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ABSTRACT

This study is a critical review of the implementation and effects of the National Resettlement Policy (NRP) in Namibia. The NRP is part of the National Land Policy (NLP), which has been implemented in this country since independence in 1990. Its purpose is to redress the colonial injustices of land distribution.

This is a broad national review of policy implementation and its effects. Data was collected using questionnaires, interviews and literature search. The analysis of data integrated both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. From the results obtained, the study concluded that the implementation of the resettlement program is not progressing well. The willing-seller-willing-buyer has brought inefficiency and ineffectiveness in land redistribution. In addition, there is no master list for applicants. As a result, corruption is rife. The plots of 1 000 hectares each are insufficient for cattle and crop farming. Women are given less prominence in the resettlement process. Those who have benefited from the resettlement process are still engaged in traditional farming activities and this tends to limit their productivity.

In light of these conclusions, the study recommends the amendment of the Land Reform Act to pave way for the abolition of the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle, which contributes to the problems of land acquisition. Instead, the government should design and introduce a heavy land tax system for absentee landlords so that they give up any excessive land they own. On the other hand, mechanisms should be put in place to fairly remunerate farmers who will be forced to give up their farms. At least 1 500 to 2 000 hectares should be allocated to each resettled farmer. Those who benefited from this scheme should be trained in land utilization. There should be constant consultations between communities and the resettlement directorate so that both parties value the resettlement process.

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my parents Jonas Kadhila and Aina Nampa Shigwedha – Nkandi and my late grandmother, Maria Embumbulu (Efata LyaNamutenya GwaNkandi Yamwaanawa), for they have shaped my life immensely. Was it not for their love, tireless efforts, dedication, and unselfish commitment in giving me proper guidance during my childhood, perhaps I could not have been able to sit and write this paper today.

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To all those institutions and individuals who made this thesis possible, but whose names do not appear here, I say God bless.

DECLARATIONS

This is a research paper prepared in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Public Administration, a study program with the University of Namibia (UNAM) in Windhoek, Namibia. This thesis is an original work of the author and it has not been submitted for a degree elsewhere. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the institution.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AALS	Affirmative Action Loan Scheme
AgriBank	Agricultural Bank of Namibia
COD	Congress of Democrats
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
ID	Identity Card
LAC	Legal Assistance Centre
LRAC	Land Reform Advisory Committee

MAWRD	Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development
MHSS	Ministry of Health and Social Services
MLRR	Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation
NAU	Namibia Agricultural Union
NBC	Namibian Broadcasting Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NLP	National Land Policy
NNFU	Namibia National Farmers Unions
NHDR	Namibia Human Development Report
NRP	National Resettlement Policy
NRC	National Resettlement Committee
NEPRU	Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit
PS	Permanent Secretary
RG	Regional Governor
RM	Resettlement Manual
RRC	Regional Resettlement Commission
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SWAPO	South West People Organization
UNAM	University of Namibia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following concepts are defined to help clarify the context within which they are used in this thesis.

Certificate of waiver: This is a certificate of formal rejection of the unsuitable farms issued by the Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rehabilitation upon being issued it leaves such farms to the owners to sell them to the Namibian citizens in the open market.

Willing Seller, Willing buyer: A policy adopted by the GRN under which those who owned land can sell it on their own will to those who want to buy it on their own will in the open market

Contract labour system: A system adopted by both the German and South African colonial Administrations, in terms of which the indigenous Namibian people were only allowed to enter the former police zones for work purposes and were compelled to return to what was formerly known as reserves or homelands (Owamboland, Kavangoland, and the Caprivi strip) upon completion of their work attachment or expiry of attachment period.

Economic units: The division of the resettlement farms into small units from 1500 – 3000 hectares under the current GRN resettlement program.

Lease agreement: This is an agreement entered into between the Minister of the MLRR and the resettlement beneficiaries in terms of which the latter leases the land allocated to them for the period of 99 years with an option to buy such land.

Affirmative action farmer: This is a farmer that is given a state guaranteed loan by the Agricultural Bank of Namibia under affirmative Action Loan Scheme, as part of the land

redistribution scheme to purchase his or her own farm. This farmer is categorized so because he or she owns more than 150 large stocks and/or more than 800 small stocks.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1. Introduction

This study focuses on the implementation and impact of the National Resettlement Policy (NRP) that was introduced in 1990 by the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN). The implementation of this policy is presided over by the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (MLRR). The objectives of the policy are to afford targeted groups (the San Community, ex- fighters, former refugees, displaced and disabled people, and people from overcrowded communal agricultural land), the opportunity for food production, employment, as well as to accommodate small scale farmers in the mainstream of the Namibian economy and to decrease human and livestock overcrowding in the communal areas (MLRR 2001: 2).

The MLRR (1996:6) defines resettlement as a process where people are provided with the avenue to move from one area with fewer resources to other areas with potential of providing better resources that can help improve the standard of living in a satisfactory way. This is done on a voluntary basis where people make applications and choose an area where they want to be allocated land, in either communal and/or commercial areas. People can be resettled in any areas with an exception of those areas that are restricted by law or those that are considered to be too marginal for productivity. The legislative and regulatory bases for the process of acquisition and distribution of land in the commercial farming areas are provided for in the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act (Act No. 6 of 1995). On the other hand, the guidelines and regulations for the acquisition and distribution of land in the communal areas are provided for in the Communal Land Reform Acts (MLRR, 1996:12).

2. Background to the study

This study has its background in the many debates and controversies that characterized the formulation of the land reform policy and in particular the implementation of the resettlement policy in Namibia. Some stakeholders have been unhappy with the implementation process. Most of the stakeholders agree with one another on the lack of progress in the implementation process, and in the process, accused one another on the lack of progress, corruption and mismanagement. The government for instance accused the white commercial farmers of exploiting the principle of willing seller willing buyer by offering the farms at exorbitant prices for purchases by the government. At the same time these farmers are offering only very bad farms for purchases. According to the government, farms that are located in the mountainous and desert areas are very unproductive and thus unsuitable for resettlement purposes. On the other hand, the white commercial farmers through the mainly white dominated farmers union, The Namibia Agricultural Union (NAU), claims that every piece of land is suitable for resettlement because it can be used for any other farming activities such as game farming. The black dominated Namibia National Farmers Union (NNFU), which claims to speak for the formerly disadvantaged people called for the grabbing of all commercial farms owned by the white farmers in order to accelerate land reform and resettlement.

3. Statement of the problem

While it should be acknowledged that the resettlement process is ongoing and is in its stage of infancy, there should be equal understanding that a number of problems cloud the resettlement process. These include: corruption allegations in the form of favoritism and nepotism, and high cost of available farms for purchases. For instance the average price per hectare in 8 regions where resettlement has been taking

place is about N\$ 159.00 (NAU 2003:82). Other problems are the slow pace of acquiring needed land, reluctance by commercial farmers to supply farms for purchases under the policy of “Willing seller, willing buyer”, and lack of official evaluation on the implementation and impact of the resettlement program.

4. Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to:

- i) Critically review of the implementation of the Namibian National Resettlement policy between 1990 and 2003,
- ii) Highlights its impacts on the basis of the mission the policy have set itself to achieve.
- iii) Provide recommendations for improving the implementation process so that it produces desirable impacts.

5. The research question

The question that drives this debate is: **what has been the performance of the land resettlement policy between 1990 and 2003?**

In order to answer this question the following sub questions are posed.

- a) How is land allocated to the applicants?
- b) How many people and under what categories have they benefited from this scheme?
- c) Is the resettlement process proceeding according to plan?
- d) What is the impact of this process to the beneficiaries?

6. Research methodology

In order to be able to answer the research question on how land is allocated to the applicants of the resettlement program and what has been the impact of this process on the beneficiaries, a number of

methods were used to collect the data. These methods include; interviews, questionnaires and documentary search. Interviews were directed to senior politicians in both the ruling and opposition parties, politicians and bureaucrats in the MLRR, and leaders of interest groups.

Interviews: Interviews were conducted with the following people: The Director of Resettlement: MLRR, Chief Control Officer: MLRR and the Public Relation Officer: MLRR. Three representatives from three different interest groups and political parties were also interviewed. They were: From the DTA party, Mr. Richard Kamburona, Administrative Secretary, From the CoD party, Mr. Ignatius Shixwameni, Secretary General and from the NAU, Mr. Jan De Wet, the president.

Questionnaires: Questionnaires were directed to 56 respondents made up of the beneficiaries of the resettlement program. At least 7 people from each 8 of the 13 regions were interviewed.

Documentary search: The following documents were used: Minutes of the National Resettlement Committee meetings which took place in the board room of the MLRR on: 28 February, 10 March, 3 April, 10 July, 16 and 30 October, 27 November 2000, 29 March, and 7 May 2001, the resettlement policy, research reports, policy and program documents, newspapers reports and speeches.

7. Importance of the study

The study of the National Resettlement Policy is important because it shows how the government has dealt with the land question between 1990-2003. The aim is to find out whether the government has implemented the resettlement policy successfully or not. It is also important in such a sense that it

indicates whether the policy has made any impact on the lives of the beneficiaries or not. For instance about 240,000 people are estimated to be in need of land but since 1990 when resettlement begun, only 30 720. 00 people were resettled. This information will be used to determine whether the resettlement policy is progressing according to plan or is falling short of the expectations. This analysis will help to reach conclusions and recommend improvements to the whole process, if need be.

8. Limitations of the study

Limitations of this study are: **Time:** This thesis has to be completed within about four months time though it would have required more time to enable the researcher to visit various stakeholders such as commercial and resettlement farmers, community leaders, individuals and various experts in the land reform and resettlement scheme for interviews. These people are scattered all over Namibia. This would enable the researcher to obtain primary data on how the resettlement program is implemented on the ground.

Funds: Lack of funds has hampered the effort of the researcher to reach most of the stakeholders and beneficiaries in different parts of the country.

Insufficient literature: There is no sufficient literature on land reform and especially on resettlement program in Namibia.

Difficulties in data collection: Although relevant information was obtained from the government officials, it must be stated here that it has not been easy to get this information. It was also at times very difficult to secure appointments with top government politicians and officials such as Ministers and Permanent Secretaries in the MLRR and other ministries as well. These people are always busy with months long

scheduled meetings, in the parliament, and traveling out to the regions or outside the country for weeks.

In addition their secretaries seems not to be serious in fixing appointments like the one for researchers.

CHAPTER 2

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

This chapter reviews and presents the theoretical process of policy implementation, its definitions, implementation models and factors that influence the implementation process in both negative and positive ways.

2. Definition

Various authors defined policy implementation:

Gerston (1997:95) defines policy implementation as a representation of a conscious conversion of policy plans into reality and as a follow through part of the process of making public policy.

According to Nsingo (2000: 213), policy implementation is about putting a program into effect; actions aimed at achieving goals; actions intended to put policies or programs into operation and getting things done. It is about executing selected and adopted policy options; translating laws, program and projects into actual actions. He further stated that a policy could only be a policy once it is implemented and if it is not implemented, its status will be negative and simply remain a policy statement.

To conceptualize the above-mentioned definitions to the implementation of the resettlement policy in Namibia would entail putting the land reform program into effect or operations. With resettlement program, the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) aims at achieving the goals of reallocating

land to those who have been previously disadvantaged by the system of colonial rule. The implementation of land reform policy means getting things done.

3. **Actors in policy implementation process**

Anderson (1984:173) and Nsingo (2000:237), identified various actors that are involved in policy implementation process: **The legislators or Parliamentarians**; who make laws or policies, by approving or disapproving them; **the president (Chief policy executor)** upon whom all government policies would eventually be associated with. For instance in Namibia if the land and resettlement policies fail, generally speaking, people will perceive this as a failure of President Nujoma to address the land inequity; **The Judiciaries or the Courts**, which administer the legality of policies; **The Law enforcement agencies for example the police**, who ensure that citizen's actions are in line with the provisions of the law;

The interest groups and individual citizens. Interest groups are for example trade unions, such as NUNW, NAU and the media, can either support or oppose a policy. **Individual citizens:** largely as well participate in policy implementation process by commenting through the radio program such as the National chart show. **The bureaucracy (chief policy-implementing agency):** Policy implementation needs effective public service, which is non-partisan and career orientated for effective policy implementation. In a personal interview with the Director of Resettlement Program in the MLRR, the director complained about lack of cooperation from civil servant from some government ministries, such as the MAWRD who supposed to play an active role in the resettlement process.

4. **Factors that influence successful implementation of a policy**

Nsingo (2000:240) notes several factors that influence the policy implementation process. These are:

Clear context of organization or institution: The institution(s) in charge should be clearly identified. It is equally important to know the number of organizations involved in the implementation process. If too many organizations are involved in the policy implementation process, the implementation and consultation process may become too complex and difficult to implement successfully. For instance, the MLRR is charged with the implementation of the resettlement policy. However, other government institutions such as the Ministry of Basic Education and Culture (MBEC), Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) are also involved in the implementation process. In a personal interview with the Director of Resettlement Program, Mr Shanyengana, accused some government ministries of not forthcoming in rendering their parts as provided for in the resettlement policy document. This is example of the difficulties that can be caused by too many stakeholders involved in the implementation process.

Competent Technocrats: These are officials that translate the language of the program into plans that are acceptable and executable. There are for instance permanent secretaries, directors, Lawyers, and other experts in the ministries that make sure that everything is in place for the smooth implementation of the resettlement policy.

Clear operational policy and procedures: This is all about clarifying policy procedures in order to facilitate the smooth implementation. If the policy is understood properly it is also easier to interpret its content. What is happening is that in most cases the intention of policy makers is not clear and hence the need to facilitate the process in term of who is doing what, when and how and the resources to be used. The MLRR for instance, developed National Land Policy, Resettlement Policy and the Resettlement program Manuals to clarify the content of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 (Act 6 of 1995).

Resource availability: If there is a lack of sufficient money and time, as well as non-qualified and competent staff, policy implementation is likely to face a number of challenges. The MLRR is faced with all these problems in the implementation of the resettlement program.

The source of the policy: The president, the legislatures, ministers, bureaucrats, the judiciaries, different interest groups and the masses all have influence on the implementation of the policy. This is also the case with the implementation of the resettlement policy. However, although each actor has its role to play, some actors have more power than others in the implementation process. For instances, if the head of state wants policy to be implemented it will be done in a fast way. For example the implementation of the land reform program in Zimbabwe was carried on in its current fashion because it was a directive from President Mugabe despite criticism from domestic and international oppositions

Support for the Policy: The external politics and the internal bureaucratic interests determine the success of policy implementation. If for instance there is no support from local communities and interest group the implementation of the policy is likely to suffer. It is therefore very important to lobby for policy support before implementation begins. According to Mr. Vergotine, senior officer in the MLRR, the Ministry has been lobbying with the stakeholders such as trade unions, agricultural unions, political parties, councilors, traditional leaders and others to support the resettlement policy.

