

**REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC): A CASE STUDY OF
NAMIBIA'S CROSS BORDER MIGRATION ISSUES IN
OSHIKANGO**

Andrew Niikondo

April 2008

**REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC): A CASE STUDY OF
NAMIBIA'S CROSS BORDER MIGRATION ISSUES IN OSHIKANGO**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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OF

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
BY

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April 2008

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Map of Africa, with SADC



Abstract

The main objective of this dissertation was to investigate issues of cross-border migration and their effects on the project of SADC regional integration. The principal theoretical grounding comes from theories on migration, inclusive of their gender perspectives. Inclusive in this framework were perspectives of regionalism and its subsets of regionalisation, regional cooperation, regional integration and regional awareness/identity. The dissertation also examined competing theoretical approaches to regional integration, among these, federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism, to determine a model to achieving a political community at the end of the SADC integration process.

Based on these theories the study investigated the extent to which the grassroots communities were involved in the SADC regionalisation process. Indicators, in this regard, were the SADC Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons of 1995 and its successor, the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons of 1997, which all failed. The dissertation traced the background of regional integration at the global, continental and regional level and compared scenarios especially on cross-border migration issues.

A qualitative research design in the form of a case study of Oshikango informed the collection of the data. The data were gathered about the distribution of variables such as the grassroots community's understanding and attitudes towards implications of cross border migration as measured against the SADC project of regional integration. Other important variables that were illuminated by the investigation techniques are gender, age and education level of respondents.

Informed by this investigation and based on the Oshikango case study this dissertation has arrived at the conclusion that SADC is currently unable to achieve its goal of

regulating free movement of persons in the region. The problem seems to be that since SADC is a state-based regime, member states take their refuge in the doctrine of state sovereignty, often at the expense of the common regional agenda. In other words they talk regionalism, but they act nationally. Consequently, SADC is an example of shallow integration with limited involvement of civil society and local communities. Thus, cross-border migration control in the region is an issue that will have to be resolved. Informed by these conclusions, this dissertation leads to recommendations for the acceleration of trans-frontier spatial development, such as parks and development corridors. The SADC Forum for Traditional Authorities should also be established to further deepen trans-border interaction and facilitate intra-regional migration management.

Key words: Regionalism; Regional Integration; Migration; Cross-border

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nation
CACM	Central America Common Market
CCCM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CEMAC	Communaute Economique et Monetaire d’Afrique Centrale
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	Economic Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African Countries
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
NAFTA	North America Trade Agreement
Nampol	Namibia Police
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODC	Offshore Development Company
RAI	Regional Integration Agreements
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
ROO	Rules of Origin
RSA	Republic of South Africa

SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chief Council Organisation
SWANLA	South West Africa Native Labour Association (Pty) Ltd
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
Tagom	The Age Of March
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monetaire de l'Ouest Africaine
WENELA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association Ltd
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

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DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my wife Jacobina, all children, my father and my mother.

DECLARATION

I, Andrew Niikondo, declare hereby that this study is a true reflection of my own research, and that this work, or part thereof has not been submitted for a degree in any other institution of higher education.

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PART I

CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE STUDY

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

The management of cross border migration and population movement has recently become crucial in the study of the regional integration project of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). At present, the region is characterised by unequal economic development, political instability and poor control of migrant movement by neighbouring states.

The two substantive SADC interventions in a form of a Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons of 1995 and a Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons of 1997 in the region, failed. Consequently, migration and population movement management in the region has become an issue, which has inspired the purpose of this dissertation. By way of making use of a case study of Oshikango, as a border area, town and post between Namibia and Angola, this dissertation probes and benchmarks issues of migration and cross-border movement of people management and control, vis-à-vis the SADC Regional Integration Project ideals. The aim is to establish a latent reality in the SADC endeavours to integrate free movement of persons in the region.

In pursuit of this goal, this chapter outlines the background of the study and problem statement with attention to the SADC Regional Integration Project and issues of migration. It argues that the origin of problems regarding migration and population movement control in Africa in general and the SADC Region in particular, associates with the advent of border demarcation in the continent. The chapter also presents the main objectives of the study, its significance, major terms and concepts and organisation. A comprehensive conclusion concludes the chapter.

1.2 Background of the study

1.2.1 Border demarcations and related issues

The root of cross border migration and population movement issues in Africa and the SADC region lies in the artificial and porous borders created by colonial mapmakers. This does not necessarily mean that people migrate because of the border that they see, but because they perceive the border as a social construct and source of socioeconomic, cultural and political life. Based on this backdrop, one major imperative prefacing this study is stocktaking of historical events regarding management of human mobility across international boundaries, especially in Africa. Ancient history presents cross-country human mobility as a habitual practice, subject to nominal control. In contrast, the modern era introduced distinct trends of xenophobia entrenched in country boundaries, sovereignty, authority and migration control.

In Africa, for example, spatial mobility is a fundamental social and historical aspect of life (Adepoju, 2006). Thus, in Africa, as stated earlier on, border demarcation has always been regarded as a source of social, political and economic problems, which encourages people to migrate from what is currently known as “their countries”.

One fundamental argument remains that before colonialism, Africa was without borders whilst colonialism was concomitant with the drawing of artificial borders, sometimes through incorrect contours and locations. The consequence was Africa’s new paradigm and its constituent concepts of nationalism and sovereignty. This, in turn, created issues of cross border human traffic, border disputes and above all, unequal economic development.

The recent past introduced new ideas of regional and continental reunion through regional integration models. However, the stumbling block in African endeavours to integrate was predominantly the colonial borders. This, as Mmegi (2005) accentuates, implies that there is no denying that the colonial borders erected around modern states are an impediment to the realisation of integration and free movement of people in the SADC Region. The major effect may be that the SADC’s small economies and small populations could make it harder for the region to get a fair share from the global markets and hence make it fragile. This fragility weakens Regional Integration Projects in Africa in general and SADC in particular.

Most African literature also recognises this reality. Breytenbach (1999) recognised the fact that artificial boundaries in Africa, whether hard or soft, are the major root cause of problems of nation-building on the continent. Members of disparate groups, for example, may become citizens of particular states, which due to various artificial and natural factors fail to cater for them and consequently the phenomenon of emigration develops.

Bearing this phenomenon in mind, it is essential to explain the existing typologies of borders. Normally, borders could be in the form of boundaries or frontiers. Prescott (1987:14) quotes Hartshorne (1936) in an attempt to describe the relationships between the boundaries and the landscape through which it runs. He argues that a boundary that was drawn before the development of most of the features of the cultural landscape was called an *antecedent boundary*, while a boundary that was drawn through an uninhabited area was called a pioneer boundary.

Other boundaries, which were drawn after the development of the cultural landscape, were known as *subsequent boundaries*. If the boundary coincides with a cultural or physical divide and receives both international and national recognition, it is a *subsequent boundary*. In the light of this definition, this dissertation argues that not all boundaries drawn to demarcate what are presently the SADC countries can be classified as subsequent boundaries. The point is, although some boundaries in the SADC region coincide or follow physical divides, none of them coincides with cultural lines.

Given these typologies of border demarcation, Illés, (2003) also classifies borders according to geographic, ethnic and social, economic and political characteristics. From the ethnic and historical perspectives, borders can be explained in three subdivisions, for example, the borders where the people on either side of the border belong to different ethnic communities and speak different languages, but live beside each other for centuries and develop traditional linkages and relations with each other. These borders are rare in the SADC Region and Namibia has none.

There are borders, where the people in neighbouring border areas belong to the same ethnic group and in many cases, close family links connect the two groups of the people; relatives live on both sides of the border and the border thus constitutes only a political, not ethnic, linguistic or social dividing line (Illés, 2003). The latter is exactly the border-category, in which the Namibian/Angolan borders should be classified (see Chapter 6).

Another border classification worth mentioning here is the border sector, where, owing to historical events, the composition of the population changed radically on one or both sides of the border. This constitutes other demographic patterns, where the present inhabitants came to these areas through organised, spontaneous or forced migration. They had no traditional contacts or personal or family links previously. Hence, they developed a different language or culture. The Herero community that was forced by

the German colonial forces into Botswana illustrates this scenario in the Namibian context.

The challenging dynamics that often receive less attention in current research on regional integration are issues of trans-border communities as alluded to above. Referring to these issues, Illés (2003) argues that the problem lies with the borders where the people in the neighbouring areas belong to the same ethnic group and divisions. In this case, close family networks bind these people together. Their relatives live on both sides of the border, and the international border is only a political demarcation with little influence on ethnic, linguistic or social phenomena.

Arguably, this would result in overt wrangling between the political and ethnic matrix, especially when relatives visit each other across the borders. Politically, these people are migrants once they cross over to either side of the border, while ethnically, they are in their home area. In other words, local communities and political elites operate on two distinct repertoires, i.e. local communities tend to disregard international borders largely for cultural and socio-economic reasons, while the political elites tend to safeguard borders based on sovereignty and constitutional grounds. The support of this evidence is in Chapter 6 of the case study at Oshikango.

One scenario in Africa, as Rowlands (1998) argues, is that the mixture of people (so-called ethnic groups) are diverse enough to include, for example, the Kuria, Luo and Masai along the Kenya-Tanzania border, Rwandans and Burundians along the Rwanda-

Uganda and Burundi-Tanzania borders, the Kakwa and Nubi along the Uganda-Sudan border; the Somali along the Kenya-Somali and Somali-Ethiopia borders, and the Tutsi living in Rwanda, Burundi, and the northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rowlands, 1998:356). Given these cross-border ethnic Diasporas, Rowlands (ibid) further explains that to these ethnic groups, borders are artificial structures interfering with long-standing ethnic solidarity. The ultimate result is undocumented increase in migration, especially between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

The same phenomenon may also be better understood from the perspective of the Nyemba community that resides on both sides of the Kavango River between Namibia and Angola. Theart (2001) sheds more light on the latter when he says that most Nyemba people residing in Kavango today originate from the south-eastern part of the “*Kuandu-Kumbango*”¹ province in Angola. Also smaller groups of these people came from Moxico, some from Huila and Kunene in the western part of Angola, while some who fled to Zambia also came to settle in Kavango. In Angola, these people are called Ngangela, while in Zambia they are known as Wiko and/or Luvale. Hence, the Nyemba is the product of the combination of Tjihokwe, Ovimbundu, Luvale, Mbunda, Khankala, Jauma, and Luchazes with different cultures and slight language changes. This creates problems in terms of border crossing with various intentions including visiting family

¹ Kuandu Kumbango: This is how the spelling appears in the original source. But, the correct spelling of this south-east Angolan province is “Cuando Cubango”.

members or relatives on either side of the border or as Mokoena, et al (2001:2) has stated, for medical attention, education and business.

Like all countries worldwide, political frontiers and boundaries fragment the SADC states under different political controls and sovereignty. In some parts of the world and in particular the SADC Region, boundaries are delimited by making use of mountain ranges and escarpments. These boundaries vary at some points of geographical areas, i.e. some are artificial lines drawn by Europeans with minimal, if any, involvement of Africans, while some are natural landmarks such as rivers. Ashton (2002) confirms this by stating that most international boundaries in Southern Africa are aligned with rivers and watercourses and like the artificial lines, the locations of these boundaries, too, are the legacies of surveys and treaties conducted by earlier colonial powers.

Prescott (1997) states that the boundary between the Orange Free State and Basutoland was delimited in 1869 by authorities in the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State and it is part of the line that followed the Drakensberg. In the same vein, the Republic of South Africa and Portugal selected the boundary, which today separates South Africa and Mozambique along the Lebombo Mountains. This boundary does not fade away and above all, cannot greatly contribute to problems of cross-border migration and population movement since not many people are capable of climbing up and down the ranges or swimming across a river. Ashton (2002) also argues that because rivers

are dynamic systems that frequently change their courses in response to floods, border disputes will always be imminent over the precise locations of international boundaries when rivers change their shape and configuration.

Although some principles of international law provide a solid foundation for negotiation and arbitration when the international scale of a water-based border conflict or dispute between two or more countries erupts, this is often state-centric. Hence, most protocols that governments sign to increase migration and cross-border population movement control measures would irritate individuals who, in most circumstances, criss-cross the boundary river.

Besides rivers, Farlex, (2004) gives another credible argument reflecting the example that Zambia's major international dormant dispute remains about the place where Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe's boundaries converge, and with the DRC in the Luchinda-Pweto Enclave in the north of Chiengwe following concerns raised by individuals with the Late President Laurent Kabila on the Zambia-Congo Delimitation Treaty. The problem is the lack of demarcation beacons and the citizenship rights of people in that enclave remain a thorny issue, particularly in Luapula, Copperbelt, and North Western Provinces of Zambia. This problem will seemingly never end since it is vaguely understood within the communities at the grassroots level.

Normally, bilateral boundaries were demarcated artificially, except where they followed rivers or mountain ranges. Owing to a lack of resources in colonial administrations to apply full control along the entire boundary, pillars and cut lines disappeared, hence these administrations simply concentrated their efforts at the principal crossing points. Subsequently, a *laissez-faire* attitude developed that the normal activities of border populations, in terms of border crossing, were not to be disturbed and some new-born people could not even tell to which country they belonged. These are some of the thorny problems underlying the status quo initiatives of cross-border migration including movement of people and regional integration.

The current dilemma that poses a threat to the SADC's ideal of free movement of persons is that the grassroots communities do not fully recognise or respect the colonial borders. A century after Southern Africa was demarcated into boundaries, the grassroots communities still regard boundaries as alien barriers and nuisances imposed on them by Europeans, which block their traditional mobility across regions (read Chapter 6 for a case study).

This arouses curiosity about who drew these boundaries, for whom and predominantly, in whose interest? Any one or two of the following colonial powers played a decisive role in fixing three or more boundaries of Southern African countries: France, Spain,

Portugal, Britain, Belgium, Germany and Italy. They drew the boundaries that suited the interests of European countries, which according to Prescott,

“...saw Africa as an el Dorado of unknown resources, a place for manufactured goods, a continent where middle class public servants and soldiers could find employment which would advance their status, a people that desperately needed deliverance from the evils of slavery and spiritual oppression, an area with only a few, key strategic locations in terms of communications, and the place of naval power”, (Prescott, 1997:243).

In addition, Levraut, (1988:31), argues that during the construction of the Benguela Railways, there were many engineering problems due to the region's topography. To solve these problems in the interests of both Belgium and Portugal, the Belgian-Portuguese agreement was signed in Luanda in August 1928. Following this agreement, the Belgian Congo yielded about 3000 additional kilometres of its territory. Consequently, the border was pushed back more than 100km in an easterly direction in order for the Benguela Railways construction to reach the new frontier at Luau.

These boundaries were drawn in the name of greed. Quite unbelievably, the British, Belgian and Portuguese colonial powers carved out these boundaries in a very short time after 1885, hence making serious mistakes at that time. In Thomson (2001:12), these anomalies were acknowledged by the British Prime Minister of the day, Lord Salisbury when quipped at the 1890 Anglo-French conference that: “we have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have been giving

away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and river and lakes were”.

Understanding of conflicts and disputes inclusive of boundary demarcations by European countries cannot be confined to cross-border migration and border disputes, but could include their negative impact on the social and economic lives of people. Because of the drawing of boundaries, unfortunate people might receive a tiny part of an area, regardless of population size, as their country (microstate), or an abnormal portion (macro state) that would become a burden to manage.

Macrostates in Africa such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola were made too big, and thus became difficult to manage successfully (Breytenbach, 1999). On the other hand, microstates such as Rwanda, Burundi, the Gambia, Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea were made too small for viability. Thomson (2000:2) refers to Gambia as a tiny country in Africa of just 11,000 sq km, while the Sudan's territory is 250 times than this. Hence, Breytenbach (1999) terms these phenomena “the absurdities of boundary demarcations”. The consequence is that the sizes of these countries might now hamper their social and economic development. The people “squeezed” into microstates might flee in search of better social and economic space, and those people scattered in vast macro states might flee from anarchy to better-controlled states. Currently, migrants from either small countries such as Rwanda and

Burundi in the Great Lakes, which have difficulties to keep their large population inside, or large countries, which have difficulties to successfully extend their control to the furthest corners, exacerbate existing cross-border issues in the SADC countries, particularly in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.

Not only the size of the country matters; resources are also unevenly distributed within these countries. Imagine a tiny country like Malawi, with a total area of 45,745 sq mi i.e. 118,480 sq km and a Population of 13,013,926 (2006 estimate) with an economy depending predominantly on beans, cassava, cotton, ground nuts, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, sugar, tea and tobacco (Infoplease 2000-2006). These people are victims of a boundary that limits their area to such an extent that it cannot satisfy their needs. This could be regarded as one of the major triggers of emigration to the greener pastures and other social and economic survivals in other countries, predominantly in this case, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

1.2.2 Free Movement of People and Frontier Barriers in SADC

Social, cultural and economic policies are the pressing challenges facing all regional integrations worldwide. Although the economic dilemma was conceived as a paramount issue in this regard, the social problem of cross-border mobility that has resulted from it

has recently become equally crucial in contemporary literature. Most literature such as Sachikonye (1997), McDonald, (2000) and Kok et al, (2006), to mention but a few, tend to relate the origins of migration issues in the SADC region to the quest for labour at the end of the 20th century only. However, as stated above, this dissertation adds that the origin of migration issues could be attributed to various phenomena such as pre-colonial ethnic and tribal conflicts (war) and lately to the arbitrary demarcation of borders in Africa. The economic factor followed later with a host of dilemmas, which include trans-frontier movement of persons.

In the case of the SADC, the trans-frontier movement of persons is still an undeniable issue. Arguably, nobody knows up to now, when the two-thirds majority of the member states will sign the Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the region. Another important dilemma is what will happen to those countries, which obstinately refuse to sign it forever. For example, Mmegi, (2005) explains that the Botswana government has postponed ratifying the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Free Movement of People, because the human traffic will run in one direction towards the better run and more successful economies if it is signed. In the same vein, Solomon (1997) also argues that, far from resulting in a more equitable regional development, this protocol could simply lead to widening disparities between the core and peripheries – meaning South Africa and other sister SADC member countries.

Asymmetries of economies of countries in the region are currently a matter of concern, for example, Jauch (2003) indicates that the Southern African region has the highest inequalities in the world with some suffering from political instability. With these disparities, as Mmegi (ibid) argues, it is difficult and not too wise to talk of free movement of people. This blatant typical obstinacy gives indications that the SADC Free Trade Area planned for 2008 is also at stake if member states fail to reach consensus on a Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the region. The free movement of persons referred to, in this regard, simply, as Munyuki (ibid) argues, refers to the dismantling of barriers in the SADC region such as visa requirements, which operate to restrict the movement of human beings across national borders.

Although some writers such as Solomon (1997) oppose this idea critiquing that the free movement of people in the SADC Region will benefit neither the more developed nor the least developed states of Southern Africa due to the economic asymmetry of the region, some such as Colin disagree by stating that

“In the SADC Free Trade Agreement the unequal nature of the economies is addressed through asymmetry in tariff phase downs in favour of South Africa’s SADC partners. In the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) the smaller and less developed member states benefit from mathematical gymnastics in the formula used to distribute customs union revenue” (Colin 2005).

In support of Colin’s thought, not only a fair distribution of revenue that would benefit the region, but free labour movement can also strengthen regional economy. This

indicates that one major challenging component evident in discourses on free movement of persons is labour movement in the SADC region. Jauch (2003) argues that the unions under the umbrella of the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) are concerned that narrow economic concerns of SADC states have overridden the political aspirations for regional integration.

This means that individual states have increasingly been pursuing competing policies at the national level, which at the same time contradict efforts towards regional integration. Jauch (2003) further quotes the Regional Policy and Planning Workshop (1995:4) that asserts that free movement of labour within the current context of economic inequality and polarisation will lead to a drain of skilled people and influx of unskilled immigrants into richer countries in the region.

In addition, McDonald, et al (2000) assert that from exploitative labour practices and deferred pay systems to the transmission of AIDS and the stretching of families in some countries in and outside the SADC region, there is ample evidence to suggest that cross-border migration has served to undermine the social, cultural and economic integrity of the SADC states.

Hence, it can be acceptable that facilitation of free movement of persons in the region is gravely undermined by various factors. One of them is that the supra-national member

states also differ among themselves, particularly in passing controversial protocols such as the SADC Draft Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons. For example, although South Africa signed this protocol in 2005, she initially perceived the SADC initiatives to promote the free movement of persons within the region as 'Eurocentric' and which would impose an appropriate European Economic Community (EEC) model on Southern Africa (HSRC, 1995, Hough, 2000 and Solomon, 2000 as quoted in Oucho and Crush 2001:140). Consequently, South Africa revised the 1995 SADC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons to construct an alternative Protocol that suits the perception of South Africans, but possibly not that of the regional SADC nationals (see chapter 4).

Some critics even conceive the original draft of the Protocol as state-centric, inviting less attention from the civil society and community at grassroots level. Since the grassroots community whose everyday life is affected by national boundaries, are poorly informed about the importance of the borders, they also show little respect for such borders. In addition, since they continually and regularly commute across the borders, it is impossible to determine their nationalities. As became evident in the case study (Chapter 6) some people living along the borders, for example between Namibia and Angola may possess dual citizenship (see Chapter 6) without realising its illegality.

Given these problems, it appears that most recent literature on issues of migration in the SADC Region focuses more on South Africa. To add more knowledge, this study

selected Oshikango between Namibia and Angola as a site of investigation to explore the dynamics of cross-border migration and population movement in Southern Angola and Northern Namibia. Oshikango was chosen as a study laboratory for various reasons. Historically, Oshikango is one of the few border towns bisected by international borders in the SADC Region and it is one of the oldest official border posts between Namibia and Angola. The town is located in the Kwanyama community living on both sides of the Namibia/Angola common border, sharing the same cultural values and family ties and above all speaking the same language.

Economically, the Namibian government, through the development of an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) Industrial Park has enhanced Oshikango's position as an economic growth point. Since the launch of the Industrial Park, worth N\$20 million, in 1997, the area has become a hive of commercial activity between Namibia and Angola (Shivute 2003).

The EPZ incentives received a considerable boost, evident in the new railway line from Tsumeb to Oshikango via Ondangwa/Oshakati, which will eventually link up with the Angolan railway system at a point near Cassinga/Chamutete on the line running from Namibe to Menongue(Dierks :n.d). Such a connection will promote trade between all the countries within the region (through Oshikango gateway), but especially between Angola, Namibia and South Africa. It will also enable Angola to export iron ore mined near Cassinga to Namibia, South Africa and via Walvis Bay to countries beyond.

Politically, Oshikango's lifestyle is influenced by the politics of two countries - Namibia and Angola. The movement of people and goods between the two countries is a variable depending on the political climate of either country. Social, traditional, cultural and family ties have created major difficulties for the communities to accept modern laws and cross border controls, which to them are alien phenomena.

Given these reasons, this dissertation finds it appropriate to use Oshikango as a living proof of existing problems in managing the cross-border movement and migration of communities intersected by international boundaries in the SADC region. The findings from Oshikango will illustrate the potential severity of a threat, which SADC may face, especially by controlling the movement of people within the ethnic groups intersected by international boundaries in countries at the margins of the SADC region. Some symptoms of irredentism (already developed to a conflict level), are evident, for example, a rebel faction operating in the DRC eastern province of Nord-Kivu, under General Nkunda² sympathetic to Congolese Tutsis and the Tutsi-dominated government of neighbouring Rwanda (Wikipedia 2008). This has led to the formulation of the

² Democratic Republic of Congo rebel commander General Laurent Nkunda sees himself as a guardian of the peace and the only man who can protect his Tutsi community. He fought in both the Rwandan and Congolese conflicts. He said he was protecting Congolese Tutsis, known as the Banyamulenge, from "genocide" - an emotive word following the slaughter by Hutu extremists of some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda 10 years earlier (BBC News 2007).

problem in this dissertation based on regional integration and issues of cross-border mobility as briefly presented below.

1.2.3 Statement of the Problem

Since 1995 SADC has been futilely attempting to implement the Protocol on the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons in the Region. The barrier to reach this objective is three-fold. First, phenomena of cross-border migration and movement of people in the region, based on age-old ties that were mostly cultural, emotional, economic or historical in nature are difficult for SADC and individual member states to manage. Second, the asymmetric nature of economic development among the SADC countries also fans migration and weakens SADC efforts to manage migration efficiently and effectively. Third, SADC's model of integration is state-centric, which limits the participation of civil society and communities at grassroots level in the integration process. These problems challenge SADC's goals, namely: the ideal of free movement persons; the realisation of the SADC Free Trade Area planned for 2008; and ultimately, as SADC in Action (2007:A5) indicates, the Southern Africa Customs Union³ and Common Market by 2015, a Monetary Union 2016, and a Single Currency by 2018..

³ Some literature in this dissertation such as Tromp (2004) predicted the creation of the Southern Africa Customs Union to happen by 2010.

Previous literature already indicated immaturity of the SADC Region to allow people to move freely across borders. For example, after evaluating the 1995 and 1997 Protocols for the Free Movement of Persons, Solomon (1997) concluded that, “it is obvious that Southern Africa is not yet ready for the free movement of people at its current stage of development.”

The hypothetical problem that this dissertation intends to investigate is the gap between what SADC thinks is right to control movement of people in the region through the implementation of the official SADC Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons in the region as one effort towards regional integration and what the local people think about cross border mobility.

The principal questions to which this dissertation has tried to find an answer are: (a) To what extent may the successes of SADC project of regional integration be influenced by means of supra-national cross-border migration policy and participation of grassroots communities? (b) Why is cross-border human mobility between Namibia and Angola an issue that needs to be resolved, considering that trade and tourism and everyday movement across the borders would be beneficial to both countries in particular, and the SADC Region in general? These questions will be informed by the distinction between migration and short term cross-border population movement between Namibia and Angola.

1.2.4 Objectives of the Study

In order to examine integration and migration (including population movement) issues in the SADC Region using Oshikango as a case study, the research has investigated:

- Origins of problems in managing intra-regional migration in the integrated SADC Region. This information was obtained from literature on the history of border demarcation in Africa and the SADC Region.
- Theoretical perspectives on migration, regionalism and supranational models with specific reference to SADC Regional Integration Project. This information was obtained by reviewing literature on political and management theories including migration and gender perspectives in regional integration.
- The situation of intra-regional migration in the SADC Region and how this has been addressed through the SADC's supra-national policies and protocols since 1992 with specific reference to the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons. The researcher made use of various newspapers, books, journals, Internet, periodicals, interstate protocols and agreements as a method to acquire data towards this objective.

- Attitudes and opinions of the Regional and Local Councils of Ohangwena and Oshikango constituencies and Helao Nafidi Town Council, Heads of government, Non-governmental and private institutions in the Oshikango area regarding regional integration and implications regarding management of cross-border migration in Oshikango. Interviews were conducted with Councillors of Ohangwena and Oshikango Constituencies, Helao Nafidi⁴ Town Council, Heads of government, Non-governmental and private institutions in Oshikango area.
- The grassroots attitudes and opinions in Oshikango on regional integration and cross-border activities between Namibia and Angola. Face-to-face interviews with households in Oshikango and cross-border migrants such as formal and informal traders (both men and women), visitors, casual workers and pupils crossing the borders were conducted.
- Governmental attitudes in Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola towards regional integration and implications of management of cross-border migration in the region. The researcher consulted the embassies/higher commissions of these countries and other relevant authorities in Namibia for interviews.

⁴ Helao Nafidi is a newly proclaimed town close to Namibia/Angola border representing constituencies such as Oshikango, Engela/Omafo, Ohangwena and Onhuno.

1.3. Research methodology

The research design of this study is a case study. David and Sutton, (2004:111) define case studies as “in-depth studies of specific ‘units’, which may be individuals, organisations, events, programmes or communities”. Guided by this definition, this dissertation selected a case study design to investigate a specific case of migration issues and population movement at Oshikango.

A case study design is selected for this dissertation because it draws upon a range of methods, such as interviews and questionnaires, focus groups such as key informants, observation and document artefact collection and analysis. In this regard, the researcher enters the subject’s life-world or life-setting at the Oshikango border post and surroundings to understand and interpret the meaning that subjects give to their everyday life across the common Namibia/Angola border. In this case, the experiences of the people living in the border town of Oshikango in terms of social and cultural ties across the border were a major denominator of the results of this study.

The study utilises an applied research aimed at solving policy problems regarding migration in the SADC Region with specific reference to the controversy revolving around the implementation of the SADC Protocol of Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons in the region. As indicated in the statement of the problem above, this study is geared to explore answers to the research question, “To what extent may the successes

of the SADC Project of Regional Integration be predicted by means of supra-national cross-border migration policy and participation of grassroots communities?”

The objective of the methodology used in this study is a hybrid of exploratory and descriptive approaches for the following reasons: (a) the researcher selected the exploratory research method because this study arose out of a lack of basic information regarding perspectives and understanding by the grassroots community at Oshikango on regional integration and migration phenomena. Bless & Higson-Smith (1995), as quoted by Fouché (2004), indicate that exploratory research is conducted to gain insight into a situation, phenomenon, community and/or individuals. (b) In qualitative studies such as this, Rubin and Babbie (2001:125) as quoted by Fouché (2004:109) explain that description is more likely to refer to a more intensive examination of phenomena and their deeper meanings, thus leading to thicker description, and hence a research strategy such as a case study can be used. Moreover, the purpose of the study is to provide qualitative and quantitative information on various factors, which are hypothesised as being related to regional integration and migration in the SADC Region.

However, since the study is exploratory and descriptive, the research is predominantly qualitative. Quantitative data will be used minimally during saturation and cross-tabulation of data in Chapter 6. As indicated above, this study focuses on the border town called Oshikango between Namibia and Angola and its surroundings. Interviews

with the inhabitant households, cross-border migrants and key informants were conducted in the area.

The sample size of 168 respondents was conveniently used for the purpose of interviews conducted among the households, migrants and other stakeholders in that area (for more details on the methodology of this study see Chapter 5). At this stage, the researcher only presents a primary indication of the design and methodology. Therefore, it is also appropriate to present the delimitation, limitation, significance and structure of this study.

1.3.1 Limitation of the study

The study is constrained by various obstacles beyond the researcher's control. Finance was the major problem, since no sponsor or bursary was provided for this research. This limited the researcher's range of travel to the Oshikango border post only. The initial proposal suggested a visit to the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone (Botswana), as well as all Namibia's border posts. However, due to a lack of funds this could not materialise.

Another major problem was time. The research time was strictly confined to the June academic recess, hence the interviews were conducted in a short period and some

appointments were missed. Lack of time also forced the researcher to co-opt research assistants.

The area of study was also an issue of concern. 'Oshikango' as a name is understood in two different ways. First, there is Oshikango Constituency, which is a political demarcation. Secondly, there is Oshikango traditional ward or village, which is not explicitly demarcated (and stretches across the international border into Angola). The residents in the area, some of them from Oshikango in Angola, were also included as respondents during the interviews, because to them Oshikango is only one traditional area, regardless of the political borders.

The total population from which the research sample was drawn came from the 2001/2 Population Census, which only provides the research sample statistics of the population in the Oshikango Constituency and not in the ward. This fact has the potential threat to undermine both the internal and external validity of this research. Another limitation was a lack of cooperation from the cross-border and household respondents.

As the majority of people in the research area were illegal migrants, they did not feel comfortable being interviewed. They confused the researchers with the police or immigration officers. Consequently, many people ran away when approached for an interview, or when they accepted, they deliberately avoided the questions.

1.3.2 Delimitation of the study

SADC Project of Regional Integration is dedicated to the ideals of trade, free movement of people, a single currency, democracy, and respect for human rights. Each of these ideals has its researchable problems. The scope of this dissertation is, therefore, delimited to probe the problem of free movement of persons in the SADC Region and the influence of cross-border mobility on regional integration. The study is narrowed down to focus on the attitudes and understanding of communities at the grassroots level about regional integration using Oshikango cross border migration and population movement issues as a case study.

1.3.3 This study vs. the latest research in Oshikango

The most recent research on the cross-border migration between Namibia and Angola using Oshikango as a case study was conducted during 2003 and 2004 by Nangulah and Nickanor for SAMP. This research was commissioned by Namibia's Ministry of Home Affairs. Their research questions were as follows (Nangulah and Nickanor 2005:5):

- Does border management facilitate or inhibit the movement of people and goods?
- What kinds of pressures exist at official border crossing-points and how could these be better managed?

- How much irregular border crossing takes place in the region and with what result?

This dissertation supports their approach, which entails that these (referring to the above questions), and other questions related to movement and management on the Angola-Namibia border need investigation in order to facilitate the overall SADC goal of freer movement of people and goods. However, this dissertation differs from the previous study in important ways. These are:

- The previous study focused mainly on Oshikango border post while this dissertation goes beyond the border post to include households in the surrounding area.
- The previous research was conducted 18 months earlier, thus some contextual factors might have changed since then.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Theoretically, this dissertation explores significant theories and the literature on regional integration and cross-border migration that make it an important source of information for future researchers in this field. It provides broad insights about the current theoretical parameters on Regionalism at the international level and how the SADC Integration Project would fit in.

At the SADC level, this dissertation contributes new knowledge about issues of cross-border migration and population movement and as such it poses a challenge on regional migration policy. Major challenges posed to the national policy by the Regional Integration Project are pointed out and recommendations on potential reconciliation, both supra-national and national are made. Moreover, information provided in this dissertation will enhance the reader's understanding of the complexity of cross-border migration as a challenge to the SADC Regional Integration Project.

The study is particularly significant to Namibia, since Namibia is a country where it was conducted and the result is predominantly based on the empirical data in the Namibian context. Based on the case study, the grassroots perspective will be better understood. This will also emphasise the need to involve communities in policy formulation, considering the role of civil society and community-based organisations in integration policies or policies that transcend national boundaries. It also contributes to existing knowledge regarding challenges and constraints towards regional integration by introducing another important dynamic of individual and community understanding of integration and the people's mobility between neighbouring countries, more particularly, Namibia and Angola.

1.5 Definition of Major Terms

(a) Allocation, delimitation and demarcation: Jones (as quoted by Prescott 1987:13) defines these terms together as follows: “*Allocation means the initial political division of territory between two states. Delimitation means the selection of a boundary site and its definition. Demarcation refers to the construction of the boundary in the landscape.*”

(b) Border: Makins (1993:149) defines a border as “*the dividing line or frontier between political or geographic regions.*” Illés (2003:1) defines borders as “*scars on the face of the Earth.*” Illés (ibid) further classifies borders according to geographic, ethnic and social, economic and political characteristics of a particular country. In the light of social constructivism approach, “border” is a social construct that can be changed (see social constructivism). In this dissertation, borders refer to this definition and classification.

(c) Borderland: Prescott (1987:13) explains, “*Borderland refers to the transition zone within which the boundary lies.*”

(d) Border regions: Illés (ibid) also states border regions as those subjects and actors of regional cross-border cooperation. This definition tallies with the context in which these concepts are used in this dissertation. Moreover, border

regions refer to the regions at the geographical margins of the country. For example, Ohangwena Region is perceived as a border region because it is geographically located at the northern border of Namibia.

(e) Community: Makins (1993:269) refers to community as “*a group of people having cultural, religious, or other characteristics in common.*” For example, as Illés (ibid) explains, the community on the border who belong to the same ethnic group. This definition is used in this dissertation to refer to the communities of the neighbouring countries who live on both sides of the border. However, Makins (ibid), also defined a community as “*a group of nations, having certain interests in common,*” for example the European Community or the Southern African Development Community. Both definitions are applied in this dissertation.

(f) Boundaries and frontiers: Following Prescott (1987:13), ‘*boundary*’ refers to a line, but ‘*frontier*’ refers to a zone.

(g) Cosmopolitan: According to Heater (2001) the word ‘cosmopolitan’ derives from *kosmoplites*, citizen of the universe, and *polites*, citizen, notably in Aristotelian definition, has a decided ethical content. Heater further explains cosmopolitan that, “accordingly, if the citizen of a state (*polis*) should be

possessed of civic virtue (*arête*), by extension, the citizen of the universe (*kosmopolis*) should live a life of virtue, guided by his perception and understanding of the divine, natural law”. This dissertation uses cosmopolitan as a theory that illuminates life after communitarianism.

(h) Cross-border migration: The concept ‘cross-border migration’ denotes the everyday mobility of people through one country’s international borders. Some cross-border migrants are commuting, some on foot.

(i) Federalism: Roskin et al (2000:51) define federalism as *“the territorial balancing of power between a nation’s capital and autonomous divisions such as the “states”, of the US. Zalt et al. (2003:n.p) refer to federalism as a “theory or advocacy of federal political orders, where final authority is divided between sub-units and a centre. Unlike a unitary state, sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels so that units at each level have final authority and can act independently of the others in some areas. Citizens thus have political obligations to two authorities.”* Both explanations are relevant to the use of a concept of federalism in this dissertation.

(j) Functionalism: Makins, (1993:515) states functionalism as the theory of design that says that the form of a thing should be determined by its use. Savas (2003) indicates that the functionalists’ approach, developed by Mitrany, deeply affected

the founding fathers of the EEC, Jean Monet and Robert Schuman. It was finally believed that through this approach the European states would have an opportunity to stop their conflict after centuries of warfare.

(k) Globalisation: Lim (2005) defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa.” Globalisation is characterised by trends of internationalisation of production, new international divisions of labour, new migratory movements, new competitive environments and the internationalisation of states, i.e. making the states agencies of the globalising world (Lim, 2005). This dissertation adopts this definition of globalisation.

(l) Irregular Migrants: The UN (1989) considers irregular migrants as those persons who enter other countries in improper ways. This includes all persons who do not have authorisation for admission in that country or those persons who stay or undertake economic activity without these authorisations. A person can also be treated as an irregular migrant if he or she exceeds or ceases to comply with the conditions to which the admission, stay or economic activity is subject.

(m) Mail-order brides: This refers to women seeking husbands from overseas using Internet dating services. Simons (1999:130) explains that the agencies do not

charge the women to be listed in their catalogues. They find interested women by placing ‘brides wanted’ advertisements overseas. Prospective brides answer questionnaires and send photos

(n) Migration and immigration: The two concepts often confuse the users. In this dissertation, migration means to move from one’s country to settle for a short period in another country. However, it was used as a combined definition of immigration and emigration issues as discussed in Chapter 4, due to the complicated nature of the peoples’ movement in the SADC region. Immigration on the other hand refers to movement of people from their countries to permanently settle in other countries. To support this, wordiq.com defines that: **Immigration** is the act of moving to or settling in another country or region, temporarily or permanently. An **immigrant** is usually someone who intends to reside permanently, and not as a casual visitor or traveller. Immigration means "in-migration" into a country, and is the reverse of emigration or "out-migration." The long term and/or permanent movement of human population in general, whether into, out of, or within countries (or before the existence of recognised countries) is regarded as migration, for example, it would include the regular movement across the borders with the purpose of visiting family and shopping.⁵ In this dissertation, “migration” is sometimes used to include immigration, emigration and regular cross border human mobility.

⁵ See Chapter 3, “Reasons for migration and immigration.”

(o) Nationality and Citizenship: Black's Dictionary as quoted by Adigun (1989:271) describes nationality as that quality of character, which arises from the fact of a person belonging to a nation or state. Nationality determines the political status of the person, particularly in respect of allegiance, while domicile on the other hand determines the individual's civil status. Nationality is acquired by birth or naturalisation, while citizenship refers to a person who by virtue of the constitution and laws, of say, Namibia is a member of the Namibian political community entitled to the enjoyment of all civil rights.

(p) Neo-functionalism: Ozen, (1998) states neo-functionalism as an integration theory proposing a model to achieve establishing a political community at the end of the integration process. Proponents of this theory believe that it creates a linkage between economic and political integration. This means that once economic integration is achieved, political integration comes into existence automatically.

(q) Open versus closed Regionalism: Gelb (2001) defines closed Regionalism as referring to efforts to integrate in which the regional market is seen as an end in itself, in the sense that growth is expected to take place on the basis of an enlarged regional market. Open Regionalism on the other hand, as Bergsten (1997) argues is a concept that seeks to ensure that regional agreements will in

practice be building blocks for further global liberalisation rather than those barriers that deter such progress.

(r) Regionalism: Makins (1993:1126) defines Regionalism as the “division of a country into administrative regions having partial autonomy.” However, in this dissertation, Regionalism usually refers to political and economic groupings of countries sharing the same geographical region or area, for example, ECOWAS, SADC, EU, etc.

(s) Refugees: Clover (2002) explains that “technically the term ‘refugees’ refers to those who have been displaced across the borders of their home State, while *“Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) refers to those who have been displaced within their country of origin.”*

(t) Regional Integration: Rosamond (n.d) argues that “the term Regional Integration suggests that we are talking about geographically contiguous units – the integration of physically adjacent economies.”

(u) Regionalisation: According to Jilberto and Mommen (1998:7) “regionalisation can be defined as an integration process on the regional level with the help of governments.” This appears as aspect of a process towards liberalisation of markets and foreign direct investment regulations in the region. These regional

arrangements as Jilberto and Mommen further indicate appear to be the direct result of governmental actions instituting regional trade regimes and creating deeper integration of separate economies on the region level.

(v) Regular migrants: UN (1984:14) refers to regular migrants as those “*non-national workers and members of their families who have obtained the legally required authorisations for admission, stay or exercise of economic activity of the State in which they find themselves, or who fulfil the conditions to which their admission, stay or economic activity is subject.*”

(w) Rules of origin: The International Centre for Economic Growth (n.d) defines the Rules of Origin: “...as those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied by any members to determine the country of origin of goods, provided such rules of origin are not related to contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the application of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of GATT 1994”. The Economist (2004:78) explains that the rules of origin are needed to define whether imported goods, which may consist of inputs from many different countries, qualify for favoured treatment.

(x) Social constructivism: Social constructivism emphasizes the importance of culture and context in understanding what occurs in society and constructing

knowledge based on this understanding (Derry, 1999; McMahon, 1997 in Kim 2001). In extension, constructivism is an approach to politics and society that concerns itself with the centrality of ideas and human consciousness and stresses a holistic and often idealist view of structures. Scholars who work within this frame have examined politics from the perspective of how structures constitute the actor's identities and interests, how their interactions are recognised and constrained by that structure, and how their very interaction serves to either reproduce or transform that structure (read "border" in this case).

(y) Southern Africa: Olowu (2003) quotes the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) that divides Africa into five sub-regions referred to as sub-regional developmental centres. Its Southern Africa block comprises eleven countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Some observers limit Southern Africa to countries within the Southern African Regional Community. In this dissertation Southern Africa refers to all countries included in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

(z) Trans-national communities: These refer to communities or ethnic groups extending beyond the boundaries of a single nation.

(aa) Xenophobia: Mattes et al (1999:20) explain the etymological roots of xenophobia as being much broader, referring to a fear of the unknown or anything that is different, whereas Makins (1993:1567) refers to xenophobia as hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers or other politics or culture. Although both explanations are correct, this dissertation adopts the latter.

1.6 Organisation of the Study

The study is organised to investigate the SADC's Integration Project ideal of free movement of people. Hence, this gives it two major levels of investigation: the regional integration level and the migration level. The latter determines the legitimacy of the supra-national regional structure and tests the sovereignty of states. The study is divided into three parts as follows:

PART I: CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background

This chapter clarifies issues and the framework of the research parameters of this dissertation. It begins by contextualising the study, its topic, relevance and importance. Hence, it is the only component of Part I of this study. Generally, this chapter outlines the background to the problem in the SADC's Regional Integration Project with specific emphasis on migration and the free movement of persons in the region. The chapter discusses the statement of the problem with emphasis on cross-border migration and population movement as one of the major challenges to the SADC Regional Integration Project. Moreover, other important components of the study, such as its objective, research design and methodology, as well as its significance have been covered. The chapter ends by outlining the organisation of the study, definition of the major terms and summary.

PART II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Part II comprises of Chapters 2, 3 and 4, which are summarised as follows:

Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives: Regionalism and Migration

This chapter explores the relationship between theory and the research. The first part discusses various theoretical perspectives on regional integration in broader terms. It goes on to discuss the importance of incorporating gender into theories of international

migration. It critically analyses the shortcomings of the migration theory, which traditionally considers the causes of international migration over questions of who migrates without specifically addressing gender migration experiences. It also looks at theoretical perspectives on women and migration as well as the challenges of gender and cross-border migration in the SADC Region. The chapter reflects the importance of gender in shaping the migrant labour system and the historical organisation of gender in the African communities living in the area of Oshikango. The chapter ends with the conclusion.

Chapter 3: Regional Integration: Historical Perspectives

This chapter provides a general historical overview of regional integration in the global, continental and ultimately regional contexts. It gives an outline of the existing models of integration emphasising the EU as an historic model, the problems experienced in the EU and the origin of regional integration in the SADC Region. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

Chapter 4: Migration

This chapter primarily discusses the characteristics, approaches and types of international migration. It also discusses the international systems approaches and major categories of migration. The last part of this chapter discusses in detail the historical background of cross-border mobility in the SADC countries, the boundaries between

them and the historical implications of migrations and the migration policy implications in Africa and the SADC Region after which the chapter is summarised in a conclusion.

PART III: METHODOLOGY, PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, DATA ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part III comprises of chapters 5 and 6 as well as appendixes and references as follows:

Chapter 5: Research design and methodology

This chapter highlighted a research design and methodology used in this dissertation. Research Design and Methodology contained practical information on how this research was to be conducted within the communities in the Oshikango area. Data collection and assessment strategies, interpretation methods, and important ethical considerations also received significant coverage in this chapter. The chapter condensed the wide-ranging topics of the field into a concise, accessible format in terms of sampling and data collection techniques.

Chapter 6: A Case Study of Oshikango

Empirical data drawn from the case study of the Namibia/Angola border town of Oshikango are analysed, discussed and interpreted in terms of the research problem that informs this dissertation. The findings from the case study will be considered against the theoretical part of the study to determine the gaps, which need to be addressed. The chapter ends with the summary.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations

This last chapter of the dissertation summarises the findings deduced from the case study. While the purpose of this research project was to bridge a gap in the existing knowledge left by previous research on regional integration and migration, it is pointed out here to what degree the results obtained succeeded in achieving this goal. Recommendations or policy proposals are made in line with research results and conclusions. Finally, all references used in the text are listed at the end to enable the reader to consult these references as well as appendixes to reflect material used, such as questionnaires.

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter contextualises the study by linking the topic to the research problem. The researcher relates how the decision on the topic was made. Moreover, the researcher shows the preliminary literature that led to the refinement and focusing of the initial ideas about the study. Hence, this chapter introduces the background and problem statement of the study. This led to the conclusion that the major challenge for SADC Regional Integration is a gap between the management of the regional body and grassroots community perspectives. Therefore, the visionary focus of this dissertation is on the effect of cross-border mobility on the SADC Integration Project. Part two of the dissertation presents the principal theories of migration and perspectives of regional integration models as applied to the SADC integration process.

PART II

LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: MIGRATION AND REGIONALISM

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the theoretical grounding of this dissertation with special reference to contested interpretations of issues of cross border mobility and regionalism in the SADC region. The focus on migration was informed by factors such as the fact that it is a formative feature of the region as well as by the economic, political and cultural importance of migration. Linking migration to regionalism became vital to underscore its potential challenge to the regional project of SADC as well as its implications for state sovereignty.

This chapter also links migration to the SADC regional integration project because the region and its affairs have renewed importance and interest following the demise of Cold War, the growing importance of economic globalisation and at present the transition from war to peace (in other words, democratic experiments). In this regard, this chapter accepts the fact that contemporary migration is debatable within the new role of the region in the global security after the Cold War.

Also, migration is at present inseparable from the existing nature of potential political conflict in the region as well as from those issues regarding the realisation of the role of people, communities, ideas and identity in the regional integration process. The chapter thus seeks to investigate these issues within theoretical approaches as presented in literature. The focus is to marry migration approaches with perspectives of regionalism including its subsets of regionalisation, regional interstate cooperation, integration and regional identity. It starts investigating perspectives of international migration and the focus will shift to investigate “regionalism based on “regionalisation” and “regional interstate cooperation” in terms of universal institutions in regional blocs, vis-à-vis in the SADC.

The dissertation will probe the theoretical foundations of “regional integration” in light of the political process and member states’ decisions to remove barriers for regional unification. Perspectives from intergovernmentalism, liberal-intergovernmentalism, federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism to constructivism will also be highlighted. These are the integration theories proposing a model to achieve a political community at the end of the SADC integration process. Finally, the chapter concludes investigating issues of regional identity, awareness or consciousness based on Andrew Hurrell’s and Immanuel Kant’s ideas on “cosmopolitanism” and common history of nations. The chapter ends with a summary.

2.2 Main theories of International Migration

According to Mulaudzi (2006:6), the mainstream perspectives on “regionalism” in Africa in general, suggest that this important contemporary political dimension is characterised mainly by failed or weak regional organisations, and poor levels of integration. However, like this dissertation, Mulaudzi (2006) critiqued this argument in that “it ignores the fact that regional co-operation and integration Africa are expressed not only via state-to-state interaction but also via informal cross-border trade and migration” (also see Chapter 6 of this dissertation).

In order to assure a better understanding, this chapter has analysed migration within the context of nascent regionalism in the SADC region starting with international perspectives of migration. For Calvo (1998:16) [the] “contemporary international migration occurs within the context of globalisation and regionalisation.” However, Calvo fails to contextualise clearly the broader implications of international migration that underlie regionalism into meaningful theoretical categories. This dissertation links these implications to the following two major categories of theories on international migration: (1) theories on the initiation of migration; and (2) theories on the perpetuation of migration (Groenewold 2005; Entwisle et al 2005; Russell n.d; and Massey et al n.d).

2.2.1 Theories on the initiation of migration

2.2.1.1 The theory of development in a dual economy

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2003) identifies this theory the brainchild of W. A. Lewis (1954). This theory suggests that the growth with unlimited labour supply model was the precursor to models explaining migration, though not a *sui generis* migration theory (IOM 2003:n.p). According to Golinowska (n.d), Lewis assumed that developing economies would be dual economies – meaning that in these economies one finds two co-existing sectors, i.e. the modern and the traditional sectors. The modern sector draws the labour force from the traditional sector, where the marginal effectiveness equals zero and on that premise, migration would start. The migration process will later on benefit both the traditional and modern sectors in terms of development. Golinowska's views resonate with this dissertation's notion in that migration is not always negative and thus should not be regarded as a threat to the regionalisation process.

Based on this theory, one may argue that through regionalisation free movement of labour may allow the less developed countries in the region such as Malawi and Zambia in the SADC region to develop. These countries being regarded as the traditional sector that would send labour to the modern sector such as South Africa, Namibia and

Botswana may consequently flourish due to technologies and remittances that would be transferred from the latter to the former.

In addition, this could also be better understood within the context of the mainstream approach to regional trade agreements and free movement of persons. According to Caldentey and Ali (n.d:1) the mainstream theory maintains that the principle of “comparative advantage” is the fundamental explanation for the gains from trade argument or the assertion that ‘free trade’ is best. This, as Caldentey and Ali (ibid) argue, implies that in terms of the mainstream economic theory free movement of persons makes free trade possible and the latter creates welfare gains by allowing consumers and firms to purchase from the cheapest source of supply insuring that production is located according to comparative advantage in the region. Consequently, through customs unions the economies of poor countries within the regional integration project would flourish and internal migration patterns from poor to rich economies within the region would change.

Justifying this conclusion, this dissertation adopts Spain’s scenario in relation to the European Union. Spain was well-known as the poorest country in Europe, but its economy flourished after it joined the EU and gained subsidies from EU. The People’s Daily Online (2005) explains that after it acceded to the European Community (predecessor of the EU); Spain enjoyed political stability, sustained economic development and led EU member countries in terms of economic growth rate. At

present, Spain is the fifth largest EU economic power, the world's fourth largest capital exporter and its GDP is ranked eighth in the economic cooperation organisation.

2.2.1.2 The neo-classical theory

According to Solomon (2003), classical theories of migration tend to be dominated by sociologists and economists. IOM (2003) on the other hand, refers to “neo-classical theory” as an extension of the development in a dual economy theory. It was developed by Lewis in 1960 and adopted by Ranis, Fei and Todaro. This dissertation ties the issues of SADC’s regionalism and migration to this theory. Take, for example, Todaro’s neo-classical model, which regards migration as a product of economic decision-making (India Together 2004:2).

This means that the migrant makes a rational free choice to improve his/her economic life by seeking more favourable employment conditions, even if that decision is taken under stressful or hazardous conditions. It is by now believed that, even after regionalisation in the SADC region is fully completed migration within the region will remain skewed to countries with stronger economies and employment opportunities as is the case of the Federal Republic of Germany in the European Union.

Jennissen (2000:n.p) advances the same argument that “according to the neo-classical theory, wage differences between regions are the main reason for labour migration.”

This, as Jennissen further explains, shows that application of the neo-classical economics to international migration would reflect the result that countries with a shortage of labour relative to capital have a high equilibrium wage, for example, South Africa and Botswana in the SADC Region. On the other hand, the countries with a relatively high labour supply have a low equilibrium wage, for example, Malawi. Lucrative wages in the former encourage labour flows to arise.

The IOM (2003:n.p) divides the neo-classical theory of migration into macroscopic and microscopic approaches. The macroscopic approach focuses on the structural determinant of migration, while the microscopic approach centres on the study of individual behaviour. Like Jennissen, the IOM's approach on the macroscopic level reflects that migration results from the uneven geographical distribution of capital and resources. There are countries with small comparative advantages, which for that reason are called poor countries. It is in these countries that wages and standards of living are below the poverty line and human resources inflate over job opportunities, and thus migration sprouts.

In this case, a trend of supply-push and demand-pull factors influences people to emigrate to where jobs, wages and other economic factors are favourable. Afrol News (2004:2) gives a good example of Kenyan migrants who start their exodus by migrating to Southern African countries, including Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia and then re-

emigrate to the US and Britain because of the better terms and conditions of service there. For US/Mexico migration issues, Paul the American indicates that:

Studies show that the valleys and peaks in migration have depended far less on changes in policy or policing and far more on the basic economic conditions in the U.S. and Mexico. If you want to truly tamp down illegal immigration, you could induce a recession in the U.S. A better idea might be to help Mexico create more jobs that pay better. A recent Council on Foreign Relations study found that when Mexican wages drop 10% relative to U.S. wages, attempts to cross the border illegally rise 6% (Paul the American (2007:n.p)).

This provides another supportive conclusion that if the disparities in terms of wages and other benefits in the region disappear then labour and economic migration also tends to decline. One glaring example is Namibia and South Africa with their relatively equated wages - only a few Namibians currently go to South Africa for employment purposes. Frayne and Pendleton (2000:94) indicate that only 2% of Namibians recently (i.e. close to year 2000), visited South Africa with the purpose of looking for work.

The micro approach as an element of neo-classical theory examines the reasons prompting individuals to respond to structural disparities among countries by migrating (IOM 2003). This means that migration develops as an individual decision taken by people who simply want to improve their living conditions in countries where wages are better than in their own countries. This is done by thoroughly comparing incomes and the costs and benefits of migration, hence the migrants would choose the destination where they would enjoy enough net benefits, i.e. an individual first looks at the transport cost from home to the place of work and cost of accommodation and food before he or

she migrates. This occurs in every context – intergovernmental, federal and confederation regimes.

It is also worth arguing within the context of this theory that regionalisation may not give an answer to microscopic issue of migration or population movement such as migration based on individual decision from rural to urban areas as such. The issue, in this regard, as the structuralism theories argue, is that the personal choice to migrate is not a product of individual freedom but rather is structured by the larger mechanisms of capitalist production (India Together 2004:2). This means that poor people have no other option than to emigrate, hence their decision is simply a reflection of lack of choice rather than freedom of opportunities.

It is believed from this theory that since the capitalist system is the stimulus of regional imbalance, migration to countries in which a huge deposit of capitalists wealth accumulates, will hardly vanish. Employers within a regional bloc may hire labour at the lowest available cost and the poor in the poorest countries, even outside the region, where unemployment is rife, emigrate to exploit such opportunities.

2.2.1.3 The new economics of labour migration

Contra-arguments embedded in various theories of migration identify issues with considerable impact on regionalisation and regional integration. In this case and unlike

the neo-classical theory, the new economics of labour migration rule out the importance of individual choice as a factor in migration. Jenissen (2000) with reference to Stark and Bloom (1985) argues that there is incoherence in explanations of an individual's decision to emigrate. It is not accurate to explain this at the level of individual workers, hence it is also essential to take the broader social context into consideration. Stark and Bloom's theory is called the new economics of labour migration. This theory tallies with Vertovec and Cohen's (1999:2) new approaches to migration supporting demographers such as Kritiz, Lim and Zlotnik (1992) and Skeldon (1997), who retain the term "migration" in a restricted sense but at the same time try to present a holistic picture of migration.

Vertovec and Cohen (1999:2) further assume that migration should be placed within a larger picture of movements and networks, thereby transcending binaries of outward and return migration, in terms of sending and receiving societies. These demographers created another supplemental term the "migration system" to describe the whole spectrum of migration. This system was further refined by Pieke (1999) in Vertovec and Cohen (1999:2), who proposed the term "migration configuration" to encompass the movements of people, information, goods, money and other resources between the two loci of a trans-national community, but also the institutions and networks supporting such flows and niches carved out by migrants.

The point of departure here is the “Migration Configuration approach” which encompasses the migration typology that would include kinship and community ties, formal immigration barriers and commercial human traffickers, state agencies and individual officials, the configuration of ethnic groups, migrant encounters, airlines, railways and shipping companies and even law firms, human rights groups and anti-migration activists (Vertovec and Cohen 1999:2).

For Adepoju (2006), most Migration Configurations are determined by a shared culture, language and colonial heritage. In the context of regionalisation, especially within the SADC, these factors may detrimentally undermine regional integration, since the citizens of the member states share the same language, culture and even colonial legacies and geographical landscape with citizens of states outside the regional bloc. A focus on migration enables this dissertation to explore questions of sovereignty at the supranational level, in case of regionalisation, by encompassing both the external and internal dynamics of social structures (including clans and family ties).

We should accept the fact that, people often also tend to migrate for one reason only, namely, to follow their relatives living on the other side of the border. In most cases, people, more specifically in Africa, may emigrate without any knowledge that what they are doing constructs migration. This, as Adepoju (1983a) as quoted by Adepoju (2006) argues this fluidity of the migration phenomenon has raised another question as to whether the term ‘circulation’ would be more appropriate than ‘migration’ in the African

continent, for example, where the boundaries are only marked with pillars and the borderline is not clear, or where the trans-national community refuses to accept the demarcated boundaries. A similar situation is empirically illustrated in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

2.2.1.4 The dependency theory

GIRR⁶ No10 (n.d) states that contrary to neo-classical theory, the dependency which falls in the ambits of both the World System and Neo-Marxist school of thought draws its analysis of migration not so much from individual discretion, but from systemic factors and structures of production and reproduction. Scholars of the 1970s challenged the legitimacy and predominance of the neo-classical theory. The neo-Marxist dependency, for example made some remarkable contributions to studies of migration, although this has its focus on rural exodus to urban areas. This constitutes a conflict created by inequalities between rural and urban areas.

Replicating this argument at the regional or global levels, countries at the centre are developed through exploitation of the countries on the peripheries, in which developmental momentum is hindered by symmetric dependency relations (IOM 2003:

⁶ This acronym appears in the internet like that and no details given on what GIRR stands for.

n.p). In this case, countries on the peripheries tend to depend on developed countries and people leave the peripheries to central countries to live a better life.

Questioning the nature of SADC regionalisation and migration leads to an examination of distinct dependency of individual member states to different capitalist centres resulting from their colonial backgrounds. Although it is simply discursive, the fact is that migration between for example, Angola and Portugal or between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom is easier than between themselves. This phenomenon may remain strong regardless of whether SADC regional integration is a success or not.

Another serious implication appears in GIRR No10 (n.d) by arguing that labour migration in southern Africa has been the articulation of modes of production discourses. It was documented that the emergence of capitalism and its uneven penetration in southern Africa induced the creation of a regional subsystem and economic asymmetry since the major place of capital accumulation was South Africa.

It was also correctly argued that the neighbouring countries, including Namibia although it was treated as part of South Africa at the time, were all subordinated to serve the labour needs of South Africa, to provide a ready market for its products and eventually to provide the needed raw materials for South Africa's manufacturing sector. It was in that way that South Africa became a regional economic powerhouse and attracted many migrants from the region. This dissertation deduced from this theory a lesson that the

accumulation of capital in South Africa by the capitalists caused the dependency on South Africa of other countries in the region, which were neglected by the capitalists in terms of capital accumulation.

This phenomenon led to what is currently termed a long history of migration to South Africa, which is difficult to stop even through a supranational policy. Hence, as GIRR No10 (n.d) referring to Arrughi, (1970), Magubane (1972), Wolpe (1972), Cliffe (1978), Murray (1981) and Bundy (1988), indicates, the Neo-Marxist or dependency theory on southern Africa focuses on three important systematic processes that drove the migration phenomenon:

- Penetration of capitalism in Southern Africa;
- Commodification of production which in turn undermined subsistence production;
- Proletarianisation process, which was a new feature of the African social order.

Thus, it is accepted in this dissertation that, the challenge of the SADC regional integration and regionalisation of migration policies and institutions, is a dual-faceted dependency issue: first, dependency on distinctive former colonial centres; and dependency on South Africa as a “regional hegemon” of the first world capitalist states or in its own right.

“Dependency” as a central denominator in this argument raises other questions, such as ‘who depends on South Africa now and before?’ Are the SADC member states the ones who only depend on South Africa or other nations in Africa too? If the latter question is true, will the SADC regionalisation be effective in controlling migration and population

movement from the neighbouring African states that also share a history of dependency on South Africa? Answers to these questions are articulated in chapter 4 of this dissertation.

2.2.1.5 The dual labour market theory

The Dual Labour Market theory of international migration stems from intrinsic labour demands of modern industrial countries, not from rational choice decisions; push factors do not play a role. Wikipedia gives a holistic overview of this theory when it reflects:

“The Dual Labour Market theory divides the economy into two parts, called the “primary” and “secondary” sectors. The distinction may also be drawn between formal/informal sectors or sectors with high/low value added. The secondary sector is characterised by short-term employment relationships, little or no prospect of internal promotion and the determination of wages primarily by market forces. In terms of occupations, it consists primarily of low or unskilled jobs, whether they are blue collar (manual labour), white-collar (e.g. filing clerks), or service jobs (e.g. waiters). These jobs are linked by the fact that they are characterised by “low skill levels, low earnings, easy entry, job impermanence and low returns on education or experience.” (Wikipedia 2005:n.p).

According to Jennissen (2000), as pointed out above, the Dual Labour Market theory perceives that international migration is mainly caused by pull factors in the developed migrant receiving countries. IOM (2003) on the other hand as quoted in Piore indicates that this theory links immigration to meeting the structural needs of modern industrial economies.

However, the most important version of this theory, as Jennissen (ibid) explains, is that the labour market in developed countries is divided into a primary and a secondary segment. Its character as a capital-intensive method of production distinguishes the primary segment and predominantly high-skilled employment while the secondary segment is characterised by a labour-intensive method of production and predominantly low-skilled employment (Jenissen 2000:4).

IOM (2003) refers to these sectors as operating like watertight compartments and leading to the emergence of a Dual Labour Market. It is worthwhile to note from this perspective that, regionalisation and regional integration, especially the SADC scenario will be unable to give effective control of migration emerging as a consequence of dual labour market practices. The evolution norms regulating population flows due to the dual labour market situation are embedded in the global social construction which simultaneously falls beyond supranational policies at the regional level.

The problem, even if SADC regional integration becomes a successful project, lies in the issue of lack of upward mobility in industrialised countries, which would make it difficult to successfully motivate local employees to take jobs in secondary industries.

It would become normative that immigrants from low-wage countries, within the region, would be inclined to take such jobs because the salary they would earn is higher than what they earn in their countries. Hence, this theory argues that international labour

migration commences from labour demands in the labour-intensive segment of modern industrial receiving countries (Jenissen 2000; Piore, 1979 and Massey et al., 1993). Kupiszewski (2005:4) supports this viewpoint, arguing that the Dual Labour Market theory entails that migration is driven by the demand for labour as well as by recruitment practices functioning in destination regions rather than by differences in salary levels observed between the origin and destination.

