagani, an OECD analyst of peer review (Kajee 2003:11).

### **3.9. Summary**

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was adopted at Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC) meeting in March 2002. The African leaders recognize that no one will make Africa a credible continent if the people of Africa are not taking the lead. To make NEPAD realize its aspirations and goals for the continent, APRM is seen as a solution to make all African

countries to belong to one credible club. To Landsberg (2003), this will move Africa from the old discredited approach of bad governance and economic performance, human rights abuse, corruption, election rigging etc for which the continent is known for. If all African countries belong to one credible club, this will attract foreign direct investment without discrimination and give countries the chance to be at more or less the same pace of development. This will result in a continent utilizing its vast abundant resources more optimally.

The purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices through sharing of experience, reinforcement of successful and best practices and identifying deficiencies and assessing the need for capacity building. African states will scrutinize each other's performance and assist each other whenever the need arises. APRM is a voluntary mechanism meaning that no force will be used against particular countries to accede to APRM. Countries have to do this at their own will and pace.

Upon the adoption of APRM structure in March 2002, different organizational components have been created such as African Peer Review Forum which consists of Participating Heads of State and Government, African Peer Review Panel which is a Panel of Eminent Persons, the African Peer Review Secretariat, African Peer Review Team which will carry out actual reviews, and African Peer Review Partner institutions. The APRM as an organization will be managed by five to seven members Panel of Eminent Persons who have proved and distinguished themselves in careers that are considered relevant to the work of APRM. They are drawn from countries such as Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Mozambique and Kenya. Patrick Bond

(2005) has indicated that, Chris Stals, the South African representative has been criticized in that country for his role in the apartheid government.

The review process will be carried out in different stages. The review team will start with the stage of gathering information and drafting programme of action, and then the second stage of actual reviews in countries identified. Upon their findings, a third stage begins whereby a report has to be prepared and a fourth stage follows when a report is submitted to the participating Heads of State and Government through the APRM Secretariat and lastly the report is released for public consumption and implementation. The whole process of review will take around six to nine months. The envisaged interference by the Heads of State on whether the report has to be released publicly or not, and whether the public will be allowed to give their inputs in the process is something yet to be seen. And again the potential tension for African countries to control the peer review process and the major dependence on foreign aid to finance the process is something puzzling. If African people are not careful, Western powers will influence the process extensively.

While some countries are skeptical about the process of APRM, some are happy about it. To date twenty-four nations have acceded to APRM and have indicated their willingness to be reviewed. Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya and Mauritius are the first countries to go under the peer review microscope and their report will only be ready by March 2005. A long journey still lies ahead to convince and encourage more African countries to sign up and the fruitful or bad results of APRM that will perhaps act as deterring or encouraging the APRM acceptance is yet to be seen.

## **CHAPTER 4: DEBATES ON APRM AND NEPAD**

*Whenever I am asked what we have done, it is meetings, meetings, meetings...we need action, says Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade whenever he is asked what the NEPAD recovery plan has achieved in its three years of existence (African Business magazine 2005).*

The above quotation has to a certain extent created debates as to whether NEPAD and its peer review mechanism will produce fruitful results within expected time frame. While some civil society organisations in Africa are concerned that millions of dollars are being spent on meetings and no concrete action being taken, on the contrast some of the African governments that are considered reformist such as South Africa, Senegal, Algeria and Nigeria are of the opinion that the meetings have created a foundation upon which actual work will start.

### **4.1. Debates on APRM**

The African Peer Review Mechanism has raised complex debates among different groups, particularly the governments of some African states have been hostile towards the initiative. Some African governments, among others, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Libya have seen APRM as an attempt by the West to interfere in the internal affairs of African states while some such as the business community see that APRM will help African countries to put their house in order. This will create a conducive environment in which business will flourish. This section will explore the contours of debates on different aspects of the APRM by different groups being of interest groups, academics and official documents.

#### **4.1.1. Lack of consultation, ownership and exclusions**

Smunda Mokoena (2003) has asserted that the criticisms leveled against NEPAD's APRM are that Africans did not draft the document. The African people were never consulted so that their

inputs could be considered in the process. As a result, many African people do not even know what NEPAD and APRM are all about. Diescho (2002) is of the opinion that because of lack of consultation, the continent has misrepresented on some issues. The author makes a reference to the opening paragraph in the NEPAD document, which refers the continent as backward. To Diescho (2002), this has shown the disrespect on the continent, its people and greater leader such as Kwame Nkrumah by the West. What Diescho (2002) wants to say is that Africa has never been backwards before and that Africa was having its practices, which was destroyed by the West because they regard it as uncivilized practices. The backwardness of Africa should be blamed on The West who exploited Africa's natural resources to their expense

Chris Landsberg (2003) is of the opinion that the drafting of APRM without meaningful public inputs has generated significant suspicious among African civil society. The APRM has been widely criticized by civil society groups and leaders who perceive it as elitist and exclusionary. They argue that it is being driven by the continent's leadership and has completely bypassed African civil society. The same sentiment is echoed by Karuuombe (2003), that African leaders in particular those who spearheading the NEPAD process, took the approach of "we know what our people want and we can do it for them"(2003:22).

Irene Zrimwabagabo (2004) fears that, the APRM may have the opposite effects from those it intended causing more conflict by distancing itself from the principle of non-interference enshrined in the AU charter that the APRM suggests, and that civil societies were not being consulted in NEPAD's top-down decision making structure.

Ross Hebert (2003) has indicated that, this thing (NEPAD's APRM)) can be seen as "neo-liberalism creeping through the back door". So the failure to communicate directly sabotages the sense of ownership and the chances of long-term success. It will lack credibility and legitimacy, if the heads of state operate in such a manner that it remains primarily their own responses, without involving other non-state actors in the whole process.

While the supporters of NEPAD argue that it is good in principle, uncertainty remains over exactly how it will operate in practice. Ross Hebert (2003) is of the opinion that from the beginning, African reformers have undermined the credibility of NEPAD – and the peer review process now emerging from it. Firstly, they have oversold it, raising impossible expectations about its ability to fix what are profound social, economic and political problems.

Secondly, they have hidden the process behind closed doors. Officials have given out very little information to the public or the press, feeding widespread skepticism. Politicians blundered badly, for example, when they first declared that peer review would deal with political governance, and then later denied that it would. Under pressure from donors, who had been given a clear undertaking that political governance would not be left out, NEPAD leaders reversed course again and included political governance within the ambit of peer review. How such reviews will be handled, however, and whether they will be taken seriously and conducted transparently, remains to be seen.

Ross Hebert (2003) further adds that peer review, as it is conceived, seems to be trying too hard to prove something to the West. This is a critical mistake. Too much energy is being



directed at proving points to the West, when the people whom the programme is supposedly designed to benefit have not even been consulted. Peer review has not been an open process, neither encouraging robust public debate nor involving the broader array of civil society. Peer Review was conceived behind closed doors and concern about how transparent it will be rightly persist. Much of African Civil Society has not mobilized to exploit the opening that peer review offers.

#### **4.1.2. Neo – colonialism and conditionalities for aid**

Malachia Mathoho (2003) put it forward that numerous African leaders are opposed to NEPAD's APRM because the resources for its evolution depend heavily on wealthy nations outside the continent. The sources of fund for NEPAD are foreign governments i.e. Japan, India, G 8 and Multilateral Institutions such as World Bank, European Union etc. The G 8 at the end of their conference held in Kananaskis, Canada 2003, promised to extend 65 billion US dollars to assist the NEPAD pool of funds. The conditionalities attached to these funds are a major concern to African governments.

Critics from civil society organizations, among others, Trade Unions and Women, Groups have argue that, leaders who are considered friendly to the West are promoting NEPAD. It is pointed out that APRM is based on political and economic principles championed by donor countries and multilateral institutions. Some African leaders see the peer review under NEPAD as an un-African artefact. They are worried that those who pledge and provide support to NEPAD will insist on attaching conditionalities for providing these resources. This could result in a donor dictated agenda rather than an African negotiated agenda. Zrimwabagabo (2004),

shares the same sentiment saying that the African Peer Review may, intended or otherwise, be legitimizing western conditionalities of good governance and free market based economic policies for donor funding by affording an African stamp of authenticity.

Mathoho (2003) has pointed out that some critics also have fears that the external actors could attempt to use the APRM to sanction leaders selectively, as has occurred with Zimbabwe. The EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe's leaders in February 2002, and a month later Zimbabwe was suspended from the commonwealth body. Critics also suspect that the peer review mechanism could become a means through which donors impose collective penalties on Africa in cases where African leaders fail to sanction African peers, who are declared pariahs by external actors.

Chris Landsberg (2003) has noted that, there is a real tendency on the part of some external players, especially some powerful G-8 members, to view the APRM as a policing mechanism and a compliance instrument, there to see to it that African states keep their commitments to economic and political reforms. They, therefore, tend to see it as an incentive and disincentive tool and thus an instrument for reward and withholding rewards.

Diescho (2002) emphasized this point by saying that no matter how and from which angle one looks at the dialogue between the rich countries and Africa regarding NEPAD, the fact remains that it is not a dialogue between equals. "It is a dialogue, if it is a dialogue between the beggar and the potential giver"(2002:17). This has characterized most of the aid and cooperation relationships between Africa and her former colonizers.

#### **4.1.3. Threats to national sovereignty**

Sanou Bayne (2002) has indicated that, a number of African states expressed concern about the threat to sovereignty, as NEPAD Peer Review is seen to cause unwanted intrusions in how countries are managed. Moreover, lack of consistency among African governments in implementing APRM (and NEPAD as whole) and the unresolved questions of Zimbabwe have increased the negative perception of African commitment to the partnership.