Good communication and co-ordination: Policy implementers must ensure that there are good communication networks, which can facilitate policy implementation in an efficient manner between the main center and its periphery areas. For instance the MLRR should ensure that there is proper

communication between itself and all stakeholders. This is the only way that stakeholders will be able to understand targeted communities.

5. Factors that lead to implementation failure

Various factors that caused implementation failures as outlined by Nsing (2000: 240) are as follow:

Poor policy framework: If the policy is only formulated in general terms it can be very difficult to be understood by its administrators and as a result it will be difficult to be implemented. This means that operational documents that explain procedures to be followed are very important. The resettlement Manual for instance explains the implementation of Resettlement Policy in detail.

Too much detailed policies: If a policy is having too much detailed steps to be followed it may become a burden to the implementers.

Malicious obedience by the implementers: If the implementers are not having the implementation spirit at heart and they are simply doing it because it is stated like that by the policy document, this could lead to policy failures. Implementers need to be in the policy implementation mood to make implementation a success.

Deliberate delaying tactics as expression of the lack of interest or actual opposition to the policy: The slowness of the commercial farmers to offer their farms for government purchases is a good example of deliberate delaying tactics to mess up the resettlement program.

Attitude changes: This is the case when the implementers and policy makers change their minds during the implementation process. This may lead to the failure of policy implementation. For instance, if the government

decides not to allocate enough money to a certain project this can lead to the failure of the implementation of that policy.

Imperfect knowledge of the problem: If nobody knows that the cause of the overcrowding in communal areas is the lack of access to land among the formerly disadvantaged communities than it will be hard for the government to come up with the resettlement program.

Failure to establish a proper cause-effect relationship: This may lead to the formulation of policies that are poor and without bearing any fruit.

Lack of adequately trained policy implementers: It is important to have well trained people in order to implement policies successfully. If well-trained people conduct the implementation, it is always better in terms of motivation and co-coordinated implementation process.

Lack of consultation between those who are formulating policies and those who are implementing it: If this happen, each of the two may regard the policy as foreign to them. If there is no coordination between the implementers and formulators of the resettlement policy, such policy could be viewed to be strange by the stakeholders and as such run a risk of being rejected.

Lack of funds: If there is a shortage of funds to finance the implementation process than there will be no successful implementation of a policy. The MLRR has so far not been able to complete the resettlement program because of a lack of funds. The Ministry has been receiving an allocation of 20 million per year for implementation. This amount is perceived by the Ministry itself and other critics as too less for the resettlement exercise. In his budget speech, the Minister of Finance, Nangolo Mbumba, announced the increase in the funds earmarked for the land acquisition and redistribution exercise from N\$ 20 million to N\$ 50 million per year (The Namibian Newspaper 2 March 2003).

Lack of trust between politicians and civil service. If for instance the Minister in the MLRR does not trust his/her Permanent Secretary and directors, this may lead into delay in the implementation of the land reform policy.

Corruption especially in resource utilization: If for instance the officials are using money to allocate land to their friends and relatives this will lead to the resettlement policy failing to achieve its Objectives.

The behavior of the target group or clientele: In a personal interview with the Director of Resettlement in the MLRR, Mr. Mukwaita Shanyengana, the director, stated that some members of the beneficiaries, such as a group of resettled San people in the Mangetti Dune in the Tsumkwe area, had slaughtered, for meat purpose, all the four cattle that were given to them for cultivation purpose. This type of behavior can contribute to the failure of the resettlement program.

Too many implementing agencies: There is always more than one agency involved with the implementation of a policy. In the case of resettlement policy is for instance various GRN ministries. If the activities of these agencies are not well coordinated this can lead to the failures of the policy.

Outdated legislation: There are for instance complaints by various resettlement stakeholders such as trade unions and researchers that that the land Act is old fashioned and therefore contributing to land reform difficulties.

6. Models of policy implementation

There are various models applicable to the policy implementation process such as:

The top-down rational control model

Several scholars such as Dunshire, Hood and Gun in Nsingo (2000:220), referred to this model as a traditional model. The principle underlying this model is that policy implementation requires a top down system of control and communication as well as the allocation of resources to do the job. It emphasizes hierarchy, centralized authority / unit of command, decision making from the top, impersonality in the performance of one's duties, rules and regulations and control. This model is criticized as elitist and

dictatorial in nature, kills innovations and promotes negative attitude towards implementation because people hate to be controlled.

Bottom-up model

This model according to Hill, Linder, and Peters, Titmus, Dunshire, and Dunleavy (Nsingo, 2000:221), is based on the principle of discretion in policy implementation. The Policy process is shaped by the implementers, which may change the result as expected by policy makers. There is danger of policy being distorted completely and for implementation to be carried in line with the self-interest of the officials. The advantage is that this model enables implementers to implement the policy in consistent with the demand of a particular policy environment. For example, the manner in which resettlement program is implemented in Omaheke region may not be the same as in the Erongo region because these two environments may be different from one another.

The political game model

According to Bardach, Pressman and Wilasvsky, Dunsire, and Parsons (Nsingo, 2000:222), policy implementation in the context of this model is seen as being a process of a political bargaining, persuasion and maneuvering, between various groups that are competing for the respective different interests. Implementation in this model therefore stress power, conflict and group individual interests, and implementers in this model therefore pursue their selfish interests.

The managerial model (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979)

Parsons in Nsingo (2000: 222) noted the cornerstone of the management model as: to achieve effectiveness, which depend on well defined objectives, well formulated plans, monitoring procedures, continuous assessment of action plan and the implementation of remedial actions to redirect the process

of policy implementation. Efficiency, which aims at minimizing waste and maximize benefits. Economy, which entails the selection of best tenders for servicing government programs and projects.

Integrated process

Smith (Nsingo, 2000:223) noted the pressures imposed by the policy implementation process onto the implementers, policy recipients, government and external forces. This causes tensions, which can derail the entire implementation process.

The Public Policy Discourse, Or Policy Discourse Model

Walters and Sudweeks (1996:7) noted that the principle underlying the policy discourse model is that value judgments are an important part of policy analysis and one cannot simply analyze policy using scientific means alone.

MLRR models of policy implementation

According to the Resettlement Policy (2001:6), the MLRR is utilizing three models in implementing the resettlement program. These are: **Individual Holdings:** This is a unit allocated to a family or individual in any agro - ecological zones, **Group Holdings:** This are informal or formal groups made up of more than one person who are unable to form a co-operative but who are interested to take part in agricultural or related activities as a group, **Co-operative Holdings and other Legal Entities:** This includes registered legal entities such as Companies and Close Corporations. The size of a unit allocated depends on the agro-ecological zone of an area. In the areas with high rainfall such as the Khomas and Omaheke regions, the size of unit allocation is 1200 hectares, while in the areas with low rainfall such as Hardap and Karas regions; the size of unit allocation is 3000 hectares.

The analysis of the resettlement policy in this thesis is based on policy discourse model. The thesis emphasizes the use of policy discourse model because this model is more democratic than the above – mentioned ones. It gives beneficiaries an opportunity to express themselves about the resettlement policy, their needs, and the better way of implementing it. Participation is a good thing because beneficiaries know better what they need than anybody else.

CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF THE LAND QUESTION IN NAMIBIA AND SADC

1. Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the land question in the colonial period in Namibia, first under German and later under South African colonial occupations. The policies of these two colonial regimes contributed immensely to the skewed land distribution that Namibia inherited at independence and the land reform dilemma that Namibia currently undergoing. This chapter also gives an overview of the violent land expropriation in the SADC region.

Hangula (Harring and Ondendaal 2002:18) noted that the Land Reform and Resettlement processes that are currently under implementation are deeply rooted in the political, social and economic discriminatory past of Namibia. According to the National Resettlement Policy (2000:1), the colonial governments implemented discriminatory laws and policies that demarcated the country along ethnic and racial lines. Therefore it is however paramount for anyone to first get acquaintance with the colonial history of Namibia in order to comprehend the rationality behind the national bickering over land reform and redistribution today.

2. The Land Question in Namibia

2.1. The German colonial encroachment (1884-1904)

The fact that the European traveled across the oceans to Namibia is clear indication that they could not carry significant amount of their properties with them. Land of course is one of the properties that are immovable. Thus, when the German settlers arrived in Namibia at around 1883, their hands were empty.

Despite that, Namibia's rich natural resources immediately attracted their attention and they become interested in unfair wealth accumulation exercises. As Toulmin and Quan (2000:32) noted, land is a basic asset of life and a principal natural capital where people produce in order to make a living. As a result, Haring and Ondendaal (2002:19) noted that Germany in 1884 annexed Namibian portion through what Mshonga (1979:9) referred to as dubious land and cattle deals. Although according to Pankhurst (1996:15), other Europeans and South African refugees preceded the German arrivals, he did not mention whether they as well were involved in the land grabbing.

The Mwengo publication (2001:95) indicated that the German colonial government systematically created a dualistic system of access and holding with regards to land resources. In the process, Namibia's borders were restructured. This was an agreement reached with Portugal in 1886 and with Great Britain in 1890. The Mwengo publication (2001:95) and the UNDP reports (Haring and Odendaal, 2002:19) noted interestingly that while in most of the former colonized African countries, such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa where white farmers settled were endured with the most fertile land, high rainfall and highest agricultural potential, in Namibia the case was different because, white settlers occupied the grazing areas of Hereros and Namas but did not occupy some of the most fertile areas in the former Owamboland, Kavango and Caprivi i.e northern areas.

According to the GRN (1991:47), these areas were not occupied because; for instance in Owamboland, the Owambo chiefs refused to sign a protection treaties with the German colonial Governors during the early years of colonialism, German governor more specifically Leutwein did not see any mineral potential in Owamboland, it was not considered to be attractive for white settlers and they as well thought that the German garrison were not strong enough to conquer the strong Owambo kingdoms militarily and

politically. According to Mbaya (2001:95) and Clarence-Smith and Moorsom (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:22), colonizers were discouraged by distance to move unto these areas and therefore considered such an option as cost ineffectiveness one. As a consequence, the indigenous people in the north and their land were left untouched and their land continued to be ruled under their own traditional laws. Werner (Adams, Werner and Vale, 1990:10), outlined how traditional chiefs in the southern and central parts of Namibia controlled their land. In the central parts for instance, Herero chiefs manipulated the customary rights in land allocation. Some of the Herero Chiefs inter alia chief Samuel Maharero, entered into so-called protection against the enemies' agreements with the Germans as far back as 1896. Goldblatt (Adams, Werner and Vale, 1990:19), indicated how the Germans used protection agreements, to create an enabling environment for the colonial government and European traders to occupy large portions of land in Namibia between 1893 and 1903. For instance the Germans promised to protect the Herero and Nama chiefs against local enemies in exchange for land.

According to Mbuende (1986:49), in the treaties signed with the Germans, Local chiefs agreed to: Grant rights and freedom to the German settlers in order to conduct unrestricted trade in the respective territories of the Namibian Chiefs; to protect the lives of the Namibian chiefs as well as their properties, recognize the jurisdiction of the German Emperor over the Europeans and to refer all the disputes between Africans and Europeans to German authority, give no concessions, entering into no any agreement, give away any land or any interest pertaining to that to any nation or subjects without prior consent by the German government and, to assist in the maintaining of peace and tranquility.

In return, the German Emperor agreed, through his agents to: render All His- Highest protection to the chiefs as well as their people, recognize and render support to the jurisdiction and control of the chiefs

over their people and to ensure that the Europeans respect the laws, customs and the use of the local people and pay the required taxes. Drechsler (Adams, Werner, and Vale, 1990:11) and Vogts (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:20), pointed out how various indigenous communities of Namibia, resisted the occupation of their land by the Europeans settlers and how the Hereros refused to sell their land to the Germans but instead preferred to allow them to settle on the land without any purchase. These acts of resistance were viewed by German colonial governor of that time, Theodor Leutwein, as a serious threat to the territorial development as envisaged by the colonial government. The literature further referred to the implication for land ownership that resulted from the rinderpest pandemic of 1897, which wiped out about 90% of the country's cattle stock.

This catastrophic incident triggered most of the indigenous African people to change their way of life. For instance they begun to exchange their labor for wages, and in the process became more dependants on European imports. These developments made land very cheap which encouraged the Germans to buy more land and expand their farms. Nujoma (2001: 10) also indicated how the Germans pushed the Hereros out of their ancestral lands and get possession of their cattle. Emmett (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:20) and Hishongwa (1992:6) indicated that the possession of land by Germans led to the outbreak of conflict between the indigenous people and white settlers. As indicated, the loss of land was the main reason for the Hereros/Germans war.

2.2. The Namibians` rebellions (1904 – 1907)

Drechsler (1980:132), noted the Herero people as one of the early indigenous groups of Namibia that took up arms against European intrusion, in this case the Germany colonial government. The war started on 12 January 1904. Sparks and Green (1992:12) agree with Drechsler (1980:132), that Samuel

Maharero, the Supreme Herero Chief, attempted to mobilize and unite all the Namibian leaders of his time, to join him as a single united force against German colonialism. His efforts are well marked under his famous call: "let us die fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity" (Drechsler 1980:143). As Mbuende (1986:60) noted, the call for unity was specifically directed to Chief Nehale Lyampingana of the Ondonga community in the former Ovamboland, Chief Hermanus Van Wyk of the Rehoboth Community, and Chief Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama community. Despite the invitation, only Chief Nehale was positive about the idea of joining hands as Namibians in order to fight the common (Namibian) enemy. Nehale however did not respond directly to the call of Samuel Maharero but he responded by attacking the German troops at the German Fort at Namutoni on the former Ovamboland frontier. This is a clear testimony that he heard the call of Samuel Maharero for Africans to unite against the Germans illegal occupations of their land. Despite lack of response Chief Samuel Maharero went on and wage the war against the illegal occupants of his ancestral land.