As shown in Chapter 4 of this dissertation people from poor countries, being the members of regional blocs or not, tend to migrate to Europe not for high salaries but because of the demand for labour, especially for unskilled jobs. The report from the Bank of England (n.d) as quoted by the Namibia Press Agency (Nampa) (2006:14) correctly argues that “it appears that new immigrants are more educated than both previous waves of immigrants and those born in United Kingdom, but they are more likely to be working in elementary occupations such as in the hotels and restaurants”.

One example is those Namibians who go to the UK as baby-sitters or caretakers of old people because the British or people from European Union do not show an interest in these lower-skilled jobs, are a case in point. For example, the Republic of South Africa’s (RSA) Migration Commission (2005) quotes arguments on the current UK policy on migration that, “low-skilled workers are key to the UK economy – a high-skills economy needs low-skilled support (‘who’s going to look after granny?’)”. Taking this argument from a gender perspective, Ruphael (2004) argues that thousands

of young women, who are often highly skilled, work as domestic workers or caregivers for the elderly and children in some industrialised countries (such as in the United States and Western Europe).

To explore these broad issues raised by looking at the effects of dual labour market, the same arguments can be replicated at the regional level. This would also induce this dissertation to investigate the implications that the Dual Labour Market system may pose to SADC's regional integration and regionalisation processes.

In some countries such as Namibia and South Africa, the reluctance of locals to take up certain types of employment, such as farm and domestic work or leaving it for modern jobs gives migrants from neighbouring countries who can survive as cheap labour the opportunity to immigrate. Sometimes the industries opt for the employment of immigrants, especially in the primary sector to avoid conflicts with the trade unions. Solomon (1996) correctly summarises such practices in South Africa that conform to the Dual Labour Market approach by showing that illegal immigrants are generally active in the following sectors of the economy:

- agriculture
- hotel and restaurant
- construction
- domestic
- informal trading

In the food and agriculture sector, the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) organisers have noted the presence of large numbers of aliens working on farms in the Mpumalanga and on the sugar plantations of northern KwaZulu-Natal. FAWU organisers claim that farmers employ

aliens because they are cheaper to employ – many work for shelter and a plate of food a day - and that they are, because of fear of exposure, resistant to union activities. South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) officials have detected an increased presence of illegal immigrants in the hotel and restaurant sector. Officials of the Tearoom and Restaurant Industrial Council, who believe that the majority of these workers are Mozambican and Zimbabwean, have confirmed this impression. As in the agricultural sector, SACCAWU organisers report that aliens are prepared to work for extremely low wages and that owing to their vulnerability arising from their illegal status, are wary of embarking on industrial action. SACCAWU argues that this not only undermines their ability to fight for better wages and conditions, but also serves to depress wage levels of South African workers and results in a decrease in employment opportunities for South Africans. The example often cited here is Cafe Zurich in Hillbrow. The owner dismissed 20 South African waiters and replaced them with 20 Congolese waiters who worked without being paid a wage, simply surviving on tips.

Given these glaring scenarios based on the Dual Labour Market theory, this dissertation affirms that the dual labour market system in regions may pose serious implications in the process of regionalisation and integration.

The predicted future on this basis may be that, although SADC will succeed in regionalising the free movement of people in the region, another wave of immigrants to take opportunities in the primary and secondary labour market may enter the region from outside. This dissertation agrees that as far as the economy and the comparative advantages (e.g. strong pull and push factors) among the African countries remain uneven and the cultural, social and, above all, the ethnic diasporas are strong then regionalisation of migration in the SADC will be of little effect. We will return to this point in Chapter 6 that explores implications of cross border ethnic Diasporas at the Oshikango border area.

2.2.2 Theories on the perpetuation of migration

There are theories that underpin arguments regarding factors that perpetuate migration globally, regionally and even nationally. These theories include: social network theory; institutional theory; cumulative theory; and migration systems theory.

2.2.2.1 Social network theory

For Entwisle et al (2005), the social network theory, explains micro level factors such as the links between migrants and their friends/family back home that may initiate new migration movements and sustain it within or without the region. Entwisle et al (2005) also add that social ties, and the social networks based on the structure of these ties, affect whether potential migrants leave, where they go, and the likelihood of return. Russell (n.d) also explains that the development of such networks is often facilitated by government policies toward family reunification and, once started, migrant networks can make international flows relatively insensitive to policy interventions.

Although this explanation concurs with some aspects of this dissertation, it also differs with some in that, Russell seemingly argues at the individual government level. This dissertation, on the other hand, has its focus on the implications of migration on the supranational level, in which the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons in the region will less affect the perpetual migration patterns between SADC

and other countries or regions. In this regard, this dissertation supports the notion that international flows into the region are not likely to be sensitive to policy interventions, both at the SADC supranational and national levels. Given this, the SADC regionalisation of migration policies can be drastically at stake because some countries in the region do not trust sister member states on the margins in migration control. Solomon (1997:2), for instance, also identifies and alludes to this distrust that “South Africa cannot trust her neighbours, because based on experience, border police and customs and excise officials of her neighbouring states are known to be inefficient and corrupt.”

The issue of serious concern in the debate of SADC regionalisation and migration features in two polar ways. First, the challenge is that migration patterns into the region perpetuated in the historical links between migrants and their friends/family back home will remain inflexible and irresponsive to any policy. Second, some member states, such as South Africa are suspicious of “flooding” and want the member states to effect control on all inflows including those embedded in historical and cultural links, which is impossible. In sum, the SADC regional policy on immigration control will remain a contentious issue.

2.2.2.2 Institutional theory

This theory, as Russell (n.d) argues, entails that once international migration has begun, private and voluntary organisations develop to support and sustain the movement of migrants. These include a variety of legal and illegal entities that provide transport, labour contracting, housing, legal and other services, many of which have proven difficult for governments to regulate. For Massey et al (n.d) these organisations become known by migrants and constitute another form of social capital they become institutionalised.

Since regionalisation in the SADC region is strongly influenced by South Africa's hegemonic economic power, the concept of the institutional theory may tie well with this dissertation. In this regard, most of the big companies in the SADC Region are of South African origin, and thus the possibility of perpetual legal and illegal institutionalised migration in their structures is eminent.

In support, Kadima and Kalombo provide one useful example, as quoted by Steinberg (2005) that between 1994 and 1997, Kadima interviewed 139 Congolese living in Johannesburg. Many of those he spoke to had found a niche in the nascent and exploratory trade links that were developing between South Africa and Central Africa. Several exporters Kadima surveyed were exploring trade opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and had employed Congolese nationals living

in South Africa as trade consultants, business advisers and interpreters. Based on this, the dissertation also foresees another challenge which the implementation of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement in the region will face, because of possible uncertainty to control institutionalised migration.

2.2.2.3 Cumulative causation theory


Cumulative causation theory, according to Massey et al (ibid), entails that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent decisions are made. Among the factors affected by migration are the distribution of income and land; the organisation of agricultural production; the values and cultural perceptions surrounding migration; the regional distribution of human capital; and the "social labelling" of jobs in destination areas as "immigrant jobs." Hence, Rivero-Fuentes (2002:n.p) argues that, "the theory of the Cumulative Causation of Migration postulates that past migration in a community will bring increased migration in the future through the effect of social networks and economic and social changes as a product of remittances".

Rivero-Fuentes bases this postulation on the fact that "this statement has been tested in the case of migration from Mexico to the United States, showing that the proportion of individuals that have migrated increases with the level of past migratory experience". In the Namibian and SADC migratory experience, this theory ties well with the historical labour migration system within Southern Africa discussed in Chapter 4 and 6.

2.2.2.4 Migration systems theory

For Massey et al (n.d) the migration systems theory refers to a core receiving region, especially a few countries receiving migrants from a few specific sending countries. Massey et al (n.d) further indicate that this literally implies the population flows in the context of historical links between origin and destination regions and countries. However, academics such as Jennissen extends the flows to include non-human matters as conceptually interpreted in figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework of the international migration systems



Source: Jennissen (2000) Working Paper No: 2000/2

Figure 2.1 depicts dominant dynamics of the internationally perpetuated migration in four categories: economy, society, policy and linkages between countries. Jennissen, (2000), and Kritz and Zlotnik (1992), all indicate that the categories that are regarded as clusters encompass components that act on international migration. These clusters have impact on both the sending and receiving countries determined by different causalities of direct, reverse and indirect relationships.

The direct impacts are those effects that the cluster such as economy, can pose on international migration, while the reverse impacts, on the other hand, refer to those effects of the international migration on the cluster that can rebound to effect international migration. For example, if many migrants flow into the receiving country the population of that country increases faster than its economic growth and hence creates another new exodus of migrants and vice versa. The indirect effects are those effects found between clusters that can also have an impact on international migration.

This dissertation supports Jennissen's cluster model of international migration systems in that perpetuation of migration between sending and receiving countries comprises a spectrum of variable factors. Chapter 6 of this dissertation illustrates the relevance between this model and this study. If a brief analysis is done on the components of clusters in figure 2.1 above, all these tie well in chapter 6:

- Economy (Figure 2.2 line 1) is composed of two major parts i.e. income and employment conditions at the individual and family level and the amount of physical and human capital.
- The society cluster (figure 2.2 line 2) has three subdivisions: the cultural, social, and demographic dimensions. The cultural part of this cluster reflects dynamics of lifestyles and ethnicity, whilst the social component includes aspects of inequality and cohesion in the societies. A demographic component encompasses aspects of age and sex distribution of the society.
- The policy cluster (Figure 2.2 line 4) also splits into two, which are the political situation and migration policy. For example, people may emigrate when forced by unfriendly political policy of the sending country to settle in the country where the political situation is favourable.
- The last cluster, which is a linkage between countries (figure 2.2 line 10 and 11), has two important components as well, which are cultural and material linkages.

2.3. Gender and Migration Perspectives

Since migration has been reflected as one key component of regionalisation, gender implications cannot be divorced from it. In discussing gender, Walker (1990:4) asserts

that before one can construct a more sophisticated theory of gender, one needs to have a far better understanding of the dynamics of men's and women's experiences in society and cross-culturally. Also one's theory needs to be empirically grounded. Agreeing with Walker, this dissertation views regionalisation and migration as having gender dimensions, since men and women are involved, and the effects of migration on migrants cannot be necessarily treated in a universal manner.

In chapters 4 and 6 practical reflections relevant to Walker's views are clear that men and women occupy different social roles and so their reasons for migrating will be different. In addition, women are not in the same category because they differ in terms of colour, income and education. On the basis of this, Fall (2001:72) opines that regional cooperation should include "actions such as the inclusion of social and gender indicators in trade policy reviews and carried out to assess every country's effort and progress."

Although this is the fact, the problem, which this dissertation has foreseen is that research and programme development in the SADC region often are gender blind. The omission of gender in most literature pertaining to regionalisation, regional integration and migration, especially in the SADC context informs this study to take a pragmatic and gender inclusive approach in probing issues of migration and regionalisation.

This theoretical approach is *de facto* justified by circumventing the traditional tendency to “add women and stir” – meaning research men and later generalise the results to the whole population, including women (Harding 1986). At this point, this dissertation explores common gender and feminist perspectives to identify theoretical grounds that would facilitate a more informed contextualisation of the conditions under which women migrate.

2.3.1 Feminist Approaches: Liberal, radical and socialist feminism

The feminist approaches of liberal, radical and socialist feminism could be of great significance to strengthen theories of migration and regionalism previously discussed. Feminist theories postulate different competing discourses on women’s situations in general. According to Steward (2003), liberal feminism was most popular in the 1950's and 1960's, when many civil rights movements were evolving.

The dominant argument of liberal feminists is that all people are created equal by God and deserve equal rights (Steward *ibid*). Women should have the right to choose and decide their own destiny, rather than to have their lives chosen for them because of their sex. In addition, Steward further explains that liberal feminism aims at gender equality, but it fails to outline questions on other aspects of society, which directly influence and disadvantage women and their opportunities.

Moreover, liberal feminists pursue a strategy of *inclusion*. Ferguson (1990) emphasises that for liberal feminist theory, women's *exclusion* is problematised. Alvesson and Billing (1997) indicate that this perspective reflects the idea of making only upper-class women equal to upper-class men and the minority class women equal to minority class men. Hence, this perspective fails to address other variables such as oppression and injustices in societies based on gender. It also fails to address issues of race and class.

The main focus of the liberal feminist perspective is predominantly on strict comparison between men and women in society and women's abuse. Critiquing this approach in the context of regionalisation and migration, especially in the SADC region, this dissertation finds that studies of migration based on these perspectives may produce incomplete knowledge because focusing on "equality" alone is not enough.

Radical feminism, on the other hand, opposes male-dominated society in its entirety. This approach is rooted in the assumption that women have different experiences and interests from those of men. Radical feminists' strategy is that of "reversal". Such feminists wish to reverse and reconfigure the political society as currently conceived to make it open to their gendered specificity. Radical feminists are also labelled "cultural" or "maternal" feminists.

In addition, they are not interested in competition with men on an equal basis or to share the benefits such as top jobs, higher wages and access to formal power, but to change the

structure of society as a whole. They also wish to see outright specificity in terms of policy that specifically addresses women's issues. This could be a reflection of Namibia's approach to gender related issues. For example, Namibia's National Gender Policy in its foreword puts emphasis on effective guidelines and strategies for the promotion of women's economic and political empowerment (Department of Women's Affairs – DWA 1997). Moreover, the promulgation of the National Gender Policy, National Plan of Action, and the establishment of the then Ministry of Women's Affairs and Child Welfare, (currently, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare), are vivid indicators of radical feminists' strategy of specificity in the Namibian context.

The second strategy of radical feminism has a more radical approach, which is also labelled post-modern or post-structuralist feminism. At the global level, this manifests itself in certain UN instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states in its preamble that, "extensive discrimination against women continues to exist" and further stresses that "such discrimination violates the principle of equality of rights and respect for human dignity" (UN 1990:1). This is what the more radical feminist wishes to see done – deconstruction of all structures at global, regional and national levels. Hence, this is also called "a displacement strategy", since these feminists seek to deconstruct those discursive regimes and narratives with gender as the subject. Namibia's National Gender Policy also contextualises this feminist displacement strategy by postulating that "the social structures and stratification, including the culture and legal systems, show

clear and visible specific interests of those who dominate decision-making and political power, in this case, the male” (DWA 1997:6).

These post-modern feminists further argue that it is not enough to have a gender policy, while the discourse itself is the problem. It is necessary to redefine the discourse of gender and politics. For example, to have a specific gender policy is not enough, without specifically having, for argument’s sake, a policy on women migrants. In subsection 4.8 (Chapter 4), some of the policy implications in the SADC region centred on post-modern feminist approach are extensively discussed.

Ferguson (1993:3) summarises strategies of radical feminism, as that in the first ordinary radical feminism where men are problematised, while in the post-structuralist perspective the gendered world itself is a problem. This strategy of displacement has profound implications for the nature and debate within gender theory and in addition, this is also the most radical project-rejecting masculinist binary thought.

Another important feminist approach is socialist feminism. This is an element of Marxist theory, which states that social classes affect the life chances of women and forms an important factor in the relationship between men and women. Capitalism that results in conflicts between sexes also places women in the status of a ‘reserve army’ of labour who are excluded from crafts and exploited for free labour in their homes. Radical and Socialist Feminisms can be fused into one prominent perspective, which

Harding (1987) calls “the feminist standpoint”. Alvesson and Billing (1997) argue that this perspective stresses the importance of a broader and more profound documentation and theorising of women’s situations and experiences.

Women’s experiences are widely different from those of their male counterparts and Harding (1991) emphasises that women’s differences are only differences and not signs of inferiority. In this vein, Harding also correctly explains that:

“One could argue also that the particular forms of any emotion that women experience as oppressed, exploited, and dominated gender have a distinctive content that is missing from all those parallel forms in their brothers’ emotional life. Consider suffering, for example. A woman suffers not only as a parent of a dying child, as a child of sick parents, as a poor person, or as a victim of racism. Women suffer in ways peculiar to mothers of a dying child, to daughters of the sick parents, to poor women and in the special ways that racist policies and practices affect women’s lives” (Harding 1991:122).

In this light, a significant direction can be deduced from this perspective that experiences of migrant women cannot be conflated with those of men. This direction induces this dissertation to support the view of perceiving women as major sources of information and it avoids errors in many previous studies that seem to pay little attention to gender differences. Hence, the ontology of this research accommodates the feminist epistemology, which according to Harding implies that:

“Traditional epistemologies, whether intentionally or unintentionally, systematically exclude the possibility that women could be “knowers” or agents of knowledge. They claim that the voice of science is a masculine one, that history is written from only the point of view of men (of the dominant race); that the subject of a traditional sociological sentence is

always assumed to be a man. They have proposed alternative theories that legitimate women as “knowers” (Harding 1986:3).

Aligned with this, the dissertation takes feminist epistemologies further to ensure inclusion of migrant women’s experiences as “knowers”. Harding (1987) also accentuates this technique, arguing that a research method is only effective if a researcher also listens carefully to how women informants think about their own lives and those of men.

Thorough observation of women and men’s behaviour is vital in this regard, contrary to traditional social scientists, who conceive it to be insignificant. In this respect, Ulicki and Crush (2002:64) give an exemplary argument stressing that “over the last decade, there has been a major upsurge in women’s migration to South Africa, but the specificity and profoundly gendered character of this movement has not been fully recognised by researchers or policy-makers”. Meena (1992) echoes the same view, clarifying that “women have as much right to participate in the production of knowledge as they have a right to be part of that knowledge”.

In contrast, development initiatives in the SADC Region have been based on sexist definitions of development. Meena (1992) further explains that women contribute insignificant input to the development thinking and indeed to the development process of the SADC. This background is vital to justify the importance of feminists’ perspectives and epistemologies in probing issues of migration and regionalisation in the

SADC Integration Project. Hence, this is another context within which this research is conceived.

2.4 Regionalism

Literature and debates on regionalism interpret “regionalism” as a discursive construct that can be the subject of different interpretations and is multi-dimensional in form. Andrew Hurrell, for example, captures this discursivity, when he argues that “both region and regionalism are ambiguous terms. The terrain is contested and the debate on definitions has produced little consensus” (1995:38). Other analysts, such as Andrew Wyatt-Walter also define regionalism as an economic process, which aims at increasing or enhancing trade interactions among states (2000:78).

For some International Political Economic theorists, regionalism, “concerns the ideas, identities and ideologies related to a regional project” (Lee, 2003:8). Bach (2005:138) refers to the notion of regionalism as ideas or ideologies, programmes, policies and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a regional project. Hettne, on the other hand, regards regionalism as a multi-dimensional project which deals with economic, historical, cultural, environmental and security issues (Hettne and Soderbaum, 1998; Soderbaum, 2001).

Practical definitions of regionalism in Andrew Wyatt-Walter (2000); Lee (2003); Bach (2005); Hettne and Soderbaum (1998); Soderbaum (2001) indicate the practical identity of SADC, which this dissertation accepts. Moreover, Andrew Hurrell (1995), usefully, conceptualises regionalism in broader terms to encapsulate phenomena such as “regionalisation”, “regional cooperation”, “regional awareness and identity”, “inter-state cooperation”, regional integration”, and “regional cohesion”. Following from this Hurrell’s conceptualisation, one can then clarify each of these phenomena.

2.4.1 Regionalisation

For Hurrell “regionalisation” is primarily the informal, multi-layered flows of ideas, trade and people across borders. At one level, it represents the network of alliances between firms, business associations or organisations across borders in a set region. At another level it depicts migratory flows of people within a region and the activities of the regional civil society. A “regionalisation” process, therefore, leads to the emergence of new forms of identity and loyalty, which form below the level of the state. It can undermine the monolithic character of the state and suggests that the state no longer controls individual or societal identities and loyalties.

On the other hand, Bach (2005:138) defines regionalisation as processes and outcomes: It can encapsulate inter-state or sub-national projects that achieve their stated objectives. Regionalisation can also encapsulate that a much broader range of situations where

“regionness” grows independently from identified regional strategies or aspirations. Indeed the “regionalisation” process has intensified in contemporary times for a myriad of reasons.

Since this dissertation is an attempt to investigate issues of cross border migration within the context of SADC regionalism, it supports Bach’s notion that regionalisation is simply an outcome of the behaviour of agents (diasporas, trade or region networks, multinational corporations) whose activities contribute *de facto* to the formation of regional spaces although they are not motivated by a regionalist project.

2.4.2 Globalisation and Regionalisation

“Globalisation”, “regionalisation” and “migration” are connected, yet analytically and practically separate phenomena. Different scholars define “globalisation” based on the heterogeneity of their specialisation. Writers such as Rennen and Martens (2003:n.p) explain that “there is more and more agreement on the fact that globalisation is an extremely complex phenomenon; it is the interactive co-evolution of multiple technological, cultural, economic, institutional, social and environmental trends at all conceivable spatiotemporal scales”. From another perspective, David Held (2004) addresses the concept of “globalisation” and stresses the need for a “cosmopolitan democracy” in an age of interconnectedness. Also, he comments that “globalisation”

also entails how evolving supra-national, political and economic projects challenge state sovereignty.

In this light, Rennan and Martens (ibid) define the “contemporary globalisation as an intensification of cross-national cultural, economic, political, social and technological interactions that lead to the establishment of transnational structures and the global integration of cultural, economic, environmental, political and social processes on global, supranational, national, regional and local levels”. In support, Tanzanian⁷ (n.d) prefers to define “globalisation” as the process of increasing international integration in economic, political, social and cultural spheres, whereby actions beyond national boundaries constrain and influence national outcomes.

Tanzanian (ibid) further argues that “within globalisation interaction is seen in the form of increased flow of goods and services, increased flow of capital, increased cultural and political interactions, migration of people and many others”. With these definitions, writers share common grounds with this dissertation, especially on critical issues such as “culture” and “migration” of people internationally and regionally, which can potentially challenge the regional project.

⁷ “Tanzanian” here refers to the name of a certain author and not a national of Tanzania as it is commonly used.

2.4.3 Regional (interstate) Cooperation Approach

For Hurrell (1995) “regional interstate cooperation” refers to the creation of formal institutions by states in a specific region to meet external challenges, to co-ordinate common positions in international institutions, to promote common values or to resolve common problems. Echoing the same definition is the National Centre for Interstate Compacts (n.d) in that “in the face of common problems and opportunities that span beyond their individual boundaries, states have joined together in recent years to address regional and even national issues”.

This cooperation, as the National Centre for Interstate Compacts (ibid) further explains, comes through formal agreements, such as interstate compacts, as well as informal collaborative mechanisms. For example, states in a specific region collaborate in technical fields such as energy, transport, communication, tourism, agriculture and resource development; they can also establish regimes to deal with common security problems.

In addition, Vaughan (n.d) expresses that the interstate public institutions or agencies may be established under interstate compacts or protocols in the form of commissions, boards, or authorities, because compacts or protocols are legal instruments, which when ratified by member states, become the law of that state. By mentioning, “becoming the law of that state”, Vaughan links with Article 6 (5) of the Treaty of the Southern African

Development Community in that “member States shall take all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of the national law.”

Furthermore, he also ties well with Article 7 of the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the region in that “every State Party shall ensure that all relevant national laws, statutory rules and regulations are in harmony with and promotive of the objectives of this Protocol.” Despite all these, this dissertation is not concerned with how regional agreements and protocols are drafted, but it focuses on issues of seriousness from the side of the members in terms of implementation of protocols to promote regional cooperation. The gist of argument is whether the member states are ready to ratify those protocols with little benefit to them. This can be understood on the basis of regional integration theoretical models.

2.4.4 Regional Integration

Regional integration could be correctly understood within the concepts of “region” or regionalism. For Karl Deutsch (1981) as quoted by Makarychev (1998:66), a “region is a set of countries that are more markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions...than they are with other countries. Thus, regionalism in this sense might be equated with regional integration”. In its context, “regional integration” is a sub-category of “regional co-operation” and deals primarily with the decision of states or governments to reduce or remove economic barriers in order to facilitate mutual

exchange of goods, services, capital and people. From a neo-liberal approach, this dissertation expresses the view that the SADC regional integration is analytically difficult, because it is simultaneously promoting the removal of economic barriers as well as creating an economic block.

In other words, SADC regionalism has the potential to support and to erode the process towards a fully-fledged free trade system in the region. Pursuant to this implication, this dissertation supports Kennes (1999:31) by arguing that the chances of success for regional integration increase when the political and economic benefits complement each other. Hence, regional integration can contribute to regional peace and security.

2.4.5 Regional awareness/identity

“Regional awareness”, “identity” or “consciousness” is a shared perception of belonging to a region arising from common culture, history, language, tradition and religious beliefs. Note that like nationalism, at the national level, the meaning of regional identity can be subject to definition and redefinition. For Hurrell (1995:44) these four processes “regionalisation”, “regional co-operation”, “regional integration” and “regional awareness and identity” lead to a “cohesive and consolidated regional unit”. Again, following the logic of Hurrell, this happens in two ways. On the one hand, it depicts the context in which the region plays a “defining role” in the interactions between states,

and the relations of the regional states with the rest of the international system. The EU is the classical example of a regional cohesive environment.

However, although what Hurrell gives as an impression that EU can be taken as an international emulation of regional cohesiveness is true, this dissertation raises another concern based on Colin's standpoint. For Colin (2005:2), unlike in Africa, the process of integration in Europe has been relatively slow and considered. In Europe, according to Colin the "serious commitment" to the political and economic goals of integration was evident, which this dissertation finds absent within both the public and private sectors in the SADC region. This lack of commitment can be ascribed to many factors, one of which is that the trade patterns of most SADC economies are characterised by very low levels of intraregional trade.

On the other hand, "regional cohesion" emerges where the region becomes the "organising basis" for policy formulation over a wide range of issues: problems are defined in regional terms. Predictably, regional cohesion presupposes the existence of a supranational structure(s), which has/have the capacity to shape regional policies and to enact rules, norms or regulations that bind member states. With reference to this theoretical essence, one question may arise whether SADC is there yet.

With reference to Mkapa as quoted by the African National Congress (ANC) Today (2005), this dissertation agrees that SADC is at the level of providing the region with the

institution to coordinate and drive regional development, especially by adopting a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), and a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) on Defence and Security Cooperation. Tromp (2004) indicates that the SADC Trade Protocol that came into force in 2000, and will be integral for the establishment of a fully-fledged free trade area will ultimately lead to the creation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2010. However, like the (ANC) Today (ibid), this dissertation queries the potential of realising this goal, if the free movement of people in the region, which is currently blocked, is the denominator. Madakufamba (2005) makes it clearer that a Free Trade Area is meaningless without facilitating the free movement of people since trade is conducted by people.

This brings this dissertation to the conclusion that, although regionalisation, interstate cooperation, integration and regional identity/ awareness process lead to a cohesive and consolidated regional unit, the region becomes the organising basis for policy formulation over a wide range of issues, problems are defined in a regional terms and serious commitment to political and economic goals of integration, the SADC regional integration project still not there.

2.5 Regional Integration Theoretical Models

2.5.1 Inter-governmentalism

SADC, as Cilliers (1999) argues, is an intergovernmental organisation aimed at promoting economic development. Van Houten (2004:4) provides a meaningful description of inter-governmentalism that “the original variant of inter-governmentalism applied ideas from neorealist theories in international relations, which propose that states should be the only actors in the regional integration process. States should only cooperate if they have similar interests, and all benefit from this cooperation”. In the light of the objectives of this dissertation, this theory reflects the nature of SADC today. SADC’s status in terms of interest is questionable, as Muchanga (n.d) reveals nine (9)⁸ protocols had still not received the required number of ratifications in order for them to be enforced.

Furthermore, with inter-governmentalism there is no sharing of sovereignty and each member state effectively retains a veto on the application of regional agreements, as is the case of South Africa towards the 1995 Draft of the SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region. In this vein, Gwartney and Lawson (1997:5) as quoted in Nye (1971) argue that the success of integration in terms of original inter-governmentalism depends upon the ability of member states to adapt and respond to the

⁸ The author mentioned all these protocols, hence the researcher shortened the content by simply using a number instead of a whole list of protocols as appeared in the original document.

co-operative agreements that define integration. Integration can be treated as a function of negotiations between governments to produce co-operative agreements, which evolve into further integration.

2.5.2 Federalism

According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2003:1), “federalism” is the theory or advocacy of federal political orders, where final authority is divided between sub-units and a centre. Bodenhamer (n.d) specifically defines federalism as “a system of shared power between two or more governments with authority over the same people and geographical area”. In view of literature on SADC integration, federalism as an ideal perspective to regional integration is ignored. The rationale behind this can be attributed to the fact that federalism as a theory of regional integration has a distinct lineage since the SADC Integration Project is not federalist-oriented, but rather confederation.

Proponents of federalism such as Laming show an inclination towards federalism. The matter according to them is that there are certain issues that a confederation structure cannot effectively address such as free movement of citizens of the member states across their common borders.

Laming (2001:2), for example, asserts that even if conflict between countries stops short of war, there is still a lot of harm that can be done without violence. It may demand the institution of federalism to deal with the matter. Laming (ibid) gives an example of the global environmental challenge that needs to be dealt with together. Countries cannot deal with social issues such as the growth of organised crime, the spread of diseases such as AIDS and issues of cross-border migration on their own. Although Laming's view is accepted in this dissertation, he fails to underscore other important challenges such as a strong "sovereignty", especially within SADC, which makes it difficult for federal oriented integration (read chapter 6, a lesson from Botswana).

Broadly, even the European Union, which in many ways presents characteristics of federalism, suffers from not having enough centralised power in some aspects such as the environment and foreign policy. Although some writers such as Moyo (1998) praise the member states of the European Union to have successfully removed inter-state movement obstacles for its citizens, Solomon (1997) differs that:

"In June 1985, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain signed the Schengen agreements, although full implementation was only to occur on 1 July 1995. Like SADC, Schengen member states sought to remove internal controls while strengthening external controls. The weak link in 'Schengenland', however, was the southern European states. They soon became the conduit through which third country nationals moved to the richer northern European Schengen states, resulting in an increase in illegal immigrants and the smuggling of contraband. The situation became a source of tension between northern and southern Schengen states. As a result of this, France, citing internal security reasons, decided to continue with passport controls at all its borders" (Solomon 1997:2).

In support of Solomon, this dissertation sees SADC interstate as non-federal integration project, not only because of the strong sovereignty and development asymmetries, but most importantly due to internal political considerations as well.

2.5.3 Functionalism (Mitrany)

The theory of functionalism has been most elaborately developed and persuasively stated by David Mitrany, a Professor of Political Economy born in Rumania in 1888 who later emigrated to England. With functionalism, Mitrany has focused on the role of international functional agencies as a means of establishing a working peace system based on the notion of technical self- determination within “a-territorial”, rather than a *priori* “a-political”, policy environment (Chrysochoou 1998:12). This definition can provide a meaningful guide to SADC regional integration if those major regional agencies in SADC such as the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil; the Southern African Botanic Diversity Network; the Service for Environmental Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Development; and SADC Regional Gene Bank, can be used as ladders to final regional integration.

The theory of functionalism as Inis L Claude Jr. (1969) argues, is regarded as an essential assertion and defence of the proposition that development of international

economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the final solution of political conflicts and removal of war. Based on this conclusion, this dissertation parallels the notion of “removal of war” by Mitrany with Kant’s thesis of “the democratic peace” or the “law” that “democracy does not fight each other” (Franceschet, (2000) in Solomon (n.d). Also, this is what Nam Jigyong (2000:8) conceptualises that integration that proceeds from the functional cooperation between states, which are relatively non-controversial “low politics” areas such as economics. In the light of functionalism theory, this dissertation also argues in chapter 4, that in the beginning as the Frontline States, the SADCC ensured a high level of peace and gradual transformation towards political, economic and administrative structures at the regional level regardless of its ideological diversity.

Exactly in the same line, Mitrany hypothesises that the development of successive layers of functional collaboration may lead to increasingly deeper and wider strata of peace (Inis L Claude Jr. 1969:347). This gradual evolution constitutes what Mitrany calls a process of ‘federalism by instalments.’ Also Haas, (1964) as quoted by Tanter (n.d), correctly explains that functionalists are interested in identifying those aspects of human needs and desires that exist and clamour for attention outside the realm of politics.

Haas further noted that the functionalists believe in the possibility of specifying technical and non-controversial aspects of governmental conduct, and of weaving an

overspreading web of international institutional relationships on the basis of meeting these needs (Tanter n.d:1). In support, Fortunecity, (n.d), adds that Mitrany advanced functionalist theory based on the idea that society always has economic, social or political needs. Hence, a logical idea that a supra-national organisation requires is to provide and monitor these needs.

Although functionalism as an important international theory of regional integration, presents some connotations in line with SADC integration approach, this dissertation has reservations about it. One important notion is that, contemporary theorists regard the functionalist theory, in general, as outdated. For example, Nam Jigyoung (2000) argues that the functionalist theory was greatly discredited by developments within the European Community in De Gaulle's era (1960s – 1970s). During this period, EC institutional development became stagnant, reassertion of national interest was experienced, and progress in the European Community integration process was blocked. This dissertation therefore, finds the functionalism approach requires a region with a strong supranational organisation to which the national states should surrender their national sovereignty, which the current SADC region lacks.

2.5.4 Neo-functionalism theory

Wikipedia (n.d) describes neo-functionalism as a theory of regional integration built on the work of David Mitrany and one of his protagonists Ernst B. Haas, a US political scientist. Schmitter, (2002) argues that no theory of regional integration has been misunderstood as often as neo-functionalism. This theory, spawned in 1960, was primarily meant to explain processes of regional integration in Western Europe. Over the years, this theory underwent great modification so that it could be applied outside Western Europe.

At present, as Ross Mayfield's Weblog (2003) argues, neo-functionalism can be used to describe the political unification in Europe. It begins with the Marshal Plan, with technocrats from different nations working together to distribute aid and rebuild. Mayfield's Weblog further explains that "this cooperation and dense network of international relationships led to the formation of economic structures such as the European Monetary Union to the European Union to the Euro. Neo-functionalism as a form of regional co-operation is based on the notion that co-operation in one issue area or sector will lead to co-operation in other areas. Hence, in this regard, Haas provided certain initial settings as basic principles of the regional integration process, namely:

- Open industrial economies;
- Pluralist societies; and
- Democratic political systems.

In its ontology, the neo-functionalism theory is transformative in nature. The roles that actors (member states) play in the process of integration could change in this process and transformation would occur. This, as Haas accentuates, interprets integration as a process by which actors shift their loyalties and activities to new centre, which demands jurisdiction over nation-states to form new political community.

Based on Haas and Lindberg's approach, writers such as Jeppe (1990) and Ross Mayfield's Weblog (2003:2) outline the functional spillover, political spillover and geographical spillover, as the main features of neo-functionalism approach emphasising integration within one sector first. This sector may produce its own impetus and spread to other sectors. If, for example, one supra-national institution is established to execute certain tasks, it may further generate a need for similar institutions, say, in the economic, social and political sectors. A process goes on, as the latter would also produce pressures towards further integration. This is alluded to as the principle of 'spill-over' or the 'expansive logic' of sectors.

The concept of "spill-over" argues that problems arise as states co-operate in one sector, which leads to further co-operation in other sectors to resolve problems. One instance is that, "functional spill-over occurred into inter-governmental European Union political structures", (Ross Mayfield's Weblog 2003:2). Similarly, Jeppe (1990) also explains that the functional spill-over is embedded in the idea that some sectors within industrial

economics are interdependent and it is quite impossible to treat them separately. In the case of initiatives to integrate, one function will lead to the need to integrate more tasks or the entire regional or sub-regional economy.

One classical example of dynamics of regional integration by sectors is evident in EEC initial initiatives to integrate. In terms of the nature of expansion of tasks assigned to the EEC in the treaty, the integrative potential was meant to create a real Customs Union (Jeppe 1991:1 as quoted in Lindberg).

Spill-over by economic functions or institutions and expansion in this line are vital to regional integration, but political spill-over as pointed out by Jeppe (1991), forms another dimension of regional integration. This is reflective in the pluralist nature of Western European societies. The gist of this approach conforms primarily to the conflict between groups in these societies that pursue different goals based on different interests. Their elites or leaders, who in the end would feel that their interests are best served by seeking supra-national rather than national solutions represent these groups. They will start to refocus their expectations and loyalties on the new international centre. This reorientation will lead to calls for further integration, hence the process would be provided with political impetus.

The elites could be governmental or non-governmental. Governmental elites refer to various committees and other bureaucratic systems that involve many national and community officials in decision-making processes. This, according to the neo-

functionalist approach, would lead to a system of interpenetration in which governments will find it increasingly difficult to act as ‘gatekeepers.’ Furthermore, they would opt for integration.

Non-governmental elites, on the other hand, according to Haas as quoted in Jeppe (1991), focus on the behaviour and perceptions of leaders of political parties, trade unions and associations. This can lead to integration if change has occurred at the national level and umbrella organisations are established at supra-national level. These groups will generate pressures, which could spill over into ‘federal’ spheres.

Based on this, it is important to note in this dissertation that SADCC (the erstwhile Southern African Development Coordination Conference) adopted a sectoral approach to co-operation by collaborating in areas such as energy, agriculture, transport and communication. The dissertation concludes that unlike SADC, its predecessor SADCC adopted neo-functionalism. SADC turned away from neo-functionalism towards a free market approach, like ECOWAS. It is, therefore, clear that both SADC and ECOWAS have accepted the neo-liberal ideology that free trade leads to mutual development.

2.6 Constructivist and Cosmopolitan approaches

2.6.1 Constructivist approach

The core theoretical integration models – inter-governmentalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and federalism discussed above are unlikely to be offering any concrete sense of direction in assessing the emerging patterns of interaction between the states and the regional system that include civil society and traditional leaderships in a particular region. This implies that these theories negate local communities and the “people” to the margins of the integration project. Constructivist approach, however, is distinctive and in this regard, will inform this dissertation to the findings that disclose the significance of bottom up approach in the process of regionalisation and integration. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (2005), “constructivism” is an approach to social analysis that deals with the role of human consciousness in social life.

For Callow (2005) constructivist theory underlines the significance of citizens’ sense of “regional awareness” and “identity” as members of that region, whilst for Finnemore and Sikkink:

“constructivism asserts that human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; that the most important ideational factors are widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and that these shared beliefs construct the interests of purposive actors” (Sikkink 2005).

The workable part of constructivism that suits well in this dissertation is the notion of common culture, history and beliefs, which influence regionalisation in many ways including issues of “identity”, “cross border migrations” and “population movement”. Also Oga (n.d) was exceptionally articulate, in this regard, praising Ruggie’s critics of the positivist-realist legacy in international relations which, according to him, fails to explain “identities” and “interests”. In this regard, constructivism shares common ground with Critical Theory. Both, as Clark (n.d) explicates, offer a challenge to logical positivism, arguing that dynamic social and cultural structures, rather than certain distinguishable variables, constrain human actions.

Toprak (2006) also adds that “constructivist scholars use the concept of cognitive development, to study “common values” and their dissemination. This is also the starting point of institutionalization of values that develop into cooperative behaviours in the international society.” Based on this argument, institutions such as interstate projects, which, as alluded to in regionalisation concept above, are important in this process, since they affect interest and identity changes. Checkel, (2003: 352-54) as quoted by Toprak, made the European Union’s cooperative network programmes and projects as good examples that, “as cooperation frameworks among EU states and non-state entities increase in number, common cultural values develop and pave the way for further cooperation”.

Moreover, this dissertation supports constructivism theory as opposed to realism which predominantly deals with security and material power or liberalism which mainly focus on economic interdependence. By dealing with the role of ideas that shape the international system, constructivism becomes a school of thought pertinent to the course of this dissertation. By ideas constructivists, as Wikipedia (2008) explains, refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities and other elements of perceived reality that influence states and not state actors in international relations and in this case regional integration. For example, within a constructivist perspective, ratification of highly sensitive protocols in the SADC region such the Protocol on the Facilitation for Free Movement of Persons is viewed with much greater concern in Botswana (fear of influx) and Angola (security reasons), than Zambia and Malawi where these threats are not significant.

Premised on this, the dissertation aligns constructivists approach with Cox's (2001) civilisation arguments. Cox argues that as civilisations encounter one another and as people migrate, they construct meanings. This means that, different peoples in the same geographical site come to perceive reality differently. For example, as the individual states in the SADC region perceive integration processes differently, so the local communities at the grassroots level do not perceive some civilisation aspects such as sovereignty, identity and citizenship in the same way the governments perceive these.

In this light, Reitzes (2000) points out that some people, (sometimes referred to as illegal migrants) do not recognise national boundaries as exclusionary, as kith and kin networks span across borders which they have commuted for centuries. This implies that the people's cognitive map differs from that of the government since the meanings that they attach to various social constructs such as "identities" and "boundaries" are reflections of norms and behaviour patterns of their own context. The logic here is that unless SADC is rooted in grassroots communities, it is going to be a suspended or abstract supranational government. This is clearly articulated in chapter 6 of this dissertation and it also carries overtones of the cosmopolitan approach.

2.6.2 Cosmopolitan approach

"Cosmopolitan" approach also means "thinking beyond nationalism". Heater in Wise (1998) refers to cosmopolitan as a "world citizenship". According to Heater as quoted by Wise (ibid), "one is a world citizen to the extent one has a sense of belonging to all mankind especially in the Stoic consciousness." This reflects a link between the individual and the level of global governance, which Heater calls "world government".

In addition, philosophical cosmopolitans whom, Wikipedia (n.d) refers to "as moral universalists" also introduced arguments supporting this dissertation. To them, as supported by the results from the Oshikango case study (chapter 6), the boundaries

between nations, states, cultures or societies are therefore morally irrelevant. Klitou, as quoted by Wikipedia (n.d), argues that a cosmopolitan "human identity" is as necessary for the triumph of human rights. In illustration, Klitou perceives a European identity as being for a political European Union. The European Union (EU) is there, but no Europeans or a European identity exists and by extension the situation in SADC is even worse.

Other sociologists such as Ulrich Becker (Wikipedia n.d) also add another useful dimension to this discourse by reflecting on the significance of institutional cosmopolitanism. This advocates some reforms in global governance to allow world citizens to take a more active part in political life. In this case, "cosmopolitan democracy", for example, suggests strengthening the United Nations and other international organisations by creating a World Parliamentary Assembly (Ulrich Becker in Wikipedia n.d).

By broadening horizons of Cosmopolitanism within the context of this study, this dissertation makes use of illustrative scenario in Wise as follows:

Cosmopolitanism appears when the Greek city state begins to fail. The polis quality of the Greek city state meant the political community, as Aristotle advocated, had a high degree of cohesion. Citizens voted by majority in tune with the common interest rather than as an arithmetic cumulating of self interested individual preferences. Yet the city state was also self-contained and self-reliant. This permitted citizens to exercise their prejudices against "Barbarians" – those who spoke a language other than Greek. To the citizens such persons obviously lived

lower than the sophisticated political, social, and cultural zenith of the Greeks. Then their need for security against outsiders led the city states to ally. Further, economic opportunities and pursuit of empire began drawing Greeks into the lands of the “Barbarians”. The city states lost their self respect. In this climate grew ideas of human oneness, searching for an identity beyond the city state (Wise 1998:n.p)

This dissertation connects the beginning of cosmopolitanism ideas in the illustration of the Greek city state to the concept of present Neo-Regionalism, which is also known as the “new Regionalism” or “cross-border Regionalism” emerging after World War II. Perkmann and Sum (n.d) describe neo-Regionalism as a structure that became especially important from the end of the 1980s. Some writers, as Hettne (2005) argues, referred to “new Regionalism as the “world order” (Gamble and Payne) or “international order” (Fawcett and Hurrell), which according to Telò (2001) became a structural factor of the post-Cold War globalised international system. Another way of thinking about new Regionalism is, as Kaur (2001) indicates, to see to it as a way of overcoming the contradiction between “Westphalian”⁹ and “post-Westphalian”¹⁰ logics.

Perkmann and Sum (n.d) outline the macro tendencies being connected to the proliferation of cross-border regions that have affected the status of national borders in recent years and constitute what is currently called neo-Regionalism. These are: (a) the growth of economic transborder activities through increased movements of goods, services and people – activities that are contributing to, and are in turn reinforced by, the

⁹ Westphalian logic refers to inter-state system depicting these characteristics: the sovereign independence of states; each state motivated in its international behaviour by a consistent national interest; the inter-state system regulated by a balance of power among the principal powers (Cox as quoted by Kaur 2001).

¹⁰ Post-Westphalian logic refers to the fact that the nation state has lost its usefulness and that solutions must be found in transnational structures, global or regional (Cox as quoted by Kaur *ibid*).

many and diverse processes that produce globalisation; (b) the transfer of specific state powers upwards, downwards and sideways from the national state form that came to provide the principal matrix for territorialisation of political power around the world after 1945; and the end of the Cold War. In this line, Hettne (2005) states that “the state can be replaced or complemented by a regionalised order, or by a strengthened global civil society supported by a new ‘normative architecture’ of world order values”. This argument extends the existing understanding of the world cosmopolitan values. Hettne (ibid) is of the opinion that the global cosmopolitanism emphasises the role of community at the global level as well as the formation of global norms.

On this basis, Wise (ibid) puts it clearly that “if the ideology of nationalism is “pernicious”, then discovering the deep roots and permanence of cosmopolitanism will be Earth’s political salvation”. “Pernicious nationalism” could be an anchor of debate in this dissertation. Nationalism in the SADC region or Africa is pernicious because it threatens traditions, cultures and other moral values of transfrontier ethnic groups and tribes. Chapter 6 of this dissertation articulates this problem clearly.

In support of positive thinking beyond “nationalism” in forms of regional blocs, this dissertation aligns its course with the cosmopolitan school of thought. The central point, in this connection, is that the dissertation is not only concerned with appreciation of supranational initiatives of SADC regionalism, but is investigating its headway as discussed in the next chapter of this dissertation. One prospective imperative in this

discourse is that “beyond nationalism” by way of supranational structure could facilitate management of issues beyond state power such as cross border migration addressed in this dissertation.

Cosmopolitan also embraces a brilliant idea to support the foundation of this dissertation by looking not only beyond nationalism at the SADC regional level but also beyond the SADC supranationalism. This is correctly embedded within a theoretical position which found inspiration in Kant’s writings known as “cosmopolitan democracy” that also helped to spawn comprehensive models of a future world of peace, democracy, equality and justice (Held, 1995; Linklater 1998 in Solomon n.d).

2.7 Conclusion

This Chapter juxtaposed the dominant perspectives on migration and their impact on regionalisation. These theories include theories on the initiation of migration and theories on the perpetuation of migration within the context of globalisation. On the premises of these theories, it was concluded that there were conditions that either initiate or perpetuate internal, regional and international migration. These conditions could be positive or negative to sending or receiving regions.

The second level of theoretical analysis of this Chapter was on the incorporation of gender perspectives in migration management based on the following feminist theories:

Radical feminism; Liberal feminism, and Marxist feminism. From these perspectives, the dissertation deduced that migration and gender were inseparable aspects. This chapter also linked the migration theories to regionalism and its constituent subsets of regionalisation, interstate cooperation, integration and regional identity/awareness based on Hurrell's approach. The dissertation adopted Hurrell's approach that regionalisation represented the network of alliance between firms, business associations or organisations across borders and depicts migratory flows of people within a region and the activities of civil society.

The chapter also attempted to apply these theories and approaches to the perspectives of international integration models of: Inter-governmentalism; Federalism; Functionalism; Neo-functionalism. At that stage, a provisional conclusion was made that the SADC Regional approach is one of inter-governmentalism. The solution to the issue of SADC regionalism and problems of cross border migration was established within the context of constructivist theory, which postulates bottom up approaches recognising the importance of participation of the grassroots communities in the process of regional integration and resolutions of major problems such as cross border migrations. These theoretical debates inform this dissertation to investigate in Chapter three, the SADC regionalism model as mirrored within the "cosmopolitan" context.

CHAPTER 3: REGIONAL INTEGRATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter that presented the theoretical framework also stimulated another historical imperative of debate in the light of the SADC Regional Integration and Migration Management. Given this fact, this chapter draws heavily from international literature on regionalism and research previously conducted in the SADC Region such as by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). The chapter starts delineating origins of regional integration projects at the global, continental and SADC level. It highlights major aspects of regional integration such as markets and trade integration and presents pictures of existing models of regional integration, for example the European Union.

At the SADC level, the chapter outlines the phases of regional integration in Southern Africa from the Frontline States, SADCC to SADC and the SADC restructuring process. Since the SADC Regional Integration Project is moulded on the four ideals of free trade, free movement of people, a single currency and respect for human rights, this chapter focuses on the ideal of free movement of persons within the Region as an implicated migration issue in the SADC Regional integration. The chapter concludes by comparing

SADC migration policy issues with those of other contemporary regional blocs outside the European Union. An integrated conclusion completes the chapter.

3.2 The history of regional integration projects

It is understood that regional integration is not a phenomenon of the recent past, but increasingly accelerated after the Cold War. Regionalism in the form of a confederation of states (in line with the functionalism perspectives) entered into history after the Second World War. This is evident in various practical scenarios regarding economic rehabilitation and political reconciliation among nations of the same region.

The European Community forms one of the remarkable benchmarks for regionalism worth emphasising in this study. Williams (1991:1) holds that “the emergence, growth and expansion of the European Community have been the outstanding features of the economic and political geography of Europe since the 1950s.” He further notes that this is a complex phenomenon both politically and economically, hence it can be studied at a number of levels e.g. global, regional, national and grassroots levels.

In the same vein, Laidi (2002) as quoted by the WTO (n.d) notes that between 1990 and 1995, about 33 agreements pertaining to regional integration have been notified at the international level, while between 1980 and 1989, for instance, such agreements did not

exceed a dozen. Over the past few decades, there has been a significant increase in efforts among developing countries to achieve regional economic integration.

These efforts have been activated by increasing regional integration among industrialised countries; for example, after the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (EU) and the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to mention but a few successful major agreements of regional integration in the world. This was also strengthened by the achievements of the Uruguay Round¹¹ and the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Currently, every continental region has at least one major integration movement: Europe has the European Union (EU); Asia has the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); North America has the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Latin America has the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), and the Andean Common Market (ANCOM); the Caribbean has the Caribbean Community and Common Market or simply the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); the Middle East has the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU); Central America has the Central American Common Market (CACM); and finally Africa has three major ones: the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of West African States

¹¹ A multilateral trade negotiation launched at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1986 and concluded in Geneva in 1993, and signed by Ministers in Marrakech, Morocco in 1994. This round converted GATT and led to the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

(ECOWAS); and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), (Muuka 2000).

Alluding to above instances of integration, we should draw lines between economic or regional integration and customs unions. It is understood that integration can take place without union and is the voluntary pooling of resources for a common purpose by two or more countries in the same or different geographical areas (Lavargne 1997). A union, on the other hand, can take place without integration, for example, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that was formed in 1912 and has become the oldest customs union in the world. However, the SACU was simply composed of five countries: Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland rather than all Southern African countries as the name implies. In this light, Namibia's NDP2 states that *“although SACU was an undertaking to encourage the development of the less advanced members of the customs union and the diversification of their economies, no concrete measures have hitherto been taken to realise this objective. Hence, the SACU has been regarded as a trade and payments arrangement, rather than being an integration scheme in the mould of the European Union”* (National Planning Commission 2001/2002-2005/2006:747).

In addition, confusion between regional integration and economic integration dominates current debate on regional integration. Aside from distinctions between regional integration and customs unions raised above, we also need to differentiate between

regional integration and economic integration. Lavargne (1997:50) clarifies some conceptual ambiguities underlying the concept of regional integration, for example the fact that economic integration and regional integration are often regarded as a prelude to unification, understood to represent the homogeneous rules in a given spatial area.

Economic integration means integration of economic activities, sectors, or sub-sectors to achieve economic advantage. Geographical dimension such as spatial proximity of countries does not augur much. One relevant example in this respect is current negotiations for the SADC countries to enter into Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the EU through the Economic Partnership Agreements known as (EU-SADC-EPAs). These agreements, as Konopo (2006) indicates, would bring together the regions, each with its history of regional integration and geography.

Regional integration, on the other hand, associates with geographical physical space (Lavargne 1997). Within regional integration, regional affiliation determines the feelings of cultural and political cohesion and shared vision of the people forming a group in a particular region, as is the case with the SADC integration being considered. With these brief remarks on distinctions between regional integration and economic integration, attention will now focus on the origins of regional integration at the international level.

3.2.1 Integration in the Global Context

El-Agraa (1997) refers to international regional integration as something that appeared a few decades ago. In contrast, Asante (1997) argues that “regional integration is not new and it has been a continuing part of the post World War II trade landscape.” Kym, et al (1993:1) explain that regional economic integration “...was popular in Europe beginning in the 1950s with the 1951 Paris Treaty on coal and steel, the signing by six countries in 1957 of the Treaty of Rome to create the European Economic Community (EEC), the formation in 1960 of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) among the other West European countries and, in the East, the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

During the last decade, the move towards regional integration has become a ‘headlong rush.’” Table 3.1 below depicts a summary of the recent regional integration agreements in the world notified to GATT/WTO.


Table 3.1: Recent Regional Integration Agreements

Region	Regional Integration Agreement	Date
Europe	European Union (EU)	1992
Latin America	MERCOSUR	1991
Sub-Saharan Africa	SADC	1992
Middle East	Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	1997
Asia	The Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) Free Trade Area.	1992
	The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)	1997

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2004).

Apart from the recent notifications to GATT and WTO depicted in Table 3.1 above, the notifications of Regional Integration Agreements (RIA) to GATT/WTO started soon after the end of World War II. Figure 3.1 below indicates the increase of notifications of Regional Integration Agreements since 1949.

Figure 3.1: Notifications to GATT and WTO of Regional Integration Agreements, 1949-98



Source: WTO (http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/TRC/Articles/Regionalism/Trade_Blocs_Chap01.pdf . 20 October 2004).

The last decade has witnessed certain changes in terms of qualities and quantities in regional integration. As Figure 3.1 above shows, from 1994, notifications to GATT/WTO increased considerably to more than 20%. This change is evident in various important development stages experienced so far. In the first place, the fact was recognised that effective integration does not mean to only reduce tariffs and quotas. Too many barriers can hamper the process of the free flow of goods, services and

investments. These barriers should first be removed to realise the integration goals, especially, “deep integration” i.e. integration that takes on board a variety of factors.

With reference to the ‘deep integration concept,’ Gelb (2001) points out that open versus closed regionalism is the central debate today in relation to regional integration. This can also be regarded as a shift of an old concern with distinctions between ‘trade’ and ‘development’ integration or ‘shallow’ versus ‘deep’ integration, which were the focus of the SADC when it was established. One problem, which was noticed, was that of closed regionalism adopted by most of the trading blocks of the 1960s and 1970s (OECD n.d). This model is based on the approach of substituting development and regional development with high external barriers.

Jerram, Hodges, Turner and Kurz (1997) argue that closed regionalism is an ill-defined term, but it seems safe to take it as being the opposite of open regionalism. The best part of closed regionalism is that of tariff reductions within the regional bloc that are not offered to outside blocs. This means that the producers within the regional bloc benefit in terms of greater trading opportunities within the member states at the expense of producers from outside the region.

The last development approach, which is open regionalism¹² entails that the trade blocs would be created to cater for both developed and developing countries to act as equal partners in agreements geared to boost the economies of all the member countries. Table 3.1 above also depicts clear examples in this respect. The EU, which is the extension of the defunct EEC, implemented the Single Market Programme in 1992 and enlarged its membership (e.g. the recent inclusion of the Baltic Countries and others). From 1990, the EU also has agreements with the European Economic Area and the EU-Turkey Customs Union, to mention but two. In this regard, Bergsten (1997) argues that the proponents of open regionalism posted the fact that it can provide the definitive answer to the potential clash between regionalism and globalism by rolling all regional liberalisation initiatives into a global free trade agreement and thereby eliminating all preferential agreements.

Debates on closed and open regional integration are endless, but what we have learnt from those debates is that regional integration projects could either be open or closed depending on the agreement typology. The closed regionalism approach, which correlates with SADCC's integration ideology, wants to clearly demarcate the region in terms of boundaries, for growth, service delivery, job markets and the like. Meaning, as Williams (n.d) explains, the region is, in effect, closed and you are either in it or outside of it. Open regionalism which is based on neo-liberalism, shapes the SADC approach of integration and it accepts that boundaries are open and elastic.

¹² For a broader explanation of open versus closed regionalism, see definition of major terms in Chapter one.

Closed and open regionalism aside, there is currently a great number of major regional agreements noted in this dissertation. Table 3.2 below shows the membership of selected major regional integration agreements recorded in the history of regional integration.

Table 3.2: Membership of Selected Major Regional Integration Agreements and Date of Formation

Regions	Regional integration agreements	Date of formation	Memberships
Europe (Industrial and developing economies)	<i>*European Union (EU): Formerly European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community (EC)</i>	1957	Belgium, France, the Federal republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, (173) Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, 1981 Greece, 1986, Portugal, Spain and 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
	<i>*North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)</i>	1994	Canada, United States, Mexico
Latin America and the Caribbean	<i>Andean Pact</i>	1969	Revived in 1991, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Venezuela
	<i>Central American Common Market (CAM)</i>	1960	Revived in 1993, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 1962, Costa Rica
	<i>*Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Commun del Sur – MERCOSUR)</i>	1991	Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
Sub-Saharan Africa	Cross-Border Initiative	1992	Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
	<i>*Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</i>	1975	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tog
	<i>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</i>	1993	Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
	<i>*Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Formerly Southern African Development Co-ordination conference (SADCC)</i>	1980	Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 1994 South Africa, 1998, Democratic Republic of the Congo
	<i>Southern Africa Customs Union</i>	1910	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
Middle East and Asia	<i>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Free Trade Area</i>	1967 1992	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 1984 Brunei Darussalam, 1995, Vietnam, 1997, Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 1999, Cambodia
	<i>Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)</i>	1981	Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates
	<i>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</i>	1981	Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf>. 13 June 2004.

With reference to Table 3.3 above, OECD (n.d) implies that the major reason for developments towards regionalism were due to globalisation. Another reason was to minimise the economic significance of national political boundaries within a

geographical area creating a larger market with economies of scale and greater growth. Similarly, Drake-Brockman et al (2000) adds that the motive for regional economic cooperation often comprises both political and economic dimensions. The European Union, for example, does not have common foreign or security policies, but the trade policy fills that lacuna as an instrument for external influence. Political factors serve as key motivation behind any integration drive for bilateral free trade agreements, first with the neighbouring countries and then with global partners.

In this vein, Drake-Brockman et al (2000) cite an example of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FAA) being explicitly linked to the promotion of democracy as well as economic development. Thus, regional integration could be taken as a capacity-building endeavour illuminating the fact that closer integration of neighbouring economies constitutes a first step in creating a larger regional market for trade and investment.

Although great emphasis in the regional integration approach is put on trade and economic integration, an additional dimension that this dissertation particularly focuses on is the issue of cross-border mobility of people, goods and services. However, before that, it is essential to highlight issues of market and trade integration.

3.2.2 Markets and Trade Integration

Regional integration *per se* is not a one-faceted undertaking. It is comprised of many heterogeneous dynamics ranging from political and cultural to the economic. This is what Hansohm (2000:4) explains that the term “regional integration covers a wide variety of schemes, different in depth and kind.”

However, the primary concern is economic integration. According to Ali, (1997) economic integration originates in different forms such as free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, complete economic unions and complete political unions. In contrast, Asante (1997) as quoted by Molle (n.d) identified two distinct areas of concern in the stages of integration: the integration of markets for goods and services, on the one hand, and of production factors on the other; and the integration of economic policy.

Unlike Ali, (1997), Hansohm (2000) gives the same categories of economic integration theories starting with the *preferential trade agreement*. A preferential trade agreement is limited in nature and customs duties on trade among members are reduced compared to those on trade with non-member countries. El-Agraa (1997) adds the rest of the classifications: *Free trade areas* are where the member nations remove all trade impediments amongst themselves but retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their own policies *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world.

A *Customs Union*, on the other hand, means that the member nations must conduct and pursue common external commercial relations. They, for example, adopt common external tariffs on imports from the non-participants.

The practical examples in this respect are the European Union (EU), the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CCCM). *Common Markets* are customs unions that also allow for free factors mobility across national borders. *Economic Unions* indicate common markets that allow for complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies.

Complete political Unions means that the participating countries become literally one nation. The Economist (2004:78) quoting the World Bank, indicates that of the percentage of the world covered by regional agreements, which involves the EU, US and the developing countries by 2002, the developing countries contributed slightly more than 5%, while the EU and US contributed more than 15% each.

Besides, regional integration in terms of trade is a complex issue that laypersons at the grassroots level cannot easily understand, especially in societies where civil society is inactive and the education level is low (refer to Chapter 6). Examples of the difficult aspects to understand are the free trade agreements and the rules of origin. A Policy Brief Document by the International Centre for Economic Growth (ICEG n.d) explains clearly how trade agreements and rules of origin (ROO) within regional integration would start and what they would mean.

According to ICEG (*ibid*), trade agreements traditionally establish preferential terms governing the relationships between two or more countries. The scope of such relationships may vary substantially, but the starting point centres invariably on the free movements of goods. In a Free Trade Area (FTA) as stated above, tariffs and quotas are determined on goods originating in, and traded between, the member countries.

In a Customs Union, the same principle applies, with the added ingredient of the determination of a Common External Tariff (CET) on goods originating from non-member countries. The initial step for establishing preferential treatment is to identify which goods originate in member countries and which do not. This constituted the concept of rules of origin.¹³ The Economist (2004: 78) indicates that “economists have long pointed out that the gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are far greater than those from bilateral or regional deals. At best, regional deals offer smaller benefits. At worst, they do damage, artificially diverting trade away from excluded countries or clogging up commerce with fiendishly complicated “rules of origin”.

What does this concept of the rules of origin mean in the SADC context and to what level might it influence the population? These rules have not been agreed in some key sectors. The rules stipulated in the preferential trade agreement entail that the inputs in terms of the components of the product are the determinants of the origin of that product.

¹³ This statement is drawn from the Policy Brief #0012 in the Economic Policy Initiative Consortium Project supported by USAID/Egypt.

These also determine whether the product is qualified for preferential treatment in the countries under that agreement or not. Flatters et al. (2004) argue that the rules of origin have been among the more contentious issues in the SADC Trade Protocol. In support of this, Industry Trade (2000:42) explains that the SACU member states have proposed to introduce product specific rules of origin to complement the existing rules in the SADC Trade Protocol for some sensitive products such as agricultural, chemical, textile, clothing, footwear, motor vehicles and motor vehicle components.

Among other matters, the central issue has been the extent to which rules of origin can or should be used to promote economic development in the region (Flatters *ibid*). The fundamental argument in this regard is the origin of goods traded in the region. Are the goods traded in the region, manufactured within that region or are they imported from without? Furthermore, are knockdown components of the finished products such as the parts to assemble cars or the linen to make clothes, products of the regional member states? If we replicate these questions into the context of regional integration of developing countries, we would disclose practical problems. The major one manifests in cross- border trade, especially informal trade, with member states signing a Preferential Trade Agreement. More often than not, control on the origin of products is enforced.

Recent literature on regional integration and trade blocs fails to reflect often enough this implication or to conceptualise it in the political, social and economic milieu of developing countries, particularly in the sub-Saharan. Most literature on issues of cross-

border trade and the rules of origin are written in the context of integration of the developed countries such as the EU, possibly because all cross-border activities are formalised and trade control mechanisms are in place.

Literature on cross-border trade and movements of persons and goods discloses that borders within the European Union do not represent any obstacles of movement. Border crossing points in the traditional meaning no longer exist (Illés, 2003). “The borders of France, for example, can be crossed on more than 40 000 roads, streets, bridges, paths, and passages” (Illés, 2003:2).

In contrast, in Africa generally and particularly in the SADC Region, issues of informal trade transactions and undocumented migrations are common. Hence, control of the rules of origin is not that easy. Let us look at the example by Peberdy & Crush (2001) of the informal traders who make their living by trading across the border between the Mozambican port of Maputo and Gauteng in South Africa. The resultant patterns of movement and economic activity are largely unremarked and even invisible to both policy-makers and researchers. The trader can sell products that originate in any other country without being detected.

Peberdy & Crush (2001:115) further indicate that the Mozambican-South African border is no different from numerous other borders within the Southern African Development Community. For example, Thomson (2004:6) tells a story of a certain Antonio Martins who lives in the Angolan town of Santa Clara just across the border who says he must

pay Angolan immigration officials N\$50 every time he crosses it into Namibia or back into Angola. He goes regularly to sell jeans, T-shirts and shoes imported from Brazil by way of Luanda through Portuguese-speaking trading links including Cape Verde.