Malachia Mathoho (2003) has pointed out that, as sovereign entities, African states will not be duty bound to follow any prescribed ruling by any other state. There is skepticism about how far African leaders are prepared to go to put pressure on their peers. Karuumbe (2003) adds that the sad reality is that most of the current African leaders do not have the moral high ground that would allow them to throw stones at each other or anyone else. Barney Karuumbe (2003) went further citing the case of Zimbabwe saying that instead of African leaders pointing fingers at the Zimbabwean President, they applaud him on the highly controversial election that he won. The ambivalence of African states on the unfolding political crisis in Zimbabwe has cast doubts on the outcomes of the APRM processes.

#### **4.1.4. Mechanism's voluntary nature and lack of punitive sanctions**

David Mageria (2004) has indicated the problem with the scheme (APRM) that, it is voluntary, meaning countries with the worst records of democracy will avoid it, and that the reports will not be made public unless the Heads of State agree. Another concern is that critics of the APRM regret the lack of provision for punitive sanctions for those who fall short of good

governance benchmarks or who fail to comply with recommendations made by the PRM measures.

Hicks (2002) has added also that until the African Union develops the necessary capacity to be involved, peer review is to be conducted on a voluntary basis. This will mean that those states most in need of political scrutiny will be able to avoid the process. Moreover, it remains unclear how those states found lacking after going through a review will be brought into compliance with human rights and democratic standards.

Smunda Mokoena (2004) is of the opinion that, the voluntary nature of the APRM process is the point that has raised many eyebrows. Heads of states will then accede to the APRM and then adopt its finding and recommendation. In reality, most countries have already conceded to general principles such as rule of law, anti-corruption, transparency and other democratic related practices in various international agreements.

Malachia Mathoho (2003) has added that the Peer Review Process has never been attempted in Africa before and unlike judiciary proceedings, the final outcome of a review is not legally binding, so the impact from this process will probably be limited. In practice the Peer Review Process, may in part play the role of a dispute settlement mechanism by encouraging the kind of dialogue among states that helps to clarify their positions.

Malachia Mathoho (2003) has indicated that the effectiveness of a peer review relies on the influence and persuasion exercised by the peers over each other during the process. The Heads

of State who are participating in the APRM accept that peer pressure will be exercised in order to encourage improvements in countries practices and policies in compliances with agreed international best practices. But peer pressure does not take the form of legally binding acts backed up by sanctions or other punitive measures. It also lacks enforcement mechanisms.

Chris Landsberg (2003) share similar sentiments that, surely given that the APRM is seen as a voluntary plan, clearly implies that there would be major problems with compliance with obligations and commitments. So, in practice, the APRM is likely to be characterized by many pitfalls, many changes and many setbacks.

#### **4.1.5. States are at different stages of development and leadership**

Smunda Mokoena (2003) has inserted that, it is likely that states may water down some APRM guidelines due to the conditions pertaining in African states and their systems of governance. Many of the states that are to take part have yet to conform to the criteria and indicators stipulated in the APRM Accord. It is still unclear whether the APRM will be able to be implemented effectively in an environment of dictatorship and authoritarianism.

Malachia Mathoho (2003) went further that, many of the states that are to take part have yet to conform to the criteria and indicators stipulated in the APRM Accord. The APRM process is likely to dissipate over time if participating states do not conform to the tenets of democracy and governance demanded by the APRM. In Dentlinger (2004), the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Hidipo Hamutenya, said that considering that AU member states were at different forms of government, “the challenge of reviewing their performance was daunting”(2004:2).

Ross Hebert (2003) has pointed out that participating countries are supposed to have their baseline reviews conducted within eighteen months of signing the APRM memorandum of understanding. These deadlines already look implausible, given that none of the countries has produced their national Programme of Action. That leaves plenty of room to cut corners. Time and staff shortages will create enormous pressure to rely on the background research to assess, for example, the state of corruption in a country review. That makes the choice of researchers and partner institutions critical. The APRM documents note that the examination of political aspects of governance will be managed by the new organs of the African Union, but most of these don't yet exist. Those AU structures that do exist only have a skeleton staff and no administrative capacity to engage in complex reviews.

Another key concern raised by Herbert (2003) is whether the leaders of countries under review will have the ability to, in effect, edit review reports, before they are released in their final form. The documents laying out the organization and processes of peer review say that a review team's final report only needs to contain "all the essential elements of the draft report by the country review team" (2003:10). This wording suggests that the draft report may be edited – potentially by the heads of state under review – before it is released to the public.

Jakkie Cilliers (2003) has noted that APRM also seems "to have a tendency to bite off more than it can bite" (2003:6). It makes promises for example to promote and protect economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights. Indeed these are important elements, but they are difficult to measure, to implement and to monitor.

Many states are yet to accede to and ratify all the relevant African and international rights instruments. Many states also lack countervailing institutions like human rights commissions and public protectors. Even where they exist, many such institutions lack relevant capacity and resources.

Malachia Mathoho (2003) put forward the concern that, work being done around NEPAD is often unclear and confusing, and question the relationship between the peer review process of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) that is under the auspices of the AU, and the APRM under NEPAD. In the context of AU, these are particular areas of overlap and possible duplication that need to be addressed. Herbert (2003) shares the same sentiment that “the devil is obviously in the details”. The APRM does not seem to offer more than a promissory note for increased accountability, and the process itself is more opaque than transparent.

However, one need one need to take note that the tragedy of state to transit to democracy is different – there are those that move faster and those move slowly in terms of democracy and good political governance, corporate governance, socio-economic development, among others. If one takes a country such as Mozambique, it will not make sense to review the country in its current state. This is so because its transit to democracy, social economic development and corporate governance, among others, are not to the expected standard yet. These trajectories are attributed to the history of civil war that have ravaged the country for so many years. One needs to give such state reasonable time to develop practices of good and corporate governance

and to deal with issues of social economic development. Such state must be given reasonable time to consolidate their transit to democracy.

#### **4.4.6. Peer review and the Zimbabwe crises**

The crisis that is going on in Zimbabwe has presented challenges to APRM and NEPAD. While the West trying to isolate Zimbabwe and threatened to put on hold NEPAD aids to Africa due to circumstances in Zimbabwe, Some African leaders rally behind in defence of Robert Mugabe. They see APRM as an attempt to isolate Zimbabwe from the rest of the world. The testimony has been that in some cases the EU had banned Mugabe from attending some of their meeting of which in some instance African leaders had tried to boycott. What anger the West more are the land crises and the re-election of President Mugabe. Some African leaders such as Botswana and Senegal etc has neither criticized or applaude Mugabe. They had taken a soft approach and probably waiting what will happen in the future, to them peer review will be a judgement case to the issue of Zimbabwe.

Anthony Lobaido (2002) reported that public eye recently, when President Mbeki endorsed the “murderous election tactics” of Zimbabwe dictator, Robert Mugabe. The ruling Labor Party in the UK was so furious that it threatened not to fund NEPAD. Lobaido (2002) further reported that within twenty - four hours, Mbeki did a 180-degree turn and condemned Mugabe’s election victory. Whether Mbeki stated this explicitly or implicitly is debatable and need further clarification. The South African businessman, Bobby Van Dynaken reacts to this by saying that “is the kind of clout NEPAD funding carried. It is the Anglo-carrot on a stick for an impoverished Africa”(2002:4).



Although NEPAD's architects bitterly reject any suggestion that NEPAD's success in any way should be linked to action or inaction on Zimbabwe, Western diplomats continue to note that Africa cannot be serious about installing good governance if it cannot bring itself to criticize Zimbabwe. Similarly, Africa's promotion of Libya to head the UN Human Right Commission and the earlier refusal of African states to support human rights investigations by the Commission in Zimbabwe or Sudan run counter to the NEPAD ideal of a continent determined to deal with oppressive states.

Making reference to the case of Zimbabwe which considered to be a test case for NEPAD, Taylor (2002) is of the opinion that even those African leaders who have actively promoting NEPAD, notably South African President Thabo Mbeki, are not practicing what they are preaching. At the conference on the African Renaissance, September 1998, President Thabo Mbeki proclaimed that:

We want to have an African continent in which the people participate in systems of governance in which they are truly able to determine their destiny and put behind us the notions of democracy and human rights as peculiarly 'Western concepts'. Thus would we assume a stance of opposition to dictatorship, whatever forms it may assume. Thus we say that we must ensure that when election are held, these must be truly democratic, resulting in governments which the people would accept as being genuinely representative of the will of people (2002:82).

To Taylor (2002) this provides a clear test case to which leaders such as Mbeki can be measured against their words and actions, hence the doubts raised on the credibility of NEPAD and APRM.

Cilliers (2003) share the same sentiment by pointing out that the issue of Zimbabwe has already served as a reality check for many of Africa's development partners, in terms of their

expectations around NEPAD and the prospects of the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism. It has also damaged Africa's relations with the European Union. Thus, earlier this year when the EU wished to host a follow up meeting in Lisbon to the 2002 Cairo meeting between Africa and Europe, South Africa again rallied to the cause of ZANU (PF) once the EU indicated that President Mugabe would not be welcome. Amid much acrimony, the Africa – Europe meeting was postponed.