In response to the intensity of the war, the German government sent General Lothar Von Trotha to Namibia to fight the indigenous people. Von Trotha who was notorious for his brutality of African people in other parts of Africa issued out an "Extermination Order" that led to the Hereros massacre in 1904. It reads as follow: "The Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns. Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle will be shot. I shall not accept any more women and children. I shall drive them back to their people-otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them. These are my words to the Herero people" Drechsler (1980:156).

2.3. The Post Rebellion Era (1907-1915)

At the end of the war in 1907, as Cockram (1976:12) indicated, only about 15 000 Hereros survived Germany genocide out of the estimated 80 000 – 90 000 pre rebellion Herero population. This means between 65 000-75 000, i.e. about 80 % of the Herero population perished during this war. According to Mbuende (1986:62) the Nama lost 10,000 of its population, i.e. about 50% of the total estimated population of 20,000. The Damaras lost about one third of their population. The genocide against the Namibians marked the completion of the process of land confiscation by the Germans.

As Haring and Odendaal (2002:22), noted that more lands, which became unoccupied after the war, were made available to the German settlers to farm. Sparks and Green (1992:13), noted that genocide reduced the supply of labor. This resulted into desperation for labor force supply, which prevailed for sometimes, a situation that tempted the colonial government to attempt to import workers from the rest of the world. This option was proven to be expensive. Eventually the colonial government decided to penetrate the former Owamboland and get people from there to come and work inside the police zone. This was done by means of agreements with the local Owambo Chiefs (Pankhurst 1996:16, Green and Sparks 1992:13).

By the end of the war, colonial government had expropriated all the land from the African people. This made them very poor as they lost both their land and livestock. The African people found themselves into destitution and as a consequence transformed into forced labors for survival. During the 1907-1915 period, the African people suffered a lot. Most of them continued to be killed in brutal manners for refusing to accept forced labor (Drechsler, 1980:231).

2.4. The South African colonial period (1915-1990)

In 1914 German colonial rule came to an end when the South African forces that were acting on behalf of the allied forces during the First World War defeated them. The African people with open hands welcomed the defeat of the Germans because they thought this would mean their freedom and indeed an opportunity to regain their ancestral land. This dream was never realized and instead the new occupation even worsened their situation further (Hishongwa, 1992: 8). Mbaya (2001:94), noted the establishment of the interim military rule, 1915 – 1920. Following the final defeat of Germany in the war, South West Africa became a protectorate of Great Britain with South Africa holding the mandate under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles which was signed on 28 June 1919. The terms of the treaty and the South West Act 49 of 1919 stipulated that land held by the German colonial government became the (state) crown land of South West Africa. The Governor of the Union of South Africa had legislative power over all the matters and this included land allocation.

Adams, Werner and Vale (1990:16), noted that during the military rule period many Africans managed to regain some of their ancestral lands, whilst others were allowed to squat on the settlers farms and graze their cattle as a means of payment.

Harring and Odendaal (2002:23), noted that at the time when the Africans were struggling and desperately in need of land for settlement, the Union introduced a policy of moving some poor South African farmers from South Africa into the Southern parts of Namibia where the government issued them with the grazing or occupation licenses to utilize the freely available land that was previously occupied by

the Namas and then expropriated by the German colonial government after the 1904 – 1907 Namas/Hereros resistance against the German rule. By implications this means that South Africa like the Germany colonial government were inclined to ignore the land desire for the black Namibians. After the military laws came to an end in 1920, land settlement laws, which was in force in the Union, was also made applicable to South West Africa. At the same time a Land Board was established to facilitate the resettlement of the white farmers in Namibia, which was regarded necessary by the South African colonial government, because it would have enabled it to strengthen and maintain its control over the new territory. In order to secure land for the white settlers, the South African colonial government introduced a Native Administration Proclamation 11 of 1922, which was based on the Native Land Act 27 of 1913. This Act prohibited unemployed native from squatting on owners or leasers' land unless given permission by the magistrate. The proclamation also, prohibited transactions between blacks and whites and proposed the identification of separate settlement areas for different races.

According to the United Nation Institute for Namibia (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:24), although the Native Reserve Proclamation did not affect the Owamboland and Kavangos in the north, the South African colonial government pursued a policy similar to that of the German colonial administration using the Police Zone, which made distinction between northern and southern areas of Namibia as well as restricting movements between these two zones.

Wellington (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:24), referred to the establishment of the Native Reserves Commission by the South African colonial government, which was given a task of formulating reserve policies. The commission recommended the clear segregation between blacks and whites settlement

areas in Namibia, prevention of black squatters on white farms lands, maintenance of reserves previously recognized by the German administration and closed down those established between 1915 –1920 during the military rule and the establishment of new reserves and more efficient control of the existing one. As noted by the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:24), that despite the fact that the succession colonial government supported white farmers by giving them generous loans to construct infrastructures such as dams, boreholes and buy livestock, it paid little attention to the development of the indigenous farming communities. In addition, white farmers were also given expert advice, drought relief and regular access to the South African marketing system which was also subsidized. According to Mwengo (2001:94), none of these services were given to blacks farmers. By 1960 when the process of allocating farms to whites was completed, the number of white owned commercial farming units reached 5214, which was approximately 39 million hectares with an approximate hectares of 7 500 per farm.

Another milestone in the process of restructuring land tenure administration was the appointment of the Odendaal Commission on 11 September 1962 by H. F. Verwoerd, the South African Prime Minister of that time, whose recommendations had a significant and negative impact on the welfare of black Namibians. The objective of the commission was to advise the South African Government on the best ways for introducing the separate development policy in Namibia, in a similar way to the one, which was applied in South Africa (Harring and Odendaal, 2002:25).

The Odendaal Commission as stated by Adams, et.al. (Harring and Odendaal 2002:26), recommended the granting of self-government based on the model of native homelands. This provided for the establishment of respective legislative assemblies with the authority to deal with all matters pertaining to the land including that of land alienation. In 1964 the directive of the commission led to the establishment

of 10 reserves or homelands for black people in South West Africa (SWA). Haring and Odendaal (2002:26), noted that the Odendaal Plan was an extension and rationalization of an administrative system already created since the 1920's. As noted by Rohde (Haring and Odendaal, 2002: 27), the Damara reserves at Sorris-Sorris, Onverwag and Okombahe are good examples of the result of the work of the Odendaal Commission.

3. The Land Reform Question in the Southern African Region

According to several authors there has been a violent expropriation of land in other countries in the SADC region too (MLRR, 2001:5). Botswana is the only country in the SADC region, which was not significantly affected by this phenomenon. For instance land redistribution to colonial white farmers from the indigenous people amounted for about 5.5 % of its best land which was set aside for use by the white farmers. Although this appears so small in percentage it is a significant figures when it is compared to the fact that the arable land in Botswana constitute only between 5 to 6 percent.

The percentages of alienated land had been low in Angola, Lesotho and Zambia. The greatest land alienation to the white settlers took place in South Africa at 89%, where the Dutch and English colonial interests pushed one another for the control of the land since the 18th century.

The colonial administrative arrangements denied the indigenous people in the SADC region their independence and approved discriminatory laws to protect the interest of the white farmers in the form of freehold title to land. Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe are seen to have largest white farmers population in the SADC region. There is for instance 100 000 whites in Zimbabwe with significant

influence on the economy by controlling, land, industry, commerce and manufacturing. South Africa have an excessive skewed land holding, with 60, 000 white South African farmers who constituted 5% of the white population but who own approximately 89% of the agricultural land which is 85 million hectars of the land, compared to 12 million blacks farmers who occupy 17.1 million hectares of land. Because the potential arable land in South Africa is less than 15% or 2.6 million hectares, whites in that country own 6 times more land in terms of the available land quantity and quality. In Swaziland and Lesotho, the majority of the people have been marginalized in terms of land by the system of the government that privatized state lands as part of the foreign investment-attracting device. In Mozambique, a program of land privatization was embarked upon in order for the government to comply with the requirements of the structural adjustment program. This however created hostilities, because the South African whites and other foreigners dominated this process. Some white Zimbabwean who migrated to Mozambique because of the land confrontations in their home country also acquired farmland. The government however called for greater social integration of the in-coming white farming population in order to avoid white enclaves and outpaces of indigenous populations in the areas adjacent to these new commercial agricultural developments.

In Zimbabwe, approximately 4500 white commercial farmers i.e. 0.03% of the population control 31% of the country land under freehold tenure or about 42% of the fertile agricultural land, whilst black Zimbabwean families are subsisting on the 41% of the country's area of 39 million. The inequalities in land distribution that occurred in most part of the SADC region due to colonialism therefore has become the rationality behind the widespread liberation struggles during the 20th century in Africa and the existing conflicts between blacks and white farmers over land. In Zimbabwe the conflict became much more tense

than anywhere else in the region. It is generally perceived that if the land question won't be resolved immediately, the Zimbabwe type conflict is likely to be rampant throughout the SADC region and disrupt the prospects for smooth economic activities.

It is against this background that Namibia government established the willing buyer, willing seller principle in order to avoid economic disruptions and facilitates racial harmony among the Namibian people by reforming the land within the framework of the Agricultural (commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 (Act 6 of 1995) (Wildschut and Hubert (MLRR, 1998:7).

4. The land situation at independence, 1990.

At independence, the newly established Namibian government under the ruling party (SWAPO), faced the challenge of redressing the colonial legacy of skewed distribution of land. The MLRR was established to serve as the lawful custodian of the land and charged with the main task of redressing the inequity in the land distribution (NRP, 2001:1).

As a first steps in addressing the land issue, which was one of the main objectives of the liberation struggle, the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) organized a national conference on land reform and the land question, which took place in Windhoek, from 25 June – 1 July 1991 under the auspices of the Office of the Prime Minister (NEPRU, 1991). During the conference, Hage Geingob, the then Namibia's Prime Minister, outlined the objectives of the conference as follow: to serve as a platform for presentations and discussions of all relevant issues and grievances on the land; reviewing of policy and strategic options for land reform by taking into consideration regional and local factors; and the

development of a national policy and action program to resolve the problems pertaining to land (NEPRU, 1991:9).

Recommendations from the conference formed the basis for the enactment of the Agriculture (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995, which provided the umbrella for the National Land Policy (NLP), enacted in April 1998, the National Resettlement Policy (NRP) of July 2001 and other related documents.

CHAPTER 4

NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY

1. Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the National Resettlement Policy by outlining its content under the following headings: Resettlement philosophy, aims and objectives, main focus / target groups, types of resettlement program, and structures for the implementation of resettlement.

2. Resettlement Philosophy

The philosophy underpinning this policy is to provide formerly disadvantaged people with land, housing, infrastructures, knowledge and skills in order for them (beneficiaries) to maintain and develop their new environments and entitlements. In addition, the resettlement program also aims at the establishment of an innovative attitude, which will eventually lead to self-reliance with the intention to cover all kinds of landless, displaced, and destitute people in Namibia. Estimation of the MLRR is that about 243,000 Namibians comprising mainly of the people from communal areas, ex-farm laborers, the unemployed etc, are without land. This policy is part of the strategy for national development (National Resettlement Policy, 2001: 2).

3. Aims and objectives of the resettlement program

The National Resettlement policy (1996:2), Werner (2001:7) and Resettlement Manual (RM) (2001: 5), outlined the aims and objectives of the resettlement program as follow:

- a) To make beneficiaries to become self-reliant in terms of food production,
- b) To promote self-employment and income generating skills,

- c) To reach an improved living standards,
- d) To improve countrywide regional development via beneficial and wise utilization of both natural and human resources,
- e) To redress the colonial past imbalances in the distribution of the natural resources, more especially land,
- f) To afford small-scale farmers an opportunity to produce for the open market by bringing them into the mainstream of the Namibian economy and as a consequences contribute to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
- g) To decrease the human and livestock pressure in the communal areas,
- h) To reintegrate those citizens who have been displaced by colonial rule, liberation war and other diverse circumstances.

4. The main target groups

The NRP (1996:3), Werner (2001:8) and RM (2001:7) identified the following three main target groups. People without land, income or livestock; people without land and income but who are having few livestock; people without land, but they have income or they own livestock but needs land for grazing their livestock. The NRP further identified its top priorities in the following order: the San Community, Ex-Soldiers, returnees, displaced people, disabled people and people from overcrowded communal areas.

5. Criteria for the selection of the beneficiaries

The NRP (2001:5), RM (2001:7) and Werner (2001:8) outlined the following criteria for the selection of applicants. Applicants are required to be above 18 years old and in case of an applicant who is 65 years

older than he/she is expected to have a person within a productive age, and they should be prepared to give up any land rights, which they own elsewhere. This excludes dwelling places. They are also expected to have some agricultural experience, should be literate, and must be ready to hold the land under the leasehold tenure arrangements, which may be granted after 2 years probation period. They should as well own between 0-149 large stock units and 800 small stock units, and they are expected to render their support for any introduced cost recovery measures. Applicants who have been previously most disadvantaged should be given special care such as resettling the most disadvantaged one alongside with those who are highly advanced and skilled farmers.

6. Types of resettlement

The NRP (1996:6) and RM (2001:8) established three main models of resettlement:

Individual holdings, which are allocated to a family or individual based on the minimum size of a commercially/subsistence viable in the respective agro-ecological zone, **Group holdings**, which could be either formal or informal group made up of more than one person who could not form a co-operative but who are interested to undertake agricultural or related activities as a group, **Co-operative holdings** and other legal entities, which are established under the provisions of the Co-operative Act and/or other legal instruments regulating the establishment of companies and close corporations.

7. Organizational structure and implementation strategy

The policy put in place the implementation strategies that should be followed by all government ministries that are involved in its implementation. The strategy is important for the smooth selection and coordination of the resettlement program. The Resettlement Policy (1996:8) outlined the role of

Register of Deeds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ It manage and control finance ➤ It is responsible for human resources development
Division of General Services	
Ministry of Agriculture Water, and Rural Development (MAWRD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ensure progressive growth and sustainability of agricultural production and income. This can be achieved by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Providing veterinary services to the resettled farmers. ➤ Rendering assistance for evaluating farms that are on offer and for monitoring of the existing resettlement farms on a continuous basis. ➤ Providing much needed extension and training services. ➤ Rendering support to co-operative programs. ➤ Identifying markets for the products of resettled farmers. ➤ Providing and maintenance of water infrastructures on resettlement farms. ➤ Co-operative scheme support assistance. ➤ Development of the marketing system.
Ministry of Environment and	

<p>Tourism (MET) Department of Environmental Affairs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Render assistance to plan wildlife on the bases of resettlement schemes ➤ Ensures that all plans are done with environment consideration
<p>Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing (MRLGH)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ It deals with the proclamations of resettlement areas should it become necessary.
<p>Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (MWTC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ It is responsible for the provision road communication infrastructures in the resettlement areas.
<p>Ministry of Basic Education and Culture (MBEC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ It provides relevant materials for education including human resources.
<p>Ministry of Health and Social Services (MHSS)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ It is responsible for the provision of health related services
<p>National Planning Commission (NPC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NPC plays an advisory role on project planning and financing.
<p>Namibia Development Corporation (NDC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NDC provides credit to those who are willing to become small-scale farmers. ➤ Render assistance in terms of scheme planning beneficiaries training.
<p>Agricultural Bank of Namibia</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provides credit loans. ➤ Render assistance in terms of farms valuation.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)	➤ NGO render assistance in terms of planning, extension services, provides input materials and training when necessary.
The Land Tribunal	➤ Responsible for giving recommendation to the Minister of MLRR as provided for by the land reform act.
Land Reform Advisory Committee (LRAC)	➤ Recommend applications for resettlement to the Minister of land. It is also responsible for the compensation of expropriated farms.