Now the question arises, how to determine the origin of a product or products traded through informal transactions across borders such as these. Peberdy & Crush (2001) ask a similar question, namely what crosses the border? Peberdy & Crush (ibid) express a concern regarding the complexity of the patterns of trade of the small entrepreneurs. Flatter et al (2004) expressed the same hesitation that, during the review of SADC Trade Protocol a central issue was the extent to which rules of origin could or should be used to promote economic development in the region. In the light of these questions, this dissertation finds it essential to conceptualise the rules of origin in the issue of cross-border migration and trade in the SADC Regional Integration Project. A variable of concern is predominantly the transnational ties of communities on either side of the border engaging in cross-border transactions on a daily or hourly basis.

The movement pattern varies from undocumented and illegal migration to formal and legal transactions. The problem of control in terms of persons and goods always goes from weak to weaker and criminal activities escalate unabated. Although the aspiration of SADC Regional integration is constantly and vibrantly growing, the success of the project in the face of this threat may take long to achieve. Before we discuss the origin

and current position of the SADC, it is worthwhile to examine other models of regional integration in the world with specific attention to the EEC/EU models.

3.2.3 The EEC/EU as a historic model of regional integration

The European Union differs considerably from other regional integration bodies and in this case it cannot be equated with SADC regional integration but rather with the African Union. However, for the purpose of this study it appears imperative to compare some integration patterns, strategies and structures of the SADC and the EU Regional Integration Projects to establish whether SADC is an EU replica.

According to Rosamond (nod), the European Union's distinctiveness has much to do with the particular circumstances of its origin. The EU of today can trace its ancestry directly to the six-member European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) founded in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris as indicated above. The integration efforts have failed for all the subsequent decades. A variety of treaties was signed for that purpose. For example, the Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1957.

Rosamond (nod) further summarised the distinctiveness of the European model of integration as follows: "The EU is the product of a very specific historical conjuncture and this explains both its format and its subsequent trajectory."

The ECSC came into being out of four important dilemmas: Firstly, the urgent task of economic reconstruction in the wake of the destruction caused by the Second World War. This implies that market relationships among the European nations were required to face that dilemma jointly. Secondly, the German question was an outstanding issue that forced Europeans to maintain strong ties. Thirdly, the emerging Cold War, which produced a divided Europe became a concern, hence, ways were required to secure solidarity among the European nations, especially of the West. Issues revolving around the emergence of the EU produced security concerns, exactly in line with the basic principles of the functionalism theory, which entail reorganisation of the international relations among different states in the same region in a co-operative manner (Savas 2003).

Arguably, the EU and SADC's beginnings have a lot in common. For example, like the EU, the SADCC, the predecessor of the SADC also emanated from security considerations. In this regard, Landsberg (2004) states that, "the pre-occupations of the SADC's predecessor, the SADCC, to render the sub-region more democratic, peaceful and secure were not enough". Therefore effective norms, values, procedures and institutions are crucial to achieve these objectives.


However, the only difference is that the SADCC was created during the war between the then apartheid regime of South Africa and the liberation movements supported by the Frontline States, whereas the EEC was created after the end of the Second World War.

However, the fact remains that both regional groupings were created due to political and economic fragility in these regions. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the comparison of the two regions could be disputable based on the question whether it is fair to compare the SADC and the EU regional integration.

SADC Today (2005:1) presents interviews with Tomáz Salomão, the SADC Executive Secretary who argues that “sometimes people try to compare the SADC with the European Union, but you cannot compare them. This is a different community, a different region and a different history. You have to look at the context. It’s clear that they are far ahead of us in terms of regional development.” For analytical purposes, this is fair, but geopolitically it is somewhat irrelevant. It is irrelevant in the sense that the EU is equated to the AU, because it is a continental grouping, while the SADC, on the other hand, is a sub-continental organisation.

This dissertation analytically compares the two organisations in terms of structures and purposes in order to determine the extent to which the SADC replicates the EU as a model of regional integration. Figure 3.2 below depicts the structure of the European Union.

Figure 3.2: EU Institutional structure at the supranational level



Sources: (Schumann, n.d)

Figure 3.2 above indicates that the institutional structure of the EU at the supranational level consists of the Council of the European Union. The Council is responsible for passing laws proposed by the Commission and with the involvement of the European Parliament. This is equated to the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, which according to the Institute for Security Studies (n.d) is the ultimate policy-making institution of the SADC.

However, as mentioned above, the EU and the EEC have been seen as replicable models to mould the SADC Regional integration. For example, parliamentarians from the SADC member countries have agreed to a proposal that the SADC Parliamentary Forum

be transformed into a fully-fledged SADC Parliament¹⁴ (Staff Reporter, The Namibian June 3, 2004:1).

Apart from the Parliament, the EU also has the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Community in Brussels, which is not the case with the SADC in Gaborone. Another important step the EU has taken is the establishment of the European Commission, whose main tasks can be summarised under four headings (Schumann, n.d):

- Right of initiative: Every decision taken by the Council has to be based on a proposal from the Commission. This means that the Commission's task is to act as an engine of integration drawing up proposals for the development of Community policy.
- Guardian of treaties: The Commission is responsible for monitoring the application of treaty provisions and decisions made by other EC institutions and can appeal to the European Court of Justice when violations are identified.
- Executive authority for the implementation of Community policy: This includes the administration of finances as well as the implementation of EC policies. As the number of decrees and guidelines are implemented in individual member states, the main task of the Commission then is to monitor and supervise the actions of member states.
- External representation: The Commission represents the EU at the GATT negotiations and international organisations.

Schumann, (ibid) further explains that the Commission is characterised by its distinct functional differentiation and the fact that it represents a multi-national bureaucracy, which uses an extensive system of committees. This system features very close

¹⁴ This report was written by the Staff Reporter of The Namibian newspaper of June 3, 2004 quoting the announcement by National Assembly Speaker Dr Mosé Tjitendero at the 16th Plenary Assembly of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, which started in Windhoek on 31 May 2004.

cooperation with member state administrations and other national and European associations.

The Commission, the Council and the Parliament form the centre of decision-making of the EU system. However, the structure extends to comprise the European Court of Justice, the European Council, and the national government level. To sum up, the SADC structure emulates that of the European Union.¹⁵ However, it is essential to go a step further in investigating other similarities in terms of problematic issues of the EU and SADC integration projects.

3.2.4 Problems Experienced in EU

The EU Integration Project has also encountered problems peculiar to, among other things, its geography and level of development, culture and social dynamics. Conceivably, these problems may be similar to those experienced in the SADC Region.

This section evaluates these problems to find out the degree to which the EU problems relate to the SADC situation and the EU's approach to tackle them. Schumann (n.d) argues that the major problem of the European Union is not significant at the supranational level, but rather at the national level. This problem includes a dilemma of

¹⁵ For a detailed structural comparison, also look at the SADC structure in subsequent sections.

defining precisely what the national level encompasses and which structures, parties and other determined factors should be incorporated in integration, in line with community policy in the member states.

Another problem is to identify and understand the major differences of the individual states. Somers (1994:3) indicates a distinction in economic structure among the EU member states in that, “every country has its own industrial structure and business traditions, reflecting historical circumstances, comparative advantages, government decisions, geographical conditions and chances.” This difference will not necessarily disappear, although some changes may occur after integration. The contemporary EU, for example, has some nations, which perceive the European Union as a biased endeavour that would only benefit some.

The Estonian Human Development Report (2001:1) indicates that, “... Both in Estonia and in the European Union itself (EU) European integration is often called an elite project.” A public opinion survey conducted in Estonia indicates that more than two thirds of the population believe that the EU membership primarily interests politicians and civil servants, who hope to gain from it personally. This implies that less well-off people in some EU countries are more pessimistic about integration into the EU than are others.

Owing to these facts, the European Union is classified into two distinct areas, i.e. the Euro¹⁶ and Schengen¹⁷ areas. Therefore, direct comparison between SADC and the EU, is not possible.

The EU differs from SADC, as far as the area of free movement of persons vis-à-vis regional integration, is concerned. The European Union member states are not compelled by any Protocol to join the Schengen Agreement as is the case with the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons in the region. However, the Schengen countries have also experienced problems similar to SADC's. For example, since Poland's entry into the Schengen zone, visa-free between Poland and Ukraine was scrapped, and consequently, Ukrainians have staged protests at the border against what they see as the "New Berlin Wall" (Erlinger 2008). The existing problems in managing cross-border migration has even compelled the European Union to initiate, as Castle (2008) reveals, that "all non-Europeans would need to submit biometric¹⁸ data

¹⁶ Euro area refers to 15 Member States of the European Union use the euro as their currency: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, and Finland. Non-participants: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom are EU Member States but do not currently use the single European currency (ECB n.d).

¹⁷ Not all countries of the European Union are part of the Schengen area. The Schengen area covers: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

¹⁸ "Biometric data" refers to biological data analysed by means of statistics, but this dissertation did not obtain more information about this exercise as proposed by the European Union.

before crossing Europe's frontiers under sweeping European Union proposals to combat illegal migration, terrorism and organized crime...”.

Another issue that SCADPlus (2003) emphasises in the EU is the problem of the economic situation in the border regions. These problems are evident in important disparities between these regions, predominantly with regard to economic development, the employment rate, the infrastructure and the level of education. SCADPlus (ibid) also indicates the problem of the income gap between the EU and the accession countries that led to fears of large migration flows into the EU. The daily cross-border migrations vary considerably from one border region to another. They also vary in terms of purpose and ambitions.

From this argument, it could be deduced that these problems are universal, hence the SADC Regional integration also reflects them. A problem of economic disparity in the region may affect mainly Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. For example, Mokoena, et al (2001:2) explains that Angolans come to Namibia for medical attention, education and work. Some hospitals in Northern Namibia are 60–70% filled with Angolan patients. Some Angolans even draw a pension in Namibia. Also, see the case study in Chapter 6 for more information. Similarly, Botswana, and South Africa are overburdened by economic refugees from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This creates another research gap calling for investigation of the impact

of economic and political ills on regional integration. This dissertation ignores that gap, to focus on the exact historical evolution of regional integration in Africa.

3.3 The origin of regional integration arrangements in Africa

Every African sub-region or independent country in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been part of an actual proposed broader economic grouping at one time or another (Oucho and Crush 2001). Regional integration in Africa started a few decades after the end of World War II. FAO Corporate Document Repository (n.d) identifies the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) established in the mid-1960s as the champion of regional integration in Africa at the time. This body proposed the division of the continent into regions for the purpose of economic development.

However, Africa's current integration arrangements can be perceived as being based on the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the 1991 Abuja Treaty. The ECA and OAU supported the initiative of the Lagos Plan of Action and it was launched to divide Africa into three Sub-Saharan African Regional Integration blocs: the already established Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would serve West Africa, while the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of 1981, which in 1993 was replaced by the current Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established to integrate the countries of East and Southern Africa.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was formed in 1983 to promote economic cooperation between member states, which include Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Angola only has observer status. However, the northern African countries that include Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya established the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989, which was more Arabic but contributed to arrangements expected to lead to an all-African common market.

Some arrangements for regional integration fell outside the Lagos Plan of Action. These include the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which fell under the ambit of ECOWAS and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) *from its name in French, Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* in the proposed regional integration of ECCAS. The Southern African Development Community, established in 1980 as the Frontline States and later converted to become SADC, which in 1992 finally changed to the current SADC, embraced in its ambit the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monetary Area (CMA).

In the Horn of Africa the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was created to succeed the Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was originally established in 1986 by six drought-stricken East African

countries to co-ordinate development in the region. According to the United States of America (USA) Department of State (n.d), IGAD member states are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea. Eritrea became the seventh member of IGAD following its independence in 1993.

It transpired that although Africa presents such multiplicity of regional groupings the problem is that these groupings are not effective. FAO Corporate Document Repository (ibid) indicates that the major reason was first and foremost that intra-regional trade in Africa as a share of total international trade has been extremely low. For example, statistics for the 1990s indicate that the proportion of African intra-regional trade was only 8.4 percent in 1993 compared to 69.9 percent with Western Europe, 49.7 per cent with Asia, 33 percent with North America (McCarthy 1995:12 as quoted by FAO Corporate Document Repository ibid).

This implies that African countries were reluctant to trade amongst themselves in the continent, hence regional blocs in Africa became paper organisations and this trend remains a reality even in the current African regional blocs including the SADC Region. Another serious problem is the exclusion of civil society and the general public in the process of regional integration in Africa.

African regional integration is inter-governmental or based on 'states' relations and the grassroots community plays a spectator's role. This is not the case in Europe, for

example, where countries join economic and regional groupings through referendums. One vivid example is Norway where the people have twice voted in a referendum to reject membership of the European Union. Reporting on this, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (n.d) stated that with 92% of the referendum votes counted the "no" campaign had a clear margin of 52.4% to 47.6% for the "yes" vote.

This implies that it was the people who made the decision and the country had to live with that decision. In Africa, it is the state that makes the decision to join any regional integration and the people have to live with that decision. As a result of these remarks, it becomes imperative to look into issues involved in the origins of the SADC Regional Integration Project.

3.4 Origins of Regional Integration in Southern Africa

In Africa, the then apartheid rule in South Africa was blamed for sluggish progress towards African unity and sub-regional integration, especially in Southern Africa. The Southern African countries, though some of them were members of other regional groupings, had the Southern African Development Community (SADC), previously known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) as their regional bloc.

As an economic community, the SADC is dedicated to the ideals of *free trade, free movement of people, a single currency, and respect for human rights* (Southern African Development Community SADC n.d). Currently, SADC is composed of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar¹⁹, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mbekeani (2001:2) statistically indicates that the SADC Region (excluding Madagascar) has a population of 200 million people. He also points out that the SADC countries comprise of an extremely heterogeneous group, spanning an unusually wide spectrum of economic and demographic indicators.

However, as Reitzes (2000) concludes, the Southern African Region stands at a crucial juncture in its history owing to new global trends and post-Cold War and apartheid dynamics. Arguments in various literature show that apartheid was the notorious blockage towards African unity and peace. For example, Obasanjo (1977:n.p) states that “... so long as there is apartheid, there will be no peace. The elimination of apartheid will be a contribution to peace”.

Similarly, Ostergaard (1989) acknowledges that Southern Africa as a region is rich, but marred by apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation policy, dependence on South Africa and other problems that have led to the crisis of thousands of families fleeing their homes and countries, children being malnourished, preventable diseases such as malaria,

¹⁹ Madagascar is a member of SADC effective since 18 August 2005, bringing back to 14 the total number of member states after Seychelles abandoned the Community in 2003.

wide-spread bilharzias and tuberculosis, growing unemployment and mounting national debt. This glaring contradiction begs for answers based on regional cooperation.

The initial point of the idea of regional integration and economic integration can be traced back to 1974 and the architect was Kenneth Kaunda, the former President of Zambia. For instance, Abegunrin states that “the idea of regional economic cooperation – that is the pooling of economic resources on a regional basis – in Southern Africa dates back to 3 July 1974, when President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia proposed the establishment of a transcontinental belt of independent and economically powerful nations from Dar-es-Salaam and Maputo on the Indian Ocean to Luanda on the Atlantic” (Abegunrin 1985:191).

Towards the end of the 1970s African states bordering on South Africa decided to enter into development cooperation meant to curtail economic dependence on South Africa. Abegunrin (1985:190) further explains that this time Southern Africa became a battlefield between two constellations of states, which were ideologically and fundamentally opposed. The first group was the Lusaka Constellation of nine Southern African states or ‘Frontline States’ also known as ‘the Southern Nine’: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The declared aim of these countries was to form an alliance, which would pursue an economic strategy that would reduce their economic dependence on South Africa (Abegunrin *ibid*). Four months after the launching of the Lusaka Constellation, the second constellation known as the Pretoria Constellation was established between Prime Minister Botha and the presidents of the then ‘independent’ Bantustans: Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.²⁰ The aim of the latter constellation was to implement Botha’s strategy to use South Africa’s economic power and wealth to manipulate its black members to join hands with the white minority regime in South Africa.

Prime Minister Botha’s constellation endeavour came to nothing and the Lusaka constellation gained considerable momentum. Hence, the 1980s saw a wave of political and economic change in the Frontline States with the initiation of the regional integration of the Southern African countries. This initiative of regional integration converted into the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1982, which was initially a state-centred regional body. Initially, the SADCC rejected common market integration. According to the SADCC’s 1986 Macro-Economic Survey (as quoted by Ostengaard 1989: 29):

“Member states were too aware of the numerous failed experiments at regional integration. These were mostly of a trade creating and diverting type like the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Portuguese Community, the East African Common Market, and the Southern African Customs Union, all of which were or in the case of the SACU, is a free trade area or common market. They failed because in every case the stronger member tended to benefit at the expense of the weaker members. The member states collectively rejected models, which would lead to growing gaps between stronger and weaker states”

²⁰ The international community did not recognize these homelands as independent countries.

In the wake of these reservations, the SADCC member states decided to abandon the suffix “Co-ordination Conference” and change this to “Community.” Landsberg (2004) explains that it is the “C” in SADC, i.e. the idea of a ‘community’, which is important. The concept of ‘community’ or ‘society’ in world affairs should be regarded as a means to establish values and norms that bind states together in the turbulent world, (Landsberg *ibid*). In this respect, let us follow the transformation process of the SADCC to the SADC as unpacked in the subsequent section.

3.4.1 From SADCC to SADC

From the above, it appears that the SADCC pioneered the idea of regionalism but not actually regional or economic integration in Southern Africa. Rawlands (n.d: 49) indicates that a meeting of the SADCC Council of Ministers agreed that the organisation should be transformed from Development Coordination into fully-fledged Development Community. Therefore, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was born in August 1992 with the signing of a treaty in Windhoek, Namibia. The fact is that the SADC’s approach is far different from the SADCC’s. The SADC Treaty of 1993 (as quoted by Rawlands n.d: 49) stipulates that *“the ten countries committed themselves to much fuller cooperation in terms of deeper economic integration, common economic, political and social values and system, and strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security.”* Hence, membership in the SADC by the countries of Southern Africa implies

the desire for regional economic integration and the creation of a common market. Given its historical background, the SADCC or the Conference was formed with four principal objectives, namely:

- to reduce Member States' dependence, particularly, but not only, on apartheid South Africa
- to implement programmes and projects with national and regional impact;
- to mobilise Member States' resources, in the quest for collective self-reliance; and
- to secure international understanding and support (SADC: 2005:2).

In contrast, the SADC was formed with much broader objectives including to:

- Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- Evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- Promote and defend peace and security;
- Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the inter-dependence of Member States;
- Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the Region;
- Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment;
- Strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the Region (SADC: 2005).

Landsberg (2004) identifies the stamina of the leaders, explaining that the founding fathers demonstrated the tangible benefits of collaboration and cultivating a climate of confidence and trust among the member states. In addition, SADC (2005) adds that these objectives were pursued with determination and vigour.


The SADC has developed since then, to become an organisation that has a Programme of Action covering several broad economic and social sectors, namely, Energy, Tourism, Environment and Land Management, Water, Mining, Employment and Labour, Culture, Information and Sport and Transport and Communications (SADC *ibid*). Apart from these, the important sectors of the SADC are Finance and Investment, Human Resource Development, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Legal Affairs and Health. Each of these sectors is allocated to a certain Member State for co-ordination. Some member states co-ordinate more than one sector.

The SADC inherited the structures and functions of its predecessor the SADCC, hence over a period of two years the SADC undertook an exercise of restructuring its institutions. This restructuring was necessitated by the number of difficulties and constraints encountered in the process of moving the organisation from a co-ordinating conference to a Community. These include:

- Inadequate institutional reforms to enable the effective transformation from the SADCC (Coordinating Conference) to the SADC (the Community). Furthermore, the resource provisions and the management system were not adequately addressed.
- The need to put in place appropriate mechanisms capable of translating the high degree of political commitment to shape the scope and scale of building the Community through regional integration. This implies delegating authority and strengthening the capacity for decision-making to the relevant agencies responsible for implementing the SADC agenda.
- Lack of synergy between the objectives and strategies of the Treaty on one hand and the existing SADC Programme of Action (SPA) and the institutional framework on the other.
- Limited capacity to mobilise significant levels of the Region's own resources for the implementation of its Programme, (SADC 2005:2).

Owing to the above challenges, an attempt was made to revamp the structure of the SADC to meet those challenges. See Figure 3.3 below for the revamped SADC structure.

Figure 3.3: New SADC Structure



Source: New SADC Structure. (2005).

Figure 3.3 above gives the whole picture of the current SADC structure drawn up on the recommendation of the Review Committee. Landsberg summarises the new SADC institutional framework as follows:

- **The Summit:** this consists of Heads of States or Government of all member states. This is the ultimate SADC policy-making institution; it is responsible for the overall policy direction and central functions of the organisation. The Summit normally meets once a year, although the Review Committee recommended it to meet twice a year.
- **The Troika:** this consists of the SADC Chair, incoming Chair and outgoing Chair. This instrument was introduced in 1999 and was seen as more active in respect of the improvement of the functioning of the SADC.
- **The Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC):** This Organ operates on the Troika basis on the period of one year, and reports to the Chairperson of the SADC. The Organ is co-ordinated at the level of the Summit, and is regulated by the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation; the Chairperson of the Organ cannot simultaneously hold the Chair of the Summit.
- **The Council of Ministers:** This consists of ministers of each member state, usually of Foreign Affairs and Economic Planning and Finance. The Council is responsible for overseeing the functions and development of the SADC, and for ensuring that policies are properly implemented. According to the Committee's recommendation, the Council should meet as regularly as four times a year to ensure speedy decision-making.
- **The Integrated Committee of Ministers:** This can be constituted by at least two ministers from each of the Member States and is responsible to Council for overseeing the core areas of integration, which are: trade, industry, finance and investment, infrastructures and services, food, agriculture and natural resources, social and human development and special programmes, and implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) process.
- **The SADC National Committees:** These comprise key stakeholders, notably the government, private sector and civil society in member

states. They co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of regional policies, strategies, and the SADC Plan of Action at the national level.

- **A standing committee of senior officials:** This consists of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from a SADC national contact point in each member state.
- **The Secretariat:** This body plans and manages the SADC programmes, implements Summit and Council decisions, organises and manages the SADC meetings, undertakes financial and general administration, represents and promotes the SADC, and promotes the harmonisation of policies and strategies of member states through its structure, including an Office of the Executive Secretary, a Strategic Planning, Gender and Development and Policy Harmonisation Department, and directorates in four core areas. (Landsbergis 2003:31).

Comparing the SADCC and the SADC approaches, Rawlands (ibid) explains that although many of the structures of the SADCC continued to exist in the SADC, one important change was the commitment to economic integration. The SADC is an economic bloc and its economic ideal is the cornerstone for other functions of integration. Hansohm (2002) argues that most processes of regional development in Africa focus on economic integration as an important element - meaning that some important functions of Regional Integration Projects in Africa receive little if any attention. This trend stayed the course even after restructuring. However, the next section discusses the current SADC restructuring process.

3.4.2 SADC Restructuring: Progress to date

Neo-regionalism theory, which introduced a new strategy in the form of regional integration that tries to induce the world to reorganise in line with world trends of globalisation in terms of structures and behaviours, could influence the initiation of the SADC Regional Integration processes. The SADC Barometer (2005) outlines some of the achievements of SADC. Since 1992, for example, the SADC has adopted 23 protocols. More recently, the Community revamped its institutions. The Seychelles left SADC, but Madagascar joined and Tanzania chose to remain in the SADC and withdrew from COMESA.

SADC Today (2005) also summarises significant progress achieved after restructuring within the SADC and lists outstanding tasks that still need to be accomplished as comprising: The following milestones, according to SADC Today (2005: n.p), have been achieved:

- Amendment of the Treaty and subsidiary instruments;
- Development of a new formula for membership contribution;
- Clustering of 21 sectors and the establishment of four directorates at the SADC Secretariat;
- Creation of an Integrated Committee of Ministers and SADC National Committees;

- Audit of the SADC programmes/projects and assets;
- Implementation and approval of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP); and
- Completion of the job evaluation exercise.

The following are outstanding tasks to be completed:

- Amendment of subsidiary instruments such as the protocols, memoranda of understanding (MOUs), agreements and charters;
- Feasibility study on the Fisheries Agency;
- Staff development and training;
- Performance management;
- Creation of a Regional Development Fund; and
- Long-term office accommodation needs.

The next challenges and way forward for the SADC is to implement the new structure and effectively conclude the transitional phase of restructuring through:

- Strengthening of the Secretariat by provision of adequate resources to accelerate the appointment of directors, heads of units and senior officers within the next year;
- Convening of regular meetings of the Troika to perform its duties as steering committee of SADC;
- Strengthening and popularisation of the SADC National Committees so that member states and stakeholders make effective use of them as institutions of the SADC;
- Efforts should be strengthened to establish the proposed SADC Development Fund;

- Member states should at every meeting of Council submit reports on how they are implementing the SADC Protocols.

Apart from the outstanding tasks and challenges listed above, another major challenge that the literature omits is the issue of the free movement of persons in the Region. Although in 1995 and 1997 the Draft SADC Protocols for the Free Movement of Persons in the Region were crafted and failed, the SADC Treaty as amended in 2001 did not make it one of its core concerns. Instead, according to the SADC Barometer (2005) the core areas are:

- Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment;
- Infrastructure and Services;
- Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources;
- Social and Human Development and Special Programmes;
- Politics, Defence and Security, and dispute settlement and other legal means.

It makes sense that all member states have been expected to ratify, accede to protocols and memoranda of understanding (MOU) that fall under these core areas, but owing to a lack of legal repercussions only some countries have done so. This is also the case with the Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement in the Region, albeit it does not fall into the above-mentioned core areas in the SADC Treaty, as amended. For example, Mmegi (2005) argues that the Botswana government has postponed ratifying the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Free Movement, pending consultations with the nation. However, many share the sentiments of Foreign Affairs Minister, Mompoti Meraphe that the Protocol has far-reaching implications to be

left to the wisdom of government alone. Until normalcy and stability is attained in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, some of the SADC ideals, including that of free movement of persons, may not be realised. There is still (at the time of this research) no clarity about when stability will eventually come to countries such as the DRC, since the war in the east of that country is waged from the non-SADC member states. Hence, the final realisation of the SADC ideals of integration also remains unpredictable.

This implies that the SADC Regional integration has many challenges that raise concerns about its future success. The Sunday Tribune (2005) indicated that, on paper, regional integration in Southern Africa has made advances with countries linked by protocols and agreements of every stripe. In reality, however, there has been no advancement. Xinhuanet (2005), quoting Pahad (2005), also argues that Southern Africa will be unable to realise its economic integration plans by the target year 2012, if it fails to uplift the current pace of implementation. In addition, Strid (1997) identified as one of the critical transitional challenges in the SADC a demographic transition towards an optimal size and distribution of population and economic activity in relation to the environment and natural resources.

Based on this background of regional integration in general and in the SADC Region in particular, it becomes more imperative to probe further the issues of regional integration and cross-border migration in the world and in particular in the SADC Region. Before

this investigation, the comparative migration issues between the SADC Region and other regional integration, apart from the EU should be highlighted.

3.5 Comparative Migration Cases in Regional Integration Projects

3.5.1 The SADC vs. other Regional Bodies outside the EU

Cross-border issues are now global in nature and can pose a threat to all regional integration. So far, EU dynamics on crossing borders imply negative and positive perspectives as reflected in the first sections of this Chapter. Central American countries have also generated another form of regional integration, which is composed of migration issues. For example, Chacon (2003:1) explains that between 1.75 and 4 million Central Americans now live in the United States. Unquestionably, migration flows constitute a critical element of the economic and social relationship between the US and Central America.

Now the Central American immigrants have organised to demand that their needs should be considered in the new regional initiative of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). They believe that CAFTA has been centred on trade and economic issues while human mobility was ignored. In this light, Chacon (2003) further indicates that the Central American migrants had two important demands: (i) a new policy regime regulating the movement of people between Central America, and (ii) as

transitional communities that have been and continue to be affected by the implementation of an export-oriented economic model in the Central America, they criticize the proposed Free Trade Agreement.

In the same vein, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents another contentious dimension of the same issue. Positive and negative dynamics of cross-border migration between the US Hispanic Community and Latin America is of particular concern to NAFTA. Like the Kwanyamas on both sides of the Namibia /Angola border, the Hispanic community has crosscut the US/Mexico borders. Hinojosa-Ojeda (n.d) confirms that it is the contention of the US that the Hispanics are more interconnected with Latin America than are other segments of the US economy by virtue of migration, remittances, telecommunications, travel, trade and investments, more especially through small businesses.

It is a fact that cross-border migration has certain positive outcomes. For example, U.S/Mexico borders leads in the number of border crossings, with more than 656 thousand per day in 2000, (Hinojosa-Ojeda n.d). These border crossings involve under-explored and undocumented transactions that represent huge economic opportunities on both sides of the borders. This means that the Hispanic Diaspora from Latin America contributes a lot to the US economy through a transfer of resources that operates outside the recognised trade and integration agenda.

Similarities could be observed here in terms of undocumented and unrecognised transactions that take place across the borders within the SADC countries. For example, there is a huge buying power in the market in Northern Namibia, particularly through the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), coming from Angola. As in the case with NAFTA, Hinojosa-Ojeda (n.d) indicates that this organisation did not create any changes in terms of North American dynamics of growth and inequality, especially in border regions.

Apart from the economic side, other negative aspects hamper the NAFTA perspective. For example, according to the Centre for US-Mexican Studies (2002:2) burgeoning trade and investment activities between the US and Mexico have brought a greatly increased need for cross-border cooperation on law enforcement issues. These issues are trans-border in nature, ranging from violence against unauthorised Mexican and third-country migrants to the smuggling of drugs, arms, stolen cars and other contraband.

This mirrors SADC's cross-border crime situation, which seems to add some stumbling blocks to regional integration. Gastrow, (2001) points out that while leaders in Southern Africa argue at regional summits about the need to develop closer economic integration among Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, organised criminal groups have already succeeded in creating a free trade zone for illicit commerce in the region via cross-border activity. A study (in the SADC) conducted by Mokoena et al (2001) on land border-posts, airports and seaports revealed that there is no fence along the Namibia/Angola border and people cross as they please. This increases crime; for

example, syndicates steal vehicles in South Africa to bring them to Namibia, where the stolen vehicles are registered and then taken to Angola. It is difficult to trace the stolen vehicles that crossed into Angola and as is the case with NAFTA, this has sown distrust among the SADC countries with regard to cross-border issues. The Centre for US-Mexican Studies (2002) as quoted in Garcia (2002) aired similar reservations regarding US-Mexican border-crossing problems by indicating that, "...collaboration between US and Mexican law enforcement agencies at all levels is hindered by deep-seated mistrust and divergent priorities that prevent the development of a cross-border law enforcement community".

The Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) has experienced the same cross-border dilemma. ASEAN Regional Immigration officials agreed in principle to work towards broadening a visa-free zone to promote tourism among nationals of member countries. Adding substance to this, Beddoe (2002:2) reports that the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that as many as 3 000 000 women and children are trapped in slave-like conditions in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and the Southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi.

This has also brought into question the point that a visa-free ASEAN is going to create difficulties, not only with cross-border trafficking, but also through the movement of

people who are entering countries specifically for prostitution or sexual services with children (Beddoe 2002:1).

These scenarios depict facts about existing situations of regional integration in general, and cross-border dynamics in particular, in the world and to some extent in the SADC community. However, in all the comparative scenarios described above none referred to the issue of policy comparisons in terms of the Free Movement of Persons. In this regard, it is imperative to compare the SADC and COMESA Protocols of the Free Movement of Persons in the two regional blocs.

3.5.2 Comparisons of the SADC Draft Protocol and the COMESA Protocol

Quite interestingly, as Oucho (2006) explains, Southern African countries have thus far made three important attempts to manage cross-border migration and population movement. The first attempt, which was abortive, was the Protocol on the Free Movement of People within the SADC Region. A second similar attempt occurred in the COMESA Region, and the third attempt was the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA). The International Migration Organisation (IOM) and its partners initiated the latter. The 1995 SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Region was, as Oucho (ibid) argues, a replica of those of the European Union on one hand and the Economic Community of the West African States on the other. Like

ECOWAS, SADC provided for successive phases, which are: (i) visa-free entry, (ii) rights of residence and establishment, and (iii) a borderless SADC, copying the Schengen Accord in Europe.

Since the origins of the SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, let us focus here on the comparison between the COMESA and SADC Protocols. Like the SADC, COMESA also developed a protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Rights of Establishment and Residence emulating the Schengen Accord. The only difference observed was that the COMESA Protocol never reflected initiatives of borderless member states. However, in the same light, both protocols never worked, which is another token that free movement within African states is one of the unachievable ideals.

Another thing that this dissertation found as complicating regional integration and migration management is the IOM initiated MIDSA. This, as Oucho (ibid) puts it, was initiated with the aim of fostering regional cooperation on migration-related issues through a regular exchange of information and dialogue. Although Oucho refers to MIDSA as a good omen for the two economic groupings benefiting from its activities, this can still be viewed with certain reservations.

Observably, problems would develop due to overlapping objectives of the two regional blocs. The other problem is that South Africa, as the major role player in the creation of

MIDSA seemed to have been applying fiendish standards; for example, she blocked the 1995 SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons, fearing “flooding of Johannesburg’s streets” and at the same time initiated the new organ (MIDSA) to deal with migration, which was inclusive of both the SADC and COMESA. Further discussions on migration in the SADC Region will figure prominently in the next Chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter narrows down this research from the broad perspective of the history of regional integration to the SADC scenario. Although it is hard to trace the exact genesis of regional integration in the world, most current literature discovers its origin in the end of World War II and its increase at the end of the Cold War. For example, during the latter half of the 1990s, notifications to GATT/WTO increased considerably.

This Chapter also highlighted the fact that the market and trade integration agreement can be distinguished in many ways such as preferential trade agreements; Free trade areas; Customs Union; Common Markets; Economic Unions; and Complete Political Unions of which the SADC is predominantly typical of preferential trade agreements.

It was also noted in this chapter that economic integration and regional integration are not synonymous, as some people may believe. Regional integration associates with the

geographical proximity of the states that intend to integrate. Economic integration has nothing to do with the geographical neighbourhood of states. One country in Africa can, for example, be in an economic agreement with a sister country in Europe. One important conclusion made in this chapter is that, although there is a great deal of regional integration in the world today, the only existing role model is the European Union. It was noted that the existing disparities in terms of economic development that exist within the SADC Region are also evident in the EU. This, as in the SADC case leads to migration flows from weak economies to well-off countries. A landmark in the origins of the SADC countries was the creation of the Front Line States which later also known as SADCC. After the Cold War, the SADCC was converted into a community to be known as the Southern African Development Community, established to further the ideals of economic integration, free movement of persons and human rights.

SADC was revamped in terms of its structure and functions to meet the current challenges from the regional, continental and global arena. However, the SADC is still faced with insurmountable challenges, of which this dissertation singled out the issues of cross-border migration management and free movement of persons as its study focus. In this light, the subsequent chapters investigate the problems of cross border migration management with specific reference to the reasons for migrants, types of migration and dormancy of the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region.

CHAPTER 4: MIGRATION

4.1. Introduction

The previous Chapter sketched the background of the current context of SADC regional integration. It also benchmarked the SADC Regional integration against selective global regional integration scenarios in terms of political and socio-economic configurations and management of cross-border migration. It is worthwhile to note that according to the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005) the issue of migration is a key for certain regional bodies. The EU, for example has harmonised its refugee policies and is currently developing region-wide approaches to pertinent issues such as migrant integration, economic migration and also migration and development. The same efforts have also been envisaged within the NAFTA and ASEAN.

Since the objective of this dissertation is to probe effects of cross-border migration and population movement on the SADC Regional integration, this chapter will focus on different analysis of migration, starting with the international context followed by the regional context. Along these lines, this chapter also investigates different migration typologies and migrants' strata based on the hypothesis that migrants portray diverse purposes and methods of migration. Writers such as McDonald, Gay, Zinyama, Mattes

& De Vletter (1998) as quoted by Oucho (2006) revealed this diversity referring to migrant groups such as border jumpers, illegal immigrants and illegal aliens. However, the international migration and internal migration within the SADC Region constitute a very broad typology based on reasons of an individual or group of persons to migrate. Hence, this chapter critically analyses migration typologies in groups of labour migration, brain drain or professional migration, refugees and asylum seekers and undocumented migrants.

At the SADC level, especially, the primary emphasis is placed on labour migration phenomena because of its dominance in the historical and current literature of the SADC migration history. For example, as Oucho (2006) states, Southern Africa is the epicentre of labour migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, whether viewed from an historical perspective or in contemporary terms.

That aside, migration is a gendered phenomenon as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, this chapter discusses issues of gender and migration in the world as well as within the SADC Region. The critical area of focus is the migration policies and their implications in Africa and the SADC Region. The points of reference of this chapter are the national policies on gender and migration and the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons. The chapter presents the harmonisation of migration policies and

legislation in the SADC Region and concludes with a summary in the form of a conclusion.

4.2 The History of International Migration

It is illogical at this point to ignore international migration and cross-border movement at the international level. Hune (1991) as quoted by Pettman (1996:65) makes the importance of this clear when he states that international migration in the last 500 years has gone through several different phases such as from 1500 to 1800, when comparatively small numbers of Europeans began to inundate continents in the scramble for colonies and slaves were imported to countries like the Americas.

Hune (ibid) indicates that from 1815 to the First World War there was also a dramatic upsurge in the number of people leaving Europe, calculated between 48 and 60 million people leaving for particularly North America, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand. In the same period, 10 million Russians went to Siberia and Central Asia and some 12 million Chinese and six million Japanese moved to East and South-East Asia.

However, it needs to be noted here that migration has even become an issue of national identity or a racialised matter, particularly, according to Pettman (1996:73) where immigration becomes a code word, meaning ‘black’ in the United Kingdom or Asian in Australia while the often larger number of ‘white’ immigrants goes unremarked”. Stephen (2000:1) extends this argument by pointing out that international migration swiftly became a key issue in international politics at the beginning of the 1990s, when the collapse of the bi-polar power assemblages of the Cold War seemed to have opened the floodgates for vast new population flows.

Opposed to this argument, the history of human mobility across international borders has no obvious beginning or end although it gravitates around one point in time. Thus, Anderson (1996:132) argues that even in prehistory, before the rise of literate civilisation in the Mesolithic²¹ and Neolithic periods, there is evidence of migrations over vast distances. Sharing this view, Schrover (2003:2) refers to the French Revolution in 1789 as being an opener of an era of liberal revolution, which slowly established the right of every citizen to move whenever and wherever he²² liked.

²¹ The period between the Palaeolithic (before the emergence of primitive Man and the Neolithic (period of primitive farming and the use of polished stone and flint tools and weapons).

²² “He” is used because by that time only men were expected to migrate and women were expected to stay behind taking care of families.

In recent decades, as the Federal Office for Migration (FOM) (n.d) implies, global migration has reached a hitherto unknown level. People also started moving from place to place in categorised groups such as migrants and refugees, hence, a new group of refugees grew from the political and economic refugees. Adelman (1993) as quoted by Pettman (1996:66) suggests the characteristics of current international migration, saying that, “ we are now witnessing a new phase of international migration, marked by rapidly increasing numbers and the diversity of states involved and particularly by the ways in which migration has now become a global phenomenon.”

In addition, Castles 1993 as quoted by Pettman (1996) explains that this phase comprises of unique characteristics ranging from transformations in terms of its global reach; diversity of types of migration including permanent and labour migrants as well as refugees; the feminisation of most of the migration flows; the politicisation of the migration trends induced by political influences such as conflicts in certain regions of the world and the rise of new nationalism and xenophobia in many countries in the world as discussed in subsequent sections.

4.2.1 The current trend of international migration

Various approaches lead to a strong impression that migration has become an alarming and controversial issue, frequently embedded in current international discourses regarding globalisation, regionalism and that migration also threatens state security. In this context, Kotze and Hill (1997) as quoted by Solomon (2003:1) argue that “the number of international migrants, including refugees, asylum-seekers and clandestine migrants is estimated at 120 million worldwide.”

For the sake of different arguments, Solomon (2003:1) also refers to de Kock et al (1995) who state that one in every 114 people is displaced in the world today. For example, this alarming situation over the last few years was evident when a flood of people in flight emerged from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia, Croatia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, East Timor and Armenia, (Solomon 2003, and Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995). A big exodus of people from Eastern Europe and the Third World countries has also caused a high level of concern in many major cities in Europe such as Paris, Berlin, Berne, Vienna and Brussels.

In its report on the International Conference on Population which deliberated on the theme, Population Distribution, Migration and Development, the United Nations (UN) (1984) reflects that over the past decade, experience and scientific case studies have revealed a great variety of long-term and temporary migratory movement. Participants in this conference disclosed reflective relationships between various types of migration and local development styles. This suggests a compelling reason for countries to examine their own experiences more closely in terms of cross-border migration.

The (UN) (ibid) further reflects a study of migration as being a multifaceted approach, which requires multilevel analysis such as at the individual, family and household levels. One important imperative is that analysis should also transcend these levels to include different levels of geographic aggregation – the sub-antnational area, the national and the international state-system. This helps to record and comprehensively understand the complexity of migration flows and processes, so as to establish phenomena that inform appropriate policy responses.

In similar vein, IOM (2003) denotes the enduring impact of globalisation as the catalyst for significant consequences for the socio-economic phenomenon of migration. Migration contributes greatly to current transformation occurring in social and economic systems at the global, regional, national and constituency levels. In traditional societies,

people were not exposed to various sorts of lifestyles, hence they tended to spend their entire life in their villages of birth.

Solomon (1996) identifies communications and technology as one factor, which is epitomised by the microchip that acted as a tremendous spur for population movements. People currently watch live broadcasts via satellite on developments in other countries and use this to make decisions regarding the feasibility to migrate. In this light, the current international migration scenario presents a picture that is reflected in a great tide of population flows that has hit the world from every corner. The migration circuit, as the IOM argues, spans the globe like a spider's web with ramifications and countless intersections. This has made the current world map of migration multipolar. A variety of variables ranging from finance, commerce and ideas or information is widely conceived as catalysts for the exodus of people crossing frontiers to other places. Eventually, this trend emerges as one of the reliable indicators of the intensity of globalisation.

In addition, the IOM (2003) states that migration occurs owing to multiple pull and push factors, which include among others: economic development and its disparities, population trends, the existence of migratory networks, access to information, the ease of travel today, armed conflicts, environmental degradation and human rights violations.

These factors manipulate the existing trend of migration worldwide; for example, if any change occurs in any of them migration may or may not occur. Similarly, important understanding is created that the contemporary processes of immigration could simply be understood through analytical studies of theoretical approaches on migration, which are predominantly premised on these variables. Thus, Chapter 2 discussed the most important approaches of emigration, which inform theoretical grounds for reasons to emigrate or immigrate. In this respect, it is logical to critically explore how these reasons may feature in the SADC context.

4.2.2 Reasons for emigration and immigration

The pertinent, but general question may arise as to why exactly people migrate. Answers to this question are as various as reasons and decisions to migrate. Oucho (2006:62) groups these reasons into diverse factors that influence emigration and immigration at the macro, meso and micro levels. These factors, according to Oucho (ibid) include demographic setting, economic setting, social/cultural context, the political system and environmental conditions. Du Pisani refers to this diversity as follows:

“Broadly understood as a change in the location of the home and often involving entire communities, migration is a complex phenomenon that reflects individual and collective decisions, interdependence through trade, communication, social mobility and culture as well as North/South divides

and deeper structural fractures in the social fabric of societies. Migration interacts in complex ways with population trends, with health, to name but some of the contextual features that shape and are in turn shaped by migration,” (Du Pisani 2000:1).

Historically, people around the globe have been for centuries on the move determined by varied reasons and ambitions. One reason why people left their countries in the past has been because of a lack of available land, especially for agricultural purposes. In Africa, for instance, the population is on the rise and the economy and geographical area becomes insufficient to sustain them as in the case of Malawi (see Chapter 1).

Different writers suggest a variety of reasons for migration, which to a certain extent overlap. Morgan (2000) poses very interesting questions such as: Do you know where your ancestors came from? Do you know what influenced their decision to migrate? Do you know why your ancestors settled where they did? Morgan (2000) gives some reasons that could be universal factors and similar to those given by Oucho above, that compel people to leave and move to other places or countries: Religious or ethnic persecution; natural disasters; famine; economic problems; war; political strife/turmoil/oppression; following family and friends; adoption; slavery; criminal incarceration/deportation; and financial opportunities. Minnesota State University (MSU) (2003) raises the same argument by classifying the reasons why people left their countries for homes elsewhere as "push" factors. These factors vary and often work in conjunction with the "pull" factors (reasons to migrate to a particular area) of a certain part of the world.

People also tend to migrate as a result of subtle reasons that they are often unwilling to reveal, for example, after killing another person. Other people may have had their own personal reasons for leaving their countries to others, for example, family problems may compel an individual to migrate, or some people could get into conflict with the national laws, or have debt, or a tarnished reputation. Another factor is religious persecution.

Similarly, and as contained in the neo-classical theory (Chapter 2), Wordiq (n.d) expounds that people immigrate for the following reasons: professional, political, economic and sentimental, meaning that they leave their country with the desire to settle in a country because of personal preference or family reunification. However, as Wordiq (n.d) further elaborates, much immigration occurs for economic reasons (see Chapter 2, classical theory). Affluent countries in terms of economy and personal income attract people from weak economies and lower income countries and hence cause immigration. As indicated above, other common reasons for immigration include escape from persecution and the desire to join close friends and/or family members residing in other countries.

Contrary to economic reasons, which dominate almost all neo-classical arguments of migration, people also migrate for non-economic reasons such as Murphy²³ suggests:

“...The Pilgrim Fathers sought "a better country" that they might exercise religious liberty. Some migrate because of a sense of adventure, a longing for the something hidden behind the hills and some are what Mr. John A. Stevenson calls "the industrial wild geese," those who follow shifting jobs whether seasonal or otherwise. Many migrate to escape their debts, their domestic responsibilities, the police officers and others just elope,” (Murphy n.d).

It is remarkable that the above-mentioned reasons are indeed global in nature. Therefore, Reitzes (2000:1) realised that issues of population and reasons for migration in the Southern African Region are also complex and diverse and interact in multiple ways. Arguably, migration and immigration are confusing concepts although they are all based on mobility of people from one place to another.²⁴

In the SADC Region, as indeed elsewhere, the reasons of mobility often constitute the basic difference between concepts of migration and immigration or emigration. These have a serious influence on current reasons for migration and immigration within Southern Africa, more especially to South Africa via Namibia. McDonald et al (1999:2) argues that most migrants and immigrants from African countries feel that South Africa and Namibia have a moral obligation to, especially, the African countries that took up positions against apartheid. Those countries hosted the South African and Namibian

²³ The full address of this reference cannot be found and hence at the end it is just listed with www.google.com and it was accessed on 29 October 2004.

²⁴ For this dissertation the meanings of these terms are provided in Chapter 1 under ‘Definition of Major Terms.’

refugees and freedom fighters during their wars of liberation and would now like them to reciprocate their hospitality. Such a feeling suggests this as another reason of migration to South Africa and Namibia. Complementing this, Table 4.1 contains some more reasons by McDonald, which migrants from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho often give for visiting South Africa.

Table 4.1: Reasons for visiting South Africa on Most Recent Visit (%)

What was the purpose of your most recent visit?	Mozambique	Lesotho	Zimbabwe
To look for work	22	8	14
To work	45	17	15
Buy and sell goods	2	3	21
School	1	1	2
Shopping	4	19	21
Business	2	2	8
Visit family or friends	12	34	13
Holiday, tourism	5	2	3
Medical	4	6	2
Other	2	8	3

Source: McDonald (2000:57).

Statistics in Table 4.1 above indicate that a large number of Mozambicans, (45%), come to South Africa for work, while most people from Lesotho i.e. 34% only come to South Africa for a visit. Zimbabweans normally come to South Africa for shopping or to buy and sell their goods. The same reasons are given by many migrants to Namibia (refer to Chapter 6 for Oshikango case study). In light of this, many perspectives as discussed in Chapter 2 add value to these reasons and ways how international migration starts and is perpetuated. On this basis, we should extend this argument to include the main categories of migration at the global and regional levels.

4.2.3 Major Categories of migration

As discussed earlier, people worldwide do not migrate in a unique way and for unique reasons. People can migrate from the same family, house or village but in different categories. Zentella and Schiesser (2005) emphasised that today, migratory flows continue to be a worldwide reality and that this phenomenon keeps growing, creating different implications for the international community. Moreover, SADC Today (1999) also argues that the current waves of migration not only include mine and agricultural workers, but also professionals and skilled workers, especially in the SADC Region. Giving this argument more breadth, the United Nations categorises international migration into four major topics, i.e. regular migration, irregular migration, the brain drain and refugees.

Focus on diversification of migration categories is important in this dissertation because of many reasons. One major reason as IOM (2003) argues is to investigate current concerns that migration, by way of regular, irregular, refugees and brain drain, is gradually eroding the traditional boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups, nation-states and regional bodies.

4.2.3.1. Regular migration

The Regular migration category includes aspects such as free migration, which means the system of abolishing controls of persons' movements in terms of entry, stay or work in other countries of common interest, for example in the European Union Region.

Another aspect inherent to the Regular migration system is the admission of migrants without restrictions other than those concerned with public order or national security, contract migration, which in itself includes individual contract migration, collective contract migration and Project-related migration of movement (United Nations 1984). In addition, another dynamic of free migration as a function of Regular migration includes official or business migration evident in the transfer of personnel by multinational corporations and other businesspersons (also refer to the institutional theory of migration in Chapter 2). This trend was favoured in the first SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons developed and championed by the SADC Secretariat in the mid-1990s (this Protocol will be discussed later in this chapter).

This approach was advocated because integration as contained in the SADC Treaty needs those deeper levels of cooperation, which can be achieved if free movement of people and goods crossing the border is granted and all factors of production can be conveniently traded across borders (Oucho and Crush 2001). Acceptably, the free movements guaranteed in Regular migration can lead to a good policy in Regional Integration Projects, because the member countries would be able to utilise their human, financial and natural resources more efficiently and such business migration might benefit the receiving countries by boosting their economic growth.

As a member state of the regional bloc, a country can also retain its sovereignty and discretion to decide who they can accept as a Regular migrant and the authorities can

balance the presence of required persons in the country in terms of skills and business acumen. For example, the agreement between Namibia and Angola for a visa free movement of people is applicable only to Angolans and Namibians, while Angolans and Zambians, albeit neighbours still need visas to visit each other.

It is also worth noting that this agreement only minimises the problem of cross-border visits between families but the problem embedded in other variables remains intact. People not only cross the boundaries to visit and do business; other major reasons are employment seeking and social benefits such as education and health care. Due to these, the demand for dual citizenship remains a legal issue between the two countries, which may pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the two countries. For example, Angola allows dual citizenship on a reciprocal basis while Namibia does not.

In addition, while Namibia signed the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons, which at least may lead to facilitation of recruitment of citizens of the SADC across the border with minimum national restrictions, Angola remains reluctant to sign. This implies that, unlike in the EU, Regular migration could be selective and more bilateral than regional in the SADC Region.

Aside from benefits that the receiving and sending countries may reap from Regular migration, there are also some other problems associated with this. For example, the SADC countries adopted Affirmative Action Policies after independence that interferes

to a certain extent with the process of the free movement of personnel, particularly in the labour sector. Affirmative Action Policies prioritise employment opportunities for nationals and migrants must survive on the residues. This inconsistency of policies as discussed in the systems approach in chapter 2 could hamper the progress of regional integration.

Another similar scenario that the UN (1989) identifies shows that children of migrants who were living with their parents abroad and whose legal status did not permit them to participate fully in the economic, social and cultural life of the host country would not live a normal life. From this argument, we should deduce that the SADC Region at a current level of interstate relationships is not ready to exercise regular migration, due to policy inconsistency and failure to reach consensus on the SADC Protocol for (Facilitation) Free Movement of Persons in the region. From Regular, we move to Irregular migration, which is another category of migration apparently more problematic in all regions in the world.

4.2.3.2. Irregular migration

Irregular or illegal migrants are those people who leave their countries to reside in other countries without the necessary documents. The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005) challenges the adequacy of the concepts “irregular” and “illegal” commonly used to characterise unauthorised migrants. The Commission (ibid) argues that an individual person cannot be ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ and should be referred

to as a 'migrant with irregular status.' However, this dissertation adopts both meanings. As the UN (1989:17) estimates, 12 or 13 million people worldwide fall into the category of irregular migrants. These people are highly exposed to various conditions in terms of social and economic situations or even to human right violations. It appears, as Solomon (1996) explains that in Paris, Berlin, Bern, Vienna and Brussels the large irregular or illegal migrant influx from Eastern Europe and the Third World is a cause for concern. Similarly, Solomon (ibid) suggests that in Washington, DC, the problem is about Haitian, Chinese and Cuban boat people.

However, in certain countries, more especially in the SADC countries many people cannot easily realise whether they are illegal migrants when found within member states. As Vertovec and Cohen's migration configuration approach entails, this could be attributed to various factors that include family networks and traditional ethnical links that know no borders or traditional labour migrations, which are subject to fewer migration controls. This motivates another point of debate regarding the officials' dilemma in determining the difference between true migrants and cross-border commuters. Adepoju (2006:26) refers to this as the fluidity of the migration phenomenon that prompts discussion as to whether the term 'circulation' would be more appropriate than 'migration' in the African context.

In a different argument, Faist (n.d) criticized a common notion in the discussion on migration and labour asserted by labour organisations, including the International

Labour Organisation (ILO) that says that people should first deal with the problem of Irregular migration before embarking upon a more generous singular policy discussion on migration. Faist (ibid) argues that this claim is flawed since all research on long-term development of migration implies that Regular migration is always followed by so-called Irregular migration.²⁵ Sharing these sentiments, Thomas-Hope (n.d:8) outlines some of the commonest strategies of the migrants who leave their countries with a hidden agenda of becoming Irregular migrants. This occurs in three ways: there are those migrants who enter legally, but in the future dishonour the terms of their entry permit or visa and simply disappear into the country; those who enter through the regular channels with illegal documentation; and those who enter by crossing the borders illegally (see also Chapter 6).

Normally those countries that are the principal sources or destinations of migration are the same. For example, in the SADC Region, the principal sources of migrants are those countries experiencing war and other socio-economic disorders such as the DRC, Zimbabwe and Angola. The current major destinations are Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, with the former two countries usually used as transits by migrants on their way to the latter. Hence, South Africa remains the main point of destination for most migrants.

²⁵ Thomas Faist of the University of Bremen made this contribution in his presentation at the international Workshop in Istanbul, Turkey, but no date was provided.

The Southern Africa Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (1998) explains that both legal and undocumented migration to South Africa from the SADC Region and elsewhere has increased dramatically since 1990. The Southern Africa Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (ibid) also reflects that official statistics show a significant growth in cross-border movement in both directions. Meanwhile, Solomon (1996:1) estimates the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa to be between two to eight million.

With reference to these strategies of the migrants stated in the previous paragraph, a new impression has been created that the distinction between Regular and Irregular migration is no longer a reliable definition of migration categories, hence the way to deal with it is difficult. UN (1989) equally argues that there are only three types of strategies left for dealing with illegal migrants, namely: to prevent their entry, deport them or regularise their status. As all these strategies are used by the receiving countries, it is not that easy, particularly in the SADC Region. For example, where the illegal migrants from the Cunene province in Angola cross over into Ohangwena Region in Namibia the border fence is characterised as so porous that a person can pass through everywhere, as explained in the case study (Chapter 6). Therefore, it is awkward to make a clear-cut distinction between regular and irregular migrants.

Similarly, Faist suggests two reasons to abandon this distinction namely that first, “we must stop thinking of migration as a problem and second that we must realise that any

hope to control migration and thereby uphold the distinction between regular and irregular migration, is bound to fail,” (Faist n.d).

For the second strategy of deporting illegal migrants, especially Angolans from Namibia, as Mushelenga (2005) argues would lead to a waste of resources in terms of money, since the same person can be deported many times a year. In that case, it is the Namibian government, which carries the responsibility for the deportation cost of migrants. However, it also transpires that irregular or illegal migration dominates in the category of non-professional migrants. The issue of brain drain, which is inclusive of highly skilled migrants, also receives special attention in current literature.

4.2.3.3 The Brain Drain

The recent history of the world employment arena has encompassed another notable concept namely that of “brain drain”. “This issue is a recurrent theme in the Southern African media with much heat, very little light and a great deal of scaremongering,” (Crush n.d). Although this is the case, the situation of brain drain from developing countries to developed countries is serious. Oduba (ibid) confirms that “every year about one third of research and development experts in developing countries migrate to the industrialised countries. About 80% of Indian computer programmers migrate to the USA, depriving the Indian economy of about US\$2 billion a year in innovations,” (Oduba n.d: 2). The UN (1989:18) argues that “the use of the expression “brain drain”

was deplored because “drain” had pejorative undertones and “brain” seemed to imply that only the emigration of professionals was of importance.”

However, the international principle of migration upon which migration policies should be moulded stipulates that each country has the sovereign right to decide on who should enter the country and individuals have the right to emigrate. In addition, the receiving country retains the authority to impose restrictions on who might enter the territory and the right to select people of the required calibre that will benefit the nation. The sending countries on the other hand have also to apply certain measures to prevent emigration of professionals to other countries, for example by introducing a visa tax targeting professionals.

A comprehensive question on professionals’ migratory system still hangs in the balance, meaning that it is not clear, which are the sending and which the receiving countries. Oduba (2003) observes that brain drain is not uniquely an African affair, but is universal. The United Nations (1989) observes that currently, the flow of personnel occurs not only from developing to developed countries, but can also occur between developing countries and from developed to developing countries or between developed countries. For example, Stafford (2003) acknowledges that “some in Germany’s community appear to be stifling yawns as EU officials continue their loud warnings that scientific “brain drain” is on the rise and a threat to Europe’s knowledge economy”.

Stafford (ibid) continues that “about 75% of EU citizens who obtained doctorates in the United States from 1991 to 2000 had no specific plans to return to the EU.” Padarath et al (2003:1) summarise in their research findings that brain drain, for example, for health personnel takes place as follows:

- An exodus of healthcare workers is occurring from areas of poverty and low socio-economic development to more highly developed areas
- Flows follow a hierarchy of wealth and result in a global conveyor belt of health personnel moving from the bottom to the top, increasing inequality
- Flows and migration are occurring from rural to urban areas, from public to private sectors, from lower to higher income countries within Southern Africa and from African countries to industrial countries.

Supporting this notion, Crush (n.d) suggests another issue that affects the impact of the brain drain namely the permanence of health professional emigration. Crush gives the practical example of many South African trained doctors who initially came to Saskatchewan, Canada, to do locums and while there, they began the migration process in or order to stay.

Oduba (2003) concurs, taking Kenya as example, where a large number of Kenyan academics, doctors, nurses and engineers consistently leave for the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Oduba (2003:2) indicates that “It is estimated that, over 400 Kenyan doctors are practicing in Southern Africa. The Kenyans have simply replaced a small portion of the 3 500 South African top medics lured to Australia, Canada, Britain and New Zealand by

better pay and working conditions.” Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi also experience the problem of the exodus of medical doctors to developed countries.

The Herald (2005) quoting Zimbabwe’s Health and Child Welfare Minister Dr David Parirenyatwa claims that it is disheartening to note that billions of dollars in taxpayers’ money continues to be used to train human resources for other countries. Dr David Parirenyatwa warns that there are two very rich countries in the West that need at least five million nurses within the coming years and they do not have those nurses in their own countries, hence it is assumed that opportunity will pull medically experienced staff from the developing countries.

The Herald (ibid) further states that a few years ago Zambia had 1600 doctors and now only 400 are left, in one of the worst examples of regional brain drain. These are some of the important scenarios depicting brain drain in the world, which have hit national economies. Africa is the hardest hit. For example, Cox (2004) notes that brain drain has affected Africa for the past four decades and the challenge for all governments in the continent is to balance the factors, which create the retention and flow of skills into the economy.

Cox has further suggested that regional organisations such as the SADC and ECOWAS and even the African Union itself should ease visa restrictions and adopt the European Union model for migration for skilled personnel. This, according to Cox would enable

the African professionals to work on the continent and for the enterprises to develop pan-African management training schemes. This positive thought is not a new aspect to migration policies and perspectives of the SADC managing circles. Hence, it convincingly tallies with the contents of the Free Movement Protocol, which was vehemently counteracted by some states in the Region. With these remarks, it becomes clear that not only professionals migrate, but also people who migrate for refuge in other countries and become refugees when the political and economic situation becomes tense in their mother countries.

4.2.3.4. Refugees

The SADC Region has a long history of refugees owing to armed conflicts and wars of liberation. Therefore, Oucho (2005) is of the opinion that all Southern African countries, other than Botswana and Zambia, have produced refugees at one time or another. However, this study counters this argument by pointing out that Mauritius and Madagascar have no obvious record of sending refugees.

Although Zambia has always been credited for hosting refugees from many African countries, Namibia and South Africa have also become refugee destinations since 1990 and 1994 respectively. Another wave of refugees in the SADC Region was experienced after the secessionist attack in Caprivi Region in Namibia, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and the escalating war in the DRC.

Still, some writers and political analysts continue to struggle with the concept “refugee.” One prominent and paradoxical question embedded in the complexity of refugee status would be: who is a refugee? In exploring the answer to this question, Clover (2002) argues that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as:

“a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion is outside of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”,²⁶ (Clover 2002:1)

This means that a refugee can be any person who cannot feel protected by his or her own government. In this sense, the UN (1989:19) emphasises that the definition of “refugee” stipulated in the United Nations instruments was found to be adequate. Therefore, any attempt to enlarge its scope in order to include migrants who have been loosely characterised as economic refugees should be discouraged. In the light of this, Solomon (2003:7) suggests that according to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees definition of refugees, 13 600 000 of the world’s migrants may be classified as refugees.

However, it does not suffice to define this concept based on the single variable of protection only, which is too broad and somewhat vague. Not all refugees leave their nation because of inadequate protection or direct threat of persecution. Hence, refugees have many reasons to offer as pretexts to emigrate, for example economic refugees as will be discussed later in this subsection. Contemporary scholars criticise this definition

²⁶ For the technical definition of the concept of “refugees” see the section on Definition of Major Terms.

as being too restrictive. The UN Convention was originally intended to regulate the European refugee problem after the Second World War, hence it is no longer applicable in light of the outbreak of economic and environmental refugees who currently make up the bulk of the numbers (Solomon 2003 and the Centre for Socio-political Analysis 1995).

Persecution as a benchmark to determine refugee status cannot be accepted in various ways including the fact that it revolves between the state and the individual. Other factors sending out people as refugees such as generalised conditions of violence and oppression are largely excluded. Redelinghuys (n.d) identifies some of these factors by indicating that currently, large numbers of people across the globe are identified as environmental refugees who constitute a diverse group of people compelled to abandon their homelands because of conditions such as drought, floods, deforestation, desertification and depletion of natural resources such as water, industrial pollution and development perspective.

Redelinghuys (n.d) puts the number of environmental refugees in the region of 25 million people worldwide with the majority of these found in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is one group of refugees seemingly left out in the categorisation of refugees contained in the 1951 UN Convention. Redelinghuys (n.d) further argues that, “in spite of the seriousness of environmental refugees, these people are totally disregarded in terms of policy decisions, both at an international level and by individual countries.

Currently, only people fleeing from adverse political conditions are recognised as legitimate refugees.” Solomon (2003) also identifies another important exclusion in regards of the Convention by stating that:

“It also excludes the inhabitants of states where violence is externally induced. South Africa’s destabilisation of the Front Line States (FLS) throughout much of the 1980s, as a result of its support of proxy groups such as the Resistencia Naçionale Moçambicana (National Resistance Movement of Mozambique - Renamo); the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita); the Lesotho Liberation Army, and the Mashal Gang in Zambia,” (Ray 1987 as quoted in Solomon 2003).

Hence, Article 1 (2) of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa as quoted by Valji, De la Hunt and Moffett (203:61) broadens the UN definition of a refugee as follows:

“The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”.