Cherry (2002) has argued that most public opposition attacks NEPAD indirectly by treating Zimbabwe as a test case. That is, by attacking the ongoing Anglo-American attempt to impose a government of its own choice on Zimbabwe, the opponents implicitly attack NEPAD. Cherry (2002) is of the opinion that Mbeki, Obasanjo and the NEPAD Steering Committee chairman Wiseman Nkhuhlu have covered themselves by loudly joining in the defense of the Mugabe government. But this is where push comes to shove. The Anglo-American powers have kept the theme in the press since Mugabe's reelection, that the credibility of the Africans in the new partnership depends on their arranging a new election in Zimbabwe. The *Washington Post* lead editorial of May 6, 2002 declared that if Africa's new partnership means anything, it is that the continents leaders must tell Mr. Mugabe to stop terrorizing his country and call for fresh election.

To Ditshwanelo (2003), the credibility of the NEPAD peer review process is further challenged by the current human rights crisis in Zimbabwe. There are numerous, credible reports of serious human rights abuses being committed in Zimbabwe. Such abuses include torture and political violence, severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association, the deliberate

denial of access to food for those perceived as supports of the political opposition, abductions and arbitrary detentions, and the general denial of the right of Zimbabweans to participate in government through freely chosen representatives.

Distshwanelo (2003) is of the opinion that, the deepening crises in Zimbabwe has already had serious negative effects on the surrounding regions and this is likely to worsen as even greater numbers of people seek to leave the country. Those countries and institutions currently considering their provision of economic assistance to Africa through NEPAD are undoubtedly watching the African response to the Zimbabwe crisis. The West and EU donors are likely to avoid funding Zimbabwe linked projects.

#### **4.2. Debates on NEPAD**

Debates on NEPAD have been based on the substances rather than the programme itself. Most African government has indicated that NEPAD is a good programme, which is aimed to attract foreign direct investment and raise the standards of living of all African people. But its substances is what more trigger debates. The fact that NEPAD will be financed from external sources and that it is more external oriented in its approach raise eyebrows to African people. NEPAD document also stated that the people of Africa would take control of their own destiny. This short of sight in the sense that given the prevailing circumstances, African to be architects of their own sustained upliftment is something still to be seen under NEPAD. This section will explore debates on various substances of NEPAD by different groups being it academics, interest groups and official documents.

#### **4.2.1. NEPAD seen as neo-liberalism**

African people have gone through difficulties time over a century. They have enslaved, colonized and their resources have been exploited for the benefits of foreign countries. The solutions developed to help Africa had been done without African inputs and as a result have failed and put Africa in vicious cycle of poverty. African people are now skeptical of the development programme such as NEPAD onto which the West can lay their hands. NEPAD is seen as a new way by the West to recolonise Africa again. This has been heavily criticized by interest groups, official documents and academics. On 2002 May 24, the Zambia Post ran an editorial piece which read that “No matter how attractively these so called solutions to Africa’s vast problems are being packaged or what they are being named, the western policies are conveniently put in place not for our benefit, but to continue undermining us”(2002:8). ( <http://www.worldnetdairly>, 2004 March 18)

The South African journal of Social and Economic Policy (2005) indicated that under NEPAD, Africans will have to do what Western donors wishes in terms of economic and political matters to deserve the increased amount of aids that the programme envisaged. This is an attempt to recolonise Africa again and with this kind of attitude from the West, African will never be in charge of their own destiny. In the above-mentioned journal, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo has warned African people to guard against NEPAD from being turned against them as a tool for new conditionalities.

([seriallyspeakingtoc.blogspot.com/2005/04/tables-of-contents-achiever-advanced.html](http://seriallyspeakingtoc.blogspot.com/2005/04/tables-of-contents-achiever-advanced.html), 02 January 2005)

The chairman of NEPAD Steering Committee, Wiseman Nkhulu in the African Business Magazine (2005), has rejected warning by the West that African endorsement of Zimbabwe's presidential election could hurt Western support for NEPAD and indicated that it is not fair for African to be treated in this way.

Deve Cherry (2002) has opined that, what is worse about NEPAD is that participating African governments will take collective responsibility for imposing on themselves the kinds of destructive, monetarist burdens and controls the IMF and World Bank have so far solely responsible for. Without a different economic theory and rejection of the IMF and World Bank, NEPAD principles will still governed by existing system of old discredited structural adjustment programme which has failed Africa in the past. This will result in more debts and more problems, more influences and more control from the West.

#### **4.2.2. NEPAD and HIV/AIDS**

Akukwe (2002) has shown that NEPAD lacks a serious focus on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is unarguably the greatest threat to Africa's development at this point in time. It is regret that NEPAD is not seen as vehicle for tackling major impediments to the economic growth such as HIV/AIDS. The pandemic is a formidable foe of accelerated growth and sustainable development in Africa. According to the World Bank and UNAIDS (Akukwe 2002) HIV/AIDS in the hardest hit countries of Africa is directly responsible for an annual loss of 0.5 to 1.2 % of their GDP. It is estimated that by the year 2020, heavily infected countries may lose up to 20% of their GDP to AIDS. To UNAIDS

(Akukwe 2002), in Botswana where one of every third adult is living with HIV/AIDS, one quarter of households can expect to lose a breadwinner within ten years and per capita household income for the poorest quarter of household will fall by 13%.

Akukwe (2002) has further argued that although it is noticeable that HIV/AIDS is a threat to development, issues related to the pandemic never mentioned seriously in the NEPAD document. The document is heavily criticized that issues related to HIV/AIDS such as access to antiretroviral drugs, culturally appropriate information on HIV/AIDS, education and communication campaign and mobilization of Africans to fight the pandemic are hardly discussed in NEPAD document.

Patrick Bond (2005) has written that, despite South African President Thabo Mbeki regarded as outspoken on behalf of the continent on issues of NEPAD, he has been silent in addressing HIV/AIDS, an issue that he has been heavily criticized for in Africa. There is fear that his African counterparts could emulate this bad example. “ By the time NEPAD was launched, Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS policies were routinely described as genocidal and AIDS – dissident” (2005:18).

Stephen Lewis (2002), questioned that “How can you talk about the future of Sub-Saharan Africa without AIDS at the heart of analysis”(2002:7)? ([www.irinnews.org/AIDS](http://www.irinnews.org/AIDS) report) Africa’s development goals would remain an “impossible hope” until the HIV/AIDS pandemic was addressed and that a number of noble goals of NEPAD would be doomed unless it addresses HIV/AIDS. The UN special envoy for HIV/AIDS to Africa continue saying that

“Why is the war against terrorism sacrosanct, and the war against AIDS equivocal”(2002:8).  
(Available from [www.irinnews.org/AIDS\\_report.asp](http://www.irinnews.org/AIDS_report.asp), 11 September 2004)

A HIV/AIDS development consultant, Cohen and Smith (2002) has proposed that there is a need for NEPAD to integrate HIV/AIDS in its approaches and sectoral priorities. They indicated that HIV/AIDS is a cross-cutting issue and may prevent NEPAD to realize its goals. The sectoral priorities of NEPAD such as infrastructure development, transportation, information and communication technologies, energy, water and sanitation, efforts to achieve all these sustainably and effectively will be undermined if nothing is done under NEPAD to tackle the pandemic.

An AIDS strategist Stephen Kramer at the Africa AIDS conference in Mozambique (2003) was of the opinion that nations that benefit from the NEPAD efforts to create economic opportunities may become more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. This is so because the plan does not address the epidemic. NEPAD is doing a great deal to coordinate actions in sectors such as agriculture and communications, but it hardly mentions HIV/AIDS. The AIDS strategist continues that if NEPAD creates jobs without addressing HIV/AIDS, it will bring greater inequality to communities, which is a risk factor for HIV. He concluded that NEPAD should integrate HIV/AIDS into its programs so that it could be much effective.

#### **4.2.3. NEPAD and African people’s participation**

Apart from the fact that NEPAD is based on IMF and World Bank policies, Deve (2003:4) has notice with a great concern that the lack of consultation has remained a thorny issue. Deve

further argues that the role of civil society is reduced to one merely supporting the initiative. In this regard, NEPAD takes a highly (and discredited) paternalistic approach to its people. By choosing this top-down approach, NEPAD ignores lessons from past strategies. Even the World Bank and IMF, masters of the top-structural adjustment programme (SAPs), have come around to accepting that ownership of development strategies by people is critical to their success, and hence in 1999, they adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which are supposed to be government-led, but people driven.

This position and critique is well developed in South Africa, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Namibia and Uganda, among others. Its proponents spelt out that the African governments adopted the African Charter on popular participation at Arusha (Tanzania) in 1990 as the continent's operational framework. It is therefore unfortunate that NEPAD violates a key principle of popular participation adopted by African governments themselves. On the continental level, this view was reiterated in the Addis Ababa, January 2003, African Social Forum that NEPAD is based on the old discredited approach of structural adjustment programme of IMF and World Bank.

Karuombe (2003) has pointed out that, although NEPAD is supposed to be a development agenda for Africans by Africans, it is ironic that the general African populace does not know the content and intention of NEPAD. African leaders and in particular those who spearheaded the NEPAD process - Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade – took the approach that “We know what our people want and we can do it for them”(2003:22). This approach raises serious



questions about the ownership of the process and content of NEPAD as well as the development success that NEPAD is expected to deliver.

Karuuombe (2003) further noted that, this problem is further compounded by the fact that NEPAD is more external (concerned with the interest of donors and investors) and pays little attention to the long-standing demands of progressive African civil society organizations who are challenging the impact of aid, debt, FDI and globalization on Africa. Some activists question the legitimacy of NEPAD on the basis of lack of consultation in the NEPAD process and the external orientation of the plan.

Sharing similar sentiments, Keet (2003) who noted that lack of appropriate and wide ranging public consultation in the process of NEPAD formulation and in the various phases of its subsequent elaboration is the major flaw after the neo-liberal framework within which NEPAD is located. Keet (2003) is of the opinion that NEPAD did not emerge out of a continent wide-dialogue, but an initiative that had spearheaded by a small group of African leaders who presented it to their peers and to the industrialized countries for funding before Africans themselves could participate in any debate.