Source: Haring and Odendaal (2002:41)

8. Inter-Institutional Committees

In order to ensure the smooth coordination of the resettlement program, the government established various inter-institutional committees to coordinate the implementation of the activities of the resettlement program. These are the land acquisition committees, the National Resettlement Committee (NRC), and the Regional Resettlement Committees. The NRP (1996:9) referred to various line ministries that constituted these committees, which are expected to pro-actively involve themselves with the identification, planning, and implementation as well as evaluation stages of resettlement projects.

8.1. The Land Acquisition Committees

The following institutions constitute this: Ministry of Land, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication, Ministry of

Regional and Local Government and Housing, Ministry of Environment and Tourism and Agricultural Bank of Namibia (NRP, 1996:9). The main responsibility of this committee is to scrutinize, assess, and evaluate farms that are offered to the government for sale and to carefully study assessment reports, which the Land Use Planning Division prepares, and tables to the Division of Estate Valuation.

8.2. The National Resettlement Committee (NRC)

The following institutions constitute this. Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication, Ministry of Local and Regional Government and Housing, Ministry of Basic Education, Sport and Culture, Ministry of Women Affairs, Ministry of Health and Social Services, National Planning Commission, Agricultural Bank of Namibia, Namibia Development Corporation. The main responsibilities of the NRC are to design strategies for resettlement program in order to advise the MLRR and LRAC, examination and recommendation of ways for the involvement of local communities in the planning and implementation of program, advising the PS and LRAC in terms of development, planning, terms of settlement, agricultural land suitability for allotment consideration, planning and designing resettlement schemes allotments and assisting in their execution, approving of applications that are recommended to it by LRAC and recommend them to the LRAC, reviewing models of resettlement and production mode, collecting and maintaining the lease agreements registry and updating the allotment list, co-coordinating the resettlement functions with line ministries, receiving and discussing of regional reports and make recommendations to the LRAC.

8.3. Regional Resettlement Committees (RRC)

These are committees' set up in the regions to coordinate and facilitate the process of the resettlement program. The compositions of the Regional Resettlement Committees are as follow. Governor (Chairperson), Regional deputy director (MLRR) (co-chairperson), 1 youth Representative, 1 representative of traditional leaders, 1 agricultural extension officer in the region, 1 veterinary officer in the region, 1 representative of the NGO in the region, 2 regional councilors, 1 regional education officer, 1 regional health officer and 1 representative of the agricultural farmers union. Responsibilities of the RRC are to: Identify regional resettlement needs, assist with application forms, selection, receive and process resettlement application forms, recommend people for resettlement, monitor resettlement process and promote development in regions.

9. The Regional Administration of Resettlement program

The staff of MLRR in the regional offices coordinates the resettlement program at their respective regions. Their responsibilities are to: Implement resettlement program, monitoring, advise, training, Identify materials and logistics that are required, do marketing, maintain and develop infrastructures, coordinate activities with line ministries in the regions, distribute, receive and record resettlement application forms, Handle application and lease agreement forms, and record agricultural products from resettlement projects.

9.1. Resettlement application procedures

As stipulated by the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, (No.6 of 1995) Section 39, the allotments plans for farming units, criteria and the minimum requirements for qualification of the applicants should all be prepared by the MLRR. The first step is the advertisement of allotments earmarked for purpose of resettlement in the government gazette or at least in the local press on the basis of which completed

application forms should be submitted to the RRC via the Regional Governor (RG) or the MLRR offices (Resettlement Manual, 1995:6).

9.2. Resettlement Application Forms

According to the Manual (2001:6) Application forms for land resettlement would be distributed through both the head and regional offices of the MLRR as well as at the offices of the Regional Governor. The following steps should be followed when completing the forms. Stage one: Application form must be studied very well before an applicant start with the process of completing it. The allotment plan and description must also be studied carefully. One must choose the farm and the farming unit one wishes to apply for and if possible one should made attempt to visit the advertised farm.

Stage two: One must decide on the farm to apply for and complete the application form as follow: Name and surname, identify card number (ID), address and telephone number, dependants, number of livestock owned and the copy of your livestock card must be attached, the name and address of your employer, by attaching your pay slip, by making sure that your chief or councilor and relevant regional ministerial official staff have signed the application form. Finally an applicant makes sure that his/her application is send to the ministerial regional office or regional government office.

Stage three: Processing of the resettlement forms. The Offices of the MLRR at regional level and that of the Regional Governor should send the completed applications to the region in which the farm applied for is situated, The RRC will considers the tendered applications and the name of the successful applicants before recommending it to the NRC for consideration. The NRC sensitizes the application and the form is recommended further to the LRAC. After the LRAC scrutinizes the application it recommend it to the Minister of lands, resettlement and rehabilitation for final approval. The result from the minister is communicated to the applicant by means of a letter or newspaper via the RRC.

9.3. Selection of Beneficiaries

The NRP (1996:5) and Manual (1996:8), established the following selection criteria to help identify those eligible for resettlement: To be ready to hold land under leasehold and tenure arrangements and such a person must be ready to give away any agricultural land that they may own somewhere else, should be ready to comply with the lease/resettlement agreement and use the allocated land in a productive manner, be 18 years or older, have agricultural and/or other related background and/or an interest. For example they should earn more than 15000.00 per year. To take care of the government properties on the farm by protecting and maintenance of inter alia, the fences, building, roads, water facilities, game and others, keep record book to record all daily agricultural activities, refrain from sub-leasing of allocated land, keep protection of game on the farm and refrain themselves from poaching, be peaceful with one another as neighbors, to use the allocated farm unit for the purpose as one applied for, return the allotment to the GRN when one does not need it anymore, take up responsibility of repairing and maintenance of water and fences (Resettlement Manual, 2001:9). These criteria excluded the people who own more than 150 units of large stock and 800 units of small stock because they are covered under AAL arrangements.

9.4. Rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries

According to the NRP (1996:6), beneficiaries will be allocated land for resettlement on a leasehold basis for the period of 99 years. It further referred to the arrangements that will be made for the lease agreements to be utilized as collaterals to secure loans from money lending financial institutions, which can be used for the purpose of agricultural production. It also mentioned the possibility of alternative, shorter periods that could be agreed upon between the lesser and lessee.

9.5. Regional administration of the resettlement process

The NRP, (1996:12) indicates as paramount, the involvement of the Regional councils as stakeholders in the planning and implementation of this policy because after the resettlement policy is established it is anticipated that it will become part of the local public and development administration spearheaded by the Regional councils. The NRP expectations is for the respective Regional Land Boards to be involved in the resettlement program once they are set up.

9.6. Arbitration

The NRP made provision on how land related disputes would be resolved. According to the RM (2001:9) beneficiaries should follow the following four procedures in case they have land disputes. First, of beneficiaries should try to solve the problem among themselves and if they are unable to do that they can approach the regional office of the MLRR. Second, if the regional office of the MLRR cannot solve these it could refer the matter to the PS for review or for consideration of the NRC. Third, the Minister of the MLRR can be approach if there is no amicable resolution of dispute between the concerned parties. Fourth, the office of the constitutionally provided institutions can be approached if the disputes could not be resolved in step three. The land and resettlement policy however encourages the beneficiaries to resolve all resettlement disputes amicably and without any violence.

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

1. Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the data that was collected through the interviews, questionnaires, and literature reviews on the application and impact of the resettlement policy in Namibia. The chapter also presents the views of the beneficiaries of this program and comparative views from literature reviews. This analysis therefore gives an opportunity to determine the manner in which the NRP is being implemented, its impact and constraints.

2. Result from data collection

All three government officials from the MLRR and representatives from political parties such as the CoD, DTA, and NAU who were interviewed, and their responses are presented and analyzed hereunder. Questionnaires responses by the beneficiaries of the resettlement program are as well included. All questions are attached in appendix 4.

2.1. Progress of the resettlement program

All three government interviewees from the MLRR responded that; there has been some progress as far as resettlement of the beneficiaries is concerned. The progress started when the MLRR first came up with the land reform regulating policies, such as, the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 (Act

No. 6 of 1995), the NLP, NRP and the RM, which are the guiding documents on how resettlement policy supposed to be implemented in Namibia. As part of progress made, 30 720.00 people have been resettled so far. The process however is described to be a bit slow because the MLRR is following the willing seller - willing buyer principle. Another problem is that most of the farms, which were offered to the government, were useless and not suitable for farming purposes. Useless farms were given certificate of waver. This means that the government is not interested in these kinds of farms and the sellers can sell them by themselves to the public, giving first preference to the Namibian people because foreigners are not allowed to acquire agricultural land in Namibia. The Namibians themselves can do farming. However, foreigners can occupy land in Namibia for other investment purposes such as building factories.

The DTA interviewee also acknowledges the resettlement progress and congratulates the government for its efforts in resettling the people in different areas of Namibia, as this is the only way, which can bring about economic empowerment to the landless people. It however feels that the MLRR must address some technicalities because resettlement is one of the magnitude programs that ought to be done with sensitivity. The DTA fears three things: the lowering of production standard and possible improper selection process to determine people with real interest in farming and those that are ready to stay in the remote areas and produce for the benefits of the country's economy and contribute to GDP growth. DTA is also concerned that the land size that is allocated to people for farming is not economically viable.

The NAU interviewee agreed with the government and the DTA interviewees on the progress made on the resettlement process because many farms have been acquired and people have been resettled despite the fact that this was not done with sustainability and viability in mind. NAU feels that resettlement was done more on the basis of political satisfaction. This is not viable and it is not sustainable in the long

run. According to Mr. De Wet no proper selection and screening was done to ensure that those who are resettled are really interested in farming. No training was given to the beneficiaries and also the fact that the 1300 hectares is a bit smaller for farming purposes. So they propose at least 2600 hectares per beneficiary. The 56 beneficiaries interviewees, agree with NAU that the average land allocation is 1300 hectares but unlike the NAU, all 56 interviewees were generally satisfied with such hectares. Unlike the government interviewees and the DTA, the CoD indicated that the process lacks progress and that there are contradictions between the policy and the implementation exercise. For instance as Mr. Shixwameni stated, the policy stated that resettlement aims at giving the land to the poor, but when one look at some of its beneficiaries one get doubt weather some of these people who were allocated land can also be categorized as poor. He made reference to some permanent secretaries, such as, the one for the Ministry of Higher Education, Vocational Training, Science and Technology, governors of some regions such as the one of the Omaheke region and some police inspectors, as people that were allocated land although they are not necessarily poor.

In the NDC speech delivered at the Resettlement Workshop, conducted by the MLRR from 5-6 March 1999, at Tsjaka Village in Omaheke Region, its General Manager for Special Projects admitted that the resettlement process is progressing but relatively slow and expensive, because of the willing buyer-willing seller principle. The failure of the willing buyer - willing seller principle was also echoed by NNFU in its working paper in preparation for the NAU/ NNFU Consultative Conference on land reform which took place on the 15- 16 February 2002, at Tabitha Center, Windhoek). The paper also referred to the slowness, exorbitant cost and inequity, contradictions with original objectives, which was to cater for the poor (NNFU, 2002). Most response from various interviews and literature indicated that some progresses were made since the introduction of the resettlement program. Most of the stakeholders indicated that

they were not comfortable with the principle of willing seller - willing buyer as this causes unnecessary delays in the land redistribution process. A delay in resettlement is not good because it can easily turn the whole country into chaos. Zimbabwe land grabbing case is a good example of a delayed land reform program.

2.2. Sufficiency of land for resettlement.

All three government interviewees from the MLRR responded that not every Namibian needs land. There are those who prefer to stay in town in flats and so on. The estimated figure that the government has is that there are around 240.000 people who want to be resettled. The land the government is having according to its calculations is that it needs to have at least 9 million hectares in order to satisfy those who applied. Unfortunately one can however not expand the land, and therefore eventually, in the process, it will be seen that not everybody would get land. The MLRR has done calculations and discovered that if it has to give land to each and everybody who needs it, that means that if one divides the hectares of land available with the population number for everybody to get land, than everybody will get around forty hectares. This calculation includes arable land only. It excluded the desert land. The reality however is that not everybody wants to do farming activities.

All three interviewees from the political parties and interest groups, the DTA, CoD and NAU also agreed with government interviewees, that they do not think that there would be less land available for the people to be resettled because not every body is a farmer or need land for farming. Both interviewees do not agree with the general argument that all Namibians need land and they have doubt whether those who assumed to be in need of land are ready to work on the land. However the two parties (DTA and CoD), are in agreements with the MLRR interviewees that there are those people that really need land in order

to cultivate and for cattle farming. The DTA believes that there is vast land but the unfortunate thing is that Namibian's arms are cut in terms of producing because there is not enough water for the people to either cultivate or to continue reeling cattle and become farmers. There is under utilized land which could be considered enough especially in the communal areas. This is unutilized land, lying idle and virgin that can be made possible for other people to be resettled there. The DTA interviewee made reference to the far eastern areas of Namibia in the Epukiro, Gam, Eiseb where there is close to 4000 million hectares of virgin land that can be utilized. What the government needs to do is to have water pipeline across this areas in order to enable this economic units to be put up for the people to farm. The DTA feels that the talk of less land is in reference to 6000 commercial farms that are currently in the hands of white farmers. The NAU like MLRR interviewees feels that there can never be enough land for farming purposes in any country of the world. This can be avoided by looking at other alternative provision for people to make a living in other industries such as manufacturing.