With this in mind, we may conclude that definitions of a “refugee” contain a substance of externally induced unrest that could cause unclassified migrations. For example, UNITA forces and civilians were brought to Namibia by the South African Army to help them combat SWAPO and the perceived communist regime in Angola. Now the question is: how were these people classified in terms of the 1951 UN Convention? Unrest of this nature also causes internal displacement of people or moves them out to take refuge in other countries as refugees; their category has not been clearly articulated in the Convention. This constitutes another research gap.

In addition, Gutto (2001) argues that in Africa at the legal and normative level, the continent has responded positively to the situation of refugees produced by conditions of wars of national liberation and instabilities in the newly independent countries, by adopting the OAU Refugee Convention, which among other things, expanded the grounds for qualification as a refugee beyond the narrow definition contained in the 1951 UN Convention and the 1966 Protocol.

However, with the passing of time and inevitable changes that take place, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has also conceded that problems of refugees cannot be approached from one side since the successful settlement of refugees usually demands more than mere relief or even the attainment of self-sufficiency. Therefore, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has been prepared to act as a catalyst to promote the involvement of diverse agencies concerned directly with development projects (UN 1989).

These arguments relieved general illusions embedded in the overall discourse on being a refugee in the sense of the misuse of the concept “refugee”. To some degree people who have been displaced from their regions within their own countries are also called refugees or internal refugees.

Contrasting this view, Clover (2002) argues that these people are not fully qualified to fall in the category of refugees but should rather be classified as internally displaced

persons. Clover (2002) emphasises the definition given in the Guiding Principles on International Displacement, drawn up by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998 that states that:

“Internally displaced persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disaster, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border,” Clover (2002:1).

This has brought this argument to a halt, although diverse discourses regarding refugee status still stand in the balance. This section has discussed important dynamics and typologies of migration at the international level, hence, the subsequent section will juxtapose the historical background of cross-border mobility within the SADC Region.

4.3 The History of Migration in the SADC Region

The cluster of Southern African countries engaged in the Regional Integration Project has migration as an outstanding and controversial issue. This cluster of countries is, as in Africa in general, interwoven in a web of interlinked family, cultural, ethnic and tribal groups of Africans. As African Guide (2005) argues, much of the African cultural activity centres on the family and ethnic group. Their art, music and oral literature serve to reinforce existing social patterns. These people cling to their traditions and cultures.

Among these traditions and cultures are African social structures including the maintenance of the extended family or clan networks, mutual support and philanthropy.

Marrying this phenomenon to the concept of the artificial border (as briefly discussed in Chapter 1) demarcated by the colonial power, has always been an issue; hence, it also becomes difficult to control cross-border migration and population movement among member states. For example, Hargreaves (1985) as quoted by Singh (1999) argues that the borders resulting from the colonial legacy in many developing countries, especially in Africa, have split indigenous groups as well as ecosystems.

In addition, colonists using geographic features rather than traditional patterns of human and wildlife movements fixed many borders arbitrarily. Prah (1997) quotes one of the important studies undertaken to examine this question namely Asiwaju's *Partitioning Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries 1884-1984*, which entails that:

“In these specifically divided African culture areas, the boundaries have been drawn across well-established lines of communication including, in every case, a dormant or active sense of community based on traditions concerning common ancestry, usually very strong kinship ties, shared socio-political institutions and economic resources, common customs and practices and sometimes acceptance for a common political control”, (Asiwaju, 1985:324 as quoted by Prah 1997:n.p).

Prah (ibid) also gives an interesting example in this respect, of the results of the demarcation of the borders of Ghana-Togo at Flao, where the traditional Chief of Flao

has subjects and kinsmen immediately across the border in Togo. The circumstances require him crossing the border regularly, but under the existing conditions, he requires a passport to do this.

The result of artificial borders was always confusion among the divided community and cross border migration also developed as an issue. In other words, this, as Prah (ibid) explains, has profound implications for the creation of identities, which are essentially restricted to the states captured between specific borders.

This implication typically transpires in the cross-border mobility of persons and goods and influences other developments such as issues of regional integration and globalisation. Therefore, it proves true that one of the major problems challenging the SADC Regional Integration Project, which deserves not to be condoned in this dissertation, is cross-border migration and population movement. One imperative to note in this regard is that, migration and population movement are integral parts of the history of SADC. Thus we may argue that the historical background of people's mobility in the SADC Region is a phenomenon of a time long past.

Movements of people are sometimes recorded differently in much of the historiography of the region. Before the labour migration it is evident that people in the region were nomadic, moving from place to place owing to wars or other natural conditions. History also tells us that most of the Bantu-speaking people migrated south from the area of the

Great Lakes (Central Africa) to settle in Southern Africa. These people constitute a big chunk of SADC citizens today.

In addition, it is true that the “black tide” of migration from the south also swamped South Africa’s northern neighbouring countries in the past. For example, by around 1826, the Nguni group from South Africa under King Ndwandwe Zwangendaba moved through Mozambique and modern Zimbabwe, crossed the Zambezi River to modern Malawi and eventually settled in modern Tanzania (Omer-Cooper 1994). Records refer to this move as the migration to the north. Houghton Mifflin Company (2005:1) indicates that this Nguni group from South Africa entered Eastern Zambia in 1835. At about the same time the Kololo penetrated Western Zambia from the south and subjugated the Lozi kingdom of Barotseland.


Solomon (1996) echoed the same argument based on socio-cultural factors that have historically served as an influential “pull” factor owing to the legacy of history.

Solomon explains that:

“The early nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a militarist Zulu kingdom under Shaka. This was accompanied by a period of tremendous upheaval known by the Sotho word *Lifaqane*, which conveys the notion of forced removal. Thus the rise of Shaka’s kingdom saw other tribes fleeing from the militarist regional hegemon: Xhosa, Rolong, Pedi, Kora, Ndembele, Tlokwa, Hlubi, Mpondo, Swazi, Ngoni, Griqua, Sotho and Tswana were part of these great population movements. These centrifugal pressures were further strengthened by the ‘Great Trek’ when thousands of Boer (Afrikaner) families decided from the 1830s to leave their British colonial masters in the Cape Colony and trek into the interior to establish their own Afrikaner homeland,” (Solomon 1996:3)

This evidence confirms that people have been migrating in the region for more than a century, and the remnants of this trend exist to date in the SADC Region. The difference between the old and the new trend is only that migration is now legalised and hence subject to cross-border control systems. Map 4.1 below, though not depicting all migration routes in the region emphasises some of the major people's movements north-south-south-north attributed to various situational conditions at certain times.

Map 4.1: South-north migration in Southern Africa 1800 -1840



Source: Denoon, et al (1972:49).

Map 4.1 above depicts an historic migration process from the Cape c. 800-c. 1800 when Trekboers moved east from the Cape peninsula; Nama, Griqua and Kora moved north

from the Cape Colony; and Trekkers moved north from the Eastern Cape (Denoon et al 1972:49). This picture explicitly presents the legacy of the ethnic Diaspora for present Southern Africa.

As is the case regarding the number of Kwanyama in Namibia as opposed to the number in Angola, the number of Nyembas in Namibia as opposed to those in Angola, Tswana in Namibia as opposed to those in Botswana, so also as Solomon (1996) further puts it, the number of Swazis inside South Africa as opposed to in Swaziland, the number of Tswanas inside South Africa as opposed to in Botswana and the number of Basothos inside South Africa as opposed to in Lesotho. This dissertation looks at this argument from the point of community ties and the historical network of clan, lineage or tribe that took precedence over the ties of citizenship, which resulted from the creation of states in Africa and yet poses problems regarding the current control of migrations in the region.

Another example is the large concentration of Angolans in the northern regions of Namibia, which is due to tribal links. Particularly, the Oshiwambo speaking people from Angola share the same Oshiwambo culture with the Oshiwambo speaking people in Namibia, hence they regard it as one nation (see Chapter 6). The same applies to the large concentration of Mozambicans in the former homeland of Gazankulu due to cultural similarities across the Mozambique/South African border.

Apart from that, Williams (2002:2) also observes that migration, particularly for work within the SADC Region was prevalent long before 1880 and can be traced back at least 150 years. This implies that even labour migration had started long before the demarcation of current boundaries. The prevalent phenomenon was that the Southern African polities were sending all types of migrants for work and other purposes. After the region was demarcated into countries, this phenomenon changed into hitherto “cross border migration” that may include “cross-border population movement”.

In their research, McDonald et al (1999:13) state that Southern Africa has a long history of cross-border migration. About 45% of respondents indicated to have visited South Africa once, 30% have at least one parent who worked in South Africa and 25% claim to have at least one grandparent who worked in that country. However, it might be biased if we pinpoint South Africa to be the only victim of the wave of migration in the Southern African Region.

It is quite interesting to take cognisance of Adepoju (1991) as quoted Ricca (1989) who observed that Africa as a whole is described as a continent perpetually on the move... migrants within the region include farmers, pastoralists, nomads, and refugees of mixed characteristics, labourers and traders. Suffice it to say, migration to the north and south repeats itself in one of the above-mentioned forms in the sub-region. Apartheid conditions, for instance in Namibia and South Africa scattered people to migrate up north as refugees only to return home as returnees after many years.

In this respect, Rutinwa (2002) notes that in modern times migration may be traced to the early 1960s when wars of liberation in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe forced thousands of people from these countries to migrate into neighbouring countries and beyond. Forcible population displacement is known to have taken place in the Southern African Region even during the pre-colonial and colonial times (Rutinwa 2002).

McDonald et al (1998) as quoted by Crush (2000:12) also argue that central to the panic over immigration which has gripped South Africa since 1994 is the notion that the country is being swamped by a “black tide” from the north. Crush seems to be missing the fact that migration in Southern Africa or Africa in general is a reciprocal phenomenon. For example, as stated above one remarkable migration trend was experienced during the 1960s and 1970s liberation struggle across Southern Africa.

The people fled colonialism in Angola, Mozambique and the apartheid system in both Namibia and South Africa for refuge in Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, hence this dissertation terms this northward mobility a south-north migration and return. For example, before Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 and Namibia’s in 1990 as well as the introduction of majority rule in South Africa in 1994, Botswana hosted approximately 5000 refugees from these countries while Zambia hosted between 102 000 and 149 000 (Oucho, et al 2000). This was a migration trend to the North, which reinvented itself into migration to the South when peace was achieved in these countries.

Swai (2000:12) hails the most successful voluntary repatriation operations in the region in the early 1990s, that included the return to their homes of 48 000 Namibian refugees, 1.6 million Mozambicans and 15 000 South Africans from other African countries.

When civil war broke out in Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s and 1980s another dynamic of population displacement occurred. Theart (2001) supports this scenario that since the 1960s when the war broke out between the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), most of the Nyemba in Cuando Cubango province in Angola fled the area to take refuge in Kavango in Namibia.

Theart (2001) further states that although the then colonial government in Namibia officially closed the border between Namibia and Angola during 1976, its attempts never prevented these people to move freely between the two countries. What had happened was that the Angolan Nyemba who by that time lived across the Kavango River²⁷ moved to Namibia during periods of tension and fighting in Angola and returned to Angola during periods of peace and stability while some travelled to Botswana and Zambia as refugees.

During the 1990s the Region continued to experience migration problems, but this time as a result of the host of refugees from within and outside the Region (Rutinwa 2002).

²⁷ This river demarcates Namibia's north-eastern border with Angola.

Currently, sporadic civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the second last country to join the Southern African Development Community followed by Madagascar, has raised a concern of massive migration in the Region.

The UNHCR (2003) as quoted by Levitt and Wagner (2003:n.p) confirms that the number of refugees who fled the Congo was estimated at over 415 000 at the end of 2002. ” ...the Congolese are said to be the largest refugee population in South Africa and an estimated 26 000 of them are concentrated in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban and Port Elizabeth.” Notwithstanding, this provides contemporary evidence of constant north-south and south-north human mobility in the sub-region.

Despite this long history of all-purpose migration in the Region discussed in this section, labour migration was regarded as the dominant phenomenon in the migration history of the SADC Region. Thus the next section discusses theoretical issues regarding the history of labour migration in the region.

4.3.1 Labour Migration in the SADC Region

The history of migration in Southern Africa postulates labour destined for South Africa as one of the major stimuli of migration to the South. People had a myth that South Africa was an island of treasure. Therefore, everyone wanted to migrate to South Africa

to work and become rich. The same myth also exists in contemporary generations about the SADC Region or other African countries.

Given this situation, cross-border migration to South Africa from the sister SADC countries, is not a phenomenon of the recent past. History, as mentioned earlier, reflects that cross-border migration and related issues in Southern Africa evolved concurrently with the demarcation of countries' borders and contract mining migration. Therefore, one of the oldest reasons for cross-border migration within the SADC Region was for employment purposes.

However, this cross-border migration was characterised in a spectrum comprised of two major continuums evident in the highly formalised and regulated contract labour system of the South African mines and a host of various kinds of informal, unregulated or clandestine movements across borders. Rich in mineral wealth such as gold, South Africa at one point ran out of labour. SADC Today (1999:1) confirms that trends in labour migration in the SADC still mainly remain towards South Africa and it is likely that this migration pattern, which dates back to the 19th century, will continue to grow in the new millennium despite official attempts to regulate it. One new dimension added to the existing situation is the inclusion of professionals and skilled workers.

SADC Today (1999:1) quotes the report on labour migration to South Africa in the 1990s, published by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and notes that without

this inflow of cheap migrant labourers from other Southern African countries over a sustained period, South Africa's key gold mining and white farming industries would probably not have been developed at all. Williams (2002) shares the same view, implying that without migrant work forces from throughout the Southern African Region, the world's largest supplier of gold would not have become a regional economic superpower.

The success of the South African mines is thus attributed to the contribution of the combined labour force from all over the Southern African Region, coming from Botswana, Rhodesia, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi. In brief, Crush et al (2002) points out that:

“Since the late 19th century, hundreds of thousands of young black migrants have crossed into South Africa from other countries of Southern Africa to work on this country's mines and farms. Most were recruited through a wide-reaching network of rural offices whose influence reached deep into Angola on the west coast and Tanzania on the east,” (Crush et al 2002:1).


Quite amazingly, migrant workers from Mozambique, Malawi and Lesotho came on foot to work on the Kimberly diamond mines in South Africa. As indicated above, migration in the Southern African Region operated south-north and north-south. Crush (n.d) indicates that crisscrossing labour migration increased following the development of major employment centres like the Zambian Copperbelt, the Zimbabwean coal and gold mines, commercial farms in Malawi, Mozambique Swaziland and South Africa.

Workers had, for example, been hired from South Africa to work in Zambia and from Zambia to work in South Africa.

The South African government and its British and Portuguese counterparts in the Region forged agreements to create a joint regional labour market for mines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to provide access to migrant workers from all countries that now comprise the SADC (Crush n.d). This trend also led to regional catchments throughout the Region and legal and illegal cross-border migration was consistently on the increase.

One reason that stimulated illegal migration was, as Crush & Tshitereke (2001) explain, the fact that historically the mines in South Africa have enjoyed privileged access to foreign labour and this right was not available to most other employers. This eventually led to the latter making use of undocumented or illegal foreign labour, a trend that seems to be still functional in South Africa. In contrast, a series of overlapping migration streams also developed in the process. Map 4.2 below clearly depicts the abovementioned phenomenon of labour catchments in the Southern African region during the last century.

Map 4. 2: Labour catchment areas in Southern Africa



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Source: *Denoon et al (1972:170)*

Map 4.2 above portrays trends and labour catchments in Southern Africa providing workers for South African mines during the 19th and 20th centuries. Wentzel and Tlabela (2006:71) argue that during the period 1920-1990, virtually every country in the current SADC Region at one time or another sent migrants to work on the Southern African mines. In this light, Crush (1997a) as quoted by Wentzel and Tlabela (*ibid*) classifies these labour supplying countries as follows:

- Long-standing supply countries: Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
- Episodic supply countries: Malawi and Zimbabwe
- Occasional supply countries: Zambia, Tanzania and Angola

²⁸ “Ambo” in the map is a synonym for “Aawambo”, “Owambo” or “Ovambo” – meaning the Oshiwambo speaking ethnic group in northern Namibia and southern Angola (see Chapter 6 for the case study).

Denoon et al (1972:168) assert that in 1943, for example, there was a total work force of 360 000 men in the mines operated by the Chamber of Mines in South Africa. They further explain that “of this total workforce, half – 180 000 - were recruited within the Union (and two thirds of those came from the Cape, whose eastern districts were grossly overpopulated); 45 000 from Basutoland, 10 000 from Bechuanaland, 8 000 from Swaziland, 87 000 from Portuguese East Africa and 30 000 from the Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”

Dierks (2004) has also pointed out another agreement, which the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) concluded with SWANLA to recruit Namibian workers for South African mines. This agreement decentralised recruitment centres so that recruitment could be done at places such as Ondangwa, Namutoni, Rundu, Mohembo and Shakawe (the latter in present-day Botswana).

The Ovambo contract labourers had to travel on their own from Ovamboland to Rundu and then via Mohembo and Shakawe to South Africa or with WNLA-organised transport via Grootfontein and Mohembo to Francistown in Botswana and from there by train to the Transvaal (Dierks 2004). The agreement reached on 7/7/49 at the Windhoek Conference for the Amendment of Agreement of 13/9/44 as modified at the Pretoria Conference on 24/9/45 (1) provides that:

“SWANLA will provisionally engage, on behalf of and as requested by WENELA, Angola Natives offering at its station at Ondangua and will present them to WENLA medical officer at Grootfontein for medical examination... (3) Natives who pass the WENELA medical examinations at Grootfontein will be dispatched by SWANELA (acting as WENELA’s agent from Grootfontein in WENELA lorries running between Grootfontein and Bechuanaland”, (Namibia Similar National Archives 2004).

Netwitt (1995) highlights a similar agreement of 1901 between Portugal and the South African government, which was known as a *Modus Vivendi*²⁹. This accord granted a recruiting monopoly in southern Mozambique to WNLA³⁰ by the Chamber of Mines to control labour costs. This was to be achieved through the procedure that all labour would be recruited at a standard rate and according to a standard contract and WNLA’s recruiting monopoly made this an achievable aim.

Newitt (1995:492) also explains that under the terms of this *Modus Vivendi* 154 047 Mozambicans were officially recruited for the mines between 1903 and 1906 and they constituted 60 percent or more of the total labour force in the South African mines. The favoured destination of most migrant labourers to South Africa was the Rand. Labourers from more distant countries such as Angola and Nyasaland had to move south by stages. For example, Newitt (1995) indicates that Nyasalanders had first to stop in


²⁹ This refers to an agreement entered into between Mozambique and South Africa to safeguard labour supply from the former to the latter.

³⁰ WNLA also refers to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association as abbreviated by Newitt (1995:492) in the *Modus Vivendi* between the Boers and Portuguese in Mozambique regarding labour recruitment. WENELA is the abbreviation used in the 1949 Agreement of the same nature between South Africa and the Portuguese in Angola. All these abbreviations refer to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association.

Mozambique for employment so that they could make enough money to enable them to reach WNLA recruiting centres.

It was also the case as reflected in the agreement quoted above that, migrant labourers from Angola had to stop over in Namibia where some administrative work had to be done before they were transported through Botswana to South Africa. Map 4.3 below further shows WNLA stations throughout the Southern Africa before 1970 and the major routes for migrant workers to South African gold mines.

Map 4.3: WNLA stations and the major routes to the South African gold mines, pre-1970.



Source: Crush (1995:173)

Map 4.3 above indicates how WNLA and the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) recruited most young black migrants through a far-flung network of rural offices whose influence reached as deep as into Angola as the west coast and into Tanzania on the east coast (Crush 1995:172). In addition, Crush (ibid) accentuates that these agencies

operated a transport system of ferries, trucks, trains and latterly planes to take the migrant workers to the south. Their movements, particularly those of miners were strictly controlled by forcing them to live in regimented, austere, single-sex barracks also called compounds or hostels where they were joined by black migrant workers recruited in the same way from within South Africa itself (Crush 1995).

This shows that recruitment for labour to South Africa was the predominant stimulus of cross-border migration in the Region, which for good reasons lingers to date and which the current integration regime struggles to address. In this light, the next subsection extends this discussion on stimuli with regard to labour migration in the Southern African Region.

4.3.2 Stimuli for labour migration

In the light of the theory of development in a dual economy (see Chapter 2) which entails that the modern sector draws the labour force from the traditional sector, where the marginal effectiveness equals zero, circulation of workers between traditional rural areas or less developed small countries and commercial and industrialised areas or countries became a world phenomenon, especially during the last two centuries. It must not be taken as an African or SADC event, though. This dissertation takes this phenomenon from the perspective of the SADC Region where seemingly it appeared

that most able-bodied adult men had been at some point in time absent from their homes for work as migrant labourers in modern sectors.

The desire to leave rural homes for urban areas or other countries was due to social developments associated with Western civilisation, which introduced fascinating modern materials to traditional societies in rural areas in Africa. However, Zegeye (1989) argues that in remote areas where villages were little affected by the Western cash economy the number of men who went away for work was small. Those Africans with regular contact with whites or returning migrant friends and relatives started hypothesising that all good things were obtained from modern areas in exchange for labour. Let us now leave this aspect for later discussion and revert to the stimuli of labour migration in the SADC Region.

Zegeye (1989) refers to Schapera's study in Bechuanaland Protectorate that identifies factors that have to be considered including adventurousness, escape from the dull and lonely life of cattle posts and migration, particularly for labour which was also regarded as initiation into manhood. This implies that labour migration in Southern Africa at that time replaced traditional initiation as a mark of maturity.

In many SADC countries, a man was regarded as a man after proving that he had successfully worked in the mines in South Africa and had brought home money and other modern items. Zegeye (1989) adds that girls among the African communities

preferred men who had risked town life and had shown that they were willing to work for the support of a family. All these emphasise economic reasons. Zegeye acknowledges the economic factors as predominant to labour migration, and further points out that, motivations behind labour migration stand at the following three levels:

- (a) *Through the normative system of the society.* Schapera and Gulliver both state that labour migration has become a habit and Schapera, Southall and the Lacey Commission all say that migration is considered almost *a rite de passage*, marking the attainment of adulthood. The implication of this is that migration has become, in some societies, the expected type of behaviour for young men. The motivation for the migration is incorporated, therefore, in the normative social controls of that society.
- (b) *Through the economic system.* All writers on the movement of peoples have emphasised its economic basis. Winter's material on first sight seemed to refute the universality of the economic basis to migration but on further analysis, this does not seem to be upheld.
- (c) *Through the personality of the individuals.* Numerous different personal reasons may be adduced from the statements of informants – to escape quarrels, to escape witchcraft, to avoid arduous duties, etc (Zegeye (1989:40))

In all these arguments, it stands to reason that the most important factor to investigate is the relationship between 'personal' and 'economic' variables involved in the whole tendency of labour migration. Suffice it to say, if economic drives to labour migration are not there it is unlikely that it will happen; however, if the economic conditions are present, meaning that people are relatively well off, the likelihood is not that high for actual labour migration to occur.

Although the economic reason is not the only stimulus to labour migration, it is widely believed to be the dominant causality in all societies. More about the stimuli of

Namibian men who left their home villages as migrant labour to the mines will be covered in Chapter 6. However, given these stimuli of migration, we should still argue that this discussion is gender-biased because the female migration phenomenon and its stimuli have been omitted.

4.4. Gender and migration

The rationale of including debates on gender and migration in this dissertation is to highlight the current reality that the world migration background has undergone sweeping changes in the past years. The dissertation also probes the enduring impacts of globalisation and regionalisation, which brought significant consequences for socio-economic phenomenon of migration from gender perspectives. These consequences of migration have severe and exclusive impacts on female migrants, for example, they are prone to robbery, rape, harassments, and sex slavery, to mention but some.

Moreover, migration in history was a male phenomenon and independent female migration was generally frowned upon on the basis of cultures and traditions. In Africa as Adepoju (2006) points out, men traditionally migrate leaving behind wives and children in the care of extended family. As the influence of the Western cash-for-work system increased worldwide, the number of female migrants also increased in proportion with that of their male counterparts. It is against that background that the following

section juxtaposes the phenomena of gendered migration in the world and the SADC Region.

4.4.1 Gender and migration in the SADC Region

There is a convincing array of specific issues relevant to migration from a gender perspective that can be applied to Southern Africa, and which is articulated at the end of this chapter. Of special importance is a lack or absence of regional and national gender instruments such as policies and protocols specifically geared toward gender and migration in the SADC Region or lack of political will to implement international instruments such as the Beijing Gender Plan of Action.

In this section, the focus is on: who migrates in Southern Africa, how women are affected by migration, what category of women is on the move i.e. white, black or women of colour, to what extent does the SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons reflect on gender issues and finally, the importance of gender and migration in the process of regional integration. Before focussing on gender issues related to the Southern African context, it is imperative to first consider issues of gender and migration at the international level.

4.4.2 Gender and Migration in the Global Context

As stated in chapter 2, the global migration context is composed of sending and receiving countries, which constitute one international migration system. The variables taken into account in international systems analysis when accounting for the movement of people from place A to place B within a single system are, as Solomon (2003) amongst others states, demographic disparities, economic inequalities, geography, similarities in language and culture, trade flows, colonial heritage, political alliances and/or hostilities, and the social context.

This whole range of variables omits gender as an outstanding variable in the analysis of migration issues at the global, regional and national level. Supporting this point, Pettman (1996) admits that until recently flows of people were tracked as numbers and not according to gender. “The migrant/labour migrant was seen as a male, with or without dependents” (Pettman 1996:67). The traditional male-dominated research within a number of different disciplines disregarded women as a category and failed to pay attention to possible differences between the sexes; see for example, Acker and Van Houten (1974) in Alvesson and Billing (1997:24).

Most classical literature confines migration to the male decision-making domain and female partners have therefore, been referred to as “tied migrants”. The United Nations states that women often migrate officially as dependent family members of other

migrants or to marry someone in another country (United Nations Secretariat *ibid*). Similarly, the International Organisation for Migration IOM (n.d) points out that until the 1980s, most migration studies focused on economics and since male migrants were seen as the main economic players, women were often seen as passive followers.

Vertovec and Cohen (1999:1) also argue that many studies of migration either dealt with women only as part of those ‘left behind’ or studied them only as dependent migrants. In this vein, Hango-Rummukainen (2000:75) mentions that researchers of the past decades refer to women as wives of the migrants. Boyd (2003) supports this view, reflecting that over the last 25 years there has been little concerted effort to incorporate gender into theories of international migration.

In his neo-classical theory, Todaro also perceives migration as a product of economic decision-making whereby the migrant makes a decision to improve his economic life in countries where favourable employment conditions are available. This theory uses “his”, thus implying that only men migrate for economic reasons and from its normative perspectives women follow their male partners regardless of any push or pull factors.

In addition, although gender is crosscutting, most of the current literature on migration, as alluded to earlier, pays little attention to gender issues. Vertovec and Cohen remark that feminists in the 1960s declared that “women were hidden from history”. This observation has largely been valid in migration studies, (Vertovec and Cohen 1999:1).

This, as Boyd (*ibid*) further argues would pose some difficulty in understanding gender in the migration context.

It is therefore vital to make use of a “gender-as-a-variable perspective” to investigate in what respects, under which circumstances and to what extent men and women differ in terms of subjective orientations based on psychologies, ethics, values and attitudes and how social structures and processes differently affect them (Alvesson and Billing 1997).

At the national level, many governments in the world also take the situation of women migrants for granted. For, example, according to Crush and Williams (2001) under the 1991 Aliens Control Act of South Africa, the foreign wife of a male South African citizen qualified for immigration, while no such rights attached to the foreign husband of a female South African citizen. In some countries, alias “state masculinists”³¹, if a woman entered as a spouse of an employed male or “mail-order bride”³², she might be bound to an unhappy, even violent marriage by immigration laws, which rendered her right to reside dependent upon her husband (Potts 1990, as quoted by Phizacklea 1996:166).

Phizacklea (1996:67) further explains that if a woman in the aforementioned situation divorces her husband she is liable to deportation. Hence, Pettman (1996) emphasises that “when women do join their men, their opportunities and post-settlement experiences are

³¹ States or governments that support and adopt male-centred policies.

³² See Chapter 1, “The definition of major terms” for definition of this concept.

often affected by the receiving governments' presumption that they are dependents rather than workers".

Drawing upon these remarks, this dissertation notes that women migrants are vulnerable to human rights abuses such as trafficking, rape and sex work. However, recent literature has both contested and ratified this perception by recognising the current importance of women migrants in the world. Zlotnik (1990) as quoted by Pettman (1996:68) explains that, "approximately half of all people officially outside their country of birth over the last two decades (i.e. up to 1990) are women".

Zlotnik (ibid) also emphasises that women not only move as dependents of men, but some of them may flee from husbands, families or communities that become violent. In this light, the United Nations Secretariat in UN/POP/MIG/2004/16 (ibid) states that as of 2000, 49 percent of all international migrants were women or girls and the proportion of women among international migrants had reached 51 percent in more developed regions. Similarly, Moreno-Fontes (2002:1) remarks that the proportion of women who are involved in global migration flows is increasing rapidly and the number of migrant women worldwide represents half of the migrant population and in some countries even account for 70% or 80% of the total.

For Boyd (2003), in the 1960s and early 1970s the phrase "migrants and their families" was a code for "male migrants and their wives and children." It may sound incorrect to

confine this trend to the 1960s and 1970s respectively, since it still reflects in current practices. For instance, in 1990 the United Nations declared December 18 to be the international migrant's day following the adoption on that day of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. One would argue that there are some reasons to understand that the "migrant workers" referred to in this Convention, are men, while "members of their families" are women and children. This has brought this study to the brink of probing gender and labour migration at all global levels.

4.4.3 Gender and Labour Migration at the International Level

A sweeping change in the international socio-economic and political arena has resulted in globalisation of every sphere of life including long-distance labour migration worldwide. Long-distance migration, which was previously regarded as a male peculiarity, has recently been feminised. The Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD) (2004:2) states that today, there are over 86 million migrant workers worldwide, about half of which are women.

However, Kawar (n.d) argues that despite the difficulties and constraints, which migrant women experience, migration also gives them opportunities and financial independence. Currently, female migrant workers are major contributors to the economies of their home countries through remittances. For example, according to Kawar (n.d: 73), in Sri

Lanka in 1999, 62% of migrant workers were women and accounted for more than 50% of the trade balance, while in the Philippines in 2001 women contributed 6.2 billion dollars to the national economy. Most women migrants generate income through work that is considered unskilled, poorly paid and reproduce traditional domestic roles (washing, cleaning, cooking, sewing, taking care of children and the elderly, etc.), (Moreno-Fontes 2002:2).

Referring to the same vulnerability of female migrant workers in terms of discrimination, exploitation and abuse, IOM (n.d) implies that being “considered as cheap, docile and flexible employees, migrant women are strongly concentrated in a few female-dominated occupations: domestic work, ‘entertainment’ (often prostitution), helping in restaurants and hotels, or on assembly lines in labour-intensive manufacturing.” These jobs cannot offer superior working conditions to migrant female workers and job security is often lacking or rudimentary. Besides these, Kawar (n.d) lists the following as amongst the disadvantages and risks that female migrant workers usually face:

- During the decision to migrate, many women may have unrealistic expectations, lack of proper information on the migration process and procedures and on employment opportunities. They may also lack know-how and ability to cover expenses. Thus, they may end up in irregular and exploitative situations.
- When compared to men, women migrant workers tend to be concentrated in a more limited number of occupations.
- The migration of women is mostly unrelated to career advancement and skill acquisition. There is enough evidence to suggest that a significant number of migrant women possess skills and qualifications often unrecognised or unneeded in the types of work that they perform. In

fact, many studies indicate that migration involves deskilling for some groups of women.

- Women more often than men tend to occupy jobs within the informal sector, which is not covered by any labour legislation or social protection.
- Women migrants themselves lack knowledge of their rights, fear the authorities and are not organised.
- The authorities in most destination countries treat women migrant workers as workers with limited or no legal rights (Akawar n.d: 75).

Since the disadvantages alluded to above are often general in nature, they also form part of the SADC experience. Campani (1996) as quoted by Dodson (2000:122) asserts that the “feminisation” of international migration seems to be a worldwide trend and there is little reason to believe that Southern Africa would be an exception. In redressing this worldwide discrimination against and abuse of women, destination countries are obliged to comply with certain international instruments to protect the rights of individual men and women, whether in their capacity as migrant workers or as refugees.

Akawar (ibid) lists the important United Nations human rights instruments geared to ensure equality in the international arena. It does not necessarily mean that these instruments are peculiar to migrant workers or migrants in general but they encompass both citizens and non-citizens on any country. According to Akawar (n.d: 77) these principal United Nations instruments include, among others:

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) of 1948;
- International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 1990;
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) of 1965;
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography of 2001;
- Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against Trans-national Organised Crime of 2000; and
- Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Trans-national Organised Crime of 2000.

Although, the majority of the member states of the United Nations including the SADC countries have ratified most of these protocols, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) of 1948 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979, their implementation remains a problem to date. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (as quoted by Akawar (ibid)) summarises reasons that lead to difficulties in implementation of the international instruments:

- High unemployment of nationals, which prompts destination countries to give priority to national workers over migrant workers;

- Lack of necessary infrastructure to apply the Conventions and high financial cost of implementing and supervising the numerous provisions of the Conventions;
- Complexity of a country's immigration legislation and practice as well as the fact that the legislation on this subject is constantly evolving.

Reviewing the International Labour Organisation Report (ILO) (n.d), Raghavan (n.d) indicates that the ILO has also established some conventions and recommendation supplementing those of the United Nations to protect migrant workers in general, such as the 1949 Migration for Employment and the 1975 Migrant Workers' Convention and recommendations.

There are also other conventions relevant to the well-being of migrant workers such as the 1925 Equality of Treatment, the 1962 Social Security, the 1982 Maintenance of Social Security Rights and the 1987 Convention for Social Security for Seafarers. Apart from these, Akawar (n.d: 79) also mentions other ILO Conventions that protect the labour rights of migrants as follows:

- Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29);
- Freedom of Association Convention 1948 (87);
- Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100);
- Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.105);
- Right to organise and Collective bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98);

- Discrimination in Employment Convention 1957 (No.111);
- Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No.138);
- Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (169);
- Worst forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 (182).

It has not been established in this dissertation how much difference ratification made to these conventions and to what extent they have been effective worldwide. However, for the United Nations' International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, only five ratifications were recorded up to July 1995 by Egypt, Colombia, Morocco, the Philippines and Seychelles. Mexico and Chile have signed but not ratified it. Hence, this Convention has not yet come into effect since it requires 20 ratifications to enter into force, (Raghavan (ibid)). Moreover, none of the SADC countries have signed or ratified this Convention.

Apart from the international Conventions, the former Organisation of African Union (OAU) also adopted important protocols that served the purpose of protecting migrants, particularly women and children in Africa and the SADC Region. Among them is the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981 which came into force on October 21, 1986. Article 5 of this Charter stipulates that:

Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave

trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited, (University of Minnesota n.d).

This evidence is adequate to argue that human rights have been integral to the African Union right from the outset of the era when many African countries started to gain their independence. However, this dissertation has failed to establish the extent to which the provisions of this Charter were considered in the formation of the current AU policies such as NEPAD and the SADC Draft Protocols for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region. Article 12 of the charter also provides that:

1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law.
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality.
3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws of those countries and international conventions.
4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.
5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups (University of Minnesota n.d).

The provisions of the Banjul Charter and those of the UN and ILO seem to be ideal instruments in regional integration and migration discourses. However, currently lack of

enforcement capacity mars their implementation since neither the AU nor the UN and the ILO have the capacity for enforcement. Peter (1990:91) argues that any law, national or international is useful to the community only if it can be enforced. He further asserts that it does not serve any purpose to have a beautifully constructed and phrased legal instrument, which cannot be put into operation. In this regard, before investigating the migration policies in the SADC Region, it is imperative in the next section to discuss gender and labour migration with specific attention to the SADC Region.

4.4.4 Gender and Labour Migration in Southern Africa

In the SADC Region, labour migration is the most important migration typology in living memory. Crush (2000:13) argues that “the history of migration in Southern Africa is one of the most researched and well-documented academic fields in the Region”. However, drawing from a variety of literature on migration in the Region this dissertation has discovered that a lot of research done in this field is biased to focus on South Africa or male migrants only. For example, Oucho (2006) argues that the notion that only men have been involved in cross-border migration in Southern Africa is erroneous.

In their research discussed in preceding sections of this chapter, McDonald et al (1999) reflect that Southern Africa has a long history of cross-border migration. Be that as it may, much of this literature fails to be gender specific with references made to “migrants” or “labour migrants”. This may be seen as one of the serious limitations of this literature, which in this context marginalises records of female migration in the Region.

In this regard, Dodson (2002:1) argues that “past research on cross-border migration in Southern Africa tended to focus on labour migration of black males to South Africa from other Southern African countries”. In addition, it has emerged that, apart from being recognised in their capacity as migrants, women have been regarded as those “left behind” or just as mere appendages to male migration (Dodson *ibid*). This could lead to justification for neglecting women in regional migration studies.

As an analogy, Asis (2003:1) states that in some parts of Asia, such as the Southeast, journeying was traditionally a male preserve and on his return the man could expect not only a warm welcome but also an esteemed place in the community as the completion of a journey gave him a badge of honour. Similarly, the informal movement of male labour migrants across borders has a long history in Southern Africa. According to Williams (2005), there are a number of well-documented reasons for this:

- a. International borders in the region are long and have never been well policed. Before the 1960s, there were no border controls between many SADC states. Many migrants found it easy to move to other countries to find work.
- b. The regional mining industry was the only sector to establish a formal contract labour system. Other employers hiring migrants did not have access to this labour and often hired migrants outside the law, e.g. commercial agriculture and domestic service. Colonial regulations and the formal contract system for labour migrants were gender-biased. Female migrants could not migrate legally across borders for work. They, therefore, had to migrate illegally, which many did (Williams 2005:2).

The migrant labour system as an historical practice in Southern Africa was male-centric. Francis (2002:1) argues that for the last century, millions of rural households in Eastern and Southern Africa have depended on labour migration for their livelihoods. Gaidzanwa (1998) also asserts that in the colonial period, men moved as labour migrants searching for work as well as students, seeking secondary and tertiary education. Women did not enjoy this privilege and were largely confined to home villages doing domestic work. Men from all countries of Southern Africa had to walk long distances to the remotest destinations such as South Africa as migrant labourers while women had to remain home, looking after homesteads and engaging in agricultural food production.

Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman (1992) and Jeeves and Crush (1997) as quoted by Dodson (2000:119) also argue that in the SADC Region, the traditional pattern of cross-border migration has been impermanent labour migration of black males to South Africa from other countries in the Region. Similarly, as Williams (2005:2) points out, by 1970, there

were over 260 000 male labour migrants on the South African mine. Williams (2005) further explains that other mining centres in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Tanzania also became magnets for labour migrants, predominantly men, from other countries. Hence, Walker (1990:168) emphasises that the composition of the migrant labour force was largely gender-specific.

In addition, historical mining employers in the Region, other major employers of migrants in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Swaziland, Mauritius and Tanzania, as Williams (*ibid*) points out, were commercial farms and plantations who also employed young African men from rural areas. In addition, during the colonial period, young men were employed in the construction industry and although it is contrary to African culture for a man to do domestic chores such as cooking, male migrants worked in urban centres in domestic service.

Moorsom (1989:90) posed an interesting question: “Why was labour migration an exclusively male preserve”? A similar question was also asked by Wentzel and Tlabela (2006:74), “why did men migrate, sometimes over very long distances, to work in mines on the Witwatersrand?” Answers to these questions are simple: men needed to earn money and on the mines, they could earn the highest wages that would enable them to pay lobola and solve clan problems (this argument is discussed below). Walker (1990:168) remarks that the most pervasive image of women under the migrant labour

system is as victims – those ‘left behind’, lumped along with children, the old and the sick into the emotive but blurry category of the ‘dispossessed’ or ‘surplus’. In this view, for example, African men were cultured and socialised to be migrant labourer in their life. Moorsom (1989) indicates that men monopolised the long distance seasonal migrations to the cattle posts, which is an experience for most African men from boyhood through life.

Another reason given to support the notion of the domination of men in the domain of labour migration was according to Moorsom (1989:91) the cooperation and shared solidarity of men in groups drawn from various homesteads. This occurred in a more intense form in the long-distance raiding parties of the 30-40 years before colonisation in 1915. This presumably made men migrate more often than women.

Usually women were historically short-range migrants. Ravenstein (1885) (as quoted by Boyle and Halfacree (1999:2) explains that females are more migratory than males within the area of their birth, but males more frequently venture beyond such boundaries. During the colonial period in Namibia for example, women were prevented from leaving the rural economy by the rules governing the recruitment of migrant labourers.

The apartheid colonial laws further strengthened male-centred migration, particularly among the Aawambo communities. Moorsom (1984) as quoted by Hango-Rummukainen (2000:77) on the study of Walvis Bay indicates that the apartheid laws governing the contract labour system prevented workers from taking their families with them where they went to work. Hence, the contract labour system was exclusively for men and women were not part of it. This may have caused men to migrate as migrant labour to the south or to South African mines to earn money and return home to buy cattle or to obtain fiancées.

Kethusegile et al. (2000) describe the existence of the migrant labour system as a means of banishing Africans, in particular women to remote areas, where they could hardly make a living. Hence, the historical forms of gender division of labour also contributed greatly to male migration. For example, regarding the Aawambo community in Namibia, Winterfeldt (2002) explains that the salt-fetching journey to the Etosha Pan that had always been considered as an initiation rite was later on replaced by the journey to the south for labour purposes. Scenarios of this nature allow Walker (1990:18) to argue that initially much of the impetus behind the characteristically male and migrant nature of the early phase of African proletarianisation came from within African society itself. For instance, manliness in the Aawambo community was historically determined by the successful journey that a man took and the amount of wealth that he brought home in the form of, among other things, money, linen, hoes and even sugar.

Walker (ibid) adds that the desire for new goods such as guns or hoes made the traditional chiefs and elders determined to retain control over the young men by way of keeping a system that guaranteed that these young men would return to their rural homes after a fixed period of time. These things, as Winterfeldt (2002) further argues also influenced women's attitudes with respect to marriage – meaning that young maids opted to marry men who returned home from migrant employment trips. These were men who could give dowries in the form of money, perfume, linen and other attractive bric-a-brac.

A migrant worker who worked in the south was regarded as a real man and treated with high esteem in his cultural environment. Winterfeldt (2002) states that from an historical point of view one must come to the conclusion that men migrated; women did not. Walker (1990:172) argues that the origins of migrant labour were thus rooted in processes and relationships that were largely internal to the labour-exporting societies.

In this light, he clarifies this point by reasoning that because of the way, in which the homestead economy operated, it was the young, unmarried man who could most easily be released by the homestead and hence he was the first to be drawn into wage labour. Men became more popular in terms of status and power due to remittances that they sent home from migrant work. Kethusegile et al (2000) add that most men failed to make their remittances and as a result, families disintegrated. For example, young Aawambo

men in Namibia had a social responsibility of accumulating resources to assist their maternal extended families in difficult times such as death or crime-debt. Hango-Rummukainen (2000) argues that the items that men bought with the wages from contract labour only belonged to men and not to women.

Women who remained home performing, both their own and their husband's roles tended to suffer due to the enormous workload and in terms of insufficient food and staff and other social necessities. In reaction, women tended to migrate from village to village looking for assistance. Kethusegile et al (ibid) also argue that it was not common for men to either enter into casual sexual relationships or take up town wives while they were away from their wives and families for such a long separation.

Despite the demise of the contract system, its remnants remain alive in most parts of the SADC Region where men migrate to work somewhere far away and leave their wives at home. In the face of the scourge of HIV/AIDS, they even tend to have other partners in their new workplace. A study of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and CARE International in Southern Africa as quoted by IRIN PlusNews (2003) reveals that in Messina in South Africa's northern Limpopo province, farm workers are predominantly illegal male migrant labourers from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. They have multiple partners in South Africa and their home countries and condom use is

irregular. Reacting to this emotional and economic suffering, women tend to migrate to follow their male partners or as independent migrants in the world and the SADC Region in particular.

Recent history tells of women migrants worldwide. Women have increasingly migrated to look for wage income elsewhere. But, as Boyd (2003:4) points out, most of the migrant women engage in precarious employment. He argues that precarious employment usually offers low wages and is found in manufacturing industries, particularly textiles, in clothing industries where homework may be common, in hostel industries, in food services and food processing industries and in office cleaning. This could lead us to a tentative conclusion that women in the SADC Region, who were formerly left home by their migrant male partners when they went in search of work, are currently equally mobile and involved in migrant labour somewhere further afield.

To achieve reliable outcomes in terms of the internal and external validity of the results this dissertation investigated both women and men in the Oshikango area to establish the historical and current trend of migration along the Namibia/Angola border. The scope of enquiry has been informed by questions, some of which appear in Walker (1990:4) such as: what was the position of women and how were indigenous sex and gender systems organised in the independent African chiefdoms of Southern Africa in general

and Oshikango area in particular before the demarcation of the border? Why was migrant labour male-centric in African society? It also investigates implications that spring from this mobility regarding Regional Integration in the SADC and more particularly, as challenges to the SADC Draft Protocol of Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons in the region.

4.5 Gender, Policy and the SADC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons

4.5.1 Gender and policy

Both the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region and the 1997 version, now called the SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons in the Region, seem to have been silent if not gender blind. The SADC Regional Integration Project resembles EU integration, which, according to Lister (n.d) was influenced by European philosophers like Aristotle, whose ideas were deeply embedded in Islamic as well as in the Western thought that the state, like the household, should be governed by men and women's function is merely to provide services for male citizens.

For Aristotle and those following his ideas, women were by nature subject and subordinate to men. Lister (ibid) further explains that patriarchal gender, cultural and social constructs persist in both developed and developing countries. Even in the European Union, the political institutions still function with the maintenance of what Lister (ibid) calls a “glass ceiling” meaning that the area above remains predominantly male territory. Look for example, at the Convention of Future Europe; its 12-member Presidium includes only one woman and she is not the Chair or one of the Vice-Chairs. Gender has never been reflected in any European integration policies, either.

Exactly like in the SADC Integration Project, most theoretical debates surrounding European integration are rooted in federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism, which are gender blind. The SADC policies concentrate mainly on law, employment, infrastructures and security and seem to benefit professional women rather than grassroots and socially excluded women including migrant women or women abandoned due to labour migration practices in the Region. Catherine Hoskyns as quoted by Lister (ibid) evaluates the EU gender policies, which she calls limited, or broad and shallow. This could be the same scenario that SADC Regional Integration may imitate.

In each individual country, the National Gender Policies are structured to rectify gender issues of their nationals, hence the migrants, particularly women seem to be not really taken into account. IOM (2003) criticizes the national policies of many countries in the

world, saying that most migration related policies and regulations have not adjusted to gender differences amongst migrants.

Sometimes policies are nonexistent or neglect the gendered nature of migration, with unforeseen consequences for women. These consequences are diverse in nature; for example, many women migrant workers who are maltreated by their employers do not complain, because they are scared to lose their jobs and those who complain cannot take legal action (IOM *ibid*). Mapisa-Nqakula³³ (2002:2) confirms these consequences, remarking that television and newspaper images of million of women with sick and malnourished babies strapped to their mothers' backs is evidence of how women are affected by the migration cycle.

Women not only suffer the emotional trauma of helplessly watching their children die during these long journeys, but they also become victims of abuse and undignified treatment along the way (Mapisa-Nqakula *ibid*). Owing to the diverse experiences and consequences of migration on women, the national policies of most countries as government interventions fail to be specific about gender issues. Take for example, the Namibian Gender Policy that comprises of the following major areas of concern: Violence Against Women and Children, Gender, Poverty and Rural Development, Gender and Reproductive Health, Gender Balance in Education and Training, Gender and Economic Empowerment, Gender Balance in Power and Decision-Making,

³³ Mapisa-Nqakula at this time is South Africa's Deputy Minister of Home Affairs.

Information, Education and Communication, Gender and the Management of the Environment, The Girl Child, Gender and Legal Affairs and Monitoring Mechanisms.

It is not specifically clear how issues pertaining to gender and migration could be addressed under any of these areas of concern. Presumably, the core of the argument here is that women who enter Namibia as refugees or migrants under whatever circumstance are included in the protection of human rights enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, laws and the National Gender Policy on an equal footing with their Namibian counterparts. Nevertheless, the Namibian laws are also not gender sensitive and the Namibian Gender Policy is not legally binding, hence it is incapable of addressing gender problems such as violence against women. Such omissions underscore the need for the origin and destination countries to define clear measures to promote and protect the human rights and dignity of female migrants and above all maximise the benefits they bring (IOM 2003:n.p).

It goes without saying that it is the policy in the destination country that determines the position of the migrant women in the host society. But, ironically, the policies of most countries, particularly, in the SADC Region are geared towards immigration or cross-border migration in general, thus they can perpetuate the gender discrimination that migrant women experienced in their countries of origin. For example, the SADC countries do not approach gender issues from the same perspectives. Therefore, they

differ in their acceptance of regional and international instruments meant to address issues that affect women in general.

In this light, Gender Links (2004) summarises the key findings of a survey of 12 countries conducted by Gender and Media Southern Africa (GEMSA), which demarcates the following inconsistencies and gaps:

- **AU Protocol on African and Women's Rights:** Only one SADC country, Namibia has ratified the African Union (AU) Protocol on Women's Rights. It is also inconsistent that Southern African countries should all have ratified the United Nations Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) but fail to ratify this protocol.
- **Rights in marriages under general law:** Only six of the 12 Southern African countries have passed laws giving women and men equal rights in marriage. In other instances, women remain minors as long as they are married in community of property.
- **Sexual Offences Acts:** Only four countries (Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) have passed Sexual Offences Acts. Key features of this kind of legislation include: redefining rape to include any form of non-consensual penetration, thus making the definition gender neutral; abolishing the cautionary rule that in many countries requires the court to be cautious in handling rape cases, because of the assumption that women do not tell the truth about the circumstances that lead to rape;
- **Recognition of rape in marriage:** There is a close correlation between countries having sexual offences legislation and explicitly recognising rape in marriage. The five countries that have, or are debating sexual offences legislation, as well as Seychelles, have this statutory provision. Abolishing marriage as a defence for sexual offences is an important barometer of the level of gender justice discourse in a country, and is a critical factor in the era of HIV/AIDS, where one of the largest categories of those newly infected is married women who are faithful in their relationships while their husbands are not. With the exception of South Africa, however, there are very few instances in the Region in which this provision, where it exists, has been put to the test.

- **Provision for the administration of Post Exposure Prophylaxis or PEP to survivors of sexual assault:** Only four out of the 12 countries in the study (Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia) have policies requiring that health facilities administer PEP, a course of anti-retroviral drugs that can help to reduce the likelihood of HIV-infection, after a sexual assault. Two countries (Tanzania and Seychelles) said awareness of PEP in their countries only extends to other uses, like health care workers who might have been exposed to infection in their work.
- **Sexual harassment:** Legal provisions for sexual harassment in all countries are weak, with four countries (Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe) reporting that this is covered as part of labour law, but Mozambique also stating that this is a “brief mention” and has never been tested and Zimbabwe expressing concern that the issue is inadequately covered under “unfair labour practices.” In other countries, sexual harassment could be read into other laws, like the 1889 Crimes Act in Swaziland that refers to “inappropriate sexual behaviour” but is more than a century old! Mauritius’s Sex Discrimination Act has the most direct and up-to-date provisions for sexual harassment, referring to “any unwelcome or unbecoming gesture or act of one sex to the other.”
- **Trafficking:** No country in the Region except Tanzania (in its Sexual Offences Bill) has specific provisions for sex trafficking, a phenomenon of globalisation that should be a major concern for vulnerable developing countries that are committed to the rights of girls and women and want to prevent this scourge from taking root. In the survey, the country that showed the greatest awareness of trafficking was Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world, with a long seaboard, history of war, displacement and migrant labour that makes it especially vulnerable to this new form of slavery. The Foundation for Community Development in Mozambique provides coordination for NGOs working in this area, including working with and training border police to identify trafficking. UNICEF in Mozambique has drawn up a fact sheet on trafficking that could be used to develop a legal framework. The Child and Law Foundation in Zimbabwe is conducting research in border towns to determine the extent of trafficking. The South African Law Reform Commission recently released an issue paper on trafficking and has started to examine how South Africa can address the issue.
- **Legal Aid:** In five of the 12 countries (Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and Tanzania) there is no government-supported legal

aid. In all countries surveyed, the bulk of legal aid for women and children is provided by NGOs often relying on foreign donors.

- **Specialised facilities at police stations and in the courts:** Seven of the 12 countries have introduced some form of specialised facilities at police stations and/or in the courts for addressing gender violence. These typically consist of separate rooms at police stations with trained staff called “victim support units” (Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). South Africa is in the process of setting up special sexual offences courts and Zimbabwe has established “victim friendly courts.”
- **State support for places of safety for survivors of gender violence:** Only one country, Mauritius, reported having adequate places of safety that are partly funded by government. Three countries, Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania said they have no places of safety (other than police stations). All the others indicated that the places of safety that exist are all run by NGOs and these are stretched.
- **Public education and awareness:** Limited state funds are invested in public awareness of gender violence, a key factor in long-term solutions to the scourge, with almost all work in this area conducted by NGOs. All countries reported considerable improvement in media coverage of gender violence as a result of training and campaigns by NGOs, but this is still marred by sensational and insensitive headlines like “Sex-crazed gang rapes woman”. There have been very few opinion surveys in any of the countries to determine if attitudes towards gender violence are changing. One recent survey in South Africa showed that nearly half of the men surveyed believed that if a woman wears a short skirt she is “asking for trouble.”
- **Budget allocations and integrated approaches:** In all countries approaches towards addressing gender violence are fragmented, with Mozambique reporting that a strong cross sector network called “Todos Contra Violencia” (All Against Violence) collapsed for lack of funding. Only in South Africa, have there been studies on budgetary allocations for combating gender violence. These have concluded that resource allocations are inadequate relative to the provisions in new laws (Gender Links 2004:2).

Referring to the summary above, only six countries have special facilities such as separate rooms at police stations with trained staff called “victim support units”. Taking this and other policy gaps into mind, one can believe that in the SADC region, a migrant

woman is only safe in Mauritius where adequate places of safety for survivors of gender violence are assured and partly funded by government. Unfortunately, Mauritius is an island and most female migrants who fled their countries due to political unrests or to follow their migrant husbands are unlikely ever to be able to cross the Indian Ocean to reach that country.

The basic problem here, as Valji, De la Hunt and Moffett (203:63) argue, is that “most states that have recognised gender persecution have chosen not to amend existing legislation, but rather to provide non-binding guidelines on how gender may be incorporated into the category of social group.” National gender policies, such as the outspoken Namibia National Gender Policy, which carries comprehensive guidelines, although it is not binding, can be used as a practical example in this respect. It is a fact that abused women in areas of conflict, who intend to migrate, frequently cannot reach their ideal places of destination as opposed to male migrants.

In many countries, both in Africa and elsewhere, women and children are predominantly at risk and especially vulnerable to the effects of famine such as in Darfur and wars that commonly initiate major flows of refugees and all sort of emigrants. Based on this, Crush and Williams (2001:4) asked the interesting question, namely “why, then, are most of the refugees who find their way to South Africa male rather than female, younger rather than old, adults rather than children? The answer to this question is clearly that, while the problem to reach Mauritius is the barrier created by the Ocean, in

reaching South Africa it is a crime. It is dangerous for a single woman to enter the refugee category and travel to countries around South Africa regarded as temporary sojourns while waiting to move to her ultimate destination (Crush and Williams 2001).

Supporting this, Magardie (n.d) states that female immigrants in South Africa face being beaten, denied a minimum wage, raped in police cells, and spat at in the street for being a “*kwere-kwere* (a derogatory term used in South Africa for foreigner). In their firsthand research and from information obtained from humanitarian aid organisations working with the refugees, Human Rights Watch (2000) found that a significant proportion of women had experienced repeated physical assaults by their husbands and intimate partners while living as refugees in Tanzanian camps. Women in these camps had been assaulted with fists, bottles, shoes, sticks and pangas to the extent of hospitalisation.

The Human Rights Watch (ibid) witnessed women with visible scars, bruises, broken fingers, missing teeth, or cuts on their bodies and faces. As Gender Links (2004) implies above, Tanzania is one of the SADC countries, which has no places of safety (other than police stations).

Human Rights Watch (ibid) confirms that despite the seriousness and prevalence of these violent attacks no response was received from the Tanzanian government. This can lead to a tentative conclusion that the Sexual Offences Act that Tanzania has passed

is not applicable to refugees and persecuted migrant women in that country. Another question that needs scrutiny is based on the states' official policy that continues to acknowledge certain acts such as sexual violence as part of persecution encouraging a woman to migrate. Rape, for example is not accepted as a form of persecution. Valji, De La Hunt and Moffett (203:65) acknowledge "whatever violations or abuse men fear in an insecure world women fear doubly."

This means that if, for example, the front door of the house is kicked at two o'clock in the morning the dread that jumps into the mind of the man is only about one thing, certainly 'death' while to a woman this fear includes both death and rape. Hence, persecution within the context of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention discussed above reflects two major elements, firstly that of establishing serious harm and secondly the inability or unwillingness of a state to offer protection to individuals (Valji, De la Hunt and Moffett *ibid*).

Scenarios discussed here may represent a holistic trend of abuse of migrant and refugee women in the whole of the SADC Region. However, the SADC member states should draw a lesson on issues of female refugees' experiences from the Canada Guidelines of 1993 as updated in 1996 to include gender as a social group under the 1951 Convention.

The Canada Guidelines have been adopted by many countries in the world, including the United States of America, Australia and the United Kingdom to mention but a few.

Wallance (1996) as quoted by Valji, De la Hunt and Moffett (203:64) indicates that the Canadian guidelines point out that, women refugees' experiences of persecution fall into four broad categories, viz:

1. Women who fear persecution on the same grounds and are under similar circumstances as men. This includes women who are persecuted for their identity, nationality, race or social status – or their particular beliefs. Women in this category are also often physically persecuted like for example, being raped). In other words, they may be harmed in different ways to men who participated in the same activities or who share the same identity.
2. Women who fear persecution solely because of reasons relating to kinship. The age-old tactic of *cherchez la famille* (search the family) means that harm is done to women to punish (male) family members, or they may be used as hostages to entrap other members of the family. They may also be persecuted for views held by male members of their family.
3. Women who fear persecution resulting from conditions of severe discrimination on grounds of gender and who are at the risk of systematic violence at the hands of private citizens because the state is either unable or unwilling to protect them.
4. Women who fear persecution as a result of transgressing religious, customary or social mores. The practices themselves may be based on an assumption of the inferior status of women, which can manifest in discrimination severe enough to qualify as persecution (for example, female genital mutilation, honour killings...); or transgression may be met with punishments so disproportionately severe as to amount to persecution (for example, in countries such as Iran where women can be flogged for wearing lipstick, or Afghanistan, where they can be stoned or even killed for going out unaccompanied by a male relative).

The above mentioned categories of women's fear can constitute enough justification to effect change in existing national policies and legislation among the SADC states to include gender and more emphatically to underscore the plight and experiences of female refugees and migrants. In closing this page on gender and migration, it is

essential to refer our attention to the investigation of the implications of the migration policy at the SADC level with specific reference to the SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons.

4.5.2 The SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons

It was stated in Chapter three that the free movement of persons is one of the major ideals of the SADC Integration Project. However, at the time of this investigation this has become a regional concern due to disagreement among the member states on the Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region. Without looking at the policy perceptions of individual SADC member states, this dissertation briefly revises the historical background of the SADC policy on the free movement of persons across the borders of member states.

It is evident that the far-reaching SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons launched by the SADC Secretariat in the mid-1990s did not augur well for the future. The first initiative on free movement was mooted in 1993 at a workshop held in Harare. And following the SADC Council of Ministers' meeting in Swaziland in 1994 two consultants (one from Belgium and an expert on the European Schengen Agreement and the other a prominent lawyer from Zimbabwe) were commissioned by the SADC

Secretariat to prepare a protocol on the free movement of persons in the SADC Region (Oucho and Crush n.d).

The controversy started after the first draft of the protocol was circulated among the SADC countries for inputs. Oucho and Crush (n.d) argue that South Africa expressed a high degree of discontent with the draft protocol and was alarmed enough to commission the government-funded research think-tank the Human Sciences Research Council to compile a report on the matter reflecting South Africa's perspectives. The result changed the original draft of the protocol comprehensively and consultants produced a series of drafts. Thus, by 1998 the SADC had confusingly three different documents on cross-border migration and population movement, which, according to Oucho and Crush (n.d) were:

- (a) The SADC Secretariat's Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC (final draft dated 13 March 1996);
- (b) The South African Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement in the SADC (dated January 1997); and
- (c) The SADC Secretariat's Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC (final draft dated 8 May 1998).

Interestingly, Article 2 of the SADC Secretariat's Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region of 1996, as quoted by Solomon (1997:3) more specifically mentions the following rights to be accorded to citizens of member states:

- The right to enter the territory of another member state freely and without a visa for short visits;

- The right to reside in the territory of another member state; and
- The right to establish oneself and work in the territory of another member state.

Solomon (1997) and Oucho and Crush (n.d) indicate that the protocol proposed a three-phase process for implementation:

- Phase one: Visa free entry from one state to another would be effected for visits up to six months, provided that the individual had valid travel documents and entered through an official border post;
- Phase two: (within three years) any citizen would have the right to reside in another state in order to take up employment and to enter freely for the purpose of seeking employment;
- Phase three: (within five years) states would abolish “all restrictions on the freedom of establishment (permanent residence) of citizens of other Member states in its territory”

In contrast to the 1996 Protocol, the objectives of the 1997 Protocol as re-engineered by South Africa, (which is very different from the 1996 one), are as follows (Solomon 1999):

- To facilitate the movement of citizens of member states within the Region by gradually eliminating obstacles which impede such movement;
- To expand the network of bilateral agreements among member states in this regard, as a step towards a multilateral regional agreement;
- To strengthen cooperation in preventing the illegal movement of citizens of member states within and into the region;

- To cooperate in improving control over external borders of the SADC community; and
- To promote common policies with regard to immigration matters where necessary and feasible.

It is remarkable from the above distinctive versions of the protocol of free movement of persons in the Region that South Africa does not really want the term “free movement” of persons incorporated in the protocol. For example, the Migration Policy Institute (2004:2) contends that although South Africa has been noted as a force that could lead an “African Renaissance” whereby it would lift other countries in the Region up with it, it resists the immigration policies such as the Protocol on the Free Movement of Person in the Region.

South Africa’s reasons are fear of flooding as well as a sense of nationalism. The 1997 Protocol that is largely based on South African initiatives, adds another controversial element since it does not encourage the free movement of persons in the Region, but it encourages facilitation of movement within the Region. This means that the movement of people should be regulated on the basis of existing bilateral and reciprocal agreements between the SADC countries. The outcome, which would result if the South African initiatives on the free movement of persons were to be implemented, would have no effect on the status quo.

As MIDSA Report No 1 by Klaaren and Rutinwa (2004:54) puts it, this does not mean that there are no SADC Regional instruments relevant to national migration regimes. The report further outlines examples of a number of SADC Protocols that contain provisions relevant to migration in the region namely:

Article 3 (a) of the SADC Protocol on Education and Training states that an agreed objective of Member States is “to work towards the relaxation and eventual elimination of immigration formalities in order to facilitate freer movement of students and staff within the Region for specific purposes of study, teaching, research and any other pursuits relating to education and training.” In addition, the Protocol on Immunities and Privileges allows the SADC to issue a SADC Laissez-Passer to its officials. Holders of Laissez-Passer have visa-free entry to the territory of all member states including persons holding a SADC Identity Card and travelling on the business of the SADC, (MIDSA Report No 1 by Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004:54).

The relevance of these protocols to national migration regimes is not convincing that the SADC’s ideal of the free movement of persons is close to being achieved. One reason is that the provisions of the above-mentioned protocols are too selective; hence they benefit the selected few, such as students, academics and officials. In contrast, the migration behaviour in the SADC is inclusive.

