Protecting depositors and promoting financial stability in South Africa
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Date
2003
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Abstract
Bank failures are a worldwide phenomenon and South Africa is no exception as evidenced by historical and recent bank failures in South Africa. This thesis investigates the desirability of introducing an explicit deposit insurance scheme in South Africa as a means of protecting small, unsophisticated depositors who are almost always the losers when banks fail, and promoting financial stability. The study finds that bank failures in South Africa are mainly attributable to mismanagement of banks, liquidity problems and fraud. Bank failures as a result of the aforementioned reasons have led to depositors losing their deposits in South Africa. The absence of a clearly defined depositor protection scheme in South Africa, the inadequacy of the hitherto implicit guarantee system to protect depositors, and the poor record of the South African Reserve Bank in bank failure resolution, form the basis of the conclusion of the study, i. e., there is a case for the introduction of deposit insurance in South Africa. In order to assist South African policymakers in designing an effective deposit insurance scheme for the country, the thesis further provides a guide on how the most important design features of deposit insurance should be handled. This is in an attempt to ensure that the moral hazard problem inherent in deposit insurance is overcome
Description
Includes bibliographical references
Keywords
Financial markets, Insurance