The article by Ben Fuller and George Eiseb as published in the Broadening and Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems, BASIS BRIEF No. 11 of August (2002), raised the question weather there will be enough land for resettlement. Their concerns were based on the current trend where a number of potential hectares of land for resettlement are being transferred into corporate control by some commercial farmers. Since 1990, 1325, (25%) commercial farms were transferred to private control. According to them, if this trend continues, more than 50% of the commercial farmland in Namibia will be under corporate ownership by the year 2015. This means reduction of available land for resettlement.

When one look at the population of Namibia it is obvious that there is enough land for all Namibians provided that justice will be done to make sure that all those who need land for whatever purpose, they

get it. Land is not only required for farming activities but some people may simply need land to build on houses. Currently it seems to be that if one talks about the need for land then people are rushing into conclusions that such persons need land for farming purposes.

2.3. Application process for resettlement program.

All three government interviewees from the MLRR response was that Resettlement Application Forms must be completed; applicants choose a farm and the farming unit one wish to apply for, take it to their respective chief, councilor or relevant regional ministerial official to sign the application form. The application form is sent to the ministerial regional office or regional government office. These forms get processed until they reach the minister of the MLRR. The result from the minister is communicated to the applicant by means of a letter or newspaper via the RRC. Some of the criteria used for selection of successful beneficiaries are that, the applicants should be above 18 years. If an applicant is 65 years old they are expected to have a person representing him or her who is within a productive age. Applicants are not expected to have dual land rights. Applicants are expected to have some agricultural experience and they should be literate. They must be ready to hold the land under the leasehold tenure arrangements. Applicant should own between 0-149 large stock units and 800 small stock units.

Applicants are expected to render their support for any introduced cost recovery measures. The policy made provisions for those applicants who have been previously most disadvantaged to be given special care, such as resettling those who have been mostly disadvantaged alongside with highly advanced and skilled farmers. The responses from the three members of the political parties and interest groups were as follows: The DTA agrees with the MLRR interviewees about the resettlement application process and feels that this is done in a very efficient way because the communities and regional counselors that are

working with the people are also involved. These people have set up various community structures. The DTA does not see any other better way where farmers can be selected for allocation in the different economic units. According to the DTA, the selection process is in order.

The CoD, also agrees with the MLRR and DTA interviewees about the way application process is happening. It however differs because it believes that there are flaws in the selection process because what is happening on the ground is different from what is on the policy document. The CoD is having a serious problem as to who supposed to be selected for resettlement because although the policy spelled out that the people that really need land are those who are poor and who live in the overcrowded areas, what is happening is that even those who are better off for example the directors, deputy directors, manager in parastatals are prioritized in the resettlement program. The top priority for resettlement program should and must be the landless people.

The NAU responded that there is a need for those who are selected for resettlement to meet the requirements in order for the beneficiaries to work and manage the land to such an extent that they can make a living out of this land and that they become independent people. NAU feels that selection and allocation need to be reviewed. According to NAU, the selection process is not well planned at the moment. For instance, people are not scrutinized as to what type of land they need because the MLRR assumes that once a person applied, he / she needs land for farming and this might not be always the case. The fact that there is a heavy bureaucracy to be followed before an applicant is approved does not necessarily prevent fraud to take place. The application process for instance, does not state why there is such bureaucracy in the application process. Too much administrative process may discourage people

not to apply for resettlement. Most of the targeted people are not well literate and may be uncomfortable with the resettlement application process.

2.4. Assistance during resettlement, and after care services

According to the three MLRR interviewees, assistance is given based on the following three categories of beneficiaries. People with no income, no land and no livestock make up category no.1. According to the Director of Resettlement, these people are called, the Zero Zeros, because they have absolutely nothing. These people have to be assisted by the government for five years. After five years they are expected to be independent farmers who can produce something for themselves and the country. These are for instance the Bushmen (San) people, who are found in the former South African colonial military bases. The MLRR supplied them with land, food, water and shelter. Category no.2 is made up by people with no income, no land but they have few lives tock. These are people with one goat, one chicken and one dog for instance. These people also need to be assisted by the government at least for five years. According to the MLRR officials, if the MLRR was having more money it could have bought them some livestock as starting capital. People with income and lives tock but without land make up category no.3. This includes inter alia, civil servants, small business people, and people from the communal areas. The only thing that these people need from the government is land. If the MLRR allocated them land these people because they are having their own income, they will develop the land in terms of infrastructures such as water and so on. Government assistance differs from category to category. For instance some needs training in various agricultural fields, such as planting, animal husbandry and so on.

At present the government runs two parallel resettlement programs. The Affirmative Action Loan scheme (AAL), run by the Agribank on behalf of the MAWRD, and the resettlement scheme run by the MLRR. If one has less than one hundred and fifty cattle than he / she is qualified for resettlement scheme. If one has more than one hundred cattle than he /she goes to Agribank to get Affirmative Action Loan and buy his /her own farm. These people are really making good progress. People in category three are especially making good progress and most of them are now qualified for Affirmative Action Loan at Agribank. When a delegation from the MLRR visited some of the third category beneficiaries they were so impressed by the progress these people made. Some were now having from one hundred up to one hundred and seventy cattle. Most of them for instance started with ten herds of cattle and few goats but now most of them are having hundreds livestock. All three interviewees from political parties and interest groups, the COD, DTA and NAU believe that there is no after care for the beneficiaries after resettlement. This means that Agricultural extension officers are not visiting these people. These people lacks capacity, i.e. they lack technical know how. It is therefore up to either the non-governmental organizations or one of the divisions of the MLRR or cooperation between the MLRR and the MAWRD to come up with a division to look after these people. The DTA wants Agribank to be involved with these people and assist them financially and technically. The people must be taken care of in the same fashion a car is maintained by the owner by taking it in for the service when it is due. For instance they must be given regular training to acquire farming knowledge and skills, and farming infrastructures, for example water must be well installed on all resettlement farms.

The NAU also feels that beneficiaries needs basic farming knowledge and skills such as how to manage their livestock, finance, land fertilization and so on. The NAU feels that one of the reasons why the new settlers are not producing enough is because they have no experience on specific farms. The people that

know this farm are the farm owner and farm laborers as some of them happen to be at some of these farms for more than 30 years. NAU's problem is that government is not using this people to share their experiences in farming with new farm owners (resettlement beneficiaries). This can happen by for instance keeping some of the commercial farmers to serve as managers for resettlement areas. They can for instance be hired for up to two years and so on in order to show the people how to do it. This can serve as part of the much needed on-going farm training. By utilizing the services of the commercial farmers training this could be one of the best training services one can get. NAU reveals that some of the commercial farmers have already indicated their willingness to volunteer themselves to do training. This is very important because eventually communities have to take up the resettlement process as their own. According to NAU, the existing resettlement program is too much a top down approach type rather than the bottom up. NAU feels that, beneficiaries are not that very much involved in the process.

2.5. Threats, Challenges and Opportunities of the resettlement program

The slow pace of the resettlement process: All three government officials responded that the process is too slow because the MLRR is implementing the Act, and they have to follow the stipulation of the Act. The other obstacle is the acquiring of farms through the willing buyer - willing seller principle where the GRN wants to have more farms per year but only few are being offered. The MLRR have just to buy those farms and normally most of the farms that are offered are not good for resettlement.

According to the director of resettlement one really get frustrated and it is because of this reason that the MLRR as well tells the white colleagues that if the people get tired and frustrated the white are likely to suffer if they are not offering land because they are the one who own it. What happened in the

neighboring Zimbabwe may also happen here in Namibia. When the people decide that enough is enough, the government won't command anybody to stop them. If for instance GRN tries to command the army to stop people from grabbing the land, the army may not act to do anything because they will also tell the government that they also need land. Prime minister, Gurirab in his television addresses to the nation about land recently, like most of the stakeholders, acknowledged that the willing buyer- willing seller's has failed the Namibian government and nation (New Era, 27-29 February 2004). Two interviewees from the political parties, CoD and DTA also agree with the MLRR interviewees that the resettlement process is slowly progressing. Applicants are not getting feedback and this demoralizes them. Another problem is that after these commercial units have been purchased it lies idle without being utilized. This sometimes resulted into vandalism of properties on the farms. Some are being turned into squatter settlement residential, which degrades the land. This happens because beneficiaries are not given the necessary skills in land management and utilization. The DTA however cautioned people to realize that it took Namibia 100 years to liberate the country (Namibia). So according to the DTA, this process will as well take many years to finalize. On the other hand Namibia's constitution provides for the willing buyer - willing seller policy. Nobody wants to lose a property that one has attained for some times and such person has been making profit out of it.

Lack of funds also contributed to the slowness of the process: This makes the process to be longer. The DTA like the MLRR interviewees reminded those who own land that land was the main question during the liberation struggle. This means that the peoples' patience can vanish any time and may tell the government that enough is enough. They may be influenced by external sources such as the Zimbabwe situation. The DTA feels that resettlement process in Zimbabwe went smoothly and nothing has been harmed despite claims by international communities that the process destroyed the economy. The DTA

supports the idea of the government to confiscate farms that belong to foreign nationals as one mechanism of speeding up the resettlement process. The CoD is concerned that the slowness of the process may trigger the people to revolt against the elite who have land.

NAU differs with the rest of the interviewees, and feels that the statement that land resettlement is too slow is a political one. NAU was of the opinion that at the present situation people put too much emphasis on the politics of blacks and whites rather than looking at the practicality of the process to avoid wasting a lot of time and make progress. For the NAU the process is fast enough because there is no need to rush this process and reduce productivity. NAU however alluded to the fact that some commercial farmers are reluctant not only in term of providing land to the government for resettlement purposes but also in term of assisting the government to make land resettlement a success. The NAU is currently busy addressing the situation to change the attitude of some commercial farmers and encouraging them to become involved in the process of helping the government. The NAU as a result compiled a document, "framework for sustainable land use and land reform in Namibia", which discusses how to achieve political, economic, and resources sustainability of the land reform schemes. Currently affirmative action farmers are running into trouble because they cannot pay back their loans. This is a result of lack of knowledge and skills.

Vandalism of farm infrastructures: All three MLRR interviewees revealed that some of the farms that the white commercial farmers are offering for purchase are not good for farming purposes at all. One interviewee revealed that there is a lot of the setbacks such as that sometimes farms are initially offered with good infrastructures, but in the process when the MLRR bought it, former owner changed everything. For instance sometimes-new machine engine is removed and replaced with dilapidated one. When the

people are resettled then problems starts despite the fact that the MLRR was assured everything is new and working well. This according to the director of resettlement is a deliberate move of sabotaging the infrastructures to ensure that the resettlement of the blacks does not succeed. What some commercial farmers don't want is to compete with the beneficiaries of the beneficiaries of the resettlement program.

Absence of the Master List: All three interviewees stated that the MLRR does not have a master list for all applicants. This is a problem because the people have to apply several times. If there were a master list the MLRR can just select from it but now repeated application for resettlement delays the process very much. These waists MLRR materials because every time materials have to be put aside and paper are very expensive. The process is made to be long. This frustrated the people. The director of resettlement, for instance stated that he applied three times to be resettled but every time his application was rejected.

Corruption and favoritism allegations, in the resettlement process. All three government officials from the MLRR responded that it was not easy for corruption to take place because the MLRR has created committees. In each region there is a Regional Resettlement Committee, which is chaired by Regional Governors. The co-chairperson is the representative of the MLRR and two councilors in each region are members of the RRC committees. There are also guidelines to ensure that selection is done in the way that discourages regionalism and tribalism and seriously attend at gender and people with disability issues. From regions all the information are send to the National Resettlement Committee, which is chaired by the Director of Resettlement. Various Ministries are members of this committee.

The NRC looked at how the selection was done. For instance it looks at why some people were selected and not others and so on. If the NRC detects some irregularities it has a mandate to change the whole thing. From the NRC, the information is sent to the National Advisory Commission (NAC), the advisory body to the Minister of lands. They also scrutinize the selection process and if they detect that something is wrong they as well have a right to make some changes. The NAC recommends applications to the Minister for final approval. This procedure according to the Director of resettlement indicates how difficult it could be for this system to be corrupted. Two interviewees from the interest groups, CoD and DTA stated that corruption and favoritism are rife. The CoD referred to some incidents in the Omaheke region where resettlement was conducted on the basis of political affiliation.

The DTA however feels that this is part of human nature because in any human activities there are always some negative aspects of trying to do things. For the time being the government has put a mechanism and if this is not working it is up to all those who are involved to review it. However for the CoD and DTA, the most important thing is for at least those with high earnings, such as the permanent secretaries, directors, governors, regional councilors, and ministers to realize themselves that out of the national cake at least they are having earnings, and have decent living. They should therefore be encouraged to purchase their own properties through the Angribank's affirmative action loan scheme, and leave the resettlement program to the poor of the poorest. The interviewee from NAU stated that there are rumors about corruption practices but he did not want to make any comments on rumors, as it is dangerous for someone to make comments without all the facts. The problem of corruption was also mentioned by all 56 beneficiaries who were interviewed and during the NAU / NNFU consultative

conference on land reform which took place on the 15- 16 February 2002 at the Tabitha Center in Windhoek.

The number of allocated hectares to successful applicants. All three government interviewees from the MLRR responded that Namibia's ecological zone differs. For instance stones cover most of the land when one goes to the south of the country. Because of that, the minimum hectares allocation per family in the south is 3000 ha. In the central region for instance in the Windhoek areas, where the land is more fertile, the maximum should be from 1000 ha up to 1200 hectares. The final recommendation for allocation is normally done by the NAC to the Minister of lands to make a final decision. Three interviewees from interest group responded as follow: The CoD and DTA feel that the 1000 hectares or two camps that is currently allocated to the beneficiaries are not enough for a farmer to make a decent living on such piece of land because maintaining a farm is a very expensive exercise.

Mr. Kamburona, of the DTA who is also an experienced farmer, said that to procure one water pump engine, it could cost a farmer up to N\$ 7000.00 at a time and a farmer have to sell either two oxen to get the money for repair. DTA suggested beneficiaries to be divided into three categories. Category 1 should be the lower people who should be starting from 1- 20 herds of cattle. Category 2 should be from 20-120 herds of cattle. The third category should be the person who is having enough to qualify for the affirmative action loan but needs two to three years in order to enter into private properties. According to the DTA, once this is done, you will see that people in category 1 will need to be visited by the agricultural extension officers and veterinary services in order to see to it that these people are having proper business planning and once they are through than they can qualify for category number two, and once category number 2 also finished with the whole process like what happened in category number 1 than

they must as well qualify for category number 3. The DTA proposed that at least 5000 hectares are viable for farming.