As mentioned in Chapter 6 and Chapter 2, migration in the SADC Region is characterised by a large number of men, women and children, businesspersons and professionals. Therefore, any protocol on the free movement of persons that omits this fact is irrelevant to the SADC ideal of the free movement of persons in the Region. Hence, the state of affairs indicates that the objective of the free movement of persons in the SADC Region is far from close to realisation. In other words, as Solomon (1997:4)

argues *“it is obvious that Southern Africa is not yet ready for the free movement of persons at its current state of development.”* Echoing similar sentiments are Oucho and Crush (n.d) who affirm that *“There appears to be little appetite for the protocol at this stage and there is still no momentum at the Secretariat, or among member states, to push the protocol further.”*

However, in August 2005 four countries – South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Lesotho - signed the Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons in the Region based on the following objectives (Mafuta 2006:1):

- Entry into member states without the need for a visa for a maximum period of 90 days per year for bona fide visits and in accordance with the laws of the member states;
- Permanent and temporary residence in the territory of another member state; and
- Working in the territory of another member state.

These objectives almost tally with the 1996 SADC Secretariat Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons in the Region. Although South Africa previously opposed the Secretariat draft protocol, she eventually signed the revised draft. However, Botswana and the majority of other SADC countries still refused to sign. Mafuta (2006) points out that although half of the 14 member states of SADC have now signed, the protocol will only come into force if ratified by two-thirds of the members. The serious challenge is that it is not known whether all countries will sign this protocol.

In addition, even if the required two-thirds of the members sign, there is no provision to force its implementation by those countries that continue to refuse to sign it. Therefore, it is provisionally concluded that the major challenge that the SADC Regional Integration faces is a failure if the member states fail to reach an agreement on the issue of facilitation of the movement of persons in the Region. Many issues of cross-border migration and population movement will be empirically discussed in Chapter 6 when the focus of this dissertation will concentrate on the case study between Namibia and Angola. This chapter concludes the theoretical part of this dissertation.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter concluded the theoretical debates of regional integration and migration. A careful examination of the migration in regionalisation suggests a close interrelationship among migration patterns and gender regimes in the regional and international contexts. With a critical history of labour migration in the region, the trend of gender and labour migration remain traditional.

Evidence shows that migration issues discovered within the SADC region and internationally are economical although there are other subordinate reasons such as fleeing prosecution or evasion of police arrests. This implies that there are relationships between regionalisation issues and stimuli of migration and population movement in the

Region such as pull factors in terms of better wages in the country of destination and push factors such as poverty in sending countries.

The SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons introduced as an attempt to address migration problems in the region is still impractical. Eventually, the provisional conclusion has been drawn that the problematic element seems to be that since SADC is a state-based regime, member states take their refuge in the doctrine of state sovereignty, often at the expense of the common regional agenda. This in other words means that they talk regionalism and act nationally. By probing this practically, the next part of this dissertation will reflect the methodology used in the empirical collection of data during the case study in Oshikango and finally suggesting an alternative policy to address issues of migration and population movement in the SADC Regional Integration Project.

PART III

**METHODOLOGY, PRINCIPAL FINDINGS,
DATA ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

The previous four chapters dealt with the theoretical and conceptual part of this dissertation. Chapter 1 looked at research design and methodology based on theoretical perspectives of research methodology. This chapter presents the empirical findings of the study and attempts to link the theoretical concerns to the practical situation in the Oshikango area. It documents the research design and methodology followed during the fieldwork. It maps the research strategy employed to investigate the problem as formulated in Chapter 1.

Kidder and Judd (1986:434) explain the importance of the chapters on the methods used, saying that “readers need to know in considerable detail how the study was carried out, what was the basic design? If the data were collected by means of questionnaires or interviews, exactly what questions were asked?” The chapter briefly outlines the research design based on the case study of life experiences of the people in the area of Oshikango in the light of cross-border migration and regional integration. This means that the research design is informed by empirical exploratory questions addressing real-life problems of people living along international borders within the SADC Region in terms of cross-border migration and population movement. This dissertation adopts constructivism approach, because it contains a definite normative dimension and its

research aims for a transformative outcome, and thus is not interested in "knowledge for knowledge's sake.

Apart from the research design, this chapter also presents a comprehensive research methodology. The methodology section focuses on the research process and the tools used to collect the data. This includes the data collection procedures in terms of the research population as well as the sampling methods and procedures. The chapter ends with a summary of the sampling strategy analysis. Finally, an integrated conclusion provides a summary of the whole chapter.

5.2 Research Design

As briefly stated in Chapter 1, the research design of this study is a case study. A case of cross border migration and population movement at Oshikango is investigated. This research design is used because as Fouché (2004) explains, the exploration and description of the case take place through detailed, in-depth data collection methods, involving multiple sources that are rich in context.

These collection methods include interviews, documents, observation and archival data. In other words, since the primary goal of this dissertation is description rather than causal inference, this case study design can also be understood as a pre-experimental research design. This was very useful because it was relatively easy to implement and

permit the researcher to gather data from people in their natural setting, in this case, the common border area between Angola and Namibia. Information was gathered about the distribution of variables such as grassroots community's understanding and attitudes towards implications of cross-border migration within the SADC Project of Regional Integration.

Other important variables that support the investigation techniques are gender, age and the education level of respondents. These are crucially significant in determining within gender, who the regular migrants are, i.e. men or women, young or old, educated or uneducated. This also helps in finding out the extent of these respondents' understanding and attitude towards artificial international borders that cut through their traditional domain and also with regard to the SADC Regional Integration Project. Based on this empirical approach, this study is classified as survey research.

5.3 Methodology

Regarding Methodology, the dissertation is analytically descriptive using more qualitative methods and augmented by a few minimal quantitative interpretations. It harnesses inductive generalised reasoning, since it uses statistical inferences in which the researcher generalises from a non-probability sample (see sub-section 5.6.2 below) to the research population in Oshikango.

The qualitative data were collected by means of personal interviews, observations and life stories, while the primary quantitative data of the study were obtained through questionnaires. This means that the completed questionnaires will constitute the statistical support of the non-probability results. Personal interviews³⁴ and structured interviews³⁵ were used for that purpose.

The researcher prepared an interview schedule in the form of questionnaires administered among the residents of the Oshikango area and migrants as discussed in the relevant section. The structured research questionnaires have been prepared in English, but could be administered in a vernacular (Oshikwanyama) where necessary. To contextualise this research into the SADC regionalisation, the research includes current information regarding migration and integration issues reported in various newspapers, books, journals and periodicals. This section on methodology consists of the following constituent concepts: data collection procedures and techniques; the team of researchers; study area, population, sampling methods and strategy

5.4. Data collection procedures and techniques

The nature of the research design is a survey. The data are collected by means of direct, systematic observation, personal interviews and structured questionnaires. In the

³⁴ Interviewers visited the respondents at home (also see Huysamen 1997:144).

³⁵ Interviewers put a collection of questions from a previously compiled questionnaire to respondents face to face and recorded the latter's responses (Huysamen *ibid*).

execution of these methods, the research participants (interviewers and interviewees) had to be obtained to carry out the research in terms of the case study research strategy discussed above. The following sub-sections sketch the research techniques used during the fieldwork at Oshikango.

5.4.1 Direct, systematic observation

This research focused on three target groups in Oshikango: the key informants, the households and the cross-border migrants. The direct observation techniques were used in respect of applied the latter, cross border migration and population movement. The researcher observed directly and systematically the behaviour and movements of cross-border migrants at the Oshikango border post. This observation was systematically carried out for a week in order to avoid one-day accidental behaviour or incidents.

Another reason for using the observation method at Oshikango was that it was not always feasible to let the subjects complete a questionnaire or to conduct interviews with them, because some of them were either illiterate or distrust interviewers. Some of them were simply unwilling to report frankly about the aspect being investigated and some of them deliberately denied or remained silent about the questions. Some ran away if the interviewer invited them for a conversation (see Chapter 6 below).

This method was limited to observable behaviour, such as how the migrants were trying to avoid the immigration office, the frequency of cross-border movements, migration by gender (whether men or women are the majority migrants) and motives of migration, for example, by showing signs of economic and social migration intentions.

5.4.2 Personal visit or interviews

As Huysamen (1997) argues, when data are to be collected by means of personal interviews, interviewers should visit the respondents at home or at their workplace. In this study, the combination of the above was used in respect of households and key informants such as the police, immigration officials, town councillors, school principals and hospital or clinic matrons and the like.

The household respondents were visited in their houses, while the key informants such as businesspersons; government officials and NGO representatives were interviewed at their workplaces. All interviews were structured.

The interviewers put a collection of questions from a previously compiled questionnaire, (interview schedule) to a respondent face-to-face and recorded the respondent's responses. The interviewers were restricted to the questions, their wording and their order as they appeared in the schedule (questionnaire) with relatively little freedom to deviate from it. This technique was also used in interviewing the cross-border migrants

(those people interviewed at the time they arrived or left Namibia at the Oshikango border post on a specific day). The following sub-section explains in detail how the structured questionnaire was administered as an interview schedule.

5.4.3 The questionnaire

The research instrument used was a five-page questionnaire developed for interviews with individuals in the Oshikango area using a convenience sampling technique. The questionnaire was written in both the English and Oshikwanyama languages to simplify the work of the interviewers. The inclusion of open-ended questions in the questionnaire enabled the researcher to elicit the respondent's unique views on particular issues. The questionnaire consisted of 25 items and has been organised into the following six sections:

Section A: Demographic information

This section contained items that identified details about respondents in relation to sex, age, educational level, location and citizenship. This makes *age* a basic variable, which determines results obtained at different levels of the generation.

Section B: Reasons for regular border crossing

This section probed how often respondents crossed the border to Namibia or Angola and what the major reasons for this were.

Section C: Access to Angola/Namibia

This section investigated whether the migrants normally use the official border post or alternative points of entry. It also investigated modes of travel, which the migrants used on foot, by air or by road.

Section D: Attitudes towards borders and foreigners

This section attempted to ascertain attitudes the trans-national local communities and those people living along the border have towards the colonial borders. It also probes the attitudes that these people have towards foreigners, for example, which person was a foreigner to them. This is intended to measure the respondent's attitudes in terms of nationalism and regionalism.

Section E: SADC integration

This section investigated the extent of the respondents' knowledge about the SADC Regional Integration Project, and the extent of their participation in the unfolding of this project.

Section F: Participation in the processes of the SADC Integration

This section assessed whether respondents in the research area population support Namibia's integration in the SADC regional body. Finally, this section inquires if the respondents have ever heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region.

5.5 Team of Researchers

For reasons of economy, time and effort, six (6) research assistants, (three (3) females and three (3) males ranging from 20 to 30 years of age), were employed to assist the principal researcher in data collection. The research assistants were selected from among Grade 12 school leavers from Oshikango and other surrounding villages. They administered the questionnaires. They were all conversant with the Oshikwanyama language, since they were born in the area. They also had an excellent command of English. Five (5) of them administered 75 questionnaires segmented into age groups while the remaining one (1) research assistant interviewed 33 respondents to complete the total of 108 respondents interviewed. Forty-eight (48) men and sixty (60) women categorised in three different age groups were interviewed. The principal researcher was responsible for interviewing the Key informants.

The researcher used his/her own judgement about which respondents to choose and selected only those who best met the aims of the study. However, in order to ensure that a reasonable spread of respondents was achieved in the research area, interviewers fulfilled limited quota requirements. This limited quota incorporated four variables.

These were:

- Gender (Male/Female).
- Education (none, primary education; secondary education (matric/O -levels); tertiary (higher than secondary education)).

- Age: (an equitable distribution of men and women in three age categories 20-35; 36-49 and 50+). If there was more than one person in the house intended for interviews, the interviewer ensured that he or she interviewed someone in a different age category than his or her previous interview.
- Location: (Some interviewees were not Namibians hence they were required to indicate their place of origin).

Another important variable assessed was the language proficiency of the respondents living along the border. The fieldwork was conducted over a period of two weeks. A total of 168 respondents were interviewed. This was followed by the analysis of data from the respondents.

5.5.1 Selection of the research area

The selection of the study area was made to narrow down the research scope and in an attempt to enhance the internal validity of the research results. SADC is a large, densely populated and heterogeneous Region, although some countries like Namibia and Botswana have small populations. The SADC Region, as vast as it is has many geographical areas and sectors that would equally provide a rich source of information on integration and migration issues for this research. This, however, would require

sufficient funding, time and researchers to draw enough samples from the vast population of the Region.

These factors entail significant obstacles to successfully conducting a regionally representative research project. As indicated in the limitations of the study these factors hampered this study to be regionally and nationally representative. Hence, tradeoffs had to be made between a regionally representative sample and the selection of important areas and even institutions and individuals in the Oshikango area.

Oshikango was selected for its strategic location in terms of cross-border migration and population movement (refer to Chapter 1). Based on this reality, a method of deciding who to interview became especially important. Not all institutions in the Oshikango area were selected for interviews, although they could also have been a rich source of data. In this regard, this dissertation was also tempted to include interviews with those migrants crossing the border to and from Namibia at a certain period. This has strengthened the reason that this research was not confined to respondents from the area of Oshikango, but migrants from other places and perhaps not even from Angola or Namibia were interviewed.

Statistical data from the 2001 Census conducted by the National Planning Commission (NPC) helped in the sample selection. However, there were some problems with a

demarcated map of Oshikango, which reflected the area and population of the political constituency. The community does not perceive the Oshikango area as the one depicted on the political map (refer to Chapter one – limitation of the study). Prescott (1987:63) notes that, “the way in which a boundary influences the development of a border landscape and the lives of its inhabitants is likely to be a function of the accuracy with which that boundary is defined and located...”

Given this fact, Oshikango is firstly a traditional ward stretching from Namibia across the border to Angola; and secondly, in Namibia the ward does not conform to the political demarcation of the constituency. In the light of this fact, the geographical area of Oshikango should be interpreted at two levels, i.e. political and traditional. Politically, Oshikango area is an electoral constituency and traditionally a ward. The demarcation of the constituency and the ward do not coincide. This constituency contains many villages, with Oshikango town being the business centre. These villages or wards include Okanghudi, Oshikango, Odibo, Okatale, Onamhida and Engela. Even so, this does not affect the outcomes of this dissertation.

5.5.2 Study Area

This research was carried out among grassroots communities in a 20 km radius around the Namibia/Angola border town of Oshikango in the Ohangwena Region. The Kwanyama ethnic group, which is part of the Aawambo tribe, occupies the area on both sides of the Namibia/Angola border and the common language they use is *Oshikwanyama*. However, people of different languages - among these English, Portuguese, French and various African languages - predominantly from African countries are residing in Oshikango town. Hence, the border residents are a mix of citizens and immigrants, some of them legally permanent residents but some undocumented immigrants.

The housing pattern is also a mix of Oshiwambo traditional homesteads (stockades) and small migration stockades, shacks typical of ghettos, especially on the outskirts of the town and dual-purpose shebeens (i.e. containing a sleeping room and a shop). These domiciles contain people ranging from native born to naturalised citizens, permanent residents, and undocumented people and in some cases temporary visitors. Therefore, face-to-face interviews with individual residents of the area and other people such as informal traders, formal businesspersons, visitors and pupils who cross the common border were conducted. Another major source of qualitative data was life stories based on the following aspects:

- (a) how the Namibia/Angola boundaries were formed;

- (b) how family networks for the Kwanyama community have been affected;
- (c) how old people migrated to work on the mines or the South in general or to *Ombishi* (another name of the Angolan side in Oshiwambo derives from “*peixe*” the Portuguese word means fish. It was explained that many migrant workers to Angola worked in fishing industries);
- (d) how the community understood current governance in terms of cross-border controls and individual perspectives regarding the idea of regional integration and human migration.

By raising this study to the SADC level, the research included relevant data on people living along the borders of selected SADC countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola. This was made possible through special interviews with key informants in the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Namibia, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Namibia), and the Angolan Embassy, the Zambian, Zimbabwean, South African and Botswana Higher commissions in Windhoek.

5.6 Population and Sampling Methods

Following, Kidder and Judd (1986:145), ‘population’ is the aggregate of all the cases that conform to some designated set of specifications. Hence, by the specifications of people residing in Oshikango, this subsection defines a population consisting of all the people residing in the Oshikango constituency. Sampling, on the other hand, refers to

the group of elements selected with the aim of investigating something about the population from which they are taken.

As alluded to above, the sampling selection for research is rooted in the 2001 Population and Housing Census conducted by the NPC. However, there are strong assumptions that uncontrollable movements of people across the borders would affect area population. Therefore, this research includes a non-probability accidental technique to obtain more information from people regularly crossing the borders back and forth.

This is done based on the fact that it is not always easy to obtain statistics of people crossing the borders in and out of Namibia on a daily basis by means of probability techniques. The problem is the complexity of regular crossing of the intersected communities along the Namibia/Angola border. Some cross-border movements are not recorded, since not all migrants use official border posts. This situation is comparable to South Africa's. For example, Reitzes (1997) states that, "...illegal migration to South Africa has become increasingly controversial." Some people continually commute across South Africa's borders to the extent that it may be impossible to count them as they enter and exit South Africa. One person may be counted many times, thereby inflating the figure.

The same applies to migrants who are undocumented and/or illegal - they are regularly deported and re-enter the country many times. Hence, statistics based on the number of

deportations or attempted illegal border-crossings are misleading, as one person may be counted many times (Reitzes 1997). Similarly, the complexity of the Oshikango cross-border situation could adversely influence the population validity and sampling of this research.

According to the NPC Population and Housing Census (2001:34), Oshikango has a total population of 27, 599 (15, 222 females and 12, 377 males). The number of households is 4, 277 with an average household size of 6.5. These households include traditional homesteads and a small number of semi-urban houses. Based on these traditional homesteads, urban and semi-urban houses as primary units of analysis, a sample of 168 people was identified within a radius of 20km around the Oshikango area.

Three sampling techniques were used in this study. The non-probability sampling method in the way of accidental and purposive sampling techniques was used to elicit qualitative data on everyday cross-border migration in terms of reasons for crossing the border, destinations, attitudes towards the border and knowledge about the SADC Integration.

In that regard, forty (40) people (men and women) were interviewed while crossing the borders, facilitating this research project in obtaining information without any restrictions based on the people's purposes of everyday cross-border migration or and population movement such as for shopping, to visit, business, medical attention or

schooling (children). Interviews were conducted with any person coming and going across the border on a particular day.

A stratified convenience technique was also used based on gender and age groups to determine different levels of experience and understanding of regionalism and integration policies at the grassroots level. As stated above, the NPC Population and Housing Census (2001:34) showed that Oshikango has had 15 222 females and 123 77 males in total, meaning that women are in the majority. Hence, the sampling ratio was determined to interview 45% of men and 47% of women. In this case, 16 men (50 years of age and above) were interviewed for information regarding journeys of migrant workers to South Africa or migrations to cattle-posts in the areas across the Namibia/Angola border. A similar interview process was repeated with women of the same age.

As the family network among the community in that area is matrilineal, 20 women of 50 years of age and above were interviewed for information regarding the historical movements of people within the border-cut Diaspora. Comparisons were made between the former and current lifestyle with regard to cross- border migration and population movement.

In addition, 16 men and 20 women between 20 to 35 and 36 to 49 years respectively were interviewed to determine the extent of their understanding of the concepts of cross-

border migration and regional integration among the youth and middle-aged people in the Oshikango area. Apart from that, 5 elderly people (i.e. 4 men and 1 woman) ranging from 70 years and above were also involved as storytellers, clarifying historical issues of migration and population movement, how the border was demarcated and how they understand the current era of merging countries in the form of regional migration. Eventually, structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants in the Oshikango area. For control purposes, twenty (15) key informants such as government officials (police and army officers, officials from the Ministries of Home Affairs, Health, Education, and the Ohangwena Regional Council and Helao Nafindi Town Council were also interviewed. Finally, Ambassadors or Higher Commissioners of five SADC countries in Windhoek were also interviewed to add value to data drawn from the Oshikango area.

5.6.1 Sampling strategy

Oshikango is in the region adjacent to the Namibia/Angola border and has a history of cross-border migration and population movement informed by a trans-national culture and family networks. Currently, two types of cross-border migration are observed in the area namely: (a) regular cross-border migration through undesignated border areas, and (b) cross-border migration through the Oshikango border post (combining both regular and irregular peoples' mobility).

Migrants, too, have different reasons to migrate peculiar to each individual's intention to cross over to Namibia or Angola. Given this fact, the questionnaire was structured to reflect demographic and migratory patterns in Oshikango. Based on the assumption that households in border areas regularly cross the border for various reasons, two types of questionnaires were prepared one for the households and all those people crossing the border at a particular time and another one for the key informants (see Appendixes G and H).

The questionnaire in Appendix G also reflects the non-probability side of the convenience sampling technique since the researcher used whatever individuals were available rather than selecting from the entire population. Appendix H on the other hand, reflects a questionnaire for the key informants i.e. specialists, experts, managers and heads of government and private institutions in the area. The essence of this questionnaire was informed by institutions in the Oshikango area that render services to people from the other side of the border and possibly in line with certain SADC protocols.

However, this technique is a non-probability since it combines accidental and purposive contacts. The purpose of both questionnaires was to probe the respondents' attitudes to discover what their thoughts were on the concept of international boundaries, their nationality as Namibians and their region as SADC citizens. The key informants constitute a control group and their experience is used to measure the extent of

understanding of concepts of border issues and the SADC Regional Integration in SADC society.

5.6.2 Sampling summary

(a) Non-household respondents

- *Accidental technique*: 40 people (men and women) of all ages crossing the border at a particular time were interviewed = 40
 - *Purposive Technique*: 15 key informants = 15
- | | |
|------------------------------------------|------------|
| Total (Non-household respondents) | =55 |
|------------------------------------------|------------|
-

(b) Household respondents

- *Stratified convenience technique*:

16 men and 20 women (50+)	.=36
16 men and 20 women (35 to 49 years of age)	=36
16 men and 20 women (20 to 35 years of age)	=36
(Legends) 5 story tellers (70+)	=5
Total (household respondents)	=113

Overall Sample Total	= 168
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5.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the research design and methodology used in this dissertation. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in data collection and the general research strategy reflects a hybrid of exploratory and descriptive approach. This is ideal to probe the real-life experiences of the people in Oshikango who cross the common border of Namibia and Angola regularly. It is noted that the data collection procedures, which included observations, life stories and interviews was effective in this regard. Another justification of this effectiveness is that the interviews were conducted in a survey form but the number (i.e.168) of respondents including story tellers was enough to justify the validity of the results. The research design applied is a case study. Hence, the following Chapter applies this case study to practical cross border migration issues at Oshikango and how these could be interpreted in the SADC context.

CHAPTER 6: A CASE STUDY OF OSHIKANGO

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the research design and methodology used in empirical fieldwork. This chapter's aim is to integrate the empirical data with the conceptual and theoretical material covered earlier. It intends, among other things, to examine whether or not there is a direct link between regional integration and cross-border mobility.

The chapter also intends to investigate the degree of preparedness of grassroots communities for the challenges of regional integration. The research questions are constructed to probe the communities' understanding and participation in the integration process. These variables are probed regarding benchmarking issues of migration, emigration, immigration and population movement, gender and trade phenomena transcending national borders. This is done in the light of the hypothesis that there is a disjuncture between the official SADC negotiated Policy on the Free Movement of Persons in the Region as part of regional integration and the experience of local communities.

This chapter examines the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of the interaction between migrants and host communities in the Oshikango area in northern

Namibia, highlighting the challenges that face regional, national and local leaders in the SADC Region (using the experience of Oshikango as an example) and suggesting needed changes in regional and national policies. Trends and migration patterns in the Oshikango area and local mobility in Namibia in relation to the SADC Region in general are analysed. The human flows or migration issues dealt with in this chapter not only include migrants in the conventional sense or the individuals who have come to settle permanently in Namibia, but include short term migrants and migrant workers, traders, tourists, businesspersons, educators, students and learners in the Oshikango Region. The flow and logic of arguments start with a brief history of migration in the Oshikango area as observed.

Another purpose of this chapter includes gathering qualitative data with the aid of a non-probability sampling technique by way of interviewing key informants such as government officials, traditional leaders, businesspersons and aged people who provide insights about dynamics of migration and cross-border mobility during the previous generations. A total of 108 household respondents in the area of Oshikango were interviewed, with specific focus on issues such as dual citizenship and their attitudes towards the common Namibia/Angola border. This chapter also investigates the grassroots community's understanding of nationalism and the meaning that they attach to concepts such as "foreigners" – meaning, which people are foreigners to them.

Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring the general awareness about the SADC project of Regional Integration, participation of grassroots communities and civil society and the impact of Regional Integration on individuals' lives at the grassroots level and the opinions from SADC Embassies/Higher Commissions including the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek. Before starting with the presentation and discussion of data from the fieldwork, the study examines the question, why cross border migration management, has become an issue between Namibia and Angola.

6.1.1 Origins of issues of cross-border migration between Namibia and Angola

The international border between Namibia and Angola has been an issue for a long time, especially in view of the management of cross-border migration and population movement. This may be attributed to variables such as family networks and the negative consequences of colonial border demarcation. Returning to the subsection on international migration in Chapter 4, we can extrapolate from Pettman (1996:69) that “it is hard to put together the ‘big picture’ of migration phases and flows and personal and family dynamics, often encouraged along kin and social networks already in place in another state”. Pettman (ibid) further argues that “family politics and gender relations influence who will go where”.

Similarly, Adigun (1989:273) observes that, “in partitioning Africa, European powers regarded the peoples as ‘stateless’ persons. Thus no regard was paid to the homogeneity of the various communities or their pre-existing states.” This resulted in an arbitrary division of ethnic and kinship groups, confused nationalities and citizenships and complex trans-national cross-border movement of peoples in Africa in general, and the SADC Region in particular. Gallais’ (as quoted by Anderson 1996:79) argument that colonial boundaries often cut through tribal territories and this disrupted African societies is important to assess facts about attitudes of affected communities towards colonial boundaries.

As will be shown in this case study, the colonial borders created new challenges embedded in an intractable web of cultural, family and kinship links of the Oshiwambo-speaking people found on both sides of the Angola/Namibia border. For example, Malan (1995) explains that consanguine kin groups formed in terms of matrilineal descent and reflected in clans and lineages complicate the Owambo tribal network.

Malan (*ibid*) further indicates that Owambos demonstrate their kinship bond by using classificatory kinship terminology, according to which persons of the same generation call each other ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ though they do not know each other’s parents. Those on the first ascending generation level are all referred to as mother and father and aged members of the clan are called grandmother and grandfather.

This strong bond of kinship based on clan structures informs an intricate social network that leads to difficulties in dividing such clans with artificial boundaries. These difficulties have not only been peculiar to Namibia/Angola's post-independence era, but even the colonial rulers found it difficult to control migration at the Oshikango border post or over the borders in general. For example, as Notkotola and Siikonen (2000:14) explain, "neither the South African nor the Portuguese colonial officials were effectively able or indeed tried to control the movement of Owambos and their cattle across the common Angolan/Namibian border."

New state institutions of the post-independent governments in Angola and Namibia also face new and growing problems of border control. Dobler (n.d) shows that Namibia is, nevertheless, a state with solid and comparatively well-anchored bureaucratic institutions that can ensure migration control and management.

In Angola, on the other side of the border, state control is much weaker and less formalised. However, despite the fact that Namibia has more formal and updated immigration institutions than Angola, this has no effect on migration dynamics along the common border. This could be observed from the historical phenomena of demography and social structure of the Aawambo tribe. These people respect their cultural and tribal ties more than anything else. The ties cut across the international boundaries and for them the political boundary is unnatural. In this light, this research has provisionally

concluded that the Namibia/Angola borderline through Oshikango is a political boundary understood and respected at the official political level while at the community level the people believe they belong to one nation.

Notkotola and Siikonen (ibid) assert that the artificial division of the economically and culturally uniform Owamboland between two different states was only a division on paper. Hence, this contributes to the difficulty regarding cross-border control between Namibia and Angola. Notkotola and Siikonen (ibid) quote the South African Assistant Native Commissioner's Report from Oshikango of 1952, stating that it was impossible to control the movement of thousands of Owambos and their cattle across the common Angolan–Namibian border from one border post.

Moreover, cross-border trade and free movement of people from other parts of Namibia and Angola have complicated this problem, especially after Namibia's independence and after the end of the civil war in Angola. The solution to this problem may still be found in various approaches, among them, regional integration protocols. In the light of these complexities, international migration and other types of cross-border movement of people have become an important part of international and regional relations in the SADC Region. Since Oshikango was selected as a case area in probing this complexity, the following sub-section outlines the background of this area.

6.1.2 Oshikango, Kwanyama and Aawambo socio-political contexts


Oshikango is historically an area within the Oshikwanyama-speaking community of the Aawambo tribe in northern Namibia and southern Angola. The colonial border between Namibia and Angola that cuts through the Kwanyama community divides the town into two parts, namely: the Namibian part (Oshikango) and Angolan part (Santa Clara).

Amutenya and Van der Linden (1993) correctly state that the Namibia/Angola border is in fact a colonial border dissecting the living space of two homogeneous population groups, the Kwanyama and Mbandja. Alluding to similar border implications, Hayes (1992:264) argues that “direct effects such as the locating of homesteads and fields were felt mainly by the Kwanyama, but also the Mbalantu and smaller western polities.” This was supported by Malan (1995) who argued that the Namibia/Angola border that cuts through the Kwanyama territory made about a third of the members of this group citizens of Angola today.

Before the advent of colonialism, the Aawambo in general and the Kwanyama in particular, occupied the whole area between the Cunene and Cuando rivers. For example, Kreike (1994:1) argues that in the last decades of the 19th century and until the colonial occupation of Owamboland and the Lower Kunene was finalised in 1915,

Owambo cattle-farmers sent their herds to cattle posts throughout and even beyond the Lower Kunene (see Map 6.1 below).

Map 6.1: Sketch-map of the Aawambo Diaspora after 1930



KEY

- seasonal migration
- + + International boundary

Source: Kreike (1994)

With reference to (Map 6.1), Kreike (ibid), indicates that the Aawambo's cattle could be found along the Cuvelai and Oshimolo Rivers, the eastern bank of the Kunene River, the western bank of the Cubango River, the Etosha Pan in the south and as far north as Cassinga.

Although the Owambos did not have homesteads in those places, they usually migrated to stay there during the dry season for grazing. They declared the whole area between the Etosha Pan and Lower Kunene as their territory and established their political and social structure based on their cultural values and social organisation.

In support of this argument, Davies (n.d) (as quoted in Duparquet 1935; Loeb 1948; Aarni 1982, Tuupainen 1970; Hahn 1928 and Delachaux and Thiebaud 1933) adds that the Owambo Region was located on an alluvial flood plain about 1,200m above sea level, which slopes gently from the north. While the Owambo shared parts of northern Namibia and southern Angola, in Namibia the Owambo area covers 56, 000 sq km between latitude 17.30 and 18.30 S, and Longitude 14.00 E and 17.30 W. The Owambo area in Namibia extends as far north as the international boundary with Angola and almost as far south as the Etosha Pan. The Owambo area in Angola is situated between the Kunene and Kavango Rivers and extends roughly 200km northwards from the Angola/Namibia border.

According to Salokoski (2006) the period of Owambo migration to their current settlement, which historians suggest would have begun about 1550-1600. They lived in seven separate societies or kingdoms, although some literature reflects otherwise, namely, Ondonga, Uukwambi, Uukwaluudhi, Ongandjera, Ombalantu, Uukolonkadhi and Uukwanyama. Salokoski (2006) further explains that, “for a long time vast forest

Map 6.2 above depicts the vast open spaces between the different Owambo kingdoms on both sides of the Angolan border. The political structure of the Owambo is organised on a tribal basis. A hereditary chief, assisted in the tribal administration by a council of headmen, headed the tribal organisation. The territory was divided into districts (Oikandjo) headed by senior headmen and wards (Omikunda) (given specific names such as Odibo, Onamunhama, Oshikango, etc.) headed by sub-headmen (Malan 1995). Hence, Oshikango border town is named after the Oshikango ward meaning a “*small water stream*” in Oshiwambo. Like all wards that cut through by the colonial border, the Oshikango ward also bisects the Namibia/Angola border at present.

After Namibia’s independence, the former Owamboland on the Namibian side was re-demarcated into new political regions, namely: Oshana, Oshikoto, Omusati, and Ohangwena with constituencies, hence the name Oshikango was also given to the regional constituency that houses the Oshikango border town in the Ohangwena Region. Santa Clara is the Angolan border town situated a stone’s throw away across the border from Oshikango but it is still situated in Oshikango ward, although one sub-headman no longer rules the ward across the border. Therefore, this research covers Oshikango as a town, a ward and a constituency and extends to a small distance to include surrounding wards on the Namibian side.

6.1.3 History of Migration: Views from Senior Citizens in Oshikango

Short distance migration was historically the phenomenon in the Oshikango experienced even before the recent labour migration, which dominates current literature. Prior to the demarcation of the colonial border demarcation, Kwanyamas and Aawambo in general migrated for grazing or calling the rains from their gods from, for example, Oshimpolo in Angola. With the advent of labour migration, the trend of migration also changed. From this, we should argue that capitalism was the catalyst for this change from traditional migration to migration for wage labour. Historically, labour migration in Oshikango was threefold: firstly, as cyclical cross-border migrant labour to *Ombishi*; secondly, as cyclical migrant labour to the south of Namibia and thirdly, as cyclical migrant labour to South Africa and other southern African countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe.

However, another remarkable paradigm was created when the authority in South Africa in conjunction with the South West African Administration and Portuguese in Angola agreed to supply labour from Angola. In his archival contribution (see archival document details at the end), Neser (Secretary for South West Africa) (1954) writes that “due to acute shortage of labour in South West Africa a large number of Angolan natives, who offer their services, are annually recruited for labour in this Territory through the Government sponsored agency.

Neser (ibid) further writes that “the contract periods were eighteen months subject to renewal for a further six months and during the calendar year 1953 the number of Angolan natives recruited for South West Africa was 8142.” In this regard, Moorsom (1977:72) confirms that it was for about “half a century (1926-1972) that recruitment and distribution of labour from the Northern Zone and Angola was the monopoly of an officially sanctioned organisation, SWANLA owned by the capitalist interests in the colony.”

According to the Agreement reached on 7/7/49 at the Windhoek Conference for the Amendment of Agreement of 13/9/44, as modified at the Pretoria Conference on 24/9/45, “SWANLA will provisionally engage, on behalf of and as requested by WENELA, Angolan natives offering at its station at Ondangua and will present them to WENELA Medical Officer at Grootfontein for medical examination”.

A strategy to shift the recruitment approach to focus more on Angolan ‘natives’ strengthened the ethnic and family network of Aawambo across the common Namibia/Angolan border. As a result many Namibians were recruited disguised as Angolans.

It was difficult for SWANLA recruiting officials to distinguish between the South West African natives and Angolan natives since they spoke the same languages such as Oshiwambo and as Kane-Berman (n.d) writes, “their home straddles the border between

South West and Angola.” This fact aroused curiosity to explore the empirical reality in respect of historical migration patterns along Namibia/Angola’s common border and how this features in interpretations of current dispensations of nationalism, regionalism and globalisation.

As indicated in the previous chapter, five (5) men and (5) women older than seventy (70) years were identified as storytellers to narrate their experiences of migration to other places for work or other purposes. However, it manifested that not all women interviewed migrated to distant areas. This conforms to Crush and Williams’ (1997:3) opinion that “women make more frequent and shorter visits than men do – days or weeks rather than months or years”.

In Oshikango, data indicate that only men migrated for employment purposes. Women remained at home taking care of livestock, homesteads and families. Only one female story teller Victoria Ndongo (80) indicated that she had been to Windhoek, not for migrant labour purpose, though, but to follow her husband who was employed as a police officer in the city. It is evident that professionals such as the police officers, teachers, pastors and administrators had special privileges to migrate for work with their families, but not the contract migrant workers. Headmen Mukalele and Iyambo (no age given: 2005) jointly narrated their experiences, adventures and journey as migrant labourers to South Africa as follows:

“Our journey to mines in Johannesburg commenced from Ondangwa. We had to walk on foot from Oshikango to Ondangwa where we

boarded SWANLA buses via Grootfontein to Shakawe. From Shakawe we travelled by air up to Francis Town where we boarded a train to Johannesburg. We normally worked for a period of 12 consecutive months. The communication with the family at home was irregular since it relied only on post-mail. Curiously, when we left to work in South Africa, we registered as Angolans because the South African government preferred recruiting Angolans rather than South West Africans. Both customs and civil law prevented women from migrating for labour. Customarily, women were regarded as carrying bad omens and if they followed us to work, they would cause bad luck. In addition, all migrant labourers were bearers of a 'Tribal Fund Registration Certificate' (see Appendix E), also called a "Tax Card" (Okakalata kefedelo, in Oshiwambo), which was not given to women. Those male community members without that card or who did not pay tax to their tribal authority would not be able to migrate for work. In Oshikango, we paid our tax at the Ohangwena Traditional Authority Office. At the beginning, we were paying mahangu (millet) measured in an empty tin of 1 gallon and later we started paying R0.25, which increased regularly. We were not only migrating for labour, but we also migrated as herdsmen to Angola. We herded our livestock, as deep in Angola as Oshimolo and at that time we did not experience border controls or citizenship questionings. Indeed, you could stay in Angola as long as you pleased - even a year or more at the cattle post. Likewise, no woman was allowed to follow us to cattle posts, because of bad luck that they might cause to our animals and us. On rare occasions, some fathers might take young girls in their company. The Boers and Portuguese brought borders and citizenship to us after killing Mandume, our king. The consequence of it is the current division of the Kwanyama ethnic group."

Fillipus Kadume (87) (2005), a community leader also told his side of the story on migration:

He went to work at Rehoboth on a farm. The chance to obtain that opportunity was terribly small. Firstly, you had to walk a distance of 60km to Ondangwa for recruitment. Secondly, recruitment was achieved through a long day's physical confrontation at the Ondangwa SWANLA recruiting offices. "You were beaten and pushed". "You starved for days once you ran out of foodstuff". When recruited a cord was rolled around your neck with its end clamped with a copper substance. The name of the farm where you would be working was engraved in that copper. It also symbolised that you were bought and by who. Angolans also joined us to work

in the south, but they did not pay tax. At that time, we only earned 0.95 shillings a month (0.95c). Our contracts ranged from 12 to 18 months, but you could negotiate with your boss for renewal (this renewal was called in Oshiwambo “Okunohola” deduced from Afrikaans word “nog” which means “again”). Women were not allowed to follow us because they could disturb the work. The women’s responsibility was to look after the houses waiting for us to bring them money and dresses. However, women also migrated to visit their families in Angola and elsewhere in the region of Owamboland. They did so with permission from their husbands. Usually, husbands prescribed a length of time to their wives if they were leaving to visit somewhere. If a woman exceeded the given time, the husband had the right to follow her to get her home. This could also lead to beatings by the husband as a punishment for violating his order. Apart from going to the south, we also went to the cattle post at Oshimolo. Borders were not important and Oshikango border post was not there, since it was established a bit later. Border control was not known and we lived as one tribe although we heard that there was a borderline. Hence, most Kwanyamas until now believe that they are one tribe and the newly inaugurated Kwanyama kingdom is incomplete since it does not cover the area as it was ruled by the previous Kwanyama kings. Now our families are on the other side of the border and we regularly visit them through un-gazetted border areas. Currently, people are talking about the SADC, which to me is an impossible attempt. This can cause confusion, war and other conflicts because our culture does not allow mixing with other tribes.

Another key storyteller was Mr. Kambalala (87) (2005), a former teacher at Odibo St Mary’s School, a cattle herdsman, a World War II veteran and migrant worker on mines in South Africa who gave this account of his experience.

In my youth, I used to migrate with cattle to Oshimolo, currently in Angola. In our time, that was not Angola and we regarded the area as the land of the Kwanyamas. We reared our cattle without any problem regarding migration control in this area. Oshikango border post was established in 1927³⁶ with Nakale (Taller) a nickname given to the first white commissioner. Currently, I hear people are talking

³⁶ Hayes (1992:264) correctly ties well in Kambalala’s story by indicating that ,“a sense of physical, spatial and political compression emerges from the implementation of the boundary agreement between South Africa and Portugal in the late 1920s”.

of the SADC and I believe this is a good idea, especially for economic development. However, remember that the SADC integration may also strengthen criminal syndicates in the region. On the issue of migration, I started working in the south in 1937 as a farm worker and I served as a soldier in the South African Army during World War II. After the war, I went to work in South Africa. The journey started from Nyavanyava/Grootfontein through Rundu to Shakawe where we met with other migrant workers from Evale in Angola. We all came on foot up to Shakawe. Shakawe was at that time a recruiting depot where people were transferred to Muhembo by road where we were examined medically before we departed to Francistown in Botswana and thenceforth to Johannesburg. At every WENELA rest camp and centres, other people from other countries joined us until we arrived in Johannesburg. In Johannesburg, migrant workers were categorised as follows: All those people from countries in the north such as Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika were called 'northern people' and those of us from Namibia and Angola were called 'Magola', meaning people from Angola. We were regarded as Angolans because we made ourselves Angolans at the recruiting centre because SWANLA preferred Angolans to Namibians. No woman was allowed to migrate to South Africa for labour. The general impression was that they disturbed the work and in contrast, they did not have tax cards. Our decision to migrate for work to South Africa was prompted by a rumour that in Johannesburg "the people receive their cash salary in the hat because the amount was too big to fit in the bowl of two hands, meaning that they earned a lot of money."

These oral histories add more knowledge to existing information. These three examples may suffice by way of illustration. First, only males migrated for labour. Second, women were prevented from migrating by both civil laws and traditional customs, and this promoted male dominance. Third, it transpired that Kwanyamas in Angola and those in Namibia still regard themselves as one nation. To add more substance to this finding, evidence from the perspective of individual households in Oshikango is explored in the subsequent section.

6.1.4 Observation: The Oshikango Border Post and the Surroundings

The Oshikango border post is Namibia's major northern gateway situated on the extreme northern edge of the Oshikango border town. This border post and the town are as old as the border itself. Through observations, Thomson (2004:6) argues that "Oshikango on the other side of the fence looks no different from this, but in some respects, it is another world." In the same light, the researcher of this dissertation observed the same scenario.

Through a three-day observation in Oshikongo and more particularly at the border post itself a clear picture of the migratory situation at Oshikango border town emerged based on the daily movement of migrants. One remarkable migratory dynamic observed was that the Oshikango border post was constantly busy and the situation often changes from calmness to anarchy as many people, men, women and children are constantly crossing the border in large numbers. Some migrants made use of legal migratory procedures to cross the border whereas some struggled to cross the international border through dubious means.

During this observation, the majority of people crossing the border were women carrying their babies. It was also observed that common languages used at Oshikango border town were Portuguese and Oshikwanyama.

Shopping appears to be the major migratory activity. People from Angola tend to buy their consumer goods in Namibia often to sell these back home. Many Angolans, especially women even sell bric-a-brac on the pavements or outside offices and business places such as shopping malls in Oshikango.

During interviews, these women were reluctant to speak to any stranger about anything apart from business. It seems they were illegal migrants hence they refused interviews and they regarded the interviewer as a 'police officer'. This added another limitation to this research. The reason why these women avoided the interviewer could be attributed to the fact that they live in fear due to perpetual abuse. As pointed out in Chapter 4, migrant women are said to be subjected to perpetual abuse by known and unknown men in host countries.

The languages that those women spoke were mostly African languages particularly of Angolan origin such as Vimbundu, Tjihokwe and the majority Oshikwanyama. They could not understand either Portuguese or English. These were people in their own world. Therefore, it was difficult for the researcher to explain to them the purpose of the research or interviews. Moreover, it was self-evident that those people were unable to understand technical questions such as those on the SADC Integration.

Except for these women, young men and even boys carrying miscellaneous items such as corrugated iron, bags, boxes and timber on their heads or shoulders across the border were also observed. Bicycles were also used for that purpose. Those people were employed on an ad hoc basis by Angolans and other cross-border merchants to escort them through the border. They were not required to go through migration procedures because they crossed the border every five to ten minutes. Robbery is the order of the day and the police were constantly at full alert at Oshikango at the time of this research.

The research was not restricted to Oshikango border town as such, but interviews were conducted in a radius of 20km around Oshikango town with a specific focus on grassroots communities and key informants to determine the gap in terms of understanding of the SADC Integration as observed from the perspectives of the migrants themselves.

6.1.5 Summary of findings from Observation Technique

Through observations at the time of this study, it was found that the economic disparities among the SADC countries make some countries the sending countries of migrants and others the receiving countries. The problem manifests in the behaviour of grassroots communities especially those living in border regions. The majority of them do not understand the reason for border control and why they belong to another country.

Because of these factors, the following is the summary of the findings on the general situation observed at the Oshikango border post from 1 – 15 July 2005:

- The management of migration at Oshikango border post is difficult and characterized by a high degree of anarchy and poor cooperation between migrants and immigration officials or border control police;
- Most migrants from Angola were observed carrying heavy luggage on their heads when they crossed back to Angola – meaning that the majority came to Namibia for shopping purposes;
- Young men and even under-aged children using bicycles to escort migrants with their luggage across the border for pay, caused a great deal of disorder, since they rush to grab bags and other belongings of potential migrants and hence robbery is also rife;
- The majority of migrants crossing the border on foot were middle-aged women usually carrying children on their backs and big bags on their heads;
- School children from the Angolan side of the border also formed a considerable number of regular cross-border migrants at the Oshikango border post and they were not required to go through the immigration process;
- Female migrants always looked frightened and refused to communicate with strangers, particularly males;

- Another large percentage of migrants from Angola were patients at the Engela State Hospital – hence the ambulance was constantly running between the border and the hospital;
- Heavy trucks with registration numbers of various SADC countries and loaded with large cargoes queued facing the gateway and young women came to talk to truck drivers as if they were asking for a lift – this could mean that prostitution and human trafficking at Oshikango was rife.

From initial observations, the study became more structured. Interviews were conducted with key informants to compare and contrast the observation results with the results from government officials, Local Authority officials, business and church leaders and so forth.

6.2 Respondents: Key informants

The key informant interviews refer to qualitative, in-depth interviews with people selected for their first-hand knowledge about a topic of interest - in this case, the cross-border migration issues and their impact on the SADC Regional Integration. The purpose of the key informant interviews was to uncover the reasons, which the households and cross-border respondents were reluctant to provide, for example why and how migration happened along the border.

In Oshikango, interviews were conducted with a number of key informants including officials from the Helao Nafidi Town Council, (a newly established town composed of the four major settlements of Oshikango, Omafo, Engela, and Ohangwena) and extended to include nearby settlements such as Odibo village and Ohangwena Regional Council. Other prominent officials interviewed were police and migration officers, teachers and school principals, church leaders, health officials, EPZ managers and selected businesspersons (see Appendix H).

For consistency, police and immigration officers answered the same sections of the questionnaire, which is the section of questions relevant to migration and border control. On the question pertaining to common migration issues they deal with on a daily basis, the Principal Immigration Officer (Shivute) and (Inspector Kamati) the Nampol Inspector at the Oshikango Border Post (2005) both indicated that illegal migration was a major problem. Both pointed to the porous nature of the border itself. People often entered Namibia and Angola at places other than the border post. These people constitute what is known as ‘a flood of illegal migrants.’

Migrants from southern Angola to Namibia speaking different languages such as Kwanyamas, Vimbudu and Tjihokwe dominate this trend. In support, (Naminga) the councillor of the Oshikango Constituency (2005) emphasised that “you hardly ever realise in which country you are if you walk in this area”. It means that some homesteads on both sides of the international border are too close. One can be in

Namibia but the closest neighbour is the one in Angola. For example, “if you need ‘fire’ (one of the most important philanthropic symbols of assistance among the Aawambo), you get it from your neighbour across the border. Oshikango is another world, hence the existing migratory procedure cannot be followed under circumstances of this nature,” (Nambinga 2005).

The Principal Immigration Officer further alluded to the issue of illegal migrants after the expiry of their travel documents. Visitors often come to Namibia legally and then stay until their visas have expired although the passports are still valid. This happens on a comprehensive basis and it is inclusive of nationals from other countries, apart from Angola. Table: 6.1 below shows how the Principal Migration Officer and Nampol Inspector at the Oshikango border post rank the common reasons for people to migrate.

Table 6.1: Reasons to migrate

	Reasons given	Nampol/Migration
a.	Visiting immediate families (mother, father, sisters, sons, daughters)	Migration
b.	Visiting relatives (aunt, uncle, grandmother, grandfather)	Migration
c.	Shopping	Migration/Nampol
d.	Business	Migration/Nampol
E	Emigration or immigration	
f.	School	Migration/Nampol
g.	Pasturing	
h.	Till mahangu field	
i.	Attend church services	Migration
j.	Other (employment and water)	Migration/Nampol

Source: Interview Nampol and Immigration Officer (18 July 2005): Oshikango

Table: 6.1 above, indicates the major reasons, which migrants from Angola to Namibia usually give to the police or immigration officers. Paradoxically enough, migrants are quick to select which reason to give to the police and which to immigration officials.

They give reasons such as shopping, particularly food, business, schooling, employment and water to both the immigration officials and the police, presumably to gain sympathy. In contrast, they give reasons such as visiting the family and relatives and attending church services to the immigration officials only, presumably to gain mercy.

In addition, a large number of Angolan children commute every day across the border to attend school at Oshikango or Odibo combined schools. The interviewed, Mwandingi the Principal and Mpinge the senior teacher at the Oshikango Combined School (2005) have also confirmed this. On the question whether the Angolan children require study permits to enrol in these schools, the respondents (principal and the senior teacher) explained that the only documents that the Angolan learners have are Namibian birth certificates despite the fact that they commute from the Angolan side. They further stated that Angolan children obtain birth certificates easily through transborder family networks.

Angolans send their children to relatives in Namibia to get citizenship and enrol in the Namibian schools. This has led to dual citizenship, since these children may have both Namibian and Angolan birth certificates. The school principal of Oshikango Combined School produced a list of these children (see Table: 6.2 below).

Table 6.2: Learners crossing the borders from Angola: Oshikango Combined School 2005

Grade	Number of learners
Grade 1	1
Grade 2	3
Grade 3	1
Grade 4	2
Grade 5	1
Grade 7	4
Grade 8	6
Grade 9	2
Grade 10	1
Total	21

Source: School record – Oshikango Combined School 2005

Table 6.2 depicts that the children commuting every day from Angola to attend school at Oshikango Combined School range from Grade 1 to Grade 10. The school is situated around 3km from the Namibia/Angola border hence the school principal assumes that a large number of children could also go to Odibo Combined School, which is 1km from the border.

In the case of Oshikango Combined School, learners commute from the following villages/wards in Angola: Okahuyulu, Oshikango³⁷, Omulova and Santa Clara. This implies that after registration as learners in the Namibian schools the children return to Angola and start commuting to school from there. In this way, the problem of dual citizenship will possibly remain perpetual in a vicious circle since it is embedded in the youth.

³⁷ Oshikango in Angola is an extension of the Namibian Oshikango traditional ward.

Alluding to the question of dual citizenship, both (respondents) the police and the immigration officers at the Oshikango border post stressed dual citizenship as a major problem that they always had to deal with. For example, the Principal Immigration Officer (ibid) confirmed that, “although it is not statistically recorded it can be estimated that about 70% of people living along the common Namibia/Angola border especially on the Angolan side have dual citizenship.”

The Nampol Inspector (ibid) echoed the same sentiment that “the majority of people in Oshikango have dual citizenship without knowledge of its illegality.” He further argues that this is mainly illustrated by the number of people usually arrested in possession of the documents of both countries’ citizenship. Normally, no legal action is taken against them apart from confiscation of documents and immediate deportation. The major reason for the Angolan people to be dual citizens is to enjoy the rights and benefits of both countries and to keep in touch with their relatives on both sides of the border.

The benefits that Angolans enjoy in Namibia are, apart from education, a pension and medical services at nearby medical centres such as Engela State Hospital and Odibo Health Centre and morally, the church services. For example, (Nghishitende the matron of the Odibo Health Centre and (Shatilwe) (2005) a Registered nurse), who were interviewed explained that the centre is flooded with patients from Angola who also registered as citizens rather than as foreigners.

The Matron further explained that foreigners were expected to pay N\$40-00 for medical treatment at the Centre, hence in order to pay less Angolans register themselves as Namibians.

It is also worth noting that a further reason that compels them to register as Namibians is that if the Angolan patient who came for medical treatment in Namibia through illegal border crossing dies, he or she must be buried in Namibia because, according to the Kwanyama culture a corpse cannot cross the border. Subsequently, it becomes difficult for the bereaved family to repatriate a corpse of the deceased illegal migrant through the border post. Adding substance to this fact, the Matron cited another example of the incident of a certain Angolan teenage girl who was raped in Angola and brought to Odibo Health Centre for medical treatment.

It became difficult for the nurses to treat her because the Namibian law requires any victim of rape to first report the case to the Police before the nurses may treat her. In this case, the parents of the raped girl were unable to report the case to the Namibian police since the assault was committed in Angola. Consequently, the girl was returned without treatment.

Usually, the Oshikwanyama-speaking people from Angola are not regarded as foreigners at the centre because of the language they speak and their common family links, which they have even, to a certain extent, with the hospital staff members. Notably, only those

who speak Portuguese and other non-Kwanyama languages are seen as foreigners and are liable to pay N\$40-00 for medical attention. Aside from medical attention, Angolans also attend church services at Odibo Anglican Parish. The Secretary of the Parish (Nawa 2005) explained that the border is free and fenceless and that the people from the other side of the border cross freely to attend church services at Odibo. Most of their church members are historically from Angola. “This is an historical phenomenon,” she stressed (Nawa *ibid*).

The frequency of cross-border migration and population movement was also assessed during the interviews. Responding to the question of how often people cross borders to or from Angola, the Immigration Officer (*ibid*) at Oshikango border post disclosed that one person can cross the border as often as 10 times per day. Shopping and other reasons alluded to above point to this frequency. For example, an Angolan person who has just shopped in Namibia may return to Namibia the same day for more shopping if the need arises. The same sentiment was echoed by a Nampol inspector (*ibid*) who further explained that it is sometimes not easy to determine how often people cross the border even through the border post. “Many things complicate this observation”, he concluded.

This argument conflicts with Nangula and Nickanor’s (2005:2) findings that “between 1999 and 2003, for example, there was a total of 1, 31,365 arrivals from Angola and 780,050 departures from Namibia.” These figures could probably not be justified

because it might be inclusive of people crossing the border several times a day or even within an hour. With this in mind, it would be extremely tempting to say that some people were counted more than ten times a day as arrivals or departures. This is also amplified by the issue of casually employed people (Namibians) particularly the youngsters by Angolan buyers to escort them across the border or up to the no-man's land – usually using bicycles.

Upon the question whether women are also included in the number of people who frequently cross the border, the Nampol inspector (ibid) stated that the majority of people who regularly cross the border are women and children. In contrast, the Immigration Officer (ibid) perceived both men and women crossing the border in equal numbers and rate.

Most of them come to do shopping and only a small number of migrants reach Oshakati. Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:17) reached the same conclusion that “most people crossing from Angola went to local destinations such as Oshikango (34%), some 10% of the respondents indicated villages in the vicinity of Oshikango border post as their destination. Only 6% were proceeding on to Windhoek or other urban areas such as Oshakati (4%) and Ondangwa (3%) respectively.”

However, at the time of this study there was a special migratory arrangement in place for the Namibians and Angolans living within a distance of 30km from the common border

to make use of a border-pass offered at the entry point, when entering either country. In addition, Angolans do not require a visa to visit Namibia. In contrast, Namibians living beyond 30km would require a visa endorsed with a visitor's entry permit to visit Angola. The nearest place in the north of Namibia where the Angolan visa can be obtained is Oshakati. At the worst, visa applicants may sometimes travel long and costly distances to Oshakati for a visa. Things also take a turn for the worse, if the Angolan Consulate in Oshakati runs out of visas, which would force the applicants to visit other places, such as Rundu or Windhoek.

In addition, the applicant has to pay N\$60-00 to obtain an Angolan visa. Ndishishi (2003) observes that "the requirements of the Angolan Government for visa clearance for Namibian nationals entering Angola causes inconvenience especially to those citizens interested in exploring business and investment opportunities." This situation also compromises peoples' understanding of the tenets of the SADC Regional Integration.

Although former president Sam Nujoma earnestly appealed to the Angolan government to lift visa requirements, this was only done after President Pohamba and his Angolan counterpart agreed on the issue and the two Ministers of Home Affairs signed the bilateral agreement in 2005 in that regard. At the time of collection of data for this dissertation, the agreement had not been implemented. Therefore, it is very difficult to establish its practical feasibility and implications.

6.2.1 Cross-border trade

Cross-border trade was expected to boost both Namibia and Angola's economies and even promote Regional Integration initiatives from the bottom up, although to some extent it was undermined by existing cross-border migration arrangements. For example, Ndishishi (2003:1) explains that "Angola and Namibia boast a combined market size of approximately 15 million people, with Angola accounting for nearly 13 million while Namibia accounts for almost 2 million people."

Namibia has a positive trade balance with Angola, which has flourished after the end of the recent civil war in Angola in 2002, although it has declined steadily due to visa requirements and exorbitant tariffs charged by the Angolan customs. Hence, both key informants and individual migrants echo shopping and business as some of the major reasons, which drive cross-border migration at Oshikango. Cross-border business activities, for example, take place both informally and formally and involve both import and export. Kallungia, (2001:5) indicates that "cross- border trade significantly influences the Regional Integration because economic interdependence rather than autarky is the foundation of modern society."

Many studies ignore informal cross-border trade, although it is of particular importance, especially in transit areas such as Oshikango. For example, look at the following tables

on the top 10 import and export products 1997-2001 at the Oshikango border post as reflected in Nepru Report by Kahuika et al (2003:45).

Table 6.3: Top 10 Import products 1997-2001

	Import CIF Value N\$	% of total imports for that period
“Fish fillets, dried, salted or inbrine, but not smoked”	1,196,170	1.39%
Other carbonates; peroxocarbonates	1,308,612	1.52%
Seamless iron or steel drill pipe of a kind used in drilling for oil/gas	1649,763	1.91%
“Interchangeable tools for drilling, other than for rock drilling”	2,295,527	2.66%
“Waters, (icl mineral & aerorated), contg added sugar, etc”	2,453,005	2.84%
“Other inorganic compounds, liquid/compressed air; amalgams; nes”	3,490,996	4.04%
Beer made from malt	4,135,917	4.79%
“Fish flats, oilsand their fractions (exc fish liver oils)”	5,444,282	6.30%
“Live bovine animals, other than pure-bred breeding”	6,340,037	7.34%
“Flours/meals/pellets of fish, etc. unfit for human consumption”	34,423,369	39.86%

Source: Kahuika et al. (2003) as quoted CBS 2002

In their report for Namibia and Angola: Trade Assessment, Kahuika et al. (2003:45) indicate as in Table 6.3 above that Namibia imports more flours/meals/pellets of fish, i.e. 39,86%, which is unfortunately unfit for human consumption. Based on the statistics above, this study may conclude that Namibia’s import from Angola is not significant.

Table 6.4: Top 10 Export products (FOB value, 1997-2001)

	Exports FOB value in N\$	% of total exports for that period
“Soap and organic surface-active products in bars, etc. for toilet use”	25,338,419	1.18%
Used personal effects	25,530,423	1.18%
Prefabricated buildings	35,040,320	1.63%
Cigarettes containing tobacco	40,835,635	1.89%
Sun flower-seed & safflower oil (exc crude) & fractions	57,462,419	2.67%
“Waters, (icl mineral & aerorated), contg added sugar, etc”	83,042,355	3.85%
“Raw cane sugar, in solid form	86,352,443	4.01%
Whiskey	92,644,985	4.30%
“Other non-alcoholic beverages, nes”	222,551,536	10.33%
Beer made from malt	448,525,785	20.81%

Source: Kahuika et al. (2003) as quoted CBS 2002

Statistics in Table 6.4 also indicate that among the top 10 exports to Angola via the Oshikango border post are consumer goods with whiskey that makes up 4.30%, soft drinks 10.33% and beer 20.81% of total Namibian exports to Angola. Live cattle excluding purebred breeding stock dominate imports to Namibia from Angola namely 7.34%.

Although these statistics reflect the actual profile on cross-border trade between Namibia and Angola through the Oshikango border post, informal cross-border trade activities between the countries has been left out. During interviews with households in Oshikango (see reasons for cross-border migration to Angola), evidence indicated that most migrants, especially female households went to Angola to buy items to sell in Namibia.

However, the value of informal cross-border trade was nowhere reflected in the Namibia and Angola Trade Assessment report. This might give the impression that the statistical evidence in this report is incomplete, or else it is unimportant for calculating the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is also observable that recording imports and exports in Oshikango area is not always easy, since the border is porous and many people do business through unofficial border passages. Currently, no one knows how much this informal cross border trade contributes to Namibia or Angola's GDP.

Kallungia (2001:6) also accentuates that "one of the major reasons for the lack of interest by many trade analysts in the study of informal cross-border trade is the secrecy

of information in the transactions of this trade and the hidden identity of most of its participants.”

At Oshikango, most of the cross-border migrants engage in informal trade whereby some Namibians cross to Angola to buy goods such as clothes, toiletries, groceries, liquor, beer and beverages, sweets and food, including mahangu, mopane worms, fruit and groundnuts to retail in Namibia, and the Angolans cross to Namibia for the same purpose. This trend is conceived as being instigative to both legal and illegal cross-border migration at Oshikango.

6.2.2 Oshikango’s EPZ and Cross-border trade

When interviewed, Awene (2005) the Manager of the EPZ Park at Oshikango stated that the number of people from Angola coming to buy their goods at the EPZ but declined again during 2004 to 2005. Kahuika et al (2003) argued that although it was difficult to quantify the declining figure due to the inability of the Namibian Customs at Oshikango to present figures for export values, a source in the private sector indicated that the decline of exports across commodities was undoubtedly well in excess of 50% in 2003 compared to those of the previous year. This conforms to Nangulah and Nickanor’s (2005:2) findings that, “the annual number of foreign citizen arrivals at Oshikango nearly doubled from 143 992 in 1999 to 267 504 in 2003.”

The ODC manager indicated that the decline experienced during 2004/2005 was due to heavy tariff barriers following the deployment of officials from a private company called Crown Agency at the Angolan border, particularly at adjacent Santa Clara border post from the beginning of 2003 to administer and collect customs revenue for the government of Angola.

A large number of Angolan businesspeople who initially welcomed and exploited the opportunity provided by the Namibian government through EPZ incentives have lately found it unprofitable. Managers of the private companies in the EPZ Park in Oshikango when interviewed explained that their Angolan clients currently tend to refrain from crossing over to Namibia to do formal business and they may opt for informal trade. Another negative impact is that this situation is said to have resulted in some warehouses at the Oshikango EPZ Park closing.

Similarly, Kassauf (2005), Chairman/Founder of SIGMA TRADING (PTY) LTD (with EPZ status) stated that about 100% of their customers are from Angola and the majority of them are women, but the number has been going down as from April 2004 due to the above-mentioned heavy tariffs imposed on the side of Angola. Bhanji (2005), the manager of the COGEF GROUP IMPORTERS (PTY) LTD (with EPZ status) on the other hand indicates that about 99% of their customers are Angolans and 1% includes Zambians, Zimbabweans and Namibians. Some people from the DRC also buy from them but in the name of Angola. Bhanji (ibid) also expressed dissatisfaction with the

Angolan tariffs, saying that Oshikango's business was collapsing, business activities had decreased by about 80% and exports to Angola had also declined sharply.

This also indicated that the legal cross-border migration would decrease because the legal migrants were the people buying from the EPZ warehouse companies and the percentage of illegal migrants would remain intact. Formal trading also declined while the informal increased. For example, apart from the EPZ managers, Awene (2005), the Controller of the Multi Choice Company, when interviewed argued that they also receive a certain number of customers from Angola but this could be an informal deal. The Angolans pay tax when they pay for their DSTV programmes at Oshikango, which they do not claim back when they return home.

Although cross-border migration and population movement are good for the economy since it boosts the buying power of the country and deepens regional integration, it also raises some questions. For example, Meddy (2005) the official who was interviewed in the office of the Town Clerk of the Helao Nafidi Town Council argued that Angolans come to buy their goods in bulk in Oshikango and often overstay for many days in the small and emerging town, using municipal services. The Town Council has trouble in budgeting for or determining the magnitude of services required in the town.