Another concern raised by Hebert (2003) is that civil society participation was frankly non-existent. The process must take the debate out of the top floor and bring it to the community. That is basically a dialogue process. Communities must have a clear idea about what peer review means. There should be a shadow process by civil society organizations so that if they cannot participate in the formal process, they have their own process to keep it honest. As civil

society, agencies must interrogate peer review, conduct research and share information with each other.

#### **4.2.4. NEPAD and gender**

According to African Women's Economic Policy Network (AWEAPON) (2002), NEPAD is deeply and comprehensively gender blind. The authors of NEPAD document are being criticised for the fall short of the gender analysis, which is an important ingredient in all efforts geared towards achieving sustainable development. "They do not seem to live in the same world of legalised, traditional and institutionalized gender discrimination, which is actually the world inhabited by women" (2002:17). AWEAPON argue that NEPAD fails to look at ways in which women in Africa are oppressed and what measures can be put in place to change gender oppression. The programme does very little to address some of the issues that have faced and are still facing African women. A Madagascar/Ghana program director at gender and economic reform in Africa, Randriamano (2003) share the same sentiments that with regard to gender equality consideration, critics have pointed to the gender blindness of the NEPAD. Although NEPAD is gender blind, one of its long-term objective is to "promote the role of women in all activities".

Randriamano (2003) has shown that while the NEPAD envisions to ensure that the specific issues faced by poor women are addressed, a gender and institutional analysis of its macroeconomic framework shows fundamental flaws. This will negatively affect the achievement of its stated goals regarding the role of women in social and economic development. The most glaring evidence of the gender blindness of the NEPAD is the fact that

it ignores the devastating impact of structural adjustment program and policies imposed by international financial institutions on women and gender relations. The economic framework championed in NEPAD is likely to keep women in the poverty trap and to reinforce gender inequalities.

Randriamano (2003) continues that there is no mention of women or gender issues in the initiative and its sectors plan. A remarkable example of such omission is the section of the NEPAD on agriculture. The crucial contribution and roles of women to food security and agricultural production has never acknowledged in NEPAD.

Longwe (2002) has indicated that despite the fine expression of gender principles, NEPAD's expression of gender goals is very vague and lacking. Longwe (2002) also indicated that there is an overall long term in NEPAD to "promote the role of women in all activities", which is vague to the point of meaningless. Completely missing from the goals is any intention to increase women's representation in parliament, government and top decision-making position. NEPAD fails almost completely to recognize or address the major issues of gender inequality and discrimination. The issues of oppression of women still lie hidden and unacknowledged within NEPAD goals and objectives. To her, NEPAD's gender statements are therefore proving to be nothing more than window dressing.

The Kenyan High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, Maria Nzomo (2003) is of the opinion that the gender blindness of the NEPAD has been observed in its overall content, structures and implementation strategies provided for in the document. African women are especially

concerned that the process of developing NEPAD and its content particular the macro economic proposals lacks gender responsiveness. The High Commissioner continues that there is a need to address women's needs and existing gender gaps in the region's development through the implementation of NEPAD. Emphasis is placed on the need for self-development and self-improvement of African women rather than on the need for African states to address systemic discrimination against African women. To Nzomo (2003), NEPAD is thus essentially premised upon the women in development rather than the gender and development to gender mainstreaming in development.

#### **4.2.5. NEPAD and resources mobilisation**

Ditshwanelo (2003) has pointed out that NEPAD is a comprehensive plan to improve Africa's socio-economic status. Its goals are to promote accelerated growth and sustainable development, eradicate widespread and severe poverty, and halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalization process. NEPAD hopes to create an environment for sustainable development. It is different from past development plans such as the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, in that it boasts greater African ownership. Criticism has been leveled against NEPAD for being conceived and constructed from the top down by so few African leaders without the consultation of civil society and some African states. (<http://www.mmegi.bw>, 20 February 2004)

Mbaye (2003), has written that NEPAD, the last plan to kick-start Africa's economic development adopted by OAU in Lusaka (Zambia) on July, 11,2002, is articulated around investment in the key sectors of infrastructure, agriculture, health and education. The plan is to

be financed by the International Community and through private capital flows, mainly from the Multinationals. In choosing this way of financing their development, African countries have adopted the neo liberalism of globalizations as their development strategy.

Three countries - Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique received the lion's share of Africa's limited foreign direct investment (FDI), and it was used to finance investment in the exploitation of natural resources, petroleum and minerals in particular. Private foreign investment in these sectors has merely perpetuated the region's dependence and impoverishment, systemically exploiting its resources without any productive investment, job creation or exports of manufactured goods by way of compensation. The incursion of private capital is likely to accentuate the control of Africa and its natural resources. This would mean making African countries mere Western offshoots. ([http:// sanou.mbaye.free](http://sanou.mbaye.free), 2004 March 19)

De la Dehesa (2003) has asserted that, it is unfortunate that in many countries of Africa, some of these decisive factors have not been positive enough in relative terms to other regions to be able to attract substantial flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Moreover, the total lack of credibility of some African countries has precluded others with a much better level of compliance of these factors from attracting large FDI flows as well. Unfortunately, the negative externalities produced by non-credible countries have created as a consequence, a certain contagion to the rest of the region and a general perception by many multinationals of a "bad reputation" for the continent as whole.

De La Dehesa (2002) continued to draw an analogy that if it takes many years of great individual and collective effort for a country to gain or regain credibility, it is even more difficult for a whole continent. The recent historical experience shows that the only short cut available for giving faster credibility by a country is to be able to join a “Credible Club” formed by credible countries. For example, Spain, Portugal and Greece were able to achieve that short cut many years ago, by joining the European Union. More recently, Mexico has been able to decouple from the rest of Latin America by joining the North American Free Trade Area. The same is already happening to the Central European Countries that are ready to join the European Union in 2005.

In all these cases, FDI started to arrive quickly and massively into the newly blessed countries, once the multi-nationals and financial investors perceived that there is a high probability of their joining those credible integration clubs. In other cases, even the mere close vicinity to credible countries or clubs has helped to attract reasonable amounts of FDI. This is the case of Morocco and Tunisia, for example. On the contrary, it has been much more difficult for South Africa or Botswana, for instance, to attract the volume of FDI that they deserve, according to their achieved standards of credibility, because of their remoteness from the EU or any other credible club and because of the vicinity of disreputable neighbours. The NEPAD, if it achieves success, has a high chance of reversing the present negative reputation of the whole African countries. (<http://www.weforum.pdf/africa>, 10 September 2004)

In Africa there are also credible regional body such as SADC and SACU into which some African countries want to join. These organizations have been working on then removal of

barriers to trade and investment in order to promote economic development by making trade free, less distorted and fairer. Although some of these countries want to join these regional body for the same reasons outlined by De La Dehesa (2002) above, there has been impediments preventing them to join such as low intra trade, bad economic performance etc. This is something worth to be looked into.

### **4.3. Summary**

The literature review of official documents and debates among interest groups and academics/intellectuals indicates that lack of a participatory process has led to the formulation of NEPAD's APRM document without input from the African people. No ownership has been created for African people in the APRM, and therefore the initiative may lack credibility and legitimacy in their eyes. Critics hold that the process undertaken is elitist, exclusionary and done behind closed doors. African leaders spearheading the initiative take the approach that "we know what our people want and we can do it for them" (Karuombe 2003:22). To them, this is a critical mistake made by these African leaders. But if the other side of the coin is turned, it should be remembered that these African leaders have been elected to govern and make decisions on behalf of their people. These leaders stood for election to represent their people. What is surprising is that the civil society groups are more vocal when it come to NEPAD, but they have been quiet to other regional bodies which had formulated in the same fashion as NEPAD such as SADC.

Critics further indicated that the APRM is seen as neo-colonialism through which donor communities will cluster African leaders into good guys and bad guys. This will make donors

dictate development agenda in Africa, sanction African leaders selectively and attach conditionalities to aid. The APRM is not favoured by critics because it is seen that it will cause unwanted interference in internal affairs of African states by the Western countries.

On the other hand, the APRM is criticized that it will not work effectively. This is so because the mechanism is voluntary and lacks punitive measures. The fact is also that African countries are at different stages of development and leadership. It is seen that the APRM will not produce tangible results in countries where there are authoritarian forms of government.



## **CHAPTER 5: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA**

*The government of Namibia views the APRM as a futile attempt by the West to dictate as to who should benefit from NEPAD. The official government position is that there is no time frame to signing up to the APRM. Namibia has nothing to fear, as her areas of review are very good. The process is voluntary so that each country will sign up when they want to. (Interview respondent, 2004)*

### **5.1. An overview analysis of data**

From the literature reviews and interviews, it emerges that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a new initiative crafted by African leaders to take the continent of Africa out of the crisis in which it has been for too long. The NEPAD programme presents opportunity to African leaders to solve the myriad of problems facing the people of Africa. The African people are suffering in the midst of plentiful resources, so there is a need to develop a sound relationship between the people of Africa and the rest of the world.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has been crafted in Africa and mostly spearheaded by leaders such as South African President Nelson Mandela, Senegalese President Wade, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Algerian President Boutflika and Egyptian President Mubarak. NEPAD is not the first initiative which is aimed at halting the problems facing the continent. There have been many initiatives already initiated and most of them failed to address problems facing Africa. e.g. Lagos Plan of Action. However, NEPAD looks promising and African people want it to be a successful one.