The DTA visited some of the resettlement areas such as Skoonheid in the Omaheke region. In that area it is difficult to make a living with 1000 hectare more especially if there is not enough rain. If there is not enough rain people in that region will be forced to drop their cattle or sell them in order to make a living for the next season and selling cattle will obviously hamper growth. The third interviewee NAU feels that the land to be allocated must be determined by the rainfall and by its carrying capacity. NAU suggested that at least 2400 hectares is needed for a farmer to make a living. Various interviews and literature indicated that resettlement process is too slow and that there is corruption in the system. It is therefore important for those who are running the resettlement scheme to correct the situation.

2.6. The issue of self-sufficiency after five years

All three MLRR interviewees response was based on the three categories of settlers. Categories: one, two and three. Both interviewees confirmed that the MLRR does not have a problem with beneficiaries in category No. 3, because these people just need land and once this is done after one year one can already see that some settlers made significant progress. One interviewee made reference to one settler who went there with only five donkeys and ten cattle, but when the officials from the ministry visited the settler after two years, the settler's number of livestock went up significantly. The beneficiaries in category one and two are the people who are really struggling. Some beneficiaries from the San community are especially not making significant progress with cultivation and livestock. The MLRR could not really blame them for this because this was never part of their culture. The MLRR also realized that five years might not be enough time for the beneficiaries to be independent. The MLRR however contracted a company to

conduct a feasibility study to come up with the proposals as to what needs to be done to improve the condition of the beneficiaries from the San community. Currently the proposed period is 10 – 15 years because one needs to first change their culture before you get them right. Unlike their fellow settlers from other ethnic groups, San people are not used to the culture of cultivation and looking after cattle. They are hunters and gatherer of edible plants.

One interviewee referred to a case when the MLRR bought four cattle for the San beneficiaries for ploughing and milk. After six months when MLRR officials went there, all the cattle disappeared. They slaughtered all of them systematically one by one because they saw these as meat. When asked what happened, they gave reason that one was running around too much, another one was hit by the car, then they remained with two but these as well were giving them problems so they slaughtered one, and now there was only one left and because they could not see the reason to keep one cattle only, they as well slaughtered it. All interviewees however agreed that despite this type of incident there are however good sign of progress among some San beneficiaries. If for instance one goes to places such as Mangetti Dune one can see a lot of improvements. San people there own livestock, they get meat and they plough. The surrounding communities were also benefiting, as they were now able to buy mahangu from the San Community in Mangetti Dune in the Tsumkwe area. The DTA stated that what is important is to put people in categories in order to determine whether five years will be enough for them to be independent. Once this is done than there must be extension officers to look after the beneficiaries because if there is no one looking after them there will never be a performance appraisal record for these people. On the other hand the MLRR should also introduce things like an assessment committees in order to know exactly about the areas of resettlement and their level of performance. There must be officers allocated in

the vicinity for instance to run two or three resettlement farms in the area. This will enable the government to check the performance and promote the beneficiaries according to categories. This, according to the DTA is the only way the government can assess this people.

The DTA believes that if this is left in their own hands than people might be resettled without doing any farming on the land. The interviewee gave an example of a farmer who was resettled in the Omaheke region but who does not own any cattle but instead he is getting people from the communal areas to lease grazing from him. This shows that this person is not a farmer at heart. So there is a need for mechanism to assess whether the people who are resettled are the one that are occupying those farms.

The CoD response was that self-sufficiency of beneficiaries after 5 years is a good thing because they have been insisting on the time framework for resettlement. Namibians must for instance say in the next 10 years the whole process of resettlement should be finished. There is no need for it to drag on just like it happened in Zimbabwe where it turns into violent because it has been used as a political issue. The problem is however whether this is viable because the government did not initially give people the necessary capital, farming tools, knowledge and skills. The CoD however feels that for beneficiaries to be self sufficient in five years, some will of course manage, mostly those who have cash and skills whilst those who don't have cash and skills won't and they will still need to depend on the government for many years. This means that in order for the beneficiaries to be self-sufficient the government really needs to put in a lot of efforts. *The NAU* response was that because most of the beneficiaries were given land without taking sustainability into consideration they would never reach self-sufficiency. Currently the amount of land allocated is too less for them to reach self-sufficiency.

2.7. Benefits from the resettlement program

All three government interviewees from the MLRR stated that people benefited from the resettlement program because the MLRR have taken the people who were under the poverty line and give them land. Previously they did not have anything. Now they are having land and income. Politically, the land problem is solved because the liberation struggle was all about land. Economically, the MLRR has helped the beneficiaries to be able to stand on their own and produce their own food. Socially, people have gained status in society. For example one can now claim that he or she is a farmer. For instance in the past someone was just a poor somebody somewhere but now he/she have his/her own farm and cattle. People at least feel that they are something in society. By producing, these people are contributing to the economy of the country. For example some of them are in position to contribute to the GDP and pay tax. Resettlement gives them some status, for instance some are now regarded as farmers. This means they are now integrated in the economy.

One interviewee referred to the official visit to one of the resettlement farm where some beneficiaries were boosting that even if the drought comes, it wouldn't affect them quickly because they have some grain baskets where they store food that can stay for some years. Even if their cattle have to die they will still have some years to survive the drought. All three interviewees from the interest groups, the CoD and DTA and the NAU responded that some of the resettled people have benefited and had made success out of this scheme and their livelihood had improved. The DTA feels that the government really needs to be commented on that. Mr. Kamburona, a DTA interviewee referred to his visit to various farms in the Otjozondjupa region when he was traveling with the deputy Minister of Trade and Industry to consult on the liquor license that he discovered that 80% of the resettled people are really doing their best to benefit out of this scheme. Because of this he is of the opinion that the process must continue in order to allow

the people to benefit more out of it. The NAU referred to affirmative action scheme as much more sensible and successful. Out of 56 beneficiaries interviewed, 48 (86%) confirmed that they have benefited from the resettlement program whilst 8 (14%) said that they did not achieve much as yet because they only spent a short time on their land.

2.8. The positive and negative effects of the resettlement program.

Positive effects: All three MLRR interviewees stated that there is; **Political** impact because the government is giving people land that was taken away from them. **Economically**, the impact is that they have income, can produce and contribute to the economy of the country. **Socially**, they have gained status, and **Psychologically**, their problems are solved. Above all the program will eventually promote national unity, peace and tranquility.

Negative effects: All three interviewees stated that there is no negative impact as far as resettlement program is concerned. One of the interviewee stated that perhaps on the side of the whites there may be because they always argue that productivity would go down but according to the interviewee productivity wouldn't go down because the reality in the commercial farms is that blacks are the one that is doing the work. For instance they are driving tractors, looking after the cattle, cultivating and so on. If you take such a person who is doing this works and give him all the benefits that a white farmer have, then he/she will be able to produce and make profit as he is empowered. Two interviewees from political parties the CoD and DTA responses on positive effects were in agreement with those of the MLRR interviewees, that the people have been resettled and that the moral fabrics has improved and the inferiority complex that they had previously have somehow being changed and they can now share in the economy and wealth of their country. On the other hand there is peace and tranquility in the country. On the *negative part*, both the

CoD and DTA interviewees' response was that there are some elements that need to be improved in the process. The CoD and the DTA for instance feel that the assessment elements and the selection process should exclude people with high income and the size of the economic units must be enlarged. The NAU feels that the process and the implementation of the program are not based on economic and resource sustainability. This according to NAU is a short-term political gain for the ruling SWAPO Party, that won't be able to be sustained. The solution is to take both the failures and success and come up with a new policy.

2.9. Suggestions to improve the viability of the resettlement program.

All three MLRR government interviewees indicated that there is a need to improve in the following areas:

Funds: Lack of funds is another problem because the MLRR could not purchase all the farms that were offered to it. Both interviewees feel that if the MLRR were in position to get all sufficient financial injections, perhaps the resettlement process could have been finished within five years period. Funds are also needed to be able to train beneficiaries more especially those in category 1 & 2 and to develop water and other infrastructures on the farming units. There is however improvements in fund allocation because for 2003/2004 financial years, the MLRR allocation was adjusted from N\$ 20 to N\$ 50 millions.

The Act: Also needs to be amended in order to cut short the cumbersome resettlement process. This should be done without compromising the transparency mechanism that is instituted. **Participation of other government institutions:** There are ministries among others, MET, MWARD, MWTC, MBEC, MHA that are given various roles to play in the resettlement program in terms of their respective functions as policy stipulates. If they could do what they are supposed to do, this may help the program to move much faster. The need for other government ministries, private sectors, and NGOs to play a significant

role in the resettlement program was also emphasized at the NNFU meeting held on 9 March 1997 at Waterberg. **Farm laborers:** The issue of the farm workers being evicted is also one of the problem of the Act because it stipulates that everybody who needs land need to apply including the farm laborer. It does not mean that when you are on the farm you are automatically qualified for resettlement on that land. Therefore, if farm workers don't apply they won't be allocated land. Normally a unit gets reserved for them in case they applied. The CoD also feels strongly that people who are disadvantaged such as farm workers are being overlooked. The MLRR supposed not to take people from outside the farms because some people who are already living on the purchased farms are also disadvantaged and some have been there for a long time while some were even born on these farms.

The MLRR is supposed to use its discretion for justice to be done. Now what is happening is that even new black farmers are also chasing these people out of the farms similarly to what the white commercial farmers have been doing with the result that black elites are even becoming more oppressive than their white counter parts. This trend needs to be turned around to help the farm workers to also share in the wealth of Namibia. A good example is like at Queen Sophia resettlement project where the beneficiaries of the resettlement program who initial had nothing except for their labor contribution now own some livestock.

Training: All three MLRR interviewees indicated the need to improve on the training side. This is one of the aspects that are weak because of insufficient funds. The MLRR is hoping that if they were to get one hundred million from the government, at least 30% of this money should be put aside for providing additional support services, such as training to the beneficiaries. All 56 interviewed beneficiaries also recommend a need for training. The responses of two interviewees from the political parties, the CoD and the DTA were that there are in almost all the communal areas rich people who are already having the

necessary money to buy their land and cattle through the AALS. Such people need to be encouraged and assisted to come out of the communal areas and join the commercial sector to help boost the economy. The two interviewees also recommended that the resettlement program must be well coordinated. For instance the selection process must be done on the basis of fair selection criteria, and not politically motivated considerations. The selection process must select the people with farming at heart. These are people who can really stay on the farms, produce and provide job opportunities. This will contribute to the smooth running of the country's economy and to peace and political tranquility in Namibia. They further emphasize the need for the MLRR to carry the resettlement process in the right way. They don't want black elites to replace the white elites. The DTA proposed security officers to be deployed at farms immediately after being purchased to take care of the properties before the arrivals of new owners.

The interviewee from NAU responded that government had already tried to improve on the sustainability of the resettlement program. What still need to be done is for the government to hire the services of consultants to help determine what need to be done further. Consultations should be done in collaboration with the Farmers' union and the beneficiaries of the resettlement program. This will help the government to review the current resettlement approach. In the latest development aims at improving the viability of the resettlement program, Prime Minister Theo Ben Gurirab announced the decision of the government to expropriates land with just compensations for those whose farms will be affected (New Area Newspaper, 27-29 February 2004).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Introduction

The aim of this research was to critically review the implementation of the resettlement policy in Namibia and impact of this process to communities. This chapter presents the conclusions that were arrived at in answering the following questions: What has been the performance of the land resettlement policy between 1990 and 2003? How is land allocated to the applicants? How many people and under what categories have they benefited from this scheme? Is the resettlement process proceeding according to plan? and what is the impact of the impact of resettlement to the beneficiaries?

It is significant to note that conducting this research has not been an easy task. Some senior government officials such as minister, deputy minister, and permanent secretary, directors and deputy directors, in the MLRR were not available for interview appointments. The reasons varied: either they were too busy, out of the country or traveling to the regions and therefore appointments were always called off. These problems had affected the content of this research particularly where conclusions had to be made without the input of these respondents. In addition, it was also problematic to get respondents because some stay outside Windhoek and do not have proper contact details for the questionnaires. Some of the questionnaires were sent to respondents by fax. Only few of them were faxed back. Despite that, the research managed to come up with useful conclusions and recommendations, which can be used to improve resettlement program implementation in Namibia.

2. Conclusions

As indicated, the objective of this research was to critically review the implementation process of the NRP and its impact on its beneficiaries. The study shows that there is progress made with the implementation of the resettlement program. For example, legislative provisions that govern the program such as the Constitution of Namibia, Agricultural (Commercial) land reform Act, 1995 (Act 6 of 1995) National Land Policy, National Resettlement Policy and Resettlement Manual are all well in place.

However there are criticisms labeled against these legal instruments. First, these include the contention that the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform ACT has a negative impact on the successful implementation of the process as it provides for the government principle of willing seller-willing buyer, which makes the entire process very slow. According to the MLRR briefing paper of 8- 9 July 2003, of the estimated 240 000 people who need to be resettled, only 30 720 (13 %) have been resettled since 1990 when the resettlement program started. On the other hand another problem is that it is also not clear how GRN arrived at the estimated figure of 240 000. Despite the fact that there is no independent evaluation completed on the success of the program, the MLRR is claiming huge success at some of the resettlement projects such as the Mangetti Dune scheme where most of the resettled people are the Sun people. The MLRR indicated that great political, economical, social and psychological benefits resulted from the resettlement program. There is political impact that the government is giving people land that was taken away from them. Economically the impact is that beneficiaries are earning income, can produce and contribute to the economy of the country. Socially they have gained status and psychologically these people are enjoying a peace of mind. Despite strong critics from the interest groups, it is clear that all support the program, provided it is carried on within its policy framework.

Second, the MLRR does not have any master list for all the applicants to draw in whenever it is allocating land. Applicants are expected to apply over and over again. This caused administrative delays and cost the MLRR a lot of money to produce paper materials. On the other hand there is no feedback for the unsuccessful applicant. Third, the study indicates that corruption; favoritisms and nepotism are rife in the whole selection process despite mechanisms that are put in place by the MLRR to curb it. Some well-to-do people are being selected for resettlement instead of the poor ones. This contradicts the basic aims and objectives of the NRP. Some people earmarked for resettlement are selected on the basis of political affiliation. Interest groups such as opposition political parties and farmers unions contend that agricultural production may drop due to the fact that the screening process is not done effectively to help come up with a list of beneficiaries with farming interest at heart. It is therefore difficult to measure the impact of the program since no independent research report was done to confirm the output of the program as yet. However, this research may help one to understand the process of implementation and the impact this program has on the beneficiaries.