6.2.3 Key Informant's Responses on SADC Regionalism

Fifteen (15) managers and heads of government and private institutions and organisations, including the regional and town councils, private companies, church and health centres in Oshikango were interviewed about their knowledge and implementation of the SADC Integration Project and its regional protocols. They were also interviewed about their knowledge of and support for the planned SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region and finally about federalism as an ideal system for the SADC Integration. On the question whether they have knowledge about the SADC in general and the SADC Protocol of Facilitation/Free Movements of Persons (see the result in Table 6.5 below).

Table 6.5: Knowledge about SADC and SADC Protocol of Facilitation/Free Movements of Persons

	Known		Unknown		Total
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	
(a) Knowledge about SADC in general	3	20%	12	80%	15 (100%)
(b) Knowledge about SADC Protocol of Facilitation for the Free Movement of Persons	1	6.7%	14	93.3%	15 (100%)

Sources: Interviews with Key informants (2005)

It is evident from Table 6.5 above that 80% (N=12) of the key informants revealed that SADC is not known to them or at the level of their offices. Hamukongo (2005), the Administrator of the Odibo Health Centre for example, explained that “I just hear about the SADC on the radio and the television and I am not aware of the benefits that the SADC may bring to us. There is nothing to indicate what the SADC did to us”. He

further explained that, “since the SADC is not known at this level the question about the implementation of the SADC protocols or even knowledge about them does not belong here.”

On the question as to what extent the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons is known at their level of management, the result proved negative (see Table: 6.5). Only one respondent showed knowledge of the Protocol, claiming that “I have heard about it, but not officially – hence it seems hearsay”. All fourteen (14) i.e. 93.3% of the key informants said that the planned SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons was not known to them and they did not even hear about it through the media. One respondent argued that “many things including agreements that affected their work are not brought down to the people, hence they are state centric activities”. This creates the impression that implementation of any SADC Protocol at the institutional level is impossible since even the regional body itself is not known. As most respondents already stated that they do not know the SADC, the responses that they gave to the question about the implementation of the SADC protocols were also negative (see Table 6.6) below.

Table 6.6: Implementation of any SADC Protocol at the institutional level

None	One	Several
-	1	0

Source: Researcher (2005)

Table 6.6 indicates that the only SADC Agreement implemented in Oshikango is by Nampol. This one is called the “Southern African Regional Police Chief Council Organisation (SARPCCO)³⁸ Motor and Vehicle Clearance” to counter cross-border motor vehicle theft. According to the Nampol inspector (ibid) at the Oshikango border post, the problems that they experience are, with regard to SARPCCO Motor and Vehicle clearance, due to cross-border syndicates for fraud.

Msutu (2001:n.p) further explained that “the syndicates use forged registration books and travel documents, false number plates and clearance, as well as corruption and anything else in their power to pass through the borders.” Although SARPCCO has a wide range of agreements on preventing cross-border crimes this is the only one that police officers know about at the regional level.

Echoing similar sentiments, Nambinga (2005), the Councillor of the Oshikango Constituency said that the SADC documents that he had heard about were those implemented by the police and the army. “Although politically we believe that we are in the SADC, practically this is not implemented at the constituency level”, the Councillor explained. The research made inquiries whether the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons should be encouraged and respondents gave different answers as Table 6.7 below depicts.

³⁸ SARPCCO, the Southern African Regional Police Chief Council Organisation is an official forum consisting of all the police chiefs from Southern Africa established in 1995.

Table 6.7: Support the SADC Protocols

Protocols	Support		No support		No comment		Total
(a) Support of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation for the Free Movement of Persons	1	6.7%	8	53.3%	6	40%	15 (100%)
(b) Federalism as a system of SADC Regional Integration	2	13.3%	6	40%	5	33.3%	15 (100%)

Source: Interview with Key informants (2005)

Statistics in Table 6.7 above suggest that only one respondent or 6.7% of key informants supported the Protocol, 53% showed no support and 40%, mainly the managers of the EPZ companies opted not to comment. One respondent observed that “if there is such an initiative for a Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region, it is just a dream which is impracticable at this stage of development.”

In addition, on the question whether the SADC Integration can succeed without such a Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons, he explained that regional integration was a good idea “but it is dangerous and not an easy exercise since even the EU or the AU are struggling to make ends meet.” Some respondents also explained that “if freedom of people’s movement in the Region is legalised it will weaken control and the crime rate will increase alarmingly, health will be hazardous, hence it is not good and the protocol should be discouraged.”

The key informants were also asked to clarify whether federalism could be an ideal system for the SADC's Regional Integration to overcome problems that were experienced by the EU and AU. The majority offered no support. Forty percent (40%) of the respondents did not support SADC federalism. Some indicated that federalism at the regional level would disturb the process of African Union and it was just a "matter of wasting money" (see Table 6.7 above). For example, one respondent argued that "currently the SADC employs people in its structures who produce nothing tangible." "Up to now, there are no real ties between countries apart from infrastructural network such as the Trans-Kalahari and Trans-Caprivi highways or the current railway project via Oshikango to Angola (under construction)."

In addition, federalism cannot solve the problem because of strong cultural and traditional attitudes, particularly at the grassroots level. It is possible that some people will resist regional integration in the form of federalism in order to maintain their own ethnicity, culture and national sovereignty.

Federalism is a good approach to integration or decentralisation but it is likely not to be ideal in Africa where peace and political stability are often unsustainable. For example, democracy in many SADC countries, including Angola is questionable. Peace in the DRC is not certain. In addition, where is the Seychelles? One respondent asked. All respondents perceived the SADC Regional Integration as a state-centric project, which had nothing to do with people at the grassroots level.

A large number of business people that constituted almost 33.3% of the respondents had no comment on the issue of SADC federalism. This could be attributed to the fact that the majority of the business people, especially in the EPZ Park are foreigners from Latin America and other countries outside the SADC Region or Africa, hence they have no interest in the SADC or African affairs. Only 13.3% of the key respondents supported SADC federalism, arguing that “if it is possible somewhere in the world, why not in Southern Africa?”

According to them, “federalism makes regions and countries strong because of the creation of economies of scale and strong democracy.” To sum up, read the overall findings below drawn from interviews with key informants in Oshikango

6.2.4 Summary of the findings from the key informants

The overall results obtained from interviews with officials at the institutional management level in Oshikango shows that the SADC Regional Integration Project is rarely understood by people at the grassroots and institutional levels. It proves that the SADC is practically a state-centric project.

Moreover, key informant respondents also revealed the following important information. (Cross-border and household respondents could not provide this data, because of their low level of understanding of the purpose of research and distrust of researchers):

- Illegal migration is difficult to control owing to the porous nature of the border itself. People often come into the country anywhere.
- The people along the common border have dual citizenship without knowledge that it is illegal. This reality transpires in many ways, for example, Angolan parents send their children to relatives in Namibia to get citizenship and enrol in Namibian schools at Oshikango. Now these children have Namibian and Angolan citizenship and this can develop into a vicious circle. This is further illustrated by the number of people arrested in possession of the citizenship documents of both countries.
- Usually, the Oshikwanyama-speaking people from Angola are not regarded as foreigners in the area of Oshikango. The indicator is that at the Odibo Health Centre only non-Oshikwanyama-speaking are treated as foreigners and made to pay N\$40-00 for treatment. Because some staff members at the Centre are themselves Oshikwayama-speaking and originally from Angola, they cannot let their relatives from Angola pay. In addition, most people from the nearest villages in Angola have dual citizenship, hence when they come to Namibia for treatment they are Namibians and when they go to Angola for other benefits they

are Angolans. Therefore, politically, Namibia and Angola in the vicinity of Oshikango are two countries but communally they are one.

- The statistics of people crossing the border through the official border post at Oshikango are not reliable since one person can cross the border as often as 10 times per day. In that regard, one person can be counted many times per day as a migrant.
- The major reason for people to migrate at Oshikango is business. Namibians cross to Angola to buy goods such as clothes, toiletries, groceries, liquor, beer and beverages, sweets and food including mahangu, mopane worms, fruit and ground-nuts to retail in Namibia, and the Angolans cross to Namibia for the same purpose.
- Between 99-100% of clients buying in the Namibian EPZ markets at Oshikango are Angolans, which is good for Namibia's economy and sustainability of the EPZ incentives in the area. However, this trend dropped after Angola's co-option of the British Crown Agency to collect their customs tariffs at the border. They charge exorbitant tariffs and cross-border trade has declined, Oshikango's business is collapsing, business activities have decreased by 80% and exports to Angola have declined sharply.
- The key informants do not support SADC federalism as a solution to cross-border issues in the Region. Forty percent (40%) of the respondents said no to federalism because they feel that federalism at the regional level will disturb the

process of the African Union and it was just a matter of wasting money. It cannot be taken that at the institutional and constituency level, the officials fully support the national sovereignty, but they lack proper understanding of regional integration.

These results indicate the gap between the state level and community levels in terms of understanding and implementing the SADC Regional Integration Project. Documents on the SADC agreements are filed in the cabinets of central government, while people at the regional/provincial level remain uninformed. This implies paternalism as the approach that informs the interpretation of the SADC Regional Integration Project. These conclusions reflect the opinions of key informants in Oshikango and the following section will, therefore, investigate through interviews the opinion of migrants who were crossing the border at a particular time.

6.3 Responses of Cross-Border Migrants: Oshikango Border Post

The number of Namibians and visitors who arrive in or depart from Namibia is an essential benchmark against which the significance of the border post may be determined. Namibia is bordered by Angola to the north, Zambia and Zimbabwe to the northeast, Botswana to the east and South Africa to the south. The country has 20

official border posts, of which Oshikango is the busiest in terms of cross-border migration (see Table 6.8 below).

Table 6.8: Arrival and departure: Monthly statistics: January 2006

	Border posts	Arrival		Departure	
		Namibians	Visitors	Namibians	Visitors
1	Trans-Kalahari border post	2636	3743	2229	6835
2	Noordoewer border	7786	5837	7182	8813
3	Ariamsvlei border post	5470	3934	4050	6269
4	Holweg border post	38	29	56	42
5	Klein Menasse border post	483	237	308	382
6	Oranjemund border post	3742	1794	3042	1804
7	Vellorsdrift border post	179	161	119	235
8	Mohembo border post	178	1054	179	1228
9	Winela border post	1948	8597	1960	7551
10	Ngoma border post	871	2136	1172	1885
11	Impalila border post	336	397	577	371
12	Kasika border post	195	374	132	286
13	Chumansburg border post	233	28	352	29
14	Dobe border post				
15	Katwitwi border post	301	1108	435	864
16	Singalamwe border post	56	434	67	397
17	Lianshulu border post	2	91	2	80
18	Ruacana border post	56	376	58	390
19	Oshikango border post	2953	26620	3667	17413
20	Omahenene border post	14	5077	12	4395

Source: Namibia: Ministry of Home Affairs and Migration Monthly Report – January 2006

As statistics in Table: 6.8 above show, Oshikango is the busiest border post in Namibia with 2 953 Namibians and 26 620 visitors' arrivals per month. It also recorded 3 667 Namibians and 17 413 visitors' departures, followed by Noordoewer border post with 7 786 Namibians and 5 837 visitors' arrivals and 7 182 Namibians and 8 813 visitors' departures per month. More interesting about these statistics is that Oshikango records a great number of visitors to Namibia in comparison to other border posts where the border is, for example a river or more mountainous. Thus, these statistics are not realistic due to various factors such as:

- (i) People with dual citizenship could either be recorded as visitors or Namibians.
- (ii) Many people who were supposed to be recorded as commuters rather than migrants could be recorded many times a day as arrivals and departures.
- (iii) Since these statistics are for January only, they may differ from season to season or from month to month.
- (iv) Statistics could also have omitted a substantive record of arrivals and departures, because most migrants go through porous borderlines.

These factors have significant similarities to results obtained from exclusive interviews with cross-border migrants at the Oshikango border post. With the assistance of the Namibian Immigration Officials and Police Officers, the researchers were able to spend one hour a day interviewing all the arrivals and departures through the Oshikango border post as from 1-15 July 2005. The reason was to determine the magnitude of migration based on gender and age at the border post, reasons for crossing the border, migrants' origin and destination and many more cross-border migration issues. A sample of 40 people in the age categories of 20-35, 36-49 and 50 and above was used to determine the frequency of cross-border by age group and gender. Any person entering and leaving Namibia stood an equal chance to be interviewed and the interview started with demographic data as follows.

Table 6.9: Cross border migrant respondents: Age within sex

Age	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
20-35	14	42.4%	5	71.4%	19	47.5%
36-49	18	54.4%	2	28.6%	20	50.0%
50+	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

As is reflected in the statistics above, 42.4% (N=14) of people crossing the border during the interviews were male in the age category between 20-35 years and only five females of the same age group were interviewed. The data also disclosed that 54.5% (N=18) of people crossing the border were male in the age group between 36-49 years and only 28.6% (N=2) female and only 3.0% (N=1) were males in the age group of 50+. It appears obvious that men in the age group between 20-49 are the majority to cross the border through the Oshikango border post. This corresponds with Nangulah and Nickanor's (2005:16) findings that "most of the respondents were relatively young. Some 34% were in the 20-25 age groups and another 30% were between 30 and 40, while only 12% were in the age group 50 and above".

In a separate argument, Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:13) indicated that cross border movement at Oshikango also had distinct gender characteristics. Overall, men dominated cross-border movements from Angola. However, this trend may vary from season to season and from situation to situation. For example, during the rainy season the number of women crossing the border may decrease, because they would engage in the cultivation of their fields. Moreover, unfriendly situations, such as arrests by the

police and deportations, might also erupt at a certain point in time, when the border control becomes serious. This can also limit women's mobility across the border, because women take fewer risks than men.

One important cross-border dynamic observed during the interviews was that most women refused to be interviewed and sometimes ran away, especially when the interviewer was a man. This tallies with Mapisa-Nqakula's findings as quoted in Chapter 4 that women not only suffer the emotional trauma of helplessly watching their children die during these long journeys but they also become victims of abuse and undignified treatment during migration. This can be acknowledged as one of the serious research biases that may influence statistical interpretations. This means that the statistical interpretation that shows that men were the majority crossing the border could be incorrect because most women refused contact with the interviewers. However, the data collected through observation indicated the number of women crossing the border as bigger than that of men.

Another important variable investigated was the level of education of the respondents. This serves as a benchmark to measure the understanding of cross-border migrants in terms of the importance of international borders and even the initiative of regional integration.

Table 6.10: Cross border migrant respondents: Level of education (within sex)

Education level	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
None	3	9.1%	2	28.6%	5	12.5%
Primary	16	48.5%	2	28.6%	18	45.0%
Secondary (Matric or A-Level)	11	33.3%	3	42.9%	14	35.0%
Tertiary (higher than secondary)	3	9.1%			3	7.5%
Total	33	100%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

It appears that 48.5% (N=16) male and 28.6% (N=2) female respondents only have education up to primary level – meaning that they are poorly educated. In contrast, 33.3% (N=11) male and 42.9 (N=3) female have education at least up to secondary level. Statistics show that many women who migrate through the Oshikango border post are relatively educated compared to men – i.e. women dominate at the secondary level and their numbers decline at tertiary level.

This does not mean that uneducated women are not migrating in large numbers, but this can be attributed to the fact that educated women as indicated in Chapter 4 can now migrate independently. Those women with a lower education level usually remain home looking after the children and livestock. As is the case in Oshikango, most of the less-educated women avoid the official migration border posts because sometimes they do not have the required documents to migrate. Therefore, they often cross through the porous border. However, although the large number of female migrants is educated to

secondary level, their understanding of regional integration and the importance of international borders cannot be guaranteed.

Approaching this from another angle, men have all along been traditional migrants and hence the above findings could be interpreted in that way. Presumably, unemployed men in Angola or Namibia frequently cross the border in an attempt to find employment in either of the two countries, as was the case a century ago. As is normal practice in Oshiwambo culture, the man is expected to be a breadwinner in the family and therefore, they are expected to go to remote places to meet that social responsibility. Hence, their number among the cross-border migrants could be significantly higher than that of their female counterparts.

Evidence suggested that poor education also contributed to an increase in cross-border migration among the male population, while over-education caused an increase in emigration (brain drain) and immigration among both the male and female population. For example, as indicated in Chapter 4, about 3 500 (not gender segregated) “South African top medics have been lured to Australia, Canada, Britain and New Zealand by better pay and working conditions.”

However, men with lower levels of education may be attracted to short distance migration with the purpose of finding any kind of work including casual employment, as is the trend at Oshikango. For example, only 9.1% (N=3) of the male respondents with

tertiary education were migrating during the interview and no female of the same level of education was interviewed.

It can be argued that the highly educated people use other means such as air and sea to immigrate or emigrate, hence they are rarely recorded crossing at the Oshikango border post. However, it is noteworthy that those educated people with families across the border also use ungazetted border crossing points to visit their relatives in Angola or Namibia. This argument leads us to probe whether cross-border migrants may also use the Oshikango border post to visit families and relatives across the border, or whether they simply use it when they intend to take long journeys.

6.3.1 Cross-border migrants and family networks

Cross-border migrants at the Oshikango border post are a mixed group of people. Some were born in Angola and are still Angolans while some have their kin born either in Namibia or in Angola as statistics below show.

Table 6.11: Cross border migrant respondents: Country of birth, self, parents, spouse

Sex		Country			Total
		Namibia	Angola	Other countries	
Male	Self	8 (24.2%)	24 (72.7%)	1 (3.0%)	33 (100.0%)
	Father	6 (18.2%)	26 (78.8%)	1 (3.0%)	33 (100.0%)
	Mother	8 (25.0%)	23 (71.9%)	1 (3.1%)	33 (100.0%)
	Wife/Husband	3 (14.3%)	17 (81.0%)	1 (4.1%)	33 (100.0%)
Female	Self	2 (28.6%)	5 (71.4%)		7 (100.0%)
	Father	3 (42.9%)	4 (57.1%)		7 (100.0%)
	Mother	3 (50.0%)	3 (42.9%)		7 (100.0%)
	Wife/Husband	1 (33.3%)	2 (66.7%)		7 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Statistics underscored the inter-linkage of the family networks of the respondents crossing the border during the interviews as follows: 24.2% male respondents were born in Namibia while 72.7% of them were born in Angola. At the same time, 18.2% have their fathers born in Namibia, 78.8% have their fathers born in Angola. Moreover, 25.0% have their mothers born in Namibia and 71.9% in Angola. 14.3% have their wives born in Namibia and 81.0% in Angola.

The same situation repeats itself among female respondents. 28.6% were born in Namibia and 71.4% were born in Angola, whereas 42.9% of their fathers were born in Namibia and 57.1% were born in Angola; 50.0% of their mothers were born in Namibia and Angola respectively, while 33.3% of their spouses were born in Namibia and 66.7% of them were born in Angola. Given this statistical family network, one can conclude that northern Namibia and southern Angola are like one country, hence control over cross-border migration and population movement is extremely arduous.

Traditional and cultural values still receive a high level of respect to keep this network alive. For example, young people are still advised to marry members of those clans known to their parents, regardless of the borderline. If, for instance, the desired future in-law is on the other side of the border in Angola or on this side in Namibia, the two families can arrange for the marriage to take place in a traditional way without following civil law procedures. It will be abundantly clear by now that migrants crossing through the Oshikango border post are entangled in family networks.

Other reasons such as shopping, schooling and business can to a certain extent be regarded as functions of family networks. This is true because many migrants at the Oshikango border use the reason of going to visit their relatives or family members in Angola or in Namibia, but later turn these visits into business activities to sustain clans' networks across the border of both countries. This being so, the cross-border migrants' perspectives and the issue of citizenships are investigated below.

6.3.2 Cross-border migrants' views on citizenship

Most cross-border migrants had different views about citizenship. Among those interviewed 69.7% (N=23) male and 71.4% (N=5) female were Angolans compared to only 24.2% (N=8) male and 28.6% (N=2) female Namibian citizens. 3.0% (N=1) males admitted to having dual citizenship (both Angolan and Namibian) because that made it much easier for them to travel between the two countries and to get employment and other benefits in both countries without difficulties.

Table 6.12: Cross border migrant respondents and the issue of dual citizenship

Citizenship	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex
Angolan only	23	69.7%	5	71.4%	28	70.0%
Angolan and Namibian	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Namibian only	8	24.2%	2	28.6%	10	25.0%
Zimbabwean	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Total	33	100%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Statistics above also reveal that most Angolan nationals, both male and female dominate the trend of migration and population movement at the Oshikango border post. However, men, both Angolan and Namibian are the majority to cross. This, as mentioned earlier cannot be taken for granted as the absolute reality, because only a small number of both Angolan and Namibian women accepted the call for an interview. It is equally evident, however that with reference to the question of dual citizenship, many people did not reveal their real opinions on this matter.

As indicated earlier, the police and migration officials estimated the number of people among the population living along the common border, in possession of dual citizenship at over 70%. However, although the percentage of Angolan migrants is high there is no doubt that among the respondents claiming to be Namibian citizens and vice versa, there are many holders of dual citizenship. This reality usually comes out when holders of dual citizenship are arrested and not through voluntary surrendering. Moreover, as is the case with the household respondents discussed later in this chapter, cross-border migrants at the Oshikango border post also showed ignorance about the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia as indicated below.

Table 6.13: Cross-border migrant respondents: Awareness of implications of dual citizenship

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Awareness of implications of dual citizenship	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
Yes	13	40.6%	1	14.3%	14	35.9%
No	19	59.4%	6	85.7%	25	64.1%
Total	32	100.0%	7	100.0%	39	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Statistics revealed that 40.6% (N=13) male and 14.3% (N=1) female, a total of 35.9% (N=14) of cross-border migrants were aware of the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia. In comparison, 59.4% (N=19) male and 85.7% female (N=6) that gives 64.1% (N=25) were not aware of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia.

It appears that most women are not aware of the implications regarding dual citizenship in Namibia compared to their male counterparts. This could be attributed to various factors, including the historical background of migration in the area in which only men were involved, and therefore, their understanding of migration and citizenship issues exceed that of female migrants. As stated in Chapter 4, most women migrate in the company of their male partners, hence it is the male migrant who usually knows the destination and the implications of citizenship in the host country.

That aside, since the Angolan authorities does not have any problem with dual citizenship, migrants from Angola regard it as legal. Along the same lines, they also indicate innocence in having Namibian and Angolan citizenship because they are not conversant with Namibia's Constitution and Angola does not have any Constitution up to now. Hence, they usually learn of these implications when they are arrested and brought to court.

Although expectations were high that some respondents interviewed at the Oshikango border post could be from other countries, the question about who the respondents

regarded as citizens of Namibia was generally asked to assess the migrants' understanding about Namibia's immigration policy.

Table 6.14: Cross-border migrant respondents: People they regard as foreigners in Namibia

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
People they regard as foreigners in Namibia	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
All non-Namibians	6	60.0%	1	50.0%	7	58.3%
All whites	2	20.0%	1	50.0%	3	25.0%
All coloured	1	10.0%			1	8.3%
All non-Oshiwambo speaking	1	10.0%			1	8.3 %
Total	10	100.0%	2	100.0%	12	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Interestingly, 60.0% (N=6) male and 50.0% (N=1) female respondents mentioned that they regard all non-Namibians as foreigners in Namibia. However, 20.0% (N=2) and 10.0% (N=1) male and 50.0% (N=1) female respondents regarded all whites and coloureds as well as all non-Oshiwambo-speakers as foreigners in Namibia.

Since most cross-border respondents were Oshikwayama-speaking, these findings can be interpreted that those Oshikwanyama-speaking citizens of Angola do not regard themselves as foreigners when they are in northern Namibia due to their social and family links. Therefore, to Oshikwayama or Oshiwambo-speakers both in Namibia and Angola, foreigners are coloureds, whites and those people from remote areas in Angola such as Ovimbundu. To them the whites and coloureds are foreigners because of their

distinct colour, while they judge the non-Oshiwambo-speaking people such Ovimbundu on languages they speak.

6.3.3 Oshikango cross-border migrants and languages

A number of general factors on language proficiency in both Angola and Namibia have colonial connotations. Because Angola was under Portuguese colonialism for many centuries, the local languages became insignificant. Statistics indicate that most cross-border migrants were conversant with the Portuguese language although they were Africans or Oshikwanyama-speaking. In other cases, the influence of migrant labour also created a clear disparity in terms of knowledge of foreign languages between men and women. Because the majority of men had once worked in Angola or the south of Namibia, they are the majority who speak Portuguese and English. Statistics indicate that 45.5% (N=15) male and 42.9% (N=3) female were Oshikwanyama-speaking only, while 87.9% (N=29) male and 57.1% (N=4) female respondents spoke Portuguese. This data indicates that the two dominant languages spoken by most cross-border migrants are Oshikwanyama and Portuguese. This created another assumption that the majority of them were clearly Angolans.

However, a small percentage of respondents are conversant with other languages such as English (30.3% males and 28.6% females), Afrikaans (15.2% males) and French (6.1% males).

Table 6.15: Cross-border migrant respondents: Language proficiency

Sex	Language Choice	Yes	No	Total
Male	Kwanyama	15 (45.5%)	18 (54.5%)	33 (100.0%)
	Portuguese	29 (87.9%)	4 (12.1%)	33 (100.0%)
	English	10 (30.3%)	23 (69.7%)	33 (100.0%)
	Afrikaans	5 (15.2%)	28 (84.8%)	33 (100.0%)
	French	2 (6.1%)	31 (93.9%)	33 (100.0%)
	Rukavango	1 (3.0%)	32 (97.0%)	33 (100.0%)
	Ndebele	1 (3.0%)	32 (97.0%)	33 (100.0%)
Female	Kwanyama	3 (42.9%)	4 (57.1%)	7 (100.0%)
	Portuguese	4 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)	7 (100.0%)
	English	2 (28.6%)	5 (71.4%)	7 (100.0%)
	Afrikaans		7 (100.0%)	7 (100.0%)
	French		7 (100.0%)	7 (100.0%)
	Rukavango	1 (14.3%)	6 (85.7%)	7 (100.0%)
	Ndebele		7 (100.0%)	7 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Apart from English, no female respondent was conversant with other languages such as Afrikaans and French. This adds another dimension to our knowledge that most women crossing the border were from either southern Angola or northern Namibia, while some men come from other SADC or African countries. Moreover, frequency, mobility and reasons for crossing the border differ considerably in terms of gender and age. Although age as a variable is not assessed here, the following sub-section gives a clear-cut analysis on frequency and reasons that migrant respondents gave to the interviewers.

6.3.4 Cross-border migrants: Frequency of mobility and reasons

From the above perspective, the frequency of cross-border mobility evaluated showed that 32.0% (N=8) male and 20.0% (N=1) female Angolans crossed the border into Namibia on a daily basis, while 24.0% (N=6) males and 40.0% (N=2) females crossed

into Namibia weekly. Only 20.0% (N=5) males and no females crossed into Namibia on a yearly basis. Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:19) made almost similar findings, namely that nearly one in five respondents during their survey at Oshikango indicated crossing the border every day (17%); 16% a couple of times per week; 17% once a week and 16% once a month or a couple of times per month (17%).

Table 6.16: Cross-border migrant respondents: Frequency of visiting Namibia

Frequency of visiting Namibia	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
Daily	8	32.0%	1	20.0%	9	30.0%
Weekly	6	24.0%	2	40.0%	8	26.7%
Monthly	6	24.0%	1	20.0%	7	23.3%
Yearly	5	20.0%			5	16.7%
N/A			1	20.0	1	3.3%
Total	25	100.0%	5	100.0%	30	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005)

It is evident that men are the majority of migrants who cross into Namibia from Angola daily, weekly and yearly. The fact remains that women are seasonal migrants who often migrate at a certain time of the year. As discussed above, women often migrate after harvesting. They also migrate due to emergencies such as when they or their children are sick, or the relative in Namibia is sick or dead. Men on the other hand, may migrate any time they feel like it, particularly to look for jobs, rear cattle or do businesses to sustain their family.

It also appeared during the interviews that a number of people cross into Namibia so often that the frequency cannot be determined. As indicated in previous sections, men,

especially the young, dominate the trend. Some of them are from as far afield as Luanda and other remote places in Angola. Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:17) argued that although 25% of respondents were from Santa Clara, 11% and 8% from Ondjiva and Onamakunde respectively, a small number came from Lubango (6%) and Luanda (3%).

Reasons to cross into Namibia as well as their intended destinations vary from migrant to migrant. Moreover, 21.2% male (N=7) come to Namibia to do business and female respondents combine business with other purposes such as medical treatment and shopping as reasons to cross into Namibia. In addition, 18.2% male (N=6) and 14.3% (N=1) come to Namibia for shopping, business and medical treatment (see Table 6.17 below).

Table 6.17: Cross-border migrant respondents: Reasons for regular visit Namibia

Reasons to visit Namibia	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex
Escort people and their goods bought from Namibia, across common border	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
No response	8	24.2%	2	6.1%	10	25.0%
Do business	7	21.2%				17.5%
Do business and shopping	3	9.1%	1	3.0%	4	10.0%
Do business, shopping and medical treatment	6	18.2%	1	3.0%	7	17.5%
Do business and medical treatment			1	3.0%	1	2.5%
Do shopping	6	18.2%			6	15.0%
To visit my immediate relatives, attend school and rear cattle	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Visit my immediate relatives, other relatives, and for medical treatment			1	3.0%	1	2.5%
Visit my other relatives, and to do business	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Do shopping, to visit my other relatives and do business,						
Do shopping and cultivate mahangu field			1	3.0%	1	2.5%
Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

This data implies that people from Angola cross into Namibia for multiple reasons. But still shopping as Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:19) argued, is by far the most popular reason for crossing the border mentioned by 34% (N=168) in their survey. Namibians also cross into Angola and their mobility frequency varies as well.

During the interviews at Oshikango border post, statistics of the Namibians crossing into Angola indicate that 55.6% (N=5) of them were male who crossed the border on a daily basis and 33.3% weekly. Again, Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:19) made almost similar findings that 17% (N=84 not within sex) cross the border every day and 3% (N=13 not within sex) cross the border more than once a day. However, the number of women crossing to Angola is small. Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:13) indicated that some 6-10 000 foreign female migrants arrived in Namibia each month from Angola, declining to only 2-3 000 Namibian females who crossed into Angola each month.

Table 6.18: Cross border migrant respondents: Frequency of visiting Angola

Frequency of visiting Namibia	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% within sex
	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex
Daily	5	55.6%			5	45.5%
Weekly			1	50.0%	1	9.1%
Monthly	3	33.3%			3	27.3%
Yearly	1	11.1%	1	50.0%	2	18.2%
Total	9	100.0%	5	100.0%	11	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Statistics above can also be influenced by research biases. The research was conducted within a period of two weeks, hence it could be possible that the number of women and

migrants crossing the border might differ if this were repeated at different periods of the year. Nangulah and Nickanor (2005) stated that normally, the number entering Namibia tended to be a little higher at the end of the year, and the reverse might also be true because many Namibians tend to buy livestock to slaughter during Christmas from Angola.

6.3.5 Cross-border migrants: Reasons for border crossing to Angola

The reasons for Namibians crossing into Angola differed considerably from the reasons mentioned by Angolan respondents crossing into Namibia. While most Angolans interviewed crossed the border into Namibia mainly for shopping, some Namibians went to Angola for business reasons – thus only 9.1% (N=3) of Namibian males mentioned doing business as the reason to cross into Angola and 14.3% female mentioned shopping as the reason. This focuses our interpretation on gender roles embedded in cultural and social attributes of the Kwanyama community.

Normally, formal businesses and ventures are traditionally the man's domain and shopping for food and groceries is more particularly a woman's responsibility. This implies that more women went to Angola for shopping, while men did the same for business can be justified on cultural and traditional gender dimensions. Cross tabulated statistics below strengthen this argument.

Table 6.19: Cross border migrant respondents: Reasons for regular visit Angola

Reasons to visit Namibia	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
No response	24	72.7%	5	71.4	29	72.5%
Cultivate mahangu field	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Do business	3	9.1%			3	7.5%
Do business and shopping	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Do shopping			1	14.3%	1	2.5%
Visit my friends	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
To visit my immediate relatives	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Visit my other relatives	1	3.0%	1	14.3%	2	5.0%
Visit my other relatives, and do business	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Apart from cultural and traditional effects, statistics also presents another paradox. This indicates that 72.7% (N=24) male and 71.4% (N=5) female respondents gave no reasons for why they crossed into Angola. Culturally, Aawambo have a tendency of keeping reasons for some of their trips confidential. For example, a reason such as going to see a traditional healer is treated as confidential by some people, because the practice has been declared taboo by churches and sometimes the people believe that if the news spreads it will bring them bad luck.

One more reason for Namibian men to cross into Angola is the advantage of the aftermath of the civil war in that country. After the war, the social life, particularly, in the southern part of Angola was left in a shambles. As a result, most social and economic infrastructures such as shops, clinics and hospitals are absent. The Namibian

business people exploit the advantages of the situation by taking business to Angola. A great number of male respondents crossing into Angola are businessmen. It was observed that heavy trucks loaded with goods for business are constantly queuing through the Oshikango border post to Angola. Therefore, only a small number of Namibian respondents crossing to Angola mention other reasons such as visiting friends, relatives and families. Cross-border migrants interviewed at the Oshikango border post use various travel methods, which the following sub-section will deal with.

6.3.6 Travelling methods

The cross border migrants went through the border post either on foot or by car as shown below.

Table 6.20: Cross-border migrant respondents: Travelling methods

Sex	Travelling methods			
	Choice	Yes	No	Total
Male	On foot	19 (57.6%)	14 (42.4%)	33 (100.0%)
	By road	18 (54.5%)	15 (45.5%)	33 (100.0%)
Female	On foot	3 (42.9%)	4(57.1%)	7(100.0%)
	By road	4 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)	7 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

It appears that 57.6% (N=19) male and 42.9% (N=3) female respondents crossed the border on foot, whereas 54.5% male and 57.1% female respondents used vehicles to cross the common border. More women than men went through the border post by road. This could be viewed from various perspectives that include safety. Security-wise, the

Oshikango border post is perilous as reflected by observation in the sub-section above. Vulnerable people such as women, children and the disabled are always at risk of being robbed of their goods. Therefore, more women feel secure to cross by means of vehicles than on foot. However, although the interviewed cross-border migrants show respect for international border, they could ostensibly have different attitudes towards the border. It is also essential to extend our investigation to include this attitude as a correlated variable.

6.3.7 Cross-border migrants: Attitudes towards the Angola/Namibia border

Investigation inquired about the cross-border migrants' feelings about the existing common Namibia/Angola border. A provisional conclusion points out a great variance between attitudes of households and cross-border migrants towards the border (see statistics below).

Table 6.21: Cross-border migrant respondents: Attitude towards Namibia/Angola border

Sex	Response	Yes	No	Total
Male	Disturbing family		33 (100.0%)	33 (100.0%)
	Disturbing traditions and cultures	1 (3.0%)	32 (97.0%)	33 (100.0%)
	Good to keep foreigners away	15 (45.5%)	18 (54.5%)	33 (100.0%)
	Good to control migration	17 (51.5%)	16 (48.5%)	33 (100.0%)
	Neutral	2 (6.1%)	31 (93.9%)	33 (100.0%)
Female	Disturbing family		7 (100.0%)	7 (100.0%)
	Disturbing traditions and cultures		7 (100.0%)	7 (100.0%)
	Good to keep foreigners away	4 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)	7 (100.0%)
	Good to control migration	4 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)	7 (100.0%)
	Neutral	1 (14.3%)	6 (85.7%)	7 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

While a considerable number of the households view the border as disturbing (see the section on views of households later in this chapter), cross-border migrants viewed it as good to control migration situations. For example, 45.5% of male and 57.1% female respondents regard the border as good to keep foreigners away and 51.5% males and 57.1% females also regard the border as good to control migration. The reason why both males and females became positive towards the existence of the border is not determined in this research.

6.3.8 Cross-border migrants' responses on SADC integration initiatives

The preceding sub-sections underscored the existing understanding and other cross-border dynamics including reasons for migration between Namibia and Angola. The subsequent sub-sections will test the cross-border migrants' understanding and attitudes towards the SADC's Regional Integration Project.

Table 6.22: Cross-border migrant respondents: Knowledge about the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Awareness about SADC Protocol of the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
Yes			2	28.6%	2	5.0%
No	33	100%	5	71.4%	38	95.0%
Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

The findings indicated that most cross-border migrants at the Oshikango border post did not know what the SADC was for. Only 33.3% (N=11) male and 28.6% (N=2) female respondents admitted to knowledge of the SADC Integration Project. In contrast, 66.7% (N=22) male and 71.4% (N=5) female respondents do not know what the SADC is all about. It provisionally transpired that the SADC is not known at the grassroots level. This can also be fully supported by subsequent follow-up questions that probed the level of participation by grassroots communities.

Table 6.23: Cross-border migrant respondents: Participation in SADC regional integration process

Reasons to visit Namibia	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
SADC is a strange term to me	7	21.2%	1	14.3%	8	20.0%
I do not know how to take part in SADC projects	23	69.7%	4	57.1%	27	67.5%
SADC is state-centred project	2	6.1%	1	14.3%	3	7.5%
I am not interested in SADC project	1	3.0%	1	14.3%	2	5.0%
I participate in SADC projects						
Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

The statistical results indicated that 21.2% (N=7) male and 14.3% (N=1) female respondents admitted that the SADC was a strange term to them, whilst 69.7% (N=23) male and 14.3% (N=4) female respondents do not even know how to take part in any SADC integration activity. In the same vein, 6.1% males and 14.3% females stated categorically that the SADC is a state-centred project and they have no say in it. It is a fact that through cross tabulations both males and females presented the distance

between them and the SADC Integration Project as lack of knowledge and participation in its activities.

Hence, on the question of whether they support Namibia to be part of the SADC regional integration, 60.0% male and 40.0% female respondents have no comment because, according to them they do not know what is being done, and what the SADC is all about. Therefore, they further argued that it is unrealistic if not irrelevant to encourage the country to join unknown clubs.

Table 6.24: Cross-border migrant respondents: Support Namibia to be integrated in SADC

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Support Namibia to be integrated in SADC	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
Yes	8	40.0%	3	60.0%	11	44.0%
I cannot say	12	60.0%	2	40.0%	14	56.0%
Total	20	100.0%	5	100.0%	25	100.0%

Source: Interviews with cross border migrants (2005).

Nonetheless, 44.0% (N=11) including both male and female respondents supported Namibia to be part of the SADC. They argued that united you stand and divided you fall. Unions such as the United States of America strengthen nations economically and even militarily. Although the people who support Namibia to be a member state of the SADC provide valid and good reasons to listen to, the fact remains that the number is relatively small to justify this support.

6.3.9 Summary of major findings: Cross-border migrants at Oshikango

This section presents the opinions of interviewees who were interviewed while crossing the border to or from Angola through the Oshikango border post. Before we cross to the next section which focuses on the opinions of household residents in the Oshikango border area, the results of the previous section are summarised below:

- **Demography:** It appears that men in the age group 20-49 are the majority to cross the border through the Oshikango border post compared to women in the same age group.
- **Education:** It was found that many women who migrate through the Oshikango border post are relatively educated compared to men – i.e. women dominate at the secondary level but their numbers decline at tertiary level.
- **Family networks:** The respondents crossing the border during the interviews presented a significant inter-linkage of family networks in the area. Given this strong family network, one can conclude that northern Namibia and southern Angola are just like one country.
- **Citizenship of cross-border respondents:** Statistics revealed that most Angolan nationals both male and female dominate the trend of cross border migration at the Oshikango border post. But the majority of them came to do shopping and return home rather than to stay.

- **Dual citizenship:** Although only 3.0% of the respondents admitted to have dual citizenship (both Angolan and Namibian), it is assumed that many cross-border migrants might have dual citizenship, which they could not reveal to interviewers for fear that the police would arrest them
- **Cross-border respondents and the issue of foreigners:** Since most cross-border respondents were Oshikwayama-speaking, these findings can be interpreted as that the Oshikwanyama-speaking Angolan citizens do not regard themselves as foreigners when they are in northern Namibia while the Oshikwanyama-speaking Namibian citizens do not consider themselves as foreigners when they are in southern Angola, due to their social and family links.
- **Languages:** It was noted that that the two dominant languages spoken by most cross-border migrants are Oshikwanyama and Portuguese. This created another assumption that the majority of them were clearly Angolans.
- **Mobility frequency to Namibia:** It was also noted that, men dominate the majority of migrants who cross into Namibia from Angola daily, weekly and yearly, because unlike women, men's freedom of mobility is high.
- **Mobility frequency to Angola:** It was found that, the number of Namibian women crossing into Angola is relatively small.
- **Reasons for crossing into Angola:** It was noted that most respondents hid their true reasons to cross into Angola. Culturally, Aawambo have a tendency to keep reasons for some of their trips confidential. For example, going to see a

traditional healer is treated as confidential by some people because the practice was declared taboo by churches and sometimes the people believe that if the news spreads it will bring them bad luck. However, business and shopping are some of the reasons most respondents mentioned.

- **Cross-border migrants' travel methods:** It was found that more women than men went through the border post by road. More women feel secure to travel across the border by vehicle than on foot due to the anarchical situation at the border post.
- **Attitude towards the Namibia/Angola border:** It transpired that that cross-border migrants, both male and female respect the international.
- **Cross-border migrants' perspectives on the SADC Regional Integration:** It was noted that the majority of interviewed cross-border migrants did not know what the SADC is all about. The majority of respondents also indicated that they have never participated in any way in the SADC projects or formulation of its policies.

These conclusions are confined to cross-border respondents, meaning the migrants who were interviewed at the Oshikango border post on a particular in day. Similar interviews were conducted among the household residents in the Oshikango area as reflected in the following section. These are the people who have houses or live in the houses in this area.

6.4 Respondent - Households: Oshikango

As alluded to above, the residents of the Oshikango area are Oshikwanyama-speaking and part of the umbrella tribe of Aawambo. They are socially organised in matri-clans that transcend the international border with Angola. This, as Banghart (1969:117) explains, entails that “through Owamboland, one will find members of the same clans, widely dispersed.” Consequently these clans can be found in the different tribes, and in addition, they can also be found within the Kavango peoples and Angolan tribes.

The current trend of the increasing supply of technology and economic liberalisation in the region has introduced another interlinking dimension within the Aawambo Diaspora across the Namibia/Angola border. Economic inequality between the Namibian border region of Ohangwena and the Angolan border province of Cunene, in which the former presents the pull factors and the latter the push factors as discussed in Chapter 2, has become a cause for great concern. This modernism mixed with traditionalism poses a gigantic threat to the management of cross-border mobility, especially among the households on both sides of the common border. In other words, although we use the term “common border” here, in practice Namibia has no visible border lines, apart from where the border lines are the Cuando and Cunene rivers. Dr. Hübschle as quoted by Tjaronda (2006:2) also argues, “while plans are there to eventually re-erect a fence between the two countries, it may take a while.”

Dr. Hübschle as quoted by Tjaronda (ibid) further indicated the fact that “there has been movement of people across the border for over 100 years, because Namibians have relatives on the other side, which would make it unfair to cut them off”. Another implication, aside from people’s mobility, is as Dr. Hübschle disclosed, “around 70 000 cattle” from Omusati and Ohangwena border regions graze in southern Angola when the northern areas are dry. Hence, memory politics and cross-frontiers ethnic relations are other imperative exacerbations of cross border migration and associated issues in Africa and the SADC region.

Although we acknowledged above that Namibia has pull factors in terms of economic and social infrastructures, it is also arguable that Angola also has pull factors in terms of agricultural potential and unexplored business opportunities, which attract many Namibians to migrate into Angola. These phenomena have placed the grassroots communities along the common Namibia/Angola border in a unique social paradigm which shaped the main objective of this study. Given this fact, interviews with the households were conducted for a period of two weeks from 1-15 July 2005 in the Oshikango area as per research methodology (see Chapter 5 above). The purpose of the interviews was to obtain empirical data based on experiences and perspectives of grassroots communities with regard to their current movement across the common border.

For analytical purposes the obtained results would be contextualised in global challenges of nationalism after Namibia's independence, achievement of peace in Angola, the SADC Regional Integration initiatives and the international order of globalisation. The results will be equated with the findings obtained from interviews with cross-border migrants and the researcher's observations above.

6.4.1 Households: Demographical data, education and language

As was the case with the interviews with cross-migrants at the Oshikango border post, interviews with the residents in Oshikango were carried out based on sex, age, and education level and language proficiency. Statistically, at most 33.3% of both male and female respondents in the age categories of 20-35, 36-49 and 50 and above were interviewed (see Table 6.25 below). There are many and diverse reasons for grouping the respondents into such categories.

In this study, respondents in one age category are expected to present data related to their specific lifetime. In addition, as indicated in Chapter 2, gender has recently become an important aspect in studies of migration. Gender, on the other hand, provides an opportunity for both men and women to equally present their side of an experience. For example, Zentella and Schiesser (2005) indicate that "women today move with greater

ease and are freer with regard to their family responsibilities and the authority of their husbands.”

Given this fact, gender dimensions also constitute important dynamics of cross tabulation in this section. The interview specifically targeted residents (male and female) and those people owning houses in the Oshikango area and nearby villages. The existing assumption is that these people should be Namibians.

Table 6.25: Household respondents: Age within sex

Age	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex			
20-35	16	33.3%	20	33.3%	36	33.3%
36-49	16	33.3%	20	33.3%	36	33.3%
50+	16	33.3%	20	33.3%	36	33.3%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Statistics above reflect the responses of the selected sample of people found in houses and traditional homesteads in the Oshikango area. However, whether all these people are *bona fide* Namibians is doubtful. As pointed out above, the family networks across the common Namibia/Angola border mix the two peoples. Hence, these statistics could be affected by the following factors: First, it is possible that some of the respondents could have been in the area during the interview, to visit their relatives and then return to Angola.

Second, the respondents were highly unwilling to reveal real information about the status of their relatives from Angola for fear of arrest and deportation. Therefore, it is possible that statistics will include the visiting Angolans and the people with dual citizenship (Angolan and Namibian citizenship).

The education level is perceived as another most striking feature of the data among the residents of Oshikango. Since one of the major variables under investigation is the understanding of local communities of factors of current cross-border migration management in the contemporary process of the SADC Regional Integration, discussions on education level of the respondents is essential (see Table 6.26 below).

Table 6.26: Household respondents: Level of education (within sex and age)

Age	Sex	Level of Education					Total
		None	Primary	Secondary (Matric or A-level)	Tertiary (Higher than Secondary)	Other	
20 – 35	Male	1 (6.3%)	5 (31.3%)	8 (50.0%)	1 (6.3%)	1 (6.3%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	4 (20.0%)	3 (15.0%)	12 (60.0%)	1 (5.0%)		20 (100.0%)
36 – 49	Male	2 (12.5%)	10 (62.5%)	3 (18.8%)		1 (6.3%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	2 (10.0%)	6 (30.0%)	12 (60.0%)			20 (100.0%)
50+	Male	7 (43.8%)	8 (50.0%)		1 (6.3%)		16 (100.0%)
	Female	10 (50.0%)	6 (30.0%)	3 (15.0%)		1 (5.0%)	20 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Significantly, 6.3% (N=1) males and 20% (N=4) females in the age group 20-35 and 43% (N=7) male and 50% (N=10) female respondents aged 50 and above do not have

education at all. This indicates that women, especially older women are in the majority with lower education and this may lead to the conclusion that women would also be the majority with little understanding on issues of the SADC Regional Integration and cross-border migration.

It has also been noted that most respondents only have education up to primary level, i.e. 60% (N=12) female and 50.0% (N= 8) female respondents aged 20-35 years. With reference to this disparity, Iiping and LeBeau (1997:54) argue that since most employment opportunities in Namibia were for men, the education of women was viewed as unnecessary. Thus, women were not encouraged to further their education during the apartheid regime in Namibia. Owambo at large has a history of poor education, and it is right that this study may support Banghart (1969:71) who statistically indicated that in 1962 there were a total of 107 713 children in Owamboland, of which 25% were not attending school.

In addition, by that year 95% of the population had received up to STD III (current Grade 5) education level. The statistics show that the current trend of poor education levels in the Region has been consistent for many years. Those people who were children in 1962 formed part of the respondents in their 50s and above during this study

and their number was supplemented by a large number of their children who also failed to attend school.

This means that the high percentage indicated above of the total respondents have insufficient educational capacity to understand issues of cross-border migration at the international level as well as the complicated dynamics of regional integration. Poor educational background also limits respondents, especially women to acquire a good command of foreign languages such as English and Portuguese (see Table 6.27).

Table 6.27: Household respondents: Language proficiency

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
Kwanyama	30	62.5%	40	66.7%	70	64.8%
Kwanyama & Portuguese	3	6.3%	2	3.3%	5	4.6%
Kwanyama & English	7	14.6%	10	16.7%	17	15.7%
Kwanyama & Afrikaans	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Kwanyama & Oshindonga			1	1.7%	1	0.9 %
Kwanyama, English & Afrikaans	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
Kwanyama, English, Afrikaans & Otjiherero			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Kwanyama, Portuguese and Afrikaans	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Kwanyama, English and Portuguese	2	4.2%	3	5.0%	5	4.6%
Kwanyama, Portuguese & Oshifanakalo			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Kwanyama, Portuguese, Afrikaans & English	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
Kwanyama, Portuguese, English, Afrikaans & Umbundu	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Portuguese	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	107	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Table 6.27 above indicates that 66.7% of female respondents are only conversant in the Kwanyama language compared to 62.5% of their male counterparts. Only a small percentage of respondents can speak Kwanyama along with international languages such as Portuguese and English. This trend could give the result that poor education and lower levels of proficiency in other languages might lead to a poor understanding of concepts such as nationalism, citizenship and regionalism among the Oshikango community.

However, the question arises whether modernism as manifested in its concepts of regional integration and globalisation could be arbitrarily imposed on communities such as those in the Oshikango area while they were disadvantaged by poor education. One respondent (key informant who required anonymity) said “it is a waste of time to preach issues of regional integration to poorly educated people such as the grassroots communities deep in rural areas”. Nevertheless, contemporary patterns of issues of regional integration in the SADC Region, including migration control and management are rooted in socio-economic, political and historical-cultural factors, which involve the grassroots community in one way or another. Therefore, the communities need full understanding of issues pertaining to their life such as citizenship. In this respect, the following sub-section probes the understanding of the household respondents in the Oshikango area.

6.4.2 Clan network interspersion

As discussed above, the most important social disposition of the Kwanyama ethnic group is the family or interchangeably clan network dissected by the Angola/Namibia border. In the previous sub-section, we concluded that there is increasing evidence of clan links between Namibia and Angola. Malan (ibid) (sub-section 6.2 above) indicates that Owambos demonstrate their kinship bond by using classificatory kinship terminology or clan names such as Aakwaanyoka clan, (the clan of the snake family), Aakwanambwa (the clan of the dog family), Aakwaudimbe/Kwaniilya (the clan of the grain family), to mention but a few. This web of clan structures forms a diaspora that covers the entire northern Namibia and southern Angola. Hahn et al (1966:109) lists the existing clans among the Kwanyama and in general among Ambo³⁹ of northern Namibia and southern Angola as follows:

1. *Ovakwanangombe* – From *Ongombe* “Ox”.
2. *Ovakwanambwa* - From *Ombwa* “dog”.
3. *Ovakwamalanga* – From *Omalanga* “roan antelope”.
4. *Ovakwasidila* – From (*Odila*)*⁴⁰ “bird”.
5. *Ovakwaanime* - From *Onime* “lion”.
6. *Ovakwahepo* – From *Oluhepo* “poverty”.
7. *Ovakwanehungi* – From *Ohungi* “germanous plant”.
8. *Ovakwanekemba*- From *Ekamba* “hyena”.
9. *Ovakwaluvala*- From *Oluvala* “stripe” referring to the striped animal the “Zebra”.
10. *Oakwaanyoka*- From *Eyoka* “serpent” “snake”.
11. *Ovakwanyika*- From *Onyika* “torch”.
12. *Ovakwaghali*- From *Onghali** “mourning” “funeral rite”
13. *Ovakwangandu*- From *Ongandu* “crocodile”.

³⁹ Some writers use “Ambo” to refer to Aawambo or Ovambo.

⁴⁰ * reflects own words in the quotation.

14. *Ovakwanailia* or (*Ovakwaudibe*)*- From oilya “grain or millet”.
15. *Ovakwahongo* – From *Omuhongo*- “a tree (*spirostachys africanus*)”.
16. *Ovakwanambuba*- From *Ombuba* “an insect found in the inside of the wild figs”.
17. *Ovakwaneidi*- From *Eidi* or (*Omwiidi*)* “grass”.
18. *Ovakwanaiuma*- From *Oiuma* “clay pots”.
19. *Ovakwanelumbi* – The same as the *Ovakwananime* (number 5).

The strong ties transcending the common border and embedded in the matrilineal Aawambo clans embody an impasse in cross-border migration and population movement control and pose a threat to state authority and sovereignty. The fact in this respect is that you cannot separate the Kwahepo in Angola from their relative Kwahepo in Namibia by law, since this would infringe on their human rights and civil liberty. Morally, these people feel a strong sense of belonging to their clans regardless of international boundaries and thus it is difficult for the state to break this line, which to a certain extent involves top government officials in Namibia and Angola.

The intermarriage network is reflected in relationships that exist in the form of matrilineal clan structures. The matriclan social system primarily determines intermarriage relationships within the Aawawambo including the Namibian Kwanyama and Angolan Kwanyama. During his research in the area of Oshikango and within the South West Africa (SWA)⁴¹ Kwanyama, Banghart’s (1969) informants were South West African Kwanyama headmen married to Angolan wives and vice-versa. For example, SWA headmen such as Gabriel, Hifelelenga and another Gabriel were among others, married to Angolan Kwanyama wives. In this regard, their children belonged to the

⁴¹ Namibia was known as South West Africa before independence.

Angolan side because the Oshiwambo matriclan system allows the child to be part of the mother's side. Although these children were born in SWA, they were psychologically prepared to regard Angola, which is the origin of their mothers as their place to belong and in this case the maternal Angolan uncles and aunts as their family.

This move motivates cross-border migration and population movement and makes control of cross-border mobility difficult if not impossible. This problem is not only confined to micro perspectives of individual state endeavours geared to control day-to-day cross-border movements, but also, as stated above, poses a threat to state autonomy and sovereignty. For example, the issue of uncertainty about citizenship of the people sharing the common border between Namibia and Angola is a challenge to Namibia's Constitution. Questioning this constitutional challenge, Klaaren and Rutinwa (2004:95) refer to a group of residents who have been in Namibia for many years but remain nationals of Angola; these people are precluded from citizenship in terms of Namibia's law, in part because of non-renunciation policies of their country of origin, namely Angola.

Since Angola's policy does not provide for the citizen to cancel the Angolan citizenship before taking the citizenship of another country, speculation is high that those people who were born in Angola and currently reside in Namibia are still Angolans and cannot

be allowed to obtain Namibian citizenship. However, in similar vein, Klaaren and Rutinwa's (ibid) finding proves to be not very explicit, because it fails to disclose the fact that after independence Namibia's Constitution of 1990 provided for a grace period for all people who had lived in Namibia for more than five years to automatically apply for Namibian citizenship. According to Article 4 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia of 1990:

“Citizenship by registration may be claimed by persons who are not Namibian citizens under Sub-Article (1), (2) or (3) hereof and who were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the date of Independence, and had been so resident for a continuous period of not less than five (5) years prior to such date: provided that application for Namibian citizenship under this Sub-Article is made within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of independence, and prior to making such application, such persons renounce the citizenship of any other country of which they are citizens.”

The major issue here is not the precluding policy, but the cross-border family network and transboundary migration phenomenon, which Du Pisani as quoted in Reitzes (2005:5) argues challenges the autonomy, security and sovereignty of state authority. This transpires in many ways. For example, although Namibia's Constitution provides for that right above, migration, population movement and citizenship issues between Namibia and Angola remain complicated.

The problem in this regard is that mixed Namibian and Angolan Oshikwanyama-speakers in northern Namibia pose dilemmas for the authorities to identify those people who have ordinarily been in Namibia for more than five years to qualify for citizenship in terms of the Constitutional provisions. Therefore, it is not true that Namibia's intolerant policy is effective in Oshikango due to what this study terms “subtle dual

citizenship”. In this light, Du Pisani (ibid) also argues that transboundary migration has implications, which intersect with a number of other issues and will therefore be very difficult to address. At this stage, we should look at these migration implications based on transboundary family diasporas between Namibia and Angola (see Table 6.28) below.

Table 6.28: Household respondents: Country of birth, self, parents, spouse

Sex	Country	Country			Total
		Namibia	Angola	Other countries	
Male	Self	44 (91.7%)	24 (8.3%)		33 (100.0%)
	Father	39(83.0%)	8 (17.0%)		33 (100.0%)
	Mother	39 (83.0%)	8 (17.0%)		33 (100.0%)
	Wife	17 (89.5%)	2 (10.5%)		33 (100.0%)
Female	Self	57 (95.0%)	3 (5.0%)		7 (100.0%)
	Father	52 (89.7%)	6 (10.3%)		7 (100.0%)
	Mother	52 (89.7%)	6 (10.3%)		7 (100.0%)
	Husband	26 (92.9%)	2 (7.1%)		7 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Statistically, 91.7% male respondents and 95% females accepted that they were born and bred in Namibia, while 8.3% males and 5% females were born in Angola. Most respondents did not explain about their current state of citizenship, presumably due to fear of legal action against them. In addition, 83% males and 89.7% females had their fathers born in Namibia, while 83% males and 89.7% females had their fathers and mothers born in Angola.

Finally, 89.5% of male respondents had their spouses born in Namibia, 10.5% admitted to have their spouses from Angola and 92.9% females had their spouses born in Namibia and 7.1% had their husbands from Angola. As normal practice, most people with

dubious citizenship in northern Namibia hide their citizenship status. Seemingly, this commenced after Namibian's independence and the stiffening of migration laws and policies, which Klaaren and Rutinwa (ibid) described as relatively intolerant. This can also be proved from another statistical angle. If we compare the current transboundary intermarriage statistics and Banghart's statistics from 36 years ago, the results differ considerably. Banghart (1969:119) states that approximately 7% of the sample reported interclan marriages. Among them, 7% of the Ondonga and 22% of the A/Kwanyama (Angolan Kwanyama) reported intermarriage.

Another implication is that the members of the Aakwaanyoka clan, for example, on the Namibian side have their clan members, whom they regard as sisters and brothers, in Angola. If one of their clan members in Angola dies, the Namibian brothers and sisters of the clan name would go to Angola to mourn and inherit the wealth, which often may include the mahangu field.

Thus, most respondents give cultivation of mahangu fields as their major reason for crossing the common border to Angola. In this respect, there can thus be little doubt that Kwanyamas on both sides of the common border inherit mahangu fields across the border through matriclan networks. They currently acquire land the way it was done 100 years ago and the present Angolan and Namibian law of land tenure seems silent on the issue. This study leaves this gap of land issues within the Kwanyama along the common Namibia and Angola border for another research. The trends of living

discussed in this subsection necessitate the investigation of dual citizenship of the Aakwanyama community in the Oshikango area.

6.4.3 Household respondents and the issue of dual citizenship

6.4.3.1 Dual citizenship and state sovereignty

The issue of dual citizenship is global and not only confined to the SADC or to the Oshikango area. In the SADC Region, for example, as Klaaren and Rutinwa (2004:22) explain, five countries either explicitly prohibit dual citizenship or have a rule that mandates loss of citizenship even upon involuntary or marriage-based acquisition of a foreign citizenship. These countries are identified as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

In addition, Klaaren and Rutinwa (ibid) also refer to the eight SADC countries, which have policies that are relatively tolerant in regards to dual citizenship such as Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles⁴², Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. However, in their findings Klaaren and Retina fail to explicitly mention Angola's position in their classifications of tolerant and relatively intolerant citizenship policies of the SADC countries.

⁴² Seychelles is no longer a member of the SADC and Madagascar was accepted in 2005 as indicated in Chapter 3.

Angola's citizenship policy has been not clearly defined due to a war situation lasting more than three decades, which disrupted the functioning of the country's administrative machinery and thus created a lack of records. This contributes to the fact that most literature on migration in the SADC Region gives very little consideration to Angola. Statistically, the household respondents did not show that they had dual citizenship.

Interviews were conducted with the assumption that the households in Oshikango had or still have dual citizenship. To the question, whether the respondent had cancelled citizenship of Angola before acquiring Namibian citizenship, the answer was no. In that regard, statistics show that 93.8% male and 98.3 female respondents claim to be *bona fide* Namibians, while only 6.3% male and 1.7% female respondents admitted to being Angolans.

Table 6.29: Household respondents and the issue of dual citizenship

Citizenship	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
Angolan only	3	6.3%	1	1.7%	4	3.7.0%
Namibian only	45	93.8%	59	98.3%	104	96.3%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%		

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

The result in the cross tabulation above, lacks convincing substance. For example, in the follow-up open-ended question, the majority of respondents failed to indicate whether they had held Angolan citizenship before. But, paradoxically, they also indicated in subsequent questions that they had close family such as mothers and fathers in Angola.

It is therefore unclear how, when and why these people left their parents in Angola to reside in Namibia.

Moreover, they possibly acquired Namibian citizenship before they cancelled their previous Angolan citizenship. If the latter is true, they violated Namibia's laws of citizenship and should have been internally declared 'irregular' or 'illegal migrants' (see Chapter 4). However, internationally, these people do not fall in the category of irregular or illegal migrants as such.

The United Nations Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2006:32) states clearly that "in Europe, for example, where people from outside the European Union are closely controlled, it is relatively easy to identify migrants with irregular status." However, GCIM (ibid) further argues that in many parts of Africa where borders are porous, ethnic and linguistic groups straddle state borders, some people belong to nomadic communities and many people do not have proof of their place of birth or citizenship, it is unfair to call them irregular or illegal migrants. This is also true in the Namibia/Angolan border context. It is a fact that some people born in Angola or Namibia, especially during the time of war or at the beginning of the century were not officially registered as citizens of either country.

The nomadic San communities also move regularly across the border unnoticed or noticed but no one worries about their migration. The evidence is that a large number of people in the Oshikango area could knowingly or unknowingly have dual citizenship, because they acquired Namibian citizenship without renouncing their Angolan citizenship (see statistics below.)

Table 6.30: Household respondents: Have you ever been a citizen of Angola?

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Previous Angolan citizens	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
Yes	4	8.3%	3	5.0%	7	6.5%
No	44	91.7%	57	95.0%	101	93.5%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

At most 91.7% male and 95.0 female respondents indicated that they had never had Angolan citizenship and only 8.3% males and 5.0% females admitted to having had Angolan citizenship before. However, the precision of data provided above cannot be vouched for since they are in conflict with the data provided earlier in Table 6.28.

This difference in data results occurs because not all respondents were willing to provide true information about their citizenship, due to the fear of arrest and deportation. Respondents themselves also confessed to the confusion of their citizenship profiles that resulted from a number of factors. These included the war of liberation in Namibia and the civil war in Angola.

During the time of war, they did not have any fixed abode. They were not static either. They usually shifted with peace. When peace came to Angola, they went to live with their relatives in Angola. When tensions erupted in Angola, they moved over to Namibia to stay with other close relatives such as brothers and sisters. This trend continued after Namibia's independence and the end of the war in Angola. Many people remained uncertain about how to decide on their domicile. Consequently, some people opted to acquire Namibian citizenship only, while some opted for dual citizenship.

6.4.3.2 Awareness about implications of dual citizenship

The issue of dual citizenship in Oshikango is a state-conscious problem. People at the grassroots level are not conscious of the implications of dual citizenship. Statistics in both Table 6.31 Awareness within age and Table 6.32 Awareness within education variable show this reality.

Table 6.31: Household respondents: Awareness of implications of dual citizenship (within age)

Awareness of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia				
Age	Sex	Yes	No	Total
20 – 35	Male	6 (37.5%)	10 (62.5%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	6 (30.0%)	14 (70.0%)	20 (100. %)
36 – 49	Male	2 (12.5%)	14 (87.5%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	3 (15.0%)	17 (85.0%)	20 (100.) %
50+	Male	3 (18.8%)	13 (81.3%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	3 (15.0%)	17 (85.0%)	20 (100.) %

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Curiously, 62.5% (N=10) male and 70% (N=14) respondents within the age group 20-35 years indicated that they were not aware of the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia since they had not been informed about it. The same applies across all age groups. Statistics indicated that all respondents declined to admit the status of dual citizenship. However, in a follow-up open-ended question, two (2) females and one (1) male disclosed that they still do not hold any citizenship and they take it for granted that they are in their own area.