Although NEPAD looks promising, there have been stumbling blocks in its way. There are many challenges ahead of it. If African people want it to be a successful initiative, more issues need to be tackled for it to be smoothly implemented.

One thorny issue to be tackled is the ownership of the process. It is suggested that African people lack ownership of the NEPAD. The programme has been initiated by few African leaders who sell it mostly to those outside of the continent. Henning Melber (2002), has indicated that NEPAD is being spoken about more in European and Western countries than in Africa. Many African people do not even understand what NEPAD is all about. The interviews conducted indicated that for instance in Namibia, not all people understand what NEPAD involves and the majority follows the opinion makers, who are in most cases, the politician. There is a need to market the NEPAD initiative in Africa and allow African people to actively participate in the process. But at the moment publicity of NEPAD is being stepped up to have larger audiences. Now there are various official meetings and conference, consultative workshops and television programmes, and information are posted on Internet, which reaches larger numbers of audience.

The civil society organizations in Africa feel sidelined. They feel they want to actively contribute to the process. Those leaders who initiated NEPAD are criticized for taking a top down approach instead of bottom up approach. They did not bother to consult the civil society and the people of Africa in general. Those leaders think that they know what people want. This type of planning, which excludes people, brings development that is out of touch with the wishes of the people. People feel that a participatory approach to NEPAD is the way forward. As it is stated by Deve (2004:4) the role of civil society is reduced to one of merely supporting the initiative. It is therefore unfortunate that NEPAD violates key principles of popular participation. Deve (2003) indicated that, for example in Mauritania, where there has not been any democratic debate on NEPAD, and given that there has been perception by civil society

that NEPAD contains threats to Mauritanian people, the Mauritanian government was called not to go ahead with the presentation of NEPAD by organized civil society organisations.

A small group of OAU designated African leaders spearheaded the policy, presenting it to their peers and to the industrialized countries for funding before Africans themselves could participate in any debate. So African people feel that NEPAD did not emerge out of a wide dialogue, and therefore it remains unknown, if not alien, to most African people. The African civil society organisation are worried about whether this is just another Structural Adjustment Programme.

Attached to NEPAD, is the African Peer Review Mechanism. Mokoena (2003) define it as an instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism. The mandate of the APRM is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate governance contained in the NEPAD programme.

The APRM is a yardstick of NEPAD, checking whether countries have adhered to what is contained in the NEPAD document. The main idea is to bring the African countries into the mainstream of the accepted standards of governance and democracy, amongst many. African countries have to review each other on the basis of criteria that they have set. This will allow countries to share experiences of best practices, identify deficiencies and come up with a capacity building mechanisms in order to rectify the deficiencies.

By virtue of being AU members, African countries are automatically members of NEPAD. Although some countries have accepted NEPAD, some leaders do not want to accede to APRM. Those leaders feel that APRM will impose conditionalities in the same way the Structural Adjustment Programme did. Moreover, most resources for NEPAD are coming from the Western countries such as the G8 and financial institutions like the World Bank and European Union and they feel that those countries will impose conditionalities e.g. devaluing currencies and reducing the size of public service, amongst many. African leaders fear that what happened in debtor countries like Zambia due to SAPs will happen if they accede to APRM.

From the literature review, it emerges that the APRM will have some difficulties, although it is not impossible, in being practically feasible, given the fact African countries are at different paces of development and that African leaders are not prepared to criticise at each other. The issue of sovereignty comes in, with the case of Zimbabwe. African leaders, instead of criticizing President Robert Mugabe, are blaming Britain for what is happening in Zimbabwe. This shows that African leaders are not prepared to go pointing fingers at each other publicly.

The other limitation is the voluntary nature of the mechanism. By making the mechanism voluntary, African countries are going at their own pace as to when they join the APRM. It means that some countries might not even join if they do not want. Out of 53 African countries, only around 24 who have acceded. The voluntary natures of the mechanism coupled with “no sanction” that can be imposed on the transgressors present the weakness in the APRM. The APRM documents are silent on what action is to be taken toward countries that do

not want to accede. This is a great concern for some, to have policy documents which do not have any sanctions imposed on transgressors.

APRM is unlike NEPAD in the sense that by virtue of being an African Union member, one automatically becomes a member of NEPAD. Making the mechanism voluntary and lack of enforcements might prolong the process to bear fruit within an acceptable time frame. The amount of money and other related costs that has to be paid by each and every participating country before any review can start is also a matter of concern. That amount of US\$100 000 to some countries is an enormous amount. Since some countries are already indebted to the AU and regional bodies such as SADC, they might justify their exclusion on this basis.

Related to the above mention subject, a study of the APRM indicators carried out by the South African Institute of Internal Affairs (SAIIA) (2003) indicated how costly the peer review process will be and this might derail the accedation due to unaffordability by some of the country. If countries cannot afford to pay the peer review process related costs, this might be their basis ground to justify their non-accedation.

It would take twenty investigators, working in a team of two, five weeks to reasonably examine all the objectives and criteria set out in the APRM documents. That calculation assumes that interviews would be perfectly scheduled back-to-back for eight hours a day. Scheduling in the real world could easily stretch the process to two or three times that long. Assuming a team of five support staff to schedule interviews, fifteen and twenty investigators coming from outside the country of review, \$150 a night for hotel and food, a vehicle for each pair of investigators and a modest salary for international investigators, such an examination would cost \$413,884 a country. This would be \$6.62 million for all sixteen countries that have signed up for the peer review so far. This figure excludes computers, telecommunications and the cost of the APR Secretariat's office and salaries, the SAIIA (2004) study reveals. (Kajee 2003:10)

The fact that the Head of State has to approve whether the report should be made publicly or not presents another weakness. If the president decided that the report should not be released for public consumption, it could just be as if no review had been done. The report is needed in order to for the people to debate and add their input and views on the subject matter. This will also avoid decisions being made behind closed doors, but allows for bringing in the grassroots people and highlight for them what is happening.

Due to some of this, some countries decide to adopt a “wait and see attitude”. They put a brake on for the moment, checking those, which have acceded, to see if they will bear any meaningful fruit. Then if they see that there are either benefits or detriments, they can decide to join or not. Some countries do not want to rush into new things and regret later. Joseph Diescho (2002) has indicated that many other initiatives in Africa have a long history of producing unfruitful results. When you look at initiatives like Lagos Plan of Action 1980, and African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, they all failed. This has left scars of fear among the African countries to ratify whatever policy comes. Associated with the subject under discussion are the regional bodies such as SADC, COMESA, ECOWAS etc, which are not performing to expected standard, hence instill fear for countries to ratify policies without a thorough scrutiny.

## **5.2. NEPAD, APRM and NAMIBIA**

### **5.2.1. Introduction**

From the literature review and interviews conducted it emerges that Namibia has accepted NEPAD. This is perhaps due to the fact that by virtue of being AU members, automatically a

country became a member of NEPAD. There has been debate surrounding the issue of NEPAD in the National Assembly, and research institutions like NEPRU, LaRRI and SAIIA carried out a consultative NEPAD workshop in Windhoek.

According to the Notice of Question replied to in the National Assembly by former Foreign Affairs Minister on the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism (2004), Hidipo Hamutenya indicate that:

The Government of Namibia believes that NEPAD is an African development programme, collectively endorsed by the Heads of State at the historic AU Summit in Durban in July 2002. The Government of Namibia is of the view that NEPAD is a pledge by African leaders based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction that they have a pressing duty to end underdevelopment and poverty, to place Africa on a path of sustained economic growth and sustainable development and to build partnerships with the international community in order to overcome Africa's marginalisation from the global economy, international markets and investment flow. The position of the Namibia government on NEPAD is that, Namibia by being one of founding members of the AU, is a member of its programme, NEPAD, as approved by the AU Summit in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. Indeed the government is anxiously looking forward to seeing NEPAD play a leading role in the implementation of cross border projects that will facilitate not only regional but also continental integration. (Notice of Question 2004:1)

The Government of Namibia sees NEPAD as the way by which African leaders committed themselves to build a new Africa of democracy, good governance, peace, stability, sustainable development and a better life for all our people. According to the interview (2004), the government recognizes that, the success for economic growth and development will largely depend on how well we position ourselves collectively and individually in the global market place and that NEPAD will play a crucial role in this regard.

The government would resist any overt or covert attempt to convert NEPAD into an instrument to bring to bear undue pressures on any African country or non-African country. Although the

government stressed the need for Africa to have a programme with clear and achievable development objectives, it felt that such a development programme should not be used as an instrument for facilitating external influences on Africa's development. President Sam Nuyoma stated with regard to the industrialized countries of the west and their expectation of NEPAD when he addressed the SWAPO Elders Council Congress at the end of July 2002 that:

As we hear that any government that wants assistances must have so called good governance, democracy and human rights. These people cannot teach us about human rights and democracy. We are equal to Europe and if you do not think that, then to hell with you. You can keep your money. We will develop our Africa without your money. (Melber 2003:4)

These intervention shows skepticism behind the spirit of NEPAD rather than the programme itself.

With regard to civil society organisation contribution as far as NEPAD is concerned, during the interview, one respondent indicated that:

Civil society in Namibia, like all other sectors of the Namibian society, is usually slow to act. Invitations to meetings and conferences are seldom responded to. However, NEPAD has a stakeholder's forum in which civil society organisations could make the voices heard. Namibia is rarely represented at such meetings and conferences, and therefore our input is minimal. (Interview 2004)

The interview conducted on civil society organisations (2004), further indicated that the civil society has not been part of the formation of NEPAD from onset. However, there is a feeling that "slowly but surely", the civil society organization are starting to contribute and participating in debates on NEPAD at workshops, forums and also through publications. It is expected that, as soon as NEPAD become fully functioning in Namibia, the contribution from civil society organization will be enormous.