Fourth, the 1000 hectares average or two camps allotted to beneficiaries are not enough for meaningful productivity. Five years given period for beneficiaries to be self-sufficient seems not to be enough. There is a problem of cultural change among some of the beneficiaries such as the Sun people. They are not easily adapting to the new way of life i.e. farming system, as this had never been part of their culture. Theirs has been that of hunting and gathering edible fruits in the wilderness. Beneficiaries do not have access to loans despite having acquired land as properties, which may serve as collateral. They are not given any training and some farms that were offered are not suitable for farming activities.

Fifth, females seem to be given less prominence in the process. The number of females' beneficiaries seems to be less than their male counterparts. On the other hand farm workers are not catered for properly. They are not given first priority whenever the farms are being sold. In most cases they found themselves homeless as they are always pushed aside even by their fellow black resettlement beneficiaries. The sixth point is that there is no proper information dissemination to people in the rural areas the majority of whom are poor and obviously potential beneficiaries of the resettlement program. This is because advertisements are mainly done through local newspapers and, which do not easily reach each and everyone in the rural communities of Namibia. On the other hand the GRN, since its disagreements with the Namibian Newspaper on the alleged negative report against the government activities, it is difficult for the people in the rural areas to know about the resettlement program as this newspaper is better distributed across the country. On the other hand most of them do not read and speak English or Afrikaans, which is the medium languages of reporting in Namibia and most of these papers are written in these languages.

Seventh, beneficiaries are more or less involved with traditional crop and animal husbandry farming activities. Other types of farming such as the game ranching, which can as well be lucrative, is not yet known by many people. As a result, MLRR is wavering too many farms on offer on the basis of them being bad farming offer. As indicated in Chapter four of this study, 1064 farms offered for purchase were wavered and only 120 farms were purchased for resettlement since 1990.

Eighth, the study shows that other government ministries are not sufficiently involved as stipulated by the policy. It seems the entire resettlement process is left with the MLRR alone. This makes it difficult for the

ministry to run the process because it ends up doing the work other ministries supposed do. There seems to be no budget provisions from other ministries. This puts pressure on the MLRR budget.

Other important services such as clinics, hospitals, schools and police services are not emphasized in the entire process. The other concern is that NGOs such as church organizations seem not to play a significant role if any. Their role might be needed more especially with the emerging of new society created by the resettlement scheme. New society can be a source of all evils such as crimes, alcohol and sexual abuse, rapes, physical abuse, illiteracy and the worse of it this new villages can be a conducive environment for the spread of deadly diseases such as HIV/AIDS and others. This can only be reduced if other institutions take their roles seriously.

Ninth, point is that resettlement is likely to lead to the creation of a new order in society. It is likely to lead to a 'melting pot' society because people are moving from their original environment to new environment of resettlement. This is likely to create a uniform culture, which is good for national peace and tranquility in the long run.

Tenth, there is a general satisfaction among those that were resettled. Beneficiaries feel that at least they have land that they previously did not have. This contributes to political, economic, psychological and social stability.

3. Recommendations

There are countless problems in the implementation process of the resettlement program. This is because this program is so complex with various players involved. Most of the interest groups have been calling for the GRN to improve on some of the problems in order for the program to succeed. More work still needs to be done in order to improve the implementation process and eventually increase output.

These improvements are as follow: The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act,1995 (Act 6 of 1995) needs to be improved in order to increase the pace of the process and make it possible for land acquisition under the willing buyer willing seller faster. More research still needs to be done in order to determine the extent of the success of this program. Interest group must not just criticize the GRN program but they must be in position to give proper advice. In fact they must be part and parcel of the resettlement process. Farmers unions such as NNFU and NAU have been part and parcel of this program and on several occasions, have made contributions towards resolving the resettlement issues. This trend is appreciated and others must follow this example too. Contributions from other interest groups however need proper coordination. The GRN must seriously address, the issue of corruption, favoritisms and nepotism, which are rife in the whole selection process. GRN must also revisit its existing mechanisms that are put in place by the MLRR to curb corruption. For instance some well to do people must no more be selected for resettlement but instead the poor and the needy must benefit from this program. Selection list must be open to public for scrutiny. There is a need for an impartial body to identify those in need. Resettlement should target people in the rural areas and selection on the basis of political affiliation must be stopped. Beneficiaries with farming interest at heart must be selected and given farms in order to promote productivity. More independent research needs to be done in order to measure the impact of the program and improve it more and help to understand the process of implementation and its impact more.

The 1000 hectares average or two camps allotted to beneficiaries are not adequate and should be revisited. At least 5000 or well thought of hectares should be allocated. Beneficiaries should be given opportunities and they at least must be allocated between 15 years to improve their land. GRN should

commit itself to the change of the culture of nomadic people. Introducing training on farming can do this. Beneficiaries who do not have access to loans facilities and loan institutions such as AgriBank should be assisted to get access to such facilities.

GRN should use the previous owner in determining the best way of putting those particular farms to good use. The proposed use of the commercial farmers to train the resettlement beneficiaries as new emerging commercial farmers is a welcome move and government needs to look at this offer with open eyes to see how best to utilize it. Females should be given more prominence in the process, as at present the number of female beneficiaries in the resettlement process seems to be less than their male counter parts. On the other hand GRN must address the plight of the farm workers who are not catered for properly at present. MLRRs should revisit its information dissemination strategy and come up with better and proper information dissemination system to reach all the potential beneficiaries in the rural areas, the majority of them whom are poor and obviously in need of the land. Currently, advertisements are mainly done through local newspapers, which do not easily reach each and everyone in the rural communities of Namibia. On the other hand, the GRN should use the services of the better-circulated newspaper such as, The Namibian newspaper. Councilors of the constituents, village headmen, church leaders and schools should be used to disseminate the resettlement information.

Beneficiaries are more or less involved with traditional crop and animal husbandry farming activities. Other types of farming such as the game ranching, fish, poultry and ostrich farming and others which can as well attract a lot of tourists and produce money for the beneficiaries should as well be explored as some of them can become far lucrative activities than what is currently focused on. The MLRR should encourage the people to diversify in their farming activities. By exploring other means of farming such as game ranching, the MLRR is likely to cease wavering farms on the basis of bad offers.

The study shows that other government ministries are not sufficiently involved as stipulated by the policy and as a result, no budget provisions from other ministries. This puts pressure on the budget of the MLRR alone. The GRN should coordinate its efforts better with all other institutions. All institutions should start budgeting for the resettlement program and not only the MLRR. The research indicated that the GRN implement a combination of models in the implementation of the resettlement program. Some of these approaches kill initiatives, as beneficiaries are not involved in the process. This thesis recommends the MLRR to adopt a policy discourse approach in order to involve the entire community. This will help the MLRR to understand this process much better as communities know their need much better than anybody else. The government should be responsible for the repairing of the farm infrastructures such as boreholes and fences. Proper measures to avoid wild fires, and remove of dangerous animals such, as lions from the farms are important. Perhaps the Ministry of environment and tourism need to equip the beneficiaries with the skills and knowledge as to how, people can best share the environment with the wild animals. Food subsidies may be needed especially the first five years, but beneficiaries should be scrutinized in order to establish those that really in need of such assistance.

There should be a training program for the beneficiaries to equip them with the necessary farming skills. Monitoring and evaluation system should be put in place. The ministries should provide technical, and financial assistance. There should be after care services for the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries should get title deeds; Government should introduce hectare tariffs according to the productivity of land in the regions. Resettlement should take into consideration the expectation and aspirations of the beneficiaries;

for example, beneficiaries who want to do crop farming should be resettled in high rainfall areas. Leasing out of farms should be stopped by for instance removing the land away from them.

The GRN should develop land in the communal areas in order to expand the land available for resettlement purposes. The GRN, and all stakeholders should commit themselves to resolve the resettlement obstacles in order to improve on the implementation and success of the entire program in benefiting the whole nation.

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APPENDICES**APPENDIX 1****LIST OF CONTACT PEOPLE FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF RESETTLEMENT**

Mr Shanyengana: Director:	Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Mr. S. Kanyemba:	Deputy Director: Central Region
Mr. J. Nujoma:	Deputy Director: Southern Region
Mr. K. Simandi:	Deputy Director: North – Eastern Region
Mr. V. Hipondoka:	Deputy Director: North North –West Region

APPENDIX 2**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO THE GRN OFFICIALS IN THE MLRR**

1. The resettlement program has been with your ministry for sometime now. What progress have you made so far in resettling people?
2. Some experts raise doubt whether there will be enough land for all those that need to be resettled. What is your comment on this?
3. Would you describe to me how applications for land are made and how you approve some of these applications and reject others?
4. Once applications have been approved, how do you resettle the successful applicants and what assistance do you provide them?
5. There are concerns among various members of the community that the resettlement process is too slow and that people may be losing patience. What is your comment and what do you think can be done to improve the process?
6. There are allegations that there is corruption and favoritism in allocating land to individuals. What do you say about that?
7. Generally, how many hectares do you allocate each successful applicant and how do you decide as to who should occupy a particular piece of land or the other?
8. The resettlement policy states that beneficiaries are supposed to be self-supporting after a period of five years. Has this been possible so far? Please explain?
9. Do you think people have benefited from the resettlement process? If so, what are the benefits? If not why?
10. What would one classify as the positive effects of resettlement and what would be classified as the negative effects?
11. What problems are associated with the resettlement program at the moment?
12. What do you think should be done to increase the viability of this program?

APPENDIX 3**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO THE INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES**

- 1 The resettlement program has been with the MLRR for sometimes now. What progress have you observed so far in resettling people?
- 2 Some experts raise doubt whether there will be enough land for all those that need to be resettled. What is your comment on this?
- 3 Would you describe to me how applications for land are made and how do they approve some of these applications and reject others?
- 4 Once applications have been approved, how are the successful applicants are being resettled and what assistance are they provided them?
- 5 There are concerns among various members of the community that the Resettlement process is too slow and that people may be losing patience. What is your comment and what do you think can be done to improve the process?
- 6 There are allegations that there is corruption and favoritism in allocating land to individuals. What do you say about that?
- 7 Generally, how many hectares are allocated to successful applicant and how this decision is being made as to who should occupy a particular piece of land or the other?
- 8 The resettlement policy states that beneficiaries are supposed to be self-supporting after a period of five years. Do you think this has been possible so far? Please explain?
- 9 Do you think people have benefited from the resettlement process? If so, what are the benefits? If not why?
- 10 What would one classify as the positive effects of resettlement and what would be classified as the negative effects?
- 11 What problems are associated with the resettlement program at the moment?
- 12 What do you think should be done to increase the viability of this program?

APPENDIX 4

QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

This questionnaire is part of the research that I am conducting in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Public Administration Degree of the University of Namibia. The topic of the research is: **A Study of the National Resettlement Policy in Namibia: A critical review of policy application and impact.** Please note that, the information provided here would be for academic consumption only.

A. PERSONAL PROFILE

1. How old are you?

<input type="checkbox"/>	20-30
<input type="checkbox"/>	30-40
<input type="checkbox"/>	40-50
<input type="checkbox"/>	50 and above

2. What is your gender?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Male
<input type="checkbox"/>	Female

3. What is your marital status?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Single
<input type="checkbox"/>	Married
<input type="checkbox"/>	Divorced
<input type="checkbox"/>	Windowed

4. What is your level of education?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Primary education
<input type="checkbox"/>	Secondary education
<input type="checkbox"/>	Tertiary

	education
--	-----------

5. What is your ethnic group?

6. What was your full-time occupation when you were resettled and what is your full-time occupation now?

• Occupation before resettlement: -----

• Occupation after resettlement:-----

7. In which region are you resettled?

8. Before resettlement which region used to be your region of residence?

9. Do you think the resettlement process was fair? Please explain. -----

10. What kind of farming activities are you engaged in?

11. How did you come to know about the resettlement policy?

	Media
	Friends
	Others. Please specify----- ----- ----- -----

12. Has the resettlement policy been explained to you? If so, by whom?

B. APPLICATION/ IMPLEMENTATION

13. When did you apply for resettlement and how long did it take for the application to be approved? -----

14. Briefly describe the process that you followed to apply for land until the application is approved. You can write this in stages e.g. 1; 2; 3; etc. or provide a brief description.

15. Are you satisfied with the process of leading to your resettlement? Please explain.

16. Are you satisfied with the manner in which applications are processed, approved or rejected? Please explain. -----

17. Once your application has been approved, what does the government do to relocate you to that land? Please explain in detail. -----

18. What assistance is given to you to help you to settle?

19. For how long are you expected to get resettlement assistance from government and do you think you can manage to operate without assistance after five years? Please explain. -----

20. How much land in hectares was allocated to you and are you satisfied with the piece of land allocated to you?

C. IMPACT

21. In your opinion did resettlement improve your life? Please explain in detail how it has improved your life.-----

22. Before resettlement what were your expectations and did resettlement meet these or not? Please explain.-----

23. What achievements did you accomplish since being resettled?

24. What extra assistance do you need to improve your farming activities? Provide facts?

- Production? -----
 - Income? -----
 - Net income (after the loss is deducted) -----
- -----

25. Do you think resettled people are using the land productively and would you have done to

improve on that if you were the one who resettled?-----

26. Do you think government acted properly in introducing the resettlement program?

Please explain. -----

27. Please list at list five problems that you think are experienced in the implementation of the resettlement program?

- i)-----
- ii)-----
- iii)-----
- iv)-----
- v)-----

28. What do you think should be done to improve the implementation of the resettlement program in Namibia? List any five recommendations.