In addition, most respondents revealed in their comments that most of those who claimed to be Namibian citizens today (in Oshikango), did not do so willingly or on their own understanding. They argued that circumstances such as colonial oppression compelled them to seek citizenship. For example, the South African army tortured all those people who failed to produce identity documents, because they were regarded as “SWAPO terrorists.”⁴³ Hence, the respondents claimed that the only way to avoid beatings or get access to the south as a migrant labourer was to get a Namibian identity card.

Among the respondents, only one (1) man obtained Namibian citizenship during the colonial era in order to be able to get an opportunity to work in *Ombishi*. He explained that the Namibian identity card was also used as a passport to cross over to Angola to look for employment.

⁴³ “SWAPO terrorists” was a propaganda term used by South Africa to refer to Freedom Fighters of the South West Africa Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO).

Education also plays a great role in understanding the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia. Table 6.32 below shows that 80% (N=8) male and 100% (N=16) female respondents with no education are unaware of the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia. But it is interesting to note that awareness about problems of dual citizenship in Namibia grows proportionately with education. This creates another assumption that in some years to come many more people will understand these implications, if many people from both sides of the boundary receive education up to secondary level.

Table 6.32: Household respondents: Awareness of implications of dual citizenship (within education)

Awareness of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia				
Education level	Sex	Yes	No	Total
None	Male	2 (20.0%)	8 (80.0%)	10 (100.0%)
	Female		16(100.0%)	16 (100. %)
Primary	Male	3 (13.3%)	20(87.0%)	23 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (6.7%)	14 (93.3%)	15 (100. %)
Secondary (Matric or A-Level)	Male	5 (45.5%)	6 (54.5%)	11 (100.0%)
	Female	11 (40.7%)	16 (59.3%)	27(100.0%)
Tertiary (Higher than Matrics)	Male		2 (100.0%)	2 (100. %)
	Female		1 (100.0%)	1(100.0%)
Other	Male	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2 (100. %)
	Female		1 (100.0%)	1 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

As data above indicate, female respondents are the majority without knowledge about the implications of dual citizenship. This could be attributed to the fact that they were historically sidelined in many ways, including education. The reality transpires in the fact that at Secondary level 40.7% female respondents have knowledge about implications of dual citizenship compared to 45% of their male counterparts. This

indicates that women have high potential of understanding various issues if they were given the opportunities of education and travel.

Apart from education and as was the case with the cross-border migrant respondents, women were historically not exposed to travel across countries compared to men and thus the opportunity for them to understand issues of migration, population movement and citizenship was small. All sixty (60) women interviewed across all ages indicated that they did not work as migrant workers, because they did not have the right to do so. They were obliged by custom to remain at home looking after the households. After independence, they heard about the new regime of migration laws and policies but these are beyond their comprehension.

Evidence revealed that many people along the border did not know the Namibian Constitution and ironically, they cannot read the English version in which it is written, hence they have acquired dual citizenship in a state of ignorance. During interviews, some justified the reason for having dual citizenship by saying that this would allow them to live freely in both countries (Namibia and Angola) and to enjoy benefits from both countries.

6.4.4 Contract labour system: A Tax Card/Tribal Registration Certificate

The motivation question here is twofold. First, the tax card issued by traditional authorities in Namibia was also secretly issued to Angolan male nationals vying for

migrant labour in the south. Secondly, tax cards also encouraged dual citizenship because people tended to register twice – in Namibia and Angola. As the storytellers narrated above, men usually obtained a tax card from the traditional authorities, which enabled them to go out for contract labour in the south of Namibia.

The key informant, Iimbili (interviewed 2006) explained that the card was initiated in 1925 and the applicant paid £1.00⁴⁴ to obtain it and thereafter paid either money to the Officer-in-Charge of Native Affairs in Owamboland or mahangu to the traditional authorities. It seems that what Iimbili (ibid) alludes to, tallies with Bruwer's (1967:85) argument that the "history of organised recruiting of labour for employment in South West Africa, dates to 1925, when a conference of mining interests was held in Windhoek as a necessity for the proper organisation of the native labour supply for the mine became pressing". Therefore, it can be generally accepted that Iimbili and Bruwer's information depicts the start of the Tax Card/Tribal Fund Registration Certificate (*Okakalata kefendelo*) in Owamboland, (see the sample of the latest version of the tax card below).

⁴⁴ The British currency was used in Namibia by that time.

Figure 6.1: Tribal Fund Registration Certificate (*Okakalata kefendelo*)

0.7-14

**ONZAPO YEFENDELO NEINYOLITHO
ONDOMBWEDI YEFENDELO NELINYOLIFO
STAMFONDS REGISTRASIESERTIFIKAAT
TRIBAL FUND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE**

ONUMELI YA REHISTELWA
ONOMOLA YA REGISTELWA
GEREGISTREERDE NOMMER
REGISTERED NUMBER 1/2/130/1943

EDINA
EDHINA
NAAM
NAME Amos

OSHIGWANA
OSHIWANA
STAM
TRIBE Nwananwa

EMENEKELOHALA
ONHELE YOKUKALA
VERBLYFPLEK
RESIDENCE Owambo

EDHINA LYAHE
EDINA LAHE
NAAM VAN VADER
FATHER'S NAME Nghidimbwa

ELENGA
HOOFMAN
HEADMAN M. Nambeni

MWENE GWOMUKUNDA
MWENE WOMUKUNDA
ONDERHOOFMAN
SUB-HEADMAN Kamukha

MWENE GWEGUMBO
MWENE WEUMBO
KRAALOPPERHOOF
KRAAL HEADMAN Self

OMKUNDA
GEBIED
AREA Erongo

OMANDHINDHIKO
OMADIDILIKO
OPMERKINGS
REMARKS 1959
Banci up to 1986

J.M.Ltd.-0-3070

Source: Provided by Amos Nghidimbwa during interviews (2005)

It is assumed that men from Angola also received these cards under the guise of being Namibians. Therefore, to the question whether any respondent had relatives in Angola

paying tax to the Namibian traditional authorities, some answered in the affirmative (see Table 6.33 below).

Table 6.33: Household respondents: Relatives from Angola paying Tax Cards/Traditional Authorities Registration Certificate in Namibia

	Relative	Count
Male	None	46 (95.3%)
	Brother (s)	1 (2.1%)
	Uncle (s)	1 (2.1%)
Total		48 (100.00%)
Female	None	58 (96.7%)
	Brother (s)	1 (1.7%)
	Uncle (s)	1 (1.7%)
Total		60 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

The contextual data above reveal that both female and male respondents had relatives paying tax from Angola. For example, one (1) had a father; another one a brother and two (2) had their uncles from Angola paying tax to the Namibian traditional authorities at Ohangwena.

This data also confirms that women were not migrating for labour, hence no one indicated that he or she had a sister or uncle paying tax from Angola. According to Iimbili (ibid), the first traditional office that started to receive money for the tax card was established at Okaloko in the Ondonga traditional district in 1947 during the reign of King Sheepo-sha-Namene of the Aandonga ethnic group. Iimbili (ibid) also adds that the tax card was used as a citizenship identity card.

Any man but not woman, from anywhere in Africa could get the tax card by meeting these requirements: first, the ability to pay £1.00 to the traditional authority or to the government, and second, the ability to speak Oshiwambo. The point of argument here is that many young men (it was not issued to women) from Angola crossed the border to Namibia and registered as Namibians to obtain the tax card that allowed them opportunities to work in the south.

However, the same also happened when SWANLA's labour demand started to favour Angolans more than Namibians, especially to work in South African mines. The Namibian men then crossed the border into Angola to register for labour as Angolans. The key informant Paul Helmut (2006) explains the Namibians who masqueraded as Angolan only paid tax as Angolans at the SWANLA recruiting centre in Rundu.

Ndaoya confirms this evidence (2000:11-12) by stating that most of the men she interviewed in northern Namibia were actually recruited as Angolans for the following reasons: First, their Omalenga (traditional councillors) were reluctant to allow their subjects to work in the Union, because they returned with many possessions that the councillors did not have. Second, they assumed 'Angolan' identity because there was no agreement between the Portuguese authorities in Angola and the Union to control the flow of Angolan labour to South Africa. Only Angolans could make their way

independently to SWANLA recruiting centres, thus Namibian nationals obtained Angolan documents to benefit from that opportunity.

This gives an indication that the tax card was primarily introduced to control Oshiwambo-speaking migrant workers and confine them to work in Namibia rather than in the Union of South Africa. This is clearly shown by the fact that the tax card was not required for recruiting migrant workers for South Africa. However, there was no control over whether the Oshiwambo-speaking individual was from Angola or Namibia; the language was the determining factor.

It is also interesting to note that the confusion of citizenship is an historical phenomenon, which was at one time institutionalised by the colonial South African regime through the migrant labour system. For example, the recruiting centres were also reluctant to refer to labourers from Angola as ‘Angolans’ and instead called them “Extra-territorial Natives, while those from Namibia, were called “Northern Natives” (Ndaoya 2000:5 as quoted in Distribution of E.T and N. Natives, SWAA A521/8/2/2406).

Another cause for debate here is to what extent citizenship obtained through other means such as the tax card has influenced the current trend of cross-border mobility and the issue of dual citizenship. This can be treated as another challenge to the Namibian Constitution and Migration Policies in two ways: firstly, the situation of those people in Angola who obtained their Namibian citizenship by means of tax cards and who still believe that they are part of Namibia is not clearly addressed in the current laws.

Secondly, the situation of those Namibians who were recruited by SWANLA as Angolans with Angolan citizenship is also not addressed. The conclusion could be provisionally drawn that the provision of the Namibian Constitution that requires renunciation of citizenship of other countries before the person obtains Namibian citizenship is particularly challenged here, because those Namibians who obtained Angolan citizenship for recruitment at SWANLA centres have not given it up. To prove this empirically, the researcher asked the respondents at Oshikango whether they had relatives from Angola who were paying for the tax card (also called in the latest version “The Tribal Fund Registration Certificate”) to the Namibian traditional authorities. The reason was to explore other signs of traditional phenomena that have led to the current complexities of cross-border migration and population movement and issues of dual citizenship.

The situation whereby Kwanyamas from Angola pay for their tribal fund registration certificates in Namibia attests to the fact that their ethnic diaspora has remained strong regardless of international boundaries. Since the Kwanyamas in Angola did not have any formal traditional authorities, as did their counterpart in Namibia, they seemed to regard the traditional authority at Ohangwena as the one that catered for them, especially in the light of employment opportunities in the south or in South Africa.

Although Ndaoya located important evidence about migration and the implication of cross-border labour recruitment, she failed to touch specifically on the issue of tax cards, which were previously used as identity documents in northern Namibia and how this influences the current life of the people living along Namibia's and Angola's common border.

Apart from Ndaoya's conclusions, some prominent literature such as Crush et al, totally fail to focus on Namibia although Namibia in general and Oshikango in particular has a history of migrant contract labour equally important in the SADC context. For example, in his findings, Crush (2000:12) implies that "42% of resident adults from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe alone have gone to South Africa in the past with a high of 81% and a low of 23% in Zimbabwe." Ndaoya (2000:4) points out the same omission in

Yuedelman's (1984:269) map, in which Namibia and Angola do not feature among labour supplying countries to South Africa.

Since Namibia and Angola are omitted in Crush (ibid) and other literature including Yuedelman in terms of evidence regarding the contract migrant labour system to South Africa, this study complements Ndaoya to fill this lacuna. It adds that more than 50% of male respondents in Oshikango, especially those in the age category of 50 years and above indicated that they worked in different places in South Africa either as Angolans or as Namibians. They also worked in the south of Namibia and they were engaged in a range of different work such as on the farm, in the kitchen, in mines, in construction and even at sea, but their language and tax cards determined their citizenship rather than passports or visas, as is the case today. The striking question in this regard is the extent of the impact that these historical phenomena have had on the current regular movements of people across the Namibian/Angolan common border.

6.4.5 Household respondents: Regular visit to Angola

Arguing from the holistic perspective, many and diverse factors influence emigration and immigration at the macro and micro levels. Oucho (2006) underlines factors such as demographic, economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental conditions as push

factors for migrants to other countries, especially in the SADC Region. However, this dissertation finds that environmental conditions, such as floods and famine, have little influence on current trends of cross-border movements in the Oshikango area. Drought, on the other hand, which was historically another environmental factor of migration in the area, is still important. We can also use these factors as bases for determining reasons and frequency of cross-border migration between Namibia and Angola.

If we refer back to Chapter 2 of this dissertation, Todaro's neo-classical model regards migration as a product of economic decision-making. This means that the migrant makes a rational free choice to improve his economic life by seeking more favourable employment conditions, even if that decision is taken under distressful or hazardous conditions.

In this discussion, the economic and socio-cultural factors have been dominant in the history of migration and population movement between Namibia and Angola. To explain this clearly, we should look into frequencies and reasons, which the respondents in Oshikango gave during the interviews. Statistics show a high degree of cross-border mobility to Angola among Namibians living along the border with Angola. This can also be attributed to family networks and traditional dynamics. As implied in the neo-

classical theory, tendencies in terms of visiting frequency and reasons differ from person to person, and according to age and gender attributes as reflected in Table 6.34 below.

Table 6.34: Household respondents: Frequency of visiting Angola

		Frequency of visiting Angola					
Age	Sex	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Yearly	N/A	Total
20 – 35	Male	2 (13.3%)	1 (6.7%)	3 (20.0%)	8 (53.3%)	1 (6.7%)	15 (100.0%)
	Female		6 (30.0%)	5 (25.0%)	5 (25.0%)	4 (20.0%)	20 (100.0%)
36 – 49	Male	1 (6.7%)	5 (33.3%)	3 (20.0%)	3 (20.0%)	3 (20.0%)	15 (100.0%)
	Female	6 (31.6%)	8 (42.1%)	1 (5.3%)	3 (15.8%)	1 (5.3%)	19 (100.0%)
50+	Male		1 (6.3%)	4 (25.0%)	7 (43.8%)	4 (25.0%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female		3 (15.0%)	8 (40.0%)	4 (20.0%)	5 (25.0%)	20 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Drawing from the statistical data above, females aged 36 to 49 cross the international border to Angola more often than other age groups across gender. While only 6.7% (N=1) of male respondents admitted to going to Angola daily, 31.6% (N=6) female respondents did so. Hence, overall, 53.3% of young male respondents (20-30 years) indicated visiting Angola yearly, compared to only 25.0% (N=5) female respondents of the same age. Data shows that women were in the majority of the number of households who visited Angola very often – i.e. daily, weekly and monthly while men dominated with yearly visits. Given these statistics, motivation can be perceived in two ways.

First, matrilineal bonds can have a significant influence on cross-border migration and population movement in Oshikango. In this regard, one could argue that since women

are the backbones in family and clan structures, they tend to visit their children, grandchildren and other maternal relatives across the border more often than men tend to do.

Men rarely visit their children or grandchildren because of the belief that they are not part of them. Instead, they frequently visit their maternal nephews, nieces, aunts, uncles and mothers across the border. This gives us a large number of women visiting relatives in Angola.

Secondly, the historical background of migration and population movement in the Oshikango area reflects women's visit as of short duration and over short distances. This also caused women to show a traditional trend of short distance and short period migration. Data suggests that men dominate the yearly visit to Angola because their interest and concern in clans is not serious compared to women's. Moreover, men often cross the border for grazing purposes, thus their visits to Angola are usually seasonal and motivated by a good rainy season in Angola.

The last reason in this respect is that more of the men spent much of their time away from home compared to women. Although the migrant contract labour system ended

decades ago, the remittances of the migrant system remain in existence. Therefore, most men still spend many months in the south for employment and they simply come home during Christmas time. They usually use that opportunity to visit their relatives in Angola and to take gifts to them as required by culture. These could be among the respondents who visit Angola on a yearly basis. Apart from that, we can also argue in the light of neo-classical theory that different individual or community reasons as indicated in Table 6.35 determine the frequency of visits to Angola.

Evidence on the variation in terms of visiting frequencies could be based on the individual's reasons. It is, however, important to note that some literature on Southern Africa argues that men and women migrated equally and for the same reasons. For example, in his findings Oucho (2006:55) claims that "the notion that only men have been involved in cross-border migration in southern Africa is erroneous. So men and women in the region have been migrating for both similar and specific reasons".

These findings are, however, flawed and biased towards certain countries in southern Africa such as Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Arguing from an historical perspective, in Oshikango and generally in Owamboland, women did not have reasons to migrate nor did they have the opportunity to do so. They were restricted by customs and later by civil law from migrating to distant areas. Supporting this notion, Voipio

(n.d) states that the Owambo males had always been used to travel far beyond the borders of the present Owamboland, e.g. they fetched copper from Otavi for their ornaments, and hence, young boys were drawn by the desire for adventure.

This led to the development of a line of thought that a young boy was only an adult after his first journey to the south. When capitalism came to Owamboland the reasons for migration changed from traditional to modern commodity-based aspirations, albeit remaining male-biased. Kane-Berman (n.d) for instance, indicates that “no African women, with a few privileged exceptions, are allowed to leave the reserves in order to live in the Southern sector”.

In his research in Oshikango, Bruwer (1967:100) implies that, “essentially a man is not a man unless he has been outside Owamboland to work.” This leads to a thought that the reasons for migration in the early days of the migrant labour system were very different from the current ones. For example, Bruwer (ibid) indicates that one of the reasons to migrate was the desire to find favour in the eyes of females, because in many cases, women will not marry a man who has never been out of Owamboland. In our time, these reasons are no longer valid and both men and women migrate for varied reasons. For example, evidence that surfaced during interviews suggests that people have a combination of reasons to go to Angola (see statistics below).

Table 6.35: Household Respondents: Reasons to visit Angola

Reasons	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% within sex
	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
Employment	1	2.1%	-	-	1	0.9%
Visit Immediate family	3	6.3%	6	10.0%	9	8.3%
Never went to Angola	7	14.6%	7	11.7%	14	13.0%
Reluctant to respond	2	4.2%	2	3.3%	4	3.7%
Took a child for naming by its father			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Visit and attend funeral of a brother	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Cultivate mahangu field	1	2.1%	3	5.0%	4	3.7%
Cultivate mahangu field and rear cattle			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Do business	2	4.2%	8	13.3%	10	9.3%
Do shopping	6	12.5%	11	18.3%	17	15.7%
Do shopping and buy cattle	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Do shopping and for traditional treatment			2	3.3%	2	1.9%
Do shopping and look for mahangu field			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Rear cattle	6	12.5%			6	5.6%
Visit friends	1	2.1%	3	5.0%	4	3.7
Visit my immediate family and relatives	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Visit immediate family and for traditional treatment	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
Visit immediate family and do shopping	1	2.1%	3	5.3%	4	3.7%
Visit immediate family, to do business and shopping			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Visit immediate family, rear cattle, and for traditional treatment	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
Visit immediate family, do business, cultivate mahangu field and rear cattle			1	1.7%	1	0.9%
Visit immediate family, other relatives, cultivate mahangu field and rear cattle	2	4.2%			2	1.9%
Visit relatives	8	16.7%	3	5.0%	13	12.0%
Touring	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
Traditional treatments	2	4.2%	5	8.3%	7	6.5%
Total	48	100%	60	100%	108	100%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

According to the statistics above, 18.3% of female (N=11) respondents mentioned shopping as their only major reason to go to Angola compared to 12.5% (N=6) male respondents. Both men and women crossed to Angola for traditional treatment and to visit immediate family and relatives. Other dominant reasons given by both female and male respondents are to: (a) cultivate mahangu fields, (b) rear cattle, (c) do business, and (d) see friends. Only 1.9% of respondents (N=2) went to Angola for tourism.

Evidence also indicates that most female households went to Angola to buy mahangu, beans, groundnuts, mahangu and sorghum flour, mopane worms and other agricultural products to sell in Namibia. This informal cross-border trade as discussed above (see cross-border trade sub-section in this chapter) is not recognized, although it also contributes to government revenue. Men show little interest in selling this kind of items. For example, within the Aawambo tribe in general, it is against culture for a man to sell items such as mahangu and sorghum flour. Therefore, men dominate in activities such as rearing cattle; for example, 12.5% males, compared to only 0% females. 16.7% of male respondents go to Angola to visit their relatives, such as uncles, grandmothers, brothers, and nephews while only 5.0% females do the same.

Most female respondents, i.e. 8.3% go to Angola to visit their immediate family such as mothers, fathers, daughters and sons, compared to only 6.3% of male respondents. The

reasons for this might be that men have little interest in immediate family. For example, as a child is not part of them, according to Aawambo family lines, which is matrilineal, men are limited to concern about the children of their female relatives like their sisters or aunts as immediate family.

Most interestingly, 8.3% female respondents go to Angola for traditional treatment compared to only 4.2% males. The data collected did not show the reason why women prefer traditional treatment to men, hence it is another research gap. Apart from that, people in the Oshikango area cross the common Namibia/Angola border through different areas rather than the Oshikango border post as statistically depicted in Table 6.36 below.

Table 6.36: Household respondents: Access used to cross the border to and from Namibia/Angola

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Access for crossing Namibia/Angola border	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
No response	6	13.0%	8	13.3%	14	13.0%
At any place	3	6.1%	5	8.3%	8	7.4%
Odibo	3	6.1%	1	1.7%	4	3.7%
Onheleiwa	2	4.2%			2	1.9%
Oshikango border post	34	70.8%	46	76.7%	80	74.1%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

It is evident from the statistics above that most respondents i.e. 74.1% across the gender divide cross into Angola through the Oshikango border post. This evidence seems to support the findings of Nangulah and Nickanor (2005:11) namely that the Oshikango

border post processes by far the greatest number of legal travellers between Namibia and Angola. Nangulah and Nickanor (ibid) further argue that between 1999 and 2003, for example, there were a total of 1 321 365 arrivals from Angola and 780 050 departures from Namibia.

In addition, Nangulah and Nickanor's statistical results differentiated by gender also tally with the results obtained in this research. They argue that during the course of 2003, the number of Namibian women who crossed into Angola increased significantly (Nangulah and Nickanor 2005:13).

Table 6.36 above shows that 76.7% of respondents crossing the border through the Oshikango border post were female compared to 70.8% males. This statistic conflicts with that of respondents interviewed while crossing the border. Therefore, it can also be assumed that the information, which both male and female household respondents gave during interviews with regard to which border post they used to cross into Angola, lacks some truth. The respondents were very reluctant to reveal information about other places they use to go to Angola, because they did not trust the interviewers.

Moreover, the majority of people also make use of other places since the border is just a line with non-designated entry points. Statistics also reflect that while 74.1% of respondents (N=80) crossed the border through the Oshikango border post, 7.4% of them admitted that they might use other places. For example, as Table 6.36 indicates, 3.7% of both male and female respondents acknowledged that they made use of Odibo area to cross into Angola. Table 6.37 indicates that 50.5% of them went on foot – meaning that they normally do not go far.

Table 6.37: Household respondents: Travelling methods

Travelling Methods	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
On foot	21	48.8%	27	51.9%	48	50.5%
On road	22	51.2%	25	48.1%	47	49.5%
Total	43	100.0%	52	100.0%	95	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Table 6.37 shows that the majority of people, 51.9% who crossed the border on foot were women. However, alternative interpretations suggest otherwise. In the case of the cross-border migrants (see cross tabulation – cross-border migrants above) women were in the minority of people interviewed crossing at the Oshikango border post. This implies that among the households along the border, women are the majority crossing the border into Angola, whereas, among the cross-border migrants, (this includes people from farther regions and even other countries) men are in the majority.

6.4.6 Attitude towards the Namibia/Angola border

The collected data (see Table 6.38) shows that there are varied attitudes towards the existing international common border between Namibia and Angola. For example, 75.0% of male and 61.7% of female respondents did not regard the border as being good to keep foreigners away. In addition, 62.5% of male and 83.3% of female respondents did not accept that the border was good to control migration.

One respondent's criticism was that "although the border is there our cattle and vehicles are continuously stolen and hidden in Angola, hence what benefit we draw from that border?" In the same light, 18.8% of male and 18.3% of female respondents believed that the border was breaking family networks. On the other hand, 12.5% of male respondents and only 5.0% of female respondents perceived the border as a threat to their traditions and cultures (see Table: 6.38 below).

Table 6.38: Household respondents: Attitude towards Namibia/Angola border

Sex	Response	Yes	No	Total
Male	Disturbing family	9(18.8%)	39 (81.3%)	48 (100.0%)
	Disturbing traditions and cultures	6 (12.5%)	42 (87.5%)	48 (100.0%)
	Good to keep foreigners away	12 (25.0%)	36 (75.0%)	48 (100.0%)
	Good to control migration	18 (37.5%)	30(62.5%)	48 (100.0%)
	Neutral	8 (16.7%)	40 (83.3%)	48 (100.0%)
Female	Disturbing family	11 (18.3%)	49 (81.7%)	60 (100.0%)
	Disturbing traditions and cultures	3 (5.0%)	57 (95.0%)	60 (100.0%)
	Good to keep foreigners away	23 (38.3%)	37 (61.7%)	60 (100.0%)
	Good to control migration	10 (16.7%)	50(83.3%)	60 (100.0%)
	Neutral	17 (28.3%)	43 (71.7%)	60 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Requiring anonymity, one respondent argued that the border has created hatred between them because “if you just go to Angola to cut wood for stockades for your homestead, Angolans will arrest and interrogate you like a prisoner of war, and this was not the case during the era of our forefathers”.

Drawing from this, we can argue that the negative attitude towards the common Namibia/Angola border is reflected by the perpetual vandalism to the border fence. For example, as Tjaronda (2006:1) indicates “the first two attempts to erect fences between the two countries in 1990 and 1994 proved futile as the fences were vandalised” Significantly, 28.3% of female and 16.7% of male respondents were neutral. This cannot be interpreted to mean that they have no opinions about the border. Perhaps some were scared to reveal their inner feelings due to reasons best known to themselves.

6.4.7 Households respondents’ understanding of foreigners

Based on lower levels of education among the respondents, the question was posed to assess the general outlook of respondents, especially on grounds of nationalism and regionalism. The question was: “Which people do you regard as foreigners in Namibia?” In response to this question, Table 6.39 below presents data on how age and

gender variables may influence understanding and attitudes of individuals towards foreigners.

Table 6.39: Household respondents: People they regard as foreigners in Namibia (within age)

Age	Sex	People regarded as foreigners in Namibia					Total
		All non-Namibians	All White	All Coloured	All non-Oshiwambo speaking	No Comment	
20 –35	Male	8 (53.3%)	1 (6.7%)		2 (13.3%)	4(26.7%)	15 (100.0%)
	Female	12 (60.0%)			1(5.0%)	7 (35.0%)	20 (100.0%)
36 – 49	Male	11(68.8%)	1 (6.3%)		2 (12.8%)	2 (12.5%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	12 (60.0%)	8(42.1%)	5 (25.0%)	1 (5.0%)	2 (10.0%)	20 (100.0%)
50+	Male	10 (62.5%)			6 (37.5%)	4 (25.0%)	20 (100.0%)
	Female	9(45.0%)		1 (5.0%)	4 (20.0%)	6 (30.0%)	20 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Given the data in Table 6.39 above, it is clear that gender has little effect on understanding and attitudes of individuals towards foreigners in Namibia. However, it was noted that 42.1% (N=8) of female respondents (age 36-49) regarded all whites in Namibia as foreigners compared to only 6.3% of their male counterparts.

This study connects this reality to the historical background whereby men were exposed to various tribes during the era of labour migration unlike women. Due to these historical restrictions, which confined women to their villages of birth, most of them also believe that Namibia ends in their surroundings, hence women lack understanding of nationalism.

There is a varied percentage across all ages and gender of respondents who believe that all non-Oshiwambo-speakers are foreigners. This could be attributed to other factors such as education levels. Hence, Table 6.40 below analyses data on education as a variable that would cause respondents not to understand the concept of foreigners in Namibia.

Table 6.40: Household respondents: People they regard as foreigners in Namibia (within education)

Education level	Sex	People regarded as foreigners in Namibia					Total
		All non-Namibians	All white	All Coloured	All non-Oshiwambo speaking	No Comment	
None	Male	4 (40.0%)			5 (50.0%)	1(10.0%)	10 (100.0%)
	Female	4 (25.0%)	1 (6.3%)		3 (18.8%)	8(50.0%)	16 (100. %)
Primary	Male	15(68.2%)	1 (4.5%)		4 (18.2%)	2 (9.1%)	22 (100.0%)
	Female	11 (73.3%)	1(6.7%)	1 (6.7%)	1 (6.7%)	1 (6.7%)	15 (100.0%)
Secondary (Matrics or A-level)	Male	7 (63.6%)	1 (9.1%)		1 (9.1%)	2(18.2%)	11 (100.0%)
	Female	17(63.0%)	3 (11.1%)		2(7.4%)	5 (18.5%)	27 (100.0%)
Tertiary Higher than Secondary	Male	1 (50.0%)				1 (50.0%)	2 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (100.0%)					1 (100.0%)
Other	Male	2 (100.0%)					2 (100.0%)
	Female					1 (100.0%)	1 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Although 40.0% of male and 25% female respondents across education levels regarded all non-Namibians as foreigners, some people in the area had different views about foreigners. For example, both male and female respondents without education or with merely primary education were of the opinion that all non-Oshiwambo-speaking persons were foreigners – meaning that all Otjiherero, Damara-Nama and Caprivians were foreigners to them. For example, one respondent argued: “equally regard all Caprivians

and Ghanaians as foreigners in Namibia” - meaning that the respondent did not make a distinction between someone from Ghana and someone from Caprivi.

In addition, respondents on the same level of education across the gender divide regard all whites in Namibia as foreigners. Apart from that, data indicates that a large number of respondents across age and education categories were reluctant to comment - implying that they could not judge who is a foreigner and who is not. Most respondents, even those who regard all non-Namibians as foreigners, did not give satisfactory explanations on the question of citizenship. This dissertation connects this difference of perceptions to Cox’s hypothesis of civilisation.

According to Cox (2001:224), “development and change in civilisations today has to be approached from two aspects: first, the contradictions within civilisations that pose choices among visions of the future; and second, the external influences coming from coexisting civilisations that have an impact on those choices. With this in mind, one can develop another level of inquiry to discover whether there is any relationship between the level of understanding of households (one layer of civilization) in Oshikango and the developments of the SADC regional integration project (another layer of civilization).

6.4.8 Household respondents and awareness about the SADC Regional Integration

It was hypothesised that there was a gap between the level of understanding of grassroots community in Oshikango and the process of the SADC Regional Integration (see Chapter 5). Hence, Table 6.41 and Table 6.42 below present empirical data on the understanding of and support for the SADC Regional Integration among the Oshikango community based on age, gender and education variables respectively.

Table 6.41: Household respondents: Awareness about SADC (within age)

Awareness of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia				
Age	Sex	Yes	No	Total
20 – 35	Male	11 (68.8%)	5 (31.3%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (5.0%)	19 (95.0%)	20 (100.0%)
36 – 49	Male	1 (5.0%)	15 (93.8%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	2 (10.0%)	18 (90.0%)	20 (100.0%)
50+	Male	2 (12.5%)	14 (87.5%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	4 (20.0%)	16 (80.0%)	20 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Table 6.41 above reveals that age and gender may also affect the individual's understanding and support of the SADC Regional Integration at the grassroots level. For example, 68.8% (N=11) of male respondents 20 – 35 years old understand the

concept of the SADC Regional Integration compared to only 5.0% (N=1) of female respondents of the same age.

The proportion in relationship between age and understanding of the SADC Regional Integration reflects that as the age increases so the understanding goes down across gender. For example, in the age group 36-49, at most 93.8% (N=19) male respondents and 90.0% (N=18) are not aware of the SADC Regional Integration. The same manifests itself at the upper age group of 50+ where 87.5% (N=16) male and 80.0% (N=16) female respondents have no idea as to what the SADC Regional Integration is all about. However, awareness of the SADC Regional Integration can also be determined by education variable as Table 6.42 below depicts.

Table 6.42: Household respondents: Awareness about SADC (within education)

Awareness of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia				
Education level	Sex	Yes	No	Total
None	Male	1 (10.0%)	9 (90.0%)	10 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (6.3%)	15 (93.8%)	16 (100.0%)
Primary	Male	5 (21.7%)	18 (78.3%)	23 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (6.7%)	14 (93.3%)	15 (100.0%)
Secondary (Matric or A-Level)	Male	7 (63.6%)	4 (36.4%)	11 (100.0%)
	Female	4 (14.8%)	23 (85.2%)	27 (100.0%)
Tertiary (Higher than Matrics)	Male	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (100.0%)		1 (100.0%)
Other	Male		2 (50.0%)	2 (100.0%)
	Female		1 (100.0%)	1 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Data in Table 6.42 above also reveal the acute relationship between education and awareness of the SADC Regional Integration. This implies that a poor education background across gender lines has a negative impact on understanding regionalism. For example, 90.0% (N=9) of male and 93.8% (N=15) of female respondents without education are unaware of the SADC Regional Integration. At primary level, all 78.3% (N=18) male and 93.3% (N=14) female respondents did not know what the SADC was all about. Most of them explained that they had heard the word “SADC” for the first time from the researchers.

The result is that the higher the education level of respondents the better their awareness about the SADC Regional Integration. For example, at secondary level 63.6% (N=7) male and 14.8% (N=4) female respondents have knowledge about the SADC Regional Integration Project.

At tertiary level and above almost all respondents know what the SADC Regional Integration is all about. However, among all respondents classified with little awareness about the SADC Regional Integration in Oshikango, women are in the majority. Apart from their lower education background, this could also be attributed to various factors including historical aspects.

Throughout the history of Oshikango, as Bruwer (1967) puts it, women very seldom left the tribal area. It is worthwhile to argue that the majority of women, especially of

middle age in Oshikango remain living the traditional life of staying home while their men go to the south or elsewhere to bring wealth to them (this process in Oshiwambo is called *Ouxwi*). Thus, women's understanding in terms of world developments and regional integration has always been confined to their environment in Namibia and across the border in Angola.

However, in his findings, Adepoju (2006) argues that urbanisation, expansion of employment opportunities in the urban sector – both formal and informal - and increasing access to education have also encouraged women to migrate to towns. But this explanation, although correct does not mean that the migration of women to towns would improve their understanding of regionalism. Moreover, most people, both men and women who migrate to towns or even to big cities such as Windhoek are confined to workplaces and opportunities are few to concentrate on political matters such as issues of regional integration. Most people who obtain a better education in urban areas seldom return home to rural areas. Therefore, most respondents found in the Oshikango area during interviews were predominantly women with lower levels of education.

To finalise a meaningful result of this dissertation, the household respondents in the Oshikango were also asked about their role in terms of participation in the SADC activities. The purpose was to determine the extent of the gap between the SADC Regional Integration Project and the involvement of grassroots communities (see Table 6.43 below).

Table 6.43: Household respondents: Participation in SADC regional integration process

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
PARTICIAPTION IN SADC PROJECT	Count	% within sex	Count	% within sex		
SADC is a strange term to me	26	54.2%	40	66.7%	66	61.1%
I do not know how to take part in SADC projects	12	25.0%	13	21.7%	25	23.1%
SADC is state-centred project	4	8.3%	3	5.0%	7	6.5%
I influence SADC decisions in many ways	1	2.1%			1	0.9%
I am not interested in SADC project	1	2.1%%			1	0.9%
Other	4	8.3%	4	6.7%	8	7.4%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Table 6.43 shows that all 54.2% male (N=26) and 66.7% (N=40) female respondents literally indicated that the SADC was a strange term to them. In addition, 25.0% male (N=12) and 21.7% (N=13) respondents, though they knew what the SADC was, had no way to take part in the SADC activities. Data further reflected that 8.3% male and 5.0% female respondents believed that the SADC is a state-centric project, which was out of their reach. Lastly, 8.3% male and 6.7% female respondents are not even interested in the SADC Integration Project. This is a clear indication that the gap is wide between the SADC Regional Integration Project and the involvement of people at the grassroots level.

Since the main objective of this dissertation was to investigate the extent of effectiveness of the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region, it is necessary to assess the knowledge and understanding of the grassroots

community in the Oshikango area of this Protocol. With reference to knowledge about the intended SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region, almost no household respondents in Oshikango knew about it. Data indicate that 95.8% (N=46) males and 96.7% (N=58) females had never heard about it. Only 4.2% male and 3.3% female respondents indicated knowledge about it, but they also explained that their knowledge was extremely limited, hence, they did not comment any further.

Table 6.44: Household respondents: Awareness about the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	% Within sex
Awareness about SADC Protocol of the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex		
Yes	2	4.2%	2	3.3%	4	3.7%
No	46	95.8%	58	96.7%	104	96.3%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Table 6.44 above reveals that grassroots communities do not know the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region. This tallies with Hausiku (2003) who quotes Mocks Shivute (The then Permanent Secretary in Namibia's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in Chapter 1 when he blames the regional media for only ensuring that SADC citizens know more about the European Union and its programmes and projects than about their own regional block – the SADC.

Most respondents also argued that they would never support initiatives for the free movement of persons in the Region because that could cause many social problems for them. With this result, the dissertation confirms that the SADC Regional Integration in general and its Protocols are state-centric projects known only to top government officials. To that end, the inquiry proceeded with the question whether there was support for Namibia to be integrated into the SADC Region (see Table 6.45).

Table 6.45: Household respondents: Support Namibia to be integrated in SADC

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female			
Support Namibia to be integrated in SADC Protocol	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex	Count	% Within sex
Yes	15	31.3%	15	25.0%	30	27.8%
I cannot say	22	45.8%	30	50.0%	52	24.1%
No	11	22.9%	15	25.0%	26	48.1%
Total	20	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Overall, Table 6.45 shows that 45.8% (N=22) male and 50.0% (N=30) female respondents indicated that they could not say because they are not aware of the SADC. In contrast, 22.9% (N=11) and 25.0% (N=15) female respondents did not support Namibia to merge or form a union with other countries, fearing that the people from other countries might bring unrest and other social crises such as war, diseases and unemployment to them. It has been provisionally concluded that the SADC Regional Integration excludes grassroots participation. The probability of this conclusion is high, as the information has been sourced through interviews with sampled respondents among the population of grassroots households in Oshikango.

6.4.9 Summary of major findings: Household respondents

It is clear that due to memory politics in the minds of household respondents in Oshikango, migration as an issue within the SADC Regional Integration still has a long way to go. This could be determined by age, education and gender variables as follows:

- Evidence shows that there is a relationship between education, age and gender *vis-à-vis* understanding of regional integration and nationalism. A considerable percentage of respondents confuse foreigners and Namibians from other ethnic groups such as the whites and coloureds. More than 90 percent of uneducated respondents across gender lines have no idea about the SADC Regional Integration or the Protocol of Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region
- Clan distribution across the Namibia/Angola common border is another variable that motivates cross-border migration and makes control of cross-border mobility difficult if not impossible. Influenced by education and age people in the Oshikango area failed to understand why there are laws that prevent them from moving freely across the border to interact with their family members and relatives.

- There is still confusion in the minds of people born and living within the Namibia/Angolan border context. It happened that some people born in Angola or Namibia, especially during the time of war or at the beginning of the century were not officially registered as citizens of either country. The nomadic San communities also move regularly across the border unnoticed or noticed but no one worries about their migration. To these people a requirement of citizenship became a threat and consequently most people in the Oshikango area could knowingly or unknowingly have dual citizenship because they acquired Namibian citizenship without renunciation of their Angolan citizenship
- This confusion is also embedded in history. During the contract labour system a Tax Card/Tribal Registration Certificate, which was introduced to recruit contract workers from the northern part of Namibia and southern Angola, was regarded as a national identity card, to which only men were entitled. Women had no such cards. Young men from Angola also obtained these cards as South Westerners and they retained that trend until Namibia's independence. They use this as documents to acquire Namibian citizenship, especially at independence without renouncing Angolan citizenship as required by Namibian law. Dual citizenship is thus evident and both Namibia and Angola's sovereignty is consequently challenged.

- One problem was that not all respondents across age and gender regarded the border as being good (effective) to keep foreigners away or good to control migration. Some respondents believed that the border was breaking family networks and was a threat to their traditions and cultures.
- Cross-border mobility between Namibia and Angola is not officially recorded. Data shows that women (36-49) were in the majority of the number of households who visited Angola very often – i.e. daily, weekly and monthly while men dominated with yearly visits. Given these statistics, the motivation can be perceived in two ways. First, matrinity can have a significant influence on cross-border migration and population movement in Oshikango. In this regard, one could argue that since women are the backbones in family and clan structures, they tend to visit their children, grandchildren and other maternal relatives across the border more often than men do. Men rarely visit their children or grandchildren because of the belief that they are not part of them. Instead, they frequently visit their maternal nephews, nieces, aunts, uncles and mothers across the border.
- Household respondents in the Oshikango area have different reasons for crossing the international border. Shopping, traditional treatment and visiting of immediate family and relatives are their major reasons. Other dominant

reasons given are: (a) to cultivate mahangu fields, (b) rear cattle, (c) to do business, and (d) see friends.

The major conclusions drawn in this chapter include the fact that SADC regionalism and the draft Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons in the Region are not known at the grassroots level in Oshikango. This implies that the case study has exposed a serious disjuncture between the grassroots people and the SADC regional integration project. This disjuncture is evident in the understanding and meaning that SADC and the grassroots people in Oshikango attach to the reality of international border and its social, economic and political importance. At the SADC and state level, (see problem statement in Chapter 1), the issue of sovereignty is central within the debate of border and citizenship implications. In contrast, the grassroots community construct their meaning about the international border on the premises of their social, cultural and traditional environments (also refer to Cox's civilisation approach discussed above in this chapter). This constitutes enough evidence that there is a link between the findings from the Oshikango case study and the notions of social constructivism theory. To social constructivists, knowledge is also a human product, and is socially and culturally constructed (Ernest, 1999; Gredler, 1997; Prat & Floden, 1994 in Kim 2001). Individuals create meaning through their interactions with each other and with the environment they live in.

Although the views of the respondents at Oshikango could not represent the general situation of issues of migration and population movement in the SADC region, by extension, these can be generalised in the SADC region (e.g. refer to the scenario of the Tutsis between DRC and Rwanda in Chapter 1). The question that remains to be answered is which of the SADC countries is ready for the Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region? Lessons from some SADC countries may assist to find an answer to this question. Therefore, it becomes important at this point to outline the views from certain SADC countries and the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek.

6. 5 A Lesson from Six SADC Countries

As indicated in the limitations of the study (see Chapter 1), the researcher was not able to visit any of the SADC countries for interviews but instead consulted the embassies/higher commissions of selected SADC member states in Windhoek. The embassy of Angola and high commissions of Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe and Namibia's Ministry of Home Affairs were approached for interviews to explain the attitude of people in their respective countries towards cross border migration and regionalism.

6.5.1 A lesson from Angola

In support of the literature and views of the respondents in Oshikango's case study (Chapter 6), Amaro (2005), the Second Secretary at the Angolan Embassy in Windhoek, in an interview described Angola's migration policy as follows: Angola is an open country, which welcomes all people from the SADC Region. However, there are certain exclusions such as that, visitors from SADC countries are required to apply for a visa before they come to Angola. Amaro explained that Angola supports the initiative embedded in the envisaged SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region, but has doubts about the implementation of it. She further argued that Angola has just emerged from a war, hence the country is not ready to open its doors to the free movement of people owing to security concerns.

On the question whether the people at grassroots level in Angola really understand the concept of regional integration and in particular, the draft SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region, Omara (ibid) argued that there is no need for those people to understand this. The grassroots community is not very interested in the integration process, hence their understanding does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with integration developments. This background draws this study to the conclusion that like other SADC countries, Angola supports the initiative of the free movement of

people in principle. The logical conclusion here is that they cannot compromise their security with the ideal of regional integration.

6.5.2 A lesson from Botswana

Angola, as discussed above differs from Botswana as far as migration policies are concerned. Angola's exclusion in terms of migration policy is based on security concerns. However, Botswana bases her exclusions regarding migration policies on economic issues. Kgolagano (the First Secretary in the Botswana Higher Commission in Windhoek in 2005), confirmed in an interview that Botswana does not support the initiative of the free movement of persons in the Region as reflected in the SADC Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons. He says that the problem is economic inequality, so if freedom of movement is introduced many people in the Region will leave their own countries for Botswana, as is happening to South Africa today. Another problem that the informant foresaw was the threat that experienced professionals from other countries might pose to Botswana nationals.

On the question of federalism as a possible panacea for this problem, Kgolagano argued that "this is not the ideal time for federalism, because we are at the height of enjoying

our sovereignty – everyone is enjoying the hard-won freedom”. He further explained that he couldn’t see any reason for the SADC Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons since no one is badly affected by the existing arrangement. It will just escalate crime and overburden the Ministry of Home Affairs.

On the question of xenophobia, Kgolagano explained that sometimes it is not wrong for one to be xenophobic, since people cannot be happy seeing jobs taken by foreigners. However, he acknowledged the weak point of the SADC countries in not adequately informing the communities at the grassroots level. These communities such as the San and other trans-national communities are the main beneficiaries of the Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region, because they still live in the traditional way of moving throughout the Region and cross-border controls are hindrances to them.

This implies that although the government of Botswana realizes the implication of excluding the grassroots community from the process of regional integration, it still has reservations based on the issue of free movement in a Region, which is characterized by disparities on the economic and political fronts. This leads to the conclusion that Botswana does not fully support initiatives of free movement in the region.

6.5.3 A lesson from Namibia

An interview conducted with Mr Mushelenga, Deputy Director for Migration in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 09 February 2005, revealed that Namibia supports the free movement of people among SADC countries, hence the Immigration Control Act is more liberal. Namibia also supports and is involved in the reviewing process of the SADC Migration Policy, about which most literature recorded reservations from the side of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Mushelenga gave the assurance that these reservations were not as serious as other writers may believe and the potential solution is evident through the current process of policy harmonisation in the Region. For example, this harmonisation would commence through bilateral policy agreements between two countries and the process would carry on, connecting the rest of the SADC countries.

Although Namibia supports the proposed liberal policy regarding migration in the SADC Region, the government is still very concerned about an increasing number of illegal migrants in the country. Apart from that, evidence drawn from Namibia's experience shows that Namibia is committed to the SADC ideals of integration, but like other SADC countries, at present Namibia has serious reservations with regard to the ideal of the free movement of persons in the region.

6.5.4 A lesson from South Africa

The First Secretary Consular of South Africa in Windhoek, Jemane (2006 interview) argued that South Africa does not have any specific policy or law that addresses the SADC migrants *per se*. The 2002 South African Immigration Act does not favour any migrant to South Africa, thus it treats all migrants to South Africa equally regardless of place of origin. The only discriminatory provision is that all citizens from Africa should pay no deposit for study permits. Jemane (ibid) also seemed uncertain regarding the ideal regional integration structure for the SADC Region, which can create a universal framework for cross-border migration in the Region.

It is indeed not healthy to allow the free movement of people in a Region of political fragility and imbalanced economies. South Africa has still reservations about the current SADC Protocol for Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons in the Region for the reason that the SADC structure is not ready to implement such a protocol.

Thus, issues of cross-border migration and the SADC ideal of the free movement of persons may otherwise be scaled down to grassroots community level, including traditional authorities. This point agrees with the vignette in Appendix A. This means

that the SADC ideal for the free movement of persons could be easily achieved through active involvement of grassroots communities and traditional authorities, although there is a problem that not all governments in the Region recognise traditional authorities.

6.5.5 A lesson from Zambia

With reference to demand-pull concepts, Zambia is not that popular. This means that people in the SADC Region and other countries in Africa only tend to migrate to Zambia when conflicts, for example war, break out in their own countries. It is concluded that Zambia, with a high degree of demand-push factors to other SADC countries such as Namibia and South Africa, has only one demand-pull factor, which is its liberal approach to migrants. This is evident from the fact that Zambia's support for the SADC Protocol on the Free Movements of Persons in the Region is indubitably high.

Nyirongo (interviewed 2005) indicated that the Zambian government migration policy is still intact. Zambia promotes migration into Zambia, which contributes to national development and maintains internal security. The Zambian migration control policy is reciprocal in nature – meaning that those countries that require a Zambian to have a visa to visit them are also treated in the same way in Zambia.

There are some SADC countries such as Angola and Mozambique that require Zambian nationals to apply for visas to visit those countries, hence Zambia also requires nationals from those countries to do the same in order to visit Zambia. Nyirongo (2005) emphasizes that as long as each SADC country maintains its sovereignty, the relationship between countries can still be sustained through reciprocal agreements.

Zambia also has trans-national communities and the situation is almost the same as that between Namibia and Angola. The slight difference is that in Zambia the control of some paramount chiefs transcends the national borders of countries such as Malawi and Tanzania. This means that a traditional paramount chief lives in Zambia but many of the subjects live in neighbouring countries. For example, the paramount chief of the Chewa lives in Zambia but the subjects live in Malawi and Mozambique and they pay their first fruit to him. People feel that they are one by virtue of belonging to one chief.

Nyirongo (2005) further emphasizes the need for recognizing the influence of different chiefs in the Region whereby the law makers and the SADC policy makers first recognize their laws and give them the right to rule across the border regarding traditional issues only, while politically it is the task of the states. In this way, people will feel they belong to one nation, the African traditions are promoted and the paramount chiefs and kings are empowered. This can also facilitate cross-border

migration within the grassroots communities. Nyirongo (2005 also cited another barrier embedded in cross-border trade. The current confusion is about whether the free movement, which is urgent, is for the goods and services or for people.

6.5.6 A lesson from Zimbabwe

The major influence on migration policy in the SADC Region is at present, spurred by Zimbabwe's political and economic situation. Seemingly, Zimbabwe is at present an enemy amongst friends. None of the SADC countries has adjusted its policy in solidarity with the Zimbabwean economic migrants. Instead, they opted for isolationist policies as an alternative. Botswana is electrifying her borders with Zimbabwe to strictly control immigrants from that country including informal cross-border traders; South Africa is tightening her border control and security to keep the Zimbabweans on their side of the border.

One important fact is that, even though the SADC encourages a high degree of harmony and policy coherence on paper and during meetings of heads of state, the practical image is different. Indeed, there is absolutely no harmony in the Region and the situation of

Zimbabwe has caused a significant division within regional circles regarding the free movement of people.

In obtaining empirical data about Zimbabwe's migratory policies, the researcher interviewed Mr. Mutiwazuka (21 February 2005), Head of Chancery of Zimbabwe in Windhoek. According to Mutiwazuka, although the Zimbabwean government supports the free movement of persons in the Region, it is also suspicious about whether it can be successfully implemented. Visa requirements in some SADC countries for citizens of sister SADC countries remain an impediment. For example, at present, Zimbabweans require visas to visit Angola, South Africa and Mozambique.

The existing visa regime between Zimbabwe and Mozambique was initiated by Zimbabwe during the civil war in Mozambique to curb the influx of people to Zimbabwe from that country. The visa regime between Zimbabwe and South Africa was initiated by South Africa to control illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe. Arguably, one major problem could be that people in grassroots communities have failed to fully understand the importance of the visa regimes between states. They are not supportive if regional integration initiatives are brought to them. What these people want to see is a removal of visa requirements and border controls in the Region.

As is the case in the whole of the SADC Region, the trans-border communities between Zimbabwe and other countries also pose a threat to migration control. For example, the Shona between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the Ndebele between Zimbabwe and South Africa and the Kalanga between Zimbabwe and Botswana have strong ties across the borders. The creation of artificial borders by the colonial powers always stands as a culprit of current criticisms regarding cross-border migration, particularly among communities living in the border regions in the SADC countries. Although Zimbabwe currently has multiple border posts such as two with Mozambique, two with Zambia, one with South Africa and one with Botswana, the problem remains unsolved since trans-border communities continue with illegal border-crossing.

As referred to above, countries like Botswana attempted to erect electrified border fences with Zimbabwe to curb the influx of migrants from Zimbabwe. Communities along the borders, particularly on the Zimbabwe side reject this move. They believe that electricification will result in divorcing people from nature. The fear is rife that electricity will kill both people and animals and above all, it is environmentally unviable since it limits the traditional mobility of game between the SADC countries. Due to this infeasibility, Botswana's electrification project has failed. Chronicle (2006) explains that the Botswana government has finally abandoned its controversial project to electrify a two and a half metre high fence along the border with Zimbabwe after encountering a number of problems, it has been learnt including rampant vandalism and other

undisclosed reasons. Zimbabwe's border with other countries, apart from Botswana, which has electrified its borders and Zambia, where the frontier is a river, is porous so that migrants can easily cross into the neighbouring country unnoticed.

However, a good thing that Zimbabwe's authorities have done is to empower communities living along the border to deal with people's daily mobility between Zimbabwe and its neighbours. For example, the people living at a distance from an official entry point can have their migratory needs solved by a community leader. This notwithstanding, a lack of professionalism within community members in handling such needs creates problems.

It has become clear that the grassroots communities in Zimbabwe support their counterparts in other countries regarding the SADC ideal for the free movement of persons, more than the political leadership in the SADC Region does. Political and state-centric cooperation expressed in the SADC Region cannot be hailed as a final resolution for regional peace and stability. Mutiwazuka concludes that since some SADC leaders still listen more to the West than to their regional brothers, the process of regional integration will always remain slow.

6.5.7 A lesson from the ADC Parliamentary Forum

A concern of the SADC Regional Integration Project and its envisaged protocol for the free movement of persons in the Region is also felt at the SADC headquarters. The mission of regional integration is clear but the modalities of integration are vague. The central argument is: Do we need to respect the Berlin Agreement on borders? According to Karuumbe (Regional Integration Officer, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, Windhoek - interviewed 2006), it is factual for SADC member countries to respect the Berlin Agreement as it was stipulated in the international laws. The major issue, particularly in Africa or the SADC Region is the harmonisation of policies especially in terms of integration of the Region.

African communities have their lives anchored in many things such as transborder natural resources coupled with tradition, cultures and family and clan networks. Karuumbe cites two instances embedded in transborder complexity namely, “there was a chief in Zambia who had two wives, one in Zambia and the other in Mozambique. The question was whether the chief would need a passport every day when he visited his other wife in Mozambique or not”.

Similarly, there was a soccer field in Zambia close to the border with Mozambique and if the ball was kicked to the other side of border, would the players need a passport to fetch it? Apart from family and clan Diasporas, these are some of the issues that necessitate a reconciliation of state policies in the SADC Region. But, Karuuombe does not support federalism as the ideal modality for unifying the divergent societies of the SADC Region.

A federal approach could be dangerous in the SADC Region and the EU model is ideal where the states retain their identity, integrity and sovereignty. He argues that SADC regional integration should follow the line of the inter-governmentalism type of regional integration without divorcing the grassroots communities from the natural resources that they enjoyed prior to the demarcation of international borders in the Region. This could be done through transboundary resource management embedded in transborder communities and arrangements. The only solution to the tribal, cultural and traditional diasporas is bilateral agreements between neighbouring countries in the Region, rather than a SADC Protocol for the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons in the Region.

Interviews with officials in embassies/higher commissions of several SADC countries and the SADC Parliamentary Forum office in Windhoek indicated an extensive diversity of perspectives regarding the SADC Regional Integration. The interviewees had only

one commonality, which was the rejection of federalism as a solution to problems of the SADC Regional Integration Project in general. In shedding more evidence within this debate, the study provides a summary of harmonised migration policies and laws of individual countries in the Region as quoted from Klaaren and Runtinwa (2004) (see Appendixes B, C, and D).

6.6 Conclusion

This Chapter explains analytically the practical realities pertaining to cross-border migration and regional integration among local communities in the Oshikango area. Observation, oral history and interviews are among other methodological techniques, used to document the down-to-earth living situation at Oshikango and to link it to perspectives of the SADC Regional Integration. This confluence of regional integration, cross-border migration and issues of border intersections dominate the inquiry. However, the chapter commenced with the historical diaspora of Aawambo across the Namibia/Angola common border and the extent to which this has currently been influencing cross-border mobility between the two countries.

Historically, Oshikango is an area within the Oshikwanyama-speaking community of the Aawambo tribe in northern Namibia and southern Angola. The colonial border between Namibia and Angola cuts through this ethnic group. Hence, these people in northern Namibia and southern Angola share the same language and culture and have difficulties to understand and accept the common Namibian/Angolan border.

Interviews were conducted with: (i) the households in the Oshikango area, (ii) cross-border migrants, (iii) key informants, and (iv) the representatives of six SADC countries and the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Namibia. It was concluded that the findings from the case study reflects important debates within the constructivism theory. The data was statistically summarised with the assistance of the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) 10.0 for Windows at the University of Namibia and the comprehensive summary of the findings is provided in the subsequent chapter of conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

As was stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this dissertation was a study of regional integration and issues of migration in the SADC Region and in particular the involvement of grassroots communities in the Regional Integration Project. A case study of the Oshikango border area has yielded empirical data. The particular research problem was to examine the situation of intra-regional migration in the SADC Region. Furthermore, how intra-regional migration has been responded to through the SADC supranational policies and protocols since 1992 with specific reference to the SADC Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons of 1995 and the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons of 1997 was also investigated. In so doing, the research has investigated:

- Origins of problems in managing intra-regional migration in the integrated SADC Region.
- The model of the SADC Regional Integration Project in the light of existing integration, migration and gender theories and systems.

- The situation of intra-regional migration in the SADC Region and how this has been addressed through the SADC supranational policies and protocols since 1992 with specific reference to the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons.
- Governmental attitudes in Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola towards regional integration and implications of management of cross-border migration in the Region.
- Attitudes and opinions of Regional and Local Councils of Ohangwena and Oshikango constituencies and Helao Nafidi Town Council, Heads of government, non-governmental and private institutions in the Oshikango area towards regional integration and implications regarding management of cross-border migration and population movement in Oshikango.
- The grassroots attitudes and opinions at Oshikango on regional integration and cross-border activities between Namibia and Angola.

It could be said that constructivism approach, which obviously informs some theoretical assumptions of this study, shares an interesting point of commonality with the conclusions of this dissertation. Therefore, informed by the problem and objectives stated above, and based on the Oshikango case study this dissertation arrived at the following conclusions.

7.2 CONCLUSIONS

Chapter one

In contextualising this study in Chapter 1, it was difficult to identify another study conducted at Oshikango probing issues of managing cross-border migration and population mobility and their implications on development, security, politics and economic endeavours within the SADC integration context.

As was stated in Chapter 1, it transpired that there is at present, a problem regarding the SADC Regional Integration Project, especially in managing cross-border migration among member states. A noteworthy major issue, which was found, is the stalemate in reaching consensus among the SADC member states to ratify the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region. All indications are that it will remain difficult to reach consensus on this issue.

From another perspective, numerous writers such as Sachikonye (1997), McDonald, (2000) and Kok et al (2006) tend to relate the origins of migration in the SADC Region to the demand for labour capital at the end of the 20th century. In contrast, this dissertation considers the origin of cross border migration primarily to be the arbitrary demarcation of borders in Africa by the former colonial powers.

In the same vein, this dissertation found that before 1884, Africa had no border demarcations, hence there was no cross-border migration or control of population movement within the continent. Thus, what the continent had was merely cross-clan people's movement.

Another important implication of border demarcation in Africa and the SADC Region in particular was the introduction alien concepts such as sovereignty, nationalism and border control. Within this implication, and in line with the constructivism approach, this dissertation concluded that the grassroots communities and conservative traditionalists perceive the 'border' as a social construct, which can be changed to restore the previous life before borders were introduced.

Chapter two

It was noted in Chapter 2, that migration in the SADC region as is the case in other regions are caused by factors derived from aspects of the (1) theories on the initiation of migration; and (2) theories on the perpetuation of migration. In Chapter two, this dissertation links migration to the SADC regional integration project for various reasons such as the aftermath of the demise of Cold War, the growing importance of economic globalisation and at present the democratic experiments. It was, therefore concluded

that the contemporary migration issues are meaningfully debatable within the new role of the region in the global security after the Cold War.

In order to ensure better understanding, migration approaches were analytically discussed and linked to perspectives of regionalism and its subsets of regionalisation, regional interstate cooperation, integration and regional identity. By determining the integration theory proposing a model to achieve establishing a political community at the end of the SADC Regional Integration process, these perspectives were applied to existing models of inter-governmentalism federalism, functionalism (Mitrany), and neo-functionalism. It was noted that SADCC was pro-neo-functionalism while SADC is close to inter-governmentalism or roughly it is neo-liberal.

By linking the perspectives of regional integration to a real life of individuals and communities within the integration project, constructivism approach provided the notion of common culture, history and beliefs, which influence regionalisation in many ways including issues of “identity” and “cross border migrations”. In this way constructivism perspectives have created a direct link between Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 of the Case Study at Oshikango.

In support of positive thinking beyond “nationalism” by way of regionalism, this dissertation aligns its course with the cosmopolitan school of thought and new-

Regionalism perspectives. In this connection, it was concluded that cosmopolitanism approach is ideal to enable this dissertation not only to be concerned with the appreciation of supranational initiatives of SADC regionalism, but also to investigate its position in the post-Westphalian world order.

Chapter three

In Chapter 3, when this dissertation examined the history of regional integration at the , global, continental and SADC levels, a conclusion was reached that direct comparison between the SADC and EU integration projects in terms of development and integration approaches is not possible.

However, it was noted that the existing disparities in terms of economic development that exist within the SADC Region are also evident in the EU. Cultural and traditional bonds in Africa and the SADC in particular are stronger than in the EU and, hence, they can also blow the regional integration out of proportion. Lastly, a model of economic inequality within the EU Region is not as wide as in the SADC Region.

At the continental level, Africa has a considerable number of regional groupings, but these are not effective for continental development and security. For example, intra-regional trade is very low in Africa. In addition, the civil society organisations are not active partners in regional integration process.

A broader conclusion was reached that the SADC is currently trapped in a market and trade integration model. This implies that the SADC is a mixture of agreements such as the Preferential Trade Agreements, the Customs Union, and the Common Markets, in which the SADC member states affiliate exclusively to any groupings or enter into any agreement of that nature regardless of any negative impact that would have on the SADC Regional Integration Project.

It was also remarked that some features of the SADC Regional Integration Project were copied from the EU model without carefully demarcating variances in terms of levels of development and historical backgrounds.

Other contentious issues this dissertation found were the rules of origin and informal trade within SADC regionalism and cross border migration. The problem was how to determine the origin of a product or products traded through informal transactions across

porous and poorly controlled borders in the SADC region. The proposed SADC Trade Protocol is unlikely to solve the problem since it is at the state level and people at the grassroots level who sell goods across the border cannot understand or possibly do not know it. Therefore, this dissertation supports writers such as Flatters et al. (2004) who argue that the rules of origin have been among the more contentious issues in the SADC Trade Protocol.

There is also a challenge that the SADC National Committees, which consist of key stakeholders, notably the government, private sector and civil society in member states and are responsible for regional policies, strategies and the SADC Plan of Action, as well as for co-ordinating and overseeing the implementation of these programmes at the national level are dysfunctional in all member states. This leads to the conclusion that poor participation of civil society and communities at the grassroots level is partially attributed to this failure.

Another challenge noted in Chapter 3, is embedded in overlapping of SADC and COMESA roles in the SADC region. In the face of this challenge another organ called the MIDSAs was formed to facilitate migration issues within the SADC and COMESA countries, but it created another challenge in terms of overlapping objectives of the two blocs.

Chapter four

An important observation in this dissertation, especially in Chapter 4, is that the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region was blocked due to existing disagreements among the member states. Although at the time this study was carried out, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Lesotho had signed this Protocol, its implementation was uncertain, because it requires 2/3 of members as signatories. The general conclusion drawn from this observation is that the SADC's ideal of the free movement of persons in the Region seems unlikely to be achieved soon and hence the dream for regional integration is far from a reality.

It was also noted that there is a serious misconception apparent in xenophobic attitudes among the SADC member states that the free movement of persons and migration in general are always negative to national economic development. The question that would motivate this debate is: is free movement and migration beneficial to concerned SADC member countries? Numerous studies have shown migration as always negative to national economies and regional integration, but this study agrees with the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005) that migration also has a positive impact on growth, development and poverty reduction in countries.

Migrants, as was the case with labour migrants in the former Owamboland, make valuable economic, social and cultural contributions to the societies that they have left behind. In this regard, the remittances that migrants send to their families and relatives play a huge part in poverty alleviation and support the development process in countries of origin. Currently, as Leopold quotes the United Nations (2005), nearly 200 million international migrants support their home countries' economy by US\$240 billion a year and spend more than US\$2 trillion (around N\$ 13 trillion) in their host nations.