The low enthusiasm shown by Namibians towards NEPAD can probably be linked to the fact that Namibia, as a country will not reap much direct benefit from NEPAD. Namibia already scored very well in political, governance and economic performance. The direct benefit that a country is enjoying is not because of NEPAD, but it is due to the good practices that Namibia already has. Another fact bringing in low enthusiasm is that Namibia has been sidelined in most leadership of regional body such as NEPAD, SADC and AU.

The Government of Namibia is in the process of setting up a focal point on NEPAD. However, this process has been hampered by the differing views on NEPAD at the political level. According to the interview (2004), the NEPAD focal point that has been envisaged once put in place, publicity of the NEPAD issues will be heightened and public participation will be facilitated. One should, however, not ignore the fact that the public also has differing views on NEPAD.

What one can deduce here again is that the government is not enthusiastic about NEPAD that is why it acts very slowly given the fact that NEPAD has been in existence for three years now. The government does not only do this with respect to NEPAD, the same thing had done in respect with for instance AGOA. The government does not always act very quickly.

### **5.2.2. The Namibia government's position on the APRM**

Although the Government of Namibia is a member of NEPAD, it did not accede to APRM.

During the interviews, one respondent indicated that:

The Government of Namibia is of the opinion that the nature of the APRM is voluntary, and as such, the overall responsibility for the APRM is vested with the member states

of the AU who have voluntarily chosen to participate in the review process. The government agreed with what has been pronounced by other stakeholders, that the purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that can promote political stability, sustainable development and accelerate sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and best practices, including the development of democracy and good governance. (Interview 2004)

According to the Notice of Question on NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism replied in National Assembly (2004) by former Foreign Affairs Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya:

For Namibia, it is important to expound its constitutional principles on which all-subsequent policies, strategies and laws should be based. As far as NEPAD and Namibia's relations with it goes, there are two important elements in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. These are Fundamental Rights and Freedom (Chapter 3) and Principles of State Policy (Chapter 11). (Notice of Question, 2004:2)

The Fundamental Rights and Freedoms are entrenched, and Chapter 19 of the constitution explains this as follows:

No repeal and or amendment of the provisions in Chapter 3 thereof, in so far as such repeal or amendment dominates or detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms contained and defined in that chapter shall be permissible under this constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be valid or have any force or effect. To government, this makes APRM redundant and justifies its action of not acceding. (Notice of Question, 2004:2)

The interviews conducted shows that the Namibian government has been true to these principles enshrined in the constitution. Indeed, the government is subjected by its citizens to review its actions, policies and strategies almost on a daily basis. This is a sustained and permanent process, taking place through various layers of society and government.

The current feeling among politicians is that Namibia will neither gain nor lose anything by joining or not joining the APRM. Namibia has nothing to fear, as her areas of review are very good. The process is voluntary so that each country will sign up when they want to. Apart

from the fact that the African Union had adequate mechanisms to address the question of good governance, Namibia was accountable to its constitution and electorates on issues of governance. According to Dentlinger (2003), the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya, has indicated that, the government of Namibia does not need external auditors, because the government already has its own auditors – the Namibian Constitution and electorates. Namibia does not have a problem with good governance. It has also been expressed by two NEPRU researchers, Dahl and Shilimela (2002), that NEPAD has little to offer Namibia. They indicated that Namibia was far ahead in terms of objectives and goals set out in NEPAD. Namibia has already scored well in both political governance and sound economic performance as set out in the NEPAD plan.

Namibia has a sustained and permanent review process-taking place through various layers of the society and government.

Government listens to the citizens and also through its interaction with cooperating partners. The Africa Peer Review Mechanism, however appears to be a mechanism to satisfy outsiders more than it assists in transforming African countries. Therefore the government thinks that it can and will continue to do things for the improvement of the living standards of the Namibian people, says one respondent. (Interview 2004)

The Government of Namibia views the APRM as a futile attempt by the West to dictate who should benefit from NEPAD. This was expressed in the statement made by the Prime Minister of Namibia –Theo Ben Gurirab in Mageria (2003), when he consigned the Peer Review Mechanism to “the dustbin of history as a sham, unworkable notion and disqualified it as a misleading new name for the old discredited structural adjustment fiasco, under which African leaders clustered between good guys and bad guys”. Vries (2003) share the same sentiments that were pointed out by the former Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Parliamentarian, Dr.

Kaire Mbwende, when he pointed out that APRM was never part of NEPAD, but was added at the insistence of donor nations as conditionality for aid. The review would subject African nations to inspections in the same fashion as Iraq was subjected to UN weapons inspectors”. To Kaire Mbuende, the APRM is a separate initiative of which the West is very excited and that rich nations are supporting NEPAD only because of the peer review.

The Government of the Republic of Namibia sees the APRM as a process. Given that the fifty - three member states of the AU are at different levels of development, and have different constitutional set ups, it will not be feasible for all countries to sign on at once. The government is studying the provisions of the APRM, and when it has done so, it will carry out the necessary national consultations.

The government reiterated that efforts to address Africa’s development did not start with NEPAD. Since the 1970s, several initiatives on Africa have been put in place in various fora. All of these initiatives fell short of their objectives, and African people feel that some of these initiatives were conceived for Africa and not by Africans. The government believes that for Africa to transform itself permanently, good governance is indeed essential, but it must be pursued within the context of the AU institutional framework.

The government is of the opinion that it would be fundamentally wrong to believe that by taking this position, the government seeks to promote the idea that good governance is irrelevant to NEPAD and its Peer Review Mechanism. On the contrary, what the government is saying is that NEPAD as a development programme for Africa, and its Peer Review

Mechanism, should draw on the input of the Peace and Security Council, the Pan African Parliament and the African Court of Justice to ensure the implementation of the socio-economic programme that constitutes the essence of its agreed purpose.

The commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights is indeed enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which Namibia has ratified, and which underscores the importance given to African democracy and the protection of human rights on our continent, says the former Foreign Affairs Minister during the Notice of Questions on NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism replied in the National Assembly in March 2004. (Notice of Question, 2004:3)

This position is well articulated in the Preamble of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which reads: “Determined to promote and protect human and people’s rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law”. (2004:3)

According to the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya, the member states of AU agreed to establish, inter alia, organs of the AU whose ambit of responsibility includes the safeguarding of African democracy and human rights, such as the Peace and Security Council, the Court of Justice and the Pan African Parliament of the African Union. The Government of Namibia has ratified their statutory institutions.

The government of Namibia is of the opinion that all these institutions, and others provided for in the Constitutive Act of the AU, exist to promote democratic institutions and practice on the continent. They constitute the various elements of the overall African Mechanism for the enforcement of democracy and good political governance in the context of the African Union.

This is how the government defends its position of not acceding to APRM, and sees that there seem to be duplicative activities between NEPAD and AU. They feel that NEPAD should be

integrated into the AU. Indeed, the government also justifies this by pointing out that Namibia is not the only country that has not yet signed up to the APRM. Out of fifty-three countries, only around 24 had signed up so far.

From the government point of view, the APRM involves first a self-review of the way of doing things and then a review by the review panel. This fits in with the principles of democratic governance and political stability as some of the prerequisites for socio-economic development. However, many African leaders consider the APRM as being an unnecessary adage to NEPAD. It is viewed as a failed attempt by the West to dictate to Africa.

As for the countries, which are not acceding to APRM, the fact remains that each country is unique. Some may be playing a “wait and see game” until some have been reviewed. Others may not really see the point in acceding. They say, “What difference does it make?” On the other hand there is no deadline, and the process is voluntary. As for those countries, which are not acceding to APRM, nothing will happen to them, as there is no provision for sanction. On the other hand, some of those that are not eager to sign up such as Namibia and Botswana may gain support based on existing performance rather than APRM review.

As already indicated by two NEPRU researchers that NEPAD would be of little benefits to Namibia, the outcomes of interviews also indicated that the fact that Namibia does not want to accede, it does not mean that the government is hiding something. The country has nothing to hide and is open to outside evaluation of its governing systems. The main detriment would perhaps be the payment of the APRM membership fee of US\$100 000 which each participant

has to pay. This fee makes one question whether some of those countries that have signed up to the APRM will be able to pay up if they are already indebted to the African Union.

### **5.3. Summary**

The government of Namibia has made it clear that it has accepted NEPAD. The government sees NEPAD as an African development programme that will place Africa on a path of sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and will build partnerships with the international community. NEPAD is the way by which African leaders committed themselves to build a new Africa of democracy, good governance, peace, stability, sustainable development and a better life for all African people.

The government of Namibia has not acceded to APRM so far. The government indicated that APRM is a futile attempt by the West to dictate development agenda in Africa. Instead of being subjected to APRM, the government is of the opinion that it already has mechanisms in place to which it is subjected, such as the constitution and its citizens. Also, worth noting by government is that the mechanism is voluntary, and it is not only Namibia which did not accede to APRM.

The Government of Namibia would sign up when ready to do so and when there are tangible benefits to be gained from doing so. The two countries that have pioneered the review, Ghana and Rwanda, will only be finished in 2005, and so far twenty-four of the fifty - three member states have acceded. As reported already, the outcomes of results of the countries under review

will either deter or encourage countries to accede to APRM. The indication is that the process is likely to go on for some years.

There is a need to reduce the high level of criticism of APRM. There should be clarity on the purpose of the review. So far, the only stated purpose is to enable member states to learn from one another's good practices. Is that the only main reasons? What will Namibia learn for instance from Gabon or Equatorial Guinea, in regards to good governance or respect and protection of human rights? There is no reward for good APRM results, as there are no punitive measures for the poor performance either.



## **CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

*Namibia should sign up when ready to do so and when there are tangible benefits to be gained from doing so. (Interview respondent 2004)*

### **6.1. Conclusion**

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a new development programme crafted by African leaders to remove Africa from its social and economic problems. NEPAD is not a body like SADC, but is a programme of AU. Hence the member states of AU are automatically members of NEPAD programme.

The NEPAD initiative, if conducted successfully, will solve many social and development problems in Africa. NEPAD has its priority areas such as agriculture, infrastructure, health, education, environment, information and communication technology. By focusing on these areas, poverty and underdevelopment in Africa could be something of the past.

NEPAD is not the first initiative in Africa. There have been other initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Africa Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment for socio-economic Transformation (1989), amongst many others. All these initiatives were aimed at accelerating economic growth and removing Africa from its quagmire of problems, but they have failed. So the people of Africa are eager to see what change NEPAD will bring about.

NEPAD has been formed at a political level, spearheaded especially by South African President Thabo Mbeki, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Egyptian President Hosni

Mubarak, Senegalese President Wade and Algerian President Boutflika. This is suspicious to some of the African leaders and to some of the African people. The mistake has been that these leaders took the programme upon themselves and marketed it first to Western countries and then in Africa. This made people of Africa doubt the originality of NEPAD and confuse it with other programmes, which had failed in Africa, e.g., Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).

Another point is that these leaders chose a top down approach instead of bottom up approach. The publics have not been consulted and there has not been from the onset a strategy to increase the publicity of NEPAD to the ordinary people of Africa. Civil society organisations are claiming that they have been left out, and therefore they have been criticizing NEPAD. In some countries like Mauritania, the nation stood up and told their government directly not to go ahead with the plan of recognizing NEPAD. The analysis that can be made here is that many people just joined NEPAD by virtue of being members of AU. If membership to NEPAD was voluntary, many Africa countries would, still not have joined this programme.

The fact that some NEPAD sources of funds will come from the West raised some concern. This will make donors discriminate between countries which are performing well and those, which are not. African people are worried about conditionalities that might be attached. But the fact that we have to remember is that NEPAD cannot be successful on its own. NEPAD needs to find a way to strike a balance on this and solve issues of conditionalities. If one look at SADC programme, it share some similarities with NEPAD. Not all funds for SADC project are domestic, but some come from external sources. The SADC programme has a common

donor agenda in which both donors and Africans discuss and reach a consensual agreement which is mutual beneficial. The NEPAD programme could do the same.

The fact that remains and still needs much emphasis is the publicity of NEPAD. The publicity needs to be heightened so that everyone can be taken on board. This should be done if NEPAD is to be a successful programme. The African leaders made a mistake because the initiative was publicized outside of the continent first. This made African people think that this initiative is not owned by Africans, but was being developed by non-Africans for Africans. Hence those marketing it are being used as puppets of the West.

Despite the above criticisms, NEPAD looks promising. It has made some of the African issues that have never discussed seriously at global level be discussed at that level. One remarkable evidence is when African countries were first invited to the G8 meeting.

The Government of Namibia has pronounced its position with regard to NEPAD. The government has accepted NEPAD and sees it as having potential to move Africa forward. They see NEPAD as a programme that will play a leading role in the implementation of massive cross border developmental projects and bring economic integration for the benefits of all the people.

The success of NEPAD depends on the ownership of initiatives by African themselves. As long as African people don't have ownership, NEPAD will remain a foreign object to Africa,

and African people will do everything possible to sabotage its efforts to go forward. Publicity should be stepped up.

If the APRM is to be successful, then effective sanctions and rewards could be considered. The wording element of “voluntary nature” should be removed. The effective sanctions accompanied by rewards will prevent African countries to deviate from principles laid down in NEPAD programme. If sanctions are introduced, countries will be afraid for punishment and isolation, hence they will try their best not to violate NEPAD principles. It should be made mandatory to AU member states. By making APRM mandatory, this will make all AU member state to accede to APRM and make them to progress forward at the more or less same wavelength. There will be no single country that would want to be left behind if all African countries are in the APRM, just like NEPAD. Its principles of operation should be similar to that of NEPAD with regard to membership. It should be that by virtue of being a member of NEPAD, one automatically signs up to APRM. That would make Africa to go forward. Otherwise Africa will have two blocks of countries – those signed up and getting donor assistance and those, which are not. Hence, the problem and bad image will persist and drag down the continent’s good image. For instance if there are fifty African state accede to APRM and put their house in order, and on the other side there are three African states having problem with civil wars, corruption, election problems etc and left out, then it is a problem that will continue damaging the good image of Africa.

African countries have different views on APRM. Some see it as a good thing, while others see it as an attempt by the West to dictate the agenda of development in Africa. Some

countries have adopted a “wait and see attitude”. If they see tangible benefits for those countries undergoing the review, then they will sign up. If there are no tangible benefits, then it might make APRM a futile exercise. The fact that countries have to pay US\$100 000 APRM membership fees is also contributing to discouraging member states to sign up. Some member states are already indebted to AU and other regional bodies like SADC and COMESA. So they are worried again about APRM costs. If African countries do not have enough money to contribute to APRM exercise, then external sources might be the solution. However, external sources of funding have problems, such that of conditionalities that African states do not want.

The Government of Namibia, like many other African countries government, has accepted NEPAD, but has not acceded to the APRM. The Government of Namibia viewed APRM as a futile attempt by the West to dictate who should benefit from NEPAD. Other reasons cited are that since there is no time frame of signing up, the government can take its time. Moreover the mechanism is voluntary, and Namibia has other mechanisms in which it is being reviewed like the constitution and electorates. Hence, there is no need to rush into something which is new and which has unclear advantages and disadvantages. The government is of the opinion that accession or non-accession is thus a matter of sovereign choice for each member state of the African Union. Thus, Namibia’s current position of non-accession in no way detracts or contradicts from its broader commitment to NEPAD, as well as other African Union initiatives nor external benefits from good practices.

From the point of view of the study undertaken, Namibia has met all the criteria of good governance and political stability, but it did not want to accede. Namibia has nothing to fear,

but instead if it accedes, it will portray a good example to other countries, especially its neighbours, to sign up. Namibia fully committed to transparency and is open to review by any organisation, and many reviews have been conducted on many of the country's policies. Hence there is no need for the government of Namibia to fear being reviewed on any aspects of her governance.

There is a possibility that the government of Namibia might change its position in future, and this will be determined by changing in circumstances of situation. This can be done only if APRM produces good tangible results. The first countries under review – Ghana and Rwanda - whether with good or bad results, will deter or encourage more countries to sign up, as some countries have adopted a “wait and see attitude”. So, there is a need to make APRM more effective. The publicity and strategy need to be worked out clearly. Some punitive measures need to be introduced and make it a mandatory or compulsory to every country.

There seems to be some kind of wait and see attitude on the side of government. The government might want to see outcomes of results of countries under review and wait to see whether there will be benefits accruing or not. Then the decision will be made based on the outcomes of the result from the reviews exercises.

The understanding undertaken during the research is that, the APRM process is not intended to target particular African leaders or compel leaders in APRM to take a certain public position versus others. The APRM, which is predicated on persuasion and peer influence, will deal with those countries that accede to it. The APRM is not expected to be an instrument of

coercion of participating states. The government is not joining APRM in part due to the fact that it has a strong relationship with Zimbabwe, and is afraid to criticize President Robert Mugabe. There is a perception on the side of government that APRM has a hidden agenda to get “rid “off president Robert Mugabe.

It is important to point out that since APRM is a new initiative, the government needs to carefully weigh a variety of factors from its national point of view. This would make government deliberate as to whether accession to the initiative will add value to that which already exists in its own contexts, whether it will strengthen or weaken the relationship that Namibia has with other existing institutions and the cost considerations. The APRM is still fairly new and some of its content is still being formulated. This is also contributing to government’s decision as to whether or not accession to APRM will bring benefits both, on a short and long-term basis.

As previously suggested, the result that will come from countries under review – Rwanda and Ghana, will play a foremost determining role for other countries to decide whether to sign up or not, and to assess whether the mechanism is credible or not.

## **6.2. Recommendations**

The analysis undertaken here suggests that there are certain circumstances whereby the government can make decisions on behalf of the masses. The governments are elected and given mandate by the people to make decision on their behalf. The government enter into agreements with other governments, something that civil society cannot do. The civil society

organisations for instance cannot put massive amount of resources i.e. money on the table. Imagine the billions of dollars that NEPAD requires. The G8 can put such kind of money on the table. The government has first to lay a foundation and then other stakeholders can come in. Look to President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who did not loose any votes by taking a leading position on NEPAD. So, the governments are elected to represent the electorates and govern on their behalf.

By taking this position, the study is not proposing that the government should take unilateral action, but in consultation the government should make decision on behalf of the masses, which voted for such government. However caution should be here that, there are some cases whereby if the government does not listen to the voices of the masses, the masses can remove such government through (for instance) election.

Although, Namibia has not successful embarked upon inclusive governance as far as the issues of NEPAD are concern, there is a strong feeling that in future, all stakeholders will have chance to participate fully in NEPAD deliberations. What is already happening is that ‘slowly but surely’ there is a movement towards inclusive governance as far as NEPAD is concern. The Government of Namibia is committed to the principles enshrined in the NEPAD documents, among others, respect for the rule of law and human rights, transparency, accountability and democracy. The government is accountable to its constitution and electorates, which is a good sign of inclusive governance.



Some of the civil society organizations have taking part in NEPAD debates in few meetings, workshops and seminars that have been hold. In these workshops, both government and civil society organizations had representatives. They took part in the deliberations on NEPAD and APRM and had increased publicity of NEPAD through publications and presentations. Notwithstanding the above, the awareness about NEPAD among the general public remain low, such that an ordinary Namibian do not even know what NEPAD or APRM are all about.

The envisaged Focal Point on NEPAD to be housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one hope that it will facilitate to tackle issues of NEPAD and APRM 'tooth and nails' and ease the participation of civil society organizations and other stakeholders to the satisfactory level. It is expected that once NEPAD Focal Point become functional, the stakeholders i.e. CSOs will do more in terms of sharing information with the government and public at large. The government-civil society organizations interactions will be heightened. It will be high time that the government treat CSOs as partners in development as oppose to government old tradition of looking at CSOs as enemy of the state.

The NEPAD process both in Namibia and South Africa has been characterized by lack of deliberations, debates and discussions, as they have not fully involve the diversity of civil society organizations. The CSOs in the two countries has argued that, they have not been given chance to participate fully in issues of NEPAD and APRM. Rather CSOs have been treated as NEPAD spectators. The two Governments need to develop a broad based participation of CSOs and public at large for the successful implementation and creation of ownership on NEPAD and APRM. Unlike Namibia, the South African Government has acceded to APRM.

The Government of South Africa is in the first phase of APRM and the country is busy putting in place processes and mechanisms to undertake the reviewing process.

The study therefore recommends the following:

- The government should go ahead with its plan of establishing a NEPAD focal point. Its capacity and human resources should be strengthened. NEPAD projects should not be considered in isolation but should be coordinated with other regional bodies' projects such as SADC, COMESA, SACU etc so as to reduce costs, coordinate efforts and be able to have an adequate pool of expertise. There is a need to figure out how the linkage between NEPAD and the above-mentioned regional bodies could be initiated and strengthened.
- The government should embark upon a "NEPAD roadshow" whereby it sensitizes the nation on the issue of NEPAD.
- Civil society organizations should be encouraged to actively participate in the NEPAD process.
- Consultative NEPAD workshops should be encouraged, and government and other stakeholders should assist in whatever ways they deem fit.
- The government should review continuously its official position of "not acceding to APRM" and should do so in such a way that the nation does not forego benefits associated with acceding to APRM.
- The voluntary nature of the initiative should be changed to that of mandatory nature.

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**ANNEXURE “A”**

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON APRM**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA**

**FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR M.PUBLIC ADMIN RESEARCH PROJECT/THESIS**

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT’S POSITION ON NEPAD’S  
PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)**

I am a Master of Public Administration (MPA) student at the University of Namibia and I am undertaking a research project. Your views and inputs will be incorporated in my thesis, as partial fulfillment of the requirements of Master of Public Administration Degree. Your name will not be used and your views and inputs will be treated with strict confidentiality. Would you be so kind as to respond to the questions below and please try to answer every question?

1. What does APRM involve and where does it fit in terms of Namibia’s (AU,s, NEPAD’s) overall framework and purpose?

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2. In your own words, what do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of APRM?

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3. Those African countries which have not yet acceded to APRM, what are they waiting for?

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4. What will happen to those countries which do not want to accede to APRM?

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5. What is the position of the government of Namibia with regard to APRM?

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6. Although the government of Namibia has accepted NEPAD, it initially has not acceded to APRM. Why?

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7. Does it make sense for Namibia to be part of NEPAD, but at the same time avoid APRM?

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8. Do you think the government of Namibia will change its position in the future?

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9. In Namibia, what are the institutions specifically dealing with issues of NEPAD and APRM?

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10. It is suggested that Namibia has nothing to lose if it accedes to APRM. What benefits or detriments are there for Namibia, if it accedes to APRM?

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11. What can be done to reduce or address the high level of criticisms on APRM?

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12. What is the way forward for the government of Namibia as far as the APRM is concerned?

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13. Kindly add any other comments that you would like to make with regard to APRM.

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Thank you for completing the questionnaire.

S. Nambala

**ANNEXURE “B”**

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON NEPAD**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA**

**FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR M. PUBLIC ADMIN RESEARCH PROJECT/THESIS**

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT’S POSITION ON NEPAD’S  
PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)**

I am a Master of Public Administration (MPA) student at the University of Namibia and I am undertaking a research project. Your views and inputs will only be incorporated in my thesis as partial fulfillment of the requirements of Master of Public Administration Degree. Your name will not be used and your views and inputs will be treated with strictly confidentiality. Would you be so kind to respond to the questions below and please try to answer every question?

1. What does a country need to do before it is inducted into NEPAD?

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2. Are civil society organizations part and parcel of the formation of NEPAD? Please explain.

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3. Why is NEPAD met with mixed feelings in some African countries?

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4. What mechanisms will be put in place to ensure that NEPAD does not become like other bodies such as SADC, which have a track record of underachievement?

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5. Indicate the advantages of Namibia of joining NEPAD.

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6. Most of NEPAD's resources will come from Western and European countries. Will this not create a dependency among the African countries? Please explain.

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7. Why cannot NEPAD just mobilise its resources from the continent of Africa only?

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8. What is the position of the government of Namibia with regards to NEPAD?

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9. Do civil society organisations in Namibia have an active input as far as NEPAD is concerned? Please explain.

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10. What mechanisms does the government of Namibia put in place to ensure active public participation and strong inputs with regards to the issue of NEPAD?

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11. Do the ordinary Namibian people understand what does NEPAD involves?

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12. How will NEPAD alleviate poverty and underdevelopment?

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13. Indicate why you think NEPAD would be a successful body for Africa's development.

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14. State the sources of funds for NEPAD.

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15. Kindly add any other comments that you would like to make with regard to NEPAD.

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Thank you for completing the questionnaire.

S.Nambala



**ANNEXURE “C”**

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO CIVIL SOCIETY ON APRM**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA**

**FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR M.PUBLIC ADMIN RESEARCH PROJECT/THESIS**

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT’S POSITION ON NEPAD’S PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)**

I am a Master of Public Administration (MPA) student at the University of Namibia and I am undertaking a research project. Your views and inputs will be incorporated in my thesis, as partial fulfillment of the requirements of Master of Public Administration Degree. Your name will not be used and your views and inputs will be treated with strict confidentiality. Would you be so kind as to respond to the questions below and please try to answer every question?

1. What does APRM involve and where does it fit in terms of Namibia’s ( AU,s, NEPAD’s) overall framework and purpose?

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2. In your own words, what do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of APRM?

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3. Those African countries which have not yet acceded to APRM, what are they waiting for?

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4. What will happen to those countries, which do not want to accede to APRM?

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5. The APRM membership fees of US\$ 100 000 to be paid by member states, will this contribute to the slow pace of signing up to the APRM?

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6. Although the government of Namibia has accepted NEPAD, it initially has not acceded to APRM. How do you justify Namibia's position not to subscribe to NEPAD, s peer review?

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7. Does it make sense for Namibia to be part of NEPAD, but at the same time avoid APRM? Why can it just be in everything or be out of everything?

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8. Do you think the government of Namibia will change its position in the future?

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9. What do you think are the attitudes of civil society organizations towards APRM?

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10. What benefits or detriments are there for Namibia, if it accedes to APRM?

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11. What can be done to reduce or address the high level of criticisms on APRM?

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12. African Union member states automatically have NEPAD membership. Why does the same apply to APRM?

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13. What roles have civil society organizations played as far as APRM is concerned? Please explain.

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14. Kindly add any other comments that you would like to make with regard to APRM.

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Thank you for completing the questionnaire.

S. Nambala

**ANNEXURE “D”**

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO CIVIL SOCIETY ON NEPAD**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA**

**FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR M. PUBLIC ADMIN RESEARCH PROJECT/THESIS**

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT’S POSITION ON NEPAD’S  
PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)**

I am a Master of Public Administration (MPA) student at the University of Namibia and I am undertaking a research project. Your views and inputs will be incorporated in my thesis as partial fulfillment of the requirements of Master of Public Administration Degree. Your name will not be used and your views and inputs will be treated with strict confidentiality. Would you be so kind as to respond to the questions below and please try to answer every question?

1. What does a country need to do before it is inducted into NEPAD?

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2. Are civil society organizations part and parcel of the formation of NEPAD? Please explain.

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3. Why is NEPAD met with mixed feelings in some African countries?

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4. What mechanisms will be put in place to ensure that NEPAD does not become like other bodies such as SADC, which have a track record of underachievement?

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5. Indicate the advantages and disadvantages of Namibia joining NEPAD?

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6. Most of NEPAD's resources will come from Western and European countries. Will this not create a dependency among the African countries? Please explain.

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7. Why cannot NEPAD just mobilise its resources from the continent of Africa only?

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8. Indicate what Namibian civil society organizations have done as far as NEPAD is concerned?

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9. Do civil society organisations in Namibia have an active input as far as NEPAD is concerned? Please explain.

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10. Do you think the government of Namibia has placed enough mechanisms to ensure active public participation and strong inputs as far as the issue of NEPAD is concerned?

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11. Do the ordinary Namibian people understand what NEPAD involves?

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12. How will NEPAD alleviate poverty and underdevelopment?

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13. Indicate why you think NEPAD would be a successful body for Africa's development.

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14. State the sources of funds for NEPAD and indicate whether this will not dictate the direction in which NEPAD will move.

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15. Kindly add any other comments that you would like to make with regard to NEPAD.

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Thank you for completing the questionnaire.

S.Nambala