- i)-----
- ii)-----
- iii)-----
- iv)-----
- v)-----

Master list of farms acquired and number of family units resettled by MLRR from 1990 to 28 February 2003

Summary of farms acquired by MLRR 1990 – 2003 for resettlement

Region	Total in hectare	Total number of farms	Total Amount n\$	Farms purchased		Farms donated		Farms transferred		Farms inherited		Number of families resettled
				No. Of farms purchased	Size farms purchased (ha)	Total donated	Farms donated (ha)	Total transferred	Farms transferred (ha)	Total inherited	Farms inherited (ha)	
Erongo	21612	2	2, 166, 868.22	2	21612	-	-	-	-			12
Hardap	129100	22	14, 473, 910.23	21	122300	-	-	1	6800			112
Karas	152977	18	6, 578, 458.76	18	152977	-	-	-	-			39
Khomas	24014	4	6, 615, 887.31	4	24014	-	-	-	-			12
Kunene	91385	17	12, 298, 891.51	11	68780	6	22605	-	-			194
Omaheke	161672	33	36, 349, 116.13	32	159410	-	-	-	-	1	2262	533
Oshikoto	59258	11	7, 086, 782, 24	10	53113	-	-	-	-	1	6145	529
Otjozondjupa	77957	13	19, 857, 700.90	13	77957	-	-	-	-			48
Grand total	717975	120	105, 427, 615.30	111	682423	6	22605	1	6800	2	8407	1479

Master list of farms acquired and number of family units resettled by MLRR from 1990 to 28 February 2003

	Farm name	No.	Reg. div	Region	Size (HA)	Price (N\$)	Transfer costs	Year	No. families
1	PTN 1 of Tsaobismund			Erongo	8421	2,161, 225, 09	5, 643, 13	2001	12
2	Tsaobis	90	H	Erongo	13191				
Total number: 2		Total size: 21612.0000 ha							
		Total price: N\$ 2, 166, 868.22							
3	Voightgrund	649	P	Hardap	6800	Transferred from MAWRD		1990	7

4	Uitsight	217	R	Hardap	5000			1991	2
5	Ptn 2 (panorama) of uitsight	217	R	Hardap	5721	857,691.00	2,707.50		2
6	Jakkalsdraai	228	R	Hardap	6400		3,737.50	1991	8
7	Weiveld	234	R	Hardap	5481	1,069,386.00			9
8	Rem.ext. Of halifax	113	P	Hardap	6501				
9	Rem.ext of ptn of halifax	113	P	Hardap	4306		3,077.50		12
10	Ptn 2 (mara) of halifax	113	P	Hardap	4303				
11	Ptn 3 (spoetnik) ptn of ptn 1 of halifax	113	P	Hardap	2108				
12	Tulpsvlei	93	P	Hardap	2810			1991	5
13	Ptn 1 of secretarispan	191	M	Hardap	4000				6
14	Rem. Ptn of secretarispan	191	M	Hardap	6908	638,931.11	2,247.50	1995	7
15	Rem.Ext. Of Ptn 1 Of Westfallen	113	M	Hardap	1191	1,617,000.00	3,887.50	1995	14
16	Bernafey	208	R	Hardap	3729	1,300,000.00	3,737.50	1995	16
17	Kleinfontein North	82	P	Hardap	15287			1997	6
18	Nooitgedacht	110	P	Hardap	9442	1,360,095.00	3,737.50	1997	5
19	Farm Gemini	119	M	Hardap	7032	1,476,720.00	3,737.50	2001	5
20	Rem. Of Farm Wolfsputs	121	M	Hardap	3000	540,000.00	2,087.50	2001	2
21	Onse Rust	192	M	Hardap	5616	1,078,272.00	3,737.50	2001	3
22	Rem Ext Farm Narib Oost	602	R	Hardap	3013			2001	3
	Rem Ext Ptn 2 (Duinpunt) Of Narib Oost	602	R	Hardap	3386				
	Ptn (A Pnt Of Ptn 4) Argentina	39	R	Hardap	360	675,786.00	2,307.00	2001	
23	Gomaub Sud	139	M	Hardap	6819	1,760,270.00	3,627.50	2002	PENDING LRAC
24	Sandforte	36	P	Hardap	9887	1,087,598.00	3,531.62	2002	PENDING LRAC
	Total Number: 2								
					Total Size: 129100.0000 ha				
25	Tsachanabis	20	N	Karas	10570	317,000.00	1,807.72	1997	2
26	Grasheuvel	30	T	Karas	9304	418,635.00	2,075.22	1997	3
27	Haninabis	132	T	Karas	10212	606,739.61	2,364.72	1997	3
28	Khabus	146	T	Karas	12483	943,800.00	3,097.50		3
29	Ptn 2 Of Itzawisis	9	T	Karas	614			1997	
30	Ptn Of Kangus	160	T	Karas	2634				
31	Dagbreek	256	V	Karas	11468	344,040.00	1,807.72	1997	3
32	Belda	361	V	Karas	15110	453,297.42	2,144.92	1997	3
33	Obub	47	V	Karas	9523	652,004.17	2,819.72	1998	2
34	Rem.Ext. Of Harib	142	V	Karas	5966				2
35	Soekwater	160	V	Karas	5995	600,955.54	2,589.50	1999	2


36	Rem.Ext. Of Bruinheuwel	257	V	Karas	6017				
37	Ptn 1 Of Bruinheuwel	257	V	Karas	3063				3
						240, 691. 54	1, 537. 72	1999	
38	Aandblom	25	V	Karas	8862	400, 101. 54	2, 002. 50	2000	3
39	Rem.Ext. Of Klipdrift	134	S	Karas	6634				
40	Ptn 1 (Biessieputs) Of Klipdrift	134	S	Karas	6634	597, 017. 07		2000	4
							2, 379. 25		
41	Ptn 1 (Langberg) Of Sperlingsfontein	414	V	Karas	13719				
42	Rem.Ext. Of Spelingsfontein	414	V	Karas	14169				6
						976, 072. 88	3, 397. 50	2000	
	Total Number: 18			Total Size: 152977. 0000 ha		TOTAL PRICE:N\$6, 578 458.76			
43	Rem.Ext. Of Anias-Nord	84	M	Khomas	6223	1, 898, 276. 70	3, 957. 50	2001	5
44	Corsica	89	M	Khomas	5364	1, 609, 424. 40	3, 737. 50	2001	4
45	Nautabis	268	K	Khomas	4936	1, 332, 850. 46	3, 743. 25	2001	3
46	Anias Sud	85	M	Khomas	7491	1, 760, 270. 00	3, 627. 50	2002	PENDING LRAC
	Total Number: 4			Total size: 24014.0000 Ha		Total price: N\$6, 615, 887. 31			

47	Die Vlakte	834	A	Kunene	5630	855, 760. 00	2, 937. 50	1995	9
48	Elandspuit	34	A	Kunene	5929	978, 285. 00	3, 257. 50	1996	27
49	Namatanga	35	A	Kunene	7550	1, 245, 750. 00	3, 877. 50	1996	23
50	Nadas	46	A	Kunene	7329	1, 172, 562. 90	3, 737. 50	1998	4
51	Kleinhuis	174	A	Kunene	5209	936, 720. 00	3, 157. 50	1996	21
52	Stilte	280	A	Kunene	5630	760, 050. 00	2, 507. 50	1996	50
53	Michael	347	A	Kunene	3561	Donated		1998	
54	Nimitz	353	A	Kunene	2131	Donated		1998	
55	Tsumis	360	A	Kunene	5561	Donated		1998	
56	Elf	361	A	Kunene	5555	Donated		1998	
57	Dwight East	368	A	Kunene	1932	Donated		1998	
58	Dwight West	368	A	Kunene	3865	Donated		1998	
59	Nirwana	636	A	Kunene	6101	1, 029, 752. 96	3, 077. 50	2001	5
60	Elandslaagte	651	A	Kunene	5834	1, 166, 811. 90	2, 307. 50	2002	5
61	Rem.ext. Of meyer-ton	175	A	Kunene	7885	1, 655, 749. 00	7, 231. 75	2002	Pending LRAC
62	Ptn. 1(voorspoed) nissen	375	A	Kunene	3393	712, 529. 00	4, 690. 26	2002	Pending LRAC
63	Langgelee (Ptn Aruchab & Ptn. 1 Meyerton)	362	A	Kunene	8290	1, 740, 907. 00	7, 231. 75	2002	Pending LRAC
	Total Number 17:			Total size: 91385.0000 Ha		Total price: N\$12,298,891.51			

64	Rusplass	692	L	Omaheke	3434				7
65	Skoonheid	735	L	Omaheke	7104	1, 528, 010. 00	3, 927. 50		80

66	Rosenhof	685	L	Omaheke	3406			1993	8
67	Goab	363	L	Omaheke	4709	1, 224, 594. 00	3, 737. 50	1995	19
68	Steenbokpos	682	L	Omaheke	2436	616, 383. 00	2, 215. 50	1996	2
69	Grootrooibult	1027	L	Omaheke	5489	2, 005, 025. 00	4, 217. 50	1996	2
70	Dankbaar	786	L	Omaheke	5028	1, 272, 034. 00	3, 547. 50	1997	9
71	Danell	973	L	Omaheke	5023	1, 255, 807. 50	3, 547. 50	1997	4
72	Heimat	442	L	Omaheke	11765				1
73	Kalahari Prag	460	L	Omaheke	4366	2, 406, 239. 26	4, 567. 56	1997	28
74	Vasdraai	486	L	Omaheke	4315				
75	Coetzee	249	L	Omaheke	186	863, 000. 00	2, 927. 50	1997	28
76	Samekoms	362	L	Omaheke	6075	1, 202, 937. 00	3, 787. 50	1997	18
77	Du Plessis	250	L	Omaheke	4102	986, 010.00	3, 257. 50	1997	22
78	Alex Eck	1053	L	Omaheke	7050	747, 733. 09	2, 717. 50	1998	5
79	Verlang	44	L	Omaheke	5054	1, 010, 758. 60	3, 027.50	2000	8
80	Dixieland	76	L	Omaheke	5146	1, 440, 757. 40	4, 169.25	2000	4
81	Ptn 17 (Kunesmus) Of Kaukurus	79	L	Omaheke	300				5
82	Ptn 23 Of Kaukurus	79	L	Omaheke	1015				
83	Ptn J (Hessen) Of Kaukurus	79	L	Omaheke	5671				
84	Rem.ext. of PTN H of Kaukurus	79	L	Omaheke	6083	2, 219, 480. 30	7, 924. 50	2000	
	Karamba	203	L	Omaheke	8601				5
86	Kamingama	204	L	Omaheke	3895				4
87	Rem.Ext. Of Boomlager	328	L	Omaheke	3402	2, 537, 315. 00	10, 842. 50	2000	5
88	Rem.Ext. Of Zimnik	678	L	Omaheke	2677	602, 338. 38	5, 016. 50	2000	2
89	Arbeidsvree	690	L	Omaheke	7952	2, 306, 037. 92	4, 507. 50	2001	6
90	Styria	52	L	Omaheke	5389	1, 508, 872. 00	4, 327. 50	2001	4
91	Kanabis	55	L	Omaheke	5541	1, 551, 480. 00	4, 327. 50	2001	7
92	Rembrand	998	L	Omaheke	6948	1, 737, 212. 00	3, 627.50	2001	5
93	Vlakwater	999	L	Omaheke	5000	1, 500, 082. 18	4, 854. 12	2001	7
94	Ptn G (Schellengerg) Of Kaukurus	79	L	Omaheke	4999	1, 474, 768. 96	5, 100.13	2001	6
95	Pnt F (Schornborn) Of Kaukurus	79		Omaheke	7249	2, 102, 495. 85	5, 698. 13	2001	9
96	Drimiopsis		L	Omaheke	2262	Project on inherited GRN land			163
	Total number: 32			Total size: 161672 Ha	Total price: N\$36, 349, 116. 13				
97	Excelsior	825	B	Oshikoto	6145				14
98	Chutib	1137	B	Oshikoto	6288	2, 105, 100. 00	4, 287. 50	1991	8
99	Oerwoud	1150	B	Oshikoto	4841				26
100	Welmoed	848	B	Oshikoto	6716				13

101	Ramona	886	B	Oshikoto	6619	1, 600, 080. 00	3, 837. 50	1997	6	
102	Klein-Nakusib	939	B	Oshikoto	2012	947, 621. 03	3, 057. 50	1998	3	
103	Nakusib	315	B	Oshikoto	5007					
104	Leeupost No. 930&Ptn 1 Of Hygeland No.866	1247	B	Oshikoto	9317	1, 211, 257. 70	3, 397. 50	1998	6	
105	Emmanuel	829	B	Oshikoto	3084	1, 204, 796. 01	3, 347. 50	1999	2	
106	Arcdia	1065	B	Oshikoto	3084				2	
107	Tsintaabis		B	Oshikoto	6145	PROJECT on Inherited GRN land			499	
Total Number: 10		TOTAL SIZE: 59258.0000 ha								TOTAL PRICE:N\$7, 086, 782. 24
108	Nevada	15	D	Otjozondjupa	5046	1, 720, 686. 00	3, 897. 50	1995	7	
109	Cleveland	17	D	Otjozondjupa	4748	1, 234, 480. 00	3, 787. 50	1995	9	
110	Ptn 1 (Welmer) Of Welgeluk	386	D	Otjozondjupa	3778	812, 950. 33	3, 007. 50	1997	4	
111	Quovadis	980	D	Otjozondjupa	7227	953,, 964. 00	3, 737. 50	1997	6	
112	Otjisazu	53	B	Otjozondjupa	2836	609, 734. 02	2, 089. 00	1998	PENDING LRAC	
113	Ondiri	379	D	Otjozondjupa	3483	752, 328. 00	2, 720. 00	1998	3	
114	Rem.Ptn Of Doringboom	380	D	Otjozondjupa	6878	1, 547, 490. 00	3, 971. 50	1998	LEASED TO UNAM	
115	Otjinakui	381	D	Otjozondjupa	6917	1, 590, 974. 60	3, 971. 50	1998		
116	Rem.Ext. Of Ptn 1 Of Wagnog	384	D	Otjozondjupa	3479	730, 614. 63	3, 007. 50	1998	3	
117	Paloma	227	J	Otjozondjupa	5614	1, 403, 600. 93	3, 842. 50	2000		
118	Okaputa Wes	98	B	Otjozondjupa	9062	2, 945, 490. 00	5, 917. 50	2001	6	
	Okaputa oost	568	B	Otjozondjupa	201					
	Rem.ext.of Okaputa suid-west	567	B	Otjozondjupa	1852					



Appendix 6

Map indicating risk of farming in Namibia

Data Supplied By:



Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development

Prepared by:

Map Produced by:




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Date: July 2003

Drawing No.


Scale 1:5 000 000



Appendix 7


Map indicating land redistribution and its agricultural potential in Agro-Economic Zones in Namibia

Data Supplied By:



Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development

Prepared by:



S.D.E.
Spatial Data Engineering
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Date: July 2003

Drawing No.

Scale 1:5 000 000