Another strong conclusion drawn in favour of migration is that in the case of those countries with small population such as Namibia and Botswana, immigrants may not only encumber their economies and job opportunities, but may also strengthen their buying power and hence investment and economic growth. This would lead to the interesting conclusion that ratification of the SADC Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons in the Region may equally benefit all the SADC countries with small and big population in the following way:

- Countries with small populations would get extra people from other countries in the Region to buy goods in their markets and boost their economies.

- The objective of the economies of scale can also be realised through diversification of industries in the Region due to balanced buying power, hence those countries with big population may also benefit.

Chapter five

As outlined in Chapter 5, this study derives its empirical results from a case study of Oshikango using a hybrid of exploratory and descriptive methods. Selection of this methodology was based on the assumption that it proves effective in probing into the real-life experiences and psychology of the people in Oshikango as interpreted in normative trends of crossing international boundaries between Namibia and Angola. Start here. This entails that this dissertation adopts the constructivists approach with a definite normative dimension, hence the research aims for a transformative outcome, and thus is not interested in "knowledge for knowledge's sake." It was eventually assumed that this methodology has successfully facilitated exploration of empirical data with regard to the attitudes of people at Oshikango towards international borders, foreigners and clan networks transcending the common border.

It was found that the results of this study can be generalised to the migratory situation of all people along the Namibia/Angolan common border, because a total sample of 108 respondents drawn from a total population of 27 599 of the Oshikango residents plus 20 key informants, 40 cross-border migrants and a few storytellers, has been enough to justify the validity of the results. However, this dissertation does not claim for external validity of the results if these results are generalised in the SADC context.

Chapter six

It was noted in Chapter 6 that oral and written literature on Oshikango confirmed the reality of the difficulty in controlling migration and population movement between Namibia and Angola due to the negative attitude of people towards the border. This dissertation confirms the findings of Notkotola and Siikonen (2000), quoting the South African Assistant Native Commissioner's report from Oshikango of 1952, who explained that it was impossible to control the movement of thousands of Owambos and their cattle across the common Angolan–Namibian border from one border post.

It was also noted that no matter how the number of border posts is increased, the people continue destroying the border fence. This finding aligns with Mushelenga's

(interviewed 2005) argument that Namibia has 28 border posts to Angola, and still people cut through the border fence into Namibia or Angola. Justifying this conclusion, Dr. Hübschle as quoted by Tjaronda (2006:2) indicated that “there has been movement of people across the border for over 100 years because Namibians have relatives on the other side, which would make it unfair to cut them off”. With reference to these statements and judging by the results, discussions, and conclusions in Chapter 6 it could be assumed that a threat to the SADC Regional Integration and management of cross-border movement is attributed to these variables: poor education background, memory politics of historically uncontrolled human and stock mobility in the region and issues of the contract labour system.

To test these assumptions, this dissertation has applied the following hypothesis to the case study of cross border migration issues at Oshikango: A poor education background within grassroots communities at Oshikango may lead to lack of understanding in terms of:

1. Meaning of international boundaries
2. Nationality
3. The SADC Regional Integration Project

(a) Meaning of international boundaries

In line with the constructivism approach and Cox's contradictions within civilizations, one important conclusion drawn here is that the grassroots communities, particularly those who have been intersected by international boundaries in the SADC Region attach different meanings to these boundaries. As was noted in Chapter 6, there are varied attitudes towards the existing international common border between Namibia and Angola. Respondents across gender do not regard the common Namibian/Angolan border as being good to keep foreigners away or preserve sovereignty; nor do they accept that the border is good to control migration. Instead, to them the border is an artificial nuisance that causes troubles such as breaking family networks and threatening their traditions and cultures. Informed by this finding, a general conclusion could be drawn that grassroots communities at Oshikango and possibly in the SADC Region as a whole do not fully understand the purpose of international boundaries between countries. Hence, the community at Oshikango does not accept the erection of the common border between Namibia and Angola.

(b) Nationalities

Lack of understanding in terms of nationalities is another important sign, which indicates that the current understanding of the grassroots communities in the SADC Region is insufficient for the developments of high political standards such as regional

integration. It was noted that respondents at Oshikango were not sure who should be considered a foreigner in Namibia and they were also not aware whether there were other nationalities apart from the Oshikwanyama or Oshiwambo-speaking people. In this regard, this study identifies gender, low education levels and advanced ages of the respondents as crucial determinants of understanding about nationalities at Oshikango.

An interesting finding of this study was that respondents without education across gender and age at Oshikango regard all whites in Namibia as foreigners. Moreover, both male and female respondents without education or with merely primary education were of the opinion that all non-Oshiwambo-speakers were foreigners and the example they gave was all Otjiherero, Damara-Nama, and Caprivian-speakers were foreigners to them. One respondent argued: “I equally regard all Caprivians and Ghanaians as foreigners in Namibia.” This indicates that most respondents referred to their own area (Oshikango) to mean “Namibia”. Owing to these implications, the study reaches at the conclusion that poor education within the grassroots communities at Oshikango relates directly to poor understanding of own and other people’s nationalities. This may lead to another conclusion that since the poorly educated people is unable to understand the basics of social distinctions such as nationalities; the confidence is low for them to understand advanced social aspects, which the SADC regional integration and management of cross border movements entail.

The findings also revealed that, apart from poor educational background, age also has a significant impact on the individual's understanding and support of the SADC Regional Integration at the grassroots level while gender does not. The fact is, a large number of middle aged respondents have little understanding of the SADC Regional Integration. For example, in the age group 36-49, more than 90% of respondents across the gender divide are unaware of the SADC Regional Integration and in the age group 50 years and above more than 80% of respondents across the gender divide have no idea as what the SADC Regional Integration Project is all about. This study clearly established that there is an acute and proportional link between education, age and awareness of the SADC Regional Integration Project.

Another area of contention from which this study has drawn some important conclusions is the implication of the complexity of trans-boundary cultures and traditions which clans observe, respect and value. Findings in Chapter 6 show that the clan network dissected by the international boundaries in the SADC Region such as the Kwanyamas between Namibia and Angola at Oshikango is another major problem omitted in the politics of the SADC Regional Integration Project.

The study also found that the implication of cross-border cultural Diasporas is not only economic, but also evident in dwelling patterns and traditional leadership. By confirming this implication theoretically and empirically, the study agrees with Kane-Berman (n.d) who described the Oshikwanyama-speaking community network as a

pattern of homes straddling the border between South West Africa and Angola and their family and clan networks that follow this living pattern, as the root cause of difficulty in managing cross-border movement of people at Oshikango.

It is also important to note that part of this difficulty is the intricacy of inter-marriage and the web of families across the border. Empirically, the contextual data imply that more than 80% of respondents across gender had their fathers born in Namibia, while more than 80% of them had both their fathers and mothers born in Angola. A conclusion deduced from this evidence is that there is a steady trend of strong clan interlinks at Oshikango and therefore, cross-border migration and population movement control in the area is not easy.

Another implication related to the above-mentioned strong bond of kinship among the Kwanyamas both in Namibia and Angola evident in classificatory kinship or clan names such as the Aakwaanyoka clan, (the clan of the snake family), Aakwanambwa (the clan of the dog family), Aakwaudimbe/Kwaniilya (the clan of the grain family), is the belief that they are one nation regardless of any international boundary.

In addition, another observation reveals that up to the time this study was carried out the Kwanyamas on both sides of the common Namibia/Angola border acquire land the way it was done 100 years ago. This implies that if one of their clan members in Angola dies, his or her Namibian brothers and sisters in the clan name would go to Angola to

mourn and inherit the wealth, which often may include the mahangu field and livestock. Thus, most respondents give cultivation of the mahangu fields as their major reasons for crossing the common border to Angola.

Judging by the results, discussions and findings in Chapter 6, it could be concluded that those people born in southern Angola or northern Namibia, especially during the time of war or at the beginning of the century were not officially registered as citizens of either country. Consequently, these people are currently holders of dual citizenship in Namibia or Angola, while some still do not hold any citizenship.

It was found that dual citizenship is a political issue at Oshikango. However, it was also noted that lack of understanding about dual citizenship among the grassroots community at Oshikango could be attributed to poor education. For example, 80% male and 100% female respondents with no education indicated that they were not aware of the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia.

Another area of interest from which conclusions could be derived by this study is the implication of the then tax card/traditional registration certificate, which was issued to recruit labourers from northern Namibia and southern Angola during the era of the contract labour system. It was noted that these tax cards were issued to both Namibians and Angolans; hence the findings suggest the possibility that these cards were used as a citizenship identity card in northern Namibia. It was generally concluded that after

Namibia's independence, holders of these cards who lived in Angola easily obtained new Namibian identity cards while they were still Angolans. This encouraged dual citizenship in the area and in view of the gravity of these implications, this study reaches the conclusion that Namibia's migration law and the Constitutional provisions that prohibit dual citizenship in Namibia are not effective at Oshikango.

Aside from issues of clan networks across common borders and implications of dual citizenship, the findings in Chapter 6 also revealed that people at Oshikango have varied reasons to cross the common border. Both male and female respondents only mentioned the reasons that sound good such as shopping, traditional treatment, visiting of immediate family and relatives, to cultivate mahangu fields, rear cattle, business and to see friends, while none of the negative reasons such as those mentioned in Minnesota State University (MSU) (2003), were mentioned. Arguing along same lines, MSU came to the conclusion that people tend to migrate for hidden, negative reasons that they hardly ever reveal, for example, after killing another citizen, family problems, when in conflict with the national laws or when they are in debt. These findings suggest the possibility that respondents at Oshikango also migrate due to reasons, which they circumvented during the interviews because they were negative.

Another important consideration in this study is the way migrants commute every day across the common border at Oshikango. One problem is that the immigration and police officials at Oshikango are caught in a dilemma over border control modalities,

because the frequency and nature of cross-border movements are extremely strange. Evidence emerged from this study to show that one person at Oshikango can cross the common border to and from Angola more than ten times a day.

A further factor that attracts consideration in this study is that most local households and even other Oshiwambo- speakers from northern Namibia and southern Angola do not use the Oshikango border post when travelling into Angola and back. A problem that needs special attention is that the border is porous, and seemingly, neither the Namibian nor Angolan governments have any means to deal with this issue. Therefore, the comprehensive conclusion may imply that the Oshikango border post is not effectively and optimally utilised.

(c) Regional integration

The final area of interest is the degree of understanding, and participation in the process of the SADC Regional Integration Project by grassroots communities. Evidence in Chapter 6 discloses that respondents, both cross-border migrants, households and even the key informants in the Oshikango area perceive the SADC as an unfamiliar term and they have no way to participate in its integration activities. A further revelation was that these respondents believe that the SADC Integration is a state-centric project, out of their reach and therefore of no interest to them. Informed by this evidence, this study arrives at the conclusion that there is wide gap between the SADC Regional Integration

Project and the understanding of, participation and involvement in it by people at the grassroots level as presented in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1: SADC regional integration vs. grassroots involvement

INDICATORS	GAPS	
	SADC AND TOP NATIONAL POLITICAL LEVELS	GRASSROOTS COMMUNITY LEVEL
SADC Regional Integration	Good for economic ties	Not known
Major Actors	Member states	No participation
SADC Protocol for Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons	Supported with mixed feelings	Not known
Cross-border migration and population movement	Controlled subject to bilateral, reciprocal agreements or individual country's law	Good for free movement across the common border and informal trade

One crucial implication noted in this study is that grassroots communities at Oshikango lack understanding of the SADC Regional Integration Project. Findings in Chapter 6 indicate that more than 90% of respondents across gender and age without education are unaware of the SADC Regional Integration. At primary education level, 78.3% of male and 93.3% of female respondents did not know what the SADC was all about. There is evidence to the effect that the lower a person's education level, the more likely it is that he or she has little awareness about the SADC Regional Integration project.

Another important notion that this study deduced from the findings in Chapter 6 is that more than 95% of respondents across gender and education had never heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region, and

the 5% of respondents who indicated that they were aware of this Protocol, also acknowledged having limited knowledge about it.

By the same token, it is also interesting to note that the SADC Regional Integration Project and the Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons are not only unknown to illiterate and grassroots communities at Oshikango, but data show that more than 90% of key informants also denied knowledge about them. In addition, no other SADC Agreement is implemented in Oshikango, than the Southern African Regional Police Chief Council Organisation (SARPCCO) Motor Vehicle Clearance Agreement.

It is noted that lack of information from top management of the SADC to grassroots communities is another problem. Isaksen (2002) found that the SADC National Committees established to take information down to the people had by 2002 been established in all but three countries, but only a few, if any, were functioning. In addition, in some countries these committees were not even known by persons associated with the SADC. This situation hampers SADC citizens from meaningful participation in SADC affairs.

Judging by the results and discussions of the findings above, it could be generalised that the SADC Regional Integration Project is a shallow state-centric integration project which is not integrated deeper at the grassroots community level. Therefore, in its

current state, the SADC Regional Integration body is incapable of attaining its ideal of the free movement of persons in the Region and it cannot influence the management of cross-border movement of persons and goods in the Region. Drawing on these conclusions, the study suggests recommendations as outlined in the following subsection.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has identified various factors that affect the realisation of the SADC's ideal of the free movement of persons in the Region, the implementation of the Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons and the management of cross-border migration and population movement among the SADC member states. Based on these factors, this study considers recommendations that would help the SADC management to:

- Reach consensus in ratifying the Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region;
- Devise strategies on managing cross-border movement; and
- Bring the regional integration closer to the grassroots communities.

These recommendations are important to make the SADC conscious of the existing gap between its management and the grassroots communities and the asymmetric nature within the regional economies. Therefore, this study recommends:

To the SADC management

- That since the demarcation of boundaries, as discussed in Chapter 1 is the major source of the problems that currently face the SADC ideal of free movement of persons, those borders should be respected as stipulated in the African Union

Charter. But the SADC member state laws should be liberalised to ensure a high standard of respect for human rights within communities in the border regions.

- That a Forum of Traditional Leaders should be established at the SADC level. In addition, the SADC should also recognise the influence of different traditional chiefs in the Region. SADC law and policy makers should recognise traditional laws and give the traditional leaders the right to rule across the border for traditional issues only, while politically it is the task of the states to rule (see Appendix A: Pastoralist Traditional Peace-Treaties). The example of the paramount chief of the Chewa in Zambia who also has subjects in Malawi and Mozambique who pay their first fruit to him is relevant in this regard. In this way, people will feel that they belong to one nation in the Region, African traditions are promoted and the paramount chiefs and kings are empowered. This would make it easier for cross-border control through traditional authority structures. Moreover, the Protocol of the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons in the Region would no longer be required or could be reduced to serve as a guiding policy implemented by traditional and political leaders at grassroots levels, particularly in the border regions.
- That SADC member states should find an integration model, which suits the diverse cultural, political, social and economic situations of the Region. This implies that the SADC Regional Integration Project should avoid replicating the

EU model in southern Africa without making relevant alterations due to the distinctiveness of the two bodies. For example, the EU's society differs from SADC's in terms of traditional, cultural, social, economic and political structures and civilisations. The EU does not have strong traditional authorities as is the case in Africa and the SADC Region. Their society is not organised in clan and big family relationship structures, as is the case in Africa or the SADC Region. The level of development and education among member states is more balanced, which is not the case in Africa and the SADC Region. Above all the EU is a continental body while the SADC is a regional one. In this regard, the examples such as top-down and bottom-up participatory approaches from the EU model should be replicated in the SADC Regional Integration. One good point is that in the European Union, border regions are legally empowered to establish cross-border cooperation, which, according to Illés, (2003:4), is comprised of two types of structures: top-down structures, organised and controlled by central government and bottom-up structures, initiated and organised by local organisations.

- That unlike the EU and regional integrations in other continents, integration in Africa and the SADC in particular should be unique and should firstly start with cultural integration across the common borders. This is important because it will enter into the psychology of the grassroots communities, which is predominantly imbedded in cultural and traditional values, usually transcending the common

border. Therefore, special arrangements should be made for the people of the same clans, family, ethnicity, race or language within the common border to be granted special rights through liberalised laws, to practice their traditional and cultural rites as they did before border demarcation. This can lead to the attainment of sustainable development goals in the Region, whereby the natural resources including cultures and traditions should be preserved for use by future generations.

- That the SADC policy in terms of asymmetric economic issues should be directed to transfer developments in terms of secondary and tertiary industries, technology and communication systems to backward areas or countries to curb the influx of people to economically affluent countries such as currently happens to Namibia, Botswana and South Africa as is the case of Spain's scenario vis-à-vis the European Union integration alluded to in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. If the example of Spain is practised in the SADC Region, then there need be no more hesitations from some SADC countries to sign the Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons, because none of the member states would worry about the influx of people from other sister member states.
- That the current SADC intergovernmental policy should be replaced with a deep and all-inclusive model of integration gradually realised through the creation of a strong Customs Union where income obtained from tariffs is distributed fairly.

This would lead to the solution of the asymmetric situation among the SADC economies.

- That development of joint trans-frontier projects across the borders should be encouraged. The existing trans-frontier parks such as the Namibe Corridor, the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Park between Namibia and South Africa, the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KaZa) Project which involves Namibia, Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the envisaged coastal park along the sub-continent's Atlantic seaboard, crossing the boundaries of South Africa, Namibia, and Angola should be encouraged and used to engage local communities in the SADC Region. In addition, more projects of this nature should be created with the intention of organising trans-frontier community based projects within the SADC Region. This approach would increase involvement and participation of grassroots communities in the SADC Regional Integration Project and the international borders in the Region would no longer be regarded as barriers to development. Moreover, the mindset of the local communities would change from a traditional and cultural focus to a development-oriented focus.
- That, in order for the SADC to succeed in implementing the transfrontier projects in the Region, the regional body should solicit and fully utilise the indigenous knowledge of traditional local communities by actively involving them in

transborder developments and by motivating them to work together with development agencies across the border.

- That the SADC management should foster a spirit of mutuality in the Region by convincing the member states that the free movement of persons and migration in general within the Region should not be regarded as always negative to economic development, but also as an economic booster by way of increasing the buying power, especially in sparsely populated countries such as Namibia and Botswana. In addition, those emigrants to other countries in the Region or further afield would also plough back money through remittances, which contribute greatly to the economic and social development of the member countries.
- That the SADC should consider revisiting its trade policy regarding cross-border informal trade, which is often a trade platform for grassroots communities, predominantly women. If well coordinated at the SADC and national levels, these activities would reduce permanent immigration to countries with affluent economies, because people at the grassroots level would be able to trade their goods across the border and returned to their countries with money that they can use to raise their living standard. This would strengthen the initiatives of women empowerment in the Region, since most of the trans-frontier informal traders are poor women engaged in selling basic commodities such as clothes and locally

produced food stuff such as beans, mahangu, mopane worms, and even livestock, especially at Oshikango.

- That the SADC should initiate a regional gender policy, which would protect female migrants in the Region. This would be good to curb violence against migrant women and children currently evident in incidents such as rape, trafficking, torture, killing, sex slavery, HIV/AIDS infection and many more.
- That the SADC officials should receive special training pertaining to various essential functions of the supranational regional integration regime such as economics, sociology, anthropology, customs, border control, law and police science. This training would enable officials such as immigration, police and development planners to cope with the diversity in the Region.
- That the official languages in the SADC member states should be increased to include English, Portuguese and French. This would enhance the capacity of the local people to understand important documents at the national and SADC levels such as provisions of mutual interest enshrined in the Constitution of each of the member countries, the SADC Protocols and bilateral agreements.
- That SADC initiates a migration monitor similar to the SADC Trade Hub in Gaborone as a platform for SADC nationals to access migration information.

To the Individual SADC Member States

- At the national level, this study recommends that the SADC member states should reactivate the SADC National Committees and make policy provisions supporting the operations of these committees. The operation and functioning of these committees would facilitate the dissemination of information about the SADC Regional Integration to the grassroots communities as well as to the civil society.
- That SADC offices should be decentralised from the capital cities to regional/provincial levels in the member states so that the information about the SADC can reach communities at the grassroots level of the member states.
- That the SADC member states should revisit their migration laws to accommodate the concerns of the grassroots communities, especially those affected by the border. In so doing, the SADC member states should either strengthen the bilateral agreements or make the transcending in-situ sort of cross-border liberalisation system currently found between almost all neighbouring countries legal. For example, the current agreement between Namibia and Angola for a visa-free movement between the two nations is not sufficient because it has only solved visa-related problems while the people, especially

those in the Kwanyama diaspora and who understand nothing about visas or passport requirements should be treated differently.

To the grassroots communities

- That those members of the community with better education and understanding about the SADC Regional Integration and implications of cross-border migration and dual citizenship should be involved to assist in educating other members on these issues. This could lead to a better understanding because the communities usually prefer receiving information from their own people such as pastors and teachers.

- That the NGOs and other civil society organisations should identify and organise communities at different levels to educate them about the importance of regional integration and the benefits that the communities could draw from this project.

7.4 POINTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study also recommends that further research should be carried out in the following areas:

- An attempt should be made to improve the descriptive background of this dissertation by quantifying the relationship between regional migration issues and the SADC Regional Integration and economic indicators. This means that outcomes of additional quantitative research would be important to determine what economic, social and cultural indicators should be used to produce scenarios and eventually population projection in the SADC Region.
- That, since issues such as land and cattle diseases have become serious concerns, especially in Namibia, further research is necessary to probe issues of cross-border inheritance with specific focus on land and livestock disease control at Oshikango or in the SADC Region in general.
- That, if the cultural, traditional and ethnic bond complemented by economic asymmetry between Namibia and Angola, which this study has identified as possibly the issues of serious concern within the SADC Regional Integration Project, further studies are required to investigate the same issues between the SADC member states and non-SADC member states. This would be of great

importance because current predictions are based on the assumption that the SADC cannot resolve internal problems regarding cross-border movement, which is due to trans-boundary cultural and traditional links without an attempt to control the same links between communities in the SADC member states and the communities in the non-SADC neighbouring states.

- That important further research is required to be directed at the current link between the objectives of the African Union and the SADC Regional Integration regarding continental migration issues.
- That further research should be carried out in the area of bilateral agreements, especially the recent visa-free agreement between Namibia and Angola to probe to what extent this agreement would benefit communities within the common border. This recommendation is made because since this agreement is confined to merely a single benefit, which is that of the free movement of persons and excludes other benefits such as cross-border employment opportunities and informal trade ventures, other studies are required to investigate and recommend on these issues.
- That another serious issue, which requires further investigation, is the implication of dual citizenship within communities along the common border. This implication comprises many issues of concern such as cultural and

traditional network implications and laws and sovereignty implications. Therefore, further studies are required to investigate and recommend the potential strategies, which individual SADC member states or the SADC at its supranational level should use to deal with issues of dual citizenship within the grassroots communities.

- That a further study should be carried out to investigate economic and financial consequences, which result due to the constant deportation of SADC nationals, especially Angolans from Namibia. This implication is embedded in the assumption that the SADC countries spend a lot of money in deporting nationals from sister member states; for example, one person may be deported several times a year by one state.
- That further research is required to investigate the imbalanced influence during the ratification of the SADC protocols. The implication of concern here is that no difficulty is experienced when the protocol is of immense benefit to the countries with strong economies such as South Africa, Namibia and Botswana as was the case with the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the region.

7.5 FINAL NOTES

This study was carried out in a twenty-kilometre radius around the Oshikango border town between Namibia and Angola. The study investigated issues of the SADC Regional Integration within the grassroots communities using the cross-border mobility of people and goods as benchmark. The study was prompted by the implementation puzzle of the SADC Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the Region envisaged in pursuit of the SADC ideal of “the free movement of persons in the Region”.

This study investigated the possibility of attaining this objective at this stage, as the Region faces other challenges such as economic asymmetry and political unrest. In retrospect, the investigation traced the problem to the stage of border demarcation in Africa in general and the SADC Region in particular. The consequent unfortunate result was that some countries were made too big or too small or were naturally endowed with insufficient deposits of natural resources. This is, therefore, the challenge that today is reflected in migration to economically well-off countries.

With the advent of globalisation and the regional integration era, the SADC member states have made efforts to confront the challenge, but it is apparent that this has been to no avail because of other factors such as traditions, cultures and lack of understanding at the grassroots community level. Although the study also investigated various theories of

regional integration, it established that the SADC does not have one explicit model of integration and its focus is state-centric.

From empirical results, it is clear that there is a wide gap between what the SADC is busy doing regarding integration and what the grassroots communities think about the current world. The study concluded with recommendations to improve the status quo and provides scope for further studies on various issues, which it fails to explicitly articulate.

APPENDIX A: PASTORALIST TRADITIONAL PEACE-TREATIES**Compiled by****Professor Dani W. Nabudere (interviews 2005)**

During the period of drought that persisted in the eastern African region of Uganda and Western Kenya, a number of pastoralist communities in Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan could only survive by criss-crossing the “national borders.” Over 4,000 armed Turkana crossed over from Kenya and occupied parts of the Kidepo national park in Uganda to graze their cattle because of the drought in Kenya. This resulted in clashes with the local Dodoth community and the Uganda government responded by ordering the Turkana to return to Kenya. This did not happen. At the same time, over 2,000 hungry Ugandan Karamojong crossed over to Kenya in search of food, as reported by the government’s own *New Vision* newspaper. It was reported that the Kenyan authorities also tried to repatriate them back to Uganda where there was no food to feed them.

Over the Sudan border with Uganda, it was also reported that large numbers of the Toposa had fled from Sudan into Uganda in search of food and pasture for their cattle. They also went for the Kidepo national park where they converged with the Turkana of Kenya. None of these governments was in a position either to assist their communities or deal with this crisis and conflict. A further influx of the Turkana into the area raised tension with the local communities who wanted the same grazing grounds for their cattle. The Dodoth community of Uganda asked the government and the national park authorities to supply them with ammunition so they could repel the invaders. This was not forthcoming because at the time, the Ugandan army had clashed with the same and other communities in Karamoja and was now organising their disarmament.

In these circumstances, the local communities found that in the absence of their governments being of any assistance to them, their only recourse was peace. They found that the best way for all the communities to survive was through reaching an amicable resource-sharing arrangement. They therefore set up negotiating teams to settle the matter. In June 2000, the communities in conflict - the Dodoth, Turkana and the Toposa - agreed to sign a peace and resource-sharing treaty that gave grazing rights to the Turkana and the Toposa in Kidepo national park. The Uganda government's *New Vision* newspaper of September 5 reported that the treaty had ended twenty years of conflict and hostility between the Turkana and three Ugandan pastoralist communities of Dodoth, the Jie, and the Matheniko.

There was a "40-man delegation" from the Kenya government, which included Members of Parliament, ministers and civil servants with an equally large number from the Uganda government side who witnessed the signing of the treaty, which was initiated by the elders or kraal leaders of Karamoja. There was a communiqué issued by the two sides that condemned the inter-clan alliances, which were organised with a view to raid other clans. The communiqué also called for the re-opening of communication links as well as police posts to reduce cattle raids across the border. But clearly, the states were not in a position to do so for these had collapsed over time. But the signing of the treaty had shown how local ethnic communities could take over the roles of collapsing state institutions to set up their own institutions of conflict resolution and peace keeping in the whole region across "national borders."

APPENDIX B: PERMANENT RESIDENCE POLICIES IN SADC

SADC Country	Factors considered in decision	Procedures	Other procedures
Botswana	Sufficient qualifications, education, experience etc. to render applicant efficient or, if not, in a position to support himself	Immigrant Selection Boards, Regional Boards	Ministerial Powers Permanent Residence permit to desirable person, Ministerial exemption to a class of persons; Ministerial discretion to grant PR after ten years of lawful presence
DRC	Sufficient personal means; compatibility with security and public morality		
Lesotho	Effect on social and economic interest of residents in area where alien is to sojourn; Specific employment sectors approved by Minister	External application; Minister	
Malawi	Desirable immigrants	Minister, internal application	Ministerial exemption
Mauritius	Specific employer limitation; External application; Limit of three years for skilled workers, Issued to fit work permit in terms of Employment (Non-Citizens) Restriction Act		
Mozambique	10 years of temporary status yields PR	Automatic	
Namibia	Good character; sufficient means or skills; Will assimilate within a reasonable time after entry and be desirable inhabitant; Insufficient number of domestic workers	Immigration Selection Board	
Seychelles	Not a prohibited immigrant intends to remain in Seychelles for a period in excess of 3 months has family or domestic connection has made or will make in the promotion of the Minister some special contribution to the economic, social or cultural life of Seychelles	Minister	
South Africa	Five years of work permit plus offer of permanent employment at prevailing wage; Spouse of citizen or PR with good faith spousal relationship, Offer of permanent employment , advertised and no qualified domestic workers, prevailing wage and with quotas; Business PR with prescribed net worth of establishment: Investor's PR for prescribed fee; relative's PR, first step of kinship to citizen/residents	Automatic Automatic Application to Department; Same Same	
Swaziland	None		
Zambia	Professional qualification or financial resources; Insufficient number of domestic workers; Benefit to inhabitants generally		
Zimbabwe	Spouse or relative of citizen or PR; Substantial financial means; Temporary employment permit for five years	Application to Chief Immigration Officer	

Source: Klaaren and Runtinwa (2004:138)

APPENDIX C. DUAL CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN SADC

SADC Country	Provision on dual citizenship	Tolerance	Policy Basis	Other procedures
Botswana	Yes	Yes		Loss of citizenship unless renunciation by age of majority
DRC	Yes	No	Prohibition on dual citizenship	
Lesotho	Yes	Yes		Loss of citizenship unless renunciation at age of majority; duty of renunciation for citizens by naturalisation and registration; liability to deprivation for exercise of rights of citizenship
Malawi	Yes	No	Dual citizens with knowledge liable to deprivation; loss of citizenship unless renunciation by age of majority; loss of citizenship upon acquisition (one year election period for marriage and involuntary acquisition)	
Mauritius	Yes	Yes		Liability to deprivation for citizens by registration and naturalisation if exercise of other citizenship rights; Minister may withhold registration of renunciation
Mozambique	Yes	No	Loss of citizenship upon acquisition	
Namibia	Yes	No	Loss of citizenship upon acquisition; prohibition on dual citizenship	
Seychelles	Yes (Art 13 (2) of the Constitution of Seychelles 1993)	Yes	Person shall make a declaration to the citizenship officer	
South Africa	Yes	Yes		Liability to deprivation upon voluntary acquisition other than marriage; liability to deprivation upon conviction, liability to deprivation upon exercise of citizenship rights
Swaziland	None	De facto		
Tanzania	Yes	Yes		Liability to deprivation upon exercise of citizenship rights
Zambia	Yes	Yes		Loss of citizenship upon voluntary; acquisition (not including marriage) or exercise of citizenship at full age; loss of citizenship for naturalised citizens upon involuntary acquisition
Zimbabwe	yes	No	Prohibition of full age dual citizenship	

Source: Klaaren and Runtinwa (2004:138)

APPENDIX D: EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT POLICIES IN SADC

SADC Country	Employment Permit Factors	Investment Permits
Botswana	Effect on domestic employment; Employment training, arrangements;	
DRC		5 years non-renewable, new business establishment
Lesotho	Effect on social and economic interests of residents in areas where aliens is to sojourn; Specific employment sectors approved by Minister	
Malawi	Limitation to geographical area; limitation to specific occupation, limitation to specific employer, Policy on Employment Permit Guide: Factors are qualifications as compared with advert, experience of posts in organisation, availability of local expertise, period of stay of expatriate if renewed, local advert process and remuneration package.	Payment of prescribed fee; Policy on Employment of Expatriates: Limitation of five key posts for USD100,000; one factor is shortage of domestic qualified workers;
Mauritius	Specific employer limitation; external application; Limit of three years for skilled workers;	5000 USD invested and two years residence for citizenship, Permanent Resident upon 5000,000 investment in qualified business through bank
Mozambique	Laws 25/99 and Laws 26/99	Same
Namibia	Sufficient qualifications; Insufficient number of domestic workers; Application to Immigration Selection Board	
Seychelles		
South Africa	Quota work permit: category as prescribed, quota available; General work permit: diligent search for domestic workers, prevailing wage, notification on change of position, intra-company transfer work permits: financial guarantees of deportation costs, certified need for foreigner, specific employer limitation	
Swaziland	Specific employer limitation with exceptions for sectors including trade, business, and professions; Specification of steps to engage domestic workers; Requirement for effective training programmes	Class I: foreign income of prescribed amount
Tanzania	Specific employer limitation: USD 500; Specific sectors including trade, business, and professions: USD 1500 (large capital investors), USD 500 (small capital; Or USD 50 (peasants)	Large capital investors: USD 1500 fee
Zambia	Professional qualification or resources; Insufficient number of domestic workers; Benefit to inhabitants generally	Sufficient financial resources to maintain self; Presence of benefit to inhabitants generally
Zimbabwe	Specific employer and employment limitation	Possess substantial financial means and is prepared to invest substantially in Zimbabwe without engaging in any occupation

Source: Klaaren and Runtinwa (2004:135)

APPENDIX E: SPSS-RAW MATERIALS CROSSTABS: CROSS-BORDER MIGRANT RESPONDENTS

Sex * How old are you? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
How old are you?	20 - 35	14	42.4%	5	71.4%	19	47.5%
	36 - 49	18	54.5%	2	28.6%	20	50.0%
	50+	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Total		33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * What level of formal education have you reached? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
What level of formal education have you reached?	None	3	9.1%	2	28.6%	5	12.5%
	Primary	16	48.5%	2	28.6%	18	45.0%
	Secondary (matric or A-level)	11	33.3%	3	42.9%	14	35.0%
	Tertiary (higher than secondary)	3	9.1%			3	7.5%
Total		33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * Dual citizenship - indicate names of countries Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Dual citizenship - indicate names of countries	Angolan only	23	69.7%	5	71.4%	28	70.0%
	Namibian and Angolan	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	Namibian only	8	24.2%	2	28.6%	10	25.0%
	Zimbabwean	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
Total		33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * Have you ever been a citizen of Angola? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Have you ever been a citizen of Angola?	Yes	17	60.7%	4	66.7%	21	61.8%
	No	11	39.3%	2	33.3%	13	38.2%
Total		28	100.0%	6	100.0%	34	100.0%

Sex * Are you aware of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Are you aware of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia?	Yes	13	40.6%	1	14.3%	14	35.9%
	No	19	59.4%	6	85.7%	25	64.1%
Total		32	100.0%	7	100.0%	39	100.0%

Sex * Do you have one of your relatives from Angola paying for what was known as "a tax card" as a migrant worker in Namibia? Crosstabulation

		Do you have one of your relatives from Angola paying for what was known as "a tax card" as a migrant worker in Namibia?		Total
		None		
Sex	Male	Count	27	27
		% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%
	Female	Count	6	6
		% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	33	33
		% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%

Sex * How often do you visit Namibia? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
How often do you visit Namibia?	Daily	8	32.0%	1	20.0%	9	30.0%
	Weekly	6	24.0%	2	40.0%	8	26.7%
	Monthly	6	24.0%	1	20.0%	7	23.3%
	Yearly	5	20.0%			5	16.7%
	N/A			1	20.0%	1	3.3%
Total		25	100.0%	5	100.0%	30	100.0%

x * With reference to your regular visit to Namibia, give reason(s) why you come to Namibia. Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
With reference to your regular visit to Namibia, give reason(s) why you come to Namibia.	Escorting goods across the border for those bought from Namibia	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	No response	8	24.2%	2	28.6%	10	25.0%
	To do business	7	21.2%			7	17.5%
	To do business, To do shopping	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To do business, To do shopping, For medical treatment	6	18.2%	1	14.3%	7	17.5%
	To do business, and To do shopping	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To do business, todo shopping			1	14.3%	1	2.5%
	To do business, and For medical treatment			1	14.3%	1	2.5%
	To do business, and To do shopping	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To do shopping	6	18.2%			6	15.0%
	To visit my immediate relatives, To attend school, to rear cattle	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To visit my immediate relatives, To my ther relatives, For medical treatment			1	14.3%	1	2.5%
	To visit my other relatives, To do business, To do shopping	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To visit my other relatives, To do business, To do shopping, To cultivate mahangu field			1	14.3%	1	2.5%
	Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * How often do you visit Angola? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
How often do you visit Angola?	Daily	5	55.6%			5	45.5%
	Weekly			1	50.0%	1	9.1%
	Monthly	3	33.3%			3	27.3%
	Yearly	1	11.1%	1	50.0%	2	18.2%
Total		9	100.0%	2	100.0%	11	100.0%

Sex * With reference to your regular visit to Angola, give reason(s) why you prefer visiting to Angola. Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
With reference to your regular visit to Angola, give reason(s) why you prefer visiting to Angola.	No response	24	72.7%	5	71.4%	29	72.5%
	To cultivate mahangu field	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To do business	3	9.1%			3	7.5%
	To do business, and	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To do shopping			1	14.3%	1	2.5%
	To visit my friends	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To visit my immediate relative	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To visit my other relatives	1	3.0%	1	14.3%	2	5.0%
	To visit my other relatives, and	1	3.0%			1	2.5%
	To do shopping						
	Total	33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * When you visit Angola or Namibia, which access do you usually use? Crosstabulation

			When you visit Angola or Namibia, which access do you usually use?	
			Oshikango border post	Total
Sex	Male	Count	33	33
		% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%
	Female	Count	7	7
		% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	40	40
		% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%

Sex * Which people do you regard as foreigners in Namibia? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female		Total	
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Which people do you regard as foreigners in Namibia?	All non-Namibians	6	60.0%	1	50.0%	7	58.3%
	All whites	2	20.0%	1	50.0%	3	25.0%
	All coloured	1	10.0%			1	8.3%
	All non-Oshiwambo speaking	1	10.0%			1	8.3%
Total		10	100.0%	2	100.0%	12	100.0%

Sex * Do you know what SADC is about? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female		Total	
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Do you know what SADC is about?	Yes	11	33.3%	2	28.6%	13	32.5%
	No	22	66.7%	5	71.4%	27	67.5%
Total		33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * How do you participate in regional integration process? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
How do you participate in regional integration process?	SADC is a strange term to me	7	21.2%	1	14.3%	8	20.0%
	I do not know how to take part in SADC projects	23	69.7%	4	57.1%	27	67.5%
	SADC is a state-centred project	2	6.1%	1	14.3%	3	7.5%
	I am not interested in SADC project	1	3.0%	1	14.3%	2	5.0%
Total		33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * Have you ever heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC region? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Have you ever heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC region?	Yes			2	28.6%	2	5.0%
	No	33	100.0%	5	71.4%	38	95.0%
Total		33	100.0%	7	100.0%	40	100.0%

Sex * Do you support Namibia to be integrated in SADC? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Do you support Namibia to be integrated in SADC?	Yes	8	40.0%	3	60.0%	11	44.0%
	I cannot say	12	60.0%	2	40.0%	14	56.0%
Total		20	100.0%	5	100.0%	25	100.0%

Choice * Language * Sex Crosstabulation

Sex				Language		Total
				Yes	No	
Male	Choice	Kwanyama	Count	15	18	33
			% within Choice	45.5%	54.5%	100.0%
	Portuguese	Count	29	4	33	
		% within Choice	87.9%	12.1%	100.0%	
	English	Count	10	23	33	
		% within Choice	30.3%	69.7%	100.0%	
	Afrikaans	Count	5	28	33	
		% within Choice	15.2%	84.8%	100.0%	
	French	Count	2	31	33	
		% within Choice	6.1%	93.9%	100.0%	
	Rukavango	Count	1	32	33	
		% within Choice	3.0%	97.0%	100.0%	
	Ndebele	Count	1	32	33	
		% within Choice	3.0%	97.0%	100.0%	
Female	Choice	Kwanyama	Count	3	4	7
			% within Choice	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
	Portuguese	Count	4	3	7	
		% within Choice	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%	
	English	Count	2	5	7	
		% within Choice	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%	
	Afrikaans	Count		7	7	
		% within Choice		100.0%	100.0%	
	French	Count		7	7	
		% within Choice		100.0%	100.0%	
	Rukavango	Count	1	6	7	
		% within Choice	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%	
	Ndebele	Count		7	7	
		% within Choice		100.0%	100.0%	

Person * On which side of the border were your parents, yourself and your spouse born? * Sex Crosstabulation

Sex				On which side of the border were your parents, yourself and your spouse born?			Total
				Namibia	Angola	Other country	
Male	Person	Self	Count	8	24	1	33
			% within Person	24.2%	72.7%	3.0%	100.0%
		Father	Count	6	26	1	33
			% within Person	18.2%	78.8%	3.0%	100.0%
	Mother	Count	8	23	1	32	
		% within Person	25.0%	71.9%	3.1%	100.0%	
	Wife/husband	Count	3	17	1	21	
		% within Person	14.3%	81.0%	4.8%	100.0%	
Female	Person	Self	Count	2	5		7
			% within Person	28.6%	71.4%		100.0%
		Father	Count	3	4		7
			% within Person	42.9%	57.1%		100.0%
	Mother	Count	3	3		6	
		% within Person	50.0%	50.0%		100.0%	
	Wife/husband	Count	1	2		3	
		% within Person	33.3%	66.7%		100.0%	

Choice * Travelling methods: * Sex Crosstabulation

Sex				Travelling methods:		Total
				Yes	No	
Male	Choice	On foot	Count	19	14	33
			% within Choice	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
	By road	Count	18	15	33	
		% within Choice	54.5%	45.5%	100.0%	
Female	Choice	On foot	Count	3	4	7
			% within Choice	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
	By road	Count	4	3	7	
		% within Choice	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%	

Response category * What are your feelings on the Namibia/Angola border? * Sex Crosstabulation

				What are your feelings on the Namibia/Angola border?		Total
				Yes	No	
Sex						
Male	Response category	Disturbing family	Count % within Response category		33 100.0%	33 100.0%
		Disturbing traditions and cultures	Count % within Response category	1 3.0%	32 97.0%	33 100.0%
		Good to keep foreigners away	Count % within Response category	15 45.5%	18 54.5%	33 100.0%
		Good to control migration	Count % within Response category	17 51.5%	16 48.5%	33 100.0%
		Neutral	Count % within Response category	2 6.1%	31 93.9%	33 100.0%
Female	Response category	Disturbing family	Count % within Response category		7 100.0%	7 100.0%
		Disturbing traditions and cultures	Count % within Response category		7 100.0%	7 100.0%
		Good to keep foreigners away	Count % within Response category	4 57.1%	3 42.9%	7 100.0%
		Good to control migration	Count % within Response category	4 57.1%	3 42.9%	7 100.0%
		Neutral	Count % within Response category	1 14.3%	6 85.7%	7 100.0%

APPENDIX F: SPSS-RAW MATERIALS CROSSTABS: HOUSEHOLD RESPONDENTS

Sex * How old are you? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
How old are you?	20 - 35	16	33.3%	20	33.3%	36	33.3%
	36 - 49	16	33.3%	20	33.3%	36	33.3%
	50+	16	33.3%	20	33.3%	36	33.3%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * What level of formal education have you reached? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
What level of formal education have you reached?	None	10	20.8%	16	26.7%	26	24.1%
	Primary	23	47.9%	15	25.0%	38	35.2%
	Secondary (matric or A-level)	11	22.9%	27	45.0%	38	35.2%
	Tertiary (higher than secondary)	2	4.2%	1	1.7%	3	2.8%
	Other	2	4.2%	1	1.7%	3	2.8%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * Language Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Language	Kwanyama	30	62.5%	40	66.7%	70	64.8%
	Kwanyama and Afrikaans	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Kwanyama and English	7	14.6%	10	16.7%	17	15.7%
	Kwanyama and Oshindonga			1	1.7%	1	.9%
	Kwanyama and Portuguese	3	6.3%	2	3.3%	5	4.6%
	Kwanyama, English and Afrikaans	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
	Kwanyama, English, Afrikaans and Otjherero			1	1.7%	1	.9%
	Kwanyama, Portuguese and Afrikaans	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Kwanyama, Portuguese and English	2	4.2%	3	5.0%	5	4.6%
	Kwanyama, Portuguese and Oshifanakalo			1	1.7%	1	.9%
	Kwanyama, Portuguese, English and Afrikaans	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
	Kwanyama, Portuguese, English, Afrikaans and Oumbudu	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Portuguese	1	2.1%			1	.9%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * Dual citizenship - indicate names of countries Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Dual citizenship - indicate names of countries	Angolan only	3	6.3%	1	1.7%	4	3.7%
	Namibian only	45	93.8%	59	98.3%	104	96.3%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * Have you ever been a citizen of Angola? Crosstabulation

	Sex				Total		
	Male		Female				
	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	
Have you ever been a citizen of Angola?	Yes	4	8.3%	3	5.0%	7	6.5%
	No	44	91.7%	57	95.0%	101	93.5%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * Are you aware of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia? Crosstabulation

	Sex				Total		
	Male		Female				
	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	
Are you aware of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia?	Yes	11	22.9%	12	20.0%	23	21.3%
	No	37	77.1%	48	80.0%	85	78.7%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * How often do you visit Namibia? Crosstabulation

	Sex				Total		
	Male		Female				
	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	
How often do you visit Namibia?	Weekly	1	50.0%			1	33.3%
	Monthly			1	100.0%	1	33.3%
	N/A	1	50.0%			1	33.3%
Total		2	100.0%	1	100.0%	3	100.0%

Sex * With reference to your regular visit to Namibia, give reason(s) why you come to Namibia. Crosstabulation

	Sex				Total		
	Male		Female				
	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	
With reference to your regular visit to Namibia, give reason(s) why you come to Namibia.	Medical Treatment	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	No response	46	95.8%	59	98.3%	105	97.2%
	To do business and shopping	1	2.1%	1	1.7%	2	1.9%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * How often do you visit Angola? Crosstabulation

	Sex				Total		
	Male		Female				
	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	
How often do you visit Angola?	Daily	3	6.5%	6	10.2%	9	8.6%
	Weekly	7	15.2%	17	28.8%	24	22.9%
	Monthly	10	21.7%	14	23.7%	24	22.9%
	Yearly	18	39.1%	12	20.3%	30	28.6%
	N/A	8	17.4%	10	16.9%	18	17.1%
Total		46	100.0%	59	100.0%	105	100.0%

Sex * When you visit Angola or Namibia, which access do you usually use? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
When you visit Angola or Namibia, which access do you usually use?	No response	6	12.5%	8	13.3%	14	13.0%
	Odibo	3	6.3%	1	1.7%	4	3.7%
	Okomuve						
	Wamukwana ngombe	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Omominghulo			3	5.0%	3	2.8%
	Onheleiwa	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Onheleiwa (Omanghwi)	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Oshikango border post	34	70.8%	46	76.7%	80	74.1%
	Pass through any place			1	1.7%	1	.9%
Through any gap	2	4.2%	1	1.7%	3	2.8%	
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%	

Sex * Travelling methods: Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Travelling methods:	On foot	21	48.8%	27	51.9%	48	50.5%
	By road	22	51.2%	25	48.1%	47	49.5%
Total		43	100.0%	52	100.0%	95	100.0%

Sex * Which people do you regard as foreigners in Namibia? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Which people do you regard as foreigners in Namibia?	All non-Namibians	29	61.7%	33	55.0%	62	57.9%
	All whites	2	4.3%	5	8.3%	7	6.5%
	All coloured			1	1.7%	1	.9%
	All non-Oshiwambo speaking	10	21.3%	6	10.0%	16	15.0%
	No comment	6	12.8%	15	25.0%	21	19.6%
Total	47	100.0%	60	100.0%	107	100.0%	

Sex * Do you know what SADC is about? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Do you know what SADC is about?	Yes	14	29.2%	7	11.7%	21	19.4%
	No	34	70.8%	53	88.3%	87	80.6%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * How do you participate in regional integration process? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
How do you participate in regional integration process?	SADC is a strange term to me	26	54.2%	40	66.7%	66	61.1%
	I do not know how to take part in SADC projects	12	25.0%	13	21.7%	25	23.1%
	SADC is a state-centred project	4	8.3%	3	5.0%	7	6.5%
	I influence SADC decisions in many ways	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	I am not interested in SADC project	1	2.1%			1	.9%
	Other	4	8.3%	4	6.7%	8	7.4%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * Have you ever heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC region? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Have you ever heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC region?	Yes	2	4.2%	2	3.3%	4	3.7%
	No	46	95.8%	58	96.7%	104	96.3%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Sex * Do you support Namibia to be integrated in SADC? Crosstabulation

		Sex				Total	
		Male		Female			
		Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex	Count	% within Sex
Do you support Namibia to be integrated in SADC?	Yes	15	31.3%	15	25.0%	30	27.8%
	No	11	22.9%	15	25.0%	26	24.1%
	I cannot say	22	45.8%	30	50.0%	52	48.1%
Total		48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

response category * What are your feelings on the Namibia/Angola border? * Sex Crosstabulation (Question 20)

Sex				What are your feelings on the Namibia/Angola border?		Total
				Yes	No	
Male	Response category	Disturbing family	Count % within Response category	9 18.8%	39 81.3%	48 100.0%
		Disturbing traditions and cultures	Count % within Response category	6 12.5%	42 87.5%	48 100.0%
		Good to keep foreigners away	Count % within Response category	12 25.0%	36 75.0%	48 100.0%
		Good to control migration	Count % within Response category	18 37.5%	30 62.5%	48 100.0%
		Neutral	Count % within Response category	8 16.7%	40 83.3%	48 100.0%
Female	Response category	Disturbing family	Count % within Response category	11 18.3%	49 81.7%	60 100.0%
		Disturbing traditions and cultures	Count % within Response category	3 5.0%	57 95.0%	60 100.0%
		Good to keep foreigners away	Count % within Response category	23 38.3%	37 61.7%	60 100.0%
		Good to control migration	Count % within Response category	10 16.7%	50 83.3%	60 100.0%
		Neutral	Count % within Response category	17 28.3%	43 71.7%	60 100.0%

Person * On which side of the border were your parents, yourself and your spouse born? * S
Crosstabulation (Question 6)

Sex				On which side of the border were your parents, yourself and your spouse born?		Total
				Yes	No	
Male	Person	Self	Count	44	4	48
			% within Person	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
		Father	Count	39	8	47
			% within Person	83.0%	17.0%	100.0%
		Mother	Count	39	8	47
			% within Person	83.0%	17.0%	100.0%
		Wife/husband	Count	17	2	19
			% within Person	89.5%	10.5%	100.0%
Female	Person	Self	Count	57	3	60
			% within Person	95.0%	5.0%	100.0%
		Father	Count	52	6	58
			% within Person	89.7%	10.3%	100.0%
		Mother	Count	52	6	58
			% within Person	89.7%	10.3%	100.0%
		Wife/husband	Count	26	2	28
			% within Person	92.9%	7.1%	100.0%

Relative * Do you have one of your relatives from Angola paying for what was known as "a tax card" as a migrant worker in Namibia? * Sex Crosstabulation (Question 12)

				Do you have one of your relatives from Angola paying for what was known as "a tax card" as a migrant worker in Namibia?	
Sex				1	Total
Male	Relative	None	Count	46	46
			% within Relative	100.0%	100.0%
	Brother(s)	None	Count	1	1
			% within Relative	100.0%	100.0%
	Uncle(s)	None	Count	1	1
			% within Relative	100.0%	100.0%
Female	Relative	None	Count	58	58
			% within Relative	100.0%	100.0%
	Father	None	Count	1	1
			% within Relative	100.0%	100.0%
	Uncle(s)	None	Count	1	1
			% within Relative	100.0%	100.0%

APPENDIX G: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE: HOUSEHOLDS AND CROSS-BORDER MIGRANTS

Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): A Case Study of Namibia's Cross Border Migration Issues in Oshikango a research questionnaire

Date: _____

Please note that the following contact information for the respondent is optional.

Name of respondent: _____

Contact information: _____

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Sex

A.	Male	
b.	Female	

2. How old are you? (ou na eedula difike peni?)

a.	20-35	
b.	36-49	
c.	50+	

3. What level of formal education have you reached? (Owa hulila mongapi mofikola?)

a.	None	
b.	Primary	
c.	Secondary (matric or A-levels)	
d.	Tertiary (higher than secondary)	
e.	Other	

4. Language (elaka eli hopopi).

a.	Kwanyama	
b.	Portuguese	
c.	English	
d.	Afrikaans	
e.	Other (specify)	

Location (Oshilongo sheni oshini?)

5. Dual citizenship - indicate names of countries (Ngele ou na oukwashilyo woilongo ivali oyini?)

a.	Country	a) b)
b.	Site (VILLAGE)	

11. Did you do migrant work? If yes explain by including the place or country, year and type of work. Owa longele kondalate ile kombishi? Yelifa kutya openi nounake noilonga ei kwali hplongo. Ile yelifa kutya omolwashike inookalonga kokule neumbo.

.....

12. Do you have one of your relatives from Angola paying for what was known as “a tax card” (*Okakalata kefendelo*) as migrant worker in Namibia? (Oukwete umwe omaakwanedimo loye a li koAngola ndele ohafendele koNamibia?)

		Number
a.	None	
b.	Father	
c.	Brother(s)	
d.	Uncle (s) (tatekulu)	
e.	Nephew (s) (omutekulumati)	
f.	Other (Umwe inatumbulwa pombanda) Oshike shoye.	

13. Did women also have tax cards? If no explain why. (Ovakainhu navo ova li ngoo hava fedele, yelifa?)

.....

SECTION B: Reasons for regular cross border (Omatomhelo okutauluka eengaba)

14. How often do you visit Namibia? (Ngeenge kushi omuNamibia, ohou ya kutalelapo moNamibia ouna pwapita elala li fike peni?)

NB: This question is specifically meant for non-Nambians e.g. Angolan Nationals. Epulo eli ola nuninwa okunyamukulwa kovatalelipo valya koilongo yimwe ngaashi koAngola.

	Gender	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Yearly
A	Male				
B	Female				

15. With reference to your regular visit to Namibia, give reason (s) why you come to Namibia (Okuya koye koNamibia, unene etomhelo olini?)

a.	To visit my immediate family (mother, father, brother, sister) (okutalelapo ovakwapata vange)	
b.	To visit my other relatives (ant, uncle, grandmother, grand father, nephew, niece (Okutalelapo ovapambebe vange)	
c.	To do business (Okushingifa)	
d.	To do shopping (Okulanda oinima yange)	
e.	To cultivate mahangu field (Okulonga mepya lange loilya)	
f.	To attend school (Ohandi ya kofikola)	
g.	To rear heads of cattle (Ohandiya okulifa oimuna)	
h.	Medical treatment (Ohandiya koshipangelo)	
j.	Traditional treatment (Ohandiya kukonga ouhaku woshilaule)	
k.	Other reason. (etomelo limwe)	

16. How often do you visit Angola? (Oha katalela po koAngola konima yelalafimbo lifike peni?)

NB. This question is meant for Namibians who visit Angola. Epulo eli ota li myamukulwa kovatalelipo vaNamibia koAngola.

	Gender	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Yearly
a.	Male				
b.	Female				

17. With reference to your regular visit to Angola, give reason (s) why you prefer visiting to Angola. (Etomhelo lokuya koAngola olini?)

a.	To visit my immediate family (mother, father, brother, sister) (oku katalelapo ovakwapata vange)	
b.	To visit my other relatives (ant, uncle, grandmother, grand father, nephew, niece) (Okuka talelapo ovashivikile vange)	
c.	To do business (Okukashingifa)	
d.	To do shopping (Ohai ka landa oinima yange)	
e.	To cultivate mahangu field (Ohai ka lima mepya lange loilya)	
f.	To attend school (Ohandi yi kofikola)	
g.	To rear cattle (Ohai ka lifa oimuna)	
h.	Medical Treatment (Ohandi yi koshipangelo)	
j.	Traditional treatment (Ohandi yi kouhaku woshilaule)	
k.	Other reason. (etomelo limwe).....	

SECTION C: Access into Angola/Namibia (Omito okuya koAngola ile moNamibia)

18. When you visit Angola or Namibia which access do you usually use? (Ngenge toyi ile toya u talele po koAngola ile moNamibia oho pitile peni?)

a.	Oshikango border post (oposhikango)	
b.	Other places (specify) (Peenhele dimwe ditonga)	

19. Traveling methods (Omushingo wolweendo)

a.	Foot (olupadi)	
b.	Air (mondila)	
c.	Road (motuwa)	

SECTION D: Attitudes towards borders and foreigners

i. Attitudes towards artificial borders (Omaliundo kombinga yeengamba)

20. What are your feelings on the Namibia/Angola border? (Oshike wa mona shiyi ile shiwa kombinga yeengamba odo dovakolonyeki ndaAngola naNamibai?)

a.	Disturbing family (Ondapiyaaneka omapata)	
b.	Disturbing traditions and culture (Ondapoiyaaneka omifyululwakalo)	
c.	Good to keep foreigners away (ondiwa oku kondolola ovandyayindyayi)	
d.	Good to control migration (Ondiwa okukondolola etauluko leengamba)	
e.	Neutral (Ngina eshi hai kufa po)	

ii. Attitudes towards foreigners (Omaliundo oye kovanailongo)

21. Which people do you regard as foreigners in Namibia? (ovanhu veni wa tala onga ovanailongo?)
(**Namibians only**)

a.	All non-Namibians (Keshe tuu ou eheshi omuNamibia)	
b.	All whites (Oilumbu)	
c.	All coloured (Oohondembali)	
d.	All non-Oshiwambo speaking (keshe tuu ou ihaapopi Oshiwambo)	
e.	No comment (Nghina po sha)	

SECTION E: SADC Integration (Etulomumwe loilongo yokoumbuwantu waAfrica)

Attitude towards SADC integration (Omaliundo kombinga yetulomumwe eli)

22. Do you know what SADC is about? (Ou shiiko shike kombinga yaSADC?)

a.	Yes	
b.	No	

Explain (yelifa)

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SECTION F: Participation (Ekufombinga)

23. How do you participate in regional integration process? (Oho kufa ombinga ngahelipo meeograma edi doku tula mumwe oilongo yoSADC?)

a.	SADC is a strange term to me	
b.	I do not know how to take part in SADC projects (Kandi shi nhumbi dina ku kufa ombinga)	
c.	SADC is a state-centred project (SADC oinima yomapangelo)	
d.	I take part in SADC conferences (Omo ha di kala momitumba doSADC)	
e.	I influence SADC decisions in many ways (Ohadi kufa ombinga mokukufa omatokolo moSADC)	
f.	I am not interested in SADC project (Ina ndi itula mo)	
g.	Other (shimwe po)	

SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons (Eudafano loilongo yoSADC loku pitika ovanu vapashuwone vamanguluka moilongo omu)

24. Have you ever heard of the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC region? (Eudafano eli laSADC ou li shi?)

	Yes	
	No	

If yes do you know what this protocol is about?

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.....

25. Do you support Namibia to be integrated in SADC? (Owa hala Namibia aye moSADC?)

	Yes	
	No	
	I cannot say	

Explain more.

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SECTION G: Life Stories (Selected Five Migrant Labourers 50 years and above)

26. Narrate your migration experience as a migrant labourer in other countries (old people who worked either to South Africa or to Angola). Use separate page. (Hokolola eshiivo loye eshi waka longele kojoini nenge kombishi)

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27. Explain migration experience of communal farmers between Namibia and Angola. (Hokolola eshi mwa li hamu yi keehambo Kominga yinya yaAngola nenge tu moNamibia)

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.....

28. Do you know any female from your area who worked in Angola or to the south as a migrant worker? If yes explain the type of work that she did and if no explain why. (Ou shi vamwe vomovakaintu vakalongele kondalate nenge kombishi?)

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29. How do you understand the role of the newly reestablished Kwanyama kingship within the Kwanyama Diaspora across Namibia/Angola border? (Uuhamba wauKwanyama ou upe sho wa tala otau longo ngahelipi keembinga andishe ndeengamba?)

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APPENDIX H: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE: KEY INFORMANTS

Date: _____

Please note that the following contact information for the respondent is optional.

Name of respondent: _____

Positions/Occupation _____

Contact information: _____

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Sex

A	Male	
B	Female	

Section B: Migration

(Police and Migration officers)

2. What common migration issues you deal with on the daily basis?

a.	Illegal migration	
b.	Asylum	
c.	Expired documents	
d.	Other (specify)	

3. What common reasons that immigrants grants give?

a.	Visiting families (mother, father, sisters, sons, daughters etc.	
b.	Visiting relatives (ant, uncle, grandmother/father etc).	
c.	Shopping	
d.	Business	
e.	Emigration	
f.	School	
g.	Pasturing	
h.	Till Mahangu field	
i.	Attend church services	
j.	Other (specify)	

4. Have you ever dealt with cases of dual citizenships in this region?
 Yes/No. If yes provide statistics when available.

.....

5. By estimate, how often do some people cross borders to or from Angola?

.....

6. Do women or men cross the borders most frequently?

.....

7. What are their regular indicated destinations?

a.	In the area	
b.	Ondangwa and Oshakati	
c.	Further South (give example of the place town, city etc.)	

(Schools Principals)

8. In case of schools, how many Angolan children cross the border everyday to attend school at your school (name of the school.....)

	Male	Female
Grade 1		
Grade 2		
Grade 3		
Grade 4		
Grade 5		
Grade 6		
Grade 7		
Other grades		

9. Do the Angolan children require study permit?

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Hospital/clinic

10. Do you treat patients from Angola? Explain with statistics.

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Private institutions

11. Does your office/organisation render service on the other side of the border? If yes explain.

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12. Does your office/organisation employ migrant labourers? Explain by give statistics on gender and nationality and the type of work they do.

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Section C: Regional Integration (all institutions)

13. Which SADC Protocols commonly implemented by your office? Are any?

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14. What factors deter them from being effective?

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Section C: SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons

15. Are you aware of the Draft Protocol for the Facilitation of Movement of People across borders in the SADC region?

Yes	
No	

Explain (separate page)

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16. How does your office/organisation support the Protocol?

a.	The Protocol is not known in this office	
b.	The Protocol is dealt with by the central government	
c.	The idea of the Protocol is disseminated to community level	
d.	Other reason	

Further explanation.

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17. Is SADC integration likely to succeed without a Protocol for the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons? Please explain your reason in a few words.

9. Do you think federalism is the ideal system for SADC regional integration?

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
APPENDIX I: RESEARCH SCHEDULE SADC EMBASSIES/HIGHER COMMISSIONS IN WINDHOEK

1. Would you please explain more about the migration policy of your country in terms of SADC citizens?
2. Does your country support free movements of people among SADC countries?
3. Is your country satisfied with the current migration policy of other countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Angola?
4. Has your country ever experienced any deportation of migrants some years ago?
5. If yes, of which are nationalities were deportees? (*Statistical data required*).
6. Did you experience a situation when some people were deported more than twice from your country? *Statistics required*.
7. Cases of illegal migrants handled in your country and reasons (statistics required)
8. Number of refugees recorded in your country in ten years period. (*Statistics required*).
9. Do you have any suggestions on how xenophobia should be overcome in the SADC region?
10. How does your country deal with the family and tribe Diaspora of transnational communities, which is one of the stimuli of cross-border migration?
11. How many border posts that your country have?
12. Do members of the transnational Diasporas use these posts?
13. Do you think traditional, cultural and tribal Diasporas would pose threat to regional integration?
14. Do you think that the lay people at the grassroots level of the community really understand the concept of regionalism and artificial borders in SADC region?
15. What other problems pertaining to cross-border migration which you think can pose threat to regional integration initiatives in the SADC region.


**APPENDIX J: RESEARCH SCHEDULE SADC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM
IN WINDHOEK**

1. What are the major functions of the SADC Parliamentary Forum?
2. How this differs from those of the regional integrations such EU or ECOWAS?
3. Would you please explain more about the migration policy of SADC and how it influences the regional integration?
4. What is the position of SADC countries with regard to migration policy at the supranational level?
5. From your own opinion, do you believe that SADC regional integration will succeed without the Protocol of the Facilitation/Free Movement of Persons?
6. What other SADC arrangements in place geared to sustain the protocol happen?
7. How do you explain SADC's role among the communities at the grassroots level?
8. SADC regional integration is taking place in a complexity of many challenges including traditions and cultures as well as trans-border communities. Do you think if this is not addressed in the Protocol will influence the SADC regional integration?
9. What should be done for the people who have families on both sides of the borders to facilitate their movements in the region?


APPENDIX K: NAMIBIA MAP IN REGIONS



APPENDIX L: MAP OF THE BORDER REGION OF OHANGWENA



APPENDIX M: MAP OF THE SADC REGION



Source: Researcher 2006